on what is signified, part ii

7/30/2019 On What is Signified, Part II.

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ON WHAT IS SIGNIFIED, PART II.

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

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PART II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VI. What names signify in the acceptation of the grammarian.

VII. On things said in the logic of the second act.

VIII. That pragmata legetai , or things said, are lekta , or sayables.

IX. St. Augustine, De Dialectica : The elements of speaking.

X. On what is signified taken according to the parts of speech.

Appendix I: On what words signify in relation to their modes of signifying.

Appendix II: Texts and translations.

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VI. What names signify in the acceptation of the grammarian.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent ., dist. 22, q. 1, art. 1, ad 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

To the third it must be said that He [God] can be signified by a noun, a pronoun, a verb,and a participle. For when it is said that a noun signifies a substance with a quality,quality and substance are not understood properly, according as the logician in makingdistinctions takes the predicaments. But the grammarian takes substance with respectto the mode of signifying, and likewise quality; and the reason is, because what issignified by the name is signified as something subsisting according as something canbe predicated of it, although in reality it not be subsisting, as whiteness bespeaks whatsignifies a substance, in order to differentiate it from the verb, which does not signify assomething subsisting [but rather as something inhering]. 1 And because in any name there isto consider that from which the name is imposed, which is, so to speak, a principle of making known; therefore in this respect it has the mode of a quality, according as aquality or form is the principle of knowing a thing . And so, according to the Philo-sopher, in one way the substantial form is called a quality. Nor does it matter withrespect to the signification of the name whether the principle of making known be the samething as what is signified by the name, as in abstract [names, like humanity], or diverse, asin the [concrete] name man. 2

1. Additional note on the name in the acceptation of the grammarian.

In light of In III Sent. , dist. 6, q. 1, art. 3, c., where St. Thomas teaches that

in any name there are two things to consider: namely, that from which a name is imposed,which is called the quality of the name, and that upon which it is imposed, which is calledthe substance 3 of the name. And a name, properly speaking, is said to signify the form or quality from which the name is imposed; but it is said to suppose for that upon which it isimposed 4

1 For certain ones signify inherently, not signifying the substance with respect to the mode of signifyingwhich grammarians consider, saying that the noun signifies a substance with a quality, such as verbs and

participles ( quaedam enim significant ut inhaerenter, non significantes substantiam quantum ad modum significandi quem grammatici considerant dicentes, nomen significare substantiam cum qualitate, sicut verba et participia ....). (St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent. , dist. 9, q. 1, art. 2, c., tr. B.A.M.)2 ad tertium dicendum, quod potest significari et nomine et pronomine et verbo et participio. cum enimdicitur, quod nomen significat substantiam cum qualitate, non intelligitur qualitas et substantia proprie,

secundum quod logicus accipit praedicamenta distinguens. sed grammaticus accipit substantiam quantum ad modum significandi, et similiter qualitatem; et ideo, quia illud quod significatur per nomen significatur ut aliquid subsistens, secundum quod de eo potest aliquid praedicari, quamvis secundum rem non sit

subsistens, sicut albedo dicit, quod significat substantiam, ad differentiam verbi, quod non significat ut aliquid subsistens. et quia in quolibet nomine est considerare id a quo imponitur nomen, quod est quasi

principium innotescendi, ideo quantum ad hoc habet modum qualitatis, secundum quod qualitas vel formaest principium cognoscendi rem. unde, secundum philosophum, uno modo forma substantialis qualitasdicitur. nec refert quantum ad significationem nominis, utrum principium innotescendi sit idem re cum eoquod nomine significatur, ut in abstractis, vel diversum, ut in hoc nomine homo.3 Compare Summa Theol. , Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c.: alio modo dicitur substantia subiectum vel suppositum quod

subsistit in genere substantiae , In another way the subject or supposit which subsists in the genus of sub-stance is called substance. And note how substance names the supposit and not the what here.4 in quolibet nomine est duo considerare: scilicet id a quo imponitur nomen, quod dicitur qualitas nominis;et id cui imponitur, quod dicitur substantia nominis: et nomen, proprie loquendo, dicitur significare formam

sive qualitatem, a qua imponitur nomen; dicitur vero supponere pro eo cui imponitur

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it may also be said that to signify a substance with a quality is to signify a nature or deter-minate form or quality as existing in a supposit, a description comparable to one given bySt. Thomas further below.

2. In sum:

The grammarian takes what is signified by the name as something subsisting accor-

ding as something can be predicated of it, for which reason he speaks of the substance of a name. But, inasmuch as it includes a principle of making known, he speaks of its qual-ity according as a quality or form is the principle of knowing a thing. The name, then, istaken as something in which something inheres, but, as St. Thomas goes on to explain, theverb and participle, as that which inheres in something else.

3. On concrete and abstract names.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 13, art. 1, obj. 2, ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

obj. 2. Further, every name is said either in the abstract [or abstractly] or in the concrete[or concretely]. But names signifying concretely do not belong to God, since He is simple,nor do names signifying abstractly, because they do not signify some complete subsistingthing. Therefore, no name can be said of God. 5

ad 2. To the second it must be said that because we arrive at knowledge of God fromcreatures, and we name Him from them, the names which we attribute to God signify in thisway, according as they belong to material creatures, the knowledge of which is connatural tous, as has been said above. And because in creatures of this sort the things which arecomplete and subsisting are composedin them, however, the form is not some completesubsisting thing, but rather that by which something isfrom this it follows that all namesimposed by us in order to signify some complete subsisting thing signify in concretion, as isappropriate to composed things; but those [names] which are imposed by us in order tosignify simple forms do not signify something as subsisting, but as that by which somethingis, as whiteness signifies as that by which something is white. Therefore, since God is sim-

ple, and He also subsists, in order to signify His simplicity we attribute abstract names toHim; and in order to signify His subsistence and perfection [we attribute to Him] concretenames, although both kinds of name fall short of His mode, just as our intellect cannot knowHim as He is, according to this life. 6

5 praeterea, omne nomen aut dicitur in abstracto, aut in concreto. sed nomina significantia in concreto, noncompetunt deo, cum simplex sit, neque nomina significantia in abstracto, quia non significant aliquid

perfectum subsistens. ergo nullum nomen potest dici de deo.6 ad secundum dicendum quod, quia ex creaturis in dei cognitionem venimus, et ex ipsis eum nominamus,

nomina quae deo attribuimus, hoc modo significant, secundum quod competit creaturis materialibus,quarum cognitio est nobis connaturalis, ut supra dictum est. et quia in huiusmodi creaturis, ea quae sunt

perfecta et subsistentia sunt composita; forma autem in eis non est aliquid completum subsistens, sed magisquo aliquid est, inde est quod omnia nomina a nobis imposita ad significandum aliquid completum

subsistens, significant in concretione, prout competit compositis; quae autem imponuntur ad significandas formas simplices, significant aliquid non ut subsistens, sed ut quo aliquid est, sicut albedo significat ut quoaliquid est album. quia igitur et deus simplex est, et subsistens est, attribuimus ei et nomina abstracta, ad

significandam simplicitatem eius; et nomina concreta, ad significandum subsistentiam et perfectionemipsius, quamvis utraque nomina deficiant a modo ipsius, sicut intellectus noster non cognoscit eum ut est,

secundum hanc vitam.

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4. Concrete and abstract names in sum:

Concrete names are imposed in order to signify some complete subsisting thing namely, the material creaturebut in such things the form is not some complete subsistingthing (sc. a hoc aliquid , or this something), but rather that by which something is, fromwhich it follows that such names signify in concretion, as is appropriate to composedthings (for in them what is perfect and subsisting is composed). But those names which are

imposed by us in order to signify simple forms do not signify something as subsisting butas that by which something is, as whiteness signifies as that by which something is white,for which reason such names signify abstractly.

It will be observed that when one speaks of a name without qualification, it typic-ally means something signifying in concretion. Moreover, as the foregoing considerationshave made clear, when one considers the quality of a concrete name as such, he sees that ititself can be a name, in which case one must understand the name as signifying a qualitydetermining a substance.

5. That every mode of substance is reduced to two things: a quid est or what it is, and to ahoc aliquid or this something.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Meta. , lect. 1, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.):

First, he proposes what he intends, that being is said in many ways, as was stated in thefifth book, in which he distinguished the many ways in which names of this sort are said; thereason being that that some being signifies a what it is and a this something; that is,substance, such that by what the essence of substance is understood, by this some-thing, the supposit, to which two every mode of substance is reduced, as is determined inthe fifth book. But another signifies quality or quantity, or one of the other pre-dicaments. And since being is said in so many ways, it is clear that among all beings thefirst is that which is ; that is, the being which signifies substance. 7

6. The two things substance signifies:

a what it is (= the quality of a name, the form or nature; that from which it istaken for the purpose of signifying)

a this something (= the substance of a name, the supposit; that upon which it is placed for the purpose of signifying)

In the foregoing texts one may observe the logical underpinnings of Priscians(grammatical) definition of the noun: It is proper to the noun to signify substance andquality. 8

7 primo proponit intentum quod ens dicitur multipliciter, ut dictum est in quinto libro, in quo diviserat quoties dicuntur huiusmodi nomina, quia quoddam ens significat quid est et hoc aliquid, idest substantiam;ut per quid, intelligatur essentia substantiae, per hoc aliquid suppositum, ad quae duo omnes modi

substantiae reducuntur, ut in quinto est habitum. illud vero significat qualitatem vel quantitatem, aut aliquid aliorum praedicamentorum. et cum ens tot modis dicatur, palam est quod inter omnia entia, primum est quod quid est, idest ens quod significat substantiam.8 Inst. gramm . 2.4.18 (= GL II, 55, 6): Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare .

