Notes

This affirmative isn’t topical so that’s a great option for the 2NR.

T50 States CP – No reasonCapitalism KritkSpendingPolitics

Case

1NC Topiclity

( ) Transportation infrastructure is highways, roads, bridges, intermodal transit, inland waterways, ports, aviation, and rail systems. Congress ‘11[The US House of Representatives – the 112th Congress of the United States. “HR 402 – National Infrastructure Development Bank Act of 2011” 1/24/11 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr402/text//Cal-JV] (25) TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT- The term ‘transportation infrastructure project’ means any project for the construction, maintenance, or enhancement of highways, roads, bridges, transit and intermodal systems, inland waterways, commercial ports, airports, high speed rail and freight rail systems.

CO2 pipelines are classified as hazardous waste transportationMarston and Moore, 2008 (Philip Marston, energy regulatory attorney in Alexandria, Virginia, practicing as Marston Law, and Patricia Moore, oil and gas attorney, Energy Law Journal, Volume 29)

The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) of the Department of Transportation (DOT) is responsible for pipeline safety regulation under the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Act of 1979. 112 This responsibility is carried out within PHMSA by the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS). Under the 1979 act, the DOT regulates the design, construction, operation and maintenance, and spill response planning for CO2 pipelines. 113 The DOT regulations are also generally followed by state regulators in order to exercise safety regulation over the intrastate CO2 pipelines. For purposes of the DOT safety regulations, “carbon dioxide” is defined as a supercritical fluid, not a liquid: 114 “carbon dioxide means a fluid consisting of more than 90 percent carbon dioxide molecules compressed to a supercritical state.” 115 Indeed, while CO2 pipelines are subject to the same regulations as pipelines transporting hazardous liquids (such as petroleum, petroleum products, and anhydrous ammonia), the DOT regulations do not classify CO2 as a hazardous liquid but rather a Class 2.2 (non-flammable gas) hazardous material. 116

( ) That’s distinct from water, energy, or social infrastructureHeintz ‘9(James, Associate Research Professor and Associate Director – Political Economy Research Institute, et al., “How Infrastructure Investments Support the U.S. Economy: Employment, Productivity and Growth”, January, http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/peri_aam_finaljan16_new.pdf)II. ASSESSMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS FOR THE U.S. In the previous section we looked at trends and patterns of public investment since 1950. We now examine what levels of infrastructure investment are required in the future to address expected needs and to fill the gap left by inadequate rates of past investment. We will then use this assessment of needs to develop policy scenarios and to estimate the employment impacts of an expanded infrastructure investment program. We will show, in later sections of the report, that a program of accelerated investment which aims to eliminate the country’s infrastructure deficit can generate millions of new jobs. In this section we focus on four broad categories of infrastructure and specific areas of investment within each

category. The infrastructure categories are: 1. Transportation : the road system; railroads; aviation; mass transit; and inland waterways and levees; 2. Public school buildings; 3. Water infrastructure: drinking water, wastewater, and dams; 4. Energy: electrical transmission, through all sources, including renewables, and natural gas pipeline construction. These categories constitute the most important components of U.S. economic infrastructure. In addition, public schools represent one of the most important pillars of the country’s social infrastructure, one with important implications for the long-run productivity of the economy’s human resources. Taken together, we capture the most important assets that collectively reflect the state of the nation’s infrastructure. In this section, we examine each of these areas in turn and then pull the information together to provide a more complete picture of infrastructure needs. Transportation Highways, Roads and Bridges The nation’s highways, roads, and bridges constitute the single most important transportation system for the U.S. population and economy. According to the Federal Highway Administration, the U.S. maintains 4 million miles of roads and nearly 600,000 bridges

(Department of Transportation, 2006). In dollar terms, the Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates that the current value of public assets in road infrastructure totals $2.6 trillion. The Department of Transportation periodically evaluates the condition of the country’s roads, bridges, and transit systems in its report Status of the Nation’s Highways, Bridges, and Transit. According to the most report, 85 percent of roads are in ‘acceptable condition’ but only 44 percent were deemed to be in ‘good condition’. In 2004, 26.7 percent of bridges were considered to be structurally deficient and 13.6 percent were ‘functionally obsolete.’ The cost to maintain the U.S. road system in its current condition is estimated to be $78.8 billion a year. Current levels of annual investment are around $70.3 billion, a gap of $8.5 billion. The Department of Transportation has conducted research into the level of investment needed to minimize the costs associated with prolonged travel times, vehicle damage, accidents, and excessive emissions. Bringing the system up to this high-quality standard would require annual investment of $131.7 billion, an increase of $61.4 billion over current levels (Department of Transportation, 2006). Freight and intercity rail By 2035, demand for freight rail transportation is expected to double (AAR, 2007). Maintaining adequate infrastructure is essential if freight rail is to continue to provide a more environmentally benign alternative to long-distance trucking. Intercity passenger rail, mostly on trains operated by Amtrak, currently links over 500 cities nationwide and provides a viable alternative to air and road transport (Department of Transportation, 2007). Insufficient capital investment in freight and intercity rail would compromise the future contributions of railroads to the U.S. economy. In turn, these investment gaps would slow down the transition to a clean-energy economy. Unlike road transportation, rail infrastructure is largely financed by private companies. Since the railroads were deregulated in the late 1970s, securing the funds for ongoing capital improvements has been a challenge. It is unclear to what extent railroad companies will be able to finance future fixed capital requirements from ongoing revenues (ASCE, 2005). If railroads cannot finance sufficient capital improvements, the growth in demand for rail services would shift onto the road system—increasing congestion, road maintenance costs, as well as increasing greenhouse gas emissions. A recent study by the Association of American Railroads projects that infrastructure investment of $148 billion is required in the next 28 years to be able to meet the projected level of demand (AAR, 2007). This translates into a capital investment need of $5.3 billion per year. The American Society of Civil Engineers estimates that investment needs of freight rail and intercity systems would total $12-13 billion a year over the next 20 years (ASCE, 2005). However, this estimate includes investments that would have taken place anyway, given historical trends. Therefore, we use the $5.3 billion figure as the best available estimate of the need for additional rail infrastructure in the future. Aviation According to forecasts compiled by the Federal Aviation Administration, the number of passengers flying on commercial airlines is expected to increases at an annual rate of 3.0 percent a year from 2008 to 2025 (FAA, 2008). By the end of this period, annual passenger travel is expected to reach 1.3 billion. This increase in volume will require capital investments in airport capacity and air traffic control systems if congestion and delays are to be minimized and passenger safety maintained. Updating the traffic control system has been ongoing since the mid-1980s, but the process has taken longer and required more investment than initially thought (ASCE, 2005). According to the results of a survey administered to the nation’s 100 largest airports by the Airports Council International (North American branch), annual capital investment needs over the period 2007-2011 total $17.5 billion (ACI, 2007). This represents a $3.2 billion increase over the assessment of annual investment needs from 2005 to 2009. The FAA estimates the shortfall in investment funds available to be somewhat lower: $1 billion per year from 2006-2011, based on airport master plans and ACI estimates (GAO, 2007). However, neither set of estimates include capital investment for security improvements and air traffic control systems, as documented by the ASCE (2005). Therefore, we use $3.2 billion a year in additional infrastructure as a reasonable estimate of investment needs in the absence of more comprehensive data. Mass transit Increased usage of public transportation is one of the most efficient ways to promote energy conservation in the United States. It is therefore a positive development that public transportation has been growing steadily in recent years. The increase in demand for public transportation accelerated sharply over 2007-08, as gas prices at the pump rose as high as $4.00 a gallon. But more generally, over the decade 1996-2005, passenger miles traveled with various forms of public transportation increased by over 20 percent (Department of Transportation, 2007) and usage is expected to rise faster in the future. Capital investments in transit have increased in recent years, particularly at the state and local level (Department of Transportation, 2006). Despite these improvements, public investment must increase further if the transit system is to be maintained, and beyond this, if public transportation is to become an increasingly significant means of promoting energy conservation. According to the 2006 Status of the Nation’s Highways, Bridges, and Transit, transit investments must total $15.8 billion a year just to maintain the current operating system. This would represent an increase of $3.2 billion a year over current levels. But to meet government operational and performance targets by 2024, annual investments must grow to $21.8 billion, requiring an additional $9.2 billion. Inland waterways and levees Approximately 2.6 billion short tons of commodities are transported on U.S. navigable waterways each year—an extremely cost-efficient transportation system (Army Corps of Engineers, 2005). The Army Corps of

Engineers maintains and operates the inland waterway system which includes 257 lock systems nationwide, the average age of which is 55 years. According to the American Society of Civil Engineers, by 2020 80 percent of the lock systems will be functionally obsolete without new infrastructure investments (ASCE, 2005). The estimated cost of updating all the lock systems is $125 billion. In addition, the Army Corps of Engineers assess the state of the nation’s levees and flood control systems, amounting to 2,000 levees totaling 13,000 miles, which include projects built and maintained by the Corps of Engineers; projects built by the Corps of Engineers and subsequently transferred to a local owner to maintain; and projects built by local communities. In 2007, the Corps identified 122 levees, across the country, which are in need of additional maintenance and repair.4 The investment needed to update the lock system combined with an additional $30 billion to improve the nation’s levees would total $155 billion, or about $6.2 billion annually over the next 25 years.Vote negative for limits and ground – other forms of infrastructure like (whatever the aff does) self-evidently explode the topic and require a different and unrelated set of negative arguments – rejecting the plan is necessary to preserve a manageable negative research burden and preserve competitive equity.

Voting issue – Limits – they explode the topic

-- 2NC – Infrastructure doesn’t include pipeline

( ) Pipelines aren’t topical – they’re a separate category of infrastructure Babson ‘11[Adam – Senior Analyst at Russell Research. “Structuring a Listed Infrastructure Portfolio” May 2011, http://www.openworldinvesting.com/files/ow_listed_infra_article.pdf]While the global infrastructure universe can be analyzed in a variety of ways, the space can be disaggregated into the following categories: transportation infrastructure, utilities, pipelines and communications infrastructure. Transportation infrastructure assets include toll roads, bridges, ports (sea and air) and rail. Utilities infrastructure includes electricity distribution and generation, gas distribution and storage, water and renewable energy. The pipelines sector comprises companies involved in the storage and transportation of oil and gas. Communications infrastructure features cable networks and satellite systems. Some subsectors—such as power generation—may be ignored altogether by “orthodox” investors looking to minimize volatility and correlations to global equities, while other sectors that are only indirectly related to infrastructure—such as mobile telecom companies—may be attractive to “thematic” managers looking for enhanced returns (managers willing to invest in higher-beta, competitively exposed companies).

( ) Including pipelines as transportation de-limits – brings in a host of utilities infrastructure Affs.Inderst ‘9 (Georg, Financial Affairs Division – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Pension Fund Investment in Infrastructure”, OECD Working Paper, No. 32, January, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/9/42052208.pdf)Definition of infrastructure assets The definition of infrastructure investment seems intuitive. The OECD uses a simple and general definition for infrastructure as the system of public works in a country, state or region, including roads, utility lines and public buildings. A standard dictionary‘s definition is: ―The basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society, such as transportation and communications systems, water and power lines, and public institutions including schools, post offices, and prisons.‖ (American Heritage Dictionary). Infrastructure assets are traditionally defined by their physical characteristics . One can

split them into two main categories, and a range of sectors within those: Economic infrastructure transport (e.g. toll roads, airports, seaport, tunnels, bridges, metro, rail systems) utilities (e.g. water supply, sewage system, energy distribution networks, power plants, pipelines , gas storage) communication (e.g. TV/ telephone transmitters, towers, satellites, cable networks) renewable energy Social infrastructure education facilities health (hospitals and health care centres) security (e.g. prisons, police, military stations) others (e.g. parks). There is a lot of variety within infrastructure if it is defined by its physical nature, and people disagree what exactly should or should not count as infrastructure asset. For example, do utility companies count as infrastructure? When their activities span production, distribution and networks, where is the dividing line? More generally, where does public infrastructure end and private infrastructure start?

Err Negative – 1st Line (1/1)

You should err neg on topicality and prefer Negative strategy to Affirmative ground – the Aff has structural advantages like infinite prep time to create their Affirmative, the ability to choose a strategic area of the topic for the 1AC, and the first and last speech which already give them an advantage – they should be held to the reciprocal burden of providing an acceptable amount of predictable negative ground.

Competing Interpretations Good – 1st Line (1/1)

Competing interpretations are good:

( ) Educational – debating about different interpretations equips debaters with the ability to engage in analytical debate based on precise standards of evaluation. Reasonability is arbitrary and jackknifes meaningful analysis of interpretations.

( ) Reasonability is arbitrary – replaces interpretation’s clash with judge-evaluated reasonability, which is subjective. Subjective interpretations are the death of debate because there’s no OBJECTIVE standard for evaluation and the debaters CANNOT REASONABLY PREDICT how to frame their arguments

( ) Our interp most predictable – allowing the neg to defend an interpretation shields them from unpredictable affirmatives. This improves the quality of debate by ensuring stable negative ground and minimizes judge intervention.

( ) Destroys strategic ground – the combination of all reasonable interpretations will force the topic to be as large as possible. This forces the neg to assume a massive research burden, which collapses predictable ground. Ground isn’t meaningful unless it’s predictable because all of our strategies are researched with a set case list in mind.

( ) Infinitely regressive – there’s no brightline for what is and what is not reasonable. Teams will always push these limits to catch the neg unprepared – we have evidentiary support Stone ‘23[Justice in the Circuit Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit. Sussex Land & Live Stock Co v. Midwest Refining Co, 1923. Lexis]Where the use of land affects others, the use must be "reasonable" to escape liability for resultant damage to others. What is "reasonable" depends upon a variety of considerations and circumstances. It is an elastic term which is of uncertain value in a definition. It has been well said that "reasonable," means with regard to all the interest affected,

his own and his neighbor's and also having in view public policy. But, elastic as this rule is, both reason and authority have declared certain limitations beyond which it cannot extend. One of these limitations is that it is "unreasonable" and unlawful for one owner to physically invade the land of another owner. There can be no damnum absque injuria where there is such a trespass.

