our entitlement to self-knowledge

7/29/2019 Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge

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Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge: I. Tyler Burge

Author(s): Tyler Burge and Christopher PeacockeReviewed work(s):Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 96 (1996), pp. 91-116Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Aristotelian SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545230 .

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OURENTITLEMENTTO SELF-KNOWLEDGETyler Burge and ChristopherPeacocke

I-Tyler Burgewant to understand urepistemicwarrant or a certainrangeof

judgmentsaboutour own thoughtsand attitudes. amguidedbytwohypotheses.One is that herearecertain ortsof self-knowledgethat areepistemically special.The other s that theepistemic rightor warrantwe have to these sortsof self-knowledge is, in a sense,environmentallyneutral. want to understand his specialnessandthis environmentalneutrality.Thehypothesisof epistemic specialnesswill beargued or inthispaper.The hypothesisof environmentalneutrality s relevantto aprojectthat deals with scepticism andthe natureand functions ofreason.I will not developthis latterhypothesis n depthhere,butIwill commenton it for the sake of orientation.Most of our empirical thoughts and our thoughts about ourempirical thoughts depend for their individuationconditions onrelations that we bear to a particularenvironment.But, on myguiding hypothesis,ourepistemicwarrant orour udgmentsaboutourthoughtsdoes notdependon particularelations o a particularenvironment. tis commonto any environment ndderivesfromthenatureof the thinkeras a criticalreasoner.This point is relevanttoshowingthatcertainclaims to self-knowledgewhich areamongthepremises n a certainanti-sceptical rgument o notbeg the questionby depending on presumptionsabout the environment that thescepticcallsintoquestion. nthispaper will not discussscepticism.But I begin with the sortof cogito-like judgmentsthatfiguredintraditionalanti-sceptical arguments.I believe these judgmentsrelevantnotonly to scepticism,but to theepistemic specialnessofsome self-knowledge. Although some striking features ofcogito-like judgmentsare not sharedby all membersof the widerrangeof judgments about one's thoughts whose epistemic statusinterestsme, cogito-like judgments provide a useful paradigm orreflection.


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So I beginwith some remarksaboutajudgmentthat:(1) I amthinking hattherearephysicalentities.

Thisjudgment s an instanceof cogito-like thoughts,anelaborationof Descartes' I am thinking.Let us construe 'thinking'in (1)minimally-as engaginginthoughtorhavinga thought, egardlessof whether t is merely entertaining thought,makingajudgment,or whatever. nthissense,one 'thinks'allpropositional omponentsof any thoughtone thinks(includingnegatedones, antecedentsofconditionals,and so on). (1) is the contentof my judgment. acceptit as true.To be true, (1) requiresonly thatI amengagingin somethoughtwhose content s thattherearephysicalentities.Wedonotrestthisjudgmentupon anyobservationorperceptionsuchas wastraditionallyalled'inner ense'.Thejudgmentsdirect,based on nothingelse. Making the judgment requiressufficientunderstandingo think(1). But once one makesthejudgment,orindeed ust engagesinthethought,one makes t true.Thethought scontextually elf-verifying.One cannot errif one does not think t,andif onedoes think tone cannoterr.In thissense, such thinkingsareinfallible.I do not claim that udgments ike (1) are indubitable.The scopefor humanperversity s very wide. One could be so far gone as tothinkto oneself: 'Ido not knowwhetherI amnow thinkingornot;maybeI am deador unconscious;my mantramay have finally mademe blissfullyfree of thought'.Such mistakendoubtwould evincecognitive pathology,butI think t possible.It is anerror,however,that mostpeoplewould avoid withoutswerving.Key featuresof (1) are sharedby judgmentsof

(2) Ijudge, herewith, hattherearephysical entities.When judge in (2) is used to execute not merely describe ajudgment, udgmentsof (2) arecontextuallyself-verifying. (2) isnotmadetrueby the mere thinkingof it, nor does it have quite thesame quasi-logical self-evident status that (1) does. These aresubtletiesthatI will have to discuss on anotheroccasion.(1) and(2) arenot merephilosophical uriosities. think hat heyrepresent he form of many ordinary elf-aware udgments at leastwhen (1) is taken to have the 'herewith'reflexivity of (2).) Whenone makesajudgmentand is conceptuallyawareof one's so doing,


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whether or not one spells out this conceptual awareness, one'sjudgmentshave a reflexive form like thatof (2). Such conceptualself-awarenessgoes beyond simply consciouslythinkingathought,but it is not an unusualphenomenonamong people with normalsecond-orderabilities. Thus I believe thatcogito-like judgmentsconstitutea significantsegment of our everyday mentalactivity.To remark hat (1) and (2) are contextuallyself-verifying is toremark n their ruth onditions,not on ourjustification r epistemicwarrant n thinking them. It does seem that understanding 1)suffices forknowingthat t is true.And therelevantunderstandingrequiresno great perspicacity.But noting that it is self-evidentlyself-verifying (supposingthat this needed no more comment-which of courseit would) wouldnotcapture ully whatis involvedin its epistemicstatus.ForI thinkthatcogito-likejudgmentssharean interesting epistemic status with a numberof types of self-knowledgethatarenotcontextually elf-verifyingorinfallible,andthat ack the quasi-logicalstatusof (1). I havein minda widerclassof judgments about states, not just reflexive occurrences-judgmentsaboutwhat one believes, wants,intends.When we makejudgmentsaboutmanyof ourmental statesandevents, ourjudgments commonly constituteknowledge. I knowvery well that I believe that there arephysicalentities-if I judgethatI do. Such udgmentsdo notmerelyevince aninnerstate n theway thata yelp evinces a pain;norarethey avowalsor conventionalpracticeswithoutcognitive value. What is the epistemicstatusofsuch judgments?What epistemic warrantdo we have to makethem?I take the notion of epistemic warrant o be broaderthan theordinarynotion of justification.An individual'sepistemicwarrantmayconsist in ajustificationthatthe individualhas for a belief orotherepistemicact or state.But it may also be an entitlement hatconsists inastatusof operatingnan appropriate ayinaccordwithnorms of reason, even when these norms cannotbe articulatedbythe individualwho has thatstatus.Wehave anentitlement ocertainperceptualbeliefs or to certain ogical inferenceseven thoughwemaylack reasonsorjustificationsfor them. Theentitlementcouldin principle presumably-though often only with extremephilo-sophicaldifficulty-be articulated y someone.Butthisarticulation


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94 I-TYLERBURGEneed not be partof the repertoireof the individualthat has theentitlement.Ourepistemicwarrant o much of ourself-knowledgeis of thissort.Most of us have nojustifyingargumentor evidence backingthe relevant judgments. The judgments are immediate,non-inferential.Althoughcogito-like udgmentsmaycountas self-evidentor self-verifying,mostjudgments that interestme do not.Whereinare we beingreasonable-in the sense of operatingundernormssanctionedby reason-in making udgmentsaboutour ownminds?As I have intimated, heremarksaboutself-verification uggestaninitialanalogybetweencogito-like udgmentsandknowledgeofsimplelogical truths.The truthof judgmentsof (1) and(2) is, in abroadsense, present n the formandlogic of thethought.There issomethingof the same self-evidentandobvious featureshere asthere are in simple logical truths. The main differencesare thatcogito-likejudgmentsare dependent on being thoughtfor beingtrue,andarein theirspeciallydirectway self-verifying.Anotheranalogy oknowledgeof simple ogical truthss this:Thekeytotheepistemic statusof cogito-like udgmentsseems toresidein ordinaryunderstanding, ot in some mechanismconnecting heknowerwitha sensedobject.This point will be one of thekey elementsin my accountof theenvironmental neutrality and specialness of self-knowledge.Perceptual xperiencesparticularo agivenenvironmentnevitablyfigure in the acquisition of understanding f almost any givencontent.Butone'sepistemicwarrantorbelievingthe contentmaynot incorporate he perceptualexperiencesor beliefs that go intounderstandingt. Thisis thetraditional iew of knowledgeof logicalor mathematical ruths. One may need perceptualexperience tocometounderstandimple ogicalorarithmetical otionsand ruths.(Thisis surelythe case withsuchlogicaltruthsas 'nothing s-bothadog and nota dog'.) But on thetraditional iew suchexperience snot a constituentof one's justificationor entitlement n believingsimplelogical orarithmeticalruths.I am not arguingforthe traditionalview-just recalling it. Theelement in itrelevant o ourpurposes s thefollowing.Theaccountof epistemicjustification or entitlementmay presupposeunder-standing, which may be dependent on particular perceptual


