o'kelley, thomas a - locke's doctrine of intuition was not borrowed from descartes

8/7/2019 O'Kelley, Thomas A - Locke's Doctrine of Intuition Was Not Borrowed From Descartes

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Royal Institute of Philosophy

Locke's Doctrine of Intuition Was Not Borrowed from DescartesAuthor(s): Thomas A. O'KelleySource: Philosophy, Vol. 46, No. 176 (Apr., 1971), pp. 148-151Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749446 .

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LOCKE'S DOCTRINE OF INTUITION WAS NOTBORROWED FROM DESCARTES1THOMASA. O'KELLEY

THERegulae ad directionemingenii of Rene Descartes is an unfinishedLatin work, written about 1628, which sets forth twenty-one rules to befollowed in acquiring reliable knowledge. The manuscript remainedunpublished until 1701, although a few handmade copies were circulatedamong the Cartesians. The Port Royal Logic (1664) contains part of thematerial; Leibniz purchased a copy in Holland in 1670; and a Flemishtranslationwas made il 1684.John Locke published the Essay ConcerningHuman Understandingin1690, but two different drafts were written in 1671. These have beennewly discovered in the present century and were published-along withcertain of Locke's journal entries. They are currently referred to asDraft A2 and Draft B.3 During the two decades after writing the draftsand before completing the Essay Locke made two extended visits to theContinent. He travelledin France from 1676 to 1679and endured a self-imposed exile in Holland from 1683 to 1688. Because of these Europeansojourns, and because of the remarkable similarity of portions of theEssay and the Regulae, several commentators on these works have con-cluded that Locke probably encountered a copy of the Regulae while inEurope and borrowed from it certain important doctrines which aredeveloped in the Essay. I propose to show here that this inference is amistake.The most persistentclaim made by the commentators and biographersis that Locke's doctrine of intuitionwas borrowed from the Regulae. Ishall cite some of these claims and refute them as unwarrantedby pre-senting satisfactory evidence that such borrowing is highly improbable.This is done in the hope of correctingwhat is almost certainly an errorinthe history of philosophy.Thereare two significantitems found in Locke'sjournals which he keptwhile travelling in France. Under the date line 'Sunday Aug. 8' in thejournalfor 1677 we finda catalogueof Cartesianwritingswith the heading:Cartesiiopera omnia.4 This list makes no mention of the Regulae, fromwhich it follows that Locke was not awareof such a writingas late as 1677.Also, in a journal entry for March 7, 1678, a lengthy article appears-in faculty French-entitled Methodepour bienetudierla doctrinede Mr. deCartes.5 An excerpt from the article is translatedas follows:One must, nevertheless, expect from the reading of his Methodealone a comprehensive synopsis in which Descartes establishes thefoundation of all parts of the doctrine which he wishes to impart. Forhe gives only four rules of logic and a veryfew principlesof physics...It is true that he teaches in no other place of logic, claiming that thefour ruleswhichhe gave, if well applied, must fulfill all that is necessaryin this area...This is convincingevidencethat Locke did not know of a Cartesianwritingcontainingtwenty-onerules of logic as late as 1678.Locke specificallydeniesthat he borrowedany doctrinesfrom Descartes.In his First Letter to Stillingfleet he says, 'I am so far from entitling his[Descartes'] writings to any of the errors or imperfectionswhich are to befound in my Essay ... they were spun barely out of my own thoughts.'6148


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LOCKE'SDOCTRINE OF INTUITION WAS NOT BORROWEDFROM DESCARTESAlso, in a letter to EdwardClarkdated January 1, 1685,he denies that heis expressingthe opinions of others and claims to have 'purposelyavoidedthe reading of all books that treated any way of the subject, so that Imight have nothing to bias me any way'.7In the face of this evidence, however, the commentators continue topropagate the opinion that the doctrine of intuition is borrowed from theRegulae. Elizabeth Haldane reasoned that the manuscript 'must havebeen circulatedthrough Holland, for Locke appears to have read it whenthere'. James Gibson proposes that Locke's 'conception of intuition ...is due directlyor indirectlyto the influenceof Descartes [theRegulae] .. .'.9Richard Aaron concludes that the Regulae was 'not improbably' besideLocke when he formulated his theory of knowledge. 'If IV.ii of theEssay be compared with the opening sections of Descartes' Regulae themeasure o' indebtedness will be appreciated.'10 Aaron's conviction isapparentfrom the following:The opening chapters of Book IV ... have no counterpartin the draftsof 1671 and were not, apparently, part ot the original scheme. Theyare the products of Locke's reflections between 1671 and 1690. ... Itwas the intuitionism of Descartes, made most explicit in his Regulae....But whether he was directly acquainted with it or not, he certainlylearnt its contents fully from the Cartesians, and had made the theoryset forth in its pages his own.11Other commentatorswho are convinced that Locke borrowedhis doctrinefrom the Regulae are Leslie J. Beck,12Charlotte S. Ware,13and MauriceCranston.14Descartes' doctrine of intuition appears in the Regulae but it remainsundevelopedthere and is hardly mentioned in his later works. I proposeto show conclusively that Locke did set out a doctrine of intuition in bothof the drafts of 1671-long before he visited the continent. If this issatisfactorily established, then the claim that the doctrine is borrowedfrom the unpublished Cartesian manuscript is remote and most likelyerroneous.

