of systems, boundaries, and territoriality

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Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the StateSystemAuthor(s): Friedrich KratochwilSource: World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Oct., 1986), pp. 27-52Published by: Cambridge University Press

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OF SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES, ANDTERRITORIALITY:An Inquiry nto heFormationoftheState ystemByFRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL*

I. INTRODUCTION

CHANGES in thefunctionfboundarieshroughoutistoryelptoilluminate differencesn the natureand patterns f interactions fdifferent omestic nd internationalystems. uch a clarification as be-come important ortheanalysisof nternational elations t a time whentheworld system ppears to be characterizedbytwo conflictingrends.On theone hand, we observethevirtually niversalrecognition f terri-torial overeigntys theorganizingprinciple f nternational olitics.Onthe other hand, because of the growthof transnational elations andinterdependencies,here s a tendency oward erosionof theexclusivityassociated with the traditionalnotionof territoriality.his disjunctionbetween theorganizingprinciples nd socialreality reatesdilemmas forconflictmanagement.An investigationf thesetensions nd of thevary-ing patternsn whichtheymanifest hemselvesn differentnternationalsystemss therefore f historical s well as analyticalnterest.In this rticle, intendtolaythegroundworkfor ucha historical ndcomparative nalysis f nternational ystems. n examination fshifts nthe functionsof boundaries is particularlyhelpfulfor a betterunder-standingof theoriginsand evolutionof thepresent erritorial tate sys-tem. Without intendingto bringback the old controversyf whethersuchchanges can be taken as indicators feither hedemise or the revivalof the territorialtate,' maintainthatterritoriality,ikeproperty,s not* The research orthis rticlewas furtheredya grantfrom arl Osbornto the nstituteof War and Peace Studies,Columbia University,nd by seed moneyfrom he MacArthurFoundation. also owe a debt of gratitude o Simone Chambers nd Deborah Welch Larsonwho made helpful uggestions.William T. R. Fox, JohnRuggie,Nicholas Onuf, and JackSnyderread earlierversions nd were kindenoughtocomment.See, forexample,the debate n the ate sixties ocusing n the probableconsequencesofvarious ntegrationffortsn Europe and Latin America.For a critical ppraisal, ee StanleyHoffmann, Obstinateor Obsolete, The Fate of the NationState and theCase of WesternEurope," in JosephNye, ed., nternational egionalismBoston:Little,Brown, 968), I77-230.

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28 WORLD POLITICSa simple concept,but comprises variety f social arrangementshathaveto be examined in greaterdetail. For that purpose, firstnvestigate hefunction f boundaries in nonterritorialnd territorial ocial organiza-tionsand givereasons for hetransition rom ne form f organizing so-cietiestotheother.Second,withinthe class of territorial rders, distin-guish between empires and the conceptof territorialityn a state system.Finally, I will examine changes in the relationships nd exchangesbe-tween international ystems nd their environment y contrasting hefunction f boundaries in territoriallyased orders withthose based onfunctional egimes.For purposesofanalysis, shall focuson three ypes fexchanges thatare mediated byboundaries.On the most basic evel there sthe exchangebetween the unit and its environment. The concept of environmentserves as a residual category n that t comprises ll the relevantfactorsthathavenot been subsumed under the conceptof unit.)Significant hiftsin the function f boundariesoccur with the differentiationf the envi-ronment.A second typeofexchange is that between the unit and otherunits inter-unit xchange).The nature nd scope of nter-unit xchangesis decisively nfluenced y theactor who maintains he boundariesof theunit. Consequently, here s a third ypeof exchange-that between thecenter fa unitand itsperiphery. y tracing henatureofthese xchangesand by analyzingthe various nteraction ffectsmong them,we can ap-praise therole ofboundaries ndifferentocialsystems-domesticas wellas international.SectionII deals with territorialnd nonterritorialocial organizationsand the function fboundaries in each. Within the territorialategory,thosesystems hat are based on themutual recognition frights nd ac-knowledged common practices re distinguished rom imperial" orders.The importanceof theseconceptualdistinctionss shown bytwo briefcase studies.The first xamines Mongol society,which allows us to tracethechanges nthefunction fboundarieswhen societiesmove from no-madic (nonterritorial)o a sedentary territorial) orm of social organi-zation. The second case study s a comparative xaminationofimperialboundaries, xemplified ythe relations ftheChinese,Roman,and Brit-ish Empires with outsiders who were never accorded equal status. Bycontrastinghepatterns f nteraction n imperialordersand in the statesystem,we can show thatthefunction f boundaries s significantlyif-ferent.In SectionIII, theconceptualdistinctions eveloped thus farare usedto discuss techniquesof conflictmanagement n the statesystem.Twostrategiesre examined nparticular.One is themovement fthe ocation



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SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES & TERRITORIALITY 29of theboundary;heother oncerns hemanipulationf the unctionfboundarieshrough ntyinghebundle frightsonventionallyssoci-atedwith ull erritorialovereignty.he firsttrategyrtechnique ascharacteristicfterritorialdjustmentsuring he classical alance-of-powerperiod; heuntyingfsovereign ightshroughmposed eutral-ization, he reation f suzerainties,uffertates,pheres f nfluencerpreponderance,nd so forth, as used primarilyyEuropean owers norder o manage ompetitionnthe olonialworld.In Section V, I investigatehe reation f pheresf pecial esponsi-bilityn the ontemporaryystem.argue hat he mpossibilityfreviv-ing pheresf nfluencendermodern onditions as one ofthe ontrib-uting auses fthe old war, ndthat hefailure oagree n themeaningof pheresf bstentioned tothedemise fdetente.naddition,discusstransborderesource rrangementsnd functionalegimesnd theirm-plicationsor theory f nternationalelations.Finally,n SectionV, I drawsomepreliminaryonclusionss to thepower ndparsimonyeeded n a systemspproach o nternationale-lations.

II. TERRITORIALITY AND THE SOCIAL FORMATION OF STATESIn contemporaryocialscience, roups re often lassifiedither scommunitiesased on kinship r as communitiesuiltupontherecog-nition fmutual ightsubject oa commonaw within given erritory.This distinctionetween ribal nd territorialommunities aybe em-piricallyndconceptuallyifficultomake,however.2fter ll, venno-madsdonotwander imlessly ithout ixed erritory.The primitiveomad whodependsfor urvival n whathe can find ..mustknowtheterritorynwhichheroams: ocales f waterholes,wherecertain lants row, hehabits fgame, tc.... Thus,each nomadic andestablishes ights vertheterritoryithinwhich t migrates lthoughtsmembersmayvisit andsofother erritories.3In suchnomadic ommunities,he right omove prevails ver therightocamp, nd "ownershipmeans n effecthe itle o a cycle fmi-

gration."4attimoretudied he mplicationsfthese ormsf llocating2On kinship r"primitive" ocieties ee,e.g.,HenrySumnerMaine,Ancientaw (London:JohnMurray, 866); Lewis HenryMorgan,Ancient ociety,rResearchesntheLinesofHu-manProgressfromavageryhrough arbarismo CivilizationNew York: Holt, i877). For acritiqueofthisdichotomy, eeRobertLowie,PrimitiveocietyLondon: Routledge& KeganPaul, I949).3 T. S. Murty, rontiers, Changing onceptNew Delhi: Palit& Palit, 978), 50.4See, e.g.,theextensive iscussion f"nomadism" n Owen Lattimore,nnerAsianFron-tiers fChina Boston:BeaconPress, 95 ), chap.4; quote at66.



