INTRODUCTION

There have been many discussions on the existence of US

military bases in Okinawa since the end of World War II, which see

the problem as a problem of Japan as a sovereign state highly

dependent on foreign force for her security. However, for Okinawan

people, their “Okinawan Problem” has three aspects: problem of

identity, problem of social and economic discrepancy, and problem of

the existence of US bases.

By discussing the three aspects of Okinawan Problem, this

paper will see the problem as problem of dependency of Okinawan on

both the US bases and the Japanese central government. Finally, the

rape case of Okinawan schoolgirl by three US servicemen in 1995 and

a series of political processes that followed will be examined as case

study to show the dependency of Okinawa on both the US bases and

the central government. These processes were the biggest protest

rally that for the first time unified the opposition in Okinawan

parliament, governor Ota “rebellion” for refusing to sign necessary

papers which would force anti-base landowners to continue leasing

their lands, prefectural referendum which turned into anti-climax, and

the shift of governance from Ota to Keiichi which marked the “cooling

down” of anti-base movement in Okinawa.

1

THE OKINAWANS

For quite a long time Okinawa had been a separate political

entity, holding a stature equal to that of Vietnam, Korea, and to some

extent even of Japan, in the Chinese dominated sphere of East Asia.

The Kingdom of Ryuku formed in 1429 and Okinawan Islands were

part of it. The Ryukyu Kingdom was one of the most ‘faithful’

tributary states of China, sending regular and frequent tribute-

bearing missions to the Chinese court. “Japanization” of Okinawa

started in 1609 when the Ryukyu Kingdom was brought within the

domain of the Satsuma clan of Japan. However, while Ryukyu became

a vassal state paying tribute to Satsuma, it was allowed to retain its

royal family still sending tributary missions to China. Only after the

feudal system was abolished in the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the

Ryukyus became fully integrated to Japan with abolition of Ryukyu

Kingdom in 1879 to be brought under central Japanese government

as Okinawa prefecture.

Culturally, Okinawa shows its distinction from the proper Japan.

Language is probably the most common argument to say that

Okinawan are culturally Japanese. However, linguistic study shows

that Ryukyuan and Japanese language are cognate languages which

were separated from each other some time between 1,450 and 1,700

years ago.1 Physically Okinawan are not outside of Japanese racial 1 Hattori Shiro (1961), (tr. Mauer Torpe), “A Glottochronological Study of Three Okinawan Dialects,” International Journal of American Linguistic, vol 27 (1961),

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stock. However, in comparison to the rest of Japanese (except to the

Ainu, which racially is undoubtedly not Japanese), Okinawans are

characterized by shorter stature, broader shoulder, darker skin,

grater nasal breadth, eider eye opening, and most notably, the

relative higher degree of (body) hairiness.2

Problem of Identity

The past Okinawan relationship with China had contributed to

the problem of Okinawan identity. Arts, architecture, philosophy and

Chinese laws (such as in regulation of land ownership) were among

Chinese influences to Okinawan culture, as were Chinese dietary

customs. The raising of pigs and eating of pork continues today to be

much more common than in the rest of Japan, and has been a source

for mainland perceptions of Okinawa as "Chinese" or "foreign."

The victory of Japan in Sino-Japanese War convinced many

Okinawans that closer identification with the victorious nation was

not such a bad idea after all. This reflected in some trends as Robson

describe,

An early effect of the [Sino-Japan] war was the decline of the pro-Chinese faction among Okinawan intellectuals. But among the population at large there was a broad, if not deep, effort to identify with Japan. Boys changed their hair-styles from

cited in Akio Watanabe (1970), The Okinawa Problem a Chapter in Japan-US Relations, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, p. 3.2 William P. Lebra (1966), Okinawan Religion: Belief, Ritual, and Social Structure, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 7-8.

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the traditional topknot and pin to the crew cut popular on the mainland. Women began adding the -ko suffix to their given names, and men adopted kun pronunciations for their names which previously had readings that were closer to on. In Okinawa, unlike in Korea four decades later, such renaming was voluntary. 3

However, at least in Okinawans perception, the mainland

Japanese considered Okinawans “not Japanese enough” to be

integrated with the mainlanders. Actually, it is not culture or race but

ethnic discrimination that solidified both Okinawan and Japanese

identities. In 1903, there was an exhibition in Osaka that featured

what was called a Human Museum (jinruikan). As widely advertised,

this "museum" displayed "live specimens of exotic peoples" who were

Taiwanese, Ainu, and Okinawan women wearing their traditional

dress. Therefore Okinawans were explicitly regarded as outsiders or

migrants.4

There are a substantial number of Okinawan migrant workers in

mainland Japan, most of them work in low-paid jobs. These workers

reside in Okinawa mura (villages) in large cities. Employers regarded

Okinawans as lazy and unreliable, which justify the low wages they

gave, in contradiction to diligent and reliable Japanese workers.

