packgen, inc. v. bernstein, shur, sawyer & nelson, …...negligence, malpractice, or breach of...
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MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2019ME90Docket: Cum-18-58Argued: September11,2018Decided: June6,2019Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Majority: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andMEAD,GORMAN,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Dissent: HJELM,ALEXANDER,andJABAR,JJ.
PACKGEN,INC.v.
BERNSTEIN,SHUR,SAWYER&NELSON,P.A.HUMPHREY,J.
[¶1] In Maine, with exceptions not applicable to this appeal, the
Legislature has spoken—a civil action against an attorney for professional
negligence, malpractice, or breach of contract for legal services “shall be
commencedwithin6yearsafterthecauseofactionaccrues,”14M.R.S.§752
(2018),1 and the causeof action accrueson “thedateof the actoromission
givingrisetotheinjury,notfromthediscoveryofthe[attorney]malpractice,
negligenceorbreachofcontract.”14M.R.S.§753-B(2018).2Thequestionwe
1Section752identifiesthoseexceptionsas“actionsonajudgmentordecreeofanycourtofrecord
oftheUnitedStates,orofanystate,orofajusticeofthepeaceinthisState,andexceptasotherwisespeciallyprovided.”14M.R.S.§752(2018).
2Section753-Bprovidesthatonlyinactionsallegingprofessionalnegligence“intherenderingofarealestatetitleopinion”and“inthedraftingofalastwillandtestamentthathasbeenofferedfor
2
address in this appeal is whether the court-made doctrines of continuing
representationandcontinuingnegligenceshouldapplyinthedeterminationof
thedateonwhichacauseofactionforlegalmalpracticeaccruesundersection
753-B.
[¶2] Packgen, Inc., appeals from a judgment entered by the Superior
Court(CumberlandCounty,Warren,J.)grantingthemotionofBernstein,Shur,
Sawyer & Nelson, P.A. (Bernstein Shur), to dismiss Packgen’s complaint for
legalmalpracticebecausePackgen’sclaimisbarredbyMaine’ssix-yearstatutes
oflimitationsforcivilactions,14M.R.S.§752,andattorneymalpracticeactions,
14M.R.S. §753-B. Packgen argues that its claim is not barred because the
doctrinesofcontinuingrepresentation3andcontinuingnegligence4operateto
bring the date of the act or omission “giving rise to [its] injury”—Bernstein
Shur’s failure to serve a proper notice of claim or file a defective-products
probate,” the limitation period commences upon the discovery of the cause of action. 14M.R.S.§753-B(2)-(3)(2018).
3 “Thepremise [of thedoctrineofcontinuingrepresentation] is thatthecauseofactioninanattorney malpractice case should not accrue until the attorney’s representation concerning aparticulartransactionisterminated.”3RonaldE.Mallen,LegalMalpractice§23:44at543(2019ed.2019)(quotationmarksomitted).
4Underacontinuingnegligencetheory,thestatuteoflimitationsperioddoes“notbegintorununtilthedateofthelastactofnegligence”—thedateoflastinjury.SeeBakerv.Farrand,2011ME91,¶20,26A.3d806;seealsoDickeyv.Vermette,2008ME179,¶9,960A.2d1178;3J.D.Lee&BarryA.Lindahl,ModernTortLaw:LiabilityandLitigation§25:123,at25-242to-243(2ded.2002)(“Underthecontinuingtortdoctrine,ifthenegligenceinvolvesacontinuingtortinvolvingacontinuinginjury,thestatuteoflimitationsdoesnotbegintorununtilthewrongterminates.”).
3
complaint—within the statute of limitations. 14 M.R.S. § 753-B(1). In the
contextofactionsforattorneymalpractice,wedeclinetoadopteitherdoctrine
and affirm the judgment dismissing the complaint as untimely pursuant to
14M.R.S.§§752,753-B.
I.BACKGROUND
[¶3]ThefollowingfactsaredrawnfromPackgen’samendedcomplaint
andfromdocumentsattachedtoitwhoseauthenticity isnotchallenged. See
Andrewsv.SheepscotIslandCo.,2016ME68,¶8,138A.3d1197;seealsoMoody
v.StateLiquor&LotteryComm’n,2004ME20,¶11,843A.2d43.Weviewthe
facts alleged in the complaint as if they were admitted. See Andrews,
2016ME68,¶8,138A.3d1197.
A. UnderlyingFederalCase—Packgenv.Covalence
[¶4] In 2008, Packgen retained Bernstein Shur to prosecute a
defective-productsclaimagainstCovalenceSpecialtyCoatings,LLC,andBerry
PlasticsCorporation.
[¶5] OnMay 29, 2008, Bernstein Shur sent a letter to Covalence “to
provide noticeof [Packgen’s] claimagainstCovalence.”5 Although the letter
5Packgen’samendedcomplaint,fromwhichwedrawthesefacts,allegesonlythatBernsteinShur
sentthelettertoCovalence.ItisunclearfromthecomplaintwhetherBernsteinShuralsosentthelettertoBerryPlastics.
4
wassignedbyaBernsteinShurattorney,itdidnotsetforththecauseofaction
underoathasisrequiredby14M.R.S.§1602-B(5)(2018).BernsteinShurdid
notnoticethemissingoath,nordiditinformPackgenthata“propernoticeof
claim [was required] to start the accrual of prejudgment interest” or warn
Packgenof“theadverseconsequencesoffailingtoservesuchanotice”orthe
need to “promptly file suit . . . in order to protect Packgen’s prejudgment
interest rights.” In the three years that followed, Bernstein Shur “made no
attempt to servea valid noticeof claim that compliedwith section1602-B,”
“failedtofilesuitorotherwisediligentlypursuethecase,”and“failedtokeep
Packgenadequatelyinformedaboutthestatusofitscase.”
