Office of Radiological SecurityOrganization of Agreement States Annual Meeting Boston, MA

Kristina HatcherAugust 25, 2015

Office of Radiological Security

PROTECT REMOVE REDUCE

PROTECT radioactive sources used for vital

medical, research, and commercial

purposes

REMOVE and dispose of disused radioactive sources

REDUCE the global reliance on radioactive sources

through replacement withviable non-isotopic

alternative technologies

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MISSION: The Office of Radiological Security enhances global security by preventing high activity radioactive materials from use in acts of terrorism.

S O U R C E L I F E C Y C L E

R E A C T O R

Site security enhancements for radiological and nuclear materials in storage/use

S O U R C E / D E V I C E

P R O D U C E R

Collaborate with manufacturer to install security by device design

S T O R A G E

Site security enhancements for radiological sources in storage

F I N A L D I S P O S -

I T I O N

Site security enhancements for radiological sources in long term storage

T R A N S P O R T

Transportation security addressed throughout entire lifecycle.

A LT E R N AT I V E NON-ISOTOPIC TECHNOLOGIESThe use of non-isotopic technologies negates the need for security and disposal requirements and eliminates the risk that radioactive sources will become orphaned

D E V I C EM A N U F A C T U R E R

D E V I C E U S E R

Site security enhancements for radiological sources in use S O U R C E /

D E V I C E U S E R

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Holistic Approach to Source Security

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NSS Radiological Security Gift Basket

• As of January 1, 2015 ORS had secured ~300 Cat 1 Buildings and ~200 buildings remained

• In FY2015 Omnibus, NNSA received ~$18M plus up to secure all remaining Category 1 facilities• “…the agreement provides $67,987,000 for domestic material protection to help

meet the goal of securing all buildings in the U.S. with Category 1 source materials by the end of 2016.”

• ORS currently working on a targeted outreach campaign to elicit the remaining volunteers• Emails, Phone Calls, Website, Webinar, Brochures, Thank You Postcards and

Certificates

• Check out our new webpage at: www.nnsa.energy.gov/RSP

Personal Radiation Detectors (PRDs)

DETECTPrompt Detection and Reliable Notification

Multi-Factor Access Control:Requires combination of card, pin, or biometric scan for entry

DELAY RESPOND

RSP Containment Strategy

Extended AdversaryTask Time

Timely, Aware, Equipped and Trained Response

Next Generation Integrated Remote Monitoring System (iRMS):Critical alarms trigger notification and assessment at monitoring stations

Hardened DoorsCentralized Monitoring Stations

Facility Hardening

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TRAIN

Alarm Response Training . Response Planning

PRD Training, Tabletop Exercises

Security and Response Training

Security Planning, Performance Testing, Regulatory

Development

Protect: Security Enhancements

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RSP assumes partner sites are in compliance with NRC regulations; RSP recommended security enhancements complement, but do not replace existing regulatory requirements

RSP considers existing site security when defining recommendations; RSP security experts focus on a defense-in-depth approach that starts at the target and adds one or more layers of protection

RSP security enhancements include three years of warranty and maintenance support

RSP assists to address and develop elements of overall security culture that will ensure sustainability in the out years

END GOAL: SUSTAINABLE THREAT REDUCTION SITE

TRANSITION

SITE SUSTAINABILITY

WARRENTY & MAINTENANCE

SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS

NRC/AGREEMENT STATE REGULATIONS

Protect: Sustainability Elements

Protect: Remote Monitoring System

• More Sustainable

• Cost Effective

• Integrated

• Additional Alarm Notification Capability

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Next Generation Enhancement

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Challenge: Applying sufficient detection in conjunction with added delays and response capability at facilities with extremely high radiation, humidity and the need to continuously operate.