During World War II Okinawa became the only Japanese war field. The

3 Steve Rabson (1996), “Assimilation Policy in Okinawa: Promotion, Resistance, and Reconstruction” in JPRI Occasional Paper, No. 8, October, available online http://www.jpri. org/jpri/public/op8.html4 John Lie (2001), Multi Ethnic Japan, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 98.

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Japanese military had regarded Okinawans as unreliable, believing

the lacking in martial spirit and less loyal to the Emperor.5

However, no matter how hard they tried to integrate

themselves, the Okinawans were not fully accepted as "Japanese." In

1945, their tie with Japan was abruptly severed, as Okinawa was

placed under occupation of the United States military. This separation

from Japan did not encourage the Okinawans to seek their

independence, although the occupation force tried to convince

Okinawans that they were not Japanese. Instead, the Okinawans

pursued reversion to Japan as a way to free themselves from the

American occupation, demanding equal treatment with the mainland

Japanese.

On May 15, 1972 Okinawa was "re-assimilated" into the

Japanese polity. Yet assimilation persists as an issue today. On the

one hand, it is seen as insufficient to have boosted Okinawa to a level

of material prosperity equal to the rest of Japan. Local economic

conditions have improved markedly since reversion, but Okinawa's

per capita income is still the lowest in Japan.

For Okinawans, becoming "Japanese" means discarding their

ethnic identity and characteristics first. Then, separated from Japan

and under American occupation, they awoke to their own distinct

identity. Yet, they were not free from the legacy of being "Japanese,"

5 Ishihara Masaie (1992), “Okinawasen no shosoo to sono haikei,” as quoted in John Lie (2001), Multi Ethnic Japan, p. 99.

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and had to assert their Japanese identity in order to free themselves

from foreign occupation. Since its reversion to Japan, Okinawa has

poured with capital from the central government along with rigid

bureaucratic control designed, as noted by Amemiya, “to wipe out

regional characteristics.”6

Okinawans now have lost their own language and cultural

identity. Only in recent years there are some efforts to revive the

Okinawan language in literature and the performing arts. Okinawans

have been struggling to reestablish their identity and searching for a

system of ideas with which to help determine their own destiny.

Economic Discrepancy

Being separated from the rest of Japan until 1972, Okinawa did

not experience the process of rebuilding Japanese economy soon

after the war. As cold war period started to begin, the Korean War

broke out in 1950 had contributed to the Japanese economic recovery

through the opportunity to become supplier of US military. Another

source of war-generated industrial boom for Japan was the Vietnam

War. Again, Japan became the main supplier of US forces during the

war. Okinawa did not enjoy the advantage of these two wars since it

6 Kozy K. Amemiya (1998), “Being “Japanese” in Brazil and Okinawa” in JPRI Occasional Paper, No. 13, May, available online http://www.jpri.org/jpri/public/op13.html

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was still under US military occupation during the Korean war, and

although the Vietnam War ended when Okinawa has been returned to

Japan, industry in Okinawa at that time was far from ready for such a

boom.

Okinawa prefecture has been the poorest prefecture in Japan.

Twenty years after reversion, Okinawa’s per capita income was only

72 percent of the national average, while unemployment rate was 7.6

percent, two times higher than the national average.7 Ten years later,

Okinawa is now still the poorest prefecture with its both living

expenditure and household expenditure accounted of 75.4 percent of

national average.8

Problem of US Military Bases

Following Japan’s defeat in World War II, Okinawa was under US

rule. Since then, Okinawa became an American military outpost and

played important role during the Vietnam War. In the process,

Okinawa itself became highly militarized. Although Okinawa

7 Okinawa Prefecture, “Promotion and Dedvelopment of Okinawa” available online http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/97/kokusaitoshikeisei/mokuji-e.html8 Japanese Government, “National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure” available online http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/zensho/3.htm

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constitutes only 6 percent of total Japanese landmass, about 75

percent of American military bases in Japan were located there.

