on the guyanese dictatorship (1988)

8/14/2019 On the Guyanese Dictatorship (1988)

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ON THE GUYANESE DICTATORSHIP:

SUBSTANCE, FORM AND COURSE

Ravi Dev

The trouble with us, comrades, is that we dont know to read between the lines; we are always reading

on top of the lines; we are more democratic than the people who teach us democracy.1

Tyranny, it has been said, is tyranny, and academic distinctions between Authoritarianism,

OneParty Dictatorships and Totalitarianism, leave the unfortunate souls who have to endure them,

singularly unmoved. However, for those seeking to determine how and why these political systems

persist, change, or are changed, an apprehension of the fundamental nature of the dictatorship in

question is a threshold issue that must be addressed.

Even his fervent supporters conceded that Forbes Burnham, who ruled Guyana and dominated its

politics form 1964 to his death in 1985, to be dictatorial. Desmond Hoyte, his successor, has vowed to

uphold the Burnham legacy,2 thereby indicating that the inevitable systematic continuities, inherent in

all polities, will be reinforced.

This analysis will attempt to demonstrate the following:

(i) Burnham established an exclusive oneparty state in Guyana, based on supportfrom the minority Coloured and African sections of the society, and the permanent

exclusion of the majority Indian section from political participation.

(ii) His regime acquired a totalitarian form in operationalzing the goals of permanentsubjugation of the Indian masses, and the satisfaction of his personal ambition for

absolute power.

(iii) He adopted a MarxistLeninist ideology out of a combination of personal conviction;

a need to mobilize the Coloured and African sections; and a desire to rationalize his

totalitarian excesses with an appropriate vocabulary and methodological postulate.

(iv) The Hoytes regime (which succeeded Burnhams) is a continuation of the

exclusionary oneparty state without the MaristLeninist rhetoric. It is based on the

support of the middle and upper class Creole and Indian sections - in tandem with the

demobilization of the lower class African and Indian sections.The analysis will incorporate three levels of generality both in terms of sociocultural contexts

and historical epoch.3At the highest level of generality and long-term outlook in time, the effect of the

global process of modernization/secularisation (this includes changes in modes of production) on nations

can be examined. One theory that operates at this level, and which will be implicit in the analysis, is that

of imperialism and its implications for the colonized nations. From the medium range, the socialsections within the state, and the processes they initiate in confronting the structural discontinuities

implicit in the modernization/secularisation drive within a colonial and neo-colonial context, will be

addressed. Here, the theories of cultural pluralism,4 one-party systems,5 and totalitarianism will be

applied to Guyanas historical record during and after the decolonialization period. Finally, from the

1 Forbes Burnham, Report on the Third Biennial Congress of the PNC, Aug. 22-26 1979, Sophia, Georgetown. p.205.2 Hoyte, Desmond, Address to the P.N.C 7th Biennial Congress, Sophia, Georgetown, 1987.3 Germani, Gino.Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction books

1978.4 Smith, M.G.A Framework for Caribbean Studies. Kingston, Jamaica: U.W.I Extra Mural Department, 1956.

Depres, Leo A. Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana. Rand McNally: Chicago, 1967.5 Huntington, Samuel and Clement Moore.Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of

Established One Party Systems.New York: Basic Books, 1971.

4(a). see notes 15, 16, 17, infra.

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short-range perspective, the principal actors in the social sections, and their tactics and strategies utilized

in the mobilization process, can be considered through theories of leadership and personality.6

The analysis will address the dictatorship primarily from a medium range perspective (socio-

historically), due to the exigencies of focus and space. Cognizant however, of the influence short-range

idiosyncratic features of a society, together with the broader, underlying long range factors impinging onthat society has, in determining the substance of its political regime, the form it will assume, and the

course of its evolution - the short and long range theories will constantly be alluded to.The reality the theories attempt to explain is an unbroken one and the various analyses are

inextricably interwoven. Reification of the analytic categories would substitute epistemological tools for

ontological reality; the result would be incomplete diagnosis and faulty prognosis.

One-Party Systems

Political parties arose during the eighteenth century as vehicles for the articulation of the

demands of the emergent middle class for a share of political power to complement the economic power

they already possessed at that stage in the development of capitalism. Other social alignments also

mobilized as they confronted crises of resource allocation and control, of legitimacy and power relations

and of participation and integration. Where the level of secularisation produces a complex pattern of

cross cutting cleavages in society to protect various interests, plural party systems emerge. 7 In contrast,in countries where mutually reinforcing cleavages of race, social and economic classes, ethnicity or

language coincide, the socially plural societies evolve as politically bifurcated. 8 The emergent political

parties are broker institutions for groups, which define their interests in mutually exclusive terms withreference to control of the state and allocation of its resources. 9 Politics is practised at a primordial level

with apocalyptic fervour: winner takes all.

A one-party system is, in effect, the efforts of a political elite to organise and to legitimise rule

by one social force over another in a bifurcated society.10In Europe, the result was either a separation

into different countries so that the cleavages become international rather than national or the creation of

a one-party authoritarian or totalitarian state. 11 In the latter case the social class on ethnic group that

controlled or captured the coercive apparatus of the state formed either an exclusionary or

revolutionary one-party system. Exclusionary systems, generally found in ethnic or racial bifurcation,use the party as a means of mobilizing support for their constituency, while at the same time suppressing

or restricting political activity by the subordinate force.12 The revolutionary systems, on the other hand,

attempt to eradicate the bifurcation of society by shrinking society to correspond to its constituency

through liquidation of the subordinate social force or by expanding its constituency to correspond to thesociety by the assimilation of the subordinate social force. 13

6 Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer. New York: Time Books, 1951, 1963. Fromm Eric. The Sane Society, Greenwich

Conn, Fawcett. (1955)7 . Huntington, Samuel, Social and Institutional Dynamics of One Party System, in Samuel Huntington and

Clement Moore, eds. The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems. New York: Basic Books, 1971, p.11. Asthe industrial revolution progressed the social relations of the feudal system in which it begun were profoundly

altered. A major change was the separation of maters of state and church in the activities of the populace (civilsociety) dubbed secularisation. The groups in civil society mobilised to protect or acquire interests.8. id. Generally p.10-11.9. Despres. supra.10. Huntington, supra, p.11.11. Dahl, Robert, ed.Political Oppression in Western Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.12. Huntington. supra.13. Huntington. supra.

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Both one-party systems have proven quite adaptive to the continued demands of modernization.

At the onset, however, the primary goal of both is to achieve control over the polity, and it is at this initial

stage that some one-party systems may adopt a totalitarian form.14

The Totalitarian State 15

Friedrich and Brezinskis 1956 six-point syndrome remains the most authoritative exposition of

the descriptive categorization of totalitarian regimes. Polities that exhibit the following symptoms(abstracted from the experiences of Stalinist Russia, Hitlers Germany and Mussolinis Italy) are by their

definition totalitarian:

(i) An official ideology;

(ii) a single mass party led typically by the man, the dictator;

(iii) a system of terroristic control;

(iv) a near complete monopoly of control of all means of effective mass communication;

(v) a near complete monopoly of control of all means of effective control;

(vi) central control and direction of the entire economy through bureaucratic

coordination.16 In 1969 another feature was added

vii) a near complete monopoly of control of all organisations including economic

ones.17An alternative, and not necessarily a contradictory approach, which will be utilized here,

(rationalist and normative) is to view the abovementioned symptoms as the institutions and practises

through which the regime seeks to realize its ideal - posited here as absolute control and dominationover the society.18 The control is exclusive rather than total, implying that no other institution or

individual can effectively compete with the ruling elite. The elite or maximum leader decides on the

degree of control to be imposed on the society and always retains this initiative.19

From this perspective, polities can vary from anarchistic through liberal democratic,authoritarian, etc. and culminating in totalitarian.20The sine qua non of totalitarianism, then, is the

pervasiveness of the regimes control, extending through and over every institution and every individual

in the society. The will and personality of the leader is an important element in the determination of

whether a one-party system will be totalitarian or authoritarian. 21 The latter are political systems

with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding ideology (but withdistinctive mentality); without intensive or extensive political mobilization (except for some points in

their development), and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group), exercises power within

formally, ill-defined limits, but actually quite predictable ones.22

14. Huntington, supra, 17.15. The term totalitarianism has been used polemically to such an extent against the Soviet Union that many

scholars question the utility of the term. We believe that, as defined below, the term describes a reality that has

existed and which can reappear under the proper conditions as witnessed in Cambodia under Pol Pot in the late

70s. See also Curtis, supra, 12.16. Friedrich, Carl, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. New York: Praeger Press, 1956.17

. Friedrich, Carl, Totalitarianism: Recent Trends, inProblems of Communism. Vol. 17, No 3 May-June, 1972.18. Curtis, Michael. Totalitarianism. New Brunswich, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1979. Other writers have focused on

other qualities as the substance of totalitarianism such as terror. Arendt, Hannah, The Origins ofTotalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace, Javanovich, 1973. The Leaderin Leonard Schapiro,

Totalitarianism.New York: Praeger Pub., 1972.19. Jancer, Wolfe. Czechoslovakia and the Absolute Monopoly of Power. New York: Praeger Press., 1971. p.6.20. Almond. G. and Powell. Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966.21. Shapiro, supra, 70-71.22. Linz, Juan, An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain. For authoritarianism in general, see Perlmutter,

Amos.Modern Authoritarianism: A Sociological Perspective. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Press, 1970.