Fairness 1st (1/1)

( ) Fairness has to come first – otherwise everyone would quit, destroying debate. It’s objectively true that despite educational merits, one of the BIGGEST reasons debaters are so dedicated to the activity is because anyone can win a given round.

( ) Fairness creates equitable debate which is a pre-requisite for education. Their forms of education can be reproduced in other forums – debate is a game which necessities fair rules otherwise no one would play it.

( ) Limits are good and necessary to preserve debate – otherwise people will quit Rowland 84 (Robert C., Debate Coach – Baylor University, “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective, Ed. Parson, p. 53-54)The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing in scope and size.4 This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breath. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. Naitonal debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change.5 The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of the topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6 Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske belives that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad policy topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breadth of the topic and experience “negophobia,”7 the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caugh without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much times and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the activity.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 The final effect may be that entire programs either cease functioning or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

Limits Good (1/1)

Narrow interpretations are key to all negative strategy –

( ) Case-specific strategies are educational core negative ground – vast literature exists for topic-specific trade-off disads, specific politics or court disad links, presidential power disads, etc. along with in-depth debates over agent, delegation, or other process counterplans. These are the only core ground because the topic is so broad – the only stable action is what relates to the plan. Core ground is key to fairness because it’s the only thing for which we can consistently prepare.

( ) Their interpretation is an incentive for aff conditionality – they can re-clarify the plan to be done by an alternate actor, or the plan to take a different course of action in the 2AC to avoid our best offense and manipulate the plan to their advantage

( ) Crucial to pre-round preparation – the plan text is the most mainstream form of disclosure and locus of negative strategy formulation before the round – anything else skews time allocation. Adequate pre-round preparation is key to fair debate and education.

Ext. Limits Good (1/1)

( ) Limits key to clash—minimize neg research burdens that facilitate generics Hardy ‘10(Aaron T. Hardy, Coach at Whitman College, “CONDITIONALITY, CHEATING COUNTERPLANS, AND CRITIQUES: TOPIC CONSTRUCTION AND THE RISE OF THE “NEGATIVE CASE””, Contemporary Argumentation & Debate, 2010, pg. 44-45, http://www.cedadebate.org/cad/index.php/CAD/article/view File/271/243) First, narrow topics are most likely to encourage substantive clash. One of the primary motivations for negative teams running away from engagement with the specifics of the affirmative is fear of “falling behind” in the necessary research effort. On a topic with 200 topical affirmative plan mechanisms, it is extremely unlikely that all but the most precocious of negative teams will be prepared to debate each one, and much more likely that they will turn instead to as generic of an approach as possible. Despite sentiments from some corners that the topic writing process is already too narrow and specialized, I would submit that the debate community has not yet truly experimented with what a radically narrower topic might entail. Even the smallest topics in recent memory have afforded the affirmative an incredible amount of flexibility, usually as a compromise to the “broad topics good” camp. A quick perusal of any of the archived case lists from the past decade reveals that even the narrowest topics the community has debated have entailed dozens (if not hundreds) of discrete affirmatives. Instead, envision as a potentially hyperbolic example, a topic with truly only five topical cases. With essentially no room for maneuver, it is easier to envision negative teams feeling empowered “stale” could be replaced with “nuanced,” even if debates superficially resemble each other as the year progresses.

( ) Limits ensure predictability and don’t undermine affirmative flexibility Kupferbreg ’87(Debate Coach at University of Kentucky) 1987 (Eric, “Limits – The Essence of Topicality”, Latin American Politics: The Calculus of Instability, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Kupferberg1987LatAmer.htm) amlIf you are negative, two lines of argumentation should be advanced. First, it is necessary to explain that the affirmative interpretation unlimits the resolution. It should be explained that many cases normally thought to be outside of the resolution would become topical. Special emphasis should be placed on explaining why the affirmative definition would serve as a precedent to an undebatable topic. A premium should be placed on pointing out absurd examples that would be allowable under the broader interpretation (or, the sheer number of cases that would fall within the resolution). Second, it is the negatives responsibility to explain that their own interpretation would allow for an adequate number of cases. If the negative is able to list several fruitful case areas that would remain topical, then the negative position appears less abusive.

AT//Aff Flexibility (1/1)

( ) Rules and boundaries facilitate innovation Flood 10 (Scott, BS in Communication and Theatre Arts – St. Joseph’s College, School Board Member – Plainfield Community School Corporation, and Advertising Agent, “Business Innovation – Real Creativity Happens Inside the Box”, http://ezinearticles.com/?Business-Innovation---Real-Creativity-Happens-Inside-the-Box&id=4793692) It seems that we can accomplish anything if we're brave enough to step out of that bad, bad box, and thinking "creatively" has come to be synonymous with ignoring rules and constraints or pretending they just don't exist. Nonsense . Real creativity is put to the test within the box. In fact, that's where it really shines. It might surprise you, but it's actually easier to think outside the box than within its confines. How can that be? It's simple. When you're working outside the box, you don't face rules, or boundaries, or assumptions. You create your own as you go along. If you want to throw convention aside, you can do it. If you want to throw proven practices out the window, have at it. You have the freedom to create your own world. Now, I'm not saying there's anything wrong with thinking outside the box. At times, it's absolutely essential - such as when you're facing the biggest oil spill in history in an environment in which all the known approaches are failing. But most of us don't have the luxury of being able to operate outside the box. We've been shoved into reality, facing a variety of limitations, from budgets, to supervisors' opinions and prejudices, to the nature of the marketplace. Even though the box may have been given a bad name, it's where most of us have to spend our time. And no matter how much we may fret about those limits, inside that box is where we need to prove ourselves. If you'll pardon the inevitable sports analogy, consider a baseball player who belts ball after ball over 450 feet. Unfortunately, he has a wee problem: he can't place those hits between the foul lines, so they're harmful strikes instead of game-winning home runs. To the out-of-the-box advocates, he's a mighty slugger who deserves admiration, but to his teammates and the fans, he's a loser who just can't get on base. He may not like the fact that he has to limit his hits to between the foul poles, but that's one of the realities of the game he chose to play. The same is true of ideas and approaches. The most dazzling and impressive tactic is essentially useless if it doesn't offer a practical, realistic way to address the need or application. Like the baseball player, we may not like the realities, but we have to operate within their limits. Often, I've seen people blame the box for their inability or unwillingness to create something workable. For example, back in my ad agency days, I remember fellow writers and designers complaining about the limitations of projects. If it was a half-page ad, they didn't feel they could truly be creative unless the space was expanded to a full page. If they were given a full page, they demanded a spread. Handed a spread, they'd fret because it wasn't a TV commercial. If the project became a TV commercial with a $25,000 budget, they'd grouse about not having a $50,000 budget. Yet the greatest artists of all time didn't complain about what they didn't have; they worked their magic using what they did. Monet captured the grace and beauty of France astonishingly well within the bounds of a canvas. Donatello exposed the breathtaking emotion that lurked within ordinary chunks of marble. And I doubt that Beethoven ever whined because there were only 88 keys on the piano. Similarly, I've watched the best of my peers do amazing things in less-than-favorable circumstances. There were brilliant commercials developed with minimal budgets and hand-held cameras. Black-and-white ads that outperformed their colorful competitors. Simple postcards that grabbed the attention of (and business from) jaded consumers. You see, real creativity isn't hampered or blocked by limits. It

actually flowers in response to challenges. Even though it may be forced to remain inside the box, it leverages everything it can find in that box and makes the most of every bit of it. Real creativity is driven by a need to create. When Monet approached a blank canvas, it's safe to say that he didn't agonize over its size. He wanted to capture something he'd seen and share how it looked through his eyes. The size of the canvas was incidental to his talent and desire. Think about the Apollo 13 mission. NASA didn't have the luxury of flying supplies or extra tools to the crew. They couldn't rewrite the laws of physics. Plus, they faced a rapidly shrinking timeline, so their box kept getting smaller and less forgiving. And yet they arrived upon a solution that was creative; more important, that was successful. The next time someone tells you that the real solution involves stepping outside the box, challenge

him or her to think and work harder . After all, the best solution may very well be lurking in a corner of that familiar box.

AT//Breadth > Depth (1/1)

( ) Studies prove that deep education on a few issues outweighs the decision to exclude some topics in their entirety WP 9 (Washington Post, “Will Depth Replace Breadth in Schools?” http://voices.washingtonpost.com/class-struggle/2009/02/will_depth_replace_breadth_in.html) The truth, of course, is that students need both. Teachers try to mix the two in ways that make sense to them and their students. But a surprising study — certain to be a hot topic in teacher lounges and education schools — is providing new data that suggest educators should spend much more time on a few issues and let some topics

slide . Based on a sample of 8,310 undergraduates, the national study says that students who spend at least a month on just one topic in a high school science course get better grades in a freshman college course in that subject than students whose high school courses were more balanced. The study, appearing in the July issue of the journal Science Education, is “Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Science Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework.” The authors are Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington, Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics and Robert H. Tai of the University of Virginia. This is more rich ore from a goldmine of a survey Sadler and Tai helped organize called “Factors Influencing College Science Success.” It involved 18,000 undergraduates, plus their professors, in 67 colleges in 31 states. The study weighs in on one side of a contentious issue that will be getting national attention this September when the College Board’s Advanced Placement program unveils its major overhaul of its college-level science exams for high school students. AP is following a direction taken by its smaller counterpart, the International Baccalaureate program. IB teachers already are allowed to focus on topics of their choice. Their students can deal with just a few topics on exams, because they have a wide choice of questions. AP’s exact approach is not clear yet, but College Board officials said they too will embrace depth. They have been getting much praise for this from the National Science Foundation, which funded the new study. Sadler and Tai have previously hinted at where this was going. In 2001 they reported that students who did not use a textbook in high school physics—an indication that their teachers disdained hitting every topic — achieved higher college grades than those who used a textbook. Some educators, pundits, parents and students will object, I suspect, to sidelining their favorite subjects and spending more time on what they consider trivial or dangerous topics. Some will fret over the possibility that teachers might abandon breadth altogether and wallow in their specialties. Even non-science courses could be affected. Imagine a U.S. history course that is nothing but lives of generals, or a required English course that assigns only Jane Austen. “Depth Versus Breadth” analyzes undergraduate answers to detailed questions about their high school study of physics, chemistry and biology, and the grades they received in freshman college science courses. The college grades of students who had studied at least one topic for at least a month in a high school science course were compared to those of students who did not experience such depth. The study acknowledges that the pro-breadth forces have been in retreat. Several national commissions have called for more depth in science teaching and other subjects. A 2005 study of 46 countries found that those whose schools had the best science test scores covered far fewer topics than U.S. schools.

AT//Literature Checks Abuse (1/1)

Literature does not check abuse:

( ) There’s no limit – Literature exists about everything and the resolution serves to limit teams’ research burdens down to specific subsets of that literature. Their argument’s ONLY LIMIT is “that for which literature exists” – which could be anything.

( ) Predictability is the filter through which you should evaluate literature – means that in THIS INSTANCE, lit does not check abuse because we had no way of knowing to research literature about their aff.

( ) Determining the meaning of the resolution is key --There is extensive literature about baseball, and we could have an outstanding debate about that topic, but that’s not the resolution. Determining what the resolution means is a prerequisite to debating about its merits – their argument justifies debating last year’s Mars affirmative because “everyone has a space backfile".

AT//Clash Checks Abuse (1/1)

Clash doesn’t check abuse

( ) Clash is inevitable – we can always go for Consult NATO or the Heidegger critique – both are arguments that we have and they probably have answers to. That doesn’t prove their model of debate is fair.

( ) No link – their argument presupposes that the clash allowed by their affirmative is GOOD clash; the negative is at a MASSIVE strategic disadvantage when their only 2NR options are T and the K.

( ) Don’t punish us for having ev -- Preparation is about more than just having some cards – otherwise the “disband America” aff would be topical because every team carries “hegemony good” evidence. Their vision of the topic explodes the negative’s preparation burden making it impossible for us to effectively research in-depth positions drawn from the topic literature. If we win that our interpretation is superior then we internal link turn their clash arguments because our vision of the topic would better enable the negative to meet their burden of rejoinder.

AT//Disclosure Checks Abuse (1/1)

Disclosure doesn’t check:

( ) Destroys strategic ground -- There would be as many affirmatives as there are teams and there would be no predictable negative ground. The reason we have a resolution is to provide the negative with a core set of arguments that dispute the desirability for change – their argument would force the neg to have a case neg to every affirmative on the wiki even if it isn’t close to topical.

( ) Doesn’t prove they’re topical – literature exists about everything, but we shouldn’t have to prepare for arguments outside the resolution. Determining what the topic means is a prerequisite to debating its desirability.

( ) Devastates small schools – it’s not reasonable to expect small schools with only a few debaters and a coach to keep up with the hundreds of affirmatives that would exist under their interpretation. The impact is participation in debate, which proves all our fairness arguments and internal-link turns all your ground/limits/education claims.

AT//Not a Voting Issue (1/1)

( ) Jurisdiction -- Before determining whether or not the plan is desirable one must determine whether or not the plan is within the bounds of one’s jurisdictional authority – if the affirmative is not an example of the resolution, then they have not provided a justification for voting affirmative.

( ) Relevant education – we expect to use debate rounds as a vehicle to learn about the resolution. Affirmatives reading untopical plans prevents this by taking the discussion away from the topic. Predictable education is the ONLY MEANINGFUL form of education because we need to engage in BASELINE LEARNING before the round in order to master the topic.

( ) Fairness – if the aff isn’t confined to the resolution, affirmatives would have NO INCENTIVE to read topical affirmatives. Rather, they would eliminate all negative ground with plan texts like “do not kill innocent children”. This destroys competitive equity, explodes affirmative side bias, and collapses predictable ground. We have evidentiary supportSpeice and Lyle ‘3[Patrick (Wake Forest Debater) and Jim (Director of Debate @ Clarion). “Traditional Policy Debate: Now More than Ever”. The Debater’s Research Guide, 2003. groups.wfu.edu/debate ]

The plan is a necessary convention in debate because it is a specific statement of topical advocacy that the affirmative is bound to defend, and all negative ground comes from attacks on the plan and it’s justifications. If the affirmative team argues for the judge to vote for them based on statements not related to the plan, it is likely that these portions of the 1AC will not be topical. Allowing teams to advocate non-topical statements as a reason to vote for them makes it impossible for the negative to debate. The affirmative could simply defend a statement such a “racism is bad” or “2 + 2 = 4.” Such non-falsifiable statements make going negative immensely unattractive, as the affirmative would win virtually every debate. Teams that run such affirmatives, or that justify such affirmatives by divorcing the judge’s decision from a topical plan-focus, skew the debate in such a way that it becomes a “rigged game” in favor of the affirmative.

