on the morals of genealogy - jacqueline stevens

8/2/2019 On the Morals of Genealogy - Jacqueline Stevens

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/on-the-morals-of-genealogy-jacqueline-stevens 1/32

On the Morals of GenealogyAuthor(s): Jacqueline StevensSource: Political Theory, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Aug., 2003), pp. 558-588Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3595672

Accessed: 16/11/2009 00:11

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Theory.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3595672?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3595672?origin=JSTOR-pdf



JACQUELINE TEVENS

IstanbulBilgi University

The article describes how an intellectualcommunityof those following French trendsin the

academyhave, or thepastforty years, beenoXeringa mistaken eadingof FriedrichNietzsche sconcept of genealogy. The essay shows how Nietzsche mocks moral psychologists by calling

them genealogists, contrasts Nietzsche'swork with that of genealogists, and then documents

how subsequent academics, encouragedby the work of Gilles Deleuze and, in turn,Michel

Foucault,createda revaluationof genealogy s meaning, thereby etishizing theirown scholarly

authority.

Keywords:FriedrichNietzsche; Michel Foucault;genealogy; cultural studies; Gilles Deleuze

What does the past mean to us? Why do we value it? How oughtwe to

pursue our questions about the past?For the last few decades, Foucaulthas

given us the answers,solutionsthatseem both obvious and diff1cult.Thepro-

liferation of works calling themselves "genealogical"and acknowledging

their debt to Foucault suggests his lessons (e.g., Foucault [1969] 1972a,

[1971] 1977a, [1976] 1980) have been taken to heart. While Foucault's

insights took a while to gain acceptance,his many nitiatesnow do genealogy

insteadof history.But then again,when we look at whathas been learned, he

matter seems unhappilyunsettled,with genealogists far more anxiousanddefensive thanone might expect amongassociates n a gay science. Whilethe

genealogical form remains ashionably hatof a counter-narrative-notwith-

standing he high statusof its practitionersn variousdisciplines the actual

substanceof this endeavorremainsrathermurkydespite its aherents' fforts

to elucidate. Consider the reams of paper devoted to distinguishing

Foucauldian"genealogy" romhis "archaeology," mid the strongsuspicion

that the difference amountsonly to a shift in vocabulary,not method.l

AUTHOR'SNOTE:Mary CoJfey,HannaPitkin,John Seery,and Verity mithprovidedexcellent

commentson earlier drafts,as did two helpfulreviewersat Political Theoryand StephenWhite.

A special thanks o Don Reneau or his consultationson translating nd interpretingNietzsche.

POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 31 No. 4, August 2003 558-588

DOI: l0.1177/0090591703254383

C)2003 Sage Publications

558

ON THE MOR&LSOF GENEALOGY



Stevens / ON THEMORALS OF GENEALOGY 559

As a consequenceof Foucault's nfluence, one can now list hundredsof

books and articleswhose authorspursuea"genealogy"andnot a"history" f

thisor that.2So, we mightnow ask:Whatdoes agenealogymean tous? What

is thevalue of a genealogy?Howoughtwe to pursuequestionsaboutgeneal-

ogies? The quickanswerfirst.We valuegenealogies forpoliticalresistance,

aestheticcriticism,androte professionalization.No seriousstudentof cul-

turalstudiestodaywoulddoa"historyof X" andnot itsgenealogyfor herdis-

sertation.The fad indicatesnothingespecially insidiousaboutcultural tud-

ies or the linguisticturnin partsof the academy,but amountsto one more

disciplining convention. Far less insistent or hegemonic than, say, the

requirementof rationalchoice theoryor behavioralstudiesin the social sci-

ences, the prevalenceof a Foucauldian exicon in the humanitiescalls atten-

tion to itself preciselybecauseof its advocates'generalreluctance o imposeorthodoxies.The problemwith the success of Foucault'smethod is not its

opacityorrelativism,as conservativecriticsof Foucaultcarp,butrather hat

it holds forth ts ownspecialized argonthatturnsout to be beliedby its own

intellectualhistory, leading to strainedreadingsand analyses that at times

mirror he pointless,obsessive methodism n otherfields.

Foucault([1971] 1977a)claimsto derive his devotionto genealogyfromNietzsche, yet Nietzsche himself mockedgenealogistsandtheirenterprise.

ApproachingNietzsche throughDeleuze ([1962] 1983), Foucaultmisreads

thesingletextinwhich Nietzsche discusses theconceptof genealogy(Nietz-sche [1887] 1967b),and seemsthereby o have led a herdof academicsawayfromNietzsche's own meaningof 'Genealogie'and into whatby now mayhavebecome a revaluation f theword.Foran elite circleof students,"gene-

alogy"has come to meansomethingquitedifferent romits ordinaryuse and

etymology. After offering an old-fashioned intellectualhistory of Nietz-sche's mockinguse of 'Genealogie',I turn to how the term has come to be

misused andperhapseven abusedby Foucaultandhis disciples.

AN INTELLECTUAL ISTORYOF GENEALOGY

Would-be "genealogists"may be surprisedto learn that they need to

choose betweentheirtwofathers,

as Nietzsche andFoucaulthaveratherdif-

ferentviews of themeaningof theenterprise.Despiteanessay claimingoth-

erwise (Foucault[1971] 1977a),Foucault'suse of 'genealogy'and 'history'is not authorizedby Nietzsche's use of 'Genealogie', 'Geschichte', and

'Historie'.3 Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic (Zur

GenealogiederMoral:EineStreitschrift) emonstrates hat he new"geneal-



560 POLITICALTHEORY August 2003

ogists" areverybadhistoriansanddoes not suggest"genealogy"asa superior

alternative o history.

On the Genealogy does not criticize histories referring to origins,

Foucault's ament n his work,nor does Nietzsche,as Foucaultdoes, criticize

philology foretymological narrativeshatfind thepast concealedin the pres-

ent (Foucault[1969] 1972a, 64, 142, 146). Rather,Nietzsche objectswhen

history is used to proffermoralizing,self-righteous,functionalistjustifica-

tions ofthe statusquo (Nietzsche[1887] 1967b,preface04,07, II.§12), espe-

cially when this is done by the state and its apologists.He wishes to steer the

"English author"discussed in the On the Genealogy'spreface,the Jewish-

PomeranianPaul Ree,4deridedby Nietzsche as a genealogist, in the "direc-tion of an actualhistory [Historie/ of morality," ased on the writtendocu-

ments recording he particularities f the past (Nietzsche [1887] 1988b, pref-

ace §7), andaway from quasi-Darwinianripeaboutmoralpsychology.This

early proliferationof a certain kind of sociobiology is what Nietzsche

opposes in Ree's work,andbeforethat n the thoughtof David Strauss,whom

Nietzsche also chastises for being a genealogist.

DAVIDSTRAUSS,APE-GENEALOGIST

FollowingNietzsche's use of the concept of Genealogie chronologically

requires reachingback to a few earlier texts by Nietzsche and his targets.

Strauss s bestknown for his Lifeof Jesus (I1836] 1860), a bookwidely cred-

ited as the firstsystematicexplorationof Jesusas a historicalandnot sacred

person.5While Nietzsche was familiar with this work and possibly influ-

enced by it (Breazeale 1997, xii), he devoted an entire essay "DavidStrauss, heConfessorand Writer" Nietzsche [1873] 1997a) to criticizing

Strauss or his subsequentblockbusterThe OldFaith and the New (Der alte

und neue Glaube)(Strauss 1873).6This book is a set of extrapolationsrom

Darwin'sOriginof Species ([1859] 1964) and TheDescent of Manand Selec-

tion in Relationto Sex (1974), with section headingssuch as "TheApe and

Man. Darwin'sTheoryconcerning he Descentof Man fromtheApe" (1873,

vol.2, §58), "LowBeginningof the HumanRace.Sociability andNecessity.

FirstDevelopmentof MoralQualities" 1873, vol.2, §67), and "TheBasis of

Morality.Moralityand Religion"(1873, vol. 2, 070).

To understandwhy Nietzsche objected so vehementlyto Strauss,and to

anticipate heparallelsNietzsche saw in Ree's work, considerthefollowing

selections fromStrauss's [1872] 1873) Darwinian-inflected ositivismand

utilitarianism:




Thatknowledgeof the natural ciences is indispensable o thephilosopher, hat amiliar-

ity with the latest discoveries in chemistry,physiology, etc., is absolutelyrequisite to

him, is hardlynow denied by anyone of philosophicalpretensions.(§62)

From the dearandblood-purchased xperience of what is noxious andwhat is useful,

therearisegraduallyamong hevariousraces of mankind, irstcustoms,then aws, at last

a code of duties. (§67)

Tothe State we owe the firmbasis of ourexistence, thesecurityof life andproperty; nd

by means of the school ourfitness for living in a humancommunity: t is incumbenton

every one of its members o do all which theirposition in society enablesthem, to ensure

its stability andprosperity. §70)

And, inally,quotingMoritzWagner, 'In his nherentspirationfNatureafteranunceasinglyrogressivemprovementndrefinementf herorganicforms, onsists lso herealproofof herdivinity' (§71).Thenotion hatnat-ural cience ouldmake enseofpsychologicalrives o astobring rder ndperfectiono thestate haracterizesmodernpistemology ietzscheoundbothbanalandabhorrent.

Nietzsche haracterizestrauss s someonewho "covers imself n thehairy loakof ourape-genealogistsndpraisesDarwin s oneof thegreatest

benefactorsfmankind"Nietzsche1873]1997a,29).Disturbedy the actthatustasGermanysescaping hegrasp ftotalizing,ssentializing,uasi-religious arrativesfculture, uchasthoseput orward yHegel,ntellectu-als arepopularizing quallyreductive ociobiologicalenets,7Nietzsche([1873]1997a)writes:

"Allmoralbehaviour" ays Strauss,"is a self-determination f theindividualaccording

to the idea of the species."Translated ntocomprehensibleanguage, all this means is:

Live as a man andnot as an ape or a seal! Unfortunately,his imperative s altogether

without force anduseless, because the conceptof man yokes together he most diverse

andmanifoldthings,for examplethePatagonian ndMasterStrauss,andbecause no one

will ventureto demand:"Liveas a Patagonian!" nd at the same time "Live as Master

Strauss!" p 30)8

Nietzsche ointsout hat hediversity fwhat tmeans o "liveas a man"satodds with the homogeneityfound in the species homo sapien. ThePatagonianmoralitydiffersfrom thatof Straussas a European, ndno

amount fbiological versimplificationanaccountorthesecrucial iffer-ences, houghhistories f Patagonia ndof Europemightbeuseful.9Therearemany uchpassagesnNietzsche's ssayonStrauss, rescientlyriticiz-ingthesociobiologyhatcontinues ohaunt owthree enturymarks f ourincreasinglyebased nddebasingelf-image.