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30 WORLD POLITICSterritorial ights f use for the social formation f the Mongols.5He fol-lowed the change of territorial se fromcommon, tribally wned landadministeredby a prince to the establishment f fixedprivateownershipthrough the introduction f the monastic rule of Lamaism. The socialconsequences were startling. he originalMongol tribeswere never taticbecause disputes over the right f movement ed to the splitting nd co-alescence of small clan-like groups. This allowed an exceptional eaderlikeGenghisKhan togather nto his tribe hosewho,in searchofprotec-tion, had fled fromtheir busive or ineffectiveverlords.Fundamentalchanges in thebalance of power could be effected hrough uch a gath-ering of followersby a leader.The allocation of fixed property, n the other hand, prevented theprocessof agglomeration nd led to theparcelingand repartitioningftribalterritory.he emphasis on fixedproperty irst ntroducedbyLa-maist monasteries ed to furthermportant nternal s well as externalchanges.The former ribal ustoms mphasized mobilitynd forbade hediggingof wells and intensive griculturen order toadjust theMongolwayof ifetothestepperather han to themarginal reas that ould havesustained a mixed formofeconomy.Exclusive property itles,however,led to the ascendancyof wealth over mobility nd drew the Mongolscloser to China throughtrade. This developmentbroughtthem underthe influenceof the Manchus, whose vassals virtually ll of them be-came-especially when the Chinese interveneduccessfullyn church f-fairs nd divided northern romwesternMongols.Most Westerntravelersnthe 9thcentury ommented n thepeacefulcharacterof the once warlikeMongol people; Chinese officialwritingsand Western observers ttributed his developmentto the teachingsofLamaism. Matterswere morecomplicated,however: someof the blood-iestwars betweennorthernnd westernMongolshad been convenientlyneglected n these accounts.6 amaism had notonlydivided theMongolsand broken theirabilityto invade the Chinese Empire, but the settle-mentsfollowing he ntroductionffixedproperty ad also abolished themobility hat had been one of thestrategic ssets forraidingthe border.The developmentofterritorialityn thenew sense made a more fixedre-lationshipwithChina necessary.Unable to unite and maintainan inde-pendentbasis of power, theMongols became suzerains of theManchuemperors.Similar arrangements ould be found all along the Chinese

5Owen Lattimore,TheMongols fManchuriaNew York:JohnDay, I934).6 For a further iscussion fLamaismand its mpact nMongolaffairs,ee Lattimore fn.4), 86-97.For an accountof thewars amongthe northernnd westernMongols,see GavinHambly,ed., CentralAsia (New York: DelacortePress, 969), chaps. 7, 9, II, and esp. I7.



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SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES & TERRITORIALITY 31frontier; nlythe clash withRussia necessitated more precisedefinitionof therelationship etween the suzerainsand Russia. Territorialitygainaltered its meaning as the boundarymediated a different ypeof ex-change.The treaty fPeking (i86o) between Russia and ImperialChina wasan important tepin this direction. t fixed the boundary as "followingthe mountains,great rivers nd the present ines of Chinese permanentpickets."This delimitation till eft substantial art of the Sinkiangre-gion on theChinese side, butthe mperial government id notdecide toinclude Sinkiangformally n the Chinese Empire until 884.7 Even afterthat date, itwas still treated s an "outer region" nhabitedby"barbari-ans" over which largely indirect control was exercised. According toWheeler,Sinkiang remainedsubstantiallyndependent f governmentalcontrolby Peking until the 1940s.8The governors ppear to have deter-mined all pertinent nternaland external policies.Thus, although theWestern statesystem mposeda particularmode ofterritorialule uponChina's relationshipswith ts clients nd therest f the world,the old so-cial formation f China prevented he new international oundaryfromserving tsfunction. ocal leaders and Russianand Chinese clientsmadethe attribution fthearea toeither tateproblematicn spiteof ts nter-nationally ettledboundaries.By the end ofWorldWar I, the regionwasruled by variouswarlords who-as the case of Sheng Shih-tsai hows-were more sympathetic o theSoviets than tothe National Chinese gov-ernmentunder Chiang Kai-shek.9 The region was firmly n Chinesehandsonlyafter he ChineseRevolution. till, he first reaties ignedbe-tween the new China and Moscow protected ovietinterestsn the areaby setting p joint oil- and mineral-exploitingompanies nSinkiang;theSovietshad a majority ote.'0 talin had used thesamearrangement uiteeffectivelyn Eastern Europe in orderto cementhis political nfluenceover Soviet client states. The arrangementwith China continued untilI955.

7For a fascinatingccountof the freewheelinguleof the ocal warlord Yakub Beg whoattempted o fendoffRussian,English, nd Chineseinfluence ntilhe was defeatedbytheChinesegeneralTso Tsung-tang n i878, seeJackChen,TheSinkiang tory New York: Mac-millan, 977), chap.6.8 For a general discussion, ee Surya Sharma, nternationaloundary isputes nd Interna-tionalLaw (Bombay:Tripathi, 976), I94 ff,nd GeoffreyWheeler, Sinkiangand theSovietUnion," The ChinaQuarterlyNovember-December963), 57 ff.9 See Chen (fn.7), chaps. 8-io, for an extensive iscussion f thefluidand often hiftingpolitical ituation nderthe rule of ShengShih-tsaiwho transferredissympathies rom heNationalistChinesegovernmento Stalin,but n I94i began to persecuteCommunistswithRussian eanings betting n a defeat f Stalin), nlytoseek a rapprochementn I944.10See P. P. Karan,"The Sino-SovietBorderDispute,"JournalfGeography,3 i964), 220-42, at 22I.



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32 WORLD POLITICSThe case of the Mongols has significantmplications or ur inquiry. fboundaries are important ecause of theirrole n mediating xchanges,closer ook at the types f relationships ediated by boundaries will prove

instructive. t the most general evel, boundaries re pointsof contact swell as of separation between a social system nd an environment.AsLuhmann remarks:They reduce hepointswith he nvironment,hus llowing he nternalconditioningf variousrelationswith the environment. nly whereboundaries o exist, elations etween ystem nd environmentan in-crease heir omplexity,heir ifferentiationndtheir ontrolled utabil-ity.Boundaries repermeable o causality;hey nlymake surethat achcausalprocessnvolves he ntireystem."The naturalboundaryof a mountaincrestor a watershed that sepa-rates ocieties s natural only because such areas are usually sparselypop-ulatedand bereft f naturalresources. hus, exchangesbetweensocietiesor political systems nd the environment re minimized, and thereforethe potentialfor conflict s smaller. But even the small number of ex-changeswith theenvironment enerally epends upon thesocial forma-tion of the societies nvolved.KingdonWard remarked hatobviously passof 5,000 feet snothingo a Tibetanwhohabituallyivesat 2,000 feet ltitude. he Tibetan s not topped yphysical utclimatebarriers,nd noboundary illarsreneeded omakehimrespecthese.Hisfrontiers theverge fthegrass and, hefringef thepineforests,he50inch ainfallontour eyondwhichnosalt s untilndeedyou ome o thesea)or the75%saturatedtmosphere.he barriermaybeinvisible; ut tis a moreformidablene toa Tibetan han heGreatHimalayan anges.fhe crosses t he must revolutionise is mode of ife.12It is thus mportant o distinguish etweentwo types f exchanges: sys-tem-environment,nd system-otherystems.As longas the ontacts ith hepeople n theother ide wererare,twaspossible omanagerelations ith relativelyowlevelof understanding.The otherswere barbarians,"rimitive,tc.,which ouldbe classifiedspart fthewild "environment"ecausenotmuch ameofthem.... Long-range ontactswere essentiallyeserved o higher trata nd traders ndsupplied hesystem ith strange" bjects ndwere thusonly trength-ening the awareness fa deep differenceetween ystemnd environ-ment.'3ANiklas Luhmann, "TerritorialBorders s SystemBoundaries," n Raimondo Strassoldoand Giovanni delliZoti, eds.,CooperationndConflictn BorderAreas Milan: FrancoAngeli,g982), 235-45, at 236.12 Kingdon Ward, "Explorationson theBurma-TibetFrontier,"Geographical ournal o

(1932), 465-83, s quoted inJ.R.V.Prescott, oundaries nd FrontiersLondon: CroomHelm,I 978), I o6.' Luhmann (fn. I), 238.



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SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES &TERRITORIALITY 33Whencontactsncrease nd political nd economicnterdependenciesare recognized, differentiationrises etweennter-systemnd system-environmentelations. xchanges etween ystemsstates) re increas-

ingly egulated y normativetructures,ven ncasesof nterstateio-lence. Thus, a "negative ommunity"-onenot unitedby a commonpurpose ra vision f hegood ife, ut nly y ommon racticesnd themutual ecognitionfrights-comes nto xistence.'4oundaries ecomelines althoughheir xactdemarcation ustwaituntil ettermeansofgeodesy evelop) nstead fremainingonalfrontiers.he importancefcenter-peripheryelations ecomesvisible nd the task of boundarymaintenanceresentstself.In theEuropean ontext, e see these atternsn thedevelopmentfthe state ystemnd in theemergence f theclassical onception fboundaries hat efinexclusiveonesof urisdiction.he Treaty fthePyrenees, hich etup a joint ommissionor ecidingwhere he xactboundaryine between pain and Francewouldbe drawn, nauguratedthefirst fficial oundarynthemodern ense i659).'5Although imilarattemptso determine oundarieswere recordedarliere.g.,Philip eBel's attemptn I3I2 to determine he boundaries fFlanders),'6helargely ersonalistic olitical rganizationf the timemade such at-temptst delineation different atter. nderfeudal ule, oyalty asowed,dependingncircumstances,o various verlordsimultaneously.Thus, lthoughhe imits ftherealmwere uitewellknown, herewasa tendencyoobfuscateheboundariesf hekingdom. oblesmadewaron their wn and hadpretensionsndomains n other ealms; nterven-tions nd counter-interventionsere he rder f heday, reventinghe

kingdomsromctingikeunitarytates.'7In thecase of theGermanEmpirebefore heThirty ears'War,thelackofcleardemarcationf public ealm or ecision-makingurposeswasparalleled y he onfusedtatus fthe mperial owerswith espectto "external ffairs." ccording o C. V. Wedgwood, population fabout"twenty-one illion epended or tsgovernmentn morethantwo thousand eparate uthorities,"nd althoughfreetenants nd'4 I use the term negative ommunity" ordenoting situationnwhichthere s an agree-ment on commonpractices nd rights, utnot on commonpurpose.For further iscussion,see TerryNardin, Law, Morality nd theRelations f StatesPrinceton: rincetonUniversityPress, 983).'5 For the rgument hat heEuropean state ystem ependedupona variety fconventionsand-institutionalules, ee Maurice Keens-Soper, The Practice f StateSystem," n MichaelDonelan, ed., The ReasonofStates London: George Allen& Unwin, 978), 25-45.i6 Sharma fn.8), I4-'7 For further iscussion fthispoint, ee Gianfranco oggi,TheDevelopmentf heModernState Stanford,CA: StanfordUniversity ress,1978), and Joseph trayer, n theMedievalOrigins ftheModern tate Princeton: rincetonUniversity ress, 970).