( ) The punishment paradigm is best – if they broke the rules, you should vote negative to deter future bad practicesSigel 85(Doug Sigel, Northwestern debate, Wake Forest University, 1985, Punishment: Does It Fit the Crime? The Debaters’ Research Guide, groups.wfu.edu/debate)The punishment paradigm boils down to the argument that abusive debate practices should be punished with a loss. If a team employs strategies which are unfair to their opponents or which harm the debate process, the penalty should be a loss--even if they win the substantive policy issues in the debate. For example, a negative team who runs conditional counterplans would lose a debate in which the punishment paradigm was successfully argued even if they were able to refute all other affirmative arguments--like competition, topicality, and disadvantages--against those policies. In short, the punishment approach makes the legitimacy of the debate practices of both teams a prior issue to the substantive policy concerns that normally form the basis for judges' decisions. There are three major justifications for punishment. First, voting against bad debate practices deters their future use. Second, the unfair burdens created by tactics like conditional counterplans and incomprehensible delivery requires the judge to restore competitive equity by punishing the team employing those tactics in a round. Third, the judge is an educator and should teach proper academic conduct by nullifying all arguments made by students who abuse the debate process. These three justifications are the most common reasons advanced for punishment but there are probably others.

AT//Reasonability (1/1)

( ) If we win our interpretation establishes a superior topic, then theirs should be considered unreasonableMancuso ‘82(Steve Manusco, Debater for University of Kentucky, Wake Forest University, 1982, Topicality: In Search of Reason. The Debaters’ Research Guide, groups.wfu.edu/debate)In recognition of the many possible definitions of a word, the debate community has adopted (original mother and father unknown) the convention that the affirmative definition only needs to be "reasonable." This burden traditionally stands opposed to the notion that the affirmative must have the best definition of a word, or even necessarily a better definition than the negative. While the initial theoretical underpinnings for such a convention are far from clear, it must certainly be justified on the grounds that it promotes the objective of quality debating. Such a convention recognizes that a definition is not right or wrong, but merely acceptable or unacceptable in a given situation. In situations where broad interpretations of a topic are desirable, a broader-than usual definition may be reasonable, and where a narrow interpretation is desirable, narrow definitions may be reasonable. Such a simplified view of reasonability is not justified in the face of the recent uses and abuses of such a convention. The relevant question is: What does it mean to be reasonable? Again, courts and legislators may have their own definitions of "reasonable," but they may not be at all useful for the functioning of the term in debate. To state that a court has been unable to define the word "reasonable" only means that in that particular context it was difficult, not that such a finding should be accepted as proof that we cannot come up with a workable concept of reasonability for our purposes. Of course, someone who has listened to a few debates concerning "reasonability" may find great sympathy with such a court the concept has taken on very diverse forms, to say the least, in its varied uses. On one extreme, teams have argued that as long as they were not "absurd" in defining their terms, they were reasonable, and some teams have argued that because their definition exists they are some how reasonable. On the other end of the

definitional continuum, some interpretations of reasonability have been very restrictive. Some teams have argued that only the best definition is reasonable--that it shows little reason to accept an inferior definition. Clearly there has been quite a bit of disagreement as to what is entailed by a "reasonable" definition. Some debate critics have responded to this dispute by throwing up their arms and calling for the abandonment of the concept of reasonability as a topicality convention altogether. While it is very easy to respect and have empathy with such sentiment, it seems prudent to attempt a less radical solution by constructing a more useful and practical convention of reasonability without ""piffing" the concept in its entirety. I would suggest two steps in construction of a workable reasonability convention. First, we must agree upon what makes a definition acceptable. Keeping in mind the goal of high quality debating, two criteria necessary for an acceptable definition should be (1) Does it tend toward focusing debates on timely and relevant policy advocacy? and (2) does it allow the negative sufficient ability to be prepared in both analysis and research? A definition which failed to meet either of these goals would not seem to be an acceptable approach to interpretation. Secondly, the actual debate over topicality should center on the question of whether or not the affirmative interpretation actually did meet both of these criteria. In this sense, the "threshold" for when a definition became "reasonable" would be raised well above the currently less rigorous approaches, yet not overly restrict the affirmative initial and presumptive right to define its terms. The burden would be on the affirmative to explain, wren challenged, the implications of its definition, thus reviving the concept of an affirmative burden on topicality, without making the burden prohibitively heavy by making them refute any conceivable negative alternative definition. In an effort to supplement the convention of "reasonability," "standards" of definition have been offered which the affirmative should meet in order to be considered reasonable. These standards could potentially be used to discern whether or not the affirmative approach met the above two criteria.

AT//Critiques of Topicality (1/1)

Topicality isn’t violent/genocidal/whatever they said it is:

( ) We don’t limit out your discussion—our argument is that you must tie your discussion to the topic. This is best:

a. Strategic Ground—your interpretation effectively prevents the negative from garnering any reasonable offense; makes it impossible for us to generate any reasonable response, especially in critical rounds in which the affirmative just critiques all attempts to achieve fairness.

b. Predictable Limits—education and philosophical growth can only be achieved if the merits of an advocacy are evaluated; those merits are only debatable if we can PREDICT the topic prior to the start of the debate. The alternative is anti-education because we’re taught to accept things without question.

( ) Refusal to allow a coherent, planned response to your argument results in an essentialized and romantic understanding of the thesis of the 1ac. Waterstone 2k[Bonnie. PhD in Gender Studies @ Simon Fraser University. The Feminist Struggle, Pg 49. 2000] The power to select and authorize certain voices can also be read in the paternalistic concern, in critical pedagogy as well as in research, to give "voice to the voiceless" (Visweswaran, 1994, p.9). This construction of 'voice' against a background of silence tends to result in a romanticized and essentialized version, singular and representative, obscuring dissonance and multiplicity. This use of 'voice' also reinforces an unproblematic speech/silence binary. In this binary, speech is (necessarily) beneficial, and silence a sign of repression. Speech is positively loaded with

assumptions of agency, and silence negatively loaded with passivity. Not only is this a very Western view of the practices of speech and silence, it also elides the conditions of reception and production that make some voices and not others intelligible. As Gayatri Spivak (1994) asserts, the subaltern can speak--but can she be heard ? Who will listen?

( ) We don’t silence voices – the aff gets 32 minutes to talk about whatever they want. Voting negative doesn’t prevent them from speaking, only from winning. It’s another double bind: EITHER they value their project more than winning, which proves there’s no impact to voting negative because they don’t have an “ballot key” warrant. OR they just want to win, the impact to their argument is overstated.

( ) Fairness first – it’s a pre-requisite to maintaining debate as an open marketplace of ideas for your project to flourish. Speice and Lyle ‘3[Patrick (Wake Forest Debater) and Jim (Director of Debate @ Clarion). “Traditional Policy Debate: Now More than Ever”. The Debater’s Research Guide, 2003. groups.wfu.edu/debate ]As with any game or sport, creating a level playing field that affords each competitor a fair chance of victory is integral to the continued existence of debate as an activity. If the game is slanted toward one particular competitor, the other participants are likely to pack up their tubs and go home, as they don’t have a realistic shot of winning such a “rigged game.” Debate simply wouldn’t be fun if the outcome was pre-determined and certain teams knew that they would always win or lose. The incentive to work hard to develop new and innovative arguments would be non-existent because wins and losses would not relate to how much research a particular team did. TPD, as defined above, offers the best hope for a level playing field that makes the game of debate fun and educational for all participants.

Warming Frontline

CCS is infeasible – would cost $5.1 trillion to stabilize CO2 levelsTsouris and Aaron ’10 (Costas Tsouris and Douglas Aaron are at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Georgia Institute of Technology, US, September 2010, “ Do we really need carbon capture and storage?”, http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/Issues/2010/September/DoWeReallyNeedCarbonCaptureStorage.asp) SRK Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a possible technology to mitigate anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions to the atmosphere. CCS includes multiple methods to accomplish the goals of capturing, transporting and storing CO2; most such efforts focus on fossil-fuel-based power generation. Primarily because of its high cost and environmental issues, CCS will face considerable obstacles. Several economic and technical challenges must be overcome for CCS to compete with alternative energy strategies for CO2 emissions avoidance. To better understand the relative importance of the cost of CCS and its effectiveness in avoiding CO2 emissions, we performed a comparison of carbon avoidance via CCS and using alternative energy technologies.1 In this comparison, the resources that would be spent on CCS were instead used to develop alternative energy capacity - specifically wind, nuclear and geothermal power - a concept called 'virtual CCS'. This comparison was designed to rank CCS and alternative energy technologies according to the effectiveness and cost of avoiding CO2 emissions. The calculations involved in this simulation determined the cost of performing CCS on a globally significant mass of CO2 emissions by considering the wedge concept of Pacala and Socolow.2 Specifically, we considered 100 billion (giga) tonnes (GtCO2) to be avoided over 50 years as the basis for comparison. Pacala and Socolow proposed to divide anthropogenic CO2 emissions into 'wedges' to facilitate the implementation of a portfolio approach to solving the CO2 problem. Global emissions were estimated at 30 GtCO2 for the year 2010, assumed to increase linearly over time, and expected to double by 2060. Stabilising the emissions at 2010 levels would require 800 GtCO2 to be avoided in the next 50 years. Assuming $51 (£33) per tonne of CO2 (tCO2) avoided via CCS, an estimate based on the 2005 International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report for a new coal-fired power plant,3 we estimated the cost for one wedge of CCS to be $5.1 trillion. For virtual CCS, this means that $5.1 trillion spread over 50 years could be utilised to build, maintain, operate and decommission alternative energy installations such as wind farms, nuclear plants or geothermal plants.

LeaksRochon et al. ’08 ( Emily Rochon: Climate and Energy Campaigner at Greenpeace International, Dr Erika Bjureby Previously: lecturer in political ecology, Uppsala University. Currently: researcher, Greenpeace International, Dr Paul Johnston is principal scientist at the Greenpeace Research Laboratories and Head of the Science Unit for Greenpeace International. Paul set up the Greenpeace Research Laboratories at London's Queen Mary College in 1987. He has continued as the principal scientist since the group relocated to the University of Exeter in 1992, David Santillo: Honorary Research Fellow (Greenpeace) David obtained a degree in marine and freshwater biology in 1989, and a PhD in marine microbial ecology in 1993, both from the University of London, before continuing with postdoctoral research into nutrient pollution in the Adriatic Sea. A senior scientist, David joined the Greenpeace Research Laboratories in 1994, and now has almost 15 years experience in organic analytical chemistry and development of policies for environmental protection, Dr. Gabriela von Goerne is Climate Campaigner at Greenpeace Germany . She holds a university degree and a PhD in geology, May 2008, “ False Hope Why carbon capture and storage won’t save the climate”, http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/Global/usa/report/2008/5/false-hope-why-carbon-capture.pdf) SRK

As long as CO2 is present in geological formations, there is a risk of leakage – it can migrate laterally or upwards to the surface. In contact with water, CO2 becomes corrosive and can compromise the integrity of cap rocks, well casings and cement plugs. Undetected fractures in cap rocks or those created by injecting CO2 at too high a pressure can provide another avenue for CO2 to escape. Improper design and construction of wells can also create opportunities for leakage.121 The implications for climate mitigation as well as the other environmental and public health risks make leakage a serious concern. Preventing leaks will largely rely upon careful technology choices, project design, plant operation and reservoir selection. The IPCC notes that the fraction of CO2 retained in “geological reservoirs is very likely to exceed 99% over 100 years and is likely to exceed 99% over 1000 years”.122 However, these findings are only valid for well-selected, fully characterised, properly designed and managed storage locations. At the moment, sufficient capacity in high quality reservoirs cannot be assured, nor can their appropriate design and management be guaranteed. It is likely that some CO2 storage will occur in lower quality sites, without proper management. In these cases, the risk of leakage could be even greater. For example, a CCS experiment in Texas (see “Storing carbon underground can have unintended consequences”, page 26) found CO2 injected into saline sedimentary aquifers caused carbonates and other minerals to dissolve rapidly. This could allow CO2 and brine to leak into the water table.123 While it is not currently possible to quantify the exact risk of leakage, any CO2 release has the potential to impact the surrounding environment; air, groundwater or soil. Most computer models suggest leakage will occur fastest in the first 50-100 years of a project’s lifetime, before trapping mechanisms take effect. Others indicate that little happens in the first 1000-year period with leakage most likely to occur over the following 3000 to 5000 year period.124 Either way, even a tiny rate of leakage could undermine any putative climate benefit of CCS. A leakage rate of just 1% on 600 Gt of stored carbon (2160 GtCO2 or about 100 years’ worth of CO2 emissions from fossil fuels), could release as much as 6Gt of carbon (21.6 GtCO2) per year back into the atmosphere. This is roughly equivalent to current total global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels.125 Remediation may be possible for CO2 leaks but there is no track record or cost estimates for these sorts of measures.126