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It is the drive and single-mindedness of the leader that pushes control to its outer limits and

which results in the complete atomisation of the population and pre-emption of any opposition. He

promulgates an ideology which might express the historical meaning or substance of the regime but

which certainly will offer a vocabulary and a methodological postulate for justifying and legitimising the

totalitarian state. 23

From a medium level of analysis, the legal order - defined broadly as the persistence of an

established system of rules, habits and institutions operating within a fixed framework of limits, eachsingle component part of which has to be overcome or set aside by a special enactment- becomes an

obstacle to the totalitarian leader and this is what he attempts to destroy. 24

The leader and his party, however, do not operate in a vacuum and there are several factors, as

suggested before, which will determine the precise form the regime will adopt; the ideology it will

espouse and the course it will choose: these will be the long and medium term factors.

Guyana: Internal and External Factors

(i) The Peoples Progressive Party (P.P.P.) from its formation in 1950, adopted an aggressive

socialist posture and rhetoric. To the strongly anti-communist Churchill in England; and

Eisenhower, in an America caught up in the McCarthyism communist witch-hunting -

during the height of the cold war - this was simply unacceptable, especially to the latterunder its Truman Doctrine.25The U.S-inspired ouster of Mossedeq in Iran , 26Arbenz of

Guatemala 27 - in 1953 and 1954 respectively - and the suspension of British Guianas

constitution in 1953, appeared to have convinced Burnham that his more gradualist andless pro-Soviet brand of socialism was tactically, the more appropriate course to pursue.

This ideological difference was one of the precipitating factors in the 1955 split between

Burnham and Jagan.

(ii) Guyana was a minuscule British colony, situated in the Western Hemisphere. However,

as a potential gateway into South America, the U.S took its strategic value as a potential

communist base very seriously. The strident rhetoric of the reflexively pro-Soviet

Jagan did little to allay those fears. In 1961, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba,

Kennedy could ill afford to lose Guyana to the communists and this fear was hisrationale for destabilizing the Jagan government.28

(iii) Guyana was also an economically backward colony with severe unemployment

problems. Primarily foreign multi-nations and a small comprador bourgeoisie

controlled the economy. The few social organisations that existed were based primarily

on race and class (which initially coincided) and were geared towards increasing the

share of the colonial pie for their middle class members. Politically, Guyana was

labelled precocious in the fifties due to the politicalisation by the radical P.P.P. 29

23. Germani, Gino, Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Regimes: Italy and Spain, In Huntington and

Moore, eds. Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society. New York: Basic Books, 1971. p.342.24. Schapiro, supra, p. 36.25.Truman, Harry S. Address before a Joint Session of Congress March 12, 1947. We cannot allow changes in the

status quo, by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration quoted in Richard Barnet,

Intervention and Revolution, 1972 p.1926. Barnet, Richard, supra, 26527. Barnet, Richard. id, supra.28. See general, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, Houghton Miflin,

Boston. 1965. p.522-779.29 See generally, Leo Depres, supra.

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(iv) Guyanese society was, and remains, a complex modified plural society, with race

forming the most salient cleavage, within which all other divisions (such as class) as

subsumed. The major sections are the Indians (the majority), Africans, Creoles and

Amerindians. They are ecologically distinct, with Africans and Creoles more urbanized

and proletarianilized, Indians rural and agrarian and the Amerindians relegated to theinterior jungles. The dominant Creole cultural forms have a white bias orientation and

are products of British colonial rule. The Creole section is the guardian and arbiter or theofficial cultural norms, which are imposed hegemonically over other cultural

expressions, such as those of the Indians, Africans, and Amerindians, resulting in severe

problems of identity and authenticity in those groups.30

(v) The organs of the state, especially the bureaucracy and armed forces, were inherited from

the British colonials and were staffed primarily by Creoles and Africans due to

historically biased recruitment patterns. The form of the state was basically an

authoritarian, paternalistic one, geared towards the protection of the planter class, local

business interests and other Imperial concerns.

The Leader, the Ideology and the Party 31

The personality of the leader is a most crucial variable in the determination of the preciseform the one-party system will assume.32 Burnhams overriding characteristics were his ambition

and his intellect. These qualities, along with his oratorical virtuosity 33and tactical skills earned

him the label charismatic34 A member of the communist party while a student in England, he

was recommended by that group to Jagan as a suitable African, who tactically could rally the

African section for the soon-to-be formed nationalist P.P.P. He became Chairman of the party

under the leadership of Jagan; whose position he craved and fought for from the beginning. Other

ethnic leaders were recruited, as the party yet attempted to define itself as a revolutionary party

exploiting the cleavage of class - with the British ruling class and its small local representative

as the enemy.

The ambiguities and contradictions inherent in this approach were myriad but were

masked by the electoral mobilization in the first general elections under universal franchise in

1953. They were exposed as soon as victory was won and the spoils were to be distributed;

they are exemplified by Burnhams persistent pursuit to be the leader from 1953 to the formation

of the P.N.C. in 1958.Burnham craved to be leader for three reasons:

(i) His undeniable personal ambitions;

(ii) his realization that Jagan and other extreme leftists had a very nave

apprehension of the geopolitical realities of the era; and

(iii) he considered himself the representative of the African and Creole sections, who

were increasingly seeing themselves in danger of being overwhelmed by

Indians.35

30

See generally, Leo Depres, and M.G. Smith, supra.31. See, Shapiro, supra, 70-71 for the relationships among leaders, party and ideology in totalitarian states.32. Curtis, supra, 33, in discussing totalitarian regimes, also Shapiro, supra, 4833. Manley, Robert H. Guyana Emergent. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1978, p. 19.34. Manley, Robert H. This quality consists of all apparent possession of supernatural of superhuman or at all even

specifically out of the ordinary qualities which make him appear as an emissary of God or of a destined Leader.

Weber is not concerned with the objective truth about the leaders qualities, and is prepared to include frauds and

charlatans in his category of charismatic leader. See Danns, Transition Vol. 3, No. 1, 1980, for defining Burnham35as a mesmeratic leader.

. Fraudulent Revolution, supra, p.38.

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The last reason stemmed from several factors. Firstly, even though the P.P.P. thought it

had addressed the racial cleavages by recruiting leaders from each racial/ethnic group, the

dominance of the Indian top leadership, the aggressive entry of Indians into positions formerly

dominated by Creoles, the economic development plans that stemmed towards agriculture36, and

the generally jingoistic response of this previously politically backward but numerically largestsection, raised concerns in the other sections as to the implications of their minority status.

While the P.P.P. had defined itself as a revolutionary party, which would eliminate the rulingclass and fuse the rest of society with the working class, the minority group began to perceive

themselves as potentially permanently dependent on the beneficence of the major group. The

P.P.P. was being defined, both by its supporters and its detractors, as an exclusionary party with

its constituency (Indians) and excluded group (Africans and Creoles) racially defined.

Secondly, the discomfiture of the African and Creole sections was exacerbated by the

implications of being dominated by a group with a completely different culture - one they had

been taught to consider as heathen and inferior. The national ethos had defined Guyana as a

Creole nation and the Creoles and Africans, as the guardians of this ethos, naturally presumed

they were to be the inheritors of the nation on the departure of the British. It was unthinkable to

permit power to fall into the hands of the group who were considered to be ambivalent about their

national allegiance.

Burnham, as a consequence, did not have much difficulty in legitimising his drive forpower by articulating the fears of the African and Creole sections, when he launched the P.N.C.

and provided a vehicle to address those fears. In fact Burnham was promised help by Manley and

Bustamante of Jamaica, Adams of Barbados and Padmore of Trinidad if he formed a party to

prevent Jagan from creating and Indian State in Guyana.37 The formation of the United Force(U.F.) in 1960, representing the White and near-white bloc, further increased the paranoia of the

African and Creole sections.

In a plural society where one section is over fifty percent of the population, democratic

elections are not very comforting to minority groups. It is simply a prescription for permanent

exclusion from power and the perquisites thereof, which issue from the exclusionary politics

practiced, once a group acquires power. There is no question that the fears of the minority groups

can be, and have been, heightened by demagogic politicians like Burnham, but one can assert

with as much certitude that the fears are rational and real, based on the experience of minoritiesthe world over. Unless these fears are addressed, minority groups will continue to be receptive to

mobilization by ambitious politicians. Burnham then, received increasing support from Africans

and Creoles as he strove for power because, to reiterate, they perceived their interests and his, as

coincident.