[¶6] In 2011, Packgen retained new counsel and sued Covalence and
BerryPlasticsintheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheDistrictofMaine.On
November13,2015,ajuryrenderedaverdictinfavorofPackgenintheamount
of$7,206,646.30,plusinterestasallowedbylaw. Packgenfiledanamended
motion to alter or amend the judgment to allow post-judgment interest to
accrue from May 29, 2008, the date that Covalence purportedly received
BernsteinShur’sletteronbehalfofPackgen.
[¶7]OnDecember11,2015,whilethepartieswereawaitingthecourt’s
decisionontheamendedmotion,PackgenandBernsteinShur“enteredintoa
5
tollingagreementpursuant towhichanyandall legaldefensesbasedon the
passageoftimeandanylimitationsperiodsapplicabletoanyclaimorcauseof
actionPackgenmaypossessagainst[BernsteinShur]arisingoutof[Bernstein
Shur’s] representation of Packgen on claims against [Covalence] and other
responsible parties . . . were tolled and would be deemed suspended from
runningasofDecember11,2015.”
[¶8]OnMarch7,2016,thefederalcourt(Torresen,J.)deniedPackgen’s
motion to alter or amend the judgment because Bernstein Shur’s letter to
Covalencefailedtocomplywiththeoathrequirementin14M.R.S.§1602-B(5)
andthereforedidnotconstituteavalidnoticeofclaim.Asaresult,Packgenwas
permitted to recoverprejudgment interestdatingonly from the filingof the
complaintin2011ratherthanfromMay29,2008,thedateonwhichBernstein
Shurservedtheunswornnotice.
B. Packgen’sClaimAgainstBernsteinShur
[¶9]OnMay23,2017,PackgenfiledacomplaintagainstBernsteinShur
intheSuperiorCourtallegingthatthelawfirm’sfailuretosendanoticethat
compliedwiththerequirementsofsection1602-BcausedPackgentosustain
aneconomiclossintheamountof$2,510,293.84—thedifferencebetweenthe
prejudgment interest actually awarded by the federal court and the
6
prejudgmentinterestthatwouldhavebeenawardedbutforBernsteinShur’s
negligence.
[¶10]BernsteinShurrespondedwithamotiontodismissthecomplaint
onthegroundsthatPackgen’sclaimswerebarredbythesix-yearstatutesof
limitationsforcivilactions,14M.R.S.§752,andattorneymalpracticeactions,
14M.R.S.§753-B.BernsteinShurarguedthattheactgivingrisetoPackgen’s
allegedinjury—thebasisforPackgen’scauseofactionagainstit—occurredon
May29,2008,thedatethedefectivenoticewassenttoCovalence,andtherefore
thestatuteoflimitationsexpiredonMay29,2014,threeyearsbeforePackgen
fileditscomplaint.
[¶11] Packgen then filed an amended complaint, asserting that the
December 2015 tolling agreement suspended the statute of limitations.
Bernstein Shur countered in an amendedmotion to dismiss that the tolling
agreement only saved claims that had not already expired. Bernstein Shur
argued that, because the letterwas sent onMay 29, 2008, the suit alleging
negligenceinthatletterwasbarredbythestatuteoflimitationsregardlessof
the tolling agreement, which only preserved claims accruing after
December11,2009,sixyearspriortothesigningoftheagreement.
7
[¶12]Thecourtconcludedthatsection753-B(1)barredPackgen’sclaim
andgrantedBernsteinShur’smotiontodismisstheamendedcomplaint“asto
any claim for loss of prejudgment interest prior to the filing of [Packgen’s]
federalcomplaint.”
[¶13]ThecourtnotedthatPackgen“appear[ed]toarguethatitsclaimis
not limited to the lossofprejudgment interestbecauseof [BernsteinShur’s]
failure todiligentlypursue thecaseandkeepPackgen informedof itsstatus
constituted legal malpractice ‘which caused additional damage to Packgen.’
Packgen’samendedcomplaint,however, innowayspecifieswhatadditional
damageorlosseswereallegedlycausedby[BernsteinShur’s]lackofdiligence.”
(Citationomitted.)ThecourtgrantedPackgenleavetofileamotiontofilean
amended complaint if it alleged that BernsteinShur committedprofessional
negligence on or after December 11, 2009, that caused Packgen to incur
financial lossesotherthanthelossofprejudgmentinterest. Packgendidnot
filesuchamotion,andthecourtentereditsfinaljudgmentdismissingtheaction
onJanuary24,2018.
[¶14] The court rejected Packgen’s assertions that the doctrines of
continuingrepresentationandcontinuingnegligenceoperatetosaveitsclaim
fromBernsteinShur’sstatuteoflimitationsdefensebecauseitdeterminedthat
8
such a result would contravene the Legislature’s intent in rejecting the
discovery rule and adopting the six year statute of limitations in 14 M.R.S.
§753-B(1).Packgentimelyappealed.M.R.App.P.2B(c).
II.DISCUSSION
[¶15]Packgenarguesthatthecourterredwhenitdismisseditsclaimas
untimely because the court limited its analysis to Bernstein Shur’s act of
sending the defective notice of claim to Covalence on May 29, 2008. It is
Packgen’s position that Bernstein Shur committed actionable, negligent
omissionseachdaythatitfailedtosendavalidnoticeortakeotheractionin
thecaseafterDecember11,2009.6
A. StandardofReview
[¶16]“Amotiontodismissteststhelegalsufficiencyofthecomplaint,”
InreWagePaymentLitig.,2000ME162,¶3,759A.2d217(quotationmarks
omitted),thematerialallegationsofwhich“mustbetakenasadmitted,”Moody,
2004ME20,¶7,843A.2d43(quotationmarksomitted);seealsoRamseyv.
BaxterTitleCo.,2012ME113,¶2,54A.3d710.Whenreviewingthegrantofa
motiontodismiss,“weexaminethecomplaintinthelightmostfavorabletothe
6 Packgen asserts that its claim against Bernstein Shur for negligent omissions after
December11,2009,waspreservedbytheparties’December11,2015,tollingagreement.