Peer reviewed studies show CCS can’t and won’t solve global warmingRochon et al. ’08 ( Emily Rochon: Climate and Energy Campaigner at Greenpeace International, Dr Erika Bjureby Previously: lecturer in political ecology, Uppsala University. Currently: researcher, Greenpeace International, Dr Paul Johnston is principal scientist at the Greenpeace Research Laboratories and Head of the Science Unit for Greenpeace International. Paul set up the Greenpeace Research Laboratories at London's Queen Mary College in 1987. He has continued as the principal scientist since the group relocated to the University of Exeter in 1992, David Santillo: Honorary Research Fellow (Greenpeace) David obtained a degree in marine and freshwater biology in 1989, and a PhD in marine microbial ecology in 1993, both from the University of London, before continuing with postdoctoral research into nutrient pollution in the Adriatic Sea. A senior scientist, David joined the Greenpeace Research Laboratories in 1994, and now has almost 15 years experience in organic analytical chemistry and development of policies for environmental protection, Dr. Gabriela von Goerne is Climate Campaigner at Greenpeace Germany . She holds a university degree and a PhD in geology, May 2008, “ False Hope Why carbon capture and storage won’t save the climate”, http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/Global/usa/report/2008/5/false-hope-why-carbon-capture.pdf) SRK Every decision made about new power plants today will influence the energy mix of the next 30-40 years. The urgency of the climate crisis means solutions must be ready for large-scale deployment in the short-term. CCS simply cannot deliver in time. While some system components of CCS are already in commercial use – mostly in the oil and gas industry- “there is no operational experience with carbon capture from coal plants and certainly not with an integrated sequestration operation”.78 While plans for demonstration facilities are underway, it is believed that the earliest CCS might become feasible is 2030.79 The UNDP concludes that CCS “will arrive on the battlefield far too late to help the world avoid dangerous climate change.”80 “Capture ready” power stations Proponents of CCS circumvent the fact that the technology is not ready, by proposing to build “capture ready” power stations. This term refers not to a particular type of technology but more a state of being for a power station. While there is no strict definition of “capture ready”, the IEA describes a capture ready plant as “[one] which can be retrofitted with

CO2 capture when the necessary regulatory or economic drivers are in place.”81 This is sufficiently broad to make any station theoretically capture ready, and the term meaningless. The concept of “capture ready” power stations allows new coal-fired power stations to be built today while providing no guarantee that emissions will be mitigated in the future. In lieu of delivering a concrete solution to fighting climate change, it banks on the promise of an unproven technology and risks locking us into an energy future that fails to protect the climate. In the UK, for example, a proposed new coal-fired power plant at Kingsnorth, Kent is being sold as “capture ready.” Yet this doesn’t mean that the new plant will be able to capture and store carbon; it will just be ready to incorporate CCS should the technology ever become viable in the future; and no-one has any idea if and when this might be. In the meantime, and possibly for its entire lifetime, Kingsnorth (if built) will pump out around 8 million tonnes of CO2 per year, an amount equivalent to the total annual CO2 emissions of Ghana.82 Recent project cancellations highlight some of the technical and economic concerns tied to CCS. In 2007, at least 11 CCS projects were scrapped; plans for new projects stagnated; and the pace of development for existing projects slowed considerably.83 Most recently, the US DOE pulled out of its flagship CCS project, FutureGen, citing cost concerns (see “US abandons CCS flagship programme”, page 34). Delays and cost over- runs have also led to project cancellations in the UK, Canada, and Norway. The vote of no confidence that CCS received in a survey of 1000 “climate decision-makers and influencers” from around the world is also significant. The survey, conducted by GlobeScan, the World Conservation Union, IUCN and the World Bank, reveals substantial doubt about CCS. Only 34% of those polled were confident that retrofitting clean coal technology could reduce CO2 emissions over the next 25 years without unacceptable side effects, and only 36% in the ability of ‘clean coal technology’ to deliver low carbon energy with new power stations. In contrast, 74% expressed confidence in the ability of solar hot water to deliver, 62% for offshore wind farms, 60% for onshore wind farms, and 51% for combined heat and power plants.84 “Capture ready” or not, a coal-fired power station built today aggravates the climate crisis. Maintaining the status quo in the hope that CCS might some day be able to deliver is not a climate mitigation strategy. Emission reduction potential Even if CCS were ready, the IPCC notes that deployment would only take place if the appropriate subsidy mechanisms and policy drivers (including a price on carbon) were put in place. As a result, it estimates that the bulk of the technology’s adoption would not happen until the second half of this century.85 Assuming that commercial viability is reached, scenario studies indicate that by 2050 only 20-40% of global fossil fuel CO2 emissions could be technically suitable for capture86. This includes 30-60% of emissions from the power sector.87 Therefore up to 70% of emissions from electricity generation in 2050 may not even be technically suited to CCS. Furthermore, this figure does not account for the fact that power stations will often be far away from storage sites. In Australia, CCS would lead, at best, to a 9% emissions reduction in 2030 and a cumulative emissions reduction from 2005 to -Sydney-Wollongong area of New South Wales and at Port Augusta in South Australia, which together produce about 39% of Australia’s current net CO2 emissions from electricity generation, there are no identified storage sites within 500 km of the coal-fired power stations.89 In comparison, a modest improvement in energy efficiency could – at zero or even negative cost – decrease emissions in 2030 by about the same amount, and cumulative emissions by twice as much.90 Climate scientists warn global emissions must peak by 2015, just seven years away. CCS is unable to deliver the necessary greenhouse gas emission reductions to meet this goal.

Earthquakes turn case – CCS causes earthquakes which pop the sealZoback and Gorelick 6/18 ( Mark D. Zoback is the Benjamin M. Page Professor at the Stanford Department of Geophysics, Steven Gorelick is the Cyrus F. Tolman Professor in the Department of Environmental Earth System Science at Stanford, “ Earthquake triggering and large-scale geologic storage of carbon dioxide”,http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/06/13/1202473109.full.pdf) SRK Many CCS research projects are cur- rently underway around the world. Much of this work involves characterization and testing of potential storage formations and includes a number of small-scale pilot in- jection projects. Because the storage ca- pacity/pressure build-up issue is critical to assess the potential for triggered seismicity, small-scale pilot injection projects do not reflect how pressures are likely to change (increase) once full-scale injection is imple- mented. Moreover, even though limitations on pressure build-up are among the many factors that are evaluated when potential formations are considered as sequestration sites, this is usually done in the context of not allowing pressures to exceed the pres- sure at which hydraulic fractures would be initiated in the storage formation or cap- rock. In the context of a critically stressed crust, slip on preexisting, unidentified faults could trigger small- to moderate-sized earthquakes at pressures far below that at which hydraulic fractures would

form. As mentioned above, sequences of small to moderate earthquakes were apparently induced by injection of waste water near Guy, Arkansas, Trinidad, Colorado, and Youngstown, Ohio in 2011 and on the Dallas-Ft. Worth airport, Texas. Although these earthquakes were widely felt, they caused no injury, and only the Trinidad earthquake resulted in any significant damage. However, had similar earthquakes been triggered at sites where CO2 was being injected, the impacts would have raised pressing and important questions: Had the seal been breached? Was it still safe to leave previously injected CO2 in place? In summary, multiple lines of evidence indicate that preexisting faults found in brittle rocks almost everywhere in the earth’s crust are subject to failure, often in response to very small increases in pore pressure. In light of the risk posed to a CO2 repository by even small- to moderate-sized earthquakes, formations suitable for large-scale injection of CO2 must be carefully chosen. In addition to being well sealed by impermeable over- laying strata, they should also be weakly cemented (so as not to fail through brittle faulting) and porous, permeable, and laterally extensive to accommodate large volumes of CO2 with minimal pressure increases. Thus, the issue is not whether CO2 can be safely stored at a given site; the issue is whether the capacity exists for sufficient volumes of CO2 to be stored geologically for it to have the desired beneficial effect on climate change. In this context, it must be recognized that large-scale CCS will be an extremely ex- pensive and risky strategy for achieving significant reductions in greenhousegas emissions.

Climate change is completely natural and the world is cooling – historical cycle, satellite data, ocean oscillation, and sunspots proveFerrara 12 (Peter Ferrara, Director of Entitlement and Budget Policy for the Heartland Institute, General Counsel for the American Civil Rights Union, and Senior Fellow at the National Center for Policy Analysis, he served in the White House Office of Policy Development under President Reagan, and as Associate Deputy Attorney General of the United States under President George H.W. Bush, he is a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School, 5/31/12, “Sorry Global Warming Alarmists, The Earth Is Cooling” www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2012/05/31/sorry-global-warming-alarmists-the-earth-is-cooling/2/) Check out the 20th century temperature record, and you will find that its up and down pattern does not follow the industrial revolution’s upward march of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), which is the supposed central culprit for man caused global warming (and has been much, much higher in the past). It follows instead the up and down pattern of naturally caused climate cycles. For example, temperatures dropped steadily from the late 1940s to the late 1970s. The popular press was even talking about a coming ice age. Ice ages have cyclically occurred roughly every 10,000 years, with a new one actually due around now. In the late 1970s, the natural cycles turned warm and temperatures rose until the late 1990s, a trend that political and economic interests have tried to milk mercilessly to their advantage. The incorruptible satellite measured global atmospheric temperatures show less warming during this period than the heavily manipulated land surface temperatures. Central to these natural cycles is the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO). Every 25 to 30 years the oceans undergo a natural cycle where the colder water below churns to replace the warmer water at the surface, and that affects global temperatures by the fractions of a degree we have seen. The PDO was cold from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, and it was warm from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, similar to the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO). In 2000, the UN’s IPCC predicted that global temperatures would rise by 1 degree Celsius by 2010. Was that based on climate science, or political science to scare the public into accepting costly anti-industrial regulations and taxes? Don Easterbrook, Professor Emeritus of Geology at Western Washington University, knew the answer. He publicly predicted in 2000 that global temperatures would decline by 2010. He made that prediction because he knew the PDO had turned cold in 1999, something the political scientists at the UN’s IPCC did not know or did not think significant. Well, the results are in, and the winner is….Don Easterbrook. Easterbrook also spoke at the Heartland conference, with a presentation entitled “Are Forecasts of a 20-Year Cooling Trend Credible?” Watch that online and you will see how scientists are supposed to talk: cool, rational, logical analysis of the data, and full explanation of it. All I ever see from the global warming alarmists, by contrast, is political public relations, personal attacks, ad hominem arguments, and name calling, combined with admissions that they can’t defend their views in public debate. Easterbrook shows that by 2010 the 2000 prediction of the IPCC was wrong by well over a degree, and the gap was widening. That’s a big miss for a forecast just 10 years away, when the same folks expect us to take seriously their predictions for 100 years in the future. Howard Hayden, Professor of Physics Emeritus at the University of Connecticut showed in his presentation at the conference that based on the historical record a doubling of CO2 could be expected to produce a 2 degree C temperature increase. Such a doubling would take most of this century, and the temperature impact of increased concentrations of CO2 declines logarithmically. You can see Hayden’s presentation online as well. Because PDO cycles last 25 to 30 years, Easterbrook expects the cooling trend to continue for another 2 decades or

so. Easterbrook, in fact, documents 40 such alternating periods of warming and cooling over the past 500 years, with similar data going back 15,000 years. He further expects the flipping of the ADO to add to the current downward trend. But that is not all. We are also currently experiencing a surprisingly long period with very low sunspot activity. That is associated in the earth’s history with even lower, colder temperatures. The pattern was seen during a period known as the Dalton Minimum from 1790 to 1830, which saw temperature readings decline by 2 degrees in a 20 year period, and the noted Year Without A Summer in 1816 (which may have had other contributing short term causes). Even worse was the period known as the Maunder Minimum from 1645 to 1715, which saw only about 50 sunspots during one 30 year period within the cycle, compared to a typical 40,000 to 50,000 sunspots during such periods in modern times. The Maunder Minimum coincided with the coldest part of the Little Ice Age, which the earth suffered from about 1350 to 1850. The Maunder Minimum saw sharply reduced agricultural output, and widespread human suffering, disease and premature death. Such impacts of the sun on the earth’s climate were discussed at the conference by astrophysicist and geoscientist Willie Soon, Nir J. Shaviv, of the Racah Institute of Physics in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Sebastian Luning, co-author with leading German environmentalist Fritz Vahrenholt of The Cold Sun. Easterbrook suggests that the outstanding question is only how cold this present cold cycle will get. Will it be modest like the cooling from the late 1940s to late 1970s? Or will the paucity of sunspots drive us all the way down to the Dalton Minimum, or even the Maunder Minimum? He says it is impossible to know now. But based on experience, he will probably know before the UN and its politicized IPCC.

Even if climate change is real, it doesn’t cause extinction.Sherwood, Keith, and Craig Idso et al 2012 (Craig, PhD in geography @Arizona State, M.S. in Agronomy from U Nebraska) Plant Responses to Significant and Rapid Global Warming http://co2science.org/articles/V15/N24/EDIT.phpIn an impressive and enlightening review of the subject, Willis and MacDonald (2011) begin by noting that key research efforts have focused on extinction scenarios derived from "a suite of predictive species distribution models (e.g., Guisan and Thuiller, 2005)" - which are most often referred to as bioclimatic envelope models - that "predict current and future range shifts and estimate the distances and rates of movement required for species to track the changes in climate and move into suitable new climate space." And they write that one of the most-cited studies of this type - that of Thomas et al. (2004) - "predicts that, on the basis of mid-range climatic warming scenarios for 2050, up to 37% of plant species globally will be committed to extinction owing to lack of suitable climate space." In contrast, the two researchers say that "biotic adaptation to climate change has been considered much less frequently." This phenomenon - which is sometimes referred to as evolutionary resilience - they describe as "the ability of populations to persist in their current location and to undergo evolutionary adaptation in response to changing environmental conditions (Sgro et al., 2010)." And they note that this approach to the subject "recognizes that ongoing change is the norm in nature and one of the dynamic processes that generates and maintains biodiversity patterns and processes," citing MacDonald et al. (2008) and Willis et al. (2009). The aim of Willis and MacDonald's review, therefore, was to examine the effects of significant and rapid warming on earth's plants during several previous intervals of the planet's climatic history that were as warm as, or even warmer than, what climate alarmists typically predict for the next century. These intervals included the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, the Eocene climatic optimum, the mid-Pliocene warm interval, the Eemian interglacial, and the Holocene. And it is important to note that this approach, in contrast to the approach typically used by climate alarmists, relies on empirical (as opposed to theoretical) data-based (as opposed to model-based), reconstructions (as opposed to projections) of the past (as opposed to the future). And what were the primary findings of the two researchers? As they describe them, in their own words, "persistence and range shifts (migrations) seem to have been the predominant terrestrial biotic response (mainly of plants) to warmer intervals in Earth's history," while "the same responses also appear to have occurred during intervals of rapid climate change." In addition, they make a strong point of noting that "evidence for global extinctions or extinctions resulting from reduction of population sizes on the scale predicted for the next century owing to loss of suitable climate space (Thomas et al., 2004) is not apparent." In fact, they state that sometimes an actual increase in local biodiversity is observed, the case for which we lay out in Section II (Physiological Reasons for Rejecting the CO2-Induced Global Warming Extinction Hypothesis) of our Major Report The Specter of Species Extinction: Will Global Warming Decimate Earth's Biosphere? Read it and rejoice!