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34 WORLD POLITICSknightsmight orm ederations,herewere till over hree undred o-tentiallyonflictinguthoritiesn Germany."'8AlthoughheEmperorwasnominallyhargedwith reservingpeaceand justice" in therealm ndwithdefendingtagainst xternalggres-sion,neitherhepreservationf ecurityor he dministrationf usticeand peacefell learlywithin isgovernmentalowers.Nominally,heseven lectorswere n controlftheEmpire, ince n emperorouldnotbe chosennor a Diet convenedwithout heir onsent.n addition,heirdecrees ad egalforcewith r withoutmperialpproval. he effective-nessoftheir dictswas imited, owever, ot nly y he bsence fstateinstitutionso enforce hem, utalso bythe nnumerablerivilegeshatexempted articularegalpersons rom arious ypes fduties.'9urtherpeculiarities bounded, including mmunity rom urisdiction f the m-perial court Reichskammergericht)n case of controversiesrising out ofthe executionof aws.2oThe differentmeaningsof boundaries n such a politicalsystem husbecome clear.The King ofBohemia, althougha legitimate lector,wasnotentitled oparticipaten themeetings f the Electors'circlesince hiskingdom ayoutside the confines ftheEmpire.The ElectorofBranden-burgwas a member of theEmpire as a princeofBrandenburg-but, asrulerof Prussia since i6i8, a vassal of theKing of Poland. Similarly, heDuke of Lorraine,which was nominallywithintheEmpire, also owedfealty o theKing of France. Thus, even though heHapsburg family adsecuredtheimperialcrownforgenerations hrough hecontrolof voteswithin he Electors'circle, heEmperor'spowerwas virtually onexistentexceptwithinhis own possessions.The approval of the Electors' circlehad to be soughtfor mperial nitiativesuchas theconvening ftheDietand foranynew tax,alliance, or declarationof war. The Emperorwasleftwithout ny right oindependent ctionevenin seriousemergencies.

Fiscal andmilitaryrganization as as littlen mperialontrols legisla-tion. or these urposesheEmpirehad beendivided nto en ircles,achwith ts ocal Diet andelected resident.houlda circlebe attacked,hepresidentouldappealto thetwoneighboringircles o assist im, nd ifthe three ogether ere stillunableto defend hemselves, furtherwomight ecalled n. f thisdid notease the ituation,hefive irclesmightthen sk theElector fMainzto call the eadingmembers ftheDiet toFrankfort,form fmeeting ithoutmperialonsent hichwas called

i8 C. V. Wedgwood,The Thirty ears'War,paperback d. (London: Methuen, 98I), 34ff.19 he preservationf these freedomswas originally hetask of parliaments,whichwerelargely omplaint nd adjudicative nstitutions,otbodies for egislation.20 On thefunction f theReichskammergericht,eeRudolf mend,Das Reichskammergericht:Geschichtend VerfassungAalen, Germany:Scientia,965).



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SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES & TERRITORIALITY 35Deputationstag.fthismeeting greed hat he ttacked istrict eeded ur-ther elp, hey n turn ppealed o theEmperor or general iet. By thisamazingproceduret was possible or ne-half f theEmpire o be fullyengaged n civilor externalwar before nyonewas bound o much s toinform heEmperor.21Onlyexclusive overeignty ade defense nd internaldministrationthe primary nd increasinglyxclusive ask of the central uthorities.Thisdevelopmentllustrateshe omplexityf he oncept f overeignty.It denotesnternal ierarchys well s externalquality. he similaritiesand differencesetween oundariesn a state ystemnd those evelop-ing n thefrontieronesof mpires restriking;hey how heusefulness

of eparatingenter-peripheryelations rom hose f nter-systemnter-actions nd system-environmentxchanges. lthough heGreatWall ofChina andtheRoman imes ppear o be examples f inear oundaries,theyrenotboundariesn themodern ense.Owen Lattimore oints utthat... theconcept f a man-madeGreatWall ... was more product f thekindof state reatedwithinChina thanofthekindofpressure gainstChinafrom hesteppe.Naturally nough, tis themilitaryspect f theGreatWall thathascommandedmost ttention,nd thishas distortedtshistoricalignificance.22Consideringhe mmensemilitarytrengthfCh'inatthe nd of theperiod f thewarring tates, heborder hanges ftheGreatWall werenotvery xtensive hen ompared o the erritoriesftheformereudalkingdoms hatCh'in had united, orwas there ny mminent enace ynorthernarbarians. ostofthemilitaryhreatsamefrom he till n-

conquered south. The destruction f feudalismresulted romCh'in's de-liberateolicy f xterminatinghenobilitynd of onvertingeudal erfsintopeasantswho owed rent o their verlordnd taxes othe tate. henobles ouldno onger se serfs s soldiers ndwere nly ntitledorent;thepeasants ouldnow beapproached irectlyythe tate or axes ndconscriptedaborwithout he ntercessionf thefeudal ord.With hesechanges,hedefense ftheboundaries ecame he ask fthe entral u-thorities.mperial oundaries id notoperate o demarcatereasof ex-clusive urisdictionn thebasisof shared racticesndmutual ecogni-tion frights,ut okeep he nvironmentafe hroughhe stablishmentofclients nd the ontrolftrade.Similarly,heRomanEmpire onceivedhe imes otas a boundary,but sa temporarytopping lacewhere hepotentiallynlimitedxpan-

2tWedgwood (fn. 8),36.22 Lattimore fn.4),434.



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36 WORLDPOLITICSsion of the Pax Romana had come to a halt.23 he political nd adminis-trativedomain often xtended beyondthewal124r stayed nside it at aconsiderable distance. Boundaries-i.e., legally relevantdistinctions-existed only in private legal relations,where they governed propertyrights.The agerpublicus,or public domain, had no boundaries; t endedsomewhere, utthis nd was not specifiable ymeans of a legallyrelevantline. The expressionused wasfines sse.)The boundarywas therefore s-sentially floating one withinwhichtributary ribes s well as Romanlegions with ocal barbarianrecruitswere used to keep the peace.25 therbarbariantribeswere to be slowly cculturated nd integrated, r subju-gated and suppressed. Caesar's political plan, expressed in his Com-mentaries26 as well s inPlutarch,27otonly epresentsispersonal olit-ical thinkingbutthe policy consensus n Rome-at leastuntil Commo-dus: to conquer the world up to the "earth-surrounding cean." AfterCommodus, these plans came to naught and Rome developed client re-lationshipswith the northernGermanic tribesuntil internaldecay andthe crushing defenseburdens brought the imperial organizationto itsknees.A closerinvestigation f such clientrelationshipss well as the simi-larities nd differencesn managingintersocietalffairsn the state sys-tern snow appropriate.III. BOUNDARIES AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMThe distinction etween frontiers nd boundaries, s well as the ex-aminationof howboundariesfunction nder conditions f varioussocial

formations,s particularly elpfulforunderstandingome issuesof con-flictmanagement n international elations.Basically, wo classes oftech-niqueswere available:management fthe ypes f exchangesmediated byboundaries, nd manipulationofthe ocation f the boundaries.The lat-ter was characteristic f theEuropean balance-of-power ystem hat at-temptedto "preservethe equilibriumin Europe"28through territorial23This thesishas been put forwardmost eloquentlyby Paul de Lapradelle,La Frontie're(Paris: Les Editions nternationales,928). For some mportantmodificationsfLapradelle's

thesis, ee Studien u denMilitdrgrenzenoms,Vortrigedes 6. Internationalen imes Kon-gresses n SilddeutschlandCologne-Graz: BdhlauVerlag, 967).24 See, e.g., the extensive iscussion f Roman boundary rrangementsn Franz Altheim,Niedergang erAltenWelt, vols. Frankfurt: ittorioKlosterman, o date), I, chaps. and

3-25Ibid., chap. 4-26 JuliusCaesar,De bellogallico (Commentaries),rans.by JohnWarringtonNew York:Dutton, 953).27Plutarch, itaeCaesarumNew York: HeritagePress, 941), chap. 58,sec. 6.28 This was theformula n thepreamble otheTreatyofUtrecht,whichendedthe War ofSpanishSuccession I7I3).