562 POLITICALTHEORY August2003

DR. REE

Echoing the approach of Strauss four years later, Ree claimed that Dar-

win's evolutionary theory applied to more than the physical origins of spe-

cies. According to Ree's crude reading of Darwin and reform-minded utili-

tarians, evolutionary theory, supplemented by the work of J. S. Mill and

others, provided a model of the origin of morality as well. The title of Ree's

(1877) work, The Origin of Moral Sentiments (Ursprung der Moralischen

Empfindungen), suggests homage to Adam Smith and other eighteenth-

century moral philosophers, as well as Darwin. Ree is in dialogue with Eng-

lish moral philosophy and social contract thought that seek to ground politi-cal theories in human nature. Ree essentially provides the Anglophone inqui-

ries into morality and human nature with an equally English answer. Ree

takes the problems of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and Adam

Smith, including the infamous "war of all against all" (pp. 14-15), and hands

them back to Darwin. 10According to Ree, not conscious decisions calculated

to yield personal advantage but the internalization of a moral disposition

selected for in the transition from nature to culture results in cooperation and

peace (p. 15)."Now," Ree (1877) writes, "since the work of La Marck and Darwin,

moral phenomena can be just as easily traced to natural causes as physical

phenomena: moral being is no closer to the intelligible world than physical

being." He continues:

Thisnatural(ist) xplanations basedprimarilyontheprinciple: hehigheranimalshave

evolvedfromthe lower,and the humans from the apes,by meansof natural election.

I offer nojustificationof thisprinciple.ForIregard t as alreadyhavingbeenprovedby the writingsof Darwin,and,in part,La Marck.Those who think otherwise are wel-

come toleave this bookunreadas well: in that he work'spresuppositions redenied,the

conclusionscannot be admitted. P.viii, translatedby Don Reneau)

Ree's first chapter is entitled "The Origin of the Concepts of Good and Evil,"

and its opening sentence reads: "In each human two instincts are unified,

namely the egoistic and the unegoistic," and he enumerates three selfish

impulses that follow "for everyone": "1) his survival; 2) satisfying his sex

drive (Geschlectstriebes); 3) satisfying his personal vanity" (p. 1).

Rather than the Christian world, in which a spiritual universe designates

certain motives and actions inherently good or evil, Ree (1877) says our

moral vocabulary follows from evolutionary adaptations: what leads to the

survival of the species is called good, and those deeds tending towards its

destruction are called evil. Morality really consists of consequences that are




useful or harmful; hence our moral vocabulary of character or intentions is

fuzzy-headed and out of step. We cling onto it out of habit, with no clear

knowledge of how we even came to attribute values to any particulardisposi-

tion such as cruelty or pity (p. 135, translated by Don Reneau).

That Nietzsche is offering a full-scale revaluation of Ree's approach is

clear from the chapter headings Nietzsche appropriates. Ree's (1877) first

chapter is "The Origin of the Concepts of Good and Evil" ("Der Ursprung der

Begriffe gut und bose"), concepts at the heart of much of Nietzsche's oeuvre,

and especially highlighted in Beyond Good and Evil (Jenseits von Gut und

Boise) (Nietzsche [1886] 1966a) and On the Genealogy of Morals (Nietzsche

[1887] 1967b).

While Ree's open acceptance of selfish motives seems to echo and fore-

shadow similar themes in Nietzsche, Nietzsche displays an ambivalent scorn

toward Ree's positivist relation to language and history. Ree thinks that he

can objectively reclassify the meaning of things by bringing words into a

more accurate relation to the objects they supposedly designate, while Nietz-

sche sees language as itself a creative force in making new realities. Ree

thinks he is more precisely labeling human behavior, but Nietzsche thinks

Ree, through this new vocabulary, is himself participating in the creation of anew human. More than Ree's errors in setting the record straight, Nietzsche

takes exception with Ree's lack of self-awareness about his own pseudo-

objective scientific discourse. Ree's own writings, more than what "actually"

happened, need to be implicated in the production of reality, Nietzsche

believes, while Ree (1877) saw language as a tool for ostensive tasks, as when

he writes:

It is possible to say in general:whenever someone associates the designationgood (orbad)with anobject, thepointis thatthis object is the causeof good (orbad)results....

Likewise,theegoist, e.g., apersonwhois cruel,evenif he is called badbyothersbecause

he harms hem,is not a badpersonas such,butapersonof aspecific nature.To termcru-

elty as suchbad would makeno sense.... Although crueltyand other similar actions

were originallycalled bad because they were badfor others,latergenerations ost the

knowledgeof how the designationarose,and retained t only out of habit.... A further

investigation,ntowherethis characterization f thatform of behaviorcame fromorigi-

nally,comes upondistantstagesin the developmentof culture n whichsuchbehaviors

weredesignatedbad,notbecausetheywere badin themselves,but becausetheyarebad

for others.(Pp. 59, 63, translatedby Don Reneau)

Ree is documenting here what amounts to a genealogy of morals: locating the

origin of a concept in its previously misunderstood prehistory and pointing

out the designation's continued use in contexts that may be quite different

from those in which it emerged. To be clear, this is not to say thatRee admires




the prevailingmorality;he is simply pointingout the previouslyunknown

facts underlying ts emergence.

NIETZSCHE'SREVALUATION F DR. REE

Closely paraphrasing utrebukingRee, Nietzsche([1882] 1974)writes n

The Gay Science:

Nowadaysthere s a profoundly rroneousmoraldoctrine hat s celebratedespeciallyin

England: hisholds that udgmentsof "good"and "evil"sum up experiencesof what is"expedient" nd "inexpedient."Oneholds thatwhat s calledgood preserves hespecies,

while what s called evil harms hespecies. In truth,however, he evil instinctsare expe-

dient, species-preserving,and indispensable o as high a degree as the good ones; their

function s merely different.(I. §4)

Whereas Ree claims that the expediency for the species lies at the base of

standards or good and evil, Nietzsche perverselypoints out thatevil, too,

benefits humanity,or at least canbe shown to do so by evolutionary heorists'

same unimaginative unctionalist ogic.Insteadof the flatteningscientisticpsychologicalobservations or which

Ree was known, and which Nietzsche calls 'Genealogie', Nietzsche advo-

cates ([1882] 1974) history ('Geschichte'or 'Historie'):

Anyone who now wishes to makea study of moralmattersopens himself to animmense

field for work.All kinds of individualpassions have to be thoughtthroughandpursued

throughdifferentages, peoples, andgreat and small individuals;all theirreasonand all

their evaluationsand perspectiveson things have to be brought nto the light.So far, all

thathas givencolor to existence still lacks a history Geschichte).Wherecouldyou find a

history of love, of avarice, of envy, of conscience, of pious respect for tradition,or of

cruelty?(I. §7)

Ree claims to have writtensuch an account, butNietzsche refusesto honor

such Darwinianspeculationas a history.ll

In the beginning of the second book of The Gay Science,Nietzsche

([1882] 1974) explains his disdainfor Ree's "Reealism" a punNietzsche

uses repeatedly o indict Ree as a positivist:

To he realists You soberpeoplewho feel well armedagainstpassion andfantasiesand

would like to turn your emptinessinto a matterof prideand ornament:Youcall your-

selves realistsand hint that the worldreally is the way it appears o you. (§57)



Stevens / ON TlIE MORALS OF GENEALOGY 565

Instead f realists,Nietzschewantsartists,mprovisers,hosewho get theworld ightby becoming tsinventors:

Onlyas creators! This has given me greatest trouble andstill does: to realize what

things are called is incomparablymore important han whatthey are. The reputation,

money, and appearance, he usualmeasureandweight of athing, what t countsfor . . . all

this grows from generationuntogeneration,merely becausepeople believe in it, until it

graduallygrows to be partof the thing and turns nto its verybody. (§58)

Here is another xampleof Nietzsche'sntolerance f any approachhat

would implisticallyindconcepts s theproducts finstincts, atherhanhekey tounderstandingheefficacyof language:

Whatat first was appearancebecomes in the end, almostinvariably, he essence and is

effective as such. How foolish it would be to suppose thatoneonly needs to point out this

origin and this misty shroudof delusion n order o destroy heworld thatcountsfor real,

so-called "reality."We candestroyonly as creators. But letus not forgetthis either: t is

enough to create new names and estimations andprobabilities n order to create n the

long run new "things." §58)

ForNietzsche,Ree'svirtue f beingright s asmuchbesides hepointastheinsistence n thevirtueofbeinggoodthatReeridicules s overly entimen-tal.Themoralists s well asReeclaima viewofmoral iscoursehatdoesnotrespectheforceof languagetself.Later,n asectionwritten orthesecondeditionof TheGayScience,Nietzscheasks:

Whyis it thenthatI have neveryetencountered nybody,noteven in books, who . . . knew

moralityas a problem? .. I seenobodywho venturedacrataque f moralvaluations.... I

havescarcely detecteda few meagerpreliminary ffortsto explorethe historyof the ori-

gins (Entstehungsgeschichte) f these feelings and valuations which is somethingquite

different rom a critiqueand againdifferent rom a historyof ethical systems). In one par-

ticularcase I have done everything o encourage a sympathyand talent for this kind of

history in vain it seems to me today. ([1887] 1974; [1887] 1988a, §345)

WalterKaufmannNietzsche1882] 1974,n. to §345)andRudolph inion(1968,137)both uggest hatRee s theperson eferenced ere,a claimcon-sistentwithevidencenternalo Nietzsche's euvre s well as withbiograph-icaldetailson the ntellectualelation etweenReeandNietzsche eportedby LouAndreas alome,discussed elow.NotethatNietzsche s callingnotfor a Genealogie ut anEntstehungsgeschichter "history" f origins.A"genealogy"f morals eportsrigins ut n areductive,tatic,univocalman-nerunworthy f beingcalleda history.




Nietzsche used evolutionarydiscourse, but to play a little joke at the

expenseof modernityby brilliantlyusing evolutionarymodelsandlanguageto thwartevolutionary psychologists' substantive conclusions. Nietzsche

saw hiscontemporaries s stupid,hollow creatureswhocomparedbadlywith

those who precededthem, especially the Greeks. If this is what evolution

broughtabout,Darwinianshadnothingto bragabout.Salome([1894] 1988)writes thatRee, contrariwise,acknowledgedaversion of progress ntheshift

in "value udgmenttowardbenevolentandegalitarian mpulses as a natural

andgradual ransition owardmorehighly developedsocietal forms: heorig-inal glorificationof animalrapaciousnessand selfishness yielded increas-

inglyto theintroduction f mildercustoms and aws"(p. 110).WhileStrauss,

Ree, and Nietzsche agreedthatvalues change overtime,Nietzsche insisted

this is a process of decline rather han of higher development.Ree's workwas apokein theeye notonlyfor Christiansbutalsothose util-

itarianswho wantedto infer thatpastmoraldiscourses ustifiedcurrentntu-

itions aboutgood and evil. Salome ([1894] 1988) says that "in his personalassessmentof the moralphenomenon,Ree meanwhile was farfromputtinghimself on the side of theEnglishutilitarians, houghhe was closest to them

in his scientificviews,"while forNietzsche,the "historically-given ifferen-tiationbetweenthetwo valuationsof what 'good' meantsharpenednto two

irreconcilable ontrasts:abattlebetweenmastermoralityand slavemorality,which remainsunabated ntoour own time"(p. 110).Salomehas thetension

between the two authorsust right:Ree had a functionalistview of morality,even as he condemned he generalmoral climateof his day,whichfrowned,

for instance,on his free-spiritedcavortingamong otherintellectuals,espe-

cially Salome,insteadof becomingarespectableburgher.As opposedto oth-

ers who might identifythe statusquo with the moralgood, Ree held simplythat moral development s adaptive.Evolutionarypsychologists used their

scientific method to justify the statusquo;Nietzsche used the statusquo to

indicttheevolutionarypsychology;and Ree was a good scientist,ostensibly

separating he facts aboutwhat was in the interests of the species fromhis

own moralpreferences.It was precisely to escape the pseudo-objectiveportraitsof morality

paintedby the positivists, includingRee, that Nietzsche advocated a new

approacho

knowledge,one thatunderstood he

mutuallyconstitutiverela-

tion between narratorand audience, authorand progeny,Darwin and the

nineteenth-century uropean,Nietzscheand the overhuman.Andthen,after

Zarathustra Nietzsche [1883-85, 1892] 1966b), in BeyondGood and Evil

(Nietzsche [1886] 1966a),Nietzsche establishes a systematicalternative hat

would become the preludeto his next work, On the Genealogy of Morals

(Nietzsche [1887] 1967b),by takingon the entirepositivist ndustry,with its




assumptions boutappearancesndreality, ruthandfalsity, anguage ndthings.