-2NC Ext Infeasible/Leakagehttp://blogs.crikey.com.au/rooted/2011/05/20/ccs-is-doomed-yet-weve-pumped-millions-in-to-it/

Infeasible Bryce ’10 ( Robert Bryce is an American author and journalist. His articles on energy, politics, and other topics have appeared in numerous publications, including the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Counterpunch, and Atlantic Monthly. May 12, 2010, “ A Bad Bet on Carbon”, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/opinion/13bryce.html?_r=1) SRKThe third, and most vexing, problem has to do with scale. In 2009, carbon dioxide emissions in the United States totaled 5.4 billion tons. Let’s assume that policymakers want to use carbon capture to get rid of half of those emissions — say, 3 billion tons per year. That works out to about 8.2 million tons of carbon dioxide per day, which would have to be collected and compressed to about 1,000 pounds per square inch (that compressed volume of carbon dioxide would be roughly equivalent to the volume of daily global oil production). In other words, we would need to find an underground location (or locations) able to swallow a volume equal to the contents of 41 oil supertankers each day, 365 days a year. There will also be considerable public resistance to carbon dioxide pipelines and sequestration projects — local outcry has already stalled proposed carbon capture projects in Germany and Denmark. The fact is, few landowners are eager to have pipelines built across their property. And because of the possibility of deadly leaks, few people will to want to live near a pipeline or an underground storage cavern. This leads to the obvious question: which members of the House and Senate are going to volunteer their states to be dumping grounds for all that carbon dioxide?

InfeasibleRomm 11 ( JOE ROMM is a Fellow at American Progress and is the editor of Climate Progress, which New York Times columnist Tom Friedman called "the indispensable blog" and Time magazine named one of the 25 "Best Blogs of 2010." In 2009, Rolling Stone put Romm #88 on its list of 100 "people who are reinventing America." Time named him a "Hero of the Environment″ and “The Web’s most influential climate-change blogger." Romm was acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, where he oversaw $1 billion in R&D, demonstration, and deployment of low-carbon technology. He is a Senior Fellow at American Progress and holds a Ph.D. in physics from MIT, Nov 26, 2011, “ Large-Scale Carbon Capture and Storage: Feasibility, Permanence and Safety Issues Remain Unresolved”, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/11/26/376257/carbon-capture-and-storage-permanence-feasibility-and-safety-issues/) SRK The problem for carbon capture and storage is that, as one of the commenters points out, “every time we hear of another CCS experiment, we hear a few years later that it was discontinued, usually due to the high price”. Pretty much every major CCS project relevant to large-scale deployment at coal plants has been scaled back, delayed, or cancelled entirely recently. This includes Futuregen 2.0, a big American CCS project, “which was long seen as the nation’s best hope for taking a worldwide lead in developing ways to capture and bury carbon dioxide from coal burning”. But as the New York Times reported earlier this month: “Ameren, the Midwestern power company that was to be the host for the project, has told its partners that because of its financial situation, it cannot take part as promised … Ernest J. Moniz, a professor of physics at MIT and former under secretary of energy who wrote a pivotal 2007 report calling for the prompt demonstration of carbon capture technologies, said: ‘It’s only more true four years later—we can’t get one going, but we actually need more than one.’” That echoes Howard Herzog of MIT’s Laboratory for Energy and the Environment, who said in February 2008 after Futuregen 1.0 was scuttled: “How can we expect to build hundreds of these plants when we’re having so much trouble building the first one?” And then we would have the issue of whether we can “be dependent on” CCS. The problems with depending on CCS are multifold. Let’s start with permanence and transparency. If the Russian government said it was sequestering 100m tons of CO2 in the ground permanently, and wanted other countries to pay it billions of dollars to do so, would anyone trust it? No. The potential for fraud and bribery are simply too enormous. But would anyone trust China? Would anyone trust an American utility, for that matter? We need to set up some sort of international

regime for certifying, monitoring, verifying and inspecting geologic repositories of carbon—like the UN weapons inspections systems. The problem is, America has not been able to certify a single storage facility for high-level radioactive waste after two decades of trying and nobody knows how to monitor and verify underground CO2 storage. It could take a decade just to set up this system. We haven’t even started. Then we have the leakage issue. Even a very small leakage rate of well under 1% a year would render the storage system all but useless as a “permanent repository”. Equally worrisome, a Duke University study found: “Leaks from carbon dioxide injected deep underground to help fight climate change could bubble up into drinking water aquifers near the surface, driving up levels of contaminants in the water tenfold or more in some places.” What kind of contaminants could bubble up into drinking water aquifers? The study noted: “Potentially dangerous uranium and barium increased throughout the entire experiment in some samples.” This problem may not turn out to be fatal to CCS, but it might well limit the places where sequestration is practical—either because the geology is problematic or because the site is simply too close to the water supply of a large population. Public acceptance (aka NIMBY) has already been a huge problem for CCS. Public concern about CO2 leaks—small and large—has impeded a number of CCS projects around the world. The concerns should be taken seriously, as BusinessWeek reported in 2008: “One large, coal-fired plant generates the equivalent of 3 billion barrels of CO2 over a 60-year lifetime. That would require a space the size of a major oil field to contain. The pressure could cause leaks or earthquakes, says Curt M. White, who ran the US Energy Department’s carbon sequestration group until 2005 and served as an adviser until earlier this year. ‘Red flags should be going up everywhere when you talk about this amount of liquid being put underground.’” And concerns about earthquakes should be taken seriously, as a Stanford University report warned in December 2010: “Combating global warming by pumping carbon dioxide into the ground for long-term storage—known as carbon sequestration—could trigger small earthquakes that might breach the storage system, allowing the gas back into the atmosphere, according to Stanford geophysicist Mark Zoback. That hazard, combined with a need for thousands of injection sites around the globe, may keep sequestration from being as feasible on a large scale as some have hoped.” There are simply too many unanswered questions for anyone to say today that we could rely on large-scale deployment of CCS in the 2030s as a major climate solution.

-2NC Doesn’t solve warming

Only lowers CO2 levels by .5 degrees Celsius Torvanger and Skeie 09 (Asbjørn Torvanger, Ragnhild B. Skeie are climate researchers for the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, April 2008, The scenarios analyzed in this report show that large-scale deployment of carbon capture and storage technologies for all new coal-fired power plants from year 2015 onwards can reduce global CO2 emissions by 8-18% by 2030 and 22-25% by 2100 compared to the reference scenario. The global reference emission scenarios include both energy-related CO2 emissions and emissions due to land-use change and forestry. Compared to the reference scenario global warming by end of this century is reduced by 0.5°C, which is about 10% less warming from pre-industrial level. These CCS scenarios are illustrations only, and are sensitive to the climate sensitivity and the business-as-usual scenarios chosen, both for total CO2 emissions and for power production based on coal. Since no cost calculations are inluded in the analysis the realism of the CCS scenarios chosen as part of a wider climate strategy has not been assessed.

Leadership

1. There is no correlation between hegemony and environmental politicsFalkner 05 ( ROBERT FALKNER, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics, 2005, “ American Hegemony and the Global Environment”, http://personal.lse.ac.uk/falkner/_private/2005%20isr%20-%20american%20hegemony.pdf)Throughout the history of international environmental politics, the United States has played an active role in the creation and design of international regimes and has used its power to pursue its preferred policy objectives. To be sure, US hegemony has not translated into international policy outcomes in a straightforward manner. Nor has US foreign environmental policy been consistent over time in terms of its overall direction. Depending on the environmental issue that is the focus of attention and its broader international context, America’s hegemony has formed the basis for both international leadership and veto power in environmental regime formation. There is, thus, no simple correlation between the US position in the international system and its environmental objectives. As will be argued below, the influence of competing domestic interest groups and the fragmented nature of the foreign policy system in the United States are largely responsible for the considerable variation in US foreign environmental policy over time and across issue areas.

2. Implementing CCS wouldn’t establish primacy – China, India already starting CCS tech that’s their Sussman evidence.

3. US hegemony is high now – economic and military indicators prove.Kagan 12 (Robert, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution and a columnist for The Washington Post, The New Republic, “Not Fade Away: The Myth of American Decline,” http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?page=0,1)The answer is no. Let’s start with the basic indicators. In economic terms, and even despite the current years of recession and slow growth, America’s position in the world has not changed. Its share of the world’s GDP has held remarkably steady, not only over the past decade but over the past four decades. In 1969, the United States produced roughly a quarter of the world’s economic output. Today it still produces roughly a quarter, and it remains not only the largest but also the richest economy in the world. People are rightly mesmerized by the rise of China, India, and other Asian nations whose share of the global economy has been climbing steadily, but this has so far come almost entirely at the expense of Europe and Japan, which have had a declining share of the global economy. Optimists about China’s development predict that it will overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world sometime in the next two decades. This could mean that the United States will face an increasing challenge to its economic position in the future. But the sheer size of an economy is not by itself a good measure of overall power within the international system. If it were, then early nineteenth-century China, with what was then the world’s largest economy, would have been the predominant power instead of the prostrate victim of smaller European nations. Even if China does reach this pinnacle again—and Chinese leaders face significant obstacles to sustaining the country’s growth indefinitely—it will still remain far behind both the United States and Europe in terms of per capita GDP. Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, “military strength underpins hegemony.” Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline in America’s relative military capacity—at least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined. (This figure does not include the deployment in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which are likely to diminish steadily over the next couple of years.) They do so, moreover, while consuming a little less than 4 percent of GDP annually—a higher percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms lower than the 10 percent of GDP that the United States spent on defense in the mid-1950s and the 7 percent it spent in the late 1980s. The superior expenditures underestimate America’s actual superiority in military capability. American land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the most experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle. American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world. By these military and economic measures, at least, the United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empire’s relative decline began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height of

its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has not yet arrived.

2NC EXT Heg High

American hegemony is not in decline, but adapting to global changeMead 12 (Walter Russell, professor of foreign affairs and humanities at Bard College, Wall Street Journal. 04/09, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577305531821651026.html, “The Myth Of America’s Decline,” TJ)The world balance of power is changing. Countries like China, India, Turkey and Brazil are heard from more frequently and on a wider range of subjects. The European Union's most ambitious global project—creating a universal treaty to reduce carbon emissions—has collapsed, and EU expansion has slowed to a crawl as Europe turns inward to deal with its debt crisis. Japan has ceded its place as the largest economy in Asia to China and appears increasingly on the defensive in the region as China's hard and soft power grow. The international chattering class has a label for these changes: American decline. The dots look so connectable: The financial crisis, say the pundits, comprehensively demonstrated the failure of "Anglo-Saxon" capitalism. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have sapped American strength and, allegedly, destroyed America's ability to act in the Middle East. China-style "state capitalism" is all the rage. Throw in the assertive new powers and there you have it—the portrait of America in decline. Actually, what's been happening is just as fateful but much more complex. The United States isn't in decline, but it is in the midst of a major rebalancing. The alliances and coalitions America built in the Cold War no longer suffice for the tasks ahead. As a result, under both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, American foreign policy has been moving toward the creation of new, sometimes difficult partnerships as it retools for the tasks ahead. From the 1970s to the start of this decade, the world was in what future historians may call the Trilateral Era. In the early '70s, Americans responded to the defeat in Vietnam and the end of the Bretton Woods era by inviting key European allies and Japan to join in the creation of a trilateral system. Western Europe, Japan and the U.S. accounted for an overwhelming proportion of the international economy in the noncommunist world. With overlapping interests on a range of issues, the trilateral powers were able to set the global agenda on some key questions. Currency policy, the promotion of free trade, integrating the developing world into the global financial system, assisting the transition of Warsaw Pact economies into the Western World—the trilateralists had a lot to show for their efforts. The system worked particularly well for America. Europe and Japan shared a basic commitment to the type of world order that Americans wanted, and so a more cooperative approach to key policy questions enlisted the support of rich and powerful allies for efforts that tallied pretty closely with key long-term American goals. It is this trilateral system—rather than American power per se—that is in decline today. Western Europe and Japan were seen as rising powers in the 1970s, and the assumption was that the trilateral partnership would become more powerful and effective as time passed. Something else happened instead. Demographically and economically, both Japan and Europe stagnated. The free-trade regime and global investment system promoted growth in the rest of Asia more than in Japan. Europe, turning inward to absorb the former Warsaw Pact nations, made the fateful blunder of embracing the euro rather than a more aggressive program of reform in labor markets, subsidies and the like. The result today is that the trilateral partnership can no longer serve as the only or perhaps even the chief set of relationships through which the U.S. can foster a liberal world system. Turkey, increasingly turning away from Europe, is on the road to becoming a more effective force in the Middle East than is the EU. China and India are competing to replace the Europeans as the most important non-U.S. economic actor in Africa. In Latin America, Europe's place as the second most important economic and political partner (after the U.S.) is also increasingly taken by China. The U.S. will still be a leading player, but in a septagonal, not a trilateral, world. In addition to Europe and Japan, China, India, Brazil and Turkey are now on Washington's speed dial. (Russia isn't sure whether it wants to join or sulk; negotiations continue.) New partnerships make for rough sledding. Over the years, the trilateral countries gradually learned how to work with each other—and how to accommodate one another's needs. These days, the Septarchs have to work out a common approach. It won't be easy, and success won't be total. But even in the emerging world order, the U.S. is likely to have much more success in advancing its global agenda than many think. Washington is hardly unique in wanting a liberal world system of open trade, freedom of the seas, enforceable rules of contract and protection for foreign investment. What began as a largely American vision for the post-World War II world will continue to attract support and move forward into the 21st century—and Washington will remain the chairman of a larger board.