The bases occupy 20 percent of Okinawa Island with 25,000 US

military personnel as of 2001, thus accidents and incidents have

been the consequences. Since 1972 reversion, 39 aircraft crashes

happened, means more than once a year. There ware report of toxic

waste disposals from the bases, and the common complaint of local

resident is noise exposure. Regarding this noise pollution, there was

1999 report of a research on the aircraft noise influences to health by

a team chaired by Takeo Yamamoto from Kyoto University, which

concluded that hearing ability of people reside near the bases was

85-95 percent of normal.9 Crimes committed by US military personnel

is also recorded, and as percentage of total crime in Okinawa it was

0.9 percent in 2001, with the highest rates was 6.9 and 6.5 percent in

1973 and 1974.10

US occupation had brought notably ethnic consequences.

Intermarriage between American military personnel and Okinawan

women occurs, resulting in the increasing number of haafu (from

“half,” half Japanese, half American), children born from

intermarriage. US presence in Okinawa also generated considerable

9 This report is available online at http://www.asahikawa-med.ac.jp/dept/mc/hygiene/okinawa/ report-e.html10 Okinawa Prefecture, “The Number of Criminal Cases in which SOFA Status People have been Arrested,” available online http://www2.pref.okinawa.jp/oki/okinawa.nsf/98ec0e16075d27 aa492567340044e504/6b5dda8761e27dd049256b7200236c4d?OpenDocument

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anti-American sentiments, which in turn contributed pro-Japanese

sentiments during the occupation period.

The existence of the vast US military bases in Okinawa has had

a huge impact on the local economy. Bases revenues (revenues

generated by military-related transactions), which consists of salary

paid to Japanese bases employees, rental fees for land used by the

US military paid to the local landowners and money spent by SOFA

status people in the local economy, have played an important role in

the prefecture's economy. For instance, at the time of Okinawa's

reversion, bases revenues accounted for 15.6% of prefectural gross

expenditure.

Since reversion, the percentage of bases revenues within

Okinawa's gross expenditure has reduced over the years as the rest

of the prefectural economy expanded. By 1998, it has declined to

approximately one third to stand at 5.2%. However, the value of

bases revenues has approximately doubled from 78 billion yen at the

time of reversion to 187.3 billion yen in 1998. Thus, bases revenues

still remain a large source of income for Okinawa's economy as one

of the essential element in the prefecture's economic activities.

9

THE RAPE: UNIFIED THE OPPOSITION

Unlike previous crime involving US military personnel, the rape

of a twelve-year-old schoolgirl by three US servicemen in September

4, 1995 brought immediate anger throughout the prefecture, due to

the brutality and the young age of the victim. Through the

development of the case, there were two growing feeling within the

people of Okinawa. First, the growing anti-US bases sentiments and

the view that the central government was not serious in responding

to the frustration of Okinawan over the high concentration of US

bases and personnel there. These feelings were due to the delay in

turning the three suspects to Japanese authorities. Article 17 of the

Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) prevented the three suspects from

being handed over to the Japanese authorities until they were

indicted.

The rape was a spark to the growing anti US bases sentiments

in Okinawa. There were two other fuels for this sentiment. First, the

rally organized by some citizen organization to protest the bases. The

rally in Genowan city in October 21, 1995 was the biggest people

gathering in Okinawa, attended by nearly 100,000 people. The rally

called for acceleration of the reduction of the bases, the revision of

SOFA so that crimes committed by US military personnel will be

properly handled, and compensations and apologies to victim of

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crime committed by US military personnel. The importance of the

rally was that all opposition parties attended the rally; thus the rally

was able to unite disparate political parties behind the common

agenda of the issues the gathering sought to address.

The second fuel to the anti US bases sentiment was the

“rebellion” of the governor of Okinawa. On August 28, 1996, the

central government (the Supreme Court) ordered Governor Ota to

sign the necessary papers that would force 35 anti bases landowners

to continue leasing their lands at some bases Naha, Koza, and

Yomitan village. Feeling confident with support from the mass and

the Okinawan Parliament, Ota which was elected as governor on the

bases of anti US base platform, refused the order.

THE REFERENDUM: ANTI CLIMAX

In addition to the two fuel for anti US bases sentiments, the

expected to be the third fuel, the prefectural referendum was failed

in gaining support from the mass. The referendum, for which 479

million yen was allocated, asked one question consisted of two not

necessarily related parts: “(How do you feel about) reviewing the

Japan-US SOFA and reducing the American bases in our prefecture?”11

The options of answers were “agree” and “oppose.”

11 Translation by Robert D. Eldridge (1997) in his “The 1996 Okinawa Referndum on US Base Reduction” in Asian Survey, Vol. 37 No. 10, October 1997, pp. 879-904.