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relations o a given environment.But theaccountneednot includeperceptualbeliefsor experiencesasconstituents ntheindividual'sjustificationor entitlement.The accountcan allow attribution fconceptsto the individualwhichcould be acquiredonlyinalimitedrange of possible environments,while itself takinga form thatisapplicable to any critical reasoner,regardless of the particularenvironmentallydependentcontentsof his orherthought.I want to illustrate he relevanceof thisideato our discussionbyreconsidering the scenario of one's being switched betweendifferent nvironmentsunawares-a scenario discussed napapersome yearsback.1Let us assumeforthesakeof argument hatmythinking hat herearephysicalentities(hencemythinking hatIamthinking that there are physical entities) is the thoughtthat it isbecauseof relevantcausalrelations bear o actualphysicalobjectsin my environment.Let us also assume thatan individualwith achemically denticalbody couldhavebeenbroughtup in a situationin whichsuch relationswerelacking-and in whichthe conceptofphysical object could not be acquired-but in which different,counterpart houghtsoccurred.(I doubt thatphysical object is aconceptuniversal oallpossiblecriticalreasoners; utif onedidnotdoubt,another onceptcouldbe chosen.)Finally, et usgrant hat fatanytimeone were switchedunawares romone's actualsituationinto sucha counterpartituation,one wouldhave no resources hatwouldtipone off to the difference.Unlessmemoryand earningconnections otheoriginalenviron-mentwerebroken, t is hard odescribea switchof actualsituationsthatwould producea new twin set of theconcepts,with no residuefrom the past experiences. So in the case I am imaginingone'sthoughtsdo not switch to twin thoughts.Becauseof a switch one'sthoughts might, however, change content, broadening theirextensionswithoutone's beingawareof theirdoingso.

I take t that his observations sufficient o prompt he followingquestion. Given that we are insensitive to such alleged possiblechangesin content,how can we know whatwe are thinking?1 'Individualismand Self-Knowledge' Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), pp. 649-663.Reprinted n Quassim Cassam ed. Self-Knowledge Oxford, Oxford UniversityPress,1994).


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Iwill nottryto dealwith thisquestion nall its ramifications ere.But as I noted some years back,some of the negativeforce of thequestioncan be shownto be illusory by this consideration:Thereis no way for one to make a mistake about the content,of one'spresent-tensedhought n the relevantcases.Supposethat I think that I am engagingin a thoughtthattherearephysical objects.In thinkingthis, I have to engage in the verythoughtI amreferring o andascribing o myself.Thereferencetothe content-expressed in the that-clause-cannot be carriedoutunless I actuallyengage in the thought.The intentionalcontentmentioned n thethat-clauses notmerelyanobjectof referenceorcognition; t is partof thecognitionitself. It is thoughtandthoughtabout nthesameact. Ifbackground onditionsaredifferent noughso that I am thinkingdifferent thoughts,they will be differentenoughso thattheobjectsof referenceandself-ascriptionwill alsobe different.So no matterhow my thoughtsareaffected, no matterhow I am switchedaround,I will be correct n self-ascriptionsofcontentthat arecorrectlyexpressed n cogito-that-clause orm.It wouldbea mistake oreplythatbecauseone's correct eferencedoes notgive oneany graspof whatone isreferring o,this referenceis empty. For to self-ascribe thoughts in the way expressed bythat-clauses,one has to understandhe thoughtsone is referring owell enoughto think hem.Oneneed not haveany moreexplicatoryunderstandingf one'sthoughts han snecessary othink hem.Oneneed not masteranti-individualism,much less have an empiricalmasteryof the conditions thathave establishedthe identityof thethoughtsone thinks.Such mastery s emphaticallynot guaranteedby masteryofcogito-self-ascriptions.Butone isguaranteedhatoneascribes somethingof which one has the ordinaryunderstandinginvolvedin usingconcepts and thinking houghts.This understanding resupposes he causal-perceptual elationsto a particularenvironmentthathelp determinewhat content isavailable for being understood.What one can think is partlydependent on relations to one's environment. And one'ssecond-order self-ascriptions inherit both the content and thebackgroundenvironmentalcontent-determining onditions fromone's first-order nderstanding.Ihavegranted hatone neednot be sensitiveto actualor counter-factualchangesin whatone understands nder ransportationsnto


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OUR ENTITLEMENTTOSELF-KNOWLEDGE 97

environmentswherethe contentof one'sunderstandinghanges orwould be different.One need not be capable of detecting suchchanges.But inany situationnwhichapersoncan think herelevantcogito-like judgments, the person would think them withunderstanding-andtoallappearances, nowledgeably.Atanyrate,there s noobviousreasonwhyknowledge nsuchjudgmentswouldbepreventedbysuchchanges,much ess suchpossiblechanges.2 nany such twin situation, the person would understand he self-ascribedcontents and would self-ascribe them with a justice andreliabilitythat is equal to that in any ordinary situation.Someentitlementattaching o understanding eems to be what the self-knowledge depends upon, not on some knowledge of what theunderstandingonsistsin, or whether tdiffers fromunderstandingthat s pastorpossible.The person's epistemicentitlement o the self-ascriptionspre-supposes understanding. Understanding is, as I have noted,dependenton and local to causal-perceptual elations to a givenenvironment. But the entitlement that underlies knowledgeablecogito-like thoughtsand otherself-ascriptionsdoes not seem localandseemsto survivesuchswitches. It seems to becarried omehowby the fact thatwe correctlyself-ascribeany content at all withunderstanding.Wheredoes the entitlementderive from?And whatmakesit capableof survivingsuchenvironmental witches?

2 Are thereswitchingsituations n which one would havereasonableground ordoubtingwhat contents one is thinking, so that a cogito-typejudgment would not constituteknowledge?This is verycomplex, butI will makea few remarks ere.Theself-ascriptionin the that-clauseway cannot involve a mistakeabout the intentionalcontent. So thepossibilityof aswitch does not threaten mistake. think herefore hatsuchpossibilitiespose no relevant alternative hreat to one's entitlement to one's judgment about thethat-clausecontent of one's thoughts.I believe thatthe relevantminimalunderstandingsuffices for knowledge in cogito-like judgments. Even in non-cogito-likejudgments,switches in contentcannot, for the same reason,undermineknowledgeabilityof thecontent of self-ascriptions.Cf. my 'Individualism ndSelf-Knowledge' op. cit., p. 659.A fullerstory has to be told aboutthepropositional-attitudeoncepts in non-cogito-likejudgments.I thinkthepossibilityof switching,or of errorsof incompleteunderstanding,do not by themselves undermineknowledge;but I will have to discuss these mattersfurther lsewhere.Some worriesaboutswitchingsituationshavefocusedonmemory.I think hatthey tendto confuse preservativememory with memory of objects or with comparisonswithinmemory,and to overrate heextent to whichthecontentretrievedn memory s sensitiveto immediateenvironmental ontext. For a discussionof preservativememory,see my'ContentPreservation'ThePhilosophicalReview 102 (October1993),pp. 457-488.