Heg will endure – economic and military power and lack of serious adversaries.

Lieber 11 (Robert J., Department of Government, Georgetown University, 8-25-2011, Journal of Strategic Studies 34:4, “Staying Power and the American Future: Problems of Primacy, Policy, and Grand Strategy,” Taylor and Francis Group, p. 527)Because of the enormous margin of power the US possessed after the end of the Cold War, it should be able to withstand erosion in its relative strength for some time to come without losing its predominant status. While it is true that the weight of important regional powers has increased, many of these are allied or friendly. Those that are not (Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela) do not by themselves constitute serious balancing against the United States and its allies. Russia occupies an intermediate position, at times acting as a spoiler, but not an outright adversary. China presents a potentially more formidable challenge, notably through its growing economic might and in rapid expansion of its military, but has not yet sought to become a true peer competitor. In any case, and despite the burden of a decade of war in the Near East, America continues to possess significant advantages in critical sectors such as economic size, technology, competitiveness, demographics, force size, power projection, military technology, and even in learning how to carry out effective counterinsurgency, and thus retains the capacity to meet key objectives.

Heg is high – no decline coming soonWolf 11 – (Charles, April 13 2011, PhD from Harvard, senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution, member of the advisory board of the Center for International Business and Economic Research at UCLA's Anderson Graduate School of Business, WSJ, “The Facts About American 'Decline'”, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704415104576251292725228886.html,) TJ It's fashionable among academics and pundits to proclaim that the U.S. is in decline and no longer No. 1 in the world. The declinists say they are realists. In fact, their alarm is unrealistic. Early declinists like Yale historian Paul Kennedy focused in the 1980s on the allegedly debilitating effects of America's "imperial overstretch." More recently, historians Niall Ferguson and Martin Jacques focus on the weakening of the economy. Among pundits, Paul Krugman and Michael Kinsley on the left and Mark Helprin on the right sound the alarm. The debate involves issues of absolute versus relative decline and concepts like "resilience" and "passivity." Some issues are measurable, like gross domestic product (GDP), military power and demographics. Others are not measurable or less measurable. In absolute terms, the U.S. enjoyed an incline this past decade. Between 2000 and 2010, U.S. GDP increased 21% in constant dollars, despite the shattering setbacks of the Great Recession in 2008-09 and the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001. In 2010, U.S. military spending ($697 billion) was 55% higher than in 2000. And in 2010, the U.S. population was 310 million, an increase of 10% since 2000. The notion that demography is destiny may be a stretch, but demographics are important when, as in the U.S., population increase—due to higher birth and immigration rates than other developed countries—cushions the impact of an aging population. But there were also some important declines relative to the rest of the world. In 2000, U.S. GDP was 61% of the combined GDPs of the other G-20 countries. By 2010, that number dropped to 42%. In 2000, U.S. GDP was slightly more than eight times that of China, but it fell to slightly less than three times in 2010. Japan is a contrasting case: U.S. GDP was twice as large as Japan's in 2000 but 2.6 times as large in 2010, before the tsunami and nuclear disasters of 2011. Between the inclines and declines are other data to be considered. U.S. military spending inclined substantially to more than twice that spent by all non-U.S. NATO members in 2010 from 1.7 times in 2000; to 17 times Russian spending in 2010 from six times in 2000; and to nine times Chinese spending in 2010 from seven times in 2000. Demographically, the U.S. population in 2000 (282 million) was 4.6% of the global population; by 2010, the U.S. population (310 million) had risen to 4.9% of the global figure. The U.S. population was 59% as large as that of the 15-member European Union in 2000; that figure increased to 78% by 2010 (counting only 2000's 15 members) and 62% if we count the 12 new EU members added between 2004 and 2007. The U.S. population grew by 10% more than that of Japan and 13% more than that of Russia between 2000 and 2010. Relative to the huge populations of China and India (1.3 billion and 1.2 billion, respectively), the U.S. population during the past decade increased slightly (0.16%) compared to China and decreased by a similar margin compared to India. What matters more than absolute numbers is the population's composition of prime working-age people versus dependents. Compared to most developed economies and China, the U.S. demographic composition is relatively favorable. So what do all these numbers tell us about decline or incline? Despite the Great Recession, the three crude indicators—GDP, military spending and population growth—show that the U.S. inclined in absolute terms.

Economy

A little bit of increased oil flow doesn’t prevent an economic collapse

Only 10% would be usedBryce ’10 ( Robert Bryce is an American author and journalist. His articles on energy, politics, and other topics have appeared in numerous publications, including the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Counterpunch, and Atlantic Monthly. May 12, 2010, “ A Bad Bet on Carbon”, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/opinion/13bryce.html?_r=1) SRK By contrast, carbon dioxide is a worthless waste product, so taxpayers would likely end up shouldering most of the cost. Yes, some of that waste gas could be used for enhanced oil recovery projects; flooding depleted oil reservoirs with carbon dioxide is a proven technology that can increase production and extend the life of existing oilfields. But the process would be useful in only a limited number of oilfields — probably less than 10 percent of the waste carbon dioxide captured from coal-fired power plants could actually be injected into American oilfields.

EOR is not cost efficient Rochon et al. ’08 ( Emily Rochon: Climate and Energy Campaigner at Greenpeace International, Dr Erika Bjureby Previously: lecturer in political ecology, Uppsala University. Currently: researcher, Greenpeace International, Dr Paul Johnston is principal scientist at the Greenpeace Research Laboratories and Head of the Science Unit for Greenpeace International. Paul set up the Greenpeace Research Laboratories at London's Queen Mary College in 1987. He has continued as the principal scientist since the group relocated to the University of Exeter in 1992, David Santillo: Honorary Research Fellow (Greenpeace) David obtained a degree in marine and freshwater biology in 1989, and a PhD in marine microbial ecology in 1993, both from the University of London, before continuing with postdoctoral research into nutrient pollution in the Adriatic Sea. A senior scientist, David joined the Greenpeace Research Laboratories in 1994, and now has almost 15 years experience in organic analytical chemistry and development of policies for environmental protection, Dr. Gabriela von Goerne is Climate Campaigner at Greenpeace Germany . She holds a university degree and a PhD in geology, May 2008, “ False Hope Why carbon capture and storage won’t save the climate”, http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/Global/usa/report/2008/5/false-hope-why-carbon-capture.pdf) SRK Even if CCS were available, large applications are prohibitively expensive. EOR is often proposed as a way round this. Its proponents argue that the profits from the recovered oil will cover the costs of carbon capture. However, not only are EOR sites too few and far between to accomodate much carbon from widespread CCS operations,1 the cancellation of CCS- EOR projects due to associated costs and low returns show it is not always able to offset the extra costs. In 2005, when production in the British Miller oil and gas field became uneconomic, BP sought government subsidies to initiate an EOR project. With EOR the life of the oil field could have been extended by up to 20 years, delaying the costly decommissioning process and allowing access to an estimated 57 million barrels of currently unrecoverable oil.2 The potential profits from the recovered oil, however, could not make up the difference between the cost of carbon using CCS (€38 per tonne), and the current price of carbon credits (€21 per tonne, in the EU).3 BP tried to convince the UK government to bridge the gap, asking for a tax break of over 50%, and a guaranteed subsidised rate of return. When the UK government decided that all proposed CCS projects had to compete for funding and tax relief, BP cancelled its plans. The Norwegian government abandoned a similar project after the Statoil-Hydro and Shell companies withdrew. The companies argued that although CCS would probably be technically feasible, it would never make economic sense. Building the CCS technology would have meant closing oil production for a year, and completely modifying the facilities. Overall, oil production would only have increased by 2%4 nowhere near enough to cover the costs of installing the CCS technology. EOR is one of the main ways

proposed by industry to make CCS affordable, yet as the above cases highlight, projects are often unlikely to be able to cover the costs. Funding CCS is an extremely unwise investment.

CCS will not be used for carbon storage – it will be used for OIL EXTRACTION which turns the case. Any ev from before 2012 misses key trendsShackley and Dütschke, 12 (Simon Shackley, School of GeoSciences, University of Edinburgh, and Elisabeth Dütschke, Competence Center Energy Technology and Energy Systems, “Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage – not a Silver Bullet to Climate Change, but a Feasible Option?” Energy & Environment, Vol. 23, No. 2 & 3, 2012)So what does all this say about the future for CCS? The contrast between where we are in 2012 and where we need to be in order to get any where near approaching the challenging ambitions of the IEA’s CCS Roadmap, published in 2009, is striking, as Haszeldine’s account demonstrates. There are only three or four large-scale CCS demonstration projects that are now being developed globally (see list in Haszeldine) – a much reduced number compared to the grand expectations of just a few years ago. Yet, technology expectations are typically subject to inflated hopes by early stage enthusiasts and developer-optimism, driven by self- or commercial-interest, is the norm for new technologies. So, in some senses, the new reality for CCS is a more measured, realistic one, less prone to hype and exaggerated expectations. Revenue-generation independent of carbon markets remains a strong driver internationally, of course, and the motives of multi-national firms should be seen from the perspective of perceived opportunity costs. Will oil majors that have conventionally made their money on high-risk, high-reward, very capital-expensive infrastructure projects forego the opportunities from fossil fuel exploration and extraction in favour of a low-revenue CO2 storage project with potential long-term liabilities? This helps to explain the contemporary focus upon CCS-EOR in North America, Middle East and China inter alia. The attraction of enhanced oil extraction in an era of enduring high oil prices can provide a compelling rationale for such a project in a way that CCS for the purposes of carbon storage only cannot. It is for this reason that CCUS – CO2 capture, utilisation and storage - has become an increasingly popular acronym to refer to what used to be plain old CCS. The extent to which CO2 storage and EOR really can be efficiently integrated remains to be seen, however.

Solvency

1. The aff cannot solve because they only create a pipeline and don’t mandate or provide incentives for CCS.

CCS has no market viability – the EU provides incentives AND sets a price and carbon and it still can’t competeShackley and Dütschke, 12 (Simon Shackley, School of GeoSciences, University of Edinburgh, and Elisabeth Dütschke, Competence Center Energy Technology and Energy Systems, “Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage – not a Silver Bullet to Climate Change, but a Feasible Option?” Energy & Environment, Vol. 23, No. 2 & 3, 2012)In the past decade, CCS has migrated therefore from academia and think tanks onto the agendas, policies and RD&D programmes of national and international policymakers [4] and has become part of the strategic decision making of electricitygeneration companies as well as energy-intensive industries. The ‘CCS community’ has grown rapidly and has increasingly come to share some of the characteristics of ‘epistemic communities’ – that is a community of like-minded experts, academics, industry personnel, policy makers and regulators who come to share a similar vision of the need for CCS and of how that vision might be realised [5]. Yet, despite such growing and high levels of momentum behind CCS, events over the last two years have raised some major questions about whether ambitious plans for the rapid roll-out of CCS are in fact credible. Many of the articles in this Special Issue allude to and discuss this new era of slow-down in CCS development, especially in Europe (Christensen et al.) and the UK in particular (see Gough & Mander, Haszeldine, Littlecott) – a country which had initially been amongst the leading CCS nations. Sentiment in Europe matters in all of this because it is one of the few parts of the world where climate and carbon abatement policy has had significant political support – to the extent that large public subsidies have been made available to help fund low carbon energy technologies, mostly renewables but potentially also CCS. So what has gone wrong over the past few years? Our take on the situation in the EU is as follows: • The financial crises of 2008 onwards have massively reduced the readiness of both public and private sectors in the EU to pay for risky large-scale technology projects. Other parts of the world are less committed to spending public monies on CCS projects, either because they have other public policy commitments and spending priorities or because there is insufficient political momentum behind projects which are motivated by climate change / carbon reduction. (North America may appear to be an exception here, but most projects going forwards seem closely tied to CCS-EOR, hence are likely to be profitable investments regardless of CO2 storage). • Within policy and political circles, an apparent earlier consensus around the importance of climate change and the need for deep reduction in carbon emissions has weakened under the stress of the new economic austerity plus the increased realisation that decarbonisation would be expensive, difficult (technically, socio-economically and politically) and not necessarily with apparent up-sides for politicians to talk-up for votes. Support for CCS has been one of the victims of this new ‘climate real politik’. • Public opposition to a number of proposed CCS projects onshore in the EU has flared-up, most notably at Barendrecht in the Netherlands [6] and Beeskow in Germany (Oltra et al., Christensen et al., in this issue; [7]). Strongly motivated local opposition groups were able to activate opposition to projects and politicians appear not to have been willing to expend much political capital on forcing such projects on communities which did not want them.

2. They don’t mandate eminent domain authority or standard interstate regulations which their Zarraby says is vital.

US would never mandateBryce ’10 ( Robert Bryce is an American author and journalist. His articles on energy, politics, and other topics have appeared in numerous publications, including the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Counterpunch, and Atlantic Monthly. May 12, 2010, “ A Bad Bet on Carbon”, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/opinion/13bryce.html?_r=1) SRK Given that the global energy sector is already straining to meet booming demand for electricity, it’s hard to believe that the United States, or any other country that relies on coal-fired generation, will agree to reduce the output of its coal-fired plants by almost a third in order to attempt carbon capture and sequestration.

-2NC Doesn’t lead to CCS

They do not fiat the creation of Carbon Capture and Storage, improbable that companies would voluntarily consent to costly CCS technology. Their Handwerk evidence says and I quote “ expensive CCS operations simply aren't worth the investment without government

mandates or revenue from carbon prices ” . Bryce indicates that the US would never ever mandate CCS because of political interests and the need for more and more energy. In addition, our Shackley and Dütschke indicate that even IF there we’re large incentives, companies wouls still not implement CCS because of the cost and political opposition from all levels.

Their Parker and Folger evidence doesn’t say pipelines would catalize development of CCS just that pipelines and storage sites MIGHT be necessary IN ADDITION to effective CCS technolodgy.