After characterizinglato as a "great ronic" writingas though heformsand truthare outsideconvention ndtherefore reating hisframe-work Nietzsche xplains hatpositivists ail to realize hat hey areonlypretendingo discover ruth,while actually heyaremaking t. AndwhileFoucaultwouldeschewanalyzing rigins or contemporaryxplanations,Nietzsche [1886] 1966a)hereadvocatesust thisapproach:

Whoever has traced he historyof an individualscience findsa clue in its development

forunderstandinghe mostancient and commonprocesses of all "knowledgeandcogni-tion." . . We maJoe p the majorpartof the experience andcan scarcely be forced not to

contemplate ome event as its "inventors." ll this means:basically andfrom time mme-

morial we are accustomedto Iying. Or to put it morevirtuouslyand hypocritically, n

short,more pleasantly:one is much more of an artistthanone knows. (§191, 192)

Whereas oucault ses thepast o demonstrateiscontinuityn eventsead-ing to the present,Nietzsche ees the pastas theobjects hatanyhistorianarrangesor his story'sopening cene.Thedifference etweenRee andhis

colleagues, n theonehand,andNietzsche, n theother,s that he ormer onotadmit o their nventions ut, hrough curiousmix of hubris ndmod-esty,offer heirobservationss neutral.sNietzsche imply"makinghingsup" or advocatingictionalscience?Not at all, but rather, e grasps heartisanryf hisrepresentations,heway hathis ownarrangementsakeuseof existingmaterialsatherhan imply ender naccurate ortrait f some-thingoutthere.

NlETZSCHE'SREVALUATIQN F REE

Theintimacies f Nietzsche's elation o bothRee andSalomewarrantmention, ecausewithout heerotic riangle mong hem,Nietzscheproba-bly would not have botheredspendingsuch considerablentellectualenergy positiveandnegative on Ree's behalf.l2n brief,NietzschemetRee in 1873,whileRee was agraduatetudent.Reebecamean acolyte, nd

onesensesa certain arcissismn Nietzsche's arlyaffection orhim.Theirregular ompanionshipndcorrespondenceommencedn 1876 andwassteadyand ntense.According o Salome,Nietzsche ubstituted isfriend-shipwithReefor hatwithWagner,romwhomNietzsche roke ffrelationsduringhatsameperiod 1876),whenhe substitutedis admirationorthesystematicogicaleffortsof Ree the empirical cientist or theDionysianqualities elebrated yWagnerhe artist Salome 1894]1988,60,73).13n




1882 Ree introducedSalome to Nietzsche, and nstantlySalomeincited him

and Ree to agree to joining her in a year of living together undercircum-

stancestheyknew would be perceivedas a scandalousme'nage trois(Binion

1968, 54). Salome had longed for the salon-life and sought, quite success-

fully, to establisha circle of this sort aroundherself.l4The threereferred o

themselves as the "Trinity," name that otheracquaintancesapplied o them

as well.

From 1876 to early in 1882, Nietzsche writes largely kind things about

Ree and often, though not always, his work (Salome [1894] 1988, 61-63;

Nietzsche [1878] 1986; Binion 1968, 43-48). This is worth note because

intellectuallythe two had littlein common, withthe exception of Ree's anti-theological stance,and in fact much, especially Ree's scientism,that would

seem to separatethem. The similarities between Ree's (1877) Origins of

Moral SentimentsandNietzsche's ([1878] 1986)HumanAll TooHumanare

striking, andthe two acknowledgedmutual debts in their respectiveworks

published duringthis period.For instance, Nietzsche writes that"mankind

cannotbe spared he horriblesightof the psychologicaloperating able, with

its knives andforceps. For now that science ruleswhich asks afterthe origin

and history of moral feelings,"and Nietzsche commends to scientistshisfriend Ree's On the Origin of Moral Sentiments §37). Ree inscribeson his

gift of Ursprung o Nietzsche: "To the fatherof this work fromits mother,

most gratefully" quoted n Binion 1968,43). A year later,Nietzscheadopts

the metaphorbut reverses he roles,accompanyinghis gift of HumanAll Too

Humanto Ree with a note reading:

It belongs to you.... To the others t is sent as a gift.... All my friends arenow of one

opinion thatmy book was writtenby you andoriginatedwith you: Therefore, congratu-

late you on yournew paternity (Salome[ 1894] 1988, 73,citing a letterfromNietzscheto

Ree, April 24, 1878)

Nietzsche is offering a backhanded ompliment,as Nietzsche's friends dis-

liked the bookandthought t unworthyof Nietzsche,blamingReefor its defi-

ciencies. (I agreewith Nietzsche'sfriends.)Propounding largelypositivist,

evolutionaryoutlook (moreLaMarckianhanDarwinian), he workdiffers n

emphasis fromvirtuallyeverythingelse Nietzsche wrote, but stillNietzsche

does not advocateor even mention Genealogie. And even here Nietzschevoices disagreementswith Ree's work.

Nietzsche himself eventuallyfeels compelled to discount his apparent

endorsementof Ree in HumanAll TooHuman,and does so repeatedlyn his

works after1878 as well as later, n Ecce Homo,where he writesof how the

passage on Ree in HumanAll Too Huntanquotedabove (Nietzsche [1878]




1986, §37) was misunderstood. n Ecce HomoNietzsche ([1889] 1967a)says

he never really advocatedRee's method but was just being a good friend.

Nietzsche points out how he avoided "the little word 'I' once again and

bathed n world-historical lory-not Schopenhauer r Wagner his timebut

one of my friends,theexcellent Dr. Ree" (§6). The allusionto twopreviously

rejected ntellectualallies Schopenhauer s a literarycompanionandWag-

ner as ahistoricalone suggests Nietzsche sawhimself as directing hespot-

light of world history alreadyseeking out scientists onto his friendRee,

while Nietzsche himself was not interested in being a protagonist.This

sounds like a post hoc self-vindication and perhaps it is, though thereare

enoughpassages in HumunA/ZToo Haemunhowing substantialdifferencesfromRee that I believeNietzsche. When he liked Ree he wantedto helphim

out,just as he did Wagner,and when he fell out with both of them, thenhe

attacked heir respective deas (and characters)ntemperately.

Nietzsche's subsequentdisparagement f Ree and his work wasprecipi-

tatedby a combination of personal and intellectual antagonisms(Salome

[1894] 1988, 70), the mostimportantbeing theirinability to sublimate heir

rivalry or the romanticattentionof Salome. There is no way to condensethe

complicatedandpainful ntricaciesof thisrelationship;5 of note forpurposesof this essay is thatNietzsche was deeply woundedby Ree and used Ree's

treatmentof him as an indictment of Ree's scholarship aboutconscience.

"One should talk only aboutwhat one knows firsthand,"he wrote his old

friendHeinrichStein (Binion 1968, 132, citingoriginal etter),l6 nd t is with

more than a little ressentiment hat Nietzsche titles his 1886 workBeyond

Goodand Evil, which, ln lig,htof Ree's {] 877) bookon moralsentimentsand

ehapterheadings on the origins of good and evil, is anotherway of saying

4'beyondPaul Ree."Vanous passages of Beyond GoodCand vil revealRee's features n Nietz-

sche's image of "thescientist," ust as Wagner'sprofile appearsNietzsche

when sketches romanticism."A solid man of science may feel thathe is of a

bettertype and descent,"Nietzsche ([1886] 1966a) writes, using a double-

entendre to suggest the evolutionary-mindedmoral psychologist not only

writes on but fancies himself a specimen of humanity's improvement.He

continues:"It s especiallythe sight of those hodgepodge philosopherswho

call themselves 'philosophers of reality' or 'positivists,'" similar to their

descendants n today'sbehavioralistsandevolutionarypsychologists,

that is capable of injecting a dangerous mistrust into the soul of an ambitious young

scholar.... They are all losers who have been broughtbackunder the hegemony of sci-

ence, after having desired moreof themselves at some time without having had the right

to this "more" and its responsibilities and who now represent, in word and deed, honor-




ably, resentfully,vengefully, the unbeliefn the masterlytask and masterfulnessof phi-

losophy. (§204)

Ree anslotherswho aretrying o use science in the senseof systematic,unbiased !nservationboutbodies,events,behaviors,ndbeliefs andcallthisphilosophyetray lackof faith n themselves ndhencearenunciationof theirownpower,dishonoringothphilosophynd hemselves.Onemustgo beyond hesearch or anultimate ourceof morality y consideringhequest tselfasa symptom, s aproblem, ndasdiscoursehat mis)shapess.

ONTHEGENEALOGYFMORALS:EINESTREITSCHRIFT

On the Genealogy f Morals akes ssue with genealogyas a methodunfortunatelyifted romzoology n the serviceof badhistories.Nietzschesees Darwinas Hegel'sdescendant, ith theEnglishheir'sauthority ol-stered n aneraof scientific nd echnologicaleterminism ietzscheound

everybit asstultifying s thereligiouslynflectednationalismhatpreceded.Nietzsche's enealogistsracebiologicaldescent,a project ppropriateordescribingpurely iological pecies,not orhuman istory.Nietzsche oesnot celebrate enealogy s analternativeo historybutdeploys he term omocksoeiobiologicalseudohistorians.

The 'zur' n Nietzsche's itle indicates hatNietzsche s writing n thesociobiologicalmethod ndcalling t "genealogical"n ordero makevividits unsavory ualities.WalterKaufmann1968)explains hat'zur' n ZurGenealogieouldmean ithertoward'r 'on',buthere" 'on' stheonlypos-sible meaning"introduction,2). Kaufmann escribesNietzsche'sZurGenealogie s a polemiconthemethod e findsso irritating,atherhananearnest ffort o leadstudentsoward 'Genealogie'f morals.'7Of courseanytopiconwhichone writes,one writes on',andyet 'zur'appearsn nootherbook itleby Nietzsche, uggestinghatNietzsche s formallyndicat-ing his distanceroma particularcademic nterpriseursued y others, nwhichNietzschewill comment, s he does nother ontexts uehas sectiontitlesusing'zur',Kaufmannxplains introduction,2).