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I think hat herelevantentitlementderivesnotfromthereliabilityof some causal-perceptualelationbetweencognitionand ts object.It hastwo othersources.Oneis therole of the relevant udgments ncritical reasoning.The other is a constitutiverelationbetweenthejudgments and their subject matter-or between the judgmentsaboutone's thoughtsand the udgments'beingtrue.Understandingandmakingsuch judgments s constitutivelyassociatedbothwithbeingreasonableandwithgettingthemright.Brieflydrawn,my line of thoughtwill be this. To be capableofcritical reasoning, and to be subject to certain rationalnormsnecessarilyassociated with suchreasoning,some mental acts andstatesmust be knowledgeably eviewable.3The specific characterof this knowledgeablereviewabilityrequires hat it be associatedwith an epistemicentitlementthat is distinctive.The entitlementmust be stronger hanthat nvolvedinperceptualudgments.Theremustbeanon-contingent, ational elation,of a sort o beexplained,betweenrelevant irst-personudgmentsandtheirsubjectmatterortruth.All of us, even scepticsamong us, recognizeapracticeof criticalreasoning.4Criticalreasoning s reasoningthat involves an abilityto recognizeandeffectivelyemployreasonable riticismorsupportfor reasonsandreasoning. t is reasoningguidedbyanappreciation,use, and assessmentof reasons andreasoningas such.As a criticalreasoner,one notonlyreasons.Onerecognizesreasonsas reasons.One evaluates, checks, weighs, criticizes, supplements one'sreasonsand reasoning.Clearly, hisrequiresa second-order bilityto think about thought contents or propositions,and rationalrelationsamong them.3 I thinkthat thefollowing necessity also holds: To thinktherelevant irst-personpresenttense thoughts about one's thoughts and attitudes,one must be capable of criticalreasoning. ndeed,I think hat o havea fully formed irst-person onceptor fully formed

conceptsof propositional ttitudes,one must be capableof criticalreasoning.Tomasterconcepts of propositionalattitudesin a suitably rich sense, one must be capableofappreciating he force andrelevanceof reasons to attitudesas such, which amountstobeingable to reasoncriticallyaboutreasonsandreasoning.And to mastera fully formedfirst-person oncept,one must haveconceptsof propositionalattitudes.4 In actual practice, critical reasoning approximateswhat I call reflective reasoning,Reflective reasoningmakesuse of all the mainconceptsnecessary o a full understandingof essential orfundamental lements nreasoning.Criticalreasoning s simply reasoningthatis sufficientlyarticulate o appreciatereasons as reasonsandto employarticulatedcriticism of reasonsandreasoning as reasonsandreasoning).


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OURENTITLEMENTOSELF-KNOWLEDGE 99When one carries out a proof, one checks the steps of thereasoning,makingsure that the inferences are valid. Any activityof proofrequiressome conceptionof validity,which requiresanabilityto thinkof thepropositionsnaproofasconstituting easonsfor what follows from them. Indeed, it is arguablethat use oftherefore in reasoning-deductive or otherwise-constitutes anexercise of this meta-cognitive ability. When one engages inpracticaldeliberation, ne articulates ndweighsconsiderations neach side, goes over possible sources of bias, thinks through

consequences.Essential to carryingout criticalreasoning s usingone's knowledgeof what constitutesgood reasonsto guide one'sactualfirst-order easoning.A non-critical reasoner reasons blind, without appreciatingreasonsas reasons.Animals and smallchildrenreason n thisway.But reasoning under rationalcontrol of the reasoner is criticalreasoning.Not allreasoningbycriticalreasonerss critical.Muchofourreasoning s blind,poorlyaccessible,andunaware.Wechangeattitudes nrationalwayswithouthavingmuchsense of whatwe aredoing.Often we arepoorat sayingwhat ourreasoning s. Still, theabilityto takerationalcontrolof one'sreasoning s crucial n manyenterprises-in giving a proof, in thinking hrougha plan,in con-structing theory,nengaging ndebate.Forreasoning o becritical,it mustsometimes nvolve actualawarenessandreview of reasons;andsuch a reviewingstandpointmustnormallybe available.5Criticalreasoning nvolves an abilitynotmerely to assess truth,falsity, evidentialsupport,entailment,andnon-entailmentamongpropositionsorthought ontents. talsoinvolvesanabilitytoassessthe truth ndreasonability freasoning-hence attitudes.This isnotto say thatcriticalreasoningmustfocus on attitudes,as opposed totheirsubject matter.Normallywe reasonnot aboutourselvesbutaboutthe world or aboutpracticalgoods. But to be fully a criticalreasoner,one must be able to-and sometimesactually-identify,distinguish, valuatepropositions sasserted,denied,hypothesized

5 I thinkKantneglecteddistinctionsbetweenreasoning,criticalreasoning,andreflectivereasoning.But he clearly saw that it is the possibilityof applicationsof 'I think'to ourthoughts not ourbeingself-aware nthis wayall thetime-that is basic tofullreflectiverationality.Of course, the form of 'I think'does not by itself make the relevantcon-tribution o reflectiverationality.Onecoulddreamcogito-thoughts. t is the abilityto beconceptuallyawareof oneselfasthinkingwith acertaincontrolandagencythat scrucial.


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or merelyconsidered.6Such abilities and activities are centraltoargumentation. imilarly, n criticalpracticalreasoning,one mustbe able to-and sometimes actually-evaluate propositionsconceptualized as expressing pro-attitudes, o distinguish themexplicitlyfrom thosethatexpressbeliefs, andto evaluaterelationsof reason among such propositionsas so conceptualized. Suchevaluation constitutes minimal evaluations of propositionalattitudes.To be a criticalreasoner,onemustalso be ableto, and sometimesactually,use one'sknowledgeof reasonstomake,criticize,change,confirmcommitments egarding ropositions-to engage explicitlyinreason-inducedhangesofmind.Critical easoninghere nvolvesan ability to distinguish subjectivities from more objectivelysupportableommitments nd oexplicitlyalter heformernfavourof the latter. ts pointis reasonably o confirmand correctattitudesand reasoning (not merely assess propositionalconnections), byreference o rational tandards.Critical reasoning must be exercised on itself. Any criticalreasoning,even aboutabstractpropositional elationsor aboutthereasoningof others, involves commitmentsby the reasoner.Andgenuinely critical reasoning requiresan applicationof rationalstandardsothosecommitments.Abeingthatassessedgoodandbadreasoningn othersor in theabstract, uthadnoinclination oapplysuch standards o the commitments nvolved in thosevery assess-ments, would not be a critical reasoner.To reason critically-toconsiderreasons bearingon the truthof some matter, o suspendbelief or desire, to weigh values under a conception of the good-one must treat one's own commitments as matters to beconsidered and evaluated. Critical evaluation of one's owncommitments s central o forming hemandto rationally hangingone's mind orstanding ast.

So criticalreasoningrequires hinkingaboutone'sthoughts.Butit further equires hat hat hinkingbe normallyknowledgeable.Toappreciateone's reasons as reasons-to check, weigh, criticize,6 In effect, Frege'suse of the assertionsign is an acknowledgementof a minimal use oftheseabilities. Withoutanability to recognize thata proposition houldbe and s judgedto be true,one cannot reasoncritically.Having a concept of judgment and using it inreasoningmeetsmy requirement.