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SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES & TERRITORIALITY 37gains nddivisions uch s thedivision fPoland nd the erritoriald-justments t theCongress of Vienna.29 he formerwas employedmostconsistentlyround the edges ofthe variousEuropean empires that ub-jugated the colonial world. Institutions uch as buffers, rotectorates,spheresof interest or influence), uzerainties, nd neutral zones werecommonlyused to impose European rule on more orless recalcitrantlo-cals" and to manage potential onflictswith otherexpanding Europeanpowers;30 s in Europe, the institutions f servitude nd imposed neu-tralization rather handivisionofterritory)lso playeda role.With theabolitionof the colonial frontiers, any of the inesformerlymarkingoff pheresofinterest ecame permanent oundariesofsucces-sorstates; omeofthe present oundarydisputesresult rom uch sphericagreements.The disputebetweenEthiopia and Somalia, and the ndian-Chineseboundaryproblemconcerning hemeaningand understandingsunderlying heMcMahon line in Tibet (dividingTibet into two spheresbut acknowledging the "suzerainty"of China), are cases in point.3'Nevertheless, omeparallelsor sphericboundaries, uchas the49thpar-allel in North America, are still in existenceand serve as functioningboundariesat present.Why have some meridians,designedprimarilys markers ndicatingagreementsnprinciple oruncharted erritory,ecome boundarieswith-out engendering onflict,nd why have othersnot? One ormoreofthefollowingconditions seem to have helped in mitigatingpotential dis-putes.First,most of thesphericboundaries till nexistence re indesertsorpolar regions.The maintenance f such ines can be explained n termsofthe costsofdemarcationnan uncharted nd hostile nvironment. ec-ond, straightinespersistedwhen a colonial power gained possessionofadjacentterritoryhatwas once marked off s lying n some otherpow-er's sphereof influence. ormersphericdemarcations herefore ecameinternal dministrative oundariesand only ater,through tate succes-sion, internationalboundaries. The Egypt-Sudan,Tanganyika-Kenya,and Botswana-SouthWest Africaborders re cases in point.The accept-ance of the49thparallelas theboundarybetweenCanada and theUnitedStates has a differentxplanation.Jeffersondvocated this inein i8i8 onthe basis of a putative greementbetweenthe Hudson's Bay Companyand French Canada. This proposal was acceptable to England precisely

29 See, e.g., the various compensation chemesof the Congressof Vienna, in EdwardGulick,Europe'sClassicalBalance ofPower New York: Norton, 967), chap. 9.3^?For further iscussion, ee H. Duncan Hall, Mandates, ependencies, nd Trusteeships(Washington, C: CarnegieEndowmentfor nternational eace, I948), chap. , "The Inter-nationalFrontier."3' See J.R.V.Prescott,H. J.Collier and D. F. Prescott, rontiersfAsia and Southeast sia(Melbourne:MelbourneUniversity ress, 1977), hap. i8.



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38 WORLD POLITICSbecause heBritish ad wanted hat oundaryince 697, but thad neverwon the cceptance f theFrench.Mostof the ime, owever, ormer emarcationinesmarking ff hespheres fEuropeanpowerrivalry avebeenthecauseofcomplicatedarrangements.or instance, he treaty hat stablishedheAnglo-Ger-mansphere f nfluencen Africa n 890 specificallyrovided or utureadjustmentsn accordancewith ocalrequirements.32onsequently,heboundaries hat merged etweenMalawi andTanzania, UgandaandRwanda, nd Kenyaand Tanzania showalterationsor are still ndis-pute).The othermethod-the mpositionf a specialregime n a zoneonthefrontier-has ivenrise o patternsf nteractionhat requitedif-ferent rom hosebetween hesovereign erritorialegimes fEurope.For example, n the i9thcenturyheBalkansrepresented "frontierzone"in whichAustrian, ussian, nd Britishnfluence et, ndwhichcould notbe effectivelyealtwithbythenominal ower, heOttomanEmpire.At that ime, urkeywas notconsidered European tate; tonly ame to be regardeds a "civilized" ation,cceptinghe ommonpractices nd mutuallyrecognized rights f theEuropean statesystem,after he Crimean War. The Treaty of Adrianople i829) gave theTsar,as protector f theChristians, right f nterventionn certainOttomanpossessions, circumstance hat ed to the Crimean War. Later on, theBosniancrisis f 908 was the result f the ncorporation f thenominallyTurkishprovinces fBosnia and Herzegovina into the AustrianEmpire,althoughAustria had "administered" heseprovinces ince i878.On the owest evel of formalizations the"sphereof interest,"whichis either backed by formal or informal greements mong competitorstates lone (when "the locals do notmatter"), r byadditional arrange-mentswiththe ocal authorities.As toa sphereof nfluence, ccordingtoLord Curzon, "no exterior ower but one mayreassert tself n the ter-ritoryodescribed."33pheresof nfluence ave thereforelso been called"semi-suzerainties."Otherarrangements,uchas the nstitution f a pro-tectorate, r (full) suzerainty, r condominia,were also developed. Thetripartite ondominium between Germany, Britain, and the UnitedStates over Samoa, and theAnglo-French arrangementsn Sudan andthe New Hebrides, are examples of such ointadministrations. he term

32 Art. IV, as quoted in K. C. McEwen, Internationaloundaries f East Africa Oxford:Clarendon Press, 970), I78 ff.An example s the shift f theboundary rom he shoreto themiddle of Lake Jipeon therecommendation f a boundary ommissionworking n I904-I906, which modified heoriginal greement etweenGermany nd Britain i893); this inehasbecomethemodernKenya-Tanzania boundary.33Lord Curzon,FrontiersOxford:Clarendon Press, 907), 42.



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SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES & TERRITORIALITY 39"sphere f nfluence"ppears ohave nteredhevocabularyfEuropeandiplomacynly nthe ate i9thcentury.t is somewhatronic hat histerm riginally as used byRussia odeclaretsdisinterestncontrollingAfghanistan.ountGorchakovs reportedo haveassuredLordClar-endonn 869 that Afghanistanay ompletelyutsidehe pherewithinwhichRussiamight ecalledupontoexercise er nfluence."34The applicationfthisdevice oAfrica uring heBerlinConferenceof i884-i885 resultedin a relativelyuncomplicateddivision of Africaamongthecolonialpowers; hey hus cquiredvastterritoriesithouthaving operfectheir itle hroughffectiveccupationnd administra-tionofthevasthinterlandso their olonial nclaves.35incethese reaswere echnicallyerra ulliusi.e., hey elongedonobody),onsiderableconflictouldhave developed romhe nchoate itlesnthe bsence fmultilateralgreement.36A slightlyifferentroblemrosewhen heEuropean owers acedlocal state hat, n onehand, ouldnot ffectivelyesist oreignenetra-tionbut, n theother,ouldnotbewhollybsorbedwithinne exclusivesphere f nfluence.or suchpurposes,spheresfpreponderance"eredesigned; heynominally reservedhe ntegrityf thecountry,utal-locatednfluencen an exclusive asisfor ertainreasorzones.Anex-ampleof such n arrangements theAnglo-Russianonventionf 907concerningPersia.Originally his dea had beenfloatedby Salisburypre-cisely n orderto preserve he integrityfPersia; thepractical mplica-tion,however,was the divisionof a nominallyndependent tate nto ex-clusivespheresof influence.Keal describesPersian affairs fter he 907convention:

Although oth ignatoriesadaffirmedheir ntentiono maintainhe n-dependencend ntegrityfPersia ndtoallowequalfacilitiesor rade oallnations,hatwas notwhathappenednpractice.he twopowers entjointnoteto thePersian overnment,eclaringhat heywouldrefuseosanctionoansfrom ther owers fthese oans-nvolved rantingonces-sions oanyother ower r theirubjectsontraryoRussian r Britisho-34 Ibid.; see also G. N. Curzon, Russia n Central sia n i889and theAnglo-Russian uestion(London: Frank Cass, i967), 326 ff.35Although the principle f contiguity as virtually iscountednestablishing validtitlein the slandofPalmas decision,Lauterpachthas shown that here sa sound core to thisdoc-trine. or the Palmas decision, ee Louis Henkinand others, ds., nternationalaw, Cases ndMaterials Minneapolis: West, 980), 256-62.On contiguity,ee HershLauterpacht, Sover-eignty ver SubmarineAreas,"British earbook f nternationalaw 27 1950), 376-433.36 This was the reasonforthe Latin American doctrine f utipossidetis, hich foreclosedattempts fother ountries o establish itle o sparsely dministered r even unknown partsof their espectiveerritories.or further iscussion, ee FriedrichKratochwil, aul Rohrlich,and Harpreet Mahajan, Peace andDisputedSovereigntyLanham, MD: University ress ofAmerica, 985), case studies n the Beagle Channeland Peru-Ecuador.