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Now when the logician looks at names of first substances, he sees that they signifya this something subsisting in some nature, as Socrates or Plato are each individual andone in number subsisting in human nature . But names like man or animal appear to sig-nify in the same way: that is, the appearance of the word suggests that they signify a thissomething when, in fact, they signify a sort of something, with the underlying subject not

being one in number, but many; there being many subjects admitting the predicates manor animal. Now when the logician looks at a name like whiteness, he observes that it

signifies in a manner similar to that of manthat is, in the manner of something that ex-ists through itself and not in another. Yet it signifies an accident, the being of which is to be in, in light of which distinction he recognizes the need to distinguish the mode or man-ner in which a thing is signified from what it signifies. Hence whiteness differs fromman in that the former signifies an accident, but the latter, a substance, whereas they bothagree in signifying in the manner of a substance. Likewise, as being the principle of making known, in such things the form or nature is signified in the manner of a quality.Hence, whereas the logician takes them as signifying members of categories, the grammar-ian takes substance and quality modaliter , recognizing them as principles constituting a

part of speech, the realization of which brings home to the student of these scientias ser-mocinales the related though distinct formalities of their respective considerations.

9. Supplement: On fallacies in the appearance of the words: Aristotle, Soph. Ref. , ch. 22(178b 37178b 10) (tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge).

Again, there is the proof that there is a third man distinct from Man and from individualmen. But that is a fallacy, for Man, and indeed every general predicate, denotes not anindividual substance, but a particular quality, or the being related to something in a

particular manner, or something of that sort. Likewise also in the case of Coriscus andCoriscus the musician there is [197a] the problem, Are they the same or different? Forthe one denotes an individual substance and the other a quality, so that it cannot be iso-lated; though it is not the isolation which creates the third man, but the admission that it isan individual substance. For Man cannot be an individual substance, as Callias is. Nor

is the case improved one whit even if one were to call the element he has [5] isolated not anindividual substance but a quality : for there will still be the one beside the many [= theuniversal], just as Man was. It is evident then that one must not grant that what is a com-mon predicate applying to a class [genus] universally is an individual substance, butmust say that it denotes either a quality, or a relation, or a quantity, or something of thatkind . [10]

10. In sum:

man is a general predicate and so does not denote an individual substance Coriscus denotes an individual substance, but man a quality

man is a one beside the many, and hence a universal , whereas Coriscus is athis something (this last point being presupposed here)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Fallaciis ad Quosdam Nobiles Artistas (On Fallacies: For the Benefit of Some Gentlemen Students for an Arts Degree ), from cap. 10 (tr. B.A.M.):

On the fallacy of the appearance of the words [ figurae dictionis ] follows.

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The appearance of the words, as it is taken here, is the likeness of one word to another, justas something is called made to the appearance of another which is made similar to it. Andso the fallacy of the appearance of the words is a deception arising from the fact that someword similar to another appears to have the same mode of signifying when it does nothave it: as the word man appears to signify a this something by reason of the like-ness it has to names signifying particular substances. And so in this fallacy there is not atrue manyness, but an illusory [ phantasticum ] one, because one word does not signify manythings according to the truth of the matter, but it has one mode of signifying and appears to

have another. The cause of the appearance is the likeness of one word to another word; butthe cause of its non-existence is a different mode of signifying. 11

Cf. ibid ., excerpt from cap. 10 (tr. B.A.M.):

But it must be understood that a change of predicaments with respect to the thing signifieddoes not produce the fallacy of the appearance of the words, but [a change] with respect tothe mode of signifying. For whiteness signifies a quality, but it signifies it in the man-ner of a substance because it does not signify it as inhering. But white signifies it inthe manner of a quality because it does signify it as inhering. And so the following is notthe fallacy of the appearance of the words: Whatever you saw yesterday, you see today.You saw whiteness yesterday. Therefore you see whiteness today. 12

The third mode arises from the fact that some word which signifies a quale quid appears tosignify a hoc aliquid , and this happens when a quale quid is changed into a hoc aliquid . Andto signify a quale quid means what signifies a nature common to a genus or species, 13

according as it pertains to the third mode. But to signify a hoc aliquid [means] whatsignifies a particular substance. 14

Now if a quale quid be taken according as it pertains to the genus of quality, thus tochange a quale quid to a hoc aliquid pertains to the second mode, 15 as: (The) white runs.Socrates is white. Therefore Socrates runs. 16

11 sequitur de fallacia figurae dictionis. figura dictionis, prout hic sumitur, est similitudo unius dictionis ad alteram, sicut aliquid dicitur ad figuram alterius factum quod ei assimilatur: unde fallacia figurae dictionisest deceptio proveniens ex eo quod aliqua dictio similis alteri dictioni videtur habere eumdem modum

significandi, cum tamen non habeat: ut haec dictio homo videtur significare hoc aliquid propter simili-tudinem quam habet cum nominibus significantibus substantias particulares; et sic in hac fallacia non est multiplex verum, sed phantasticum, quia una dictio non significat plura secundum veritatem rei, sed habet unum modum significandi, et videtur habere alium. causa apparentiae est similitudo unius dictionis cum aliadictione; causa vero non existentiae est diversus modus significandi.12 et est notandum quod non facit fallaciam figurae dictionis mutatio praedicamentorum quantum ad rem

significatam, sed quantum ad modum significandi. albedo enim significat qualitatem, sed significat eam per modum substantiae, quia non significat eam ut inhaerentem; album autem significat eam per modumqualitatis, quia significat eam ut inhaerentem. unde hic non est fallacia figurae dictionis: quicquid herividisti, hodie vides. albedinem heri vidisti: igitur albedinem hodie vides.13

But, as we have seen from Porphyry, inasmuch as the nature common to a genus or species is the what itis, the quid est is observed to come together with the quale quid here, just as we have argued above.14 tertius modus provenit ex eo quod aliqua dictio, quae significat quale quid, significare videtur hoc aliquid,et contingit hoc quando quale quid mutatur in hoc aliquid. et dicitur significare, quale quid, quod significat naturam communem generis vel speciei, secundum quod pertinet ad tertium modum; hoc aliquid vero

significat quod significat substantiam particularem.15 The second mode arises from the fact that some word which signifies in the manner of one predicament,may appear to signify in the manner of another.... ( secundus modus provenit ex eo quod aliqua dictio quae

significat per modum unius praedicamenti, potest videri significari per modum alterius ....) ( ibid .).16 It seems to me that the example chosen exhibits rather a change from a hoc aliquid to a quale quid .

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And a paralogism is formed as follows: Socrates is other than man. And he is (a) man:Therefore he is other than himself. It does not follow, because it goes from man toSocrates, and thus a quale quid is changed into a hoc aliquid . And to this mode is reducedevery deception arising from a change of the supposition of the terms. Whence when onesays, Man is a species. Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is a species, this goes from asimple supposition to a discrete one, which changes the quale quid to a hoc aliquid .17

11. On the grammarians consideration of the name or noun.

Cf. Priscian, Inst. gramm . GL II, 55, 6 (tr. B.A.M.):

It is proper to the noun to signify substance and quality. 18

Cf. ibid. , GL II, 18, 6.7 (tr. B.A.M.):

The noun is a part of speech which assigns a quality, either common or proper, to each of the subjects of a body or thing. 19

N.B. The subject of a body or thing is, in the case of first substances, the supposit which

subsists in some nature, while the nature is the quality which is attributed to it. And notethat the separate mentions of body and thing here argue Stoic influence, as one may ob-serve by consulting any competent discussion of their thought.

12. Note on the definition of the name or noun.

As both Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas make clear, the principles involved inevery name are (1) the substance upon which and (2) the form or nature from which a name isimposed to signify, observing here a distinction between names of first and second sub-stances: in the case of the former, the substance being the supposit which subsists in somenature, which is something individual and one in number; but in the latter, the many subjects

underlying the name, which are one only insofar as they admit a common predicate. In thelight of these observations one must recognize that, while Priscians general definition of thenomen is clear, his second requires clarification. For one may think that the difference be-tween the common and proper noun does not lie in a supposed difference between a commonand proper quality for the quality of any name is the same whether it belongs to a first sub-stance or a second, as humanity is the same in Socrates or Plato, on the one hand, and in man,on the otherfor Socrates is truly that which man is, as St. Thomas states, and the natureabsolutely considered is neither singular nor universal, as the Angelic Doctor explains in atext to be cited nextbut rather in the difference between a subject which is a this some-thing and one which is not , and so is due to a principle of individuation.