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confirm one's reasons-one must know what one's reasons,thoughts,andreasoningare.One need not alwaysbe knowledge-able,or even right.But being knowledgeablemust be the normalsituationwhenonereflectson one's reasons n thecourseofcarryingoutreasonablenquiryordeliberation.Theinteresthere s less in therequirementof normalknowledgeability-which is shared withothercognitiveactivities,suchasperception.The interest ies inthegroundof therequirement.Whymustwe be normallyknowledge-able aboutourthoughtswhen we reflectuponthem?

I will answerthis question n threestages.First,I wantto showthat to evaluate reasons critically, one must have an epistemicentitlement o one's judgmentsabout one's thoughts,reasons,andreasoning.Second,I wantto supporthestronger hesis thatcriticalreasoning requires that one know one's thoughts, reasons, andreasoning.Third,I will tryto show that this knowledgemust takea distinctive,non-observational orm.SoIbeginwith the matterof entitlement.The basic idea is simple.Putcrudely:sinceone' s beliefsorjudgmentsaboutone's thoughts,reasons,andreasoningare anintegralpartof the overallproceduresof criticalreasoning, one must have an epistemicright to thosebeliefs orjudgments.To be reasonable nthe wholeenterprise, nemustbe reasonable n thatessentialaspectof it.Less crudely,considerthe process of reasoningwhich involvesthe confirming and weighing of one's reasons. One must makejudgmentsaboutone's attitudesandinferences.If one'sjudgmentsaboutone'sattitudesorinferenceswere notreasonable-if onehadno epistemic entitlement to them-one's reflection on one'sattitudesand theirinterrelationsould addno rationalelement tothe reasonabilityof the whole process. But reflection does add arational lementto thereasonability f reasoning. tgives one somerationalcontrolover one'sreasoning.To put thepointsomewhatmorefully: if one lackedentitlementto judgments about one's attitudes,therecould be no norms ofreasongoverninghow one oughtcheck, weigh, overturn,confirmreasons or reasoning.For if one lacked entitlement o judgmentsabout one's attitudes,one could not be subject to rationalnormsgoverninghow one ought to alter hoseattitudesgiven thatone hadreflected on them. If reflection provided no reason-endorsedjudgmentsaboutthe attitudes, herationalconnectionbetween the


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attitudesreflected upon and the reflection would be broken.Soreasonscould not applyto how the attitudesshould be changed,suspended,or confirmedon the basis of reasoningdependingonsuch reflection.But criticalreasoningjust is reasoningin whichnormsof reasonapplytohow attitudes houldbe affectedpartlyonthe basis of reasoningthat derives fromjudgments about one'sattitudes. So one must have an epistemic entitlement to one'sjudgmentsaboutone's attitudes.I turnnow to the stronger hesis. One mightimaginesome gapbetweenepistemicentitlementandknowledge.Mightone have anepistemic entitlementbut be systematicallymistaken?Or mightfailure of some third Gettier-typecondition (beyond truth andepistemicentitlement)undermineknowledge?It is possible in given cases for reflection to be disconnected ntheseways fromtheattitudespurportedly eflectedupon.But bothpossibilities f generalizedare ncompatiblewith ourhavingthe sortof entitlementto the reflectionjust argued for. That entitlementrestedon theassumptionhatreflectionaddedarationalelement tothe reasonabilityof the whole process of critical reasoning-aprocesswherebyobject-levelattitudesareguidedby reflectionontheirreasonability. f reflective udgmentswere notnormally rue,reflectioncould not addto therationalcoherenceor add a rationalcomponentto the reasonabilityof the whole process. It could notrationally ontrolandguide theattitudesbeing reflectedupon (eventhoughone could imagine situations n which such disconnectedreflectionwould be mechanicallyor instrumentallybeneficial informingtrueorrationalbeliefs). So reflectionwould notadd n therelevant way to the reasonabilityof the process, and thereforewouldnot have the source of entitlement ust argued or.Thesamepointapplies o thepossiblefailureofsomeGettier-typecondition.Again, if reflection were connected to the truthof ourjudgments about our thoughts in an accidental or non-knowledge-yielding way, the reason-guiding and rational-coherence-making unctionsof rationalreview would be broken.Since part of our entitlement to reflective judgments about ourattitudesderives from their functions in critical reasoning, theentitlement tself wouldbe undermined.Not only the relevantentitlementto reflectivejudgments thatderives fromtheirfunctionswithincriticalreasoning,butcritical


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reasoning tself is constitutivelydependenton the truth-andGettierconditionsbeingmet.If abeinghad anepistemicentitlement o itsjudgments about its attitudes but were systematicallymistakenabout them-never got them right-it would not be a criticalreasoner.Orif our entitlementwere alwaysconnected to the truthof our judgments about our thoughts in an accidental or non-knowledge-yieldingway,criticalreasoningwould notbe possible.Forcriticalreasonrequires ationalntegration f one'shigher-orderevaluationswith one's first-order,object-oriented easoning.Theformermust be reason-guidedandreason-guiding.Andtheymustcement the rationalcoherencebetween the two levels. If the twocame radicallyapart,orwere only accidentallyconnected,criticalreasoningwouldnotoccur.So if we failed normallyto know ourthoughtsandattitudes, nordinary easoningaboutreasons,eitherthrough ystematic alsityof our judgments or through systematic mismatchbetween ourentitlementandtruth, riticalreasoningwouldnot occuramongus.Indeed,the entitlement o reflectivejudgmentsthatderivesfromthosejudgments'placeincriticalreasoningwould apse.Butcriticalreasoningdoes occur among us; and we areentitled to reflectivejudgmentsby virtue of theircontribution o the reasonabilityofcritical reasoning. So as critical reasoners we must know ourthoughtsandattitudes.Symptomatic of the connection I have noted between therationalityof reflection in critical reasoning and the truth ofreflective udgments s the facttherearesevere imitsonbrute rrorsinjudgmentsaboutone'spresentordinary, ccessiblepropositionalattitudes.A bruteerror s an error hatindicatesno rational ailureand no malfunction n the mistaken ndividual.7Bruteperceptualerrors commonly result from misleading naturalconditions orlook-alikesubstitutes.One can beperceptuallywrongwithout here7 1 introduced he notion of bruteerror n 'Individualismand Self-Knowledge'op. cit.,p. 657. I intendrational ailuresto includeanyfailureof entitlementorjustification,notjust ones that are epistemically culpable. I intend malfunctions to cover not onlymechanicalor biologicalfailuresin, say, the individual'sperceptualapparatus, utalsofailures of normalunderstanding-as for examplewhen an individualbelieves arthritiscan occur in the thigh.The idea is thata brute errorwould have occurredeven if theindividual's epistemic warrantswere in order and the individual'sperceptionandordinaryunderstandingwerefunctioningoptimally.