Burnhams attempt to wrest control of the P.P.P. between 1953 and 1955 resulted in a

spilt of the nationalist movement. The ignominious defeat of his faction in the 1957 generalelections persuaded him that he could not win over Indian support by merely utilizing Jagans

tactic of fielding prominent candidates from the other group. Jagan had pre-empted the field. 38

Burnhams fusion with the United Democratic Party (U.D.P.) - the political offshoot of the

League of Coloured People - in 1958 to create the P.N.C., was a natural development. Itcombined Burnhams support among the lower class rural Africans with the strategic support of

the urban based Creole and African middle class.39

36. Greene, J.E., Participation, Integration and Legitimacy as Indicators of Developmental Change in the Politics

of Guyanain Social and Economic Studies, Vol.21,No. 3. 1972. p. 274.37. Glasgow, Roy. Guyana: Race and Politics among Africans and East Indians. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,

1970.38. Fraudulent Revolution, supra, 36.39. Hintzen, Percy. Capitalism, Socialism and Socio-Political Confrontation in Multi-Racial Developing States: a

comparison of Guyana and Trinidad.Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation. New Haven: Yale University, 1980.

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The subsequent defeat of the P.N.C. in the 1961 elections demonstrated to Burnham that

the P.N.C. could not win office under the existing electoral rules. Presented with opportunity to

change those rules, he joined the C.I.A-Trade Union-U.F. sponsored violent destabilization of the

P.P.P. government between 1962 and 1963.40 The Trade Union Congress, (T.U.C.) dominated by

Creole and African middle class leadership, provided both the external links to the U.S. and theinternal support to paralyse the P.P.P. government.41Burnham, to whom politics was the science

of deals, moderated his socialist rhetoric to obtain the support of his new partners. His firstpriority was removing Jagan: to him it meant becoming leader; to his external supporter (the

U.S.) it meant removing a communist threat in its backyard.

Installed into power in 1964, Burnham resumed his drive for absolute control over the

polity. This control, as he other totalitarian leaders have recognised, cannot be achieved through

sheer will alone: individuals and organisations are needed.42 To the dictator however, he is now

presented with a dilemma: the individuals and organisations that he must use will also be

strategically positioned to accumulate power and therefore become potential competitors to his

rule. The totalitarian leader addresses this concern by simultaneously publicly building his

instruments of rule - the party, the army, the bureaucracy, etc., while privately manipulating them

to ensure their complete dependence and loyalty, and forestalling any existence outside of his

beneficence. 43

The Ideology

If ideology is seen as a system of ideas which refers to fundamental political aims anddesigned consciously or unconsciously to influence and direct the course of action for those

within its sphere of influence, then the ideology of the P.N.C. at the inception was essentially a

defensive one: the prevention of Indian control of the State. 44 The State was to be controlled by

Africans and Creole by any means necessary. In reality, this meant control by the Creole middleclass who manipulated racial symbols to bring along the African segment, who then also had a

share of power. The control of the state for, and by African/Creole sections remains the raison

detre of the P.N.C. and explains their initial general indifference to the innovations Burnham

introduced to build his power. The fear that is at its core, also explains why no Indian-led

movement has successfully generated significant support from these sections, notwithstanding theexcesses of Burnham.

It was asserted earlier that Burnham was always a Marxist-Leninist and had merely

moderated his rhetoric for tactical reasons. After the P.N.C. seized sole control of the government

by rigging the elections of 1968, Burnham cautiously begun to introduce Marxist-Leninism into

Guyana and simultaneously construct his totalitarian state. Even if the former does not

necessarily inevitably imply the latter (and this is arguable), it undoubtedly provides a very

cogent rationale and methodology.45 Concomitantly, Marxist-Leninism, at least on a theoretical

level, conflicts with the exclusionary party politics by Burnham and the P.N.C. The Marxist

definition of classes, as dependent on the relationships of the groups to the forces ofproduction, along which they would be mobilized, would have combined most Africans and

Indians, as working class against the bourgeoisie. 46 The latter, mostly Creoles together with

40. Barnet, supra. Burnham had begun to question the constitutncy system in favour of proportional representation

even before 1961.41. Trinidad Guardian, 11 July,1963, quoted in Ashton Chase;A History of Trade Unionism in Guyana, 1964.42. Shapiro, supra, 58. Mussolini and Hitler founded parties and captured power with a semblance of constitutional

rights and legality.43. Curtis, supra, 35-43, Schapiro, supra 22-23.44. Schapiro, supra, p. 47.45. David Lowell. From Marx to Lenin: Marxs Responsibility for Authoritarianism. Cambridge Univ. Press. 198646. Bottomore, T.B., Classes in Modern Society. New York: Vintage Books, 1966, p. 14-18.

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Portuguese, Chinese, and the Indian elite, would have to be eliminated or converted.47

Burnhams Marxist-Leninist innovations, introduced a schizoid element to Guyanese politics: the

covert exclusionary ideology contraposed with an overt exclusionary one. Compounded by the

inevitable negative U.S. response, Burnhams insistence on introducing this potential source of

instability is one reason for insisting that he considered himself as a Marxist-Leninist. If Burnhamsimply desired to rationalize his dictatorship, there are certainly enough models on the right,

unobjectionable to the U.S., that assert their vanguardism as necessary to prevent fissiparoustendencies or to promote stability for development, etc.

Burnham resolved the dichotomy between the two ideologies by operationalzing

differentially the two facets inherent in all ideologies: the instrumental and expressive. The

programmatic or instrumental component of Marxist-Leninist was applied to the Creole/African

sections while for the remainder of the population; the goals were translated into myth. The test

of myth is not what it predicts is true but whether it can be believed. 48 The Indian and other

excluded sections (which later included lower class Africans) were continuously propagandised

included to convince them of their unity as the people who would inherit Guyana in the

millennia and should then accept their present privations. Marxism-Leninism was subsumed

within the cleavage of race/culture. This is not an innovation; seventy-one years after the Soviet

revolution, nineteen of the twenty-three members of the ruling Politburo and Secretariat are

ethnic Russians, even though the latter are only fifty one percent of the population.49 The fact thatMarxists routinely place their national interest ahead of the ideal of international proletarians

should suggest the extent to which the expressive has overwhelmed the instrumental in Marxism-

Leninism. The transcendence of racial over working class interest is simply a manifestation

of the historical stage at which Guyana was mobilized and the persistence of race/ethnicity asmobilization nuclei.50

Since Karl Marx did not bequeath a blueprint for the transition from capitalism to

communism, through the way station of socialism, he allowed Marxists from Lenin to

Burnham, much room for improvisation. Burnhams chosen path was co-operativism and in

1970 he declared Guyana the worlds first co-operative Republic. He was now embarked on the

transformational imperative of Marxism-Leninism; constrained however, by the omnipresent

necessity to avoid irretrievably antagonizing the U.S. Co-operatives were not too controversial

- the U.S., after all, possessed some and the U.S.S.R. labelled them utopian.51By 1974, withWatergate transfixing the American Presidency, Burnham declared the paramountcy of the

P.N.C. over the government, along with the socialist nature of his party. 52 Finally, in 1976,

emboldened by U.S. President Carters adoption of a liberal view of Third World

innovations, Burnham announced he was a Marxist-Leninist and that henceforth the P.N.C.

would be recognised as a vanguard party (52) 53. He also explained the tactical nature of his

1970s, introduction of co-operativism: the co-operative was identified (as) the instrument forestablishing socialism. Cryptically, we described our ideology as Co-operative Socialism. This

was never intended to be a new brand of socialism. 54 He revealed the all-pervading goal of his

47. Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto. London: Pergnon Books, 1967.48. Moore, Clement H., The Single Party as Source of Legitimacy, in Huntington and Moore. supra, 56.49

.New York Times, Week in Review, April 11th

1988.50. For a discussion of the persistence of ethnicity as a source of mobilization, see Cynthia Enloe,Ethnic Conflict

and Political Development, Little Brown and Co. Boston, 1973.. Kwayana, Eusi, Economic Relations in Post Republican Guyana, in Co-operation Republic, Guyana, 1970, p.

36.51. Kwayana, Eusi, Economic Relations in Post Republican Guyana, in Co-operative Republic, Georgetown,

Guyana, 1970, p. 36.52. Burnham, Forbes.Declaration of Sophia. Georgetown, Guyana, 1974.53. Burnham, Forbes.Report to the Nation. Georgetown, 1976.54. Burnham, Forbes, Economic Liberation through Socialism, 15, 1977. .