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si autem sumatur quale quid secundum quod pertinet ad genus qualitatis, sic mutare quale quid in hocaliquid pertinet ad secundum modum, ut: album currit. socrates est albus. ergo socrates currit; et formatur

sic paralogismus: socrates est alter ab homine. et ipse est homo: igitur est alter a seipso. non sequitur: quia proceditur ab homine ad socratem, et sic mutatur quale quid in hoc aliquid. et ad hunc modum reducitur omnis deceptio proveniens ex mutata suppositione terminorum. unde cum dicitur: homo est species. socratesest homo: igitur socrates est species; hic proceditur a simplici suppositione ad discretam, quae mutat qualequid in hoc aliquid.18 Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare .19 Nomen est pars orationis, quae unicuique subiectorum corporum seu rerum communem vel propriamqualitatem distribuit.

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Relevant to this discussion is the following: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia ,cap. 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

So, having seen what the name essence signifies in composed substances, we must seehow it relates to the notions of genus, species, and difference. But since that to which thenotion of genus or species or difference belongs is predicated of this designated singular, it isimpossible that the notion of a universal, namely, of genus or species, belong to an essenceinsofar as it is signified in the manner of a part, as by the names humanity or animality.And so Avicenna says that rationality is not a difference, but the principle of a difference;and for the same reason humanity is not a species, nor animality a genus. 20

Likewise also, one cannot say that the notion of genus or species belongs to an essenceinsofar as it is a certain thing existing outside singular things (as the Platonists held), since inthis way genus and species are not predicated of this individual; for one cannot say that So-crates is what is separate from him; nor again would that separate thing be a help in theknowledge of this singular .21

And so it remains that the notion of genus or species belong to an essence insofar as itis signified in the manner of a whole, as by the names man or animal, according as itcontain implicitly and indistinctly this whole that is in the individual. 22

But nature or essence so taken can be considered in two ways: in one way, according to its proper notion, and this is an absolute consideration of it. And in this way nothing is true of itexcept what belong to it insofar as it is of this sort. Whence the attribution is false, whatever else be attributed to it. For example, rational and animal and other things which fall in hisdefinition belong to man by the fact that he is man. But white or black or whatever else of this sort that does not belong to the notion of humanity does not belong to man by the factthat he is man. 23

Whence, if it be asked whether this nature thus considered can be called one or many,neither must be conceded, since either one is outside the understanding of humanityand either one can befall it. For if plurality were of its understanding it could never beone, although it is one insofar as it is in Socrates. Likewise, if unity were of its notion,then it would be one and the same thing in Socrates and Plato, nor could it be multi-plied in many things. 24

20 viso igitur quid significetur nomine essentiae in substantiis compositis videndum est quomodo se habeat ad rationem generis, speciei et differentiae. quia autem id, cui convenit ratio generis vel speciei vel differentiae,

praedicatur de hoc singulari signato, impossibile est quod ratio universalis, scilicet generis vel speciei, con-veniat essentiae secundum quod per modum partis significatur, ut nomine humanitatis vel animalitatis. et ideo dicit avicenna quod rationalitas non est differentia, sed differentiae principium; et eadem ratione hu-manitas non est species nec animalitas genus.21 Similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae, secundum quod est quaedam res exsistens extra singularia, ut platonici ponebant, quia sic genus et species non praedicarentur de hoc individuo; non enim potest dici quod socrates sit hoc quod ab eo separatum est; nec iterum illud

separatum proficeret in cognitionem huius singularis.22 et ideo relinquitur quod ratio generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae, secundum quod significatur per modum totius, ut nomine hominis vel animalis, prout implicite et indistincte continet totum hoc, quod in

individuo est.23 natura autem vel essentia sic accepta potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo, secundum rationem propriam, et haec est absoluta consideratio ipsius. et hoc modo nihil est verum de ea nisi quod convenit sibi secundum quod huiusmodi. unde quicquid aliorum attribuatur sibi, falsa est attributio. verbi gratia, hominiin eo quod est homo convenit rationale et animal et alia, quae in diffinitione eius cadunt. album vero aut nigrum vel quicquid huiusmodi, quod non est de ratione humanitatis, non convenit homini in eo quod homo.24 unde si quaeratur utrum ista natura sic considerata possit dici una vel plures, neutrum concedendum est,quia utrumque est extra intellectum humanitatis et utrumque potest sibi accidere. si enim pluralitas esset deintellectu eius, nunquam posset esse una, cum tamen una sit secundum quod est in socrate. similiter si unitasesset de ratione eius, tunc esset una et eadem socratis et platonis nec posset in pluribus plurificari.

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It is considered in another way according to the being it has in this thing or in that, andthus something is predicated of it accidentally by reason of that in which it is, just as it issaid that man is white since Socrates is white, although this does not belong to him by thefact that he is a man. 25

Now this nature has a twofold being, one in singulars and another in the soul, andaccording to both [kinds of being] accidents follow on the nature spoken of. And in singularsalso it has a manifold being according to a diversity of singulars, and yet to the nature itself according to its first consideration, namely, absolute, is due none of these things. For it is

false to say that the essence of man inasmuch as it is of this sort has being in this singular thing, since if to be in this singular thing were to belong to man as man, there would benothing outside this singular. Likewise, if it were to belong to man as man not to be in thissingular thing, it would never be in him. But it is true to say that it does not belong to man asman that it be in this singular thing or in that or in the soul. 26

It is therefore clear that the nature of man absolutely considered abstracts from any beingwhatsoever, yet not in such a way that [this abstraction] be made in precision from any of them. And this nature so considered is what is predicated of every individual. 27

Still, one cannot say that the notion of a universal belongs to the nature thus taken, sinceunity and commonness belong to the notion of the universal. But according to its absoluteconsideration neither of these things belongs to human nature. For if commonness were to

belong to the understanding of man, then in anything where humanity were found,

commonness would be found. And this is false, since no commonness is found in Socrates, but whatever is in him is individuated. 28

Likewise, one cannot say that the notion of a genus or a species befalls human nature inso-far as it has being in an individual, since it is not found in individual human nature as some-thing one, such that it be one thing belonging to all, which the notion of a universal de-mands. 29

It remains, then, that the notion of species befalls human nature according to the being ithas in the intellect. For in the intellect human nature itself has being apart from everyindividuating thing, and so it has a notion uniform with respect to every individual outsidethe soul, as it is equally the likeness of all and leading to knowledge of them all inasmuch asthey are men. And because it has such a relation to every individual the intellect discovers

the notion of species and attributes it to it. Whence the Commentator says in the beginning

25 alio modo consideratur secundum esse quod habet in hoc vel in illo, et sic de ipsa aliquid praedicatur per accidens ratione eius, in quo est, sicut dicitur quod homo est albus, quia socrates est albus, quamvis hoc nonconveniat homini in eo quod homo.26 haec autem natura duplex habet esse, unum in singularibus et aliud in anima, et secundum utrumqueconsequuntur dictam naturam accidentia. et in singularibus etiam habet multiplex esse secundum

singularium diversitatem et tamen ipsi naturae secundum suam primam considerationem, scilicet absolutam,nullum istorum esse debetur. falsum enim est dicere quod essentia hominis in quantum huiusmodi habeat esse in hoc singulari, quia si esse in hoc singulari conveniret homini in quantum est homo, nunquam esset extra hoc singulare. similiter etiam si conveniret homini in quantum est homo non esse in hoc singulari,nunquam esset in eo. sed verum est dicere quod homo non in quantum est homo habet quod sit in hoc

singulari vel in illo aut in anima.27

ergo patet quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod non fiat praecisio alicuius eorum. et haec natura sic considerata est quae praedicatur de individuis omnibus.28 non tamen potest dici quod ratio universalis conveniat naturae sic acceptae, quia de ratione universalis est unitas et communitas. naturae autem humanae neutrum horum convenit secundum suam absolutamconsiderationem. si enim communitas esset de intellectu hominis, tunc in quocumque inveniretur humanitasinveniretur communitas. et hoc falsum est, quia in socrate non invenitur communitas aliqua, sed quicquid est in eo est individuatum.29 similiter etiam non potest dici quod ratio generis vel speciei accidat naturae humanae secundum esse quod habet in individuis, quia non invenitur in individuis natura humana secundum unitatem, ut sit unum quid omnibus conveniens, quod ratio universalis exigit.