9
plaintiff to determinewhether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or
alleges facts thatwould entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal
theory.” InreWagePaymentLitig.,2000ME162,¶3,759A.2d217;seealso
McCormickv.Crane,2012ME20,¶5,37A.3d295.Adismissalisonlyproper
“whenitappearsbeyonddoubtthat[the]plaintiffisentitledtonoreliefunder
any set of facts that [it] might prove in support of [its] claim.” Moody,
2004ME20,¶7,843A.2d43(quotationmarksomitted).
B. StatuteofLimitations
[¶17] In this case, Packgen challenges the court’s interpretation and
applicationofthestatuteoflimitationsinattorneymalpracticecases.“Whether
a claim is barred by the statute of limitations is a legal question subject to
denovoreview.”EstateofWeatherbee,2014ME73,¶14,93A.3d248.“The
statuteoflimitationsisanaffirmativedefense.Unlessitisclearonthefaceof
thecomplaint that theaction isbarredby therelevantstatuteof limitations,
dismissal on limitations grounds is improper.” Jackson v. Borkowski,
627A.2d1010,1013(Me.1993)(citationomitted).
[¶18]Inalegalnegligenceormalpracticeaction,thesix-yearstatuteof
limitationsbeginstorunfromthedatethecauseofactionaccrues,14M.R.S.
§752—thatis,“fromthedateoftheactoromissiongivingrisetotheinjury,not
10
from the discovery of the [attorney] malpractice, negligence or breach of
contract,”id.§753-B(1).
[¶19]Ingeneral,“[w]econstruestatutesoflimitationsnarrowly.”White
v. McTeague, Higbee, Case, Cohen,Whitney & Toker, P.A., 2002ME 160, ¶ 8,
809A.2d622.“Whenastatutealreadydefinesaccrual. . .wearenotfreeto
re-definetheterm,”Muskv.Nelson,647A.2d1198,1201(Me.1994);however,
“[a]bsentlegislativedirection,thedecisionofwhenacauseofactionaccruesis
ajudicialfunction,”White,2002ME160,¶7,809A.2d622.
[¶20] “In interpretinga statute,oursinglegoal is togive effect to the
Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.” Dickau v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co.,
2014ME158,¶19,107A.3d621.Ingeneral,astatuteoflimitations“shouldbe
construedstrictlyinfavorofthebarwhichitwasintendedtocreate.”Harkness
v.Fitzgerald,1997ME207,¶5,701A.2d370(quotationmarksomitted);see
also Dickau, 2014 ME 158, ¶ 21, 107 A.3d 621 (“Among [the principles of
statutory construction] is the principle that we must interpret the plain
languagebytakingintoaccountthesubjectmatterandpurposesofthestatute,
andtheconsequencesofaparticularinterpretation.”).
[¶21] To determine that legislative intent, “we first look to the plain
languageoftheprovisionstodeterminetheirmeaning.”MainetodayMedia,Inc.
11
v.State,2013ME100,¶6,82A.3d104. “Weseektodiscernfromtheplain
languageofthestatutetherealpurposeofthelegislation,avoidingresultsthat
areabsurd,inconsistent,unreasonable,orillogical.Ifthestatutorylanguageis
clearandunambiguous,weconstrue thestatute inaccordancewith itsplain
meaning in the contextof thewhole statutory scheme.” Harrington v.State,
2014 ME 88, ¶ 5, 96 A.3d 696 (alteration, citation, and quotation marks
omitted).“Iftheplainlanguageofastatuteisambiguous—thatis,susceptible
ofdifferentmeanings—wewillthengoontoconsiderthestatute’smeaningin
lightofitslegislativehistoryandotherindiciaoflegislativeintent.”Mainetoday
Media,Inc.,2013ME100,¶6,82A.3d104.
1. TheOccurrenceRule
[¶22]Title14M.R.S.§753-Bprovidestheaccrualdateforactionsagainst
attorneysasfollows:
Inactionsallegingprofessionalnegligence,malpractice,orbreachofcontractfor legalservicebya licensedattorney, thestatuteoflimitationsstartstorunfromthedateoftheactoromissiongivingrise to the injury, not from the discovery of the malpractice,negligenceorbreachofcontract,exceptasprovidedinthissectionorasthestatuteoflimitationsmaybesuspendedbyotherlaws.
12
By its plain language, section 753-B unambiguously divests itself of the
discoveryruleinattorneymalpracticecasesinallbuttwocircumstancesnot
applicablehere7and,instead,adoptsanoccurrencerule.14M.R.S.§753-B.
[¶23]Underthediscoveryrule,thestatuteoflimitationsistolleduntil
theinjuredpartyknowsorshouldknowoftheharmcaused.See3RonaldE.
Mallen,LegalMalpractice§23:54at604(2019ed.2019).Incontrast,under
theoccurrencerule,thestatuteoflimitationsbeginstorunonthedateofthe
“occurrenceoftheessentialfactsthatformthecauseofaction”—i.e.,thedate
oftheactoromissiongivingrisetotheinjury.Seeid.§23:22at446-50.Asa
practicalmatter, because the clockbegins to runon the date that the actor
omission giving rise to the injury occurred, under the occurrence rule, the
statuteoflimitationscouldbegintorunbeforeaninjuredpartybecomesaware
ofitsinjury.Id.§23:22at454.
[¶24] Packgen argues that our analysis regarding negligence or
malpracticeactionsagainstattorneysshouldnotbelimitedtothestricturesof
the occurrence rule and urges us to adopt the doctrines of continuing
representationandcontinuingnegligence,whichwouldsaveitsclaimagainst
BernsteinShurfromdismissalresultingfromthestatuteoflimitations.
7Seesupran.2.