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40 WORLD POLITICSlitical nd strategicnterest.ersiaprotested,oth bout his nd theAn-glo-RussianAgreement, hereupon etrograd nd London reactedbywarningther owers gainst aking p Persia's ause.37

Surveyingthe range ofvarious frontier rrangements n i945, DuncanHall found the following rather surprising but not exhaustive) set ofmandates, nternational egimes, rusteeships,nd so forth:readingfrom outh to north, ..: the mandates now trusteeships)fRuanda Burundi nd Tanganyika; heUganda Protectorate;ivalriesndspheres f influenceverAbyssinia; ritrea, n turnTurkish, gyptian,Italian, ndnow a projectednternationalrusteeship;ivalries f Britainand FranceoverEgypt nd thevalley f theNile culminatingntheFa-shoda ncident; he ondominiumfthe udan; theformerondominiumsand protectoratever Egypt; the neutralized nd demilitarizeduezCanal,with ts nternationalegime; hemandates verTransjordan, al-estine,nd Syria; heprojectednternationalrusteeshipegime orJeru-salem; the checkered istory f Alexandretta,n turnTurkish erritory,League mandate,nternationalegime,ndagainTurkish erritory.s weshall ee, he ineofphenomenafthe nternationalrontierontinuesis-torically hroughAnatolia, long the Straits, hroughheBalkans, ndthence n to theBaltic nd even o theArctic.38Finally,therewere neutral ones and buffertates,whichallowed thelocal inhabitants onsiderable autonomy. Neutral zones stopped func-tioningwhen local refugees r even brigands used the lack of a stronginternalor external uthority or theirown purposes.The neutral zonebetween theBritish nd German territoriesf theGold Coast and Togohad to be abolishedin i899 forthatreason. All such areas withoutpolit-ical authoritywere set aside inmodern timeswhen theexclusivityf ter-

ritorialrule became more and more important. hus, the neutralzonebetween Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was dividedup equallybetweenthesestates n i965.39A good exampleof a buffer tate sAfghanistan,which was created toseparateBritish nd Russian influencemoreeffectively.aving failed nI879 to impose a protectorate pon theresisting ribes, heBritish,withRussian consent, persuaded the Emir of Afghanistan o accept sover-eigntyover Vakhan, thereby reatingthe curious extensionof AfghanterritoryowardChina. To a large extent, hetreaty f I907 ended therivalries f theseEuropean powers in that area. In a similarvein,Siamwas successful n defending tsautonomy gainstdirect nterventionsybecominga "neutral" n the British-French ontest ver Indochina.

37Paul Keal, Unspoken ulesandSuperpowerominance London: Macmillan, 984), 3 .38 Hall (fn.30),44-39See S. H. Amin, nternationalndLegal ProblemsntheGulf London: Middle East andNorth African tudiesPress, 98I), I24.



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SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES & TERRITORIALITY 41As in Europe, neutralizationwas contingent pon theagreementoftheGreatPowers as well as upon thedifficultyr costliness fextendingtheimperialboundaries.40 his was the case whentheterritoryn ques-

tionwas effectivelydministered ysome sortofgovernment hatcouldprevent asypenetration.Otherwise,variousclient rrangements ad tobe developed inorder toprevent he excludedstatesfrom nvading, r-in caseswhere theborderpeople werepoorlyorganized-to prevent n-ternal pressurefromcolonists,traders,military areerists, nd othersfrom nvolving he mperialstate n furtherxpansionat greatcost. Thesocial formation fthe mperialstate s therefore s important s thatoftheouter"barbarians"ortribes.We findhistorical xamples for uch im-perialexpansion due to theactivities ftraders nd entrepreneursn themachinationsof Rhodes and Luederitz, who extended British nd Ger-man influencen Africabyforcing heir overnmentso protect heirpri-vate acquisitions. The debate concerning hecauses of imperialism ndthearguments hat"empiredoes notpay" are familiar.The acquisitionofTexas in the Americanfrontieretting lso showsthe extension fin-fluence riginally rought bout byprivate nitiative.The dynamics reatedbythisclash of nternal nd external actors anbe seen in Britain'spolicy n India. In the case ofthe BritishNorthwestFrontier, ondon vacillatedbetween "closed-border" olicy nd a "for-ward" policy.The closed-border olicy nvolved trict atrolsof the bor-der by theBritish,negotiationsimitedto representativesftransbordersocieties, nd British nsistence n theright fsupervisingnd controllingtransborderffairs. his policywas usually ccompaniedbyan otherwisenoninterventionisttance towardtribal ffairs,nd punctuatedby occa-sionalpunitive xpeditionswhenthe security fBritish ndia was threat-ened. The forwardpolicy,on the otherhand, as exemplifiedby theSandeman system fconsultation nd moreactive nterventionn tribalaffairs, ffered rbitrationnd subsidies n order tokeep the peace whilenotdiscouraging ontactsbetween thesubjects nd theoutsiders.4'

IV. UNSPOKEN RULES, NETWORKS, AND REGIMESAfter survey f a variety fforms ywhich stateshave tried o mod-ify heexclusionary atureofterritorialovereigntynd therebyoman-age theirrelations, hepresentworld system ppears to be considerably40For a discussion ftheproblems nvolved, ee CyrilE. Black and others,Neutralizationand World olitics Princeton: rincetonUniversity ress, 968).41 Fora discussion fBritish olicy, ee I. Coatman, The Northwest rontier rovince ndTrans-BorderCountryundertheNew Constitution," ournal ftheRoyalCentralAsianSo-ciety 8 (July931), 335-48, nd C. E. Bruce, The SandemanPolicy s AppliedtotheTribalProblemsofToday,"Journal ftheRoyalCentral sianSociety9 (January932), 45-67.



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42 WORLD POLITICSsimpler.The emancipationof the colonial world not only abolished mostof these arrangements-except when former pheres volved into actualboundaries-but sovereignequality and theassertionof absolute terri-torial rightsgained new salience. Especially in the third world, sover-eigntyhas been invoked in order to modify omestic egal arrangementsand international bligations resulting romstate succession. Thus, theaffirmationf "PermanentSovereigntyver Natural Resources,"42 hichjustifiesnationalizationwithouttheconventional ompensation,43s an-otherwayofreassertingndependence;hisoftenmeans that he domesticeconomyhas tobe isolatedfrom oreign enetrationhrough mphasison"bordersofseparation."Attempts o establish odes of conduct,formul-tinational orporations or nstance,must thusbe understood s a meansto mastertheproblemof oss of control hat s concomitant o increasinginterdependence.s Krasner has pointedout,the New International co-nomic Order is less a distributive argainingfor arger shares of wealththan a struggleforcontrol.44 his struggle s primarily, r at least osten-sibly,designed to ensure the sovereign ndependence of the developingcountrieswithintheirown territorial onfines; t the same time, t is aneffort o control nfluences hat originatebeyond territorial ordersandthathave an impacton national ife.Nevertheless, varietyof contradictoryendencies can be found inpresent nternational ife.Thefirst s the universalrecognition f territo-rial sovereignty s the differentiatingrinciple n the nternationalrena.But there is also a second,conflictingrend: the erosion of boundariesthrough he ncreasing nterdependenciesfmoderneconomic ife.Thus,while political systems re boundary-maintainingystems,markets-althoughdependentfor heir reationuponpoliticalpowerand economicnetworks-are not.45 t is precisely hisdifference hat led to Waller-stein's rgument oncerning he successof European capitalism:thepen-etration f theentireworldbecamepossibleonly fter heEuropean pow-ers had given up on the creation of a world empire and contentedthemselveswith economic networks.46

42 See, e.g., United Nations General AssemblyResolution 803 (XVII), i962, U.N. Doc.A/52I7 i963)-43 On this point, ee Eduardo Jimenez e Arechaga, StateResponsibilityor he Nation-alization of Foreign-Owned Property," ew YorkUniversityournal f nternationalaw andPolitics i (Fall I978), 179-95; reprintedn Richard Falk, FriedrichKratochwil, nd SaulMendlovitz, eds., Internationalaw: A ContemporaryerspectiveBoulder, CO: Westview,

I 985).44Stephen Krasner, "The United Nations and Political Conflictbetween North andSouth," inToby TristerGati,ed., The U.S., theU.N.,andtheManagement fGlobal Change(New York: New York University ress, 983), 210-26, at 21I-14.45 his point is made by Raimondo Strassoldo, Boundaries in Sociological Theory: AReassessment," n Strassoldo nd Delli Zotti fn. I).46 Immanuel Wallerstein, heModernWorld ystem: apitalist griculturend theOrigins ftheEuropeanWorld conomyn the 6th CenturyNew York: Academic Press, 976).