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ideology by elaborating, co-operativism does not have its applicability confined to (production).

It applies as well in family relationships, in service institutions and in every form of association

which takes place in societyto effect a complete change of society against a mere revision to

the existing society is the definition of Marxism-Leninism for Guyana.55

The Party

The People National Congress and the state organs of the Bureaucracy and the ArmedForces were the principal institutions used by Burnham in his creation of the totalitarian state.

The P.N.C. as the foundation of his rise will be considered first.

Political parties traditionally operate towards securing and maintaining for their leaders

the power of governing or ruling the political community on the one hand, and giving the

members of such a party ideological and material satisfaction, benefits and advantages. 56With

Burnham in office, the spoils were distributed to its primarily African/Creole supporters.57

Congress Place, the P.N.C.s headquarters, became the nations employment centre; and the

Partys card, the passport to the states largess. When other means such as the rigging of

elections were found to secure power, and the need for a mass party was obviated, Burnham

announced his socialist path where party memberships was something that had to be earned.

The P.N.C. was to be transformed into a Vanguard Party, which would be guide in thetransformation of the society in conformity to the leaders vision - Marxism-Leninism.

Burnham and his Creole lieutenants however retained political control, while the base to be

mobilized was the African/Creole sections as explained previously. The vanguard partytypically consists of a small percentage of the population who are enlightened as to the official

ideology, and who are dedicated to its implementation. 58 At its core are the trusted lieutenants of

the leaders who have to possess the additional quality of unswerving loyalty to him.

Building the Vanguard Party

When Burnham declared the paramountcy of the P.N.C. he defined its goals asmobilizing the nation in every sphere and not merely for periodic elections and in support of

specific actions and programmesthe party should assume unapologetically its paramountcyover the Government which is merely one of its executive armsThe country must be given

practical and theoretical leadership at all levels-political, economic, social and cultural - by the

P.N.C., which has become the major national institution.59 The statement unambiguously refutes

the apologists of the P.N.C. who contend that paramountcy merely describes the existential

relationship between all ruling parties and their government, in the limited sense that the former

inevitably sets the policies of the latter.

The doctrines of party paramountcy was operationalzed in 1974, by the creation of the

Office of the General Secretary of the P.N.C. and the Ministry of the National Development

(O.G.S.P.N.C.M.N.D.) under the direction of the General Secretary of the Deputy Leader and

General Secretary of the party - the loyal Dr. Reid. 60 It created the nexus between the party and

state and provided a conduit for state funds to accomplish the partys prime directives. 61 These

were the mobilization of the partys supporters and the demobilization of the Indian segment and

55. Burnham, Forbes, Report to the Nation, Georgetown, 1976.5657. Jeffrey & Barber, supra, 53. The P.N.C. came to office as essentially an African party.

Burnham, Forbes.58. Lenin, V.L. What is to be done. New York: International Publishers, 1969.59. Forbes Burnham, The Declaration of Sophia, Georgetown Guyana, 1974.60. Jeffrey & Barber. Supra, 71. Fradululent Revolution, supra, 54.61. U.S. Annual Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Guyana- 1980. p.1.

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sub rosa, to secure the supremacy of the newly designated Founder-Leader. Reorganized several

times since its formation, the O.G.S.P.N.C.M.N.D. in 1984 consisted of six departments, the

names of which suggest the scope of its activity: National Production, Financial Administration

and Economic Projects, Party Affairs and Mass Organisations, Personnel Administrative Service,

National Orientation and International Relations and Maintenance and Welfare.62

The party was also organized as an orthodox Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party along the

principle of democratic centralism.63 Seven rigid hierarchical layers of party organisationscorresponded to seven levels of local government while the eight and highest party grouping - the

Biennial Congress - was equivalent to the State Government. Each state organ was controlled by

its equivalent party entity: the state had become the party and the party the state - in theory at

least.64

The totalitarian leader, as was alluded to previously, needs the party to promulgate his

ideology and legitimise his rule, but once in power - considers it a rival for power, much as any

other institution.65 Burnham pursued control of the P.N.C. from its inception and ensured that if

the P.N.C. was going to be the State, he was going to be the P.N.C. Several stratagems were used

to rid accomplish this:

(i) Banishments: Individuals possessing, or gaining, influence within the party were

rewarded with ambassadorial postings to distant capitals. This tactic was used to rid the

P.N.C. of the U.D.P. leaders W.O.R. Kendall, John Carter and Lionel Luckhoo andothers.66

(ii) Dismissals: Before the 1968 elections, Burnham announced his intention to purge the

old guard on grounds they were not au faitwith the new realities. They were to be

placed by young men and women of imagination, earnestness and ability, whom heconveniently neglected to mention, also had no independent power base and would

consequently be completely beholden to the Leader. 67 Desmond Hoyte was one of these

young menof imagination.

(iii) Cabinet Reshuffles: Rising stars would be appointed to the Cabinet, which was shuffled

with such frequency (three between 1971 and 1973) that they were taken seriously

neither by their constituency nor their Civil Servants. Ministers came and went while

Burnham remained the constant; all looked to him for answers.68

(iv) Appointment of Loyalists: During the years of institutionalising the P.N.C. as theparamount party (1974 to 1984), Ptolemy Reid was the Deputy Leader and General

Secretary. He was absolutely loyal to Burnham and could be trusted to be next in line.

Reid replaced Hamilton Green, who had earned a formidable party following as a result

of his exploits during the communal riots of 1963-64. Desmond Hoyte, the consummate

apparatchiki, replaced Reid when the latter stepped down on account of illness. Green

was again left out of the direct line of succession.(v) Technocrats in Cabinet: Burnham increased the number of technocrats, who had no

contact with the populace and who were completely beholden to him for their positions.

Many Indians such as Shridath Ramphal and Mohammed Shahabudeen were also

prominently displayed under this technique to prove to the world, the non-racial

62. Jeffery & Barber. supra, 71.63. V.I.Lenin. supra.64. Jeffrey & Barber. Supra, 71.65. Schapiro. Supra, 22-23.

66a. Burnham.Leaders Address to Congress, April 1967, p. 16. Unpublished Quoted in Burrowes, supra, 214-1566. Burrowes. supra. p. 216.67. Forbes Burnham,Leaders Address to Congress, April 1967, p.16, Unpublished, Quoted in Burrowes, supra, p.

214-15.68. Burrowes, supra, 276-277.

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nature of the P.N.C. The reality was they never had power at any time (from the

standpoint of determining policy) but were merely Burnhams functionaries.

(vi) Appointment of the Party Officers: Burnham selected all officers of the Party with the

only constraint that he select the General Secretary and Deputy Leader from the Central

Executive Committee, which was elected by Congress.69

(vii) Supreme Leader: By 1983 Burnham was in a position to enshrine his supremacy over

the P.N.C. in the partys Constitution, Article 22. This authorized him to exercise any, orall of the powers of the Biennial Delegates Congress, the general Council, the Central,

Executive Committee, any other committee, group, arm, organ or any officer or official

of the Party.70

The Leader and the Armed Forces

The Armed Forces, or the Disciplined Forces as they are referred to in Guyana, as amember of the triad of institutions comprising the pillars of Burnhams regime, were subject to

much of the same dynamics as were the party and bureaucracy. In contrast to the other

institutions however, the Disciplined Forces were built to its present form and size after 1968,

when Burnham had already seized sole control of the Government. He had no need to make

concessions to internal opposition forces, and the development of the Disciplined Forces provides

a very reliable guide to Burnhams political philosophy.

Using as the rationale an aborted secessionist uprising in the remote Rupununi, and

proactive actions by Venezuela and Suriname in their border claims - all in 1969 - Burnham

boosted the manpower of the armed forces from 2,631 in 1966 to over 21,000 by 1976.71 The

resulting ratio of one soldier to every thirty-five civilian was one of the highest in the world.

Burnham though, could never even offer an explanation, at least publicly, why this new massive

armed force was 90% Creole/African, in a nation with over 53% Indians.72 The Creole/African

sections acquiesced in this discriminatory recruitment because, as it did in other areas, the policy

took care of their unemployed youths while guaranteeing exclusion of their rival Indians. The

raison detre of the P.N.C. was being consummated.73

Burnham envisioned that the armed forces, with its rigid hierarchical command structure,

would be the most efficient vehicle for the mobilization of the African/Creole youth.74 The

Guyana Defence Force (GDF), formed just before Independence, and the Guyana Police Force

(GPF) were joined by the Guyana National Service (GNS) in 1974 and the Guyana Peoples

Militia (GPM) in 1976. The women and youth arms of the P.N.C., the Womens Revolutionary

Socialist Movement (W.R.S.M.) and the Young Socialist Movement (Y.S.M.) were also armed. 75

The Forces were extensively politicised with the expressed mandate granted to involve the army

69.P.N.C. Party Constitution, Georgetown, p. 64-65.