13
2. TheContinuingRepresentationDoctrine
[¶25] The doctrine of continuing representation has been adopted in
somestates.Inthosestates,thedoctrineisapplied“onlywherethereareclear
indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing and dependent relationship
between the client and the attorney.” Smithv.Stacy, 482 S.E.2d 115, 121
(W.Va.1996)(quotationmarksomitted).Thisdoctrineis“designedtotollthe
statute of limitations during the continuation of the attorney/client
relationship. . .untiltheprofessionalrelationshipterminateswithrespectto
the matter underlying the malpractice action.” Id. at 120. The continuing
representationdoctrinewasoriginallyusedinmedicalmalpracticecasesand
applied in legal malpractice litigation as “a direct reaction to the illogical
requirement of the occurrence rule, which compels clients to sue their
attorneysthoughtherelationshipcontinues,andtherehasnotbeenandmay
never be any injury.” 3Ronald E.Mallen, LegalMalpractice §23:44 at 543.
Relyingonthisreasoning,Packgenassertsthatweshouldadoptthecontinuing
representationdoctrineinlegalmalpracticecasesandclaimsithadanongoing,
continuous,developing,anddependentrelationshipwithBernsteinShur.
[¶26]Althoughwehavenothadtheopportunitytodeterminewhether
the continuing representation doctrine has a place in attorney malpractice
14
litigation,8wehavehadoccasiontoreviewtheuseofthisdoctrineinthecontext
of medical malpractice claims. See Dickey v. Vermette, 2008 ME 179,
960A.2d1178.InDickey,werejectedtheapplicationofthecontinuingcourse
of treatment doctrine—as it is called in medical malpractice litigation—
pursuanttowhichthestatuteof limitationswouldnotbegintorununtil the
endof thedoctor-patientrelationship. Id.¶7. Weobserved that,when the
Legislatureset“athree-yearperiodoflimitations,declaringthatthecauseof
actionaccruesonthedateoftheactoromissiongivingrisetotheinjuryand
carvingoutaspecificexceptionforforeignobjects,theLegislatureeffectively
declinedtoadoptthecontinuingcourseoftreatmentdoctrine.”Id.(quotation
marksomitted).Applyingthecontinuouscourseoftreatmentdoctrinetosave
the plaintiff’s claim would have required “imposing a judicially-created
exceptionthatiscontrarytotheplainmeaningof[thestatuteoflimitations].”
Id.;seealsoDashav.Me.Med.Ctr.,665A.2d993,996(Me.1995).
[¶27] The legislativehistoryofsection753-Bsimilarlyproscribesour
abilitytodefinewhenalegalnegligenceormalpracticecauseofactionaccrues.
8InNevinv.UnionTr.Co.,1999ME47,¶37,726A.2d694,wedeclinedtodeterminewhetherthe
continuingrepresentationdoctrinecouldeverapplyinlegalmalpracticecasesbecausetheplaintiffs“stipulatedawayanysuchclaimsbywaivingclaimsregardinganyrepresentation”intheunexpiredlimitationsperiod.
15
TheLegislatureclearlydefinedtheaccrualdateforactionsforlegalmalpractice
whenitfirstadoptedtheoccurrencerule,seeP.L.1985,ch.804,§2(effective
Aug.1,1988)(codifiedat14M.R.S.§753-A(Supp.1988)).9Thischangetothe
legalmalpracticestatuteoflimitationswaspartofasubstantialoverhaultothe
lawsrelatingtoprofessionalliabilitygenerally,andwasprimarilyaneffortto
respondtothehighcostofliabilityinsuranceformedicalpractitioners.SeeL.D.
2400 (112thLegis. 1986). Theoccurrence rule “comportswith a legislative
intent to limit stale claims against attorneys” and the “policy of repose
mandatedbytheLegislature.”White,2002ME160,¶8,809A.2d622.When
the Legislature enacted the statute of limitations for actions involving
attorneys, itarticulatedthatthis law“expandsthecurrent ‘discoveryrule’ in
actions...byextendingittomalpracticeactionsinvolvingwillsaswellastitle
searches.The‘discoveryrule’willnotapplyinanyotherattorneymalpractice
actions.”L.D.2400,StatementofFact(112thLegis.1986)(emphasisadded);
seealsoNevinv.UnionTr.Co.,1999ME47,¶¶31,34-35,726A.2d694.This
Legislativeactionrevealsanintentnotonlytoproviderepose,buttostartthe
statutory clock at the earliest possible moment—when the act or omission
9Title14M.R.S.§753-Ahassincebeenrepealedandreplacedby14M.R.S.§753-B(2018).See
P.L.2001,ch.114,§§1-2(effectiveSept.21,2001).
16
causingtheinjuryoccurs. TheLegislaturecouldhavechosentoadoptarule
thattriggeredtherunningofthestatuteoflimitationswhentheclientbecame
aware of his or her injury, but it did not. Instead, it determined that the
limitationsperiodbeginswhentheactoromissiongivingrisetothecauseof
actionoccurs.14M.R.S.§753-B.ThissuggeststhattheLegislatureintended
forlegalmalpracticeclaimstobeginandberesolvedwithoutdelay.
[¶28] Further, as reasoned inDickey, and correctly recognizedby the
trialcourt in thiscase, applying thedoctrineofcontinuingrepresentation in
attorney negligence or malpractice actions would be tantamount to
resurrecting the discovery rule, which is clearly foreclosed by the plain
languageofsection753-B.2008ME179,¶7,960A.2d1178.Adoptionofthe
continuing representation doctrinewould defer accrual of a cause of action
until the attorney-client relationship is terminated, potentially tolling the
statuteoflimitationsthroughyearsoftrialandappellatereview,whichwould
contradict the “policy of repose mandated by the Legislature.” White,
2002ME160,¶8,809A.2d622.