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SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES & TERRITORIALITY 43This expansion,however,did not eliminate differentiationf centerand periphery,which sometimesmade itnecessary o extenddirectpolit-ical control nto the penetrated reas. The establishment fcolonial rule

becamenecessarywhen theoriginal nformal greements etweenthe o-cal rulers nd theirEuropean counterparts roke down.47 hus, farfromproving he automatic nd unproblematic atureof economicexpansion,thehistory f European imperialism, specially n its rush intoAfrica,proves the importanceof political underpinnings or thefunctioning funbounded economicexchanges.A third dentifiable rait s the result f the power differentialsmongnations and the tensions between bounded political systems nd un-boundedexchangessuchas economic, deological, rinformationalrans-actions. The issues of dependency, propaganda, and transborderdataflows come to mind. Thus, problemsnecessitating arefulconflictman-agementhave not disappeared whilemanyofthe old techniquesof mod-ifying he functions f boundaries for uch purposes re no longer avail-able. In short, lthough the system s based on sovereignterritoriality,new conceptionsmodifying his xclusiveregimehaveevolved thatmakethe management of the international ystempossiblewithoutviolatingauthoritative rescriptions.Three typesofnew managementdevices have evolved: they re usu-allysubsumed under the term "rules of thegame."48These devices are:spheres f responsibility,pheres f abstention,ndfunctionalregimes.Ofthese,onlyfunctional egimesare clearly egal in character n thattheyusually rely, mongother hings, n treatiesbilateral rmultilateral)ndthereby reateexplicit rights nd obligations.Spheresof responsibilitymix legal rightswith theunilateral rrogation fcompetence-which, ifrespected t all, gives riseonlyto a norm with the character fan "un-spoken rule." Spheres of abstention re the least formalarrangements.They are susceptible o breakdowns as demonstrated ythe short-liveddetentebetweenthe United Statesand theSovietUnion in theseventies.SPHERES OF RESPONSIBILITY

Spheresofresponsibility aybe defined itherfunctionallyr territo-rially.The functionaldefinition haped the role of the Great Powers (a

47 This is theargument n JohnGallagher nd RonaldRobinson, The Imperialism fFreeTrade," EconomicHistory eview, d series, (I953), I-I5.48 For a moreextensive iscussion f the "rulesof the game" inthe postwar ra, see Fried-rich Kratochwil, nternational rder nd Foreign olicy Boulder,CO: Westview, 978). Seealso Richard A. Falk, "The Interplay fWestphalia and CharterConceptions fthe Inter-nationalLegal Order," inCyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk, eds., The Future fthe nter-nationalLegal Order, (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity ress, 969), chap. 2. Falk is one ofthe few"process-oriented"nternationalawyerswho would be inclined ogrant ome quasi-authoritativetatus o "rules of thegame."



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44 WORLD POLITICSrole hat ame nto xistencefter heCongress fVienna). t designatedpowerswith ystem-widenterests-thosehatwere ohave say nmat-ters ertainingo themanagementfthe ystem.

In theclassic onceptionf politics,managementuestions rimarilyinvolved heissue of balances f power.But Metternich'sttemptsostretchhemeaning f ecurityo nclude he nternalonstitutionfthestates Congress fVerona), nd England's eluctanceo accedetosuchan understandingf heConcert,49howed hat hepurely unctionalys-tem-widepecificationf he esponsibilitiesf Great owerwereprob-lematic or woreasons:i) varyingonceptionsf egitimateovereigntyexisted mongthe conservativend liberal articipants,nd 2) the re-spectiventerestsfvariousGreatPowers howed ignificanteographicdiscontinuities.Gradually,pheres f nteresteemergeds thepredominantoncept,most learlyntheBalkans.As the lashes etween ussia nd Austrianthis egion emonstrated,onflictncreasinglynvolved internal"olit-ical groups Pan-Slavism) r territorialivision nd incorporationtheBosnian crisisof i908). Incorporation ecame increasingly ifficults thesystem'slexibilityecreased ecauseof nationalismnd a new under-standingfpoliticss the survivalfthefittest." rational alancingntermsfterritorialdjustmentshus reatedcores hat adto be settled.Territorialdjustmentso onger ouldfulfillhe ask frestoringn ac-ceptablestatusquo for ll.50The notion f a special phere fresponsibilityurfacedt the nd ofWorldWar I,when heAllies iscussedhe tructuref he ostwarnter-national rder.n this onnection,t s worthmentioningoosevelt'sdeaofthe four olicemen"harged y hegeneralnternationalommunitywith enforcinghepeace" ntheir espectivereas, nd Churchill'sdeaof a world organizationas a framework orregional rrangements.5'heinabilityf thegreat owers o cometo substantivenderstandingson-cerningither heir ollectiveesponsibilitiesr theirmutuallycceptedpreponderancen certain egions emonstratesotonly hat heseno-tionswere mprecise,ut lsothat hey ontainedonflictinglements.The Western onceptionsfthefuturenternationalrdernever e-solved he ension etweenheprinciplesfuniversalismndtheregion-

49SeeHenryA. Kissinger,AWorldRestoredNew York:Gosset& Dunlap, i964), chap. I5.5? On thispoint, ee FriedrichKratochwil, On theNotion of nterestn International e-lations," nternational rganization6 (Winter 98i-82), I-30.51 For a discussion fRoosevelt'splan for worldorganization fter he war,see WillardRange,Franklin elano Roosevelt'sWorldOrderAthens:University fGeorgiaPress, 959).For thevarious ncompatible onceptions merging rom he nteractionsefore nd duringthe San FranciscoConference, eeThomas Campbell,Masquerade eace Tallahassee: FloridaStateUniversity ress, 973).



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SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES & TERRITORIALITY 45alistbias exhibitedyChurchill nd even ometimesyRoosevelt. heU.N. wasbased, rom hebeginning,nanuneasy ompromiseetweentheclaimofuniversalompetenceo dealwith llmatters fpeace andsecurityeven withrespect onon-members)-as he Security ouncilwasentrusted ith he nforcementfpeace-and the laim ocollectiveself-defensehat pawned egional lliances.52n addition,he womainantagonists,heSovietUnion nd theUnited tates, idnothave com-monunderstandingfthe egitimacynd limits fGreat-Powernflu-ence n their espectivepheres. or this eason,nformalgreements-such s Churchill'sroposal napportioningnfluencen theBalkans nthebasis of either xclusive r shared ones ofpreponderance-weredoomedtofail.53he U.S. refused orecognize uchdeals,buteven fthey ad been ccepted,he oviet onceptionf nterest as soextensivethat tcametomeanthevirtualxclusionf ll foreignnfluence,r evenconstitutionalimitations.nsteadofexerting owerthroughlliancesand informalmeans, talin'smistrustfhis client overnments-espe-ciallywhen heyhowed nterestnWestern conomic ecoverylans-ledto an absoluteGleichschaltungftheSoviet atellites.54

In thisway,we canestablish he imilaritiesnddifferencesetweenthemanagementevices f the 9thcenturynd ofmodern imes. irst,there ppears o be a similarityn thechange rom hemoreuniversalconceptionf a functionallyefined eneral esponsibilityorpeaceandsecurityo a more olidly efinederritorialphere f nfluence. hat ssurprisings therapidity ithwhich his hange ccurrednthepostwarera. Variousformsf theEuropeanConcert ad functionedadmittedlywith ifferentegrees f uccess) or everal enerations,55ut hedrasticshift n thepostwar ra tookonly fewyears. his remarkablyuickchange,whichwasaccompanied otbymutual ccommodationut n-stead ed to the xacerbationfcold-warensions, as causedby he ackofcommonlyccepted racticeshat ouldguide nd set imits o the x-ertionofinfluence.56A second omparisonetween hedevelopmentsnthe 9thcenturyand those f the20th hows n inverse istoricalequence.Metternich'sextensiventerpretationfAustria'securitynterestailed owin ccept-

52 This point s furtherlaborated n Thomas Franck, Who Killed Article .4?"AmericanJournal f nternationalaw 7I (April I 977),224-47.53 For an extensive reatment f Churchill'sproposal, ee Herbert eis, Churchill, oosevelt,Stalin Princeton:PrincetonUniversity ress, 966), 447-5I.54For a discussion f Stalin'spolicies nEasternEurope, see Zbigniew Brzezinski,The So-vietBloc (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity ress, 97 ).55For a discussionof the European Concert, ee Richard Rosecrance,Action ndReactionin World olitics Boston: Little,Brown, 963).56 For a further evelopment f this heme, ee Kratochwil fn.48), throughout.