If Nietzschewereattemptingo encourageistorianso startdoinggene-alogiesandstopdoinghistory,henwe wouldexpecthim o criticize istori-ans, but instead,On the Genealogy f Morulscriticizes Genealogie', ot'Historie' r'Geschichte'. he ormers Ree'sandhis English ounterparts'specificallympoverishedormof charting umanity's evelopment.n aGenealogieone's presenceappears nly throughhe uncreative,lliterate



Stevens / ON THE MORALS OF GENEALOGY 571

notationsoutliningthe utility functions thatmade one possible. Historiecan

and should be far more subtle, more concerned with the ways in which

humansare not merely animals. Specifically, history needs to be attentive o

language, something that Ree's naturalscientific bluster ignored.

Consider the few places in this text where Nietzsche uses 'Genealogie'

and its cognates. In the first, Nietzsche says he was first inspired to write

about he origin of moralityby a "clear, idy, and shrewd also precocious-

little book"writtenby Dr.Ree. Here Nietzsche ([1887] 1967b) encountersan

"upside-down and perverse species [Art] of genealogical hypothesis, the

genuinely English type [Art]" (preface, §4). The passage might be saying

Nietzsche was inspiredto provide an alternativegenealogical approach,butthe context of this and other references suggests Nietzsche is inviting those

whose work seems reductiveand genealogical to do somethingelse, namely,

history.

Darwin's ([1859] 1964) Origin of Species was translated as Die

Enstehungder Arten. By referring o Ree's findings also as 'Arten',Nietz-

sche conflates the two. By characterizingRee's work as 'genealogisch' a

termof art or evolutionarybiologists and those tracing heirfamilytrees'8-

and not as 'historisch'or 'geschichtlich', Nietzsche situatesRee's work in abiological or racialized domestic context, as opposed to a philosophical

milieu. 'Genealogie' does not appear n the Grimmbrothers' [1854] 1984)

Deutsches Worterbuch, nd the entry for 'Genealog' in an 1876 dictionary

reads: "Der sich mit Genealogie beschaftigt. Stammbaum, Stammtafel,

Geschlechtsregister; ie Wissenschaft,die sich damit befschaftigt;ein Wert

daruber . . auf Genealogie bezuglich" (Sanders 1876).19Ree himself does

not use 'Genealogie', again suggesting that when Nietzsche superimposes

this characterization n Ree it is to make fun of him.The second time the word 'genealogy' appears n Kaufmann's ranslation

of zur Genealogie is in a passage expressing Nietzsche's wish to correct

Ree's account, to "replace he improbablewith the more probable,possibly

one errorwith another. t was then, as I have said, thatI advanced or the first

time those genealogical hypotheses to which this treatise is devoted"

(Nietzsche [1887] 1967b, preface, §4). However, the original Germanpas-

sage does not contain 'Genealogie' or any of its cognates. It reads:"Damals

brachte ich, wie gesagt, zum ersten Male jene Herkunfts-Hypothesen n's

Tageslicht" Nietzsche [1887] 1988b, Vorrede§4). Nietzsche is not propos-

ing any genealogical hypothesesbutrestating he mission of genealogists n a

rather arcasticway, as having promptedhim to offer his own competing he-r

Oryor orlglns.

In introducing the second passage that actually uses 'Genealogie',

Nietzsche ([1887] 1967b) writes:




If I considered in this connection the above-mentionedDr. Ree, among others, it was

because I had no doubt hatthe very natureof his inquirieswould compel him to adopta

better method for reaching answers. Have I deceived myself in this? My desire, at anyrate,was to pointout to so sharpanddisinterested n eye as his a betterdirection n whichto

look, in the directionof an actualhistory Historie] of morality,and to warnhim in time

againstgazing aroundhaphazardlyn the blue afterthe English fashion. (preface,§7)

Nietzsche,again n a rather arcasticone,tells his friend hat t was forhisinsight hatNietzscheconsidered is texts and then nstructs im thatheshouldbe doinga historyof morality, ndnot ponderinghe blue sky andseas.Nietzsche ontinues:

For t must be obvious which color is a hundred imes more vital for a genealogist of mor-

als than blue: namely gray, that s, what is documented,what can actuallybe confirmed

andhas actuallyexisted, in short he entire ong hieroglyphicrecord,so hard o decipher,

of the moral past of mankind!(preface, §7)

Nietzsche'sdeaof a realoractual istory ermeated ithhumanity'sxperi-ences preservedn documents ontrastswiththe starknotations f a moral

psychologist singDarwinianmethods.Aftera section peculating n whatcouldpossiblydrivephilosophersoturn o evolutionaryheory ortheoriginof values-such an accountmakesthe human pirit"something urelypassive,automatic,eflexive, nd hor-oughlystupid" Nietzsche 1887] 1967b, . §1), a curious hoice of a newself-image-Nietzscherites: All espect or hegoodspirits hatmayrule nthesehistorians f morality!But it is, unhappily,ertain hat he historicalspirit[historischeGeist] tself is lacking n them" [1887] 1967b; 1887](1988b), . §2,emphasisn original).nstead f aknack orhistory, ietzschecomplains,he "microscopistsf the soul" [1887]1967b, . §1) arecomingupwith illygenealogiesndare hemselvesenealogists[1887]1967b, . §2).

Subsequent ses of 'Genealogie'n On the Genealogyalso suggest hatNietzscheassociatesgenealogieswith bad research,not a new style ofinquiry istorianshould mulate.Afteraskinghowbadconscience mergeshe writes:

And at this point we return o our genealogists of morals. To say it again-or haven't I

said it yet? they are worthless. A brief span of experience that is merely one's own,merely "modern";withoutknowledge, without will to knowledge of the past; even less

of an historical [historischer] nstinct, of that "second vision" [Gesicht] needed here

above all and yet they undertakea history [Geschichte]of morality. Nietzsche [ 1887]

1967b, II. §4)




Thesepeoplewhooffera history f moralsby focusing n our nstinctsmis-take the modernpreoccupation ith Darwin or a timeless methodand,Nietzsche okes, hemselvesacka historicalnstinct. n the nameof historytheywritegenealogies.Nietzscheasks,"Untilnowhavethesegenealogistsof morals adeven heremotest uspicionhat, orexample, hemajormoralconcept guilt' Schuld] as ts origin n theverymaterialoncept Schulden'[debts]"Nietzsche 1887] 1967b, I. §4)?2°By pointing utthematerialityof a socialpractice nd inking heconcept f debtwith hemoral ensibilityof 'guilt'Nietzsche eversesRee'scausaluniverse.Abstractnstincts o notdeterminemoral oncepts,buthistoricalmaterial onditions, uchas debt,

giveriseto and henalter oncepts, iving hemdifferentmeanings tdiffer-ent imes.When unishmentirstarose, t wasnotdirected gainstheaberrantwill butwas simplya meansof controlling ehavior.Over ime,Nietzscheargues,hebehavior alled"punishment"averise o a newvocabularyf aninternalizedmorality Nietzsche 1887] 1967b; 1887] 1988b,II. §4). Farfrompraising enealogy r nvokingt as a newmodel,Nietzsche ondemnsthe enterprise, utarticulatingn alternativeiewpoints not easy.

Insofar s thenarrativereates heauthor, s Nietzsche [1883-85]1966b)

hasalreadymade lear nThusSpokeZarathustra,hen,Nietzschewonders,what ortof author oesthe sociobiologicalaledramatize? oncerned ithstyleand howing isunderstandingf therelation etween ormand ontentNietzschewouldn't toop o simpledenotationf Ree'spersona utoffersusa narrativef thenobleraceand heslavementalityo helpus see Ree as thetype of authorRee's own evolutionarytorycreates.NietzscheattemptsodestabilizeDarwinianhegemony hrough he dangerous nd ultimatelyunsuccessfulseof hyperbolendparody. aking oteof Nietzsche'sejection

of Darwinianociobiology,swellasthechallengesacing elf-authorshipndimprovisation, elps us contextualizehe sarcasm nflectingNietzsche'sironicdescriptionsf blondebeastsand heherd, he ambsand hebeastsofprey(Nietzsche 1887] 1967b, . §13). Observinghat ambsare astyandthat hey argue elf-interestedlyor morality oes notjustifybrutality ndviolencebut hould rompt sto laughatRee'sequations etween iologicalimperativesnd anguage.f Ree s going o representorceas a matter f ani-malurges, hen his ogically mpliesa human eingentirelyacking he in-guistic ools andagencynecessaryo consider ctions n a moral egister-for either he beastsof preyor the ambs.2l

Anotherway o stateNietzsche's oint,bearingn mindhis nterestnphi-lology and etymology Nietzsche 1887] 1988b,I. §4), is that here s aninherentension n how Ree andother ociobiologists se the word moral-




ity'.Morality, ee (1877,59) claims, onsistsof labels orbehaviorshatareinherentlyseful,a viewof languageNietzsche [1887]1974) corns ecausesuch a representationgnoreshow languageandpeoplematerializeheirappearances:

What s required to ive] is to stopcourageouslyat the surface, he fold, the skin, to adore

appearance, o believe informs, tones, words.... And is not this precisely whatwe are

againcoming back to, we daredevilsof thespiritwho haveclimbed the highest andmost

dangerous peak of presentthought and looked around from up there we who have

lookeddown from there?Are we not, precisely n this respect,Greeks?Adorersof forms,

of tones, of words? Andtherefore artists?(P. 38)

Thepassage s somewhatonfusing ecauseNietzsche eems o becollaps-ing theDionysianGreeks f passionandartistrywith hePlatonic neswhoadoredorms,and hen liding hedifference etweenhePlatonists'ppreci-ationof formsbuttheirdisdain orappearances-butheunderlying ointseems obe that hemeaning f theword good', or nstance, reates ehav-iors ratherhancorrelateswith howtheydevelop,andthe samefor 'evil'.Moreover,heutility f aconceptwillchange, epending n who s inpower.

"Whoamongus findsa moralvalueof use?"Nietzsche s asking,whereasReeassumesa homogeneouspecies hatas a massunivocallymposes tsvalues orits genericmprovement.

Nietzsche ecognizeshat f humanswereontologicallyustonemore ni-malspecies he discourse f 'gut'and bose'wouldnotexist.Peoplewouldperishandsurvivewithout language f values. s 'Moralitat'merewordmaskinghe ruth fdeedsand nstincts?Or s thisclaimaboutmoralitytselfa symptom f howwordsmatter orhumans s theydo not for animals?