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of his De Anima that it is the intellect which makes universality in things. (Avicenna alsosays this in his Metaphysics .) And although this nature in being understood has the notion of a universal insofar as it is compared to the thing outside the soul (since it is one likeness of all of them), still, insofar as it has being in this intellect or in that, in being understood it is acertain particular species. 30

And so the mistake made by the Commentator is clear, who, in the third book of his De Anima wished to conclude to the unity of the intellect in all men from the universality of theform in being understood, since universality does not belong to that form insofar as it has

this being in the intellect, but insofar as it is referred to things as a likeness of things, just asalso, if there were one bodily statue representing many men, it remains that that image or species of the statue would have a singular and proper being insofar as it were in this matter,

but it would have the notion of commonness insofar as it were the common representative of many. 31

And since it belongs to human nature according to its absolute consideration that it be predicated of Socrates, and the notion of species does not belong to it according to itsabsolute consideration, but belongs to the accidents which follow on it according to the

being it has in the intellect, therefore, the name of species is not predicated of Socrates asthough one were to say, Socrates is a species, which would of necessity result if the notionof a species were to belong to man according to the being it has in Socrates, or according toits own absolute consideration, namely, inasmuch as it is man. For whatever belongs to man

inasmuch as it is man is predicated of Socrates. And yet to be predicated belongs to a genus per se , since it is placed in its definition. For predication is something that is completed bythe action of the intellect in composing and dividing, having for a foundation in the thing thevery unity of those things of which one is said of another. 32

Whence, the notion of predicability can be included in the notion of the intention that isgenus, which likewise is completed by an act of the intellect. Nevertheless, that to whichthe intellect attributes the intention of predicability, composing it with another, is not thevery intention of a genus, but rather that to which it attributes the intention of a genus, aswhat is signified by this name animal. 33

30 relinquitur ergo quod ratio speciei accidat naturae humanae secundum illud esse quod habet in intellectu.ipsa enim natura humana in intellectu habet esse abstractum ab omnibus individuantibus, et ideo habet rationem uniformem ad omnia individua, quae sunt extra animam, prout aequaliter est similitudo omnium et ducens in omnium cognitionem in quantum sunt homines. et ex hoc quod talem relationem habet ad omniaindividua intellectus adinvenit rationem speciei et attribuit sibi. unde dicit commentator in principio deanima quod intellectus est qui agit universalitatem in rebus. hoc etiam avicenna dicit in sua metaphysica. et quamvis haec natura intellecta habeat rationem universalis secundum quod comparatur ad res extraanimam, quia est una similitudo omnium, tamen secundum quod habet esse in hoc intellectu vel in illo est quaedam species intellecta particularis.31 et ideo patet defectus commentatoris in iii de anima, qui voluit ex universalitate formae intellectaeunitatem intellectus in omnibus hominibus concludere, quia non est universalitas illius formae secundum hocesse quod habet in intellectu, sed secundum quod refertur ad res ut similitudo rerum, sicut etiam, si esset una

statua corporalis repraesentans multos homines, constat quod illa imago vel species statuae haberet esse singulare et proprium secundum quod esset in hac materia, sed haberet rationem communitatis secundumquod esset commune repraesentativum plurium.32 et quia naturae humanae secundum suam absolutam considerationem convenit quod praedicetur de

socrate, et ratio speciei non convenit sibi secundum suam absolutam considerationem, sed est deaccidentibus, quae consequuntur eam secundum esse, quod habet in intellectu, ideo nomen speciei non

praedicatur de socrate, ut dicatur: socrates est species, quod de necessitate accideret, si ratio specieiconveniret homini secundum esse, quod habet in socrate vel secundum suam considerationem absolutam,

scilicet in quantum est homo. quicquid enim convenit homini in quantum est homo praedicatur de socrate. et tamen praedicari convenit generi per se, cum in eius diffinitione ponatur. praedicatio enim est quiddam,quod completur per actionem intellectus componentis et dividentis, habens fundamentum in re ipsa unitatemeorum, quorum unum de altero dicitur.33 unde ratio praedicabilitatis potest claudi in ratione huius intentionis, quae est genus, quae similiter per actum intellectus completur. nihilominus tamen id, cui intellectus intentionem praedicabilitatis attribuit,

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Since, then, it is clear how essence or nature relates to the notion of species, since thenotion of species is not among the things which belong to it according to its absoluteconsideration, nor is it among the accidents which follow on it according to the being it hasoutside the soul, as whiteness and blackness, but it belongs to the accidents which follow onit according to the being it has in the intellect, in this way also the notion of a genus or of adifference belongs to it. 34

13. In sum.

From the foregoing discussion we observe that a distinction such as that betweenproper and common in the case of a nature like humanity clearly involves a naturetaken in abstraction from singulars and not just a principle on the side of the subject.Consider in this regard the difference between your disc operating system and someoneelses: Yours and his agree in nature, yet yours is clearly not his since it is not installed onyour computer. Likewise, human nature as it is found in this man both agrees and disagreeswith human nature in another or human nature in common. Hence we must understand thequality of a proper name to differ from the common in the same way that this operatingsystem differs from that one, or from the operating system in general. As for the way inwhich St. Thomas explicitly distinguishes the common or appellative name from the

proper or private, cf. the following texts:

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm . lect. 2, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):

And so by passions of the soul here is to be understood the conceptions of the under-standing, which names or nouns and verbs signify immediately, according to Aristotles un-derstanding of the matter. For it cannot be that they immediately signify things themselves,as is apparent from the very mode of signifying: for the name man signifies humannature in abstraction from singulars. And so it cannot be that it immediately signifies asingular [or individual] man; for which reason the Platonists held that it signified theseparated idea itself of man .35

14. That the appellative name is that which signifies a nature as in the thing having it.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theol. , q. 13, art. 9, obj. 2, ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):

obj. 2. Further, only proper names are not communicable. But the name God is not a proper name, but an appellative one, which is clear from the fact that it has a plural, accordingto the Psalm (lxxxi), I have said, you are gods. Therefore, the name God is communi-cable. 36

componens illud cum altero, non est ipsa intentio generis, sed potius illud, cui intellectus intentionem generisattribuit, sicut quod significatur hoc nomine animal.34

Sic ergo patet qualiter essentia vel natura se habet ad rationem speciei, quia ratio speciei non est de his,quae conveniunt ei secundum suam absolutam considerationem, neque est de accidentibus, quae consequ-untur ipsam secundum esse, quod habet extra animam, ut albedo et nigredo, sed est de accidentibus, quaeconsequuntur eam secundum esse, quod habet in intellectu, et per hunc modum convenit etiam sibi ratio

generis vel differentiae.35 et ideo oportet passiones animae hic intelligere intellectus conceptiones, quas nomina et verba et orationes

significant immediate, secundum sententiam aristotelis. non enim potest esse quod significent immediateipsas res, ut ex ipso modo significandi apparet: significat enim hoc nomen homo naturam humanam inabstractione a singularibus. unde non potest esse quod significet immediate hominem singularem; unde

platonici posuerunt quod significaret ipsam ideam hominis separatam.

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ad 2. To the second it must be said that the name God is an appellative name and not a proper one because it signifies the divine nature as in the thing having it; although God Him-self, in reality, is neither universal nor particular. For names do not follow the mode of beingwhich is in things, but the mode of being according as it is in our knowledge. And yet, ac-cording to the truth of the thing, it is incommunicable in the way in which it has been ex-

plained about the name sun. 37

15. The appellative name according to St. Thomas Aquinas.

An appellative is that which signifies the nature as in the thing having it. Ex.: Deus ,God, which signifies the divine nature ut in habente , as in the one having it (that is, itsignifies habens natura divina , (the one) having the divine nature). Appellatives are di-vided against proper names. The appellative has a plural, whereas the proper name doesnot. To be appellative, a name must be communicable at least in reason, if not in reality.

Communicable in both reason and reality: man, ox Communicable in reason only: God, sun (according to the ancient view) Communicable in neither in reason nor reality: Socrates, Plato

Note here that the subject is said to have a nature. On this point, compare the following:

Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat. 13):

One other text that Ive run across is from the Disputed Questions De Potentia , Question 2,Article 1, Ad2. He says:

Having is twofold. In one way, matter is said to have its form, and a subject its accident, or in whatever way the had is outside the nature of the one having it. In another way, the sup-

posit [ the individual substance, the hoc aliquid ] has a nature, as this man has humanity [ or has human nature ], which is not outside the essence [ the nature ] of the one having it. Nay,rather it is his very essence [ it is his essence, it is his nature ], for Socrates is truly that whichman is.

Thats a very interesting distinction. Its by contradictories: sometimes what is had is outside thenature of the haver, other times what is had is not outside the nature of the haver, but is the verynature.