(If they take the card out of the 1AC) The lack of financial incentives has caused the decline of Carbon Capture and Storage technology.Handwerk, 5/22/2012 (Brian, Amid Economic Concerns, Carbon Capture Faces a Hazy Future, National Geographic, p. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/05/120522-carbon-capture-and-storage-economic-hurdles/)Many companies have determined that expensive CCS operations simply aren't worth the investment without

government mandates or revenue from carbon prices set far higher than those currently found at the main operational market, the European Trading System, or other fledgling markets. According to a recent Worldwatch Institute report, only eight large-scale, fully integrated CCS projects are actually operational, and that number has not increased in three years. "In fact, from 2010 to 2011, the number of large-scale CCS plants operating, under construction, or being planned declined," said Matt Lucky, the report's author. Numerous projects in Europe and North America are being scrapped altogether, Lucky added. Last month, TransAlta, the Canadian electricity giant, abandoned plans for a CCS facility at an Alberta coal-burning plant because financial incentives were too

weak to justify costly investment in CCS.

Tradeoff Case TurnRenewable energy nowCuttino 5/16 (Phyllis Cuttino is the director of the Pew Clean Energy Program, 05/16/2012, “ A Bright Future for Renewable Energy”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/phyllis-cuttino/a-bright-future-for-renewable-energy_b_1521445.html) The current market for the renewable energy sector in the United States and around the world is a mix of challenge and opportunity. However, the long-term future of clean energy is bright. According to our recent report, "Who's Winning the Clean Energy Race? 2011 Edition," last year saw record private investments globally. And the United States received more investments for clean energy than any other nation. These investments resulted in record deployment levels -- 83.5 gig watts of clean generating capacity overall, including an unprecedented 30 gig watts of solar. But like other emerging high-technology industries before it, the clean-energy sector is going through a period of profound transition. The industry faces powerful financial and policy cross currents. The most important long-term dynamic in this sector is falling prices. Both wind and solar have experienced sustained and dramatic price declines. Solar module prices dropped 50 percent in 2011. Wind prices were down 10 percent. Lithium-ion batteries used in electric vehicles are down 30 percent over the past three years and fell 14 percent just last year. These price declines are good news for consumers and help explain last year's record deployments. Yet falling prices are putting manufacturers through a period of turmoil in the United States and elsewhere. Many are hard-pressed to make a profit and scrambling to remain viable. A number will fail, just as the more than 100 automakers in the early 20th century were whittled down to only a few American auto producers. This turmoil facing clean energy manufacturers is exacerbated by policy uncertainty in the most established and mature markets. Financial incentives in Europe are being curtailed in the push for budget austerity. In the United States, a variety of initiatives, passed as part of the stimulus package, expired at the end of 2011, and the production tax credit that has guided investors in wind projects is set to conclude at the end of this year. But these challenges will pass, and clean energy will continue its inexorable march forward -- pushing innovation into an energy sector that has not seen much in the way of new technologies for more than 100 years. Renewable power will soon be cost-competitive. Indeed, a range of financial and technical experts expect solar and wind to compete favorably without subsidies of any kind within this decade and perhaps in the next five years. Similarly, U.S. policy uncertainty will not deter other markets from flourishing. China, India, Brazil, and other emerging economies have strong and consistent clean energy policies to encourage private investment in and deployment of clean energy. These are the markets where most of the 2 billion people without modern energy services live and where demand growth will be greatest in the next 20 to 30 years. Clean energy offers African countries, for example, the opportunity to provide electricity to households and communities without transmission wires, just as cell phones allowed that continent to leapfrog landline phones. Residential solar already is the cheapest energy option in many parts of the world. For American policymakers, the question is not whether clean energy will be part of the world's energy future. It is and will be. The question is whether the United States will capitalize on its advantages in clean energy innovation and position itself to use, produce, and sell them to consumers looking for safe, clean, affordable energy options in the future. The hearing this week on the proposed Clean Energy Standard (CES) is an important step. Although the legislation is unlikely to move to the Senate floor for debate, a CES is the type of long-term policy needed in this country.

Trades off with green energyRochon et al. ’08 ( Emily Rochon: Climate and Energy Campaigner at Greenpeace International, Dr Erika Bjureby Previously: lecturer in political ecology, Uppsala University. Currently: researcher, Greenpeace International, Dr Paul Johnston is principal scientist at the Greenpeace Research Laboratories and Head of the Science Unit for Greenpeace International. Paul set up the Greenpeace Research Laboratories at London's Queen Mary College in 1987. He has continued as the principal scientist since the group relocated to the University of Exeter in 1992, David Santillo: Honorary Research Fellow (Greenpeace) David obtained a degree in marine and freshwater biology in 1989, and a PhD in marine microbial ecology in 1993, both from the University of London, before continuing with postdoctoral research into nutrient pollution in the Adriatic Sea. A senior

scientist, David joined the Greenpeace Research Laboratories in 1994, and now has almost 15 years experience in organic analytical chemistry and development of policies for environmental protection, Dr. Gabriela von Goerne is Climate Campaigner at Greenpeace Germany . She holds a university degree and a PhD in geology, May 2008, “ False Hope Why carbon capture and storage won’t save the climate”, http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/Global/usa/report/2008/5/false-hope-why-carbon-capture.pdf) SRK Spending money on CSS is diverting urgent funding away from renewable energy solutions for the climate crisis. Even assuming that at some stage carbon capture becomes technically feasible, commercially viable, capable of long-term storage and environmentally safe, it would still only have a limited impact and would come at a high cost. In contrast, as Greenpeace’s Futu[r]e Investment report shows, investing in a renewable energy future would save US$180 billion annually and cut CO2 emissions in half by 2050.31

Green energy solves global warming ASES 07 ( American Solar Energy Society, January 2007, “ Tackling Climate Change in the U.S.: Potential Carbon Emissions Reductions from Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy by 2030”This special series of papers examines the extent to which energy efficiency and renew- able technologies could potentially reduce U.S. carbon emissions by 2030 in an aggres- sive but achievable scenario. It shows that these technologies have the potential to be on track to achieve between a 60% and 80% reduction below today’s level by 2050, depending on the electricity sources displaced. A national commitment that includes effective policy measures and continued R&D to reduce costs will be needed to fully real- ize these potentials. About 57% of the carbon displacement is provided by energy effi- ciency and 43% by the various renewable technologies. Of the renewables contribution, about one-third is due to wind power, and the rest is roughly evenly divided among the other technologies studied. There are uncertainties associated with the ppotentials estimated in the papers, and, because these were primarily individual technology studies, there is some uncertainty associated with combining them. The results strongly suggest, however, that energy effi- ciency and renewable energy technologies have the potential to provide most, if not all, of the U.S. carbon emissions reductions that will be needed to help limit the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide to 450-500 ppm. We hope this work will convince policy makers to seriously consider the contributions of energy efficiency and renewable tech- nologies for addressing global warming. Because global warming is an environmental crisis of enormous scale, we simply cannot afford to wait any longer to drastically reduce carbon emissions. It certainly makes sense to attack a problem of this magnitude on many fronts. We should continue work on areas such as coal gasification, geologic sequestration of carbon dioxide, cost reduction of renewables, high-efficiency transmission, advanced storage, and development of break- through technologies. We should also continue to improve our analyses.

-2NC UniquenessGreen energy nowUNEP Center 6/2012 (Frankfurt School: UNEP Collaborating Center for Climate & Sustainable Energy Finance, June, 2012, “ Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2012”, http://fs-unep-centre.org/publications/global-trends-renewable-energy-investment-2012) SRK Global investment in renewable power and fuels increased 17% to a new record of $257 billion in 2011. This was more than six times the figure for 2004, and 94% more than the total in 2007, the last year before the acute phase of the world financial crisis.The percentage increase in investment between 2010 and 2011 was smaller than the 37% rise seen between 2009 and 2010, but it took place at a time when the cost of renewable power equipment, particularly solar photovoltaic modules and onshore wind turbines, was falling fast. The percentage growth in dollar investment would have been significantly larger in 2011 if it had not been for this deflation in the costs of PV and wind technology. The spectacular improvement in cost-competitiveness of renewables is explored in depth in Chapter 2. Last year’s increase in investment in renewable energy also took place at a time of uncertainty over economic growth and policy priorities in developed economies – and those issues continue to pose a serious threat in 2012 to the low-carbon transition and hopes of progress towards a “green economy”. Two highlights of 2011 were the performance of solar, and the performance of the US. Wind is the most mature of the “new” renewable power technologies, and has usually been the biggest single sector for investment over recent years. However in 2011, it was out-stripped by solar, which attracted nearly twice as much investment – the first time a gap of anything like this magnitude has opened up for solar over wind.

Greening will happenBrown 10 ( Lester R. Brown is founder and president of Earth Policy Institute in Washington, D.C, 25 Aug 2010, “ A global shift to renewable energy: But will it be fast enough?”, http://grist.org/article/a-global-shift-to-renewable-energy/) SRK This century will also see the electrification of the economy. The transport sector will shift from gasoline-powered automobiles to plug-in gas-electric hybrids, all-electric cars, light rail transit, and high-speed intercity rail. And for long-distance freight, the shift will be from diesel-powered trucks to electrically powered rail freight systems. The movement of people and goods will be powered largely by electricity. In this new energy economy, buildings will rely on renewable electricity almost exclusively for heating, cooling, and lighting. Can we expand renewable energy use fast enough? I think so. Recent trends in the adoption of mobile phones and personal computers give a sense of how quickly new technologies can spread. Once cumulative mobile phone sales reached 1 million units in 1986, the stage was set for explosive growth, and the number of cell phone subscribers doubled in each of the next three years. Over the next 12 years the number doubled every two years. By 2001 there were 961 million cell phones — nearly a 1,000-fold increase in just 15 years. And now there are more than 4 billion cell phone subscribers worldwide.

-2NC Link

CCS just fuels addiction to fossil fuelsSuzuki 7/4 ( David Suzuki is a Japanese-Canadian academic, science broadcaster and environmental activist. Suzuki earned a Ph.D in zoology from the University of Chicago in 1961, and was a professor in the genetics department at the University of British Columbia from 1963 until his retirement in 2001, “ Renewable Energy, Not Carbon Capture and Storage”, https://www.commondreams.org/view/2012/07/04-3) SRK We need to consider many solutions to deal with waste, pollution, and global warming, but not risky and expensive schemes that serve only to enable our continued addiction to fossil fuels. Our best bet is to reduce waste and emissions. And rather than dumping money into schemes like carbon capture and storage, we should invest in renewable energy.

-2NC Turns Case

--Warming

Renewable energy solves warmingRenewable Energy World 07 (Citing analysis released by Greenpeace USA, European Renewable Energy Council (EREC) and other climate and energy advocates, Jan 24, “ Increasing Renewable Energy in U.S. Can Solve Global Warming”, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2007/01/increasing-renewable-energy-in-u-s-can-solve-global-warming-47208) SRK Landmark analysis released by Greenpeace USA, European Renewable Energy Council (EREC) and other climate and energy advocates shows that the United States can indeed address global warming without relying on nuclear power or so-called "clean coal" -- as some in the ongoing energy debate claim. The new report, "Energy Revolution: A Blueprint for Solving Global Warming" details a worldwide energy scenario where nearly 80% of U.S. electricity can be produced by renewable energy sources; where carbon dioxide emissions can be reduced 50% globally and 72% in the U.S. without resorting to an increase in dangerous nuclear power or new coal technologies; and where America's oil use can be cut by more than 50% by 2050 by using much more efficient cars and trucks (potentially plug-in hybrids), increased use of biofuels and a greater reliance on electricity for transportation. The 92-page report, commissioned by the German Aerospace Center, used input on all technologies of the renewable energy industry, including wind turbines, solar photovoltaic panels, biomass power plants, solar thermal collectors, and biofuels, all of which "are rapidly becoming mainstream." "The world cannot afford to stick to the conventional energy development path, relying on fossil fuels, nuclear, and other outdated technologies. Energy efficiency improvements and renewable energy must play leading roles in the world's energy future." -- Arthouros Zervos of the European Renewable Energy Council and John Coequyt of Greenpeace USA

--Environmental Leadership

Even if the plan increases CCS leadership, it doesn’t matter because of decreases in renewable energy investmentBloomberg 1/12 (Jan 12 2012, “ Clean Energy Investment Rises To $260 Billion, Boosted By Solar”, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-12/clean-energy-investment-rises-to-a-record-260-billion-on-solar.html) SRK Renewable energy investment rose 5 percent to a record $260 billion last year driven by a surge in solar developments and increased spending in the U.S., Bloomberg New Energy Finance said. New spending on solar energy jumped 36 percent to $136.6 billion in 2011, outpacing the $74.9 billion put into wind power, the London-based research company said today in a statement. Spending in the U.S. rose by a third to $55.9 billion, surpassing the 1 percent gain in China to $47.4 billion. A jump in photovoltaic installations in the U.S. and Europe overcame a 50 percent decline the price of modules during 2011, said Michael Liebreich, chief executive of New Energy Finance. Falling prices made more developments possible and is bringing closer the date when wind and solar can rival fossil fuels without subsidies, he said. “For every equipment company operating at thin or negative margins, there is an installer who is getting a good deal,” Liebreich said in the statement. “Rumors of the death of clean energy have been greatly exaggerated.” Last year’s growth was the slowest since 2009, when the financial crisis curbed lending to companies of all kinds and investment in renewable energy grew 1 percent. Spending bounced back in 2010, expanding 31 percent to $247 billion, New Energy Finance said. ‘Challenging Year’ This year “looks like being another challenging year, with the European financial crisis continuing to fester and the supply chain working its way out of some fearsome overcapacity,” Liebreich said. Three U.S. solar companies including Solyndra LLC went bankrupt last year, in part because of falling prices triggered by increasing competition from Chinese manufacturers. European nations led by Germany and Italy have reduced guaranteed rates for electricity produced from renewables to keep power prices from surging during the economic slump. U.S. clean energy investment beat China for the first time since 2008, lifted by government support programs for renewable energy, some of which have expired. A remaining incentive, the Production Tax Credit, is due to end at the end of the year.

Cap and Trade

CP Text: The USFG should implement a cap-and-trade system as per our Stavins evidence.