Nietzsche's xperimentemonstratesheoxymoron faword-interestedni-mal.22 singparadox ndrony,Nietzsche's hilologicalnvestigationlaceslanguagen its rightful edestal, utsidehe axidermist'saseofahistoricalcreatures hereonefindsRee'sspecimens.23

Thepenultimateeference o genealogistsn theKaufmannranslationmostdirectly upportshe inferencehatNietzsche s enteringhefrayas anew kindof genealogist,ather han ust educating nfortunatetudents fthatpathetic ubfield:

Yet aword on the originandthe purposeof punishment twoproblems hatareseparate,

or oughtto be separate:unfortunately hey areusuallyconfounded.How haveprevious

genealogists of morals set about solving these problems?Naively, as has always been

their way. (Nietzsche [1887l 1967b, II. §12)



Stevens/ ON THEMORALSOF GENEALOGY 575

In theoriginalGerman,fter he sentencequotedabove,Nietzsche[1887]1988b)writes:"Wie reiben s dochdie bisherigenMoral-Genealogenn

diesemFall?" "Yet owhavemoral-genealogistsisherigan.")Bisherigan'

canbetranslateds "previous"utalsocanbe translateds "hitherto,"hichKaufmannimselfdoeson several ccasions lsewheren thetext e.g.pref-ace §3,§5, I. §1)."Previousenealogists"iffers na subtlebutsignificantway from "genealogists ntil now"becausethe formerconnotesmorestronglyhe possibilityhatuntilNietzschegenealogywas onethingandafterhatgenealogyhould o somethinglse,as opposedo a sense hatuntilnowgenealogists avepursued certain ath.Observinghemistakesene-

alogistshavemadehroughhepresent,Nietzsche oesnotsuggesthat newtypeof genealogistmustemerge omuchas,in keepingwithhisdistasteorthe enterprise,e impliesgenealogistshouldearn romwhatNietzsches

telling hem.The atter ranslationoesnotprecludeheFoucauldianeadingof this passage,but it does less to require his thandoes Kaufmann'srendering.

The inalappearancef theword genealogy's criticalatherhan auda-

toryof the method.Alludingo Ree'sdiscussion f punishmentRee 1877,

14)Nietzsche [1887] 1967b)writes:

Thecase is notas has hithertobeen assumedby ournaive genealogistsof lawandmorals,

who have one and all thoughtof the procedureas inventedfor thepurposeof punishing,

justas one formerly houghtof the handas invented or the purposeof grasping. II. §13)

Thesegenealogists redoing something lunky,old-fashioned,eductive,

andNietzschereats hemwithridiculen thesame onehe uses n hisearlieressayon Strauss nd nhis subsequentexts, ncludinghe bookappearingjust before On the Genealogy,BeyondGoodandEvil, whereNietzsche([1886]1966a)mentionsDarwinn a list of "mediocre nglishmen"nd

attacksDarwinismor its "narrowness,ridity, nd ndustriousiligence"that s causingan "over-allepressionf theEuropeanpirit"§253).Inhisaphorismsn TwiZaghtftheIdols,Nietzsche[1889]1990)writes,"Isoughtgreathumanbeings,I never oundanything uttheapes of their deal" I.

§39).Finally,EcceHomo lsoaffirms isattack n StraussNietzsche1889]1967a,§232),and"Why WriteSuchGoodBooks" hargeshosewho"sus-

pectedme of Darwinism" ith being"scholarlyxen" Nietzsche 1889]1967a,§1). Tobe clear,Nietzsche's oint s notto celebrateheontological

humanistubject ver hesociobiologicalnebut o instructson thepossi-bilitiesof overcomingositivists'olonizationf humanity.




DR.DELEUZENDDR.FOUCAULT

So if Nietzsche advocatessome approaches o historywhile genealogiesperse upsethim, why arethose who seem sympathetic o Nietzsche's intel-

lectualprojectso enamoredof genealogies?The turningpointappears o be

Gilles Deleuze ([1962] 1983), Nietzsche ndPhilosophy,houghI have no

idea why he chose this way of readingNietzsche. Payingdisproportionate

attentionto On theGenealogy fMorals,Nietzsche ndPhilosophy'sirst

heading n the firstchapter s "TheConceptof Genealogy,"andthe firstsen-

tence says: "Nietzschecreatesthe new concept of genealogy.The philoso-

pher is a genealogist ratherthan a Kantiantribunal udge or a utilitarianmechanic" p. 2). Rather hanattributeNietzsche's critiqueof Ree to Nietz-

sche's understanding f 'Historie'and 'Geschichte'or mentionthatNietz-

sche's "newconceptof genealogy"is discussed in only one book, Deleuze

beginsa long paragraph n thegenealogicalmethodby sayingthat "Geneal-

ogy meansboth thevalueof originand the originof values"(p. 2) butnever

referencesanyNietzscheanpassageson genealogy.24

While Deleuze ([1962] 1983) is the Elrst uthorI have encounteredwho

readsNietzscheasadvocatinga "truegenealogy"(p.56) mostof themain-

streamNietzsche scholarship, ncludingKaufmann,does not do this were

it not for Foucaultbringingthis approachnto his own work,the Deleuzean

definitionof genealogymighthaveremained ust that,atbest one interpreta-

tionof Nietzscheandnothingmore.Once,however,Foucault [1971] 1977a)

followed up on thiswithhis own essay "Nietzsche,Genealogy,History,"he

impactof the new use would extendfarbeyondthe Frenchacademy.25 he

editor'snote to theEnglishtranslation tates:

Along with"Reponseaucercle d'epistemologie,"whichbecametheintroductory hap-

ter of TheArchaeologyofKnowledge, hisessayrepresentsFoucault'sattempt o explain

his relationship o those sourceswhich are fundamental o his development.Its impor-

tance, n termsof understanding oucault'sobjectives,cannotbe exaggerated. P. 139)

"Genealogy,"Foucault'sessay begins, "is gray,meticulous,patientlydocu-

mentary. toperatesona field of entangledandconfusedparchments, n doc-

umentsthathave been scratchedover and recopied many times"(p. 139).

Immediately Foucault goes astray, mistaking Nietzsche's far-reachingappealto the "entire ong hieroglyphicrecord. . . of the moralpastof man-

kind" Nietzsche[1887] 1967b,preface,§7) forwhata genealogistwoulddo.

Foucaultseems toreadNietzsche as sayingthattracingevolutionarydescent

is complicated,thatRee's analogyof genealogy to evolutionary heoryhas

overlooked he subtletyof thisinquiry.But we haveseen thateventhough he

"actualhistory frnoruZity"hatNietzsche says he wantsto teachRee would



Stevens / ON THE MORALS OFGENEALOGY 577

indeed aspireto review the recordof humanity'smoralhieroglyphics, his is

not genealogy.

The passageFoucaultcites contrastsgenealogies wrought hroughevolu-

tionary theory to a better sort of history.Foucault infers from this that the

right way to thinkaboutthe past is a genealogy. At mostNietzsche could be

read as saying thatgenealogy has been one thing andshould be something

else. Foucaultmakesof this the claim thatgenealogy is aninherently uperior

method or researchnto the past.Foucault'sadmonitionsnclude some of the

points Nietzsche makes in criticizinggenealogists, butFoucaultdistortsor

simply changes others.

Offering anexample of Nietzsche as "trulya genealogist,"FoucaultsaysthatNietzsche's"genealogicalanalysisshows thattheconceptof liberty s an

'inventionof theruling classes,' " but the passage he cites does not mention

'Genealogie'(Foucault 1971] 1977a,142, citing Nietzsche 1880, §9). Atthe

beginning of theArchaeologyFoucault([1969] 1972a)refers to the "decen-

tring operatedby the Nietzschean genealogy" (p. 13), although Nietzsche

himself never claimed to have done a genealogy of anything. Foucault

([1971] 1977a) also introduces he "newhistorian, hegenealogist" p.160),

as someone createdby Nietzsche who, we are told, has overthrownmonu-mental history:"Genealogy is history in the form of a concerted carnival"

(p. 161), but "TheUses andDisadvantagesof History"Foucaultreferences

here nevermentions Genealogie', hough'Historie'and'Geschichte'aredis-

cussed extensively.Foucaultwrites also that the "purposeof history,guided

by genealogy, s not todiscoverthe rootsof our dentitybuttocommit tself to

its dissipation" p. 162). And he says, "In a sense, genealogy returns o the

three modalities of history that Nietzsche recognized in 1874" (p. 164), but

the same essay is silent on genealogy. In a separateessay Foucault([1970]1977b) writes admiringlyof "Deleuze, with the patience of a Nietzschean

genealogist" (p. 181),who rejectsmonumentalhistories.Indeed none of the

Nietzsche passages Foucault cites in his argumentsaboutgenealogy, other

than hose in ZurGenealogie,reviewedabove, mention'Genealogie' And to

the best of my knowledge, no otherworks Nietzsche prepared or publica-

tion, includingBeyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche [1886] 1966a), mention

Genealogie (other than the derogatoryreference to Strauss as an "ape-

genealogist")(Nietzsche [1873] 1997a),nor is the wordindexed in The Will

to Power (Nietzsche 1968). While arguablyone or two passages of On the

Genealogy are, taken alone, vague on whether genealogies need to be

improved or replaced,others state genealogies are done by unimaginative

people, and the overallcontext makes it clear thathistoryhasbecome objec-

tionable genealogy.Neither the generalcontext of On the Genealogy much

less his entireoeuvresuggests theDeleuzean andFoucauldianpreoccupation




withelevating truegenealogist verotherhistorians.Genealogyimplys

notthe mportantonceptualonceit orNietzscheater cholarslaim t to

be. 'Genealogie's deployedn On the Genealogyas a stylistic ebukepe-

cificto Nietzsche'sdismissal f ReeandDarwinism,ndnothingmore.

THEMORALSOF GENEALOGY

What provokesone to look at all philosophershalf suspiciously,half mockingly, s not

thatone discovers againand againhow innocentthey are how often andhow easily

theymakemistakesandgo astray;n short, heirchildishnessandchildlikeness butthatthey are nothonest enoughin theirwork, although hey all makea lot of virtuousnoise

when the problemof truthfulnesss touchedeven remotely.Theyall pose as if they had

discoveredand reached heirrealopinionsthrough he self developmentof a cold, pure,

divinelyunconcerneddialectic. (Nietzsche [ 1886] 1966a, §5)

AssuminghatFoucault asmisstatedNietzsche'sgenealogicaloncerns,

doestheformof thiserror evealanythingigniElcantbout hesubstancef

Foucault's iews on historicalnvestigations?oucaultmisinterpretshe

meaningof Nietzsche's"genealogy,"ut Foucault's vowedmethodsdoechoprominent ietzscheanhemes.Foucault'snsistence nthe constitu-tive role of discoursebroadly esemblesNietzsche'sown beliefs,andit

wouldbe fair o saythatmuchof whatNietzsche allshistory, oucaultnd

his followerscall genealogy notwithstandingome crucialdifferences

betweenNietzscheandFoucault.26Noticing statedmethodologicalffinity andagain,Foucaultesembles

but s nota closecopyof Nietzsche should otpreclude iscussinghecru-

cial differencesn theiraestheticsandthepolitical mplicationsntailedtherein.Theerror n Foucault'snterpretationf Nietzscheand thewide-

spread cceptancefFoucault'snterpretationevealdisturbingymptomsin themoderncademy. heElrstesson s that, egardlessf themethodolog-ical politicsof a field, its professionalizationequireshata revaluation

should e effectedwithoutelf-consciousnessrdiscussion,ustas wasdoneby thepositivists nd,after hat, hroughotecitationof themaster.Evena

lessonas apparentlyconoclastics "questionuthority"anbe transmittedthroughcholarlymedia hatmayassumeand nvitereader assivity.