36 praeterea, sola nomina propria non sunt communicabilia. sed hoc nomen deus non est nomen proprium, sed appellativum, quod patet ex hoc quod habet plurale, secundum illud psalmi lxxxi, ego dixi, dii estis. ergohoc nomen deus est communicabile.37 ad secundum dicendum quod hoc nomen deus est nomen appellativum, et non proprium, quia significat naturam divinam ut in habente; licet ipse deus, secundum rem, non sit nec universalis nec particularis.nomina enim non sequuntur modum essendi qui est in rebus, sed modum essendi secundum quod incognitione nostra est. et tamen, secundum rei veritatem, est incommunicabile, secundum quod dictum est dehoc nomine sol.

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16. On the rationale of the proper or private name as seen in contradistinction to what iscommunicable to many, whether according to account or in reality.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol . Ia, q. 13, art. 9, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

But in order to know which names are properly communicable, one must consider thatevery form existing in a singular supposit by which it is individuated is common tomany things , either according to reality or at least according to account, just as humannature is common to many things according to reality and account, but the nature of the sunis not common to many according to reality, but only according to account; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many supposits. And this is because the intellectunderstands the nature of any species by abstraction from the singular; and so to be in onesingular supposit or in many is outside the understanding [or conception] of the nature of the species so that, the understanding of the nature of the species being preserved, it can beunderstood as existing in many.

But the singular, by the very fact that it is singular, is divided off from all the others.For this reason, a name imposed to signify something singular is incommunicable bothin reality and in account, for plurality cannot fall in the apprehension of this indi-vidual.

For this reason, no name signifying an individual is communicable to many things properly, but only according to a likeness, just as someone can be called an Achilles metaphorically,inasmuch as he has something of what is proper to Achilles, namely, courage. 38

17. The proper or private name in sum.

The proper or private name is divided against the appellative or common name. Proper or private names are imposed in order to signify something singular,

namely, the individual, which is incommunicable both in reality and in reason, suchas Plato or Socrates, or, according to the ancient view, the sun, which was thoughtto be unique (the singular being understood as that which, by the very fact that it issingular, is divided off from all other things).

Proper or private names do not have a plural, while the common or appellativedoes: i.e. one can say man, men, not Plato, Platos. Ex.: Plato , Socrates

18. Note.

38 ad sciendum autem quae nomina proprie sunt communicabilia, considerandum est quod omnis forma in supposito singulari existens, per quod individuatur, communis est multis, vel secundum rem vel secundum

rationem saltem, sicut natura humana communis est multis secundum rem et rationem, natura autem solisnon est communis multis secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum; potest enim natura solis intelligi ut in pluribus suppositis existens. et hoc ideo, quia intellectus intelligit naturam cuiuslibet speciei per abstractionem a singulari, unde esse in uno supposito singulari vel in pluribus, est praeter intellectumnaturae speciei, unde, servato intellectu naturae speciei, potest intelligi ut in pluribus existens. sed singulare,ex hoc ipso quod est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus aliis. unde omne nomen impositum ad significandumaliquod singulare, est incommunicabile et re et ratione, non enim potest nec in apprehensione cadere

pluralitas huius individui. unde nullum nomen significans aliquod individuum, est communicabile multis proprie, sed solum secundum similitudinem; sicut aliquis metaphorice potest dici achilles, inquantum habet aliquid de proprietatibus achillis, scilicet fortitudinem.

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As with the text from the De Ente cited above, the foregoing furnishes a conciseexplanation as to why a nature can be considered to be common or proper in a name.

19. The principles in the light of which names are imposed according to St. ThomasAquinas.

According to St. Thomas Aquinas, in any name we can speak of that from which

(id a quo ), that with respect to which (id ad quod ), and that upon which (id cui ) a nameis imposed in order to signify. As we have seen, that upon which the name is imposed inorder to signify is called the substance of the name ( In III Sent . dist. 6, q. 1, art. 3, c.),where substance is understood as the subject or supposit which subsists in the genus of substance ( Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c.); that is, the supposit, insofar as it is con-sidered as a hoc aliquid , or this something, is that upon which a name is imposed in order to signify (cf. Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 13, art. 9, c.); and this is that on behalf of which itsupposes or stands ( In III Sent . dist. 6, q. 1, art. 3, c.). In this regard, it must be understoodthat that to which a name is attributed, if it be taken directly under the thing signified bythe name , as the determined under the undetermined, is said to be supposed by the name(dicitur supponi per nomen ). Hence, the supposition of a name is that to which a name is

attributed when it is taken directly under the thing signified by the name, as the determinedunder the undetermined. But that to which a name is attributed, if it not be taken directlyunder the thing of the name, is said to be coupled by the name ( dicitur copulari per nomen ). Hence, the copulatio (or coupling) of a name is that to which a name is at-tributed when it is not taken directly under the thing signified by the name ( Qu. Disp. de

Pot ., q. 9, art. 4, c.). (On these definitions, see Part I of this paper.)That from which a name is imposed, on the other hand, is called the quality of

the name ( In III Sent . dist. 6, q. 1, art. 3, c.); a name or noun, properly speaking, being saidto signify the form or quality from which it is imposed (ibid .). But as St. Thomas ex-

plains, a name is said to be imposed from something [ ab aliquo ] in two ways: either onthe part of the one who imposes the name, or on the part of the thing upon which [ cui ] it is

imposed. ( Qu. Disp. de Ver . q. 14, art. 1, ad 8) He goes on to say that on the part of thething a name is said to be imposed from that [ ab illo ] by which the account of the thingwhich the name signifies is completedand this is the specific difference of that thing.And this is what is principally signified by the name [ principaliter significatur per nomen ].But because essential differences are unknown to us, we sometimes use accidents or effectsin their place 39; and we name the thing according to this. And this is what isprincipally signified by the name (Qu. Disp. de Ver . q. 14, art. 1, ad 8), namely, theessence or nature, as the name stone signifies the very nature of a stone as it is in itself;for it signifies the definition of a stone, by virtue of which we know what a stone is. For the ratio which the name signifies is the definition, as is said in the fourth book of the

Metaphysics (Summa Theol . Ia, q. 13, art. 8). Then, on the part of the one who imposes the

name, he gives his example of lapis as taken from laedere pedem .In this argument St. Thomas states without qualification that essential differencesare unknown to us. But is it not the case that we do know the specific differences of somethings, such as geometrical figures? And even in the genus of substance, is it not known,for instance, that the generic part of animal, namely, animated substance, is contractedto its species by the difference sensible, inasmuch as animals differ from plants, whichare also animated substances, by possessing sensibility, which is the power of sensation?

39 Which things St. Thomas calls the etymology of the name (cf. Summa Theol ., IIa-IIae, q. 92, art. 1, ad 2).

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On the other hand, such things are clearly not named from their specific differences, nor could they be, inasmuch as we name things as we know them; but we know a thing beforeknowing its specific difference, at least qua specific difference. For instance, the trianglewas so named before anyone proved that its specific difference consists in having its exter-ior angle equal to its two opposite and interior angles. Hence it remains true that suchthings must be named by names taken from their properties or operations, or their effectsor accidents. But since there cannot be an infinite regress in that from which names are

taken in order to signify, there must be some things which are not named from other things; and this, as we have seen, is St. Thomas position: But if there are things whichare known to us according to themselves [ secundum se ], like heat, cold, whiteness, and thelike, they are not named from other things. And so in such things what the name signifies[quod nomen significat ] and that from which it is imposed in order to signify are the samething ( Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 13, art. 8, c.). It follows from this that all other names mustultimately derive from names which were first placed upon things known to us accordingto themselves, which things, it is clear from St. Thomas examples, are per se sensibles: thefirst two, heat and cold, being proper objects of touch, the third, whiteness, of sight.

But it should also be noted that, according to the common teaching of Aristotle andSt. Thomas, the choice of vocal sound signifying such things is at the pleasure ( ad placi-tum) of the one who imposes the name. That is to say, the relation between the vocal soundand the thing signified is, for all words except onomatopoetic ones, arbitrary; for whichreason the name and the verb, the principal parts of speech, are said to signify kata thesin ,

by institution or convention.

As for that with respect to which the name is imposed in order to signify (or,more simply, that which it is imposed in order to signify, In I Peri Herm ., lect. 4, n. 9),this is the thing signified in the name ( In I Sent . dist. 22, q. 1, art. 2, c.), which is also thething signified by the name (Qu. Disp. de Ver . q. 14, art. 1, ad 8 and passim in St.Thomas) or what the name signifies (Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 13, art. 8, c.), or simply thesignification of the name (Summa Theol ., IIa-IIae, q. 92, art. 1, ad 2).

20. On that with respect to which ( id ad quod ) and that upon which ( id cui ) a name isimposed in order to signify.

It should also be understood that sometimes that with respect to which a name isimposed in order to signify is also that upon which it is so imposed, as may be the case of Tetragrammaton among the Hebrews, as St. Thomas says ( Summa Theol ., Ia, q. 13, art. 9,c.).

21. Summary of St. Thomas teaching on that from which and that with respect to whichnames are imposed in order to signify.