70. Id.

71

. Danns, George, Militarization and Development: An Experiment in Nation Building. Transition., Vol. 1, No.1.,1978.72. Danns supra, p 40, concedes that only the black working class people these institutions and East Indians (donot) , based on their over all opposition to the government. However, in a later published work, he refutes this

argument, in reference to the Police Force at least, by demonstrating that the rate of applications for East Indians

was equal to that of Blacks. George K. Danns, Order andDomination in a Third World State: New Brunswick,

N.J.: Transaction Books, 1985.73. Hintzen, supra, 199.74. Hintzen. id, 20875. Fraudulent Revolution, supra. 56.

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in the development of the country and the people. There have been very meagre developmental

accomplishments but the armys ubiquitous presence amongst the population, their seizure of

ballot boxes during elections, their use as intimidators and strike -breakers and their unswerving

loyalty to Burnham, have been accomplishments crucial to the survival of his regime.76

Burnham demanded not abstract loyalty;77 always paranoid of new centres of powersbeing formed, he assured himself of the support of the Disciplined Forces through the following

stratagems :78(i) Non-Neutralism: In response to Burnhams call for the militarys involvement and

unswerving support the disciplined forces declared the policy of Non-Neutralism: they

committed their total allegiance to the ideology of the P.N.C. and not to any other

Government. This meant that if the P.N.C. were somehow to be removed from office,

the army would not necessarily have to support the new Government.

(ii) Appointments: Burnham as Chairman of the Defence Board personally appointed all

officers who swore a personal oath of loyalty to him.

(iii) P.N.C. Army links: Senior officers attended the Biennial Congresses of the P.N.C.,

participation in deliberations and swore fealty to the Comrade-Leader.79

(iv) Ideological Training: All officers were required to be fully conversant with the ideology

of the P.N.C. and to base their actions on its strictures.80

The Leader, the Bureaucracy and the Centralized Economy

Of the triumvirate institutions undergirding the dictatorship, the bureaucracy (CivilService) was the only one, exclusive of the Police component of the Disciplined Forces, not

essentially created by Burnham and which had an independent and pivotal role in his accession to

power. Colonial bureaucracies, including Guyanas, were always heavily politicised; the

Governor as a Colonial bureaucrat, along with his senior co-bureaucrats, both initiated andimplemented policy on behalf of the home Government.81 The Guyanese bureaucracy

consequently always considered itself as part of the ruling class and expected to have a continued

and increased input into policy formation, upon decolonisation. This view was at variance with

the classical (Weberian) notion of bureaucracies as neutral instruments at the disposal of varied

interests, striving towards administrative efficiency and rationality. The colonial heritagehowever, meshed perfectly with the mentality of the New Class postulated by commentators as

inevitable with the bureaucratisation of socialist states.82

Historically, the Guyanese bureaucracy was recruited primarily from the Creole section

of the society.83 They protected their interests through their membership in the Public Service

Union, the League of Colored People and later the United Democratic Party, which merged with

76. Danns, supra 1978, 31.77. Forbes Burnham, Address to the Officers of the GDF, 1970.Scarlet Beret, p.78. Reshetar, John S. The Soviet Policy: Government and Politics in the U.S.S.R., 2ndEd. New York: Harper and

Row, 1976, p. 164-65. Many of these strategies were used by Stalin in his drive to control the Red Army. Quoted in

Curtis, supra, 47

Hintzen Danns. Supra 1978, 3579. See for instance,Report on the Third Biennial Congress of the P.N.C. Sophia, Georgetown, 1979.

80. Danns, supra 1978.81. Shahabuddeen, M, Constitutional Development in Guyana 1621-1926. Georgetown, Guyana. 1978.82. Dijilas, Milovan. The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System. London: Allen and Unwin, 1966. (a

critical account.) For a positive account see J. La Palomabare. Bureaucracy and Political Development. Princeton,

N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1971, in reference to developing studies.83. Lutchman, Harold.Interest Representation in the Public Service. Guyana, 1973. From Colonialism to

Cooperative Republic. Rio Pedras: Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1974.

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the P.N.C. in 1958. It was the combination of encroachment by Indians into their bureaucracy

and their exclusion from, and disagreement with, the P.P.P.s policies that precipitated anti-Indian

mobilization in Guyana. Lower class Africans were for the most part unaffected by the Indian

surge of participation in the national economy. The strike by the Civil Service in 1962, organized

by the C.I.A. but fuelled by their concern to preserve their social status, demonstrated to all theparticipants the impossibility of governing the country without their strategic support.

On assuming power in 1964 Burnham embarked on the consolidation of this supportthrough dismissal of opposition supporters and mass hiring of the party faithful. 84By the 1970s

when Burnham manifested his socialist orientation, the essential conservativism of the

bureaucracy was overcome by the demonstration of the wider scope for exploitation; personal

gain and commandantist relations that would exist in a socialist economy than in the colonial one.

The Guyana National Co-op Bank (GNCB) was established in 1970;85 Demerara Bauxite

Company (Demba) was nationalized in 1971;86 Reynolds Bauxite in 1975; Bookers Sugar

(sixteen companies) and sixteen miscellaneous others in 1976. 87The Government now controlled

over 80% of the economy.88Between 1965 and 1981 the bureaucracy grew by over 400% from

approximately 27,000 to 124,000. A major portion of the increase arose from the need to control

the nationalized industries, but an even greater part resulted from the practice of creating state

agencies to control every aspect of Guyanese life.89 An ambitious regionalization

(decentralisation) plan necessitated an additional ten thousand (10,000) employees, while thenumber of Ministries proliferated from ten in 1966 to forty in 1983, with a tenfold increase in

employees.90 Paralleling the experience of the Disciplined Forces, the jobs were reserved for the

African/Creole sections. Burnham reinforced the loyalty of race/ethnicity with the loyalty of

patronage - the P.N.C. was fulfilling its raison detre. While the middle class supporters filledmost of the positions in the bureaucracy, Co-operatives were to be the conduits for channelling

resources to the lower class Africans.91 They were to be encouraged to return to the land and

become self-sufficient.

The increase in the size of the bureaucracy was accompanied by an increase in the

discretionary powers permitted in its dealing with the public. A new imperative, one that took

precedence over the other, joined their functions of administration and management: the

maintenance of the regime in power. The effort took two forms. Firstly, the economic resources it

controlled and the tremendous discretion it was granted, enabled the bureaucracy to condition thepopulation (especially the excluded groups) by a Pavlovian routine: punishment in the form of

loss of jobs or denial of a right which the Government disposed, or reward by the reverse

behaviour. In a country as small as Guyana this is not an inconsequential power; as Burnham

once remarked, when I fire you, you stay fired.92

The second method was the power of the bureaucracy to contain potential conflicts and

prevent them from escalating to higher and more dangerous levels.93 Paralleling the rise of thebureaucratic leviathan was the vigilance of Burnham to preclude mobilization against him from

this quarter. This he achieved through a process of politicization and de-bureaucratization:

84 .Hintzen. supra, 199.85

. Borrowes. supra, 241.86. Borrowes. id, 259.87. Fraudulent Revolution, supra, 51.88.P.N.C. Policy Paper on Cooperativism, Georgetown, 1980.89. Rai, Kemraj, Managing Political Conflict in Guyana, Transition. Issue 114, 1986, p. 76, citing Danns, George

The Head of an Elephant Sunday Chronicle, May 1, 1983.90 Id.91. Hintzen, supra, p. 200.92. Fraudulent Revolution, supra, 56.93. See generally, Kemraj Rai, supra.

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(i) Weberian criteria of bureaucratic development such as objectivity, precision

and continuity, discretion and qualification for office were abandoned.94

Through the doctrine of party paramountancy, the O.G.S.P.N.C.M.N.D.

oversaw the ideological purity of bureaucratic training and performance.

There was to be no objectivity in the reference to P.N.C. policies: they wereto be supported and not merely executed. Political loyalty became the sole

criterion for measuring competence and suitability for being hired or formaking recommendations.95

(ii) A party bureaucracy was developed parallel, but superior to the state

bureaucracy at every level.96

(iii) The party assumed many state functions, especially in reference to hirings and

firings.97

(iv) State employees were monitored for adherence to Burnhams line; dismissals

accompanied transgressions.98

(v) Multiple hierarchies of bureaucracies were created, which were granted

overlapping jurisdictions; creating bureaucratic infighting.

(vi) Requirement that higher state bureaucrats may be party members.

The resulting competition for power between party and state, the dispersal of power

within the bureaucracy and the demands for ideological conformity all facilitated Burnhamscontrol. The debureaucratization led to corruption and inefficiencies, which were major factors in

the deterioration of the economy. Others were policy decisions such as the peripheritization of

agriculture and the destruction of the small retailing trade - mainstays of Indian employment.