Recommended Enhance

ments

• Virtual Perimeter• Pool cover with detection and delay

o Pilot installation of pool cover at one facility in Fall 2014 o Pool cover tested May 2015 achieved delay time similar to Cs In-Device Delay kits o Test module at a facility to test wiring and switches for detection shows no degradation to-date 60

days into 90 day testingo In discussion with other large industrial irradiator facilities

Pool Cove

r

• Scaled attack test pool cover with left multilayer top plates removed for continuity loop clarity • Modular design that can be custom designed to fit irradiator model

Protect: Industrial Irradiators

Goal: Enhance security against the Insider Threat.

Protect: Industrial Irradiators

• Source Rack Testing Planned for October 2015:• Determine timelines for adversary to remove a pencil from a source module

and rack • Brute force attack from the side• Top down attack on the rack

• Test will use a mock up of a rack in a pool• Scheduled for early October at PNNL• Participation from Nordion

Test Rack

Mock of irradiator using a pool

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Protect: In-Device Delay

*Working Toward New Devices to Come Factory Hardened

STATUS

• Elekta Gamma Knife Hardening Field Kit One Site Pilot installation April 2015 Two Additional Sites Planned for Fall of 2015 Broader Deployment Planned for 2016

• Factory Hardened – currently working with Xcision Hopewell ViewRay Systems

• Planned to start work with MASEP (China) in 2016

CURRENT INITIATIVES

PartnerEstimated Total IDD

Eligible DevicesTotal

hardened

JL Sheppard 221 128 CIS/Pharmalucence 131 120Best Theratronics 416 232Others 73 17TOTAL 841 497

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• Best Theratronics (Canada)• JL Sheppard (U.S)• CIS/Pharmalucence (U.S.)• Husman Irradiator (U.S.)• Hopewell (U.S.)• ViewRay Systems (U.S.)• Xcision (U.S.)• Elekta Instrument, AB (Sweden)• Gamma Services Medical, Gmbh (Germany)

Current Manufacturer Partners

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Protect: Mobile Source Transit Security

Ecuador, 2002. Thieves broke into a storage shed of Interinspec, and stole five Ir-192 radiography cameras for extortion. One of the thieves was a former employee.

Colombia, 1998. Transport trucks owned by Schlumberger were ambushed and oil/gas exploration sources stolen for extortion. One of the perpetrators was a current employee.

China, 2001 Radiation technologist obtained radiography device from friend, removed Ir-192 sources, made a necklace from them, and attempted to kill girl friend.

Argentina, 2009 A former employee and accomplice broke into an Atlas Baker storage facility, and stole a Cs-137 exploration device for extortion purposes.

U.S., 2011 Truck broken into and Ir-192 radiography camera stolen. Despite extensive search, no report of recovery or known motive.

Syria, 2012/13 Radiography and exploration sources reported stolen from several facilities. No reports of recovery or known motive.

Nigeria, 2003 Unknown perpetrators stole Am-241 exploration sources from a truck. The sources later turned up in a scrap yard in Germany nine months later.

U.S., 2013 Perpetrator attempted to steal an Ir-192 camera from its storage. He was thwarted by the layered security systems the company had in place.

Mobile Device Theft Examples

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Protect: Mobile Source Transit Security

• For radiography sources, lots of material in motion worldwide all the time• Short source material half lives require constant device replenishment• Material providers represent a diverse set of research reactors across the globe• Device manufacturers AND device users often international companies

• For both radiography cameras and well logging sources, storage locations are different than use locations• Requires movement from storage locations to field application• Field site security highly likely to be less stringent than storage facility security• Often used in parts of the world where overall security is an issue and terror

groups are potentially present• Designed to be mobile – once lost, hard to find

Peculiarities of Mobile Source Vulnerabilities

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PM –Tag (Built into Camera)• Rad Detection - Monitors

source presence, alarms if removed• Tamper Detection – Alarm

if camera is tampered with• Location – alerts/alarms if

out of range

PM-Box (Replaces Current Transport Box, Installed on Truck and Stores Camera)• Tamper Detection – Alert