[¶29] The Legislature has provided a specific six-year period of
limitationssubjecttotwonarrowexceptions.14M.R.S.§753-B(2)-(3).Weare
notfreetocarveoutadditionalexceptionstosection753-Bandthereforedo
17
not do so here. SeeNevin, 1999ME47, ¶ 34, 726A.2d 694. (“[W]hen the
Legislature provides for enumerated exceptions to its definition, those
exceptions implicitly deny the availability of any other.” (alteration and
quotationmarksomitted)). While itmayseemuncomfortable topotentially
requirethataclient,inordertopreserveitsclaim,sueitsattorneybeforethe
relationship has been severed, the Legislature clearly determined that the
limitationsperiodinlegalmalpracticecasesbeginstorunonthedateoftheact
or omission giving rise to the injury, not the date of the termination of the
attorney-clientrelationship.
C. ContinuingNegligenceDoctrine
[¶30] Alternatively, Packgen urges that we apply the continuing
negligencedoctrinetoitslegalmalpracticeclaimasweappliedthedoctrineto
amedicalmalpracticeclaiminBakerv.Farrand,2011ME91,¶29,26A.3d806.
Underthecontinuingnegligenttreatmentdoctrine,thelimitationsperioddoes
notbegintorun“untilthedateofthelastactofnegligence.”Id.¶20.InBaker,
we examined the plain language of 24 M.R.S. §2902 (2018)—the medical
malpracticestatuteoflimitations—andrelied,inpart,ontheruleofstatutory
18
constructionin1M.R.S.§71(9)(2018),10todeterminethatitwasconsonant
withtheplainmeaningofthestatute“todefinetheterm‘actoromission’as
usedinsection2902asreferringtoeitherasingleactoromission,oraseriesof
related acts or omissions that proximately cause a harm.” 2011 ME 91,
¶¶27-28,26A.3d806(emphasisadded).Asaresult,weheld,
pursuant to section 2902, a plaintiff may bring a single actionalleging continuing negligent treatment that arises from two ormorerelatedactsoromissionsbyasinglehealthcareproviderorpractitioner where each act or omission deviated from theapplicable standard of care and, to at least some demonstrabledegree,proximatelycausedtheharmcomplainedof,aslongasatleastoneoftheallegednegligentactsoromissionsoccurredwithinthreeyearsofthenoticeofclaim.
Id.¶29.
[¶31]PackgenurgesthatthisreasoninginBakershouldalsobeapplied
to claimsof legalmalpracticeunder section753-BbecauseBernsteinShur’s
ongoingfailuretosendapropernoticeofclaim,incombinationwithitsfailure
tofilesuitandadequatelyadvisePackgenuptothedateoftheterminationof
its representation in2011,proximately caused the lossof the fullamountof
prejudgmentinteresttowhichPackgenwasentitled.Seeid.¶¶24-25.Inother
words, Packgen asserts that its cause of action was preserved because the
10“Wordsofthesingularnumbermayincludetheplural;andwordsofthepluralnumbermay
includethesingular.”1M.R.S.§71(9)(2018).
19
limitations period did not begin to run until Bernstein Shur allegedly
committed its lastnegligentomission. However,Baker doesnot control the
applicationofthecontinuingnegligencedoctrineinlegalmalpracticeactions.
[¶32]InBaker,aprimarycarephysicianperformedsixannualtestsona
patient’s prostate, only two of which fell within the applicable statute of
limitations. Id.¶3-4. Thephysicianfailedtoreferthepatienttoaspecialist
afterthreeofthetests,eventhoughtheresultswereabnormalandtheneedfor
furthertestingwasindicated.Id.Asaresult,thepatient’sprostatecancerwas
notdetecteduntilafteritspreadconsiderablyandhistreatmentoptionswere
substantiallylimited.Id.Becausetheharmwascausedbyacontinuingcourse
ofnegligenttreatment,thepatientwaspermittedtobringacauseofactionon
thebasisofeachoftheoccasionsonwhichthephysicianfailedtoadheretothe
standardofcare,eventhoughonlytwoofthoseactsoromissionsfellwithinthe
limitationsperiod.Id.¶¶3,29.
[¶33]UnlikethecontinuingcourseofnegligenttreatmentinBaker,the
negligencePackgenallegesarisesfromasingleact:BernsteinShur’sfailureto
sendapropernoticeofclaimonMay29,2008.Here,thenegligentactionwas
singular—an isolated mistake severable from the remainder of Bernstein
Shur’s representation of Packgen—and substantially dissimilar from the
20
ongoing treatment and annual testing in Baker. We understand Packgen’s
argumentthatBernsteinShurcommittedanewnegligentomissioneachdayit
failed to provide a proper notice of claim or seek another remedy after
May29,2008;however,wewere clear inBaker thatwhere it is “reasonably
probablethatoneactoromissioninaseriesofactsoromissionswasthesole
proximatecauseof the injurycomplainedof,acauseof actionwouldaccrue
fromthedateofthatactoromission,andnotfromthedatesofanysubsequent
actsoromissions.”Id.¶24.Inthiscase,itisreasonablyprobablethattheharm
PackgencomplainsofoccurredasaresultofBernsteinShur’sallegedfailureto
meettheoathrequirementsforthenoticeofclaimonMay29,2008.Assuch,
thecontinuingnegligencedoctrineisinappropriateinthiscase.
[¶34]Moreover,theapplicabilityofthecontinuingnegligencedoctrine
to the medical malpractice statute of limitations was based firmly “on the
language and authority of the Health Security Act,” to which there are no
analogousprovisionsintheattorneymalpracticecontext. Id.¶30.InBaker,
weanchoredourholdingontwodefinitionsparticulartotheHealthSecurity
Act:“actionforprofessionalnegligence”and“professionalnegligence.”Id.¶22
(citing24M.R.S.§2502(6)-(7)(2018)). Thesedefinitionsprovidedthebasis
forourholdingthattheactoromissionthattriggersthestatuteoflimitations
21
couldbeacombinationofseveralrelatedactsoromissions,includingactsor
omissionsoutsidethestatuteoflimitations.Thedefinitionsrelevanttotitle24
specificallyauthorizetheuseofmultipleactsoromissionstomakeoutaclaim
ofprofessionalnegligence; therefore, itwas logical forus toconclude in the
medical malpractice context that the precipitating event for a medical
malpracticeclaimcouldbeaseriesofrelatedevents,thecombinationofwhich
proximatelycausedthepatient’s injury. Id.;seealso24M.R.S.§2502(6)-(7).