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46 WORLD POLITICSance andthen uicklyedto a moremoderatenterpretationfdomesticchallenges o the nternationalrder; oviet nsistencen an implausiblyextensiveecuritynterestnitiallyed to hostilitynd thebreakdown finteractions,ut ultimatelyo a defacto ccommodation. measure fideological reponderance as addedtothe lassical otion f sphere finfluence:egimes asedon ideologies hat o not greewith hat f theregional reat ower an be changed r suppressed. he similaritiese-tween heU.S. assertionfprimacyn theWestern emisphereinclud-ing American nterferenceithnonconformistegimes) nd Sovietbe-haviorn theEastern lochavebeennoted.Moreover, oth owershavedeveloped xtensiveationalesrdoctrinesor heir urposes,s FranckandWeisbandhavepointed ut.57Differenceslso exist.The accommodationhat ccurred n the atesixties nd early eventies as notbackedby xplicitgreements,nd therules fthegame thathave mergedn regard o spheres f nfluencee-semble unspoken" ules.This lastpointconstitutes significantis-similarityetween heEuropean tate ystem nd themodern nterna-tional ystem.In theoldconception, sphere f nfluencer nterest asusually heresult fbilateral,xplicitgreements.his had two onsequences:i) theagreementsreated nforceableightsmong he ontractingarties;nd(2) they mposed regime pon he ocal nhabitants.ecause greementsin nternationalaw cannot indnonparticipatinghird artiespacta er-tiisnecprosuntecnocent),henonrecognitionf the ocalpowers s fullsubjects f nternationalaw wasformerlypreconditionor uch egalarrangements. iththe cceptancef territorialovereigntys theuni-versalorganizing rinciplen presentnternationalelations,he egalexpressionf uch greementssnotpossible. onsequently,uchunder-standingsan haveonly he tatus f tacit runspokenules, s Keal hascalled them.58Such rules generally emerge through unilateral calculations whichtake verbal as well as nonverbalcues intoaccount);theirroot ies in thecoincidence of the perception f a common interest.Unilateral calcula-tion occurs on the basis ofexpectations bout the other's reactionto theself's ction:A'sexpectationfB will nclude n estimationfB'sexpectationsfA.Thisprocess freplication,t mustbenoted,s not n interactionetweenwostates,utrather processn which ecision-makersn one statework ut

57Thomas Franckand Edward Weisband,Word olitics:Verbal trategymong heSuper-powers New York: OxfordUniversity ress, 972).58 Keal (fn.37),part .



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SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES & TERRITORIALITY 47theconsequencesftheir eliefsbouttheworld; world hey elieve oinclude ecision-makersn other tates,lso working utthe onsequencesoftheir eliefs. he expectationshich re so formedre the xpectationsofone state, utthey efer o other tates.59Although expectations hatprove correct n a number of instances t-tain a certain stability nd provide some guidance for futuredecisionmaking in similarsituations, ompliance with these unspokenruleswillbe unproblematic nly when the perception f a common nterests suf-ficientlytrong.Obviously,thiswill be the case in instances nwhichthesituationresemblesa game of coordination-i.e., when the interests fthe interacting arties are neither pposed normixed.60To thatextent,

Hume's example of two men comingto a "tacit" agreement bout howto row a boat is instructive, s a common interest an be assumed.6' Ifstates perceive the situation s resembling Prisoners' Dilemma, how-ever-i.e., when mixed motives re given and the ncentives odefect relargerthan those to cooperate-rules and norms hat ttempt o shore upthe cooperative olutionwill be endangered.This problem s furtherg-gravated by the imprecision f the tacitrule. Since it is not based on ex-plicit verbal agreements nd thus secured by the meanings of ordinarylanguage,62 ut only on unilateral mputations f motivesfor ctionsandothernonverbal cts, ts nstitutionalizations weak; no explicitdiscourseabout the tacit rule is possible, nd therefore either cope nor applica-bility o certain ontexts an be discussed.SPHERES OF ABSTENTION

In the foregoingconsiderations referred o spheresof abstention,which were eithertacitly greed upon bythesuperpowers r createdbythe United Nations through"preventivediplomacy."63 uch arrange-mentsbroke down intheCongo whenthe nterjectionfU.N. troopswasidentifiedwith thepolicygoals ofa particular action hatpossessedout-sidesympathies.As soon as thequestionaroseforwhatpurposestheU.N.troopswere being used-aside fromreestablishingminimalcontrolof

59 bid.,50.60 These thoughts re morefully eveloped nFriedrichKratochwil, Rules,Norms,Val-

ues and theLimits ofRationality," rchivfar echts- ndSozialphilosophieforthcoming).61 David Hume, Treatise nHuman Nature, ook II, OfMorals, n Hume'sMoral andPolit-icalPhilosophy,d. HenryAiken Darien,CT: Hafner, 970), 59 ff.62 In thiscontext, eeArticle I of theViennaConventionwhichestablisheshat a treatyshall be interpretedngood faithn accordancewiththeordinarymeaning o be givento theterms fthetreatyn their ontext nd inthe ight f tsobject ndpurpose."See alsoJimenezde Arechaga, "International aw in the Past Third of a Century," 59 Recueil des Cours(1978),42-48.63 For a good discussion f this echnique, ee InisClaude,SwordsntoPloughshares,th ed.(New York: Random House, i984), chap. I4.



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48 WORLD POLITICSthe ituation-the deaofpreventiveiplomacyailed. heoppositionfthe ovietUnion nd tsrefusaltogether ith rance) opayfor he p-eration ed toa financialrisis ftheworldorganization hich learlyandnarrowlyircumscribeduturectivitiesfthiskind.The tacit nderstandingmong he uperpowerso eavemost fthedevelopingworldto itsowndevices ametonaught uring heFordadministrationnd contributedignificantlyo thedemiseofdetente.The arrangement assusceptibleosubversionecause f heperceptionofrelativelyarge ains or imitednvolvements,articularlyntheweakstatesfAfrica.naddition,nterventionyproxyCuba) appeared oen-able the nterveningartyodisclaim esponsibility.

Finally, etentetself asproblematic.twasbasedon therecognitionofthe SovietUnion as an equalworldpower, uttheUnitedStatesn-creasinglyried ode-link he oviet-Americannderstandingsoncern-ingnuclear arityndarms ontrol rom he ubstantiveonsensuson-cerning ertain egions. or example, ttemptsy theSovietUniontopropose jointundertakingn theMiddleEastandtherebyotransformdetentento n entente ererebuffedytheUnited tates hroughhedrasticmeasure of a nuclear alert.64Linkage" was advocatedbytheU.S.andopposed y heU.S.S.R. ncertainreas detentendeconomic elp),but t was invoked ytheKremlin ndnegated ytheWhiteHouse inotherscondominia).Negativeunderstandingsreweak-aside from heextreme aseofmutual ssured estructionr, sHobbeswouldhavecalled t, he fearofviolent eath."Theyaresubject odefeatingonsiderationsreciselybecause nagreementf bstentions oftenoo mbiguousbout he im-itsofallowable nfluence.urthermore,heperceptionfmutualnterestisnot hored p by rights" hat emonstrateo theparticipantshe an-gible uidpro uoincases f onflictnd nsulate n ssue rom he verallpatternsf ocial nteraction.65"right"mplieshat ne s no onger e-pendent ponthe pponent'spprovalndgoodwilln allcircumstances.FUNCTIONAL REGIMES

The thirdmportantevice ormanagingnternationalelationsnthemoderntateystemsthat ffunctionalegimes. asically,unctionale-gimes"unbundle" hepackageofrightsnherentn territorialover-eignty.unctionalismasthereforeometimes een dvocated s an al-

64 For an extensive iscussion fdetente nd thereasonsfor tsfailure, ee Coral Bell,TheDiplomacy fDetente:TheKissingerra (London: MartinRobertson,977).65 Luhmannmakesthepointthatrights re meansby whichconflictsan be limited ndresolvedwithout ndangering heoverallrelationship. ee Niklas Luhmann,SoziologiederAuftldrung,d ed. (Opladen,Germany:Westdeutscher erlag, 975) II, 29-33.