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As predicted, 89 percent of the voters participating answered

“agree.”12 However, intended to question the US military bases, the

referendum turned to gain less than sixty percent of eligible voters.

Voter absenteeism was as high as 40.47 percent. Prior to the

referendum, almost everyone in Okinawa seemed to agree with the

need to reduce US bases and review the SOFA agreement.

Unfortunately, the question of the referendum was vague; there was

no clear understanding of what its goals were. In the referendum

question, there was no clear indication to what extent the “reduction”

of the base would be.

The referendum turned to be an anti climax for anti US bases

sentiments, followed by announcement by Governor Ota that he

agreed to sign the papers that would end the resistance of 35

landowners to continue leasing their lands to the US bases, just two

days after the referendum. Ota’s surrender after he met Prime

Minister Hashimoto in which Hashimoto promised to pour additional 5

billion yen to the prefecture, showed that Okinawa was highly

dependent on the central government economically and that it was

difficult for the prefectural government to act differently from Tokyo’s

policy. Ota was aware of the possible use of the 1952 Special

Measures Law to create a special legislation to simplify the procedure

of settling the dispute.

12 Vote result available online http://www.okinawa.ttc.co.jp/resultvote.html

12

OTA MASAHIDE AND THE SEEK OF AUTONOMY

Ota was the governor of Okinawa for two periods. He was

elected for the first time in 1990 with his anti-base platform

campaign. Basically, his policy was based on his believe that the US

bases would be expelled from Okinawa someday. In Ota’s calculation,

the bases problem would solve itself overtime, as East Asia stabilizes.

In his own words, “There is a good chance that by 2015 the Korean

problem will be solved and the relationship between China and

America will be much better,” and when it happens, “American tax

payer will lose interest in spending more than $30 billion a year to

maintain an unnecessary and unwanted East Asian garrison.” 13

When the withdrawal becomes a reality, Okinawa, looking into

what happened to the Philippines, will lose important source of

income: the bases for the base-related transaction and the central

government’s “compensation policy.” This compensation is a form of

form of soft coercion to obtain community support for desired

government objectives. In the case of Okinawa, the subsidies that the

prefectural government receives for the possible loss of tax revenue

are well above standard compensation outlays. Thus, Okinawan

economy is dependent on both the base and the Japanese central

government, as Table 1 shows.

13 Ota Masahide, cited in Mike Millard (1998), “Okinawa, Then and Now” in JPRI Occasional Paper, No. 11, February, available online http://www.jpri.org/jpri/public/op11.html

13

Table 1 shows that the dependency of Okinawan economy on

the base-related transaction has decreased, but the dependency on

“revenues from outside the prefecture” has reached 85 percent in

1997. Recently, the Japanese central government has three new

channels for the pouring of money to calm down anti-base sentiment:

(1) a pool of 7.5 billion yen for each district hosting US military base;

(2) large-scale endowments for municipalities that volunteers sites

for relocation within Okinawa prefecture, and (3) 100 billion yen over

seven years for projects proposed under the Informal Council on

Okinawa Municipalities Hosting US Base. 14

Table 1

14 Julia Yonetani (2001), “Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic Theatre” Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 74-75.

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Source : Okinawa Prefecture Homepage

What Ota wanted for Okinawa was more autonomy and was

called “grassroots federalism” since he based his struggle on the

popular voice of Okinawans. As stated by an activist that since the

1995 rape case, “More people have begun talking about Okinawan

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independence, about taking more autonomy from the central

government . . . . We didn’t think that way before.”15 Ota’s

government hoped to wring some economic concessions fro the

central government in return of a gradual reduction or relocation of

the bases. By receiving special treatments from Tokyo in term of

tariff and tax concessions that would attract investment, Ota hoped

to achieve economic parity with the rest of Japan.

KEIICHI INAMINE AND “HONEYMOON PERIOD”

Ota’s defeat from Inamine in 1998 was not a surprise since he

had lost most of his anti-base posture when he gave up from Tokyo’s

pressure and signed up necessary papers to force anti base

landowners continue leasing their land for bases’ purposes. Ota saw

an opportunity in a local plebiscite in Nago City, where 51.3 percent

of the citizens voted against the plan to build Nago Air Station.16 Ota

used this issue in the hope of rebuild his anti base image, but he

failed in the 1998 election. His competitor, Inamine, in his election

campaign promised a fifteen-year lease limit and joint civilian use of

the Nago base. 17 At least his public image differed from the standing

of the central government and the US government.