Thissamelogicdoesnotapplytoclaimsforattorneymalpracticepursuantto
14M.R.S.§753-B.
[¶35] There are no congruent definitions in title 14, generally, or in
chapter 205, specifically. Without similar authorizing language onwhich to
draw,we are unable to conclude that the continuing negligence doctrine is
applicabletoclaimsforlegalmalpractice.Moreover,consideringtheparticular
language and history of section 753-B, it is clear that the application of the
continuing negligence doctrine is foreclosed by the Legislature’s intent to
providetimelyreposetoclaimsagainstattorneys,asdiscussedabove.White,
2002ME160,¶8,809A.2d622.Whileitcanbesaidthatsection753-B,like
any statute of limitations, provides an arbitrary cutoff afterwhich a client’s
22
claimagainsthisattorneyisnolongerviable,thiswasadeliberatechoicethe
Legislaturemade,andwemustdefertoit.
III.CONCLUSION
[¶36] Given the legislative history underpinning the adoption of the
occurrenceruleinsection752,theplainlanguageofsection753-Bregarding
actionsagainstattorneys, and thestrictconstructionweapply tostatutesof
limitations,weconcludethattheLegislatureintendedtolimittheaccrualofa
causeofactionforattorneynegligenceormalpracticetothe“actoromission
givingrisetotheinjury”—thatis,theattorney’ssingularactoromissionthat
proximatelycaused theharmto theclient,14M.R.S.§753-B,andnot to the
attorney’songoingfailuretocorrectthatsingularactoromission.Inthiscase,
theactgivingrisetoPackgen’sallegedinjuryoccurredonMay29,2008,and
Packgen’s claim expired on May 29, 2014, six years after the service of the
defectivenoticeletter,anditisnowtimebarred,14M.R.S.§§752,753-B.We
musteffectuatetheLegislature’slanguageandwemaynotholdotherwise.See
Myrickv.James,444A.2d987,992(Me.1982)(“Thatwhichwemaynotdois
tochangesucharuleorpolicyoncetheLegislaturehasspecificallytakenthat
ruleorpolicyoutofthearenaofthejudicialprerogative....”).
23
Theentryis:
Judgmentaffirmed.
HJELM,J.,withwhomALEXANDERandJABAR,JJ.,join,dissenting. [¶37] For two fundamental reasons, I disagree with the Court’s
conclusionthatPackgen,Inc.’sclaimforprofessionalnegligence,filedagainst
its formerattorneys,Bernstein,Shur,Sawyer&Nelson,P.A., isbarredbythe
statuteoflimitations.First,inmyview,thecomplaintsufficientlyallegesthat
somenegligentomissionsoccurredwithintheperiodoflimitations,andsothat
part of Packgen’s claim should survive for that reason alone. Second, the
doctrineofcontinuingnegligence,whichwehaveadopted incases involving
medicalnegligence,shouldbeappliedtoclaimsoflegalmalpracticeand,atthis
very early phase of the case, entitles Packgen to pursue the entirety of its
negligenceclaim.Forthesereasons,Irespectfullydissent.
[¶38]ThenarrowissuepresentedhereisthelegalviabilityofPackgen’s
claim as pleaded in its amended complaint. The criterion for assessing the
adequacyofapleadingisfamiliarandgenerous.Forpurposesofthisanalysis,
wetaketheallegationstobetrueand“examinethecomplaintinthelightmost
favorabletotheplaintifftodeterminewhetheritsetsforthelementsofacause
24
ofactionor alleges facts thatwouldentitle theplaintiff toreliefpursuant to
somelegaltheory.” Argereowv.Weisberg,2018ME140,¶2,195A.3d1210
(quotationmarksomitted).BecauseMaineisanotice-pleadingjurisdiction,the
levelofscrutinyusedtoassessthesufficiencyofapleadingis“forgiving.”Howe
v.MMGIns.Co.,2014ME78,¶9,95A.3d79(quotationmarksomitted).The
statuteoflimitations—anaffirmativedefense—isthesolebasisforBernstein
Shur’smotiontodismissPackgen’scomplaint,sodismissalisproperonlyif“it
isclearonthefaceofthecomplaint”thattheclaimistime-barred.Jacksonv.
Borkowski,627A.2d1010,1013(Me.1993).
[¶39]TherelevantfactsandchronologyofeventsasallegedinPackgen’s
amendedcomplaintarenotcomplicated.PackgenretainedBernsteinShurin
2008“toprosecuteitslegalclaims”arisingfromacommercialdispute.Inlate
Mayof2008,BernsteinShursenttheprospectivedefendantanoticeofclaim,
buttheformofthenoticewasinsufficienttotriggertheaccrualofprejudgment
interest,see14M.R.S.§1602-B(5)(2018).Then,overthecourseofthenext
threeyears,BernsteinShurcontinuously“failedtofilesuit,”failedtoservethe
prospectivedefendantwithapropernoticeofclaim,andfailedto“otherwise
diligentlypursuethecase[,]whichcausedadditionaldamagetoPackgen.”In
2011,PackgenterminateditsrelationshipwithBernsteinShurand“retained
25
newcounsel[,]whopromptlybroughtsuitonPackgen’sbehalf,”resultingina
substantialmoneyjudgmentforPackgen.
[¶40] Packgen and Bernstein Shur entered into a tolling agreement,
which,asofDecember11,2015,stoppedtheclockthatwoulddeterminethe
timelinessofanyclaimthatPackgenmightlaterassertagainstBernsteinShur.