Burnham was willing to accept the destruction of the economy if the converse meant givingIndians, his political opponents, an economic base from which they might mobilize politically.

The Leader and Mass Organisations

Political Parties

A One-Party system does not necessarily imply the non-existence of other political

parties, but that when permitted, these other parties have virtually no input in the legitimisation ofthe political system, recruitment of political leadership, or interest aggregation and policy

formation.99By these criteria, Guyana was a de facto one party state since 1968 when Burnham

rigged the elections to take sole control of the Government. Burnham never banned political

parties to create a de jure situation because of the special circumstances under which he had

achieved and maintained power.

The U.S. had instigated the removal of the P.P.P. Government because of the latters

communist proclivities; Burnham was considered an opportunist who was the lesser of two

evils.100 As Burnham consolidated his power domestically and became more openly Marxist-

Leninist, he needed to address the concerns of the U.S so as not to be destabilized in favour ofanother alternative. However, if the alternative were a more orthodox, pro-Soviet Marist-

94

. Gerth, H.H, and C. Wright Mills. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press,1946. p. 196-244.95. Rai, Kemraj. supra, 76.96. See generally, Jeffrey and Barber, supra.97. Hintzen supra.98. PNC 3rd Biennial Congress, 1979, p. 310 PNC resolution to fire state worker. Also Rai, Kemraj, supra, 77.99. In the one party state the leaders of interest groups are dependent on the overall leader or elite, and only

secondarily dependent on the support of their membership. Further in having no input into the decision making,

these groups constantly have to react to decisions made by the leadership/elite.100. Schlesinger, supra.

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Leninist Party; the U.S. would not have much of a choice. The P.P.P. obliged the P.N.C. by

formally declaring itself a Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party in 1969, joined the Communist

International and reinforced its slavish pro-Soviet stance.101 This permitted Burnham to construct

the only Marxist-Leninist state in the Western Hemisphere, without being destabilized by the

U.S.The existence of the P.P.P. and the definition of it internally as an Indian party, also

gave Burnham a rationale for defending his subjugation of Indians on purely political grounds.The survival of the P.P.P. as a distinct political force was therefore, a critical element in the

survival of the P.N.C. and for this reason the periodic talks between the P.N.C. could never

have resulted in a coalition. The talks merely sought to demonstrate to the U.S. that the

P.N.C. needed help or it would be compelled to compromise on the left.

The P.N.C., after 1968, did not consider the P.P.P. as a threat for a number of reasons:

(i) The P.P.P.s base of support was immaterial in rigged elections.102

(ii) The P.P.P. had abandoned any revolutionary action strategy against the P.N.C.

(iii) The P.N.C. weaned away many top level P.P.P. functionaries through patronage.

Burnhams Marxist-Leninist rhetoric made the rationale more palatable.103

(iv) Lower level P.P.P. supporters could be controlled through the police, bureaucracy and

state terror.

The only party to threaten the P.N.C. internally was the W.P.A. of 1978-79, under Dr. Walter

Rodney.104. By this time the economy had run aground and even though Burnham had succeeded in

excluding the Indians, there were now no largess to distribute to the P.N.C.s faithful. The excesses ofBurn ham were thus less acceptable. When Burnham used troops in 1971against striking Bauxite workers

at Linden, formerly his most militant African supporters, the mask was ripped away from the face of the

dictator. The P.P.P. was still unacceptable but the W.P.A. provided an attractive alternative since it was

perceived as African-led, even though it preached and practised a non-racist line.105The partys gathered a

significant multi-racial following, albeit primarily urban, with a high concentration of intellectuals.106 The

parts radical Marxist stance did not make it attractive to the U.S. and was thus not a threat to the P.N.C.

from this quarter. What was a threat was the W.P.A.s infiltration of, and demonstrated support within,

two of Burnhams pillars - the bureaucracy and the army. When Rodney attempted to topple the regime

through strikes and agitation in 1979, much as Burnham had done to the P.P.P. in 1962-63, Burnhambroke the strikes through force and intimidation of the union leaders and strikers. He fired bureaucrats

sympathetic to the W.P.A. and purged as well as reorganised the Disciplined Forces. Burnham taught the

W.P.A. the lesson it had taught the P.P.P. in 1964: control of the Disciplined Forces was the key to

neutralising the efficacy of strikes as mobilization weapons.

Finally, on June 13th, 1980, Burnham had Rodney assassinated.107 Burnham understood the

significance of leadership on a revolutionary movement - the W.P.A. has ceased to be a force or threat

since.

101

, Cheddi Jagan.Report to P.P.P. Congress. Freedom House, Georgetown, 1969.102 See generally, the Report of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Something to Remember, London,

1980. Also Barber, supra, p. 32, quoting Burnham, it is not a question of who votes and how, but of who countsthe vote.103. This process started in 1966 with the defection from the PPP of George Bowman and Mohammed Saffee through

1978 with Vincent Teekah, Lallbachan Lallbahadur and Rangji Chandisingh et al.104. Rai, Kemraj, supra; Hintzen, supra.105. Hintzen, supra.106. id. p. 344.107. U.S. Annual Country Report on Human Rights Practise in Guyana. (1982) p. 4.

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Trade Unions

The Trade Union movement was the incubator for the nationalist movement during the 1950s: it

provided the most important institutional links to the lower classes.108Unions can serve as powerful

mobilizes of opposition when the interests (which, especially in a plural society, are not only economic)

of their members are threatened. Burnham fully appreciated their potential after being swept up by theurban-based Creole and African dominated T.U.C. into violent opposition against the P.P.P. government

in 1962.These unions were rewarded handsomely with Government positions; influence on policy formation; a

tremendously increased membership base (with the increase in the bureaucracy); and a close working

relationship with the Government - soon the dominant employer in the country.

Once safely ensconced in office Burnham moved to curb the powers of this group, as with every

other group. He achieved this by:

(i) Co-opting the leadership of key unions, such as the Guyana Bauxite Union and rigging their

elections to ensure compliant leadership. Unions became company unions with

Government being the company. 109

(ii) Collective bargaining was placed in the hands of the central T.U.C. The Government

controlled this body through its control of union leadership, as above, and by the creation of

paper unions, paying their dues, and granting them voting rights far out of proportion to

their membership.110(iii) Enacting anti-union legislation such as the Labour (Amendment) Bill (1984).111

(iv) Intimidation of neutral and anti-government union leaders.112

(v) Labelling strikes political and using force, scabs and dismissals to break strikes and

unions.113

Religious Organisations

Religious organisations threaten totalitarian regimes for two reasons. Firstly, they invariably

present a different ideology or world view to the populace and secondly they conceive of a sphere of

activity with which the state is not supposed to interfere. 114 In Guyana, the established Anglican and

Roman Catholic Churches were originally bastions of upper class, White and Creole privilege. They had

played a crucial role in the destabilization of the P.P.P. government in 1961-62, when they waged a veryenergetic anti-communist campaign.115 Guyanization of these churches coincided with Burnhams

consolidation of power and it was not until the dictatorship was firmly established that the new Creole

leadership of these Churches protested the transgressions by the PNC. The Catholic Church in particular,

took a stand against human rights abuses.116 Burnham attacked the established churches as elitist and

encouraged the proliferation of smaller Black/foreign fundamentalist churches that offered him

enthusiastic support. Two notorious examples were the House of Israel and the Peoples Temple.117

108. Jeffery & Barber, supra, 108-115.109. Jeffery & Barber, supraquoting the T.U.C. General Secretarys Report, 1984, p. 112.110. Fraudulent Revolution, supra, 56-57.111

. Also Constitutional Amendment Act (1988) voiding pro-labour decision in Guysuco v. Teemal. [1983].112. One union leader, Gordon Todd, head of the Clerical and Commercial Workers Union (CCWU) was taken in a

helicopter and dangled over the Atlantic Ocean after opposing the Government. See Burnhams taunt in Report onthe Third Biennial Congress of the P.N.C. Sophia, Georgetown, 1979113. Rai, Khemraj,Peripheralizing the Guyanese Working Class, Transition Issue 8. Georgetown, Guyana [1983].

The author also addresses the other issues mentioned in reference to trade unions.114. Schapiro. supra, 63.115. Jeffery & Barber. supra.116. Id.117. Fraudulent Revolution, supra.

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The Hindu and Moslem faiths of the majority Indian community were never as institutionalised

nationally on hierarchical lines as were the Christian bodies. The individual temples and mosques

addressed community, rather than national, concerns and preached an expressive religion rather than an

instrumental one. Their national organisations were more social than religious and led by laymen

rather than religious leaders. Not having access to independent sources of financing, the priests andmoulvis were quickly co-opted by Burnham through control of the licensing procedure for priests. Even

conceding their low institutional development, the lack of protest activity by the Hindu and Moslemcommunities is still remarkable in view of their major constituencys status as a most oppressed group in

Guyana.

