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TRANSCRIPT
OLIGOPOLY OF SECURITY PROVIDERS
IN RIO DE JANEIRO
LINKSCK CONFERENCE
Panel: Chasing demons or creating them?
The unintended consequences of international
counter-narcotics policy in Latin America
19 June 2014
Verena Brähler
PhD Candidate
Institute of the Americas
University College London
TABLE OF CONTENT
Oligopoly of security providers
Complexo do Alemão (case study)
Unintended consequences
Conclusion
2
Pavão-Pavãozinho, Rio de Janeiro
3
Oligopoly of Security Providers in Rio de Janeiro
Military Police
(incl. BOPE & UPP)
Civil Police
Municipal Guards
Military
Federal Police FNSP
Private Security
Companies
Death Squads
Militias
Drug traffickers
4
Oligopoly of Security Providers in Rio de Janeiro
Military Police
(incl. BOPE & UPP)
Civil Police
Municipal Guards
Military
Federal Police FNSP
Private Security
Companies
Death Squads
Militias
Drug traffickers
DRUG TRAFFICKING FACTIONS
5
Wilton Junior/AE/Arquivo/28.12.2009
Dominion of Rio‘s favelas
(December 2013 estimates):
Drug traffickers: 370
Militias: 454
UPP police: 174
Total: 1,001
Drug gangs in Rio
• Comando Vermelho
• Terceiro Comando Puro
• Amigos dos Amigos
MILITARY POLICE
6 BOPE
UPP pacification police
Caveirão (military
police vehicle)
MILITARY
7
Article 142 of the Brazilian Constitution, 1988: “The armed forces … are permanent and regular national institutions, … and are
intended for the defense of the country, for the guarantee of the constitutional
powers, and, on the initiative of any of these, of law and order.”
Military patrolling in the Complexo do Alemão
TABLE OF CONTENT
Oligopoly of security providers
Complexo do Alemão (case study)
Unintended consequences
Conclusion
8
Pavão-Pavãozinho, Rio de Janeiro
COMPLEXO DO ALEMAO
• Agglomeration of 13 favelas
• Min. 70,000 inhabitants
• Lowest HDI and highest crime
rates in Rio
Security providers
• Former stronghold of Comando
Vermelho drug trafficking faction
• Occupied by military
• Pacified by UPP
9
10
BPM BOPE UPP
Most feared 24.4% 31.3% 4.4% 28.9% 11.1%
Most violent 12.8% 29.8% 6.4% 36.2% 14.9%
Biggest threat to
security
9.3% 2.3% 2.3% 4.7% 51.2% 30.2%
Most trusted 12.2% 9.8% 2.4% 9.8% 4.9% 22% 14.6% 24.4%
Who should provide
security
6.7% 11.1% 15.6% 6.7% 11.1% 17.8% 11.1% 2.2% 17.8%
Who is providing
security
100%
Militias Drug
traffickers
PMERJ PCERJ GM Military Private
security
companies
Complexo do Alemão
TABLE OF CONTENT
Oligopoly of security providers
Complexo do Alemão (case study)
Unintended consequences
Conclusion
11
Pavão-Pavãozinho, Rio de Janeiro
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL
COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA
Points to consider
• Counter-narcotics policy is dealt with at the state level
• Rio’s state government is very progressive in policing issues
(“they are teachers not students”)
Examples of international influence
• Research
• Bilateral exchange of expertise
• Best practises (example “pacification” idea from Medellin)
12
TABLE OF CONTENT
Oligopoly of security providers
Complexo do Alemão (case study)
Unintended consequences
Conclusion
13
Pavão-Pavãozinho, Rio de Janeiro
CONCLUSION
Oligopoly of security providers in Rio
de Janeiro
Complexo do Alemão as an example
of a locally-grounded analysis of
“Violent Pluralism“
(Arias & Goldstein 2010)
Rio de Janeiro‘s authorities need
international expertise on human
rights and criminal justice more than
on counter-narcotics issues
(“Who is the real expert?“)
14 Complexo da Penha, Rio de Janeiro