Things are either known to us according to themselves ( secundum se ) or not. If not,then, because we know the substance of a thing from its properties or operations (or fromits properties or effects, as St. Thomas also says), we sometimes use accidents or effects intheir place. For because the specific differences of things are unknown to us, they arenamed from things taken in place of those differences (which is to say that it sometimeshappens that the substance of some thing is named by some accident which does not followupon the whole nature of which that name is said).

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But such things should not be the principal thing signified by the name; rather, thisshould be the specific difference or nature of the thing; for the specific difference is com-

pletive of the definition, and the definition is the ratio which the name signifies. Thingswhich are known to us according to themselves, like heat, cold, whiteness, and the like(which are things sensible per se ), are not named from other things; but all other thingswill be named in this way. For example, lapis or stone is named from its operation or effect, which is laedere pedem , hurting the foot. Likewise, to take an example of our

own, blackbird is named from an accident of it, namely, the blackness of the birdsfeathers.

23. On the translation of id a quo and id ad quod .

Since id ad quod is opposed to id a quo , and since the latter means that fromwhich, one would expect the former to mean that to which, especially when it is con-sidered that ad first of all means to or toward, and that to and from are immediatelyopposed. But this presents a problem when the formula is taken as whole: that to (or toward ) which a name is imposed in order to signify: for in English, we do not speak of imposing names to or toward something. For this reason, I have used an equivalentexpression, that with respect to which a name is imposed in order to signify. Of coursewe do say that we give a name to something. Hence we could speak of that to which aname is given; but that to which a name is given is the same as that upon which a name isimposed. And since ad can also mean on or upon, one might wonder if the formulashould not be translated by one or the other of these prepositions. It is, however, quite evi-dent from the texts cited that the formula id cui imponitur must be translated in this way,and that it is an entirely distinct principle from id ad quod imponitur . Hence, in order toavoid confusion, the latter should be translated by a different expression. But that id cuimeans that upon which is clear from St. Thomass explanations: for it is undeniable thatnames are placed upon something; but that something can only be the substance under-stood as the supposit. To see that this is so, consider the grammarians definition of thenomen : the name [or noun] is that which signifies a substance with a quality. But as St.Thomas says, to signify a substance with a quality is to signify a supposit with a nature or determinate form in which it subsists ( significare substantiam cum qualitate, est signifi-care suppositum cum natura vel forma determinata in qua subsistit . Summa Theol. , Ia, q.13, art. 1, ad 3). But the nature or determinate form is not that upon which a name isimposed; rather, it is that from which it is imposed, as is clear from the following text fromthe third book of St. Thomass Sentences commentary:

DS6QU1 AR3- CO

respondeo dicendum, quod in quolibet nomineest duo considerare: scilicet id a quo imponitur

nomen, quod dicitur qualitas nominis; et id cuiimponitur, quod dicitur substantia nominis:

et nomen, proprie loquendo, dicitur significareformam sive qualitatem, a qua imponitur no-men; dicitur vero supponere pro eo cui imponi-tur.

I reply that it must be said that in any namethere are two things to consider: namely, that

from which a name is imposed, which is calledthe quality of the name, and that upon which itis imposed, which is called the substance of thename.

And a name, properly speaking, is said tosignify the form or quality from which the nameis imposed; but it is said to suppose on behalf of that upon which it is imposed.

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Now it is quite obvious that the form or quality from which the name is imposedcorresponds to the nature or determinate form which is the quality of a name as statedin the grammarians definition. Since, then, that from which the name is imposed is ac-counted for by this part of a name, that leaves the substance or supposit as the only thing to

be considered in any name upon which a name could be imposed.

The three principles of naming arrived at in the foregoing account are conveniently

illustrated in the following text from the Prima Pars:QU13 AR11 RA1

ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc nomen quiest est magis proprium nomen dei quam hocnomen deus, quantum ad id a quo imponitur,scilicet ab esse, et quantum ad modum signifi-candi et consignificandi, ut dictum est.

sed quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen adsignificandum, est magis proprium hoc nomendeus, quod imponitur ad significandum naturamdivinam.

et adhuc magis proprium nomen est tetra-grammaton, quod est impositum ad signifi-candam ipsam dei substantiam incommunica-

bilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem.

To the first therefore it must be said that thename Qui est , He who is is a more proper name of God than the name Deus , God, withrespect to that from which it is imposed,namely, from esse , being or existing, andwith respect to both the mode of signifying andof consignifying, as has been said.

But with respect to that with respect to whichthe name is imposed in order to signify, thename God is more proper because it is im-

posed in order to signify the divine nature.

And a name more proper still is Tetragram-maton, which has been imposed in order tosignify the very substance of God, incommuni-cable, and, if one may be allowed to speak so,singular.

The three principles in naming found here are: (1) id a quo imponitur , that from

which [a name] is imposed; (2) id ad quod imponitur , that with respect to which [a name]is imposed, and (3) the principle which St. Thomas indicates by his example of a nameimposed in order to signify the substance of God. What he means by this statement is clari-fied by a text from the body of Article 9 of the same question:

si vero esset aliquod nomen impositum adsignificandum deum non ex parte naturae, sedex parte suppositi, secundum quod consideratur ut hoc aliquid, illud nomen esset omnibus modisincommunicabile, sicut forte est nomen tetra-grammaton apud hebraeos.

But if there were some name imposed in order to signify God not on the part of the nature, buton the part of the supposit, insofar as it is con-sidered as a this something, that name would

be incommunicable in every way, as perhapsthe name Tetragrammaton is among the He-

brews.

So a name imposed in order to signify the substance of God is to be taken on the part of thesupposit insofar as it is considered as a this something, and this, as we have seen, is thethird principle in naming, id cui imponitur nomen imponitur ad significandum , that uponwhich a name is imposed in order to signify.

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VI. ON THINGS SAID IN THE LOGIC OF THE SECOND ACT.

As Aristotle teaches in the Categories ch. 2 (1a 17), things said ( ton legomenon )without any intertwining whatsoever are substance , quantity , quality , and the rest of the

predicaments. But inasmuch as the latter are signified by vocal sounds, in his work devotedto the logic of the second act he calls them pragmata , or things. Cf. the following:

Cf. Aristotle, De Int. I. 1 (16a 1-8) (tr. B.A.M.):

First what a name is and what a verb is should be determined, then what a denial is andwhat an affirmation is, and enunciation , and speech . Accordingly, those 40 that are in vocalsound are indications of the passions that are in the soul; and those that are written of thosethat are in vocal sound. And just as the written marks are not the same for all, so neither arethe vocal sounds the same. But the passions of the soul, of which these are the first signs, arethe same for all. Also the same are the things of which these passions are the likenesses. Butthese things have been discussed in the book on the soul, since they pertain to another investigation .41

1. The order of signification according to Aristotle.

The principles with which we are concerned here, then, are these: (1) first there arethings ; then (2) there are the passions of the soul , which are likenesses of things; then (3)there are vocal sounds signifying things (doing so by means of the passions of the soul,which are the likenesses of things); and finally (4) there are written signs signifying vocalsounds. For our present purposes we must carefully distinguish the following:

pragmata or states of affairs (that is, things understood, insofar as they are under-stood, which things therefore become the objects of thought)

pathemata or passions (which are also noemata or thoughts about things, beingtheir likenesses)

semeia or signs(which are in the first place vocal sounds imposed on things)

Notice here how things (= pragmata ), inasmuch as they are signified by certainvocal sounds, thereby underly the meanings of those sounds, being additionally describedas that of which the passions of the soul are likenessesthat is to say, the passions of thesoul are likenesses of things ( pragmata ); but pragmata are the significata of vocal soundsestablished kata thesin for the purpose of signifying, which vocal sounds are names.Consequently, if one asks, What is the signification of such-and-such a vocal sound?, theanswer is that it is some pragma or thing insofar as it has been apprehended, and so has be-come the object of a noema or thought, and upon which some vocal sound has been im-

posed by agreement for the purpose of signifying, thereby establishing it as a name.