when device is removed without check-out• Worker provides

administrative notification of check out• Charging station

Telematics (Cellular/Satellite Communications used by Many U.S. Companies)• Transmits GPS location and

security alarms/alerts E –Tag (On Container)• Tamper Detection –

Alarm when source is removed from container• Location – alarms if out

of range without checkout

R –Tag & Master Control Unit (In Truck Storage)• Rad Detection – Monitors

source presence, alarms if removed• Communication from E-Tag

to the R-Tag and MCU is via Bluetooth

Wel

l Log

ging

Radi

ogra

phy

Base Station• Application software• Receives alarms, alerts,

notifications, location

Project Status• Partnering with major radiography and oil service companies

to design and pilot systems, field studies completed in early 2015

• Con ops to be developed with partners• Plan to pilot in Fall 2015 and start broad deployment in U.S.

in 2016• Developing plans to deploy with international partners

System will be integrated into site storage, providing persistent monitoring of sources and increased detection and delay.

Source Storage

Protect: Mobile Source Transit Security

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U.S. OFF-SITE SOURCE RECOVERY PROGRAM (OSRP) & SOURCE COLLECTION & THREAT REDUCTION (SCATR) • OSRP - recover disused and unwanted radioactive sealed sources that cannot be

disposed of commercially and pose a threat to national security• SCATR – recover and disposition commercially disposable radioactive sealed sources• SCATR & OSRP registration located at: http://osrp.lanl.gov/PickUpSources.aspx

STATUS of TYPE B CONTAINER DEVELOPMENT• 435-B Unshielded Overpack can ship 5 different irradiators and the IAEA Long-Term Storage Shield

Fabrication in process. Anticipate ready for use in early 2016.• 380-B Shielded Container can ship problematic devices

Safety Analysis Report (SAR) being prepared for submission to NRC

Remove

COORDINATION WITH CONFERENCE OF RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM DIRECTORS (CRCPD): • Developing Device Packaging Training at Southwest Research Institute (SWRI). Material to be complete in September. • Participating on the CRCPD working group to develop regulatory guidance for packaging Cat 1 and 2 sources.

Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project

A pilot project to offer incentives to replace Cesium irradiators with alternative technologies

Initiative seeks to convert and replace radiological devices with non-isotopic devices and achieve permanent threat reduction by reducing or eliminating risk-significant radioactive materials

Non-radioactive x-ray device poses no RDD risk; no federally funded security enhancements are required. Does not need to be disposed of as low level or

Greater Than Class C (GTCC) waste

Linear Accelerator is an alternative to Cobalt Teletherapy

Cobalt Teletherapy ReplacementsNNSA, in coordination with the State Department, funded the shipment of a used medical LINAC to Ukraine. We are working with global partners to develop options for expansion of Cobalt teletherapy replacements

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Consultations available to sites interested in replacing their existing high-activity source with non-isotopic alternatives

Research and DevelopmentCollaboration with the Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22) to analyze and prioritize R&D requirements for improvement or development of non-isotopic replacements to make alternative technologies more attractive to industry.

Reduce: Alternative Technologies

National Protection and Programs Directorate Department of Homeland Security

Alternative Technology Working GroupBackground

• The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) (Public Law 109-58) emphasized the importance of non-isotopic replacement technology development and implementation to reduce the risks posed by radioactive sealed sources in wide use domestically in the areas of research, industry, and medicine.

• As progress in the technical, operational, and economic feasibility of these replacements continues, policy options to facilitate their implementation have become increasingly important.

• At the March 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States introduced the U.S. Government commitment to “establish an international research effort on the feasibility of replacing high-activity [radioactive] sources with non-isotopic … technologies, with the goal of producing a global alternative by 2016.”

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National Protection and Programs Directorate Department of Homeland Security

Alternative Technology Working GroupBackground (cont.)