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SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES & TERRITORIALITY 49ternative organizational principle for international ife. Functionalregimes, twas hoped,would notonlydowngrade the mportance f na-tionalboundaries,but could,through heexpansionof transboundary o-operative networks, ead to "peace in parts."66n addition, some recentdevelopments eem to indicatethatthe traditional ackage ofterritorialrights s being modified.Several new arrangements ave emergedfromthe Law of the Sea draft reaty UNCLOS III) by which competingre-source uses can be accommodatedwithout heall-or-nothing egulationofterritoriality.nly in this fashion ould thecompetingnterestsn se-curity,resource management, access (navigational rights), pollutionabatement, nd freedom f research fthenew "whole" called "oceans"67beguaranteed.The creation fan Exclusive EconomicZone, thenew def-inition f the continentalhelf, f nternationaltraits,farchipelagicre-gimes, and of provisos for resourcerecovery rom hedeep sea throughtheInternational eabed Authority ll show such features.68imilarly,variety f specific esourceregimeswithin he framework reatedbytheAntarctic reatyhascarefully voided the territorialssuesbetweenthosecountries laiming certain sectors nd those not claiming any territory,and between stateswhose claimsoverlap e.g., Argentina,Chile,and theUnitedKingdom).69One of the most remarkable uccesses ftheAntarc-ticregime s itsdemilitarizationnd denuclearization ackedbya uniqueinspection ystem.Whether resourceregimeswill be similarly uccessful n holding ter-ritorial laims at bay is questionable. Since the AntarcticTreaty is validonlyuntil 99i, it may merelyhave delayed future onflicts. ven werethepresent reatymembersto prefer hecontinuation f the presentre-gime, they mightbe forcedto stake out territorial laimsbecause non-membersmightnot recognizethepresentregime d infinitum.he at-tempts f thethirdworldtodeclare Antarctica "Common HeritageofMankind" may producethe same situation s thatof thepresentLaw ofthe Sea draft reatyn relation o theoriginalconceptof a commonheri-tage: that dea was relegated o minor mportance,nd UNCLOS III re-sulted n one of thegreatest nclosuremovementsnhistory y strength-ening rather than reducing the expansion of territorialurisdiction.Furthermore,n view of thesecond thoughts fmany industrial tates

66See JosephNye, Peace in Parts: ntegrationnd Conflictn RegionalOrganizationBoston:Little,Brown, 97I).67 A discussion f theemergence fnew "wholes" onthebasisofnew knowledge s nErnstHaas, "Is there Hole in the Whole?" International rganization9 (Summer 975), 327-77.68 For a text f the UNCLOS III Draft Convention, ee nternationalegal Materials,XXI(November 982), i26i-I354.69 An extensive iscussion f theAntarctic egime an be found n F. M. Auburn,AntarcticLaw and Politics London: C. Hurst& Co., i982).



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50 WORLD POLITICSabout heredistributivespirationsf he hirdworld,henonratificationofthe atter reatyy ome mportantndustrialtatess bound o createdifficultiesor comprehensiveegulationfoceanuse.70

The lessons fthese hort onsiderationsre notdifficulto draw,butthey re somewhat isheartening.incefunctionalogicdepends nthewillingnessfall participantsokeep the ssue readepoliticized,tcancome underpressure hentheframingonditionshange.The successof the Antarcticegime, or xample, ppears ohave resultedargelyfrom he atisfactionf the uperpowers ith hetreaty,rom hemar-ginal strategicmportance f thearea, from n uneasy rucebetweenclaimant ndnonclaimanttatespapered verby mbiguous reatyan-guage), nd from he cquiescencef heworld otheprivilegedtatus fthe reaty'sonsultative embers.7'ven fwe assume hat he trategicconsensusfboth uperpowersemains nchanged,heir bilityocon-tinue longthesame inesmaydependupon their uthorityo excludeothers rom ecisionmaking. ne way fdoing hisstomaketerritorialclaims ndbury he ommon eritagedea once ndfor ll.Functionalegimes lso needcontinuouspdatingnd upgrading,e-pending ponthe mergencefnew ssue reas ndtherealization f n-teractionffectsf various egimes. he discoveryfmineral esourcesin Antarctica,or xample,madenegotiationsor uch regime matterofurgency.urthermore,heeffecthatminingwill have on theotherregimesparticularlyhe iving esourcesnd theAntarctica auna ndflora egimes)will makestringentnvironmentalegulation ecessary.Sucha proliferationfregulationsotonlynecessitatesontinuous e-gotiationsndcooperation,ut lsothe nstitutionalizationfproceduresto settle isputesn order omanage he nevitableonflicts.he advan-tageoftheall-or-nothingrinciplef territorialovereigntynthisre-spectsnotmerelyts implicity,ut he mplicit resumptionhat,n theface fnewly merging roblems,he erritorialnit-and only he er-ritorial nit-has the right o regulatematters. hus, although learboundariesreate roblems y xcluding thers,hey lsosimplifynter-national ife. n thepolitical rena, hey ppear t present obe thepre-conditionor he xistence fnationalndependence,onstitutionalule,and responsible overnmenty creating nd reinforcingignificantbreakswithin he treamftransactionsfworld ociety.

70 For an assessment fUNCLOS III in terms fthecommonheritage rinciple,ee Falkand others fn.43),chap.9.7 Consultativemembers re those ntitled omakerules on thebasisofunanimity) or heAntarctic. heyare theoriginalparties o theAntarctica reaty, lusthose dmitted ateronthebasisofsignificantesearch nthe rea. For a furtheriscussion,eeKratochwil nd others(fn.36),case study n the Arctic nd Antarctica,O-14.



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SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES & TERRITORIALITY 51V. CONCLUSION

I haveaddressed heproblem fthefunctionfboundariesn territo-rial nd nonterritorialocial rders or istoricalswell s for heoreticalreasons. he historicalnterests rooted n theneed for better nder-standingfthose hanges hat ed tothe mergencef heEuropean tatesystemn the 7thcentury,fter hedemise f hemedieval mpire. hetheoreticalnterest oncerns he appraisal f thepresentworld ystem.Thissystemscharacterizedyconflictingrendsntheuniversal ecog-nition fterritorialitys the rganizing rinciplen nternationaloliticsand bytheobservable ountertrendf ncreasingnterdependencieshatundermineerritorialxclusivity.In thepresent pproach, investigatedhree ypes fexchangeshatdeterminehe function f boundaries. ysystematicallyxamining heexchanges hat ake place between unit nd itsenvironment,heex-changes mongunits, nd the xchanges etween unit's enter nd itsperiphery-aswell as theirvarious nteractionffects-I developedparsimoniousxplanation f systemsharacteristicsn a wide varietyfterritorialnd nonterritorialocial ystems. he heuristic owerof thisapproachwas furthervidenced y ts bilityorelate he haracteristicsofsystemso modes ofconflictmanagement ymeansofboundaries.Two techniqueswerediscussed: he movement f the location f aboundary,nd the hangingunctionfboundariesroughtboutby l-lowingor excluding ertain ypes fexchanges. he firsttrategy ascharacteristicftheEuropean alance fpower nd ts erritorialdjust-ments. he secondwas usedpredominantlyn the olonialworld,wherespheresf nfluencerpreponderance,swell s buffertates,ecame hestandard evices ormanagingonflict ith ther uropean owers.Beyond hesehistoricalxamples,discussedmodernttemptsfcre-atingfunctionalegimesndformulatingacit ules norder omanageconflictingses ofresourcesnd politicalnterests.also examined herobustness,rratherhereasons or he imitationsnd the ack ofeffec-tiveness,fthese echniques.Somedifficultys created y attemptso placethis pproachn thewider ontext ftheoreticalffortsn nternationalelations.owever,tis apparent hatthis nquiry s moreindebted o a system-of-actionperspective72han to structural heoriesof international elations73hatemphasize theunintended onsequencesof the actors'choices.Although

72 Talcott Parsons,The Structure f Social Action New York: Free Press, 968); see alsoNiklas Luhmann,Soziale SystemeFrankfurt: uhrkamp, 984).73See, e.g.,KennethWaltz, Theory f nternationaloliticsReading,MA: Addison-Wesley,I979).



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52 WORLD POLITICSstructuralheories xplain n importantspect f nteractionsn an an-archicalnvironment,hey ail o uggest urthervenues or esearch e-yond heoriginalmarketnalogy ndutility-maximizingctions nderconstraints.t ishere hat he dvantages f a morehistoricallyrientedapproachbecomeapparent. y focusingn thechanging unctionfboundaries ather han n the onfigurationnd number f ctors r the"rationality"f their ctions, hepresent pproach rovides or richerand moredetailed reatmentf thehistorical aterialwhilepreservingparsimonyndexplanatoryower.

of systems, boundaries, and territoriality

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