Social and Cultural Organisations

The three levels of Burnhams ideology - the control of the state for the Creole/African sections,

the Marxism-Leninism in an instrumental sense for these groups, and his all consuming drive for absolute

power - were exemplified most clearly by his relationship with the Association for Social and Cultural

Relations with Independent Africa (A.S.C.R.I.A.). Founded by Eusi Kwayana in 1964, the organisations

goal was to assist Africans to develop a sense of worth and self confidence in order to deal with other

races in a positive rather than a defensive manner.118 This was to be achieved by encouraging an

appreciation of African culture and achievement, and fostering economic independence by advocating areturn to the land by Africans.119

This goal was congruent with the first level of Burnhams ideology and Kwayana became an

advisor to Burnham on domestic and economic policy as well as being appointed Chairman of the

Guyana Marketing Corporation (GMC). In the latter position he became the dispenser of jobs tothousands of young Africans; in the former, he is widely credited with being the architect of co-

operativism. This movement had the triple merit of possessing affinities with African heritage;

advancing Burnhams Marxism-Leninism; and most importantly could assist lower class Africans in line

with ASCRIAs and Burnhams goals.

However, when Kwayana demonstrated his independence by sympathizing with African Bauxite

workers striking against the Government (1971) and more to the point, when Ascria demonstrated the

tremendous influence it commanded amongst the workers he became a threat to Burnhams third and all

transcending level of ideology: his obsession with absolute control. 120 Kwayana broke with the P.N.C.declaring later that it had become a unity of the black political leaders with the Portuguese and Indian

exploiting classes.121

Burnham exploited the ineffectual/impotent political leadership, and the poor strategic

occupational niches, of Indians to peripheralize them further by co-opting their socio-cultural leaders.

Even though political influence was denied to these individuals, the economic and social arena were left

open on the condition they publicly support the P.N.C.The major Indian socio-cultural organisations were subverted and brought under control by

similar tactics used on the trade unions:

(i) The leadership, frequently economically dependent on the benevolence of the State, were

either coerced into cooperation, or opportunistically chose to do so, voluntarily.(ii) Election rigging was encouraged to ensure complaint leadership.

(iii) New, frequently paper organisations were established under the leadership of P.N.C.supporters. These organisations became the beneficiaries of the Governments largess while

neutral or anti-government groups were ostracized.

118. Fraudulent Revolution, supra, 50. Hintzen. supra, 337.119. Id.120. Hintzen. supra, 337.121. ASCRIA, 1974, quoted in Hintzen, supra, 337.

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The Leader, Education and the Media

The educational system and the media are combined by the totalitarian leader into an all-

pervading monolith, dedicated to the dissemination of his official ideology, as he moulds the destiny of

his people. The three functions of ideology - to legitimise the leaders rule, to mobilize the population,

and to anesthetize (rationalize) the excesses and atrocities of the leader - are ideally served by these

vehicles.122

In 1973, Burnham created Kuru Kuru Cooperative College to disseminate the mechanics ofco-operativism and the next year the Guyana National Service (GNS) was launched. The goal of this

paramilitary organization was to create a new Guyanese man and woman. The Workers Education

Unit was organised in 1975 to spread the ideology to workers at their places of employment; while the

school system was nationalized (from the religious bodies) in 1976 and ideological orientation made part

of the curriculum. The Cuffy Ideological Institute a residential facility, was inaugurated in 1977 under

the direction of the former chief Marxist theoretician of the P.P.P.123 Burnhams emphasis on

indoctrinating the young reached its zenith when he launched the Presidents College; the first boarding

school in Guyana, where the top students in the nation would be consigned, to be groomed into the future

leaders of the nation.

Education in Guyana was valued in terms of the better jobs it was expected to deliver. With the

rampant discrimination against Indians in the Government bureaucracy and in the eighty-percent of theeconomy the Government controlled, the incentive for education withered in that community. Numerous

Indian youths dropped out of the school system, further aggravating the demobilization of this group.

In addition to operationalizing the functions of ideology, the media can also act to create avacuum of information.124The absence of factual information serves to prevent the official ideology

from being challenged, or a competing ideology from being formed. Burnham explained his control over

the Guyanese media by a development-support communication theory, which postulated that only

information supportive of the Governments development program should be transmitted to thepopulace.125

In 1970, Burnham acquired the national newspapers, the Daily and Sunday Chronicle; in 1973,

and the Daily and Sunday Guyana Graphic and merged them as the Guyana Chronicle in 1976.

During that year Radio Demerara was purchased and merged with the already state-owned Guyana

Broadcasting Corporation. In conjunction with the sycophantic treatment of Burnham, the P.N.C. andthe ideology, the media was used to viciously attack the opposition. The anti-Indian line that Burnham

and the P.N.C. could not overtly espouse (being protective of their progressive third world reputation)

was delegated to the House of Israel. This group fanned the Creole/African fears of being dominated by

Indians, by violently attacking them while predicting an imminent racial Armageddon in Guyana.126

The independent media became vestigial: a weekly four page tabloid (P.P.P.s Mirror) and three

eight by seventeen mimeographed newsletters (two - W.P.A.s-Open Word and Dayclean together

with Catholic Standard of the Catholic Church). Even these vestiges were harassed continuously by

libel suits,127intimidation of journalists,128and non-delivery of newsprints. The last was explained as due

to a lack of foreign newsprints, yet gifts from aboard were refused entry in the country.129

The vacuum of information and the constant bombardment of the population with the big

lie130 created even in the minds of doubters a sense of omnipotence concerning the dictator and

122. Schapiro, supra, 55.123. Jeffery & Barber, supra.124. Schapiro, supra, 51.125. Jeffery & Barber, supra, 123.126. Fraudulent Revolution, supra.127. Fraudulent Revolution, supra, 58.128. Fraudulent Revolution, supra 53.129. Burrowes. Supra, 304.130. This technique was perfect by Goebells and the Nazis; see Curtis, supra, 50.

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impotence concerning the opposition. Eventually, even if the ideology is not accepted by all, the

disbelievers reject all ideologies. This secular agnosticism contributes to the disintegration of any all-

effective opposition.

The Leader, the Terror and the Legacy

The terror in Burnhams totalitarian state was generated essentially from two sources. First, there

was the physical violence meted out by organised bands of P.N.C. thugs, the police arrests in the nightand the rapes and murders of the kick down the door bandits. Secondly there was the psychic violence

emanating from the breakdown in the legal order; the destruction of the societal values, and the pervasive

lawlessness, which the regime extended into every facet of the lives of the citizens.

Organized Terror

In a bifurcated state, where the exclusionary one-party state has decided to maintain its rule by

subjugating the excluded group, violence against this group is inevitable, and from the perspective of the

rulers, salutary. The message is inculcated into the dominated group: the wages of rebellion is

extermination. Violence as a political tactic was introduced into Guyanese politics during 1962-63 by the

C.I.A/T.U.C/P.N.C./U.F. alliance against the P.P.P. Government.131It quickly escalated into a racial civil

war due to the racial support-base of each political party. The P.P.P. attempted to reciprocate in 1964 butsoon learnt that the success of the tactic of violence depended on whose group controlled the coercive

apparatus of the state and it was not the P.P.P.s. 132 Burnham was fond of informing his audiences, the

P.N.C. had brought peace to Guyana and that if they were removed, violence would return. TheGuyanese people understood his message.133

During the seventies, the House of Israel (H.O.F.), comprised of young African Guyanese, was

Burnhams personal goon squad and was used indiscriminately against Indians and other opposition

figures. In 1979 the group was provided with automatic rifles and other weapons.134 During the same yeara member of H.O.F. murdered a Catholic priest in public, while the latter was photographing an

opposition demonstration.135Kick-down-the-door bandits were small bands of armed hoodlums (some

claimed they included members of the H.O.F.) who preyed on the Indian population; Eusi Kwayana

labelled their activities racial genocide136. These individuals, who robbed, raped and murdered, were

generally known to their victims and the police; no action was taken because of their P.N.C. connections.Their activities were, and remain, so pervasive that few Indians families have not resulted to keeping

watch during the night. The Preventive Detention Act empowers the Police to arrest anyone suspected

of subversive activities without the need for evidence. The extensive network of police informers

recruited in every village and district provide a steady stream of detainees but not from the kick-down-

the-door- fraternity.137

The Pervasive Lawlessness

Even more insidious than the direct violence; the cumulative effect of Burnhams control, his

arbitrariness, his destruction of every independent institution in the country, engendered amongst the

people, first the Indians and towards the end the Africans, a feeling of helplessness anomie - and a

131. Richard Barnet.Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World. N.Y. Mentor Books

(1972) revised. p. 278-284. For Burnhams role, see Report of a Commission of Enquiry into Disturbance inBritish Guiana in February, 1962. London HMSO, Colonial No. 354, (1962), 82.132. Burrowes. supra, 234.133. Jagan Cheddi. Speech at Casa de Las America, N.Y. October, 1987.134. Fraudulent, Revolution, supra.135. Id.136. Eusi Kwayana. Forward to the Democratic Republic. (1985) WPA Georgetown Guyana.137. Danns, supra, (1978)

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belief that nothing or no one could change the situation. This atomisation and fatalism of the population

is the goal of the totalitarian dictator. The immiseration of the population further contributed to the

atomisation. As Aristotle observed, when the people have to scavenge for food all day, they have very

little time or inclination to plot rebellion or revolution against the dictator. 138 They are impelled towards

individual solutions, which are the fight, flight or submit responses of cornered animals.The individual who elects to fight the system is easily contained and defeated by the bureaucracy,

the police, the judiciary and other state forces arrayed against him. The conflict is not allowed to escalateto higher levels. This existential reality has forced Guyanese to opt for the other two solutions of flight

(emigration) and submission. These options have provided the dictatorship with its major safety valves.