• In August 2014, the U.S. Interagency recommended in the 2014 Report of the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force, “that the U.S. Government, as appropriate, investigate options such as voluntary, prioritized, incentivized, [sic] programs for the replacement of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources with effective alternatives. The Task Force further recommends that U.S. Government agencies, where appropriate, that lead by example in the consideration of and transition to alternative technologies that meet technical, operational, and cost requirements.”

• Nuclear Government Coordinating Council initiated the formation of an Alternative Technologies Working Group to look at the advantages/disadvantages of alternate technologies for replacement of category 1 and 2 radioactive sources.

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National Protection and Programs Directorate Department of Homeland Security

Alternative Technology Working GroupWorking Group Members

• Total Membership: 100Academia: 5Law Enforcement: 1Private Sector: 45State/Local Government: 9Federal Government: 40

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National Protection and Programs Directorate Department of Homeland Security

Alternative Technology Working Group

Working Group Timeline

• Schedule of Meetings and Discussion TopicsFebruary 2015 –Kick-off MeetingMarch 2015 –Cesium-137 Blood Irradiation April 2015 –Cesium-137 Blood Irradiation May 2015 –Cesium-137 Blood Irradiation/Research Irradiation July 2015 –Cesium-137/Cobalt-60 Research Irradiation and Phytosanitary

ApplicationsAugust 2015 –Stereotactic Surgery (Co-60 and LINACS)September 2015 –Industrial Sterilization (Co-60 panoramic irradiators)October 2015 –Industrial RadiographyNovember 2015 –Well Logging

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National Protection and Programs Directorate Department of Homeland Security

Alternative Technology Working GroupWorking Group Timeline (cont.)

• Schedule for Report DevelopmentOctober 2015 –Roadmap and Message DevelopmentNovember 2015 –Finalization of WG Report and Identification of

StakeholdersDecember 2015 –Update on Draft Report January 2016 –Issue Final Report at Joint Nuclear CIPAC and recommend

Next Steps

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National Protection and Programs Directorate Department of Homeland Security

Alternative Technology Working Group

For more information, visit:

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Additional Working Groups

• International Ad Hoc Group on Alternative Technologies – The goal of the group is to exchange views and ideas that help develop an international roadmap on alternative technology.

• Health Physics Society Task Force on Alternative Technologies – This group will bring together users of high activity radiological sources to discuss opportunities and acceptance of alternative technologies.

• National Science and Technology Council – Working group to look at the issue of alternative technologies under the Committee on Homeland and National Security. A primary objective of the NSTC is the establishment of clear national goals for Federal science and technology investments in a broad array of areas.

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Cesium Irradiator Replacement Program

• Cesium Irradiator Replacement Program (CIRP) - ORS has initiated a CIRP pilot effort that incentivizes domestic users who choose to convert from a cesiums-137 irradiator to a non-isotopic alternative (e.g., X-ray irradiator). • ORS is in the process of evaluating the CIRP Pilot for broader

applicability for FY16 implementation.• ORS has received numerous inquiries as well as volunteers to

participate in CIRP.

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Research and Development

ORS is working in collaboration with Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNNR&D) within NNSA to identify gaps and fund technology developments for non-isotopic devices that are not yet commercially available. Research in alternative technologies includes:• Superconducting LINAC X-ray source (panoramic irradiator)• Flat panel X-ray sources (blood, sterilization and research irradiation)• Micro-linacs (radiography and well logging)• Dense Plasma Focus (well logging)ORS and DNNR&D are working together to create a research and development roadmap for alternative technologies. This roadmap will look at each application (e.g. blood irradiation, research, etc), the currently available technologies and the identified needs or gaps. Once the gaps or needs are identified, the roadmap will outline the path forward for improving, or in some cases developing, the technology.

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Joy FergusonProgram DirectorDomestic Radiological SecurityJoy.Ferguson@nnsa.doe.gov202-287-6845

Kristina HatcherRegional OfficerDomestic Radiological SecurityKristina.Hatcher@nnsa.doe.gov202-586-7544

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Contact

Check out our new webpage at: ww.nnsa.energy.gov/RSP