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being anythingwrong with one. Suchbruteperceptualerrorsareunremarkable.But errorsabout whatone's thoughtsandattitudesare normally seem to involve some malfunction or rationaldeficiency. There are exceptions-the cases of unconscious,modularattitudes hatare not accessible to reflection.One couldeasily make bruteerrors aboutthese. There arejudgmentsaboutone's emotions,character,or deep motives, thatseem hardto getright.I leave open whetherthese mightsometimes involve bruteerrors.But it seemsthatwe makemistakesaboutmanyattitudeshatareaccessible to reflectionprimarilywhen we aresubject o somefailureof rationalityordefect in ourcognitive powers.8I stated hatI wouldarguethatthe specificrole of knowledge ofourthoughts ncriticalreasoningrequires hat t be associatedwitha distinctive sort of epistemic entitlement that necessitates anon-contingent, ationalrelationbetween therelevantfirst-personpresent-tenseudgmentsandtheirsubjectmatterortruth.Whyneedself-knowledgebe in any way special?Whyis it notenoughthat tbeprettyreliableobservation?Someknowledgeof ourown mentalstatesandeventsis empirical n thesense thatit is basedeitheronimaging,remembering, rreasoningaboutsensedinner-goings-on,or onobservingourownbehaviourandhearingabout tfromothers.Simplicitytemptssome to hold thatall self-knowledge s like that.Let meelaborate histemptation. tis commonlyheldthatbeliefsaboutothers'attitudesmust be based on inferences romorcriteriafor observation.9On the model at issue, beliefs aboutone's ownattitudesdifferonly in thatone neednotalways inferthosebeliefs,8 Ourepistemicentitlement ojudgmentsaboutourpresentattitudes s a generalrightandis compatiblewith ourmakingvariousmistakesaboutourattitudes ven in thecourseofcriticalreasoning.(Of course,thenwe are,in a sense, not criticallyreasoningwiththeattitudeswe aremistakenabout.)We makemistakesof haste,bias, andself-deception.Some attitudesarehard o get at,exceptwithdiscipline,andevenmaturation rtherapy.Insomecases,otherpeoplearebetteratknowingourattitudes hanwe are.So one might

demand urther pecificationof ourentitlement.Onemight askunderwhatconditions tis overturned r insufficient o give usknowledge.Andone might nquire n moredepthintotheconditionsunderwhicherrorsarise. These issuesarecomplex.I think hatwhenourjudgmentsabouta certainclass of ourthoughtsandattitudesare in a certainsenseimmediate(which entails thatthey are neither nferrednor otherwisebiased by otherattitudes),and when ourminds arenot subject to malfunction,we do not makeerrors.Butthere s norecipeforinsuring hatour udgmentsare mmediateorthat hey areaboutthe relevantclass.Thereis no internalrecipe foravoidingerror.9 I do notacceptthisview, butI neednotquestion t here.Cf. 'ContentPreservation' p.cit. Certainlyone's beliefs aboutothers'thoughtsareoftenbased thisway.


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because one is the closest witness. There is no authority inself-knowledge, other than the authorityof inner observationalpresence,practice,andfamiliarity.This simpleobservationalmodel does not accountplausiblyforcogito-like thoughts. Such thoughtsare logically special in theirself-verificationandepistemicallyspecial ntheircleardependencefor entitlementon intellectionandunderstanding, ot on any sortof observation.Butcogito thoughtsdo notconstitute he full rangeof thoughts hat enteressentiallyintocriticalreasoning.Thesimpleobservationalmodel sencumberedwiththeobscurityof the notion of inner observationas applied to thoughts andattitudes.Unlike sensationsor images,thoughtsand attitudes ackdistinctivepresentations rphenomenologies.Themodelis pheno-menologicallyimplausiblefor many immediate udgmentsaboutone'sownbeliefs or current houghts.But I wantto showthat hereis a deeperproblem f the model is takento cover all cases.10Before presentingthe argument,I will say what I take to befundamentalo thesimpleobservationalmodel.Themodelneed notclaim any phenomenological presentation in self-knowledge,thoughwaiving such a claim weakensthe analogyto observation.The fundamental claim is that one's epistemic warrant forself-knowledgealwaysrestspartlyon theexistenceof a patternofveridical,butbrute,contingent,non-rational elations-which are

plausiblyalwayscausalrelations-between thesubjectmatter theattitudesunderreview)and thejudgmentsabout heattitudes.Thisclaim is compatiblewith holding that from the point of view ofepistemology,observational udgments are often immediateandnon-inferential, equiringno background ausalhypothesison thepartof theindividualabouttheirsource.10 Hume s, I think,aproponent f thesimpleobservationalmodel.Amorerecentproponentis D. M.Armstrong,AMaterialistTheoryof theMind London,Routledge&KeganPaul,1968), pp. 323-338. The rationalisttradition,in its emphasis on the role of self-knowledge in rationality,and the role of understanding not sensoryobservation) nself-knowledge, s the source of my view. Kantdevelopsthis tradition n a particularlydeep way, although his epistemology left him with what was, in my opinion, animplausiblyrestrictiveaccount of cognition of one's own thoughts,one indeed thatoverrates the role of inner sense. A more recent non-observationalaccount thatemphasizestheroleof self-knowledge n reasoningmaybe found in SidneyShoemaker,'OnKnowingOne's OwnMind'PhilosophicalPerspectives2, (1988), pp. 183-209.


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My view aboutperceptualentitlement s morespecificthan thefundamental laim of thesimpleobservationalmodel.Ibelieve thatour entitlementrestspartlyon ourbeing perceivers,whichentailsthatwe-or ourspecies-perceptual ystems-are or have been inbrute,contingent,non-rationalbut veridicalrelations o objectsofperception,andthekindsthatourperceptualudgmentsspecify. 1Itis necessarilyconstitutive of the content of our observationalorperceptualbeliefs aboutphysicalobjects,and of theverynatureofour perceptual systems, that we be veridically attuned to theenvironment hroughcausalrelationsto it-either in ourlearninghistoriesorindirectly n theevolutionof ourperceptual ystems.12Entitlement o observationalphysicalobjectbeliefs restspartlyon11 Atemptingoversimplifications toclaim that heseconstitutiveveridicalcausalrelationsare always reliably veridical.Such a claim is temptingbecause in so manycases ourperceptionsare reliable.Perhapsmany types of perceptionmust be. But the claim isoversimplifiedbecausesomeperceptualntentional ypesin someperceptual ystemsareestablished hrough hesystems'reliableavoidanceof falsenegativesratherhan hroughtheirreliableachievementof truepositives.It is morecritical o a hare'sperceptual ystemthat it not fail to registera predatorwhen one is there than that it be reliablein itsregistration of predators.So the system could commonly indicate the presence ofpredatorsalsely-and bebroadlyunreliablen itsperceptions-as long asit was reliableincorrectly ndicatingpresentpredators. tremains,however,constitutiveof thesystems'perceiving predatorsas predators hat some veridicalperceptionsplayed a role in theevolution-fashioned unction or in the actualuse of the system.Of course,reliability smoreimportant or perceptionsof safety thanfor perceptionsof danger.These qualificationson reliability, of course, complicate any account of the relationbetween perceptual-content onstitution and perceptualentitlement.For presumablyepistemicentitlementsareprima aciecomprisedbyconstitutivelyunreliableperceptual

deliverances.I believe thata perceptual ystemin anyagent, however, s constitutivelyassociatedwithreliableperceptions n a rangeof cases. But these areissues for anotheroccasion.12 I am inclined to think thatit is a conceptual necessity thatthere be causal relations nperception. But for purposes of my argument,the fundamental eature is that theentitlement oobservational eliefsnecessarilyrestsonsome pattern f brute,contingent,non-rational relations between observed and observer, regardless of whether thecontingentre!ationsare causal. It is commonto my view andthe opposedobservationalview of self-knowledge that in many of the cases under dispute, there is a causalmechanism hatrelatesattitudes ojudgmentsabout hem.What s indispute s the natureof the epistemic entitlement that one has to such judgments, not the existence of apsychological mechanism. On the simple observationalmodel, our entitlement toself-knowledgealways restspartlyonthebrute,contingent,non-rationalausalrelations.Onmy view, in someimportant ases, it does not:Christopher eacocke haspointedouttomethat n some, though thinknotall, cases of specialself-knowledge, heentitlementmayspecifysome causalrelationbetweensubjectmatter nd udgment.Butnot all causalrelationsare brute,contingent, non-rationalones. (For example those involved in aperson'sdeductive nferencearenot.)Whereacausalrelation s not merelyabackgroundenablingcondition, but an element in the relevantentitlement o self-knowledge, it willon my view neverbe a brute,contingent,non-rationalone. It will be associated in theentitlementwith norms or transferof reasons.