15 Chikako Yoshida, cited in Mike Millard, Ibid.16 Nago was the chosen site for the relocation of Futenma Air Base.17 Julia Yonetani (2001), “Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic Theatre” Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1, p. 79.

16

Inamine was an LDP supported candidate and was the deputy

chair of Shima-kon. His involvement in Shima-kon gave a clue for his

more “pro-Tokyo” policy. Discussing the bases, he writes “When the

best option is out of reach and only a second-best option is available,

I believe one should settle for the latter . . . , rather than refuse to

compromise at all and come home empty handed” 18 As an

entrepreneur, LDP supported candidate, and had a high position in

Shima-kon before elected governor, Inamine administration have

secured the flow of central government’s money to the prefecture in

return of the reduction of prefectural challenging position on bases

issue.

Inamine administration is sort of “honeymoon period” with

Tokyo compared to Ota’s. Right after his inauguration, Inamine called

a meeting of Okinawa Policy Council which had been frozen by Ota

due to Futenma relocation issue. In this meeting, Prime Minister

Obuchi immediately promised a 10 billion yen additional budget to

Okinawa prefecture, doubled what Ota had from Tokyo for the

resolution of lease problem. In April 1999, Tokyo announced that

Okinawa would be the host of G8 Summit in 2000. The fact that

Okinawa ranked the last in the readiness of facilities only gave

another justification to transfer funds to the prefecture to build

facilities needed.

18 Inamine Keiichi (2000), “Okinawa as Pacific Crossroads” in Japan Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, p. 14.

17

Inmine administration continues to seek more autonomy as

what his predecessor did, but he relies more on the central

government’s supports which to some extent creates an image of

more pro Tokyo policy and less anti base than Ota’s. However,

Inamine considers his governance gets support from Okinawan

people, therefore recently announced his candidacy for the next

election.

CONCLUSION

If prefectural election result is more or less representing what

Okinawans want, looking into Inamine’s success in the prefectural

election in 1998, the “honeymoon period” with Tokyo, and his

confidence to go to his second governor candidacy, it is likely that

Okinawans have been becoming accepting the existence of the US

military bases. Identity problem would not be as strong as it had been

during the first years of reversion as Okinawans have found their

destiny (and dependency) as part of Japan. Although now Okinawa

prefecture still has the lowest income per capita in Japan, its

economy has improved significantly since the reversion. To put it in

other words, although only 72 percent of the national level,

“Okinawa’s per capita income exceeded that of Italy, France, and

Great Brittain.”19

19 John M. Purves (1995), Island of Military Bases: a Contemporary Political History of Okinawa, MA thesis, International University of Japan, p. 188.

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REFERRENCES

Amemiya, Kozy K. (1998), “Being “Japanese” in Brazil and Okinawa” in JPRI Occasional Paper, No. 13, May, available online http://www.jpri.org/jpri/ public/op13.html.

Eldridge, Robert D. (1997), “The 1996 Okinawa Referndum on US Base Reduction” in Asian Survey, Vol. 37 No. 10, October 1997.

Japanese Government, “National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure” available online http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/zensho/3.htm

Keiichi, Inamine (2000), “Okinawa as Pacific Crossroads” in Japan Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3.

Lebra, William P. (1966), Okinawan Religion: Belief, Ritual, and Social Structure, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Lie, John (2001), Multi Ethnic Japan, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Millard, Mike (1998), “Okinawa, Then and Now” in JPRI Occasional Paper, No. 11, February, available online http://www.jpri.org/jpri/public/op11.html

Okinawa Prefecture, “Promotion and Dedvelopment of Okinawa” available online http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/97/kokusaitoshikeisei/mokuji-e.html

Okinawa Prefecture, “The Number of Criminal Cases in which SOFA Status People have been Arrested,” available online http://www2.pref.okinawa.jp/oki/

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okinawa.nsf/98ec0e16075d27aa492567340044e504/6b5dda8761e27dd049256b7200236c4d?OpenDocument

Purves, John M. (1995), Island of Military Bases: a Contemporary Political History of Okinawa, MA thesis, International University of Japan.

Rabson, Steve (1996), “Assimilation Policy in Okinawa: Promotion, Resistance, and Reconstruction” in JPRI Occasional Paper, No. 8, October, available online http://www.jpri.org/jpri/public/op8.html

Watanabe, Akio (1970), The Okinawa Problem a Chapter in Japan-US Relations, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Yonetani, Julia (2001), “Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic Theatre” Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1.

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