And,infact,inMayof2017,Packgencommencedthisaction.Because,asthe
parties agree,Packgen’sclaimagainstBernsteinShur issubject toasix-year
periodoflimitations,see14M.R.S.§752(2018),thetollingagreementrenders
as timely any partofPackgen’s claim that accruedonor afterDecember11,
2009.
[¶41]Theinterpretationandapplicationoftwointerrelatedstatutesare
integraltothisappeal. Thefirststatute,14M.R.S.§752,appliesbroadlyand
provides,
Allcivilactionsshallbecommencedwithin6yearsafterthecauseofactionaccruesandnotafterwards,exceptactionsonajudgmentordecreeofanycourtofrecordoftheUnitedStates,orofanystate,orofa justiceof thepeace in thisState,andexceptasotherwisespeciallyprovided.
The second, 14 M.R.S. § 753-B (2018), applies specifically to actions
commencedagainstattorneysandstates,
Inactionsallegingprofessionalnegligence,malpracticeorbreachofcontractfor legalservicebya licensedattorney, thestatuteof
26
limitationsstartstorunfromthedateoftheactoromissiongivingrise to the injury, not from the discovery of the malpractice,negligenceorbreachofcontract,exceptasprovidedinthissectionorasthestatuteoflimitationsmaybesuspendedbyotherlaws.
[¶42] The facial reach of the six-year limitation period created by
section752 covers some, but not all, of the time that Bernstein Shur
representedPackgen,whichwasfrom2008into2011.Thus,inexaminingthe
timelinessofPackgen’sclaims,therearetwodifferentperiodstobeconsidered:
(1)theperiodbeginningDecember11,2009,whichisthesix-yearperiodthat
ended with the effective date of the parties’ tolling agreement; and (2) the
period that predates December 11, 2009. Because the legal considerations
differasbetweenthesetwotimeframes,Iaddressthemseparately.
A. AllegationsofNegligenceOccurringOnandAfterDecember11,2009
[¶43]AsInoteabove,Packgenallegesthatthroughouttheentirecourse
of Bernstein Shur’s representation of its interests, which extended until
sometime in 2011—and includes more than one year within the period of
limitations prescribed in section 752—the firm was negligent in several
differentways. Packgen’sclaim includesallegations,notonly thatBernstein
Shurwasnegligentbyissuingthestatutorilydefectivenoticeofclaim,butalso
thatthefirmnegligentlyfailedtofilesuitonPackgen’sunderlyingcommercial
claim,which alsowould have triggered the accrual of prejudgment interest
27
arising fromthatclaim. Thus, although theCourt focusesexclusivelyon the
BernsteinShur’sallegedlynegligentactofissuingadeficientnoticeofclaimin
Mayof2008,thereismoretoPackgen’sclaim.
[¶44]AlthoughBernsteinShur’sissuanceofthedefectivenoticeofclaim
is a single allegedlynegligentactwith anascertainabledate,11 the failure to
commenceanactionaltogetherisanallegedlynegligentomission—something
thatneverhappenedatall.Andfromtheallegationscontainedintheamended
complaint, it isnotpossible to assignadatecertain toanevent thatdidnot
occur; that omission is temporally indeterminate within the period when
Bernstein Shur represented Packgen. In other words, for purposes of
determining whether the amended complaint is time-barred on its face,
Packgen’sallegation thatBernsteinShurcommitted legalmalpracticebynot
filingsuitdoesnotinevitablyleadtotheconclusionthattheallegednegligence
associatedwith thatomissionnecessarily falls entirelyoutside theperiodof
11 BecausetheCourtshouldapplythedoctrineofcontinuingnegligenceinassessingthefacial
viabilityofPackgen’scomplaint,thedateofthedefectivenoticemaynotbethedatewhenPackgen’scauseofaction itselfaccrued. For thereasons Idiscuss later in thisdissent, thatwillneed tobedeterminedonthebasisofanevidentiarypresentationsuchassummaryjudgmentmotionpractice.But even if—as the Court holds today—the doctrine of continuing negligence is unavailable, theamendedcomplaintisstillnotuntimelyonitsfacebecause,asIexplaininthetext,itisimpossibletoassignadateoutsideoftheperiodoflimitationstoanegligentomissionintheformoffailingtofilesuit. Thismeansthereisnoneedtoconsiderwhether,asalegalmatter,BernsteinShurcouldbefoundliableforitsfailure,continuingpastDecember11,2009,tocorrectitsallegedlynegligentactofissuingthedefectivenoticeofclaiminMayof2008.
28
limitations. The bones of Packgen’s amended complaint are sufficient to
encompassanassertion,whichcouldonlybefleshedoutduringtheevidentiary
phasesofthecase,thatBernsteinShur,intheexerciseofduecare,shouldhave
commencedtheactioninthecommercialcaseonorafterDecember11,2009.
BasedonthisaspectofPackgen’sclaimalone,itsamendedcomplaintwasnot
faciallyuntimely.
[¶45]Ialsonotethatthetrialcourt’sorderdismissingthecomplaintwas
actuallyprovisional.WhileconcludingthatPackgen’sclaimwasoutsideofthe
periodof limitations,thecourtgavePackgenanopportunitytoseekleaveto
further amend its amended complaint to allege damages other than those
allegedly caused by the defective notice of claim sent in 2008. Although
Packgendidnotfileanysuchmotion,theabsenceofanysupplementalfilingby
Packgen is inconsequential. In its amended complaint, Packgenhadalready
alleged a sufficient basis—the failure to file suit, for example—on which
BernsteinShurcouldbedeterminedliablebasedonnegligentactsoromissions
occurringdirectlywithinthesix-yearlimitationsperiod.Therefore,thecourt
erredbyrequiringPackgentodosomethingmorethanithadalreadydonein
ordertoavoiddismissalofitscomplaint.
29
[¶46] Because Packgen’s amended complaint alleges negligence that
occurredwithinthelimitationsperiod,whichrunsforwardfromDecember11,
2009,IconcludethatthecourterredbydismissingthatportionofPackgen’s
claim.