Itis notFoucault'sault,and ndeedt is much o hiscredit,hathecouldanticipateagerstudents ndprestigious wards,while Nietzschewrotelargelyn anobscurityealternativelyelishednd ursed.Whereas ietzschehadto leavehis postbecauseof a constitutionalnabilityo bea professor,Foucault ndthe academy eveloped symbiotic elationHalperin 995,

157-58).Contrast ietzsche'sirst-personarathustrambivalentboutol-




lowers with the Foucaultof countless interviewsseeking to make his pointmoreclear,apractice akenup immediatelyuponhis deathby thoseattempt-

ing to preservehis legacy.Regardlessof whether the attendingcult of "St.

Foucault"(Halperin1995) is a symptomof Foucault's texts for which he

himself bearsresponsibility,or a quirkof the sociology of knowledge, the

factremains hathis oeuvrehas been mainstreamed or academics n a man-

ner that,for betteror worse, simply never occurred for Nietzsche.27UsingFoucault'sMethods,aSagePublicationsbookin a series onqualitativemeth-

ods, offers,under hesubjectheadingGenealogy,a graybox with the follow-

ing (thebullets aretheirs):

* Describesstatementsbutwith an emphasison power;

* Introducespower througha "historyof thepresent," oncernedwith "disreputable rigins

andunpalatableunctions,"making he olderguestsat the dinner able of intellectualanal-

ysis feel decidedlyuncomfortableby pointingoutthingsabouttheiroriginsand functions

thatthey wouldrather emainhidden;

* Describes statements as an ongoing process, rather than as a snapshotof the web of

discourse;

* Concentrateson the strategicuse of archaeologyto answerproblemsabout the present.

(KendallandWickham1999, 34)

ARE YOU TAKINGNOTES?

The Foucauldian utorstrives o breakdown thegenealogicalmethod nto

steps so that the good studentmight reproduce ts virtues. Of course, like

many textbooks, the above rules are illogical, misleading paraphraseshat

teach the student her inadequacyandFoucault'sauthority.Such a habit ofthoughtnecessarilyforeclosesthe imaginativeenergynecessaryforcreatingandforbeingadifferentkindof human, nsteadofjust studyingdifference.Is

theresomethinghypocriticalabout this observation,coming at the end of a

dry exegesis of 'genealogy'?Indeed. Consider he source-an itinerantaca-

demicpublishing n a scholarly ournal-though the form andcontentof the

argumentmayalso suggestaparadoxof polemic. Regardlessof what s being

questioned,one needspersuasiveevidence. WhereasNietzschesaystruth s a

veiled woman and it is indecent to uncoverher, perhapsthe clothing thatreallycalls forinspectiondrapes he bodies of those who appriseher: he sci-

entist'swhite lab coat, the postfoundationalist'sblackturtleneck, he social

scientist'sgraysuit.Academicgarbof all sorts lends credibilityto observa-

tionsby those who donit. Theproblem sn't truthor distortionper se but an

unearned ense of epistemologicalcertainty.




Nietzscheposes achallengeto the substantiveandmethodologicalortho-

doxiesamongsomeFoucauldians,whoapparently o not feel theslightestbit

silly aboutbeing so seriousin their discussionsof Nietzsche's invitations o

play with history,to treat t as a muse andnot a God, to standup to it with

irreverenceas well as authority.Whatever s provocativeandinstructive n

Nietzsche's aphoristic antrumson and as philosophyis notthatthese-rules-

and-not-thosemustbe used, thatan inquirymust be "genealogical"or the

scholar s hopelessly old-fashioned.Worth earningfrom in Nietzsche is his

commitmentto the self-awareproductionof representationsn a milieu of

powerrelationsknowledgesustains,produces,andchallenges.

Nietzsche'sartist s farmorethreateningo all established nstitutionsand

dispositions hanthe Foucauldian ritic.Theartist,orat leasttheNietzschean

one,canchangeus,whilethecriticwilljustleaveus annoyed.This is because

acriticcan surviveasaparasite,her talentsallthe more revealed nthefaceof

adversity.But Nietzschewantedmore thanspaceto be a maverick-and this

is what saveshimfrombeing a liberal:he wantedfriends.He desireda com-

munityof peoplewho"got"whathedid andwho would makehimfeel under-

stood in a way that the modernherdmentalityprecluded.He knew thatthe

conversations he craved could not be gained through individual self-improvement,orevenreachingout to a few like-mindedpeople,butrequireda new habitof thought,a new age. Nietzsche's Zarathustrattempted o cre-

atea worldin whichhe would have liked to live;he soughtto teach his com-

panions, not just himself. Nietzsche thought himself "untimely"and, as

Zarathustra,wanted to change his time. Nietzsche's self-aggrandizing,

patronizingstyle proveda poor way of cultivatingthe intellectualcompan-

ionship he so badly wanted,even as he established,againsthis best inten-

tions, a worldhistoricphilosophy.Of course herein ies theparadox hatNietzsche himselfanticipated: fter

topplingthestatusquothe alternativebecomesanotherruleormodel. A per-fect exampleis whathis andFoucault's ollowers did after heyabsorbed he

concept of genealogy and establishedit as an orthodoxy,the rightmethod

insteadof history.Therule is apointlessuse of authority,unworthyof beingoffered or followed by the Nietzscheanoverhuman.Even hadFoucaultana-

lyzed correctly Nietzsche's concept of genealogy, creativityand artistrywould not be enhanced.Nietzsche did not

improvisea new

philosophybut

nurtured philosophyof improvisation.Foucaulthada method.

The preoccupationwith method before language suggests the second

aspect of modernitythat Foucauldiansperformeven as they strive to be

postmodern.The metaphysician'snotionthatwords canexist in anarbitrary

relation o thingstheyname s implicitinthe casualreassignment f meaningFoucaulteffects.TheGerman Genealogie',theFrench'genealogie',andthe




English 'genealogy' all suggest a family tree, a chart recordingthe mix of

choices and events that line up ancestors in a necessary relationto the next

generation,telling an implicit causal story about how strataare connected

and, ideally, tracing one's history as far back as possible, the presumption

being that these origins carry orth a secret essence manifest in the present.

Even when mistaken,as they often are, genealogies offer the hope of found-

ing truthsabout,at minimum,one's race, ethnicity,or nationality.But, as we

have seen above, Foucault nverts hese meaningsandoffers a new definition,

albeit in the guise of a Nietzschean, older one. This passage quite clearly

reveals Foucault'sreversalof the meaning of 'genealogy':

Genealogy does not pretendto go back in time to restore an unbrokencontinuitythat

operatesbeyond the dispersionof forgotten hings; ts duty is not to demonstrate hat he

past actively exists in the present, hat t continues secretlyto animate he present,having

imposed a predetermined orm to all its vicissitudes. Genealogy does not resemblethe

evolutionof a species anddoes not mapthe destiny of a people. On the contrary, o follow

the complex course of descent is to maintainpassing events in theirproperdispersion; t

is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations or conversely, the complete rever-

sals the errors, he false appraisals,and the faulty calculations hat gave birth o those

things thatcontinueto exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truthor being donot lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriorityof accidents.

(Foucault [1971] 1977a, 146, citing Nietzsche [1887] 1967b, III. §17)

But of course what Foucaultsays genealogies are not is precisely what they

are: genealogies are written and rewritten,resemble the evolution of a spe-

cies, map the destiny of a people, are read and amendedby those who firmly

believe that "truth r being"does"lie at the root of what we know and what

we are."One traces out a presentconnection to ancestorsbecause one thinks

thatthis reveals somethingessential aboutwho one is now, that his pasthas avalue, and that there is something about one's being now that can be ascer-

tainedby knowing one's origins. Of course one's actualrelation o any ances-

tor is accidental,but that s irrelevant o the fact thatsuch contingenciesstrike

us as existing at the "rootof what we know" about who we are.

Perhapsone should creditFoucaultwith makinga bold move himself, by

evacuating 'genealogie' of its old meanings and redefining it as something

else. But there is a differencebetween standingup to traditionand tinkering

with language,even if the latterefforts are strategic,which Foucaultprovidesno reason for believing. Insteadof improvisation,we only notice the musi-

cian cannotkeep a beat and s playing something hathurtsour ears. Only by

turningaway from languagecould one decide that a 'genealogy' would be a

form of inquirythat wouldnotsee the presentas directly tied to a continual

past Reversing his very obvious meaning of a 'genealogy' is a symptomof




modern ecadence in Nietzsche's enseof the word o refer o the weak-ness, self-indulgence, ecline,self-congratulationsf the hegemonicntel-lectual on the partof Foucault, s well as amongcertain therprominentcritics eted n today's cademy. anguage anbe a handyweapon, heper-fecttool forrematerializinghesocialorganism, utnot f thecommunity fletterscannot ell the difference etweena new riff and a cat scamperingacross hekeyboard. gain, heproblems notthat hey ailto recognize nyclassical llusions o, say,Schoenbergut hat heyare oonervouso say hatsomethingust sounds ad.Here invoke hetradition f Nietzsche, utevenif thiswentunspoken, genealogy tillwouldnotmeanwhatFoucaultays t

does."Themodern pirit's ack of discipline,dressedup in all sortsof moral

fashions," ietzschewrites n his notebooks f 1887, slops aroundn lan-guage o as to protect gainst eemingudgmental,ubjective, ndconfused."The howywords,"Nietzsche 1968)continues, re

tolerance (for "the incapacity for Yes and No") . . . being "scientific" the "documenthumain":n other words, the novel of colportrageand addition in place of composi-

tion) . . . "depth"meaning confusion, the profuse chaos of symbols. (§79)

To hesewe mightadd oday"genealogy," eaning search ora pedigreenFrance.

NOTES

1. In his Archaeologyoucault ([19691 1972a) cannot be introducinghistorians o a new

method, as that would violate what he had written about concept formationand discourse. It

would take a great Hegelian man of history to make such demands.Rather han tell historians

how to write about the past, Foucaultpoints to those approacheshe endorses and claims a new

approachalreadyhas replacedwhat he calls "history n its traditional orm" p. 7) linear,pro-

gressive, objective. This new historiography tressesdiscontinuity, pistemicbreaks, he center-

ing of the humanistsubject raming he researchagenda,andreading he present n the past:"My

aim,"theArchaeologyays, "is to uncover the principles and consequences of autochthonous

transformationhat s takingplace in the f1eldof historicalknowledge" p. 15). His effort s to use

"theresults already obtained o define a method of analysis purgedof all anthropologism.The

groundon which it rests is one that it has itself discovered" p. 16). Awareof Nietzsche's writ-

ings, Foucaulthas not developed a paradigm hat rejects the vocabularyof genealogy. Rather,

Foucault llustratesthis new archaeologicalmethod of history by highlighting the "decentring

operatedby the Nietzschean genealogy" (p. 13). Two years later,Foucaultdevelops his account

of history hroughan explicit nvocationof Nietzsche's "Genealogie," hough he archaeological

imagerypersists (Foucault 1971 1977a). Non-Englishwords arenot italicizedto avoidempha-

sis on theirphenomenologyas foreign. Double quotationmarksbracketemphasis on concepts,

and single quotationmarksa focus on words, so that"genealogy" ndicates he generalconnota-




tions of the word as a concept and 'genealogy' attends to the phenomenology of the word.