2. On what is signified by a vocal sound.40 Thosethat is, names , and verbs , and speech , etc.41 1. [1] Primum oportet, ponere quid sit nomen et quid verbum, deinde quid sit negatio et affirmatio, et nuntiatio, et oratio. 2. Quae igitur sunt in voce, sunt notae passionum, quae sunt in anima; et quae

scribuntur, sunt notae eorum quae sunt in voce. Atque ut literae non sunt apud omnes eaedem, ita nec voces sunt eadem. Sed passiones animi, quarum haec primum sunt signa, eaedem sunt apud omnes. Eadem sunt etiam res, quarum hae passiones sunt simulacra. Ac de his quidem dictum est in libris de Anima, quia

pertinent ad alium tractum . (tr. ed. Sylvester Maurus)

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Peri Herm . lect. 2, nn. 5-6 (tr. B.A.M.):

But with respect to his statement, But of those passions which are in the soul , it mustconsidered that the affections of the sensible appetite commonly are customarily calledpassions of the soul, for instance anger, joy and the like, as is said in the second book of the Ethics . And it is true that certain vocal sounds of men naturally signify passions of thissort, like the groans of the sick, and of the other animals, as is said in the first book of the

Politics . But at present the discussion concerns vocal sounds significative by humanconvention; and so by passions of the soul here is to be understood the conceptions of the understanding, which names and verbs signify immediately, according to the viewof Aristotle. For it cannot be that they immediately signify things themselves, as is apparentfrom the very mode of signifying: for the name man signifies human nature in abstractionfrom singulars. And so it cannot be that it immediately signifies a singular (or individual)man; and so the Platonists held that it signified the separated idea itself of man. But becauseaccording to Aristotles view this (idea) according to its abstraction does not subsist inreality, it was necessary for Aristotle to say that vocal sounds signify the conceptions of the understanding immediately, and things with them mediating. 42

But because it is unusual for Aristotle to call the conceptions of the understandingpassions, Andronicus took the position that this book was not by Aristotle. But it is clearlyfound in the first book of the De Anima that he calls all the operations of the soul passions.And so the very conception of the understanding may be called a passion. Or because our understanding does not take place without a phantasm, which is not without a bodily

passion. And so in the third book of the De Anima the Philosopher calls the imaginative power the passive intellect. Or because the name passion has been extended to everyreception, even the very act of the possible intellect is a certain undergoing, as is said in thethird book the De Anima . But he uses the name passion rather than thing understood

both because it arises from some passion of the soul, for instance from love or hate, as a manwishes to signify to another an interior concept by a vocal soundas well as because thesignification of a vocal sound is referred to a conception of the understanding ,according as it arises from things in the manner of a certain impression or passion. 43

42 circa id autem quod dicit, earum quae sunt in anima passionum, considerandum est quod passionesanimae communiter dici solent appetitus sensibilis affectiones, sicut ira, gaudium et alia huiusmodi, ut dicitur in ii ethicorum. et verum est quod huiusmodi passiones significant naturaliter quaedam voceshominum, ut gemitus infirmorum, et aliorum animalium, ut dicitur in i politicae. sed nunc sermo est devocibus significativis ex institutione humana; et ideo oportet passiones animae hic intelligere intellectusconceptiones, quas nomina et verba et orationes significant immediate, secundum sententiam aristotelis. nonenim potest esse quod significent immediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso modo significandi apparet: significat enimhoc nomen homo naturam humanam in abstractione a singularibus. unde non potest esse quod significet immediate hominem singularem; unde platonici posuerunt quod significaret ipsam ideam hominis

separatam. sed quia hoc secundum suam abstractionem non subsistit realiter secundum sententiamaristotelis, sed est in solo intellectu; ideo necesse fuit aristoteli dicere quod voces significant intellectus

conceptiones immediate et eis mediantibus res. 43 sed quia non est consuetum quod conceptiones intellectus aristoteles nominet passiones; ideo andronicus posuit hunc librum non esse aristotelis. sed manifeste invenitur in 1 de anima quod passiones animae vocat omnes animae operationes. unde et ipsa conceptio intellectus passio dici potest. vel quia intelligere nostrumnon est sine phantasmate: quod non est sine corporali passione; unde et imaginativam philosophus in iii deanima vocat passivum intellectum. vel quia extenso nomine passionis ad omnem receptionem, etiam ipsumintelligere intellectus possibilis quoddam pati est, ut dicitur in iii de anima. utitur autem potius nomine

passionum, quam intellectuum: tum quia ex aliqua animae passione provenit, puta ex amore vel odio, ut homo interiorem conceptum per vocem alteri significare velit: tum etiam quia significatio vocum refertur ad conceptionem intellectus, secundum quod oritur a rebus per modum cuiusdam impressionis vel passionis.

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. , Ia, q. 13, art. 1, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

I reply that it must be said that, according to the Philosopher, vocal sounds are signs of thoughts, and thoughts are likenesses of things; and so it is clear that vocal sounds arereferred to the things signified, with the conception of thoughts mediating. Therefore,according as something can be known by our understanding, so it can be named by us. Nowit was shown above that, in this life, God cannot be seen by us through His essence; but Heis known by us from creatures, according to the relatedness of a principle, and by way of

excellence and removal. In this way, then, He can be named by us from creatures, yet not sothat the name signifying Him expresses the divine essence as it is, as this name man ex-presses by its signification the essence of man as it is, for it signifies his definition, bydeclaring his essence; for the notion which the name signifies is its definition. 44

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Resp. ad Lect. Vercell. De Art . 108, q. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):

First one must consider that the ratio [or logos ] of anything is what its name signifies, justas the ratio [logos ] of a stone is what its name signifies. But names are signs of intellectualconceptions: and so the ratio [logos ] of each thing signified by the name is the con-ception of the intellect which the name signifies. But this conception of the intellect isindeed in the intellect as in a subject, but in the thing understood 45 as in a thing represented:for the conceptions of the intellect are certain likenesses of things that have been under-stood. But if the conception of the intellect were not made into a likeness of the thing, theconception of that thing would be false, as if one were to understand a stone to be what is nota stone. Therefore the ratio [logos ] of a stone is indeed in the intellect as in a subject, but inthe stone as in that which causes truth in the conception of the intellect of the one under-standing the stone to be such. Therefore when the intellect comprehends a thing, it representsthat thing perfectly by one conception. And thus there happens to be diverse conceptions of diverse things. 46

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent. , dist. 2, q. 1, art. 3, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

I reply that it must be said that, as was said above in the body of the preceding article,wisdom and goodness and everything of the sort are in every way one thing in God, but they

44 respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, voces sunt signa intellectuum, et intellectus sunt rerum similitudines. et sic patet quod voces referuntur ad res significandas, mediante conceptione intellectus. secundum igitur quod aliquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest, sic a nobis potest nominari. ostensum est autem supra quod deus in hac vita non potest a nobis videri per suam essentiam; sed cognoscitur a nobis excreaturis, secundum habitudinem principii, et per modum excellentiae et remotionis. sic igitur potest nominari a nobis ex creaturis, non tamen ita quod nomen significans ipsum, exprimat divinam essentiam

secundum quod est, sicut hoc nomen homo exprimit sua significatione essentiam hominis secundum quod est, significat enim eius definitionem, declarantem eius essentiam; ratio enim quam significat nomen, est definitio.45 Notice that the thing understood is an extrinsic denomination, like the wall that is seen.46

primo considerandum est, quod ratio cuiuslibet est quam significat nomen eius, sicut ratio lapidis est quam significat nomen eius. nomina autem sunt signa intellectualium conceptionum: unde ratio uniuscuiusque rei significata per nomen, est conceptio intellectus, quam significat nomen. haec autem conceptio intellectus est quidem in intellectu sicut in subiecto, in re autem intellecta sicut in repraesentato: nam conceptionesintellectuum sunt similitudines quaedam rerum intellectarum. si autem conceptio intellectus nonassimilaretur rei, falsa esset conceptio de re illa, sicut si intelligeret esse lapidem quod non est lapis. ratioigitur lapidis est quidem in intellectu sicut in subiecto, in lapide autem sicut in eo quod causat veritatem inconceptione intellectus intelligentis lapidem talem esse. cum igitur intellectus rem aliquam comprehendit,una conceptione perfecte illam rem repraesentat; et sic diversas conceptiones contingit esse diversarumrerum .

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differ in ratio . And this ratio is due not only to the one reasoning himself, but also to a pro- perty of the thing itself.

For the clarification of this matter, in order that it be diligently explained, since the wholeunderstanding of the things which are said in the first book depend on this, one must see four things .47 First, what a ratio is insofar as we say things attributed differ in ratio . Second, inwhat way a ratio is said to be or not to be in a thing. 48

Regarding what pertains to the first point, it must be understood that ratio , as it is takenhere, is nothing other than that which the intellect apprehends from the signification of a name: and thisin those things which have a definitionis the definition itself of thething, according to what the Philosopher says: the ratio which the name signifies is thedefinition. But some things are said to have a ratio in the way mentioned which are notdefined, such as quantity and quality and the like, which, since they are the most generalgenera, are not defined. And nevertheless the ratio of quality is what is signified by the nameof quality; and this is that from which quality has what quality is [ illud ex quo qualitashabet quod sit qualitas ]. For this reason, he does not refer to whether those things which aresaid to have a ratio either have or do not have a definition. And so it is clear that the ratio of wisdom which is said about God is what is conceived from the signification of this name,although the divine wisdom itself cannot be defined. Nor yet does this name ratio signify the

conception itself because this is signified by the name of wisdom or by another name of thething; but it signifies the intention of this conception, just as the name definition and other names of second imposition do .49