The doctrine of intuition Locke sets out in Draft B is somewhatdifferentfrom the doctrine of the same name as it appears in the completed Essay.The earlier writing does not clearly distinguish between intuition anddemonstration.When we would arrive at that great certaintywhich we call DEMONSTRA-TION, we usually appeal to our eyes, and look for no greater certaintythan what our eyes can affordus; the whole evidence of this appearancebeing no more than what the word DEMONSTRATIONdoes naturallyimport, which is to show anything as it is, and make it be perceived; sothat in truth what we come to know this way is not by proof, butintuition. Draft B: 44.According to this, Locke is saying that the meaning of the term 'demon-stration', as he is using it, is a knowledgeof certainty that is immediateand does not requireproof. But this is what we, in the present century,ordinarily take to be the 'natural import' of the term 'intuition', not of'demonstration'. Yet it is clear that, in Draft B, Locke is using the twoterms synonymously. Now although the term 'intuition' does not appearin Draft A, we find the term 'demonstration'occurringfrequently. Thisdemands a careful inspection of Draft A to determinehow Locke appliesthe term 'demonstration' in that earliest writing.

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PHILOSOPHY

And indeed demonstrationsare not properlyproofs or capable of anyor can be produced by argumentand proof what ever we thinke but areas the word denotes the bare shewing of the things or proposing themtc the senses or understandingssoe as to make us take notice of them.. . .The demonstration manifests its self in the mind as evidently asthat one and one are two but hath noe other proofe of it but the putingand observing them together .... Certain knowledg or demonstrationmakes it self clearly appeareand be perceived by the things them selvesput together in our sight or their clear distinct Ideas put togeather andas it were lyeing before us in view in our understandings. Draft A: 27.Therecan be no question, then, that in 1671 Locke set out a doctrine ofimmediateknowledgeand designatedit by the term 'demonstration'. Yet,

in the completed Essay of 1690we find a marginaltitle which announces:Demonstrationdependson clearly perceivedproofs, and the accompanyingtext makes it clear that 'demonstration'signifiesmediatedknowledge.Those intervening ideas, which serve to show the agreement of anytwo others, are called proofs; and where the agreement and disagree-ment is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called demon-stration. Essay IV ii 3.In the next paragraphLocke goes on to stipulate the difference betweenthe denotations of 'intuition' and 'demonstration'.This knowledge [demonstration],by intervening proofs, though it becertain, yet the evidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright, norassent so ready, as in intuitive knowledge.Thus, the denotation of the term 'demonstration' in the Essay is dia-metricallyopposite to that of the same term when it appearsin the drafts.In 1671it meant immediateunprovableknowledge,a synonymfor 'intuition',and in 1690 it meant mediated,provableknowledge. To finally establishthis point I present the following parallel passages from Draft A and theEssay. The same terms are used to describe demonstrationin the earlierwritingand intuitionin the later one. Clearlywhat Locke is trying to sayis the same in bothcases; the termshe used to designateit are different,but

the terms he used to describeit are the same. These are: 'no doubt', 'nouncertainty', 'no hesitation', and 'clearest knowledge'. (The italics aremine.)Draft A: All such affirmations and negations are made without anymanner of doubt uncertaintyor haesitation, as the clearest knowledgewe can have which indeed is internal and mentall demonstration.Draft A: 27.Essay: Such kinds of truths the mind perceives ... by bare intuition ...and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain that humanfrailty is capable of ... and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, orexamination. Essay: IV ii 1.Thus we may be sure that Locke's theory of knowledge embracedwhatwe understandas 'intuition' as early as 1671, but the doctrine was not asmatureas it was in 1690. He not only changedthe terminology,he addedthe important observation that intuition is necessary to explain how thesteps in a proof can be known to validity follow one another. Thisfunction of intuition is not recognizedby Descartes in the Regulae,where-upon there remainsno warrantfor the claim that the unpublished manu-script had any influenceupon the Essay at all.St. PetersburgJunior College, Clearwater,Florida.150


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LOCKE'S DOCTRINE OF INTUITION WAS NOT BORROWEDFROM DESCARTES'The subjectis covered in greaterdetail in the author's M.A. thesisacceptedat theFlorida State Universityin 1964.2RichardI. Aaron and JocelynGibb, AnEarly Draftof Locke's EssaytogetherwithExcerptsfrom hisJournals(Oxford:The ClarendonPress,1936).3BenjaminRand, An Essay Concerningthe Understanding,Knowledge,Opinion,andAssent,byJohnLocke(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1931).4Aaronand Gibb, op. cit., p. 91.5Ibid.,pp. 105-11.6TheWorksof JohnLocke(London:T. Tegg, 1823),IV, pp. 48-9.7RichardAaron,JohnLocke(2nd ed., Oxford:The ClarendonPress,1963),p. 54.8ElizabethS. Haldane,Descartes:His Life and Times(London:John Murray,1905),p. 135.9JamesGibson,Locke'sTheoryof Knowledgeand its HistoricalRelations(Cambridge:The UniversityPress,1960),pp. 211-2.'OAaron,op. cit., p. 10."Ibid., pp. 220-21.12LeslieJ. Beck, The Methodof Descartes:A Study of the Regulae (Oxford:TheClarendonPress,1952), p. 67.13CharlotteS. Ware,"TheInfluenceof Descarteson John Locke: A BibliographicalStudy',RevueInternationaldePhilosophie,XII (1950), p. 219.14MauriceCranston,John Locke: A Biography(New York: The MacmillanCo.,1957),p. 274.

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o'kelley, thomas a - locke's doctrine of intuition was not borrowed from descartes

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