Emigration increased steadily from the early sixties and at this point (1988) it is estimated that at

least 200,000 Guyanese, one quarter of the population, have fled the country. These emigrants include the

majority of the middle class and intelligentsia - the groups from which most revolutionary movements

have sprung. Burnham has consequently never discouraged emigration, although from a developmental

perspective, the country was losing most of its qualified personnel. Most Guyanese remaining in the

country are either waiting for their papers (visas) or hoping for their papers. All eyes are cast aboard.

Submission to the system in Guyana, and surviving, implies acceptance of corruption as a way of

life. The wreckage of the economy created a corresponding ravaging of the standard of living of the

bureaucratic class, the police and every party or state official who maintained Burnham in power. Taking

their cues from Burnham and his top lieutenants, who had corrupted every institution to maintain powerand their ostentatious lifestyle, the lower echelons demanded bribes from the citizenry for the

performance of their legally require tasks. While Burnham railed against corruption, effective action was

never taken for two reasons. Firstly the transgressors were the same individuals who were rigging the

elections, harassing the opposition and generally guaranteeing his control. Secondly, Burnham understoodthat corruption can be a substitute for violence: when the citizen offers the bribe and official accepts, both

satisfy their immediate wants but more importantly, the citizen tacitly accepts the status quo. The Citizen

boasts of having lines-connections. He who corrupts a systems officer is more likely to identify with

the system than he who storms the systems police stations. 139 Burnham reversed Lord Actons famous

dictum: in Guyana corruption was power and absolute corruption was absolute power.

The Product: Burnham the Constitutional Totalitarian Dictator

The culminating act in Burnhams consolidation of absolute power and control was the

promulgation of the Socialist Constitution in 1980.140 As Stalin had done in 1937 in the U.S.S.R., the

new constitution enumerated numerous rights of the people while the few they actually possessed were

being abrogated. Similarly, as Stalin had enacted his constitution in the midst of a bloody purge of his

opponents, Burnham introduced his constitution after he had purged the bureaucracy and the disciplined

forces and assassinated his only credible opponent - Walter Rodney on June 13 th,1980 (151)141.

The Constitution articulated the constitutional and legal basis for Burnhams Marxist-Leninist

ideology but more importantly gave the legal recognition, which he always insisted on, to the existential

reality of his supremacy over all men and all institutions in Guyana. With his enumerated powers,Burnham had a greater claim than Louis XIV to declare, I am the State.

Burnham had the following powers and positions:

(i) Head of State to complement his position as head of the paramount party.142

138. Aristotle, Politics, quoted in Schapiro, supra, 36. Additionally, when the question of terror in the Totalitarianpolity is considered, it become an effective substitute for physical terror. 41.139. Samuel Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven. Yale Univ. Press.[1968]140. Burnham had a fetish, as had Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini, for insisting that his excesses had the mantle of

legality. see Schapiro, p. 28. Democratic institutions and guarantees were a faade to deceive the credulous

foreigner.141. U.S Human Rights Violations in Guyana, p. 4 (1982).142. Guyana Constitution, (1980) Art. 89.

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(ii) Head of the Disciplined Forces and Chairman of the Defence Board which appoints and

reviews every officer;143

(iii) could not be prosecuted for any crime or civil offence committed in or out of the office;144

(iv) appointed the Chief Justice, Chancellor of the Judiciary and all Judges. The stipulation that he

consult with various identified individuals and bodies was gratuitous since, if ignored, hisdecision shall not be enquired into any court;145

(v) appointed the chairman of the Elections Commission at his sole discretion. This individualwas the final arbiter of the validity of elections since no question as to the validity of the

election shall be enquired into any court;146

(vi) could dismiss most officers of the Public Service Commission that controlled the bureaucracy

in the public interest; which interest he, at his sole discretion, determined;

(vii) could serve as President for as many terms as he could win in the elections;

(viii) had veto power over legislation introduced by the party of which he was the head;147

(ix) could dissolve the assembly if it overrode his veto, which in any event, could not be re-

presented to him for approval until six months after his veto;148

(x) could be removed for misconduct or mental illness only by the decisions of individuals he

had appointed, and who could be dismissed by him before their decisions were announced.149

The End

In the bifurcated society, when the leader is permitted by his Constitution, to erect institutions andengage in practices designed to subjugate in perpetuity, the excluded group, there is the omnipresent

danger the leader will direct the repressive institutions against his erstwhile supporters after he achieves

enough control. In Guyana, the dictatorship did not creep, like a thief in the night, upon the Guyanese

people: it was erected in broad daylight by hundred of thousands of helpers. Each helper had his owngoal and motivation: the U.S. - a non-Soviet Guyana; the Creoles control of the state; the Africans - the

preclusion of Indian domination. No one gave Burnhams motivations and goals the prominence they

deserved.

The Burnham era, 1964-1985, has graphically and tragically exposed the dangers of permitting

any man or group unchecked power. Yet Guyana is caught in its historic dilemma. The call for free andfair elections would in all probability lead to the permanent control of the State by an Indian dominated

political group. The Indians have now increased their majority to over fifty percent of the population and

the African and Creole sections have to be concerned as to whether this would be a vengeful majority. 150

There can be no lasting political solution in Guyana until the legitimate security concerns of the

African and Creole sections are addressed along with the need for the full and equal participation of the

Indian and other excluded sections, in the life of the nation.

Epilogue: The P.N.C. in the Post Burnham Era

143 Guyana Constitution Art. 89.144 . Guyana Constitution Art. 182145. Guyana Constitution Art. 127, 231.146. Guyana Constitution Art. 226.147. Guyana Constitution Art. 170.148. Guyana Constitution Art. 170.149. Guyana Constitution Art. 179.150. 1980-1981 Population Census of the Commonwealth Caribbean Guyana, Vol. 3: Caribbean Community

Secretariat (1985).

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Burnhams attempt to fuse the Marxist-Leninist goal - elimination of the bifurcated society (based

on class) and the creation of a homogeneous dictatorship of the proletariat, with the exclusionary one-

party goal - perpetuation of the bifurcated society (based on any social cleavage) to create a two-caste

society ruled by the dictatorship of the dominant groups leader, ultimately failed. The economy, which

was to be plundered for the benefit of the mobilized elite, crumbled under the combined, conflictingdemands of a bastardised ideology, the demobilization of the Indian fifty percent of the population, and a

megalomaniac dictator. This destruction, in tandem with the ambiguities and incongruities of themobilization process, precluded the formation and retention of any large core of committed Marxist-

Leninist within the institutions of Burnhams power base.151 Upon the dictators death, the elite that

retained control of these institutions were obsessed more with economic rationality than with ideological

purity.152

The problem of succession is one of the most severe that confronts oneparty dictatorships since

the tyrants usual paranoia of palace revolutions usually makes him wary of designating successors. The

smooth transfer of power after the demise of Burnham demonstrated the deep institutionalisation and

strength of the P.N.C., and its pre-eminence among the ruling triumvirate institutions- the party, the

bureaucracy and the military. The confirmation by the elite, of the constitutionally defined order of

succession and the election of Hoyte as leader of the P.N.C. preserved the partys control over the

political system.

Burnhams lieutenants, while locked in a power struggle for ultimate control, have confined thebattle within the party. Desmond Hoyte, the constitutional successor on account of his obsequiousness,

apparatchiki skills, and unswerving loyalty to his mentor Burnham, is the favourite of the bureaucratic

Creole elite who consider him pragmatic but more importantly, one of their own. 153Hamilton Green,

commanding vast support in the partys rank and file as well as the army 154, is biding h

on the guyanese dictatorship (1988)

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