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OURENTITLEMENTTOSELF-KNOWLEDGE 107

thisnecessity.Butinparticularnstancesofperception, herelationson which one's entitlement o perceptual udgmentsrestsarebrute,contingent,non-rational.'3 t is this claimthat forms theparadigmfor thesimple observationalmodel.Theexistence of veridicalbeliefs involving de recausally basedrelationsto the environment s necessary to and constitutive ofsomething'sbeing a perceptual ystem.Butthe individual elationsarebrute,contingent,non-rational.Thebrutecontingencyof theserelations nindividualnstancesof veridicalperceptual udgment sfundamentalo observation.Differentconditionscouldhave causedaperceptualudgment hatwasinternally-indistinguishableindeedI thinkthe samejudgment-type)butnon-veridical,without oss ofentitlement,even as the systemfunctionedoptimallywell.'4 Thus13 The simple observationalmodel is inspired by a comparisonof self-knowledge toobservationaludgmentsaboutphysicalobjects.I operatewith a commonsensicalcon-ception of suchjudgments.Thereare non-common-sensical onceptionsthat take thebasic relation hatunderliesourepistemicright o be one betweenthe observerandsomesort of mentalitem, a sense datumor an appearance. ignoresuch theoriesnot becauseIregard hem as mistaken although do regard hem asmistaken). ignorethembecausethey model observationof physical objectson knowledgeof one's mental events. Themodel I am attacking proposes to illumine self-knowledge throughan independentmodel.I do think thatknowledgeof ourpainsand othersensations-as contrastedwithknowledge of our propositionalstates and events-is empirical in the sense that itdependsfor its entitlementon sensory experience or sensorybeliefs. Judgments hatconstitutesuch knowledge ustaresensorybeliefs. AlthoughI believe that bruteerror spossible in certain udgmentsof this sort,suchcases aremarginal.Understandingventhese empirical udgments will, I think,owe more to the kinds of considerations amelaborating han to reflectionon ordinaryperceptionsof physicalobjects.But I regard

knowledgeof one's sensationsas requiring eparate reatmentromknowledgeof one'sthoughtsandattitudes.It is worthnotingthata view thatwe must 'inferentially'base udgmentsaboutphysicalobjectson observationsof sense datawouldalso normallybe committed o holdingthatone'sentitlement o thosejudgmentsrestson brute,contingent,non-rational elations othe physical objects that always allow for brute error.The same point applies toinference-to-the-best-explanationiews of our warrants or perceptualbeliefs aboutphysical objects.14 Thisgloss on the brutecontingencyof therelations,apart rom theparenthetical emark,is less committal than my own view of the contingency involved in observationalrelations.I think the same perceptualobject could, with different externalauxiliaryconditions,have caused a differentnon-veridicaludgment.AndI think that a differentperceptualobject, or perhapsnone at all, could have combined with differentexternalauxiliaryconditions to cause a perceptionor perceptual udgmentof the same type,though perhaps one with a different token demonstrativeelement, making it non-veridical. (I do not depend on these views in my argumenthere.) These differentconditions, in individual cases, need not affect the individual's entitlement to theperceptualjudgment; nor need they affect the well-functioningof the individual'sperceptual-cognitiveapparatus.The sense in which the relevant relations are non-rationalis complex. Perhaps t can suffice here to note thatsince in the case of ordinaryperception heperceptualobjectsarephysicalkinds orphysicalindividuals, herecanin


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perception s always subject obruteerror.Theobjector conditionsof perceptioncould lead us intomisperceptionwithouttherebeinganyfailureof entitlementand without herebeing anymalfunctionof ourcognitiveorperceptual ystems.The objectivity of perception depends on the possibility ofepistemicallyentitledmisperception.Perceptual ustificationandcriticismnecessarily presupposea distinctionbetween a person'scognitive perspectiveand the objective, physical subjectmatter.They further resuppose his unremarkableossibilityofcontingentmismatches in individual cases that in no way impugn theindividual's epistemic entitlementsor perceptual-cognitive unc-tioning.Rationalandepistemicevaluation ixes on theindividual'sperceptual udgmentsandperspective,noton theirphysicalsubjectmatter.For this is only brutecontingently related,in individualcases, to epistemicentitlement.A consequenceof interpreting ll self-knowledgeon the simpleobservationalmodel is thatin any given case bruteerrors-errorsthat do not reflect on the rationalityor soundfunctioningof thereviewing judgment-are possible. I intimatedearlierthat bruteerrorsdo not seem to threaten ome instancesof judgmentsaboutattitudes. proposeto show why this must be so.Not all one's knowledge of one's propositionalattitudescan fitthe simple observationalmodel. For general applicationof themodel is incompatiblewith the functionof knowledgeof one's ownattitudesncriticalreasoning.The main dea is thatsuchapplicationwould entail a dissociation between cognitive review and thethoughtsreviewed that is incompatiblewith norms of epistemicreasonability that are basic to all critical inquiry, includingempirical,mathematical, hilosophical,and practical nquiry.Rationalevaluationof attitudes ommonly appliesto and withinaperspectiveorpointof view. Theargumentwill makereference othis fact. Differentpeople havedifferentpoints of view. My judg-ment thatyour beliefs are irrationalmay be reasonablefrom mypointof view. But it does not follow thatthere s reason fromyourperspectiveto change yourbeliefs. I may have made some brute

that case be no questionof arationalrelationbetween them-which haveno intentionalcontent at all-and perceptionsorperceptual udgments.


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errorabout what your beliefs are, or your perspectivemay havedifferentassociatedreasonsorbackgroundnformation rommine.There can be differentperspectivesor points of view within agiven person.Whatis reasonable or a personata given timemaybe different from what is reasonablefrom the perspective of theperson's memory back on that time. What is reasonable onreflectionmay differ from what is reasonable nmodularcognitiveprocesses,or in an instantpracticalreasoning,or in subconsciousreasoning. My argumenthinges on how reasons transferacrosspointsof view.Supposethat all one's knowledgeof one's propositionalmentalevents and states fit the simple observationalmodel. Then one'sentitlement o instances of suchknowledgewould alwaysrest onpurely contingent relations between any given judgment aboutone's mentalstatesandthesubjectmatterof thejudgment.Whatismore,bruteerrorwould be possible in any given case. Normativeevaluations of reasonabilityand epistemic entitlement n criticalreasoning-in checking and evaluating one's reasoning-wouldapplywithintheperspectiveof thejudgments,but notimmediatelywithin heperspectiveof thesubjectmatter f the udgments, xceptinsofaras itcontingently onformed othose udgments,andexceptinsofar as it happened o be embedded n a perspectiverelevantlysimilar to the perspectivefrom which thejudgmentswere made.Forthe subjectmattermight,in any given case, fail to conform tothejudgments throughno failure of justificationor entitlement nthejudge, andthroughno malfunctionof therelevant aculties.But thispicture s nonsense f it is applied o alljudgmentsaboutone's own propositionalattitudes.For it is constitutiveof criticalreasoningthat if the reasons or assumptionsbeing reviewed arejustifiably found wanting by the reviewer, it rationallyfollowsimmediately hat there is primafacie reason for changingor sup-plementing hem,wherethisreasonapplieswithinthepointof viewof thereviewedmaterial not ustwithin hereviewingperspective).If therelationbetween thereviewingpointof view and thereasonsorassumptionsbeingreviewedalways fit the simpleobservationalmodel, there would never be an immediaterationally necessaryconnectionbetweenjustified rationalevaluationwithinthereview,on one hand,and its being prima facie reasonablewithin the re-viewedperspective oshapeattitudesnaccordwiththatevaluation,