Cap and trade solves warming, leadershipStavins 07 (Robert Stavins, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University National Bureau of Economic Research and Resources for the Future, November 9, 2007, “ ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE WITH A COMPREHENSIVE U.S. CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM”) The need for a domestic U.S. policy that seriously addresses climate change is increasingly apparent. A cap-and-trade system is the best ap- proach for the United States in the short to medium term. Besides providing greater certainty about emissions levels, cap-and-trade offers an easy means of compensating for the inevitably unequal burdens imposed by climate pol- icy; it is straightforward to harmonize with other countries' climate policies; it avoids the current political aversion in the United States to taxes; and it has a history of successful adoption. The system described in this article has several key features. It imposes an upstream cap on CO2 emissions (carbon content measured at the point of fuel extraction, refining, distribution, or importation), with gradual inclusion of other greenhouse gases, to ensure economy-wide coverage while limiting the number of entities to be monitored. It sets a gradual downward trajec- tory of emissions ceilings over time to minimize disruption and allow firms and households time to adapt. It also includes mechanisms to reduce cost uncertainty. These include provisions for banking and borrowing of al- lowances and a cost containment mechanism to protect against price volatility. Initially, half of the program's allowances would be allocated through auctioning and half through free distribution, primarily to those entities most burdened by the policy. This arrangement should help limit potential inequi- ties while bolstering political support. The share distributed for free would be phased out gradually over 25 years. The auctioned allowances would gen- erate revenue that could be used for a variety of worthwhile public purposes. The system would operate at the federal level, eventually asserting supremacy over all regional, state, and local systems, while building on any institutions already developed at those levels. The system would also pro- vide for linkage with international emission reduction credit arrangements, harmonization over time with effective cap-and-trade systems in other coun- tries, and appropriate linkage with other actions taken abroad to maintain a level playing field between imports and competing domestic products. To address potential market failures that might render the system's price signals ineffective, certain complementary policies should be implemented, for ex- ample in the areas of consumer information and research and development. Like other market-based emissions reduction schemes, the one de- scribed here reduces compliance costs by offering regulated entities flexibil- ity. Rather than mandating specific measures on all sources, it allows emissions to be reduced however, wherever, and, to some extent, whenever they are least costly. To illustrate the potential cost savings, I have reported empirical cost estimates for two hypothetical trajectories for emissions caps. The first stabilizes CO2 emissions at their 2008 level by 2050, whereas the second reduces emissions from their 2008 level to 50% below the 1990 level by 2050. Both are consistent with the often cited global goal of stabilizing CO2 atmospheric concentrations at between 450 and 550 ppm, provided all countries take commensurate action. The analysis found significant but af- fordable impacts on GDP levels under both trajectories: generally below 0.5% a year for the less aggressive trajectory, ranging up to 1% a year for the more aggressive one. The impact of any U.S. policy will ultimately depend on the actions of other nations around the world. Without an effective global climate agree- ment, each country's optimal strategy is to free-ride on the actions of others. But if all countries do this, nothing will be accomplished, and the result will be the infamous tragedy of the commons. A cooperative solution - one that is scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically pragmatic - must remain the ultimate goal. Given these realities, a major strategic consideration in initiating a U.S. climate policy should be to establish inter- national credibility. The cap-and-trade system described and assessed in this article offers a way for the United States to demonstrate its commitment to an international solution while making its own real contribution to address- ing climate change. Getting serious about greenhouse gas emissions will not be cheap and it will not be easy. But if the current state-of-the-science predictions about the consequences of another few decades of inaction are correct, the time has arrived for a serious and sensible approach.

-2NC Solves Economy

Solves the economyTercek 09 ( Mark Tercek, President and CEO, The Nature Conservancy, March 19, 2009, “ Cap and Trade's Economic Impact”, http://www.cfr.org/united-states/cap-trades-economic-impact/p18738) SRK Contrary to what may be a developing strain of conventional wisdom, strong policies to reduce climate emissions, such as a market-based cap on U.S. greenhouse emissions (also known as "cap and trade"), can provide a form of stimulus to the U.S. economy. As during the Great Depression and other recessions, the U.S. economy is suffering from a shortfall in aggregate demand -- the collective willingness of American consumers and businesses to buy goods and services. Just one example: New car sales have fallen from roughly 17 million vehicles per year just a few years ago to just over half that number today. This phenomenon ripples throughout the economy and builds on itself. What is needed is a strong shock to the system--just the sort of shock that the president's recovery package was intended to administer. That shock may be short-lived, however, unless there is a strong sustained basis for continued investment. As the 1930s came to a close, it was World War II that finally provided that function, with the war effort driving up demand for goods and services. Today, by driving private investment in zero- and low-carbon technologies and boots-on-the-ground conservation efforts to reduce net carbon emissions, a national market-based cap on carbon that tightens over time can act as a long-term driver for demand. A cap-and-trade system will not only lower emissions and fight climate change, but also will stimulate the economy. In the short run, it will spur investment and create jobs; in the long run, it will accelerate the deployment of a new productive generation of capital stock. One element that should not be neglected is our nation's natural capital. The administration has prudently suggested that a portion of money generated from the sale of carbon allowances under a cap-and-trade system should go toward critical conservation projects that will ensure our natural resources survive the impacts of climate change. Such investments will not only protect our natural resources, but contribute to generating jobs and income through fisheries, forestry, agriculture, recreation, and other industries that rely on healthy productive lands and waters.

-2NC Trick

If the plan is the best option to solve warming – the CP results in the planWRI 07 (World Resources Institute, 14 September 2007, ‘The Future of Coal under a Carbon Cap and Trade Regime’, http://pdf.wri.org/20070914_submission_houseeigw.pdf) SRK A carbon cap and trade regime will be a critical first step in driving development and deployment of CCS technologies at the scale necessary to avoid catastrophic climate change. By creating a price for carbon, a cap and trade regime will provide incentives for industry to invest in low carbon technologies. It will also help the Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, and other key institutions prioritize their work plans more effectively. However, even the most robust legislative proposals for cap and trade offered today will not be sufficient to drive large-scale investment in CCS over the first decade or so. Estimated carbon prices under such proposals are too low to offset the high capture costs that exist today.

Politics Link

Congress doesn’t support CCSCBO, June [2012, “Federal Efforts to Reduce the Cost of Capturing and Storing Carbon Dioxide” Congressional Office of the United States, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43357-06-28CarbonCapture.pdf]

Reduce or Eliminate DOE’s Support for CCS Given the limits on DOE’s ability to lower the costs of CCS through its currently planned activities, lawmakers could substantially reduce or discontinue funding for both developing and demonstrating the technology. If little coal-fired generation capacity was being built in the United States, lawmakers might decide that the develop- ment of technologies such as CCS would have little effect on either reducing CO2 emissions or preserving the nation’s ability to use coal-fired power plants in the future. Moreover, even if DOE’s cost reduction target was attained, coal-fired plants with CCS would not be com- petitive with plants that lacked the technology unless policies were adopted that imposed costs on carbon emissions. Scaling back or eliminating the CCS programs would reduce the need for future annual appropriations for those activities. Moreover, eliminating larger-scale technology demonstration projects would reduce DOE’s involvement in fields in which the agency has a mixed track record and in which U.S. industry is generally not poised to follow up with subsequent investment. An option that would reduce or discontinue support for CCS would not necessarily apply to the funding already provided for demonstration projects, however. Much of that money has been obligated (that is, legally committed for some purpose that will result in outlays) but not yet spent, and because of the CCS-equipped demonstration plants that have been canceled or put on hold, a great deal of it may never be spent. The eventual disposition of those obligated but unspent funds is currently unknown. Because DOE has signed agreements with several private investors to help pay for the five large-scale demonstra- tion plants that are still being built or that are planned to be built, spending for CCS could not be eliminated immediately. In addition, because of existing agreements, DOE might bear some shutdown costs if its support of those plants was terminated or reduced.

Congress won’t like the plan – they prioritize more immediate concernsIRGC, 2009 [Geneva, 2009, International Risk Governance Council, “Power plant CO2 capture technologies Risks and risk governance deficits” http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/Power_Plant_CO2_Capture_CN.pdf]

This deficit has to do with “a tendency to ignore long-term risks and costs relative to the day-to-day needs that seem to be – and sometimes are – urgent” [IRGC 2009]. This deficit arguably applies to climate change mitigation measures in general, not solely to power plant CO2 capture systems. Symptomatic of this deficit, however, is the relatively slow pace of progress in demonstrating the viability of capture and storage in full-scale power plant applications – a need that has been recognised and widely promoted by governments, as well as industry, for many years, but which nevertheless remains elusive. For example, current timetables in the EU envision up to twelve such demonstrations within the next five years, but the financing of such projects is contingent on income from a carbon pricing policy that has yet to be implemented. In the US, promises of government funding for large-scale projects are often contingent on annual appropriations by the US Congress, which may or may not materialise. Immediate concerns often slow or prevent actions to address longer-term issues and risks.

The plan is unpopular. Support for CCS has dried upShackley and Dütschke, 12 (Simon Shackley, School of GeoSciences, University of Edinburgh, and Elisabeth Dütschke, Competence Center Energy Technology and Energy Systems, “Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage – not a Silver Bullet to Climate Change, but a Feasible Option?” Energy & Environment, Vol. 23, No. 2 & 3, 2012)• Within policy and political circles, an apparent earlier consensus around the importance of climate change and the need for deep reduction in carbon emissions has weakened under the stress of the new economic austerity plus the increased realisation that decarbonisation would be expensive, difficult (technically, socio-economically and politically) and not necessarily with apparent up-sides for politicians to talk-up for votes. Support for CCS has been one of the victims of this new ‘climate real politik’.

Spending Link

Plan would end up costing $5.1 trillionTsouris and Aaron ’10 (Costas Tsouris and Douglas Aaron are at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Georgia Institute of Technology, US, September 2010, “ Do we really need carbon capture and storage?”, http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/Issues/2010/September/DoWeReallyNeedCarbonCaptureStorage.asp) SRK Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a possible technology to mitigate anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions to the atmosphere. CCS includes multiple methods to accomplish the goals of capturing, transporting and storing CO2; most such efforts focus on fossil-fuel-based power generation. Primarily because of its high cost and environmental issues, CCS will face considerable obstacles. Several economic and technical challenges must be overcome for CCS to compete with alternative energy strategies for CO2 emissions avoidance. To better understand the relative importance of the cost of CCS and its effectiveness in avoiding CO2 emissions, we performed a comparison of carbon avoidance via CCS and using alternative energy technologies.1 In this comparison, the resources that would be spent on CCS were instead used to develop alternative energy capacity - specifically wind, nuclear and geothermal power - a concept called 'virtual CCS'. This comparison was designed to rank CCS and alternative energy technologies according to the effectiveness and cost of avoiding CO2 emissions. The calculations involved in this simulation determined the cost of performing CCS on a globally significant mass of CO2 emissions by considering the wedge concept of Pacala and Socolow.2 Specifically, we considered 100 billion (giga) tonnes (GtCO2) to be avoided over 50 years as the basis for comparison. Pacala and Socolow proposed to divide anthropogenic CO2 emissions into 'wedges' to facilitate the implementation of a portfolio approach to solving the CO2 problem. Global emissions were estimated at 30 GtCO2 for the year 2010, assumed to increase linearly over time, and expected to double by 2060. Stabilising the emissions at 2010 levels would require 800 GtCO2 to be avoided in the next 50 years. Assuming $51 (£33) per tonne of CO2 (tCO2) avoided via CCS, an estimate based on the 2005 International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report for a new coal-fired power plant,3 we estimated the cost for one wedge of CCS to be $5.1 trillion. For virtual CCS, this means that $5.1 trillion spread over 50 years could be utilised to build, maintain, operate and decommission alternative energy installations such as wind farms, nuclear plants or geothermal plants.

$3.4 billion for one small pipelineEssandoh-Yeddu and Gülen ’08 ( Joseph Essandoh-Yeddu - Gulf Coast Carbon Center, Gürcan Gülenb - Center for Energy Economics, November 16-20, 2008 “ Economic modeling of carbon dioxide integrated pipeline network for enhanced oil recovery and geologic sequestration in the Texas Gulf Coast region”, http://www.beg.utexas.edu/gccc/bookshelf/2008/GHGT9/08-03k-Final.pdf) SRK An onshore pipeline network to transport anthropogenic CO2 for EOR and eventually for geologic sequestration is proposed for the Gulf Coast region of Texas. This pipeline infrastructure is a multi-source, multi-sink model similar to one that has operated in West Texas for almost three decades. This design allows flexibility of operations for both the CO2 sources and the oil fields. Since a source is not tied to any specific oil field; the latter would not suffer when the source is shut down, or vice versa. Known CO2 pipeline cost models were reviewed to evaluate their suitability to our pipeline network. The models were under-estimating the construction costs when compared with announced costs estimates of new projects. Accordingly, cost escalation factors were introduced to selected models to account for cost escalations. Using the models modified as such, we estimated the cost of the proposed pipeline network to be between $2.4 and $3.4 billion. Whether such an investment would be warranted would naturally depend on other factors such as cost of capture, price of carbon, additional oil production due to CO2-EOR, the price of oil but also public acceptance. The next phase of our work would focus on these aspects of CO2-EOR economics. No environmental impact assessment has been done yet.

50 States CP

Counterplan Text: The 50 States of the United States should provide financial incentives for the construction of carbon capture and storage pipelines. The 50 States should grant eminent domain authority for the pipelines.

States can do national pipelinesVann et al. 1/23 ( Adam Vann - Legislative Attorney, Kristina Alexander - Legislative Attorney, Vanessa K. Burrows - Legislative Attorney, Kenneth R. Thomas - Legislative Attorney, January 23, 2012, “ Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline: Legal Issues”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42124.pdf) SRK In most instances, decisions about the siting of oil pipelines, even interstate oil pipelines like the proposed Keystone XL pipeline, are made by state governments if the state governments choose to exercise a pipeline siting authority.3 The federal government generally does not regulate the siting of oil pipelines, although it does oversee oil pipeline safety4 and pricing issues.5 However, the construction, connection, operation, and maintenance of a pipeline that connects the United States with a foreign country requires the permission of the U.S. Department of State, conveyed through a presidential permit.6 Accordingly, the proposed Keystone XL pipeline would require a permit. Executive Order 13337 delegates to the Secretary of State the President’s authority to issue such a permit upon a determination that the project is in the national interest.7