And from this the second point is clear, namely, how a ratio is said to be in a thing. For this is not said as if the intention itself which the name of ratio signifies is in the thing; nor as if the conception itself to which such an intention belongs is in the thing outside the soul,since it is in the soul as in a subject but it is said to be in the thing inasmuch as in thething outside the soul there is something which corresponds to the conception of thesoul, as the thing signified (corresponding) to the sign .50 For this reason, it must beunderstood that the conception itself of the intellect is related to the thing outside the soul inthree ways. 51

47 Inasmuch as only the first two are relevant to the present consideration, the third and fourth are omitted.48 respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, art. praeced., in corp., sapientia et bonitas et omniahujusmodi sunt omnino unum re in deo, sed differunt ratione: et haec ratio non est tantum ex parte ipsiusratiocinantis, sed ex proprietate ipsius rei. ad cujus rei evidentiam, ut diligenter explicetur, quia ex hoc

pendet totus intellectus eorum quae in 1 libro dicuntur, quatuor oportet videre. primo quid sit ratio secundum quam dicimus attributa ratione differre. secundo quomodo dicatur aliqua ratio in aliqua re essevel non esse.49 quantum ad primum pertinet, sciendum est, quod ratio, prout hic sumitur, nihil aliud est quam id quod apprehendit intellectus de significatione alicujus nominis: et hoc in his quae habent definitionem, est ipsa reidefinitio, secundum quod philosophus dicit: ratio quam significat nomen est definitio. sed quaedam dicuntur habere rationem sic dictam, quae non definiuntur, sicut quantitas et qualitas et hujusmodi, quae nondefiniuntur, quia sunt genera generalissima. et tamen ratio qualitatis est id quod significatur nominequalitatis; et hoc est illud ex quo qualitas habet quod sit qualitas. unde non refert, utrum illa quae dicuntur habere rationem, habeant vel non habeant definitionem. et sic patet quod ratio sapientiae quae de deo

dicitur, est id quod concipitur de significatione hujus nominis, quamvis ipsa sapientia divina definiri non possit. nec tamen hoc nomen ratio significat ipsam conceptionem, quia hoc significatur per nomen sapientiae vel per aliud nomen rei; sed significat intentionem hujus conceptionis, sicut et hoc nomendefinitio, et alia nomina secundae impositionis .50 Compare the Stoic formulation on a thing signified (whether pragma or lekta ) corresponding to a rationalimpression, for which, see the next section.51 et ex hoc patet secundum, scilicet qualiter ratio dicatur esse in re. non enim hoc dicitur, quasi ipsa intentioquam significat nomen rationis, sit in re; aut etiam ipsa conceptio, cui convenit talis intentio, sit in re extraanimam, cum sit in anima sicut in subjecto: sed dicitur esse in re, inquantum in re extra animam est aliquid quod respondet conceptioni animae, sicut significatum signo. unde sciendum, quod ipsa conceptio intellectus

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For sometimes what the intellect conceives is the likeness of a thing existing outside thesoul, just as what is conceived from the name man; and such a conception has a foundationin the thing immediately, inasmuch as the thing itself from its conformity to the intellectmakes it that the intellect be true, and so the name signifying that intellect is said properly of the thing .52

Sometimes, however, what this name [ ratio ] signifies is not a likeness of the thing existingoutside the soul, but is something that follows from the mode of understanding the thingwhich is outside the soul. And of this sort are the intentions which our intellect discovers, as

the thing signified by the name of genus is not the likeness of something existing outsidethe soul; but from the fact that our intellect understands animal as [being] in many species, itattributes to it the intention of a genus; and for intentions of this sort, although there is no

proximate foundation in the thing, but rather in the intellectnevertheless, there is a remotefoundation in the thing itself. For this reason, the intellect which discovers these intentions isnot false. And the case is similar in all other things which follow from the mode of under-standing, as in the abstraction of mathematicals and the like. 53

But sometimes what is signified by the name does not have a foundation in the thing,either proximate or remote, as the conception of a chimera: since it is neither the likeness of something outside the soul, nor does it follow from the mode of understanding some thing of nature: and so such a conception is false.

For this reason, the second point is clear, namely, that a ratio is said to be in a thing insofar

as the thing signified by the name, to which to be a ratio happens, is in the thing: and thishappens properly when the conception of the intellect is a likeness of a thing.... 54

3. On the two meanings of ratio most relevant to our investigation:

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent. , dist. 2, q. 1, art. 3, c. (tr. B.A.M.):

Regarding what pertains to the first point, it must be understood that ratio , as it is takenhere, is nothing other than that which the intellect apprehends from the signification of a name: and thisin those things which have a definitionis the definition itself of thething, according to what the Philosopher says: the ratio which the name signifies is thedefinition. But some things are said to have a ratio in the way mentioned which are notdefined, such as quantity and quality and the like, which, since they are the most generalgenera, are not defined. And so it is clear that the ratio of wisdom which is said about Godis what is conceived from the signification of this name, although the divine wisdom itself cannot be defined. Nor yet does this name ratio signify the conception itself because this is

tripliciter se habet ad rem quae est extra animam. Notice that the thing signified is a thing outside the soul.52 aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit, est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod concipitur de hoc nomine homo; et talis conceptio intellectus habet fundamentum in re immediate,inquantum res ipsa, ex sua conformitate ad intellectum, facit quod intellectus sit verus, et quod nomen

significans illum intellectum, proprie de re dicatur.53 aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam: et hujusmodi sunt intentiones quasintellectus noster adinvenit; sicut significatum hujus nominis genus non est similitudo alicujus rei extra

animam existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit eiintentionem generis; et hujusmodi intentionis licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re sed in intellectu,tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa. unde intellectus non est falsus, qui has intentiones adinvenit. Et

simile est de omnibus aliis qui consequuntur ex modo intelligendi, sicut est abstractio mathematicorum et hujusmodi.54 aliquando vero id quod significatur per nomen, non habet fundamentum in re, neque proximum nequeremotum, sicut conceptio chimerae: quia neque est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam, neque consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem aliquam naturae: et ideo ista conceptio est falsa. unde patet secundum, scilicet quod ratio dicitur esse in re, inquantum significatum nominis, cui accidit esse rationem, est in re: et hoccontingit proprie, quando conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei.

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signified by the name of wisdom or by another name of the thing; but it signifies the in-tention of this conception , just as the name definition and other names of second impo-sition do. 55

4. The two meanings of ratio in sum:

that which the intellect apprehends from the signification of a name, which iseither a definition or something similar to a definition

what signifies the intention of such a conception, just as the name definitionand other names of second imposition do, and so is the name of a second intention

Taken in the first way, then, one has what ratio is; but taken in the second, one sayswhat ratio means (in a certain sense of ratio ).

Cf. Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei . On the Power of God by Thomas Aquinas,translated by the English Dominican Fathers (1952):

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The reality corresponds to the concept in two ways. First,immediately, that is to say, when the intellect conceives the idea of a thing existing outsidethe mind, for instance, a man or a stone. Secondly, mediately, when, namely, somethingfollows the act of the intellect, and the intellect considers it by reflecting on itself. So that thereality corresponds to that consideration of the intellect mediately, that is to say, through themedium of the intellects concept of the thing. For instance, the intellect understands animalnature in a man, a horse, and many other species: and consequently it understands that natureas a genus: to this act, however, whereby the intellect understands a genus, there does notcorrespond immediately outside the mind a thing that is a genus; and yet there is somethingthat corresponds to the thought that is the foundation of this mental process.

It is the same with the relation of principle that power adds to essence: since somethingcorresponds to it in reality, not however immediately, but mediately. For our mind conceivesthe creature as bearing a relation to and dependent on its Creator: and for this very reason,

being unable to conceive one thing related to another, without on the other hand conceivingthat relation to be reciprocal, it conceives in God a certain relation of principle, consequentto its mode of understanding, which relation is referred to the thing mediately. 56

55 quantum ad primum pertinet, sciendum est, quod ratio, prout hic sumitur, nihil aliud est quam id quod apprehendit intellectus de significatione alicujus nominis: et hoc in his quae habent definitionem, est ipsa reidefinitio, secundum quod philosophus dicit: ratio quam significat nomen est definitio. sed quaedam dicuntur habere rationem sic dictam, quae non definiuntur. et sic patet quod ratio sapientiae quae de deo dicitur,est id quod concipitur de significatione hujus nominis, quamvis ipsa sapientia divina definiri non possit. nectamen hoc nomen ratio significat ipsam conceptionem, quia hoc significatur per nomen sapientiae vel per aliud nomen rei; sed significat intentionem hujus conceptionis, sicut et hoc nomen definitio, et alia nomina

secundae impositionis .56 Ad decimum dicendum, quod intellectui respondet aliquid in re dupliciter. Uno modo immediate, quandovidelicet intellectus concipit formam rei alicuius extra animam existentis, ut hominis vel lapidis. Alio modo

mediate, quando videlicet aliquid sequitur actum intelligendi, et intellectus reflexus supra ipsum considerat illud. Unde res respondet illi consideration

on what is signified, part ii

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