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on theother.For the relationbetween theperspectiveof thereviewand that of the reviewed attitudeswould always be purely con-tingent,even undercanonicaldescriptionsof them,forpurposesofrational valuation. Theattitudes eviewedwouldbeto thereviewsasphysicalobjectsareto ourobservationaludgments.Theywouldbepurely objects'of one'sinquiry,notpartof theperspectiveof theinquiry.) t wouldbe reasonable or theperson rom hepointof viewof the review thata changein the reviewed materialbe made.Butthisreasonwouldnotnecessarily ransferowithin hepointofviewof the attitudesunderreview,even though hat s a pointof view ofthe sameperson.Itstransferring oulddependonbrute,contingent,non-rational elationsbetweenthetwo pointsof view.In critical reasoning, however, the connection is rationallyimmediateandnecessary.Justifiably indingone's reasons invalidor one's thoughtsunjustified, s normally n itselfa paradigmaticreason, from the pointof view of thethoughtsbeing reviewed(aswell as fromtheperspectiveof thereview), to alter hem.If in the courseof criticalreasoningI reasonablyconclude thatmy beliefthatagiven person s guiltyrestsentirelyonunreasonablepremisesor bad reasoning,then it normallyfollows immediatelybothfortheperspectiveof the review and fortheperspectiveof thereviewedbeliefthat t is reasonable o give up mybelief aboutguiltorlookfornewgrounds orit.Insuchsecond-order easoning, amnotnormallyreasonable n alteringmyfirst-order iews aboutguiltorinnocenceonly withtheproviso hat hey areembedded nreasonsthat contingently match those associated with my reviewingperspective.I do not normallyhave the sortof excusing conditionthatallows for rationalerror hathinges on thecontingentrelationthat the subjectmatterbearsto myjudgmentsaboutit. Rathermycheckingmy belief andfindingit wantingnormally tselfprovidesimmediate prima facie reason to change it from within theperspectiveof thereview.This isbecause he first-andsecond-orderperspectivesare the samepointof view.The reviewing of reasons that is integral to criticalreasoningincludes the review andthe reviewedattitudes n a single pointofview. The simple observationalmodel treats the review and thesystembeing reviewedas dissociatedin a way incompatiblewiththe norms of criticalreasoning.It makes the reviewed system anobjectof investigation,butnot partof the investigation'spointof


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view. So the model fails to account for the norms of criticalreasoning.A closely relatedpointcentreson epistemicresponsibility.Weare epistemically responsible only because we are capable ofreviewingourreasonsandreasoning.Andwe areparadigmaticallyresponsible or our reasonswhen we checkandreview themin thecourse of criticalreasoning.But the simple observationalmodelimplies that in carryingout reviews of one's reasoning,one isepistemically responsible not primarilyfor the thoughts beingreviewed butprimarily orthe review. The model impliesthat weare in reviewing our reasons only derivatively responsible forobjects of review, as one mightbe responsiblefor the actions ofone's childordog-but fully andprimarily esponsibleonlywhereone's knowledge and control contingentlymatched what one isjustifiedin believingaboutthem.But one is not epistemically responsiblefor the thoughtsonereflectsuponin criticalreasoning n theway one is responsible orsomethingone owns or parents.One'sresponsibilityn reflectingon one's thoughts s immediately or thewhole pointof view. Thesimpleobservationalmodel fails to account orthe fact thatcriticalreasoning s carriedout withina singlemulti-levelpointof view.Of course,we are sometimes disunified.Sometimes to our owngood andefficiency, sometimesto ourmisfortune,we fail to knowourmotives orreasons,orknowthemonlythroughobservationandempiricalreasoning. Sometimes from the point of view of ourself-conscious reviewing selves, we are indeed epistemicallyresponsible only derivatively for attitudesthat we know onlyempirically.But inthesecases, we arenotreasoningcriticallywiththoseaspectsof ourselves thatwe knowonly in theseways.Theoreticalknowledge of one's modularattitudes s one sort ofpurely observationally-based self-knowledge'. When attitudescannotbe known n a directnon-observationalway, onecommonlyenterssomequalification nthesenseinwhichthe attitudes reone'sown. Inthesecasesfailure o knowtheattitudesnon-observationallyis nosignof dissociation.Butwhenoneknowsonlyobservationallyunconscious attitudes which are in principle accessible tonon-observational elf-knowledge, there is some dissociation ofself, constitutedby a divide between the point of view of one'scriticalreasoningand the attitudeknownonlyobservationally.


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Knowledge throughtherapyof one's unconscious,before fullintegrationof thatknowledge, providesone sort of example.Onemay know the attitudeson the basis of observationallybasedtherapy,but the unconsciousattitudesmay providea pointof viewof their own into which the meta-evaluationsof them may nottransfer. Those evaluations may not speak to unconsciousconsiderations hatare ntegral o theunconsciouspathology;or theunconsciouspointof view maynot have 'taken n' matters hatareintegral o therationality f themeta-, therapeutic ointof view.

Psychoanalyticcases are not the only sort that illustratetherelevant dissociation.One may know from experience or theorythatonewill actacertainway, andyetrationalmeta-considerationsmaynotpenetrateo thesystemof attitudes hatmotivate he action.Some self-admittedcompulsionsprovide examples. One knowsone hasor will havetherelevant ntention,but knows the intentiononly as object; it is then not the productof criticaldeliberation.Sometimes rational considerations rom the meta-pointof viewmaynot have thesame rational orce andrelevancewithinthe pointof view that includes the observationallyknownattitudes.Thereare cases of knowledgeof one's beliefs like this as well.One may know from self-observation that 'underneath' onebelieves somethingbecause one needs to believe it, while feelingsincere rational urges to assert the contrary. The system ofunderlyingpracticalbeliefs that motivatethe needed belief mayform a point of view that does not recognize as sufficient therationalmeta-reasons hat one can offer oneself for giving up theneed-basedbelief. The person's meta-perspectivemay correctlycondemntheneed-basedbelief as epistemically rrational.Butthebelief may be dissociated from the point of view of hisobservationalknowledgeof thatbelief. Itmaybe rational overall'for the personto give up thebelief, but the practicalrationalityofthe limited,need-drivenperspectivemayexclude or outweigh theconsiderationshatcountagainstthe belief.The relevantpsychologicaldissociation is, I think, sometimespartlyto be explainedin terms of the fact thata second 'point ofview', or system of attitudeswith its own internalcoherence, hasgottensetupwithintheperson, n sucha waythatreasonsfromthepointof view of theperson'scriticalrationality onotautomaticallytransfer o withinthe secondpointof view, ratheras reasonsfrom