Toward hatend,punctuation orwords in single quotationmarksappearsoutside thequotation

marks.2. After conducting a FirstSearch nquiry locating over one hundred article titles and

abstractsusing "genealogy" or purposesunrelated o family trees, I stopped counting.As dis-

cussed below, Gilles Deleuze's ([1962] 1983) Nietzsche and Philosophy led Foucault to

mischaracterizingNietzsche's view of genealogy and adopting this concept for his own use.

Hence Deleuze is really the key figureresponsible orinitiating his newuse, but f Foucaulthad

not adoptedthis terminology, t is doubtfulthat it would have its current nfluence,especially

among Anglo scholars.Thanksto Anna MarieSmith for drawingmy attention o this text.

3. I discuss the German/Englishand not German/French ranslationof Zur Genealogie

because FoucaultreadNietzsche in Germanand because my audiencewill certainlyread this

andmost likely Nietzsche in English. TheFrench'genealogie' is etymologically indistinguish-able from its GermanandEnglishcounterparts.

4. Ree never ived in Englandand wasbornto Jewishparents n Bartelshagen,Pomerania,

thenpartof Prussiaand now governed by Poland(Andreas-Salome1995, 162).

5. Strauss'sbook wasimmediately ranslatedntoEnglish (by noneother hanGeorgeEliot,

thenMarianEvans, who was commissioned to do this withinweeks of thebook's firstpublica-

tion in German) Haight 1968, 52-53). Straussand Eliot subsequentlymet and appear o have

been in the samesocial circle (Haight 1968, 261, 510). Thanks o LauraGreen for herthoughts

on this association, which makes much sense in light of Eliot's later strong enthusiasms or

Darwin.

6. Breazealebelieves thatStrauss's irstbook led to Nietzsche'satheism (Breazeale1997,

xii). BecauseStrausswrote TheLife of Jesuswithoutanyreference oDarwin,who of coursehad

notyet beenpublished, t is notthe slightestbitinconsistent or Nietzsche tohaveappreciatedhe

firsttext anddismissedthesecond. See alsoJohnson 2001), who argues hatNietzschebelieved

StraussmisrepresentedDarwinand thatNietzsche desiredause of evolutionary heorycloser to

what Darwinintended. My own view is thatNietzsche works the tensions betweenGerman

moral psychology andevolutionary heory in a parodiceffort to destabilize bothfoundational

discourses.

7. The essays in UntimelyMeditationsrepeatedlyobject to the questfor aprogressivehis-

tory,be it religious, Hegelian, or Darwinian.Nietzsche observes thatsuch writers"weave the

isolated event into the whole: always with the presupposition hat if a unity of plan does not

alreadyreside in things it mustbe implanted nto them"(Nietzsche [1873] 1997b, 91).

8. To be fair to Strauss,Nietzsche's characterizations misleading,as Strauss,near he sec-

tionNietzschequotes, goes outof his way to emphasize,perhaps ncoherently, hathumansare

qualitativelydifferent romanimals. "Manought to ruleNaturewithin as well as withouthim"

accordingto Strauss(1874, §72), a feat animals cannotaccomplish.

9. WhenStraussdoes try to accommodatehe intuitionaboutmoraldifferencesamongcul-

tureshe offersovertly racistDarwinianhypotheses:

[Darwin]unhesitatinglypoints to thechimpanzee as thecommonancestorof theblack

African,orEthiopianrace,and to thepongo as that of thebrownAsiatic, orMongolian,while he regarded he white Caucasian as an offshoot bleached by a colderclimate.

(Strauss 1874, 058)

10. Ree (1877) repeatedly nvokesDarwin's authority orhis project, or instance:"Darwin

explains unegotistical actions as follows" (p. 7), and "Darwinexplains pangs of conscience

anotherway [from hose who see it a resultof peoplecalculating o maximize success]"(pp.24-

25), and"Consideration f thefollowingexamplesshowDarwin o havebeen right" pp.24-25).




11.A contemporary nalogywouldbe thedifferencebetweenthe recentbest-sellerA Natu-

ralHistoryof Rape (ThornhillandPalmer2000)-tracing out the alleged adaptiveroots of sex

selection in men's contemporaryex crimes-and what SharonMarcus(1992) calls the "rapescript,"whereshe suggests rapeis constituted hrougha discourse thatinterpellateswomenas

weak,potentialvictims definedby theirvulnerability o forcedvaginalpenetration.Rapeis not

harmfulbecause sexual intercourse s inherentlymore dangerous,painful, or shameful than

being punchedviciously andrepeatedly n the kidneysbuthas been constructedas especiallyhorrible and humiliating throughthe same Madonna/whoreholographthat itself victimizes

women.

12.An excellent historical, iterary,andhistoriographical tudyof Salome6,R6e,andNietz-

sche's intimacies and their laterrepresentations an be found in Biddy Martin,Womanand

Modernity 1991).

13.In his paperon R6e's relation o Nietzsche,Dirk RobertJohnson 1998)describesR6e asa transitional igurewho "liberated Nietzsche]from his earlier nfatuations withWagnerand

German radition]"indingevidence fromNietzsche's notebooks of the 1880s, which

revealacautious,criticalreworkingof thethoughtshe hadpreviouslychampionednthe

1870 writings,muchin the same way he hadpreviouslyoverturnedSchopenhauer.n

theseentries,Nietzsche's dialecticalmethodsystematicallyundercutR6e'soriginalpre-

mises from variousangles,a processwhich culminated n TheGenealogy ofMorals, in

1888. (P.8)

14. Salome countedamongherfriendshipsandintimaciesrelations with RichardWagner,

FerdinandTonnies, Rainer MariaRilke, August Strindberg,and SigmundFreud(Andreas-

Salom6 1995). Salome overemphasizes he underlying ntellectualcompatibilityof Nietzsche

and R6e priorto this break.For the periodbetweenapproximately1876 and 1882, Nietzsche

seemsto havebeenwilling,out of friendship,osacrifice heanti-positivismandanti-Darwinism

of his UntimelyMeditationsto accommodate hepro-Darwinianviews of R6e, andperhaps o

facilitate his breakfromWagnerandeven irritatehim duringthis time.

15. Kaufmanncites Binion (1968) to refuteSalome's contentionthatNietzscheproposed

and was rebuffed (Andreas-Salome1995, 175; Kaufmann 1968, 49-51). I see nothing in

Binion's book to support his, and Binion actuallydocumentsat least one proposal,in which

Nietzschesays,

"Ishouldconsidermyself duty-bound

o offeryou my

handso as toprotectyoufrom whatpeople might say" (p. 53, quotingfromBernoulli 1908, I, 336, quotingNietzsche).

Kaufmann1968) also cites Binion to implythatall of theirrelationswere chaste(p.50), butI see

nothing n Binion to support hisclaim;especially in the case of R6e this seems doubtful.The

Andreas-Salom61995) memoirLookingBack editedby ErnstPfeiffer includescopiousnotes

onthese relationsand s afabulousreference orthisperiod,asareBinion(1968),Martin 1991),

andSalom6's (1988) Nietzsche-a translationof theoriginaltitle is FriedrichNietzscheinHis

Works.

16. In an insightfulpassageBinion (1968) observes:

Done with Lou as faras he knew,Nietzsche turnedagainstR6e in July 1887 with The

GenealogyofMorals, subtitled,"apolemicalpiece."Intheprefacehedeclaredhis argu-

ments of 1876-1886 againstR6e'smoraltheory o have beenjust that,pretending,how-

ever,to havedrawn hemfromanage-old theoryof his own about o beexpoundednfull

forthe firsttime.... By predating histheorybeforehis acquaintancewithR6e,he was

extirpatingR6e fromhispast.He was also repudiatingR6ethepositivistparexcellence

when now he representedhe scientific ideal as a derivativeof Christianasceticism ...




and repudiating Ree the rationalist par excellence when now he treatedthinking as

instinctual ike everythingelse in life. (P. 136)

17. Foucault s amongnumerous econdarywriters, ncluding Deleuze, whodrop he "on" n

their text and footnotesciting Nietzsche's revaluation Foucault 1971). Since Kaufmann ould

not anticipate he subsequentmisreadingof this title by Foucault and the ensuing new use of

"genealogy,"Kaufmannsimply states his view of "zur"'smeaning in the title and moves on.

18. The second definitionof "genealogy" "the ine of developmentof an animal or plant

from older forms" was idiomatic in English when Nietzsche wrote (OxfordEnglish Dictio-

nary, 2d ed.); the Germanword was associatedwith the study of biological descent as well

(Sanders 1876).

19. It is possible thatthe Grimmdictionaryomits 'Genealogie' because it has a Greek ety-

mology, a point I mentionbecause even some contemporaryGermandictionaries,ncluding heDuden, do not have an entry for it, while 'Genealogie' is mentioned in the Demtsche

Fremdfeworterbach.his is not a specific commenton 'Genealogie' but symptomaticof Ger-

many's continued anxietyabout maintainingbordersaround ts own pure language.The 1876

dictionaryentry statesthat the root of genealogy,from Greek, is "concernedwith genealogy.

Family tree, family table,registerof generations; he science thatconcerns tself with it; having

the value of genealogy . . . referring o genealogy." Stamm'at the root of 'Stammbaum'family

tree) explicitly connectsone's immediatelynuclear amily to a larger ribeor ethnicgroup han

the English 'family', butsince both 'Stammbaum' nd 'family tree' tie one's family to an ethnic

group, the connotationsare similar.

20. The phrase reads:"Haben sich diese bisherigenGenealogen der Moral"(Nietzsche[1887] 1988b, II. §4).

21. See also Johnson(1998), where he discussesNietzsche's criticismsof Ree's relianceon

"unspokenabsolutes" p. 9).

22. Ree's reductionof 'good' and 'evil' to a utilitarian alculus raises manyof the same ten-

sions that appearwhen Socrates and Thrasymachus attled over the meaningof justice (Pitkin

1993, 168-92). Socrates tells us about the word 'dikaiosyne', Pitkin explains, while

Thrasymachusdescribeswhat people do in the name of 'dikaiosyne'. While Thrasymachus's

point has merit some people advance their self-interestand claim that is just such actions

dependon a certainmeaningof the word andnot merelyon what people do. A purelycynical def-

inition of 'justice' as meaningadvancingone's own self-interestwould precludeusing the wordto furtherone's self-interest.

23. In 1886 Nietzsche ([1887] 1974) asks in the preface for the second edition of Gay

Science:

Alas, it is not only the poets and theirbeautiful"lyricalsentiments"on whomthe resur-

rected authorhas to vent his sarcasm:who knows what victim he is looking for, what

monsterof material or parodywill soon attracthim? "Incipit ragoedia"we read at the

end of this awesomelyaweless book. Beware!Something downrightwicked and mali-

cious is announcedhere: incipitparodia, no doubt.(§ 1 preface, 2d ed.)

Kaufmannnotes thatthe first edition of Gay Science ended with "Incipit ragoedia"and thenintroducedZarathustra,nticipatingThusSpokeZarathustra, ndsignifyingthat"Zarathustras

something of a parody" in Nietzsche [1887] 1974, 33, n. 1). But since Zarathustrahad been

published ollowing thefirst edition of Gay Science (in 1883, and then againwith additions n

1884 and 1885) and hencebefore Nietzsche was penning the wordsjust quoted,it is plausible

thatNietzsche is announcing hathis next work, Onthe Genealogy, s a parody.The next edition

of Zarathmstrclwith theadditionof book iv) did notappearuntil 1892. On thisreading,Nietz-




sche is saying that his first edition ended with an announcement hatZarathustrawould appear,

and in this edition he is announcing he parodyto begin with his next publication,which is not

Zarathustrabut On the Genealogy.This readingconforms with the section following the linesquotedabove, n which Nietzsche mentionsbeing sick and then recoveringbefore discussing the

needs of a psychologist the field Ree claimed as own and the physician which is the pro-

fession to which Ree had turned o at this point (Nietzsche [1887] 1974, §2, preface,2d ed.). All

publicationdates are taken from Kaufmann 1968, 477-78).

24. This paragraphmakes severaldefinitionalclaims aboutNietzsche's concept of "geneal-

ogy" but cites only a passage from ThusSpokeZarathustra Deleuze [1962] 1983,3, citing ZIII

"OfPassingBy"). In a section headed "Nietzsche'sTerminology"Deleuze ([1962] 1983) writes

thatNietzsche "uses very precisenew terms or veryprecise new concepts: 1) Nietzsche calls the

genealogicalelement of force the will to power,"but nsteadof a citation o Nietzsche we readan

intriguingdefinition of genealogy thatrightly shouldbe creditedto Deleuze himself, not Nietz-sche (p. 52). Whereas Nietzsche condemns the efforts of genealogists, Deleuze writes:

Only a genealogist is able to discoverwhat sortof baseness can find its expression n one

value, what sort of nobility n another,because only he knows how to handle he differen-

tial element: he is the masterof the critiqueof values. (P. 55)

Deleuze cites the preface to On the Genealogy of Morals, where Nietzsche calls for a critiqueof

moralvalues, butNietzsche of course does not stipulate he figureputting orthsuch a critique o

be a genealogist; ndeed the concept s not even mentioned n the section Deleuze cites (preface,

§6). Deleuze says thatEnglish or Gerrnan evolutionism . . is the reactive mage of genealogy,"

claiming thatthese approaches aricature"truegenealogy"(p. 56). WhereNietzsche writes of adesire to "advancehistorical (historisch)studies of morality" hatwould upendthe emphasesof

psychologists nfluencedby Englishbiologists (FirstEssay, ast note), Deleuze claims Nietzsche

is calling for genealogies (p. 75) and n the "Genealogyof Morals wanted o rewrite he Critique

of Pure Reason" p. 88), butDeleuze providesno textualexegesis to support he inference.Since

the utilitarians nd sociobiologists clearly are Nietzsche's targetsand they criticize Kant them-

selves, Kant's own centrality o Nietzsche's critique n this work seems less obvious.

25. The other especially relevantwork is "TwoLectures" Foucault [1976] 1980).

26. While my own agreementwith Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche over that of Foucault

implies some very crucial differences between Nietzsche's and Foucault'sviews on historical

narrative,imitations of space constrain ull explicationof this (Heidegger [1927] 1962; [1961]1991). One difference s thatNietzsche soughtto articulate new tradition nd ts use, rather han

abandon he form of traditionaltogether,as Deleuze and Foucault advocate.

27. One might argue hatNietzsche's parodic echnique ed to something arworse thanaca-

demic imitators: appropriation f his texts by the Nazis. While Nietzsche's defenders can,

rightly, stress his own irony, anti-German entiment, and revulsion toward anti-Semites, we

know that despite these biographicaldetails his texts themselves were used by proto-Nazi and

then Nazi propagandists.

REFERENCES

Andreas-Salome', ou.1995. Lookingback, memoirs:The ntimatestory of herfriendshipswith

Nietzsche,Rilke and Freud.Edited by ErnstPfeiffer and translatedby Breon Mitchel. New

York:Marlowe.



Stevens/ ON THE MORALSOF GENEALOGY 587

Bernoulli, Carl,ed. 1908. FranzOverbeckundFriedrichNietzsche: Eine Fruendschaft.Jena,

Germany:E. Dierderichs.

Binion,Rudolph.1968.FrauLou:Nietzsche'swaywarddisciple.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUni-versityPress.

Breazeale,Daniel,ed. 1997. Introduction. n Untimelymeditations,2d ed., by FriedrichNietz-

sche, vii-xxxii. Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress.

Darwin,Charles.[1859] 1964. On the origin of species. Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity

Press.

. [1872] 1974. Thedescentofman andselection in relationto sex. 2d ed. Chicago:Rand

McNally.

Deleuze, Gilles. [1962] 1983.Nietzscheandphilosophy.Translatedby HughTomlinson.New

York:ColumbiaUniversityPress.

Foucault,Michel. 1971. Nietzsche,La Gene6alogie, 'Histoire.InHommageaiJeanHyppolite,145-72. Paris:Universitaires.

. [1969] 1972a.Thearchaeologyof knowledge.Translated yA. M.Sheridan.New York:

Pantheon.

. [1971] 1972b.Thediscourseon language.InThearchaeologyofknowledge, ranslated

by A. M. Sheridan,215-38. New York:Pantheon.

. [1971] 1977a.Nietzsche, genealogy, history.InLanguage,counter-memory,ractice:

Selectedessays and interviews, ranslatedby Donald BouchardandSherrySimon, 139-64.

Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.

. [1970] 1977b. TheatrumPhiolosophicum.In Language, counter-memory,ractice:

Selectedessays andinterviews, ranslatedby Donald BouchardandSherrySimon, 165-98.

Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.

. [1976] 1980.Twolectures.InPower/knowledge,ranslatedby AlessandroFontanaand

PasqualePasquinoandeditedby Colin Gordon,78-108. New York:Pantheon.

Grimm,Jacob,and WilhelmGrimm.[1854] 1984. Deutsches Wiorterbuch.eipzig, Germany:

Hirzel.

Haight,GordonS. 1968. GeorgeEliot:A biography.Oxford,UK: OxfordUniversityPress.

Halperin,David.1995.SaintFoucault:Towards gay historiography.Oxford,UK: OxfordUni-

versityPress.

Heidegger,Martin.[1927] 1962. Being and time.Translatedby JohnMacquarrie ndEdward

Robinson. San Francisco:HarperCollins.

. [1961] 1991. Nietzsche, 2 vols. Translatedby David Krell. San Francisco:Harper-

Collins.

Johnson,DirkRobert. 1998. "HohererReealismus,"orphilosophicalrealignment?Nietzsche,

Paul R6e and the search or "tradition."aperpresentedat the seventhannualconferenceof

the FriedrichNietzsche Society, St. Andrews, Scotland,September5-8, 1997.

. 2001. Nietzsche's early Darwinism:The "David Straus"essay of 1873. Nietzsche-

Studien 30 (2001): 62-79.

Kaufmann,Walter. 1968. Nietzsche: Philosopher,psychologist, antichrist,3d ed. New York:

Vintage.Kendall,Gavin,andGaryWickham. 1999. UsingFoucault'smethods. London:Sage.

Marcus,Sharon.1992.Fightingbodies,fightingwords:A theoryandpoliticsof rapeprevention.

In Feminists theorize the political, edited by JudithButler and Joan Scott. New York:

Routledge.

Martin,Biddy. 1991. Woman nd modernity:The(life)styles of LouAndreas-Salome. thaca,

NY: CornellUniversityPress.

Nietzsche,Friedrich.1880. DerWanderer ndsein Schatten.Available romaol.gutenberg.de.




.1886] 1966a. Beyondgood and evil. New York:RandomHouse.

. [1883-85, 1892] 1966b.ThusspokeZarathustra:A book or noneandall. Oxford,UK:

Penguin.. [1889] 1967a. Ecce Homo. New York:Vintage.. [1887] 1967b. On thegenealogy of morals:Apolemic. New York:Vintage.

1968. Thewill topower.Editedby WalterKaufmann.New York:RandomHouse.

. [1882,1887] 1974. Thegayscience. EditedbyWalterKaufmann.New York:Vintage.

. [1878]1986.Humanall toohuman:A bookforfreespirits, ranslatedyR.J.Hollingdale.

Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress.

. [1882, 1887] 1988a. Die Frohliche Wissenschaft. 2d ed. In FriedrichNietzsche:

SdmtlicheWerke,KritischeStudienausgaben 15Einzelbdnden, ditedby GeorgioColliand

MazzinoMontinari.Berlin,Germany:DeutscherTaschenbuchVerlagde Gruyter.

. [1887] 1988b. ZurGenealogieder Moral:Eine Streitschrift. n FriedrichNietzsche:SdmtlicheWerke,KritischeStudienausgaben 15Einzelbdnden, ditedbyGeorgioColliand

MazzinoMontinari,245-412. Berlin,Germany:DeutscherTaschenbuchVerlagdeGruyter.

. [1889] 1990. Twilightof the idols. Translatedby R. J. Hollingdale.London:Penguin.

. [1873] 1997a. David Strauss,the confessor and the writer.In Untimelymeditations,

2ded.,editedby DanielBreazealeandtranslated yR.J.Hollingdale, 1 56.Cambridge,UK:

CambridgeUniversityPress.

. [1873] 1997b.On the uses anddisadvantagesof historyfor life. In Untimelymedita-

tions, 2d ed., editedby DanielBreazeale andtranslatedby R. J. Hollingdale,57-125. Cam-

bridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress.

Pitkin,Hanna. 1993. Wittgenstein ndjustice. Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.

Ree,Paul.1877.UrsprungderMoralischenEmpfindungen. hemnitz,Germany:E.Schmeitzer.

Salome,Lou. 1988. Nietzsche.Editedand translatedby SiegfriedMandel.ReddingRidge,CT:

Black Swan.

Sanders,Daniel. 1876. WorterderDeutschenSprache.Leipzig, Germany:0. Wigand.

Strauss,David.[1836] 1860. The ife of Jesus. Translatedy GeorgeEliot.New York:Blanchard.

. 1873. Theoldfaith andthenew:A confession.New York:HenryHolt.

Thornhill,Randy,andCraigPalmer.2000. A naturalhistoryof rape:Biological bases of sexual

coercion.Cambridge,MA: MITPress.

JacquelineStevens teachespolitical theoryat IstanbulBilgi Universityand is a visiting

scholarat the Center orAdvancedSocial ScienceResearch,New YorkUniversity,and

theCenterforFeministResearch,UniversityofSouthernCalifornia.Sheis the authorof

ReproducingheState PrincetonUniversityPress,1999). Hercurrentbooks nprogress

are The HumanBeing Projectand Stateswithout Nations. For more information, ee

www.jacquelinestevens.rg.

on the morals of genealogy - jacqueline stevens

Documents