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my perspectivedo not alwaysapplyas reasonsfromyours.Beingknown from the perspective of the critical reasoneronly as anobject, on the basis of observationandtheory,is sufficient for anattitude o be dissociated n thisway. Attitudes hatarepartof sucha dissociated point of view may provide us with reasons, evenoperativeones,fordoing things.But insofaras we know themonlyobservationally,heyare notpartof ourcriticalreasoning.Where we know ourthoughtsor attitudesonly by observation,thequestionof meansof control-ofeffective application f reasonsto them-arises, at least fromtheperspectiveof ourobservationalknowledge.Wherewe know our attitudes nlyasempiricalobjects,notonly are ourrational valuationsof those attitudes elativized ocontingencies associated with the knowledge. But our ability toapplyourreasons(those associated with the pointof view of theobservationalknowledge) must acknowledgethe contingencyofourrational ontrolover those attitudes.We mustface aquestionofhow, by whatmeans,to makethose reasonseffective in view of thecontingent elationbetweenthepointof view of theself-knowledgeandrational valuation,ononehand,and heobservationally nownattitudes, n theother.Again, thisis notcriticalreasoning. n criticalreasoning,suchquestionsof means andcontroldo not arise,sinceone's relationto the knownattitudes s rationally mmediate: heyarepartof theperspectiveof thereviewitself.Sometimes observation-basedself-knowledge enables one toassimilate an attitude nto one's criticalpointof view, and to takedirectcriticalcontrolandresponsibilityorthe attitude. maylearnthroughobservingmy behaviouror throughreasoning n therapythatI believe thata friend s untrustworthy. may 'internalize'hisbelief so that it is no longer merely an object of observationalknowledge.Thisprocess s sometimes mmediate, ometimeshard,requiringdeep personalchange.Althoughmuchreasoningand rationalattitude ormationoccursoutside the purviewof criticalself-knowledge,orindeed any self-knowledge, criticalreasoningremainscentral to our identitiesaspersons.So noreasonableaccountof self-knowledgecan ignore herole andentitlements riticalreasoninggives to self-knowledge.The argumentI have given against the simple observationalmodel indicatesthattherelationsbetweenknowledgeand subjectmatteron which one's entitlement estscannotalwaysbe causally


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114 I-TYLERBURGEbrute,contingent,non-rationalones. In some particularnstancesof self-knowledge, the connection must be a rational one. Forconclusions about the reasonabilityof one's thoughtsbased onself-reviewdirectlyyieldreasons within thepointof view of thosereviewed thoughts o alteror confirm them. The relationbetweenself-knowledgeandsubjectmatter s thatthey mustnormallyandrationally be part of the same theoreticaland practical point ofview-elements of a single theoryorplan.Connectionsbetweenreviews andthoughtsunder eview thatarefully open to reason and that allow immediatetransmissionofreasons arenecessaryto the rationalcoherenceof a pointof view.A merelyobservation-basedelationbetweenattitudesnsuresthatthey arepartsof differentpointsof view. Indeed,it is constitutiveof apointof view that ailure o follow orunderstandtsconnectionsby theholder of thepointof view is a failureof rationality.Thus apoint of view is not closed under deductive consequence, andcontainsrationalconnectionsother thandeductiveones.Soentitlement oknowledgeof one's ownthoughtsandattitudesis notpurelya matterof what one does. It has to do with who oneis. One's status as a personandcriticalreasonerentailsepistemicentitlement o somejudgmentsaboutone's propositional ttitudes.Itentailssome non-observational nowledge of them.Cogito-like thoughts illustrate one non-contingent rationalrelationbetweenknowledge andsubjectmatter. nthose cases, thereviewed thought is simply a logical part of the review. Butcogito-like thoughtsare in many ways special cases. If we are tounderstand riticalreasoning, heentitlement hatI havediscussedmustapplymorebroadly. tmustinclude udgmentsaboutbeliefs,intentions,wants, as well as occurrenthoughts.So far,I have putlittle weight on the first-personpresenttenseform of the relevantpieces of self-knowledge.Clearly, for thereview andthe reviewedthoughts o be partof a practiceof criticalreasoning, hereviewedthoughtsmustbecapableof becomingpartof thereasoner'spresentarrayof attitudes.Andthespecialfeaturesof cogitocasesdodependonpresent ense.But muchof whatIhavesaid aboutthe dependenceof an entitlementon its role in criticalreasoning, and about the non-observationalcharacter of thisentitlement,appliestopreservativememory-that type of memorythat preserves propositions and our commitments to them in


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reasoning.15 thinkthatthis sortof memoryprovidesus withsomenon-observational nowledgeof ourpastmentalstatesandevents,and is epistemicallyunderwritten y its role in criticalreasoning.The first-personpointof view is clearlybasic to self-knowledgein criticalreasoning.Theself-knowledge hatIfeatureddiffers romobservationalknowledgeof physicalobjects nthat hefirst-personpoint of view is deeply relevant to the epistemic status of theknowledge.Inobservationsof physicalobjects,anyone couldhavemadesubstantiallyhesameobservationwithequalright, fthe sameangle of perceptionhad been available at the same time. Butself-ascriptions onstituteanepistemic angleinthemselves.Whatdoes thismetaphor ome to?If thereviewingknowledge sto be integralto criticalreasoning,if it is to provide immediaterational round orchange n the reviewedmaterial,hereviewmusttakeupthe sameperspectiveorpointof viewasthe actunderreview-the reasoner'sown object-level pointof view. The first-personpointof view bearsa distinctiverelation o therelevanceof rationalnormsto rationalactivity.For a review of a propositionalmentaleventorstate oyieldan mmediate ationalground o defendor altertheattitude, hepointof view of thereview and that of the attitudereviewedmust be thesame andmustbe first-personal.Inevaluatingreasoningcritically,one must make commitmentsto attitudespartlyonthe basisof criticalevaluationsof them. If oneis to fully articulate he rationalbasis for theapplicationof rationalnorms withincriticalreasoning, hecommitments o bothreviewsand reviewed attitudes must be conceptually acknowledgedasone's own. For acknowledging hem as one's own is takingthemas attitudes hatone couldrationallyanddirectlychangeor confirm.Acknowledging first-orderattitudesas one's own is necessary toarticulatinghe directrational elevanceof one's criticalreasonstofirst-orderreasoning (or more generally, reasonable activity). Iintendto say more aboutthis matteron anotheroccasion.I have sketched the environmentalneutralityof ourentitlementtoself-knowledge.The entitlement emainsconstantunderpossibleunnoticeable variations in environmental circumstances orcognitivecontent.Forit does notdepend on the empiricalcontent15 Cf. 'ContentPreservation',op. cit.


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116 I-TYLER BURGE

of the judgments. It does not depend on checking whether ourjudgments meet certain conditions.It depends on the judgments'being instances of a kind essential to critical reasoning. Criticalreasoningpresupposes hatpeople are entitled to such judgments.Since we are criticalreasoners,we are so entitled.Epistemicentitlementderivesfrom urisdiction-from theplaceof thejudgments n reasoning. ncogito-like thoughts, hisplaceiscodedinthe contentof thejudgmentsthemselves.Inotherrelevantsortsof self-knowledge,which arefallible,theentitlement, ndeedone'sknowledge,dependsonlyon one's notmisusing hejudgmentsandon one's remaininga sane criticalreasoner. 6

16 Versionsof this paperweregiven as the thirdof six LockeLecturesat Oxford n 1993,andthe first of two WhiteheadLecturesat Harvardn 1994,as well as on severalotheroccasions. The key idea and first draft of the paperdates from 1985. I am grateful orhelpful commentson draftsor talks based on this paperto RobertAdams, Kent Bach,Tony Brueckner,PhilClark,DavidKaplan,Christopher eacocke, MarleenRozemond,HilaryPutnam,NathanSalmon,HoustonSmit, BarryStroud,PatrickSuppes,andCorlissSwain.

our entitlement to self-knowledge

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