B. AllegationsofNegligenceOccurringBeforeDecember11,2009
[¶47]IncontrasttoPackgen’sclaimfornegligencethatoccurredonor
afterDecember11,2009, its claim fornegligent actsoromissionsoccurring
beforethatdateistime-barredpursuanttosection752unlessanappropriate
legalmechanismbringsthatpartofPackgen’sclaimbackwithintheperiodof
limitations.Packgenassertsthattwosuchlegaltheoriesprecludethedismissal
of those older aspects of its claim against Bernstein Shur: continuing
representationandcontinuingnegligence.12
[¶48]IagreewiththeCourt’sconclusionthatthemerecontinuationof
anattorney’srepresentationofaclientonanongoingmatterextendingintothe
12 Thereareother legaldoctrines thatcansaveanotherwisestaleclaim fromdismissal. For
example, incertainlimitedcircumstances,apartymaybeestoppedaltogether fromassertingthestatuteoflimitationsasadefense,seeDashav.MaineMed.Ctr.,665A.2d993,995(Me.1995),andaperiod of limitationsmay run, not for an absolute length of time beginning with the actionableconduct,butfromthemomenttheinjuredpartyactuallyorconstructivelydiscoversthewrongfulconduct,see,e.g.,14M.R.S.§753-B(2)-(3)(2018)(creatingadiscoveryruleapplicabletothestatuteoflimitationsgoverningcertaintypesofactionsagainstattorneys);24M.R.S.§2902(2018)(creatingadiscoveryruleforthelimitationperiodinclaimsofforeign-objectsurgicalmalpractice).Packgenhasnotsoughttoinvokeanyofthosedoctrineshere.
30
limitationsperioddoesnotprecludethestatuteoflimitationsfrombarringa
claim based on a negligent act or omission that occurred outside of the
limitation period. See Court’s Opinion at ¶¶ 25-29. We have reached that
conclusioninthecontextofamedicalmalpracticeclaim,seeDickeyv.Vermette,
2008ME179,¶¶4-8,960A.2d1178;seealsoBakerv.Farrand,2011ME91,
¶¶18-19, 26 A.3d 806, and the same analysis applies to legal malpractice
claims. In Dickey, we explained that the “act or omission” phraseology
containedin24M.R.S.§2902(2018),13whichisthestatuteoflimitationsfor
actions against health care providers and practitioners, does not permit
time-barredclaimstobecometimelysimplybecauseofanongoingprofessional
relationship between the medical provider and the patient. 2008ME 179,
¶¶7-8, 960 A.2d 1178. That statutory language is identical to the “act or
omission”languagecontainedinsection753-B,whichapplieshere.Therefore,
our analysis in Dickey is fatal to Packgen’s argument that Bernstein Shur’s
representationofitsinterestsintheunderlyingmatterwithinsixyearsofthe
commencement of this action, by itself, precludes dismissal of the action as
untimely.
13 Title24M.R.S.§2902wasamendedafterourdecisioninDickey,seeP.L.2013,ch.329,§2
(effectiveOct.9,2013),butnotinanymannerthataffectsmyanalysis.
31
[¶49]IpartwayswiththeCourt,however,whenitconcludesthatthis
casedoesnotallowfortheapplicationofadoctrinethatis,ineffect,asubsidiary
of the continuing representation theory—namely, the continuing negligence
doctrine.
[¶50] As the Court correctly describes, the continuing negligence
doctrinepreventsthelimitationsclockfrombeginningtotickuntilthedateof
the last negligent occurrence that proximately causes injury. See Court’s
Opinion¶2n.4;seealsoBaker,2011ME91,¶20,26A.3d806.14Thedoctrine
is a framework for viewing a series of actionable acts or omissions as an
integratedwholethatmaybepursuedinasinglecauseofaction.Solongasthe
lastinthatseriesiswithintheperiodoflimitations,aclaimbasedontheentire
incorporatedbodyofnegligentactsoromissionsisdeemedtobetimely.See
Bakerv.Farrand,2011ME91,¶25,26A.3d806(“Insuchcases,thecauseof
action‘accrues’forthepurposesofthe...limitationsperiodonthedateofthe
last act or omission . . . that contributed to the proximate causation of the
patient’sharm.”).
14 Becausethedoctrineofcontinuingnegligenceisawaytodeterminewhenacauseofaction
accrues—thatis,thetimewhenthelimitationsclockstarts—itdoesnotimplicatenotionsoftolling,whichwouldmeanstoppingalimitationsclockthatwasalreadyticking.Seealsosupran.12.Becauseofthisimportantanalyticaldistinction,wemayhavebeenlessthanpreciseintheway,evenrecently,we have characterized the continuing negligence doctrine. See York Cty. v. PropertyInfo Corp.,2019ME12,¶24,200A.3d803.
32
[¶51] Wehaveendorsed the applicationof the continuing negligence
doctrineinmedicalnegligencecases.15Insuchactions,theplaintiffisentitled
to
bringasingleactionallegingcontinuingnegligenttreatmentthatarisesfromtwoormorerelatedactsoromissionsbyasinglehealthcareproviderorpractitionerwhereeachactoromissiondeviatedfrom the applicable standard of care and, to at least somedemonstrabledegree,proximatelycausedtheharmcomplainedof,as long as at least one of the alleged negligent acts or omissionsoccurredwithinthreeyearsofthenoticeofclaim.16
Baker,2011ME91,¶29,26A.3d806(emphasisadded).Inotherwords,where
at least one negligent act or omission that demonstrably and proximately
contributed to theharmoccurredwithin theperiodof limitations,butother
related acts or omissions occurred outside the period of limitations, the
entiretyoftheclaimmaybeprosecuted.
[¶52] Our adoption of the continuing negligence doctrine in Baker
resulted from two separate analytical strands. The first draws on an
examination of statutes that are specific to medical negligence claims. In
15 We did so notwithstanding the general principle that a statute of limitations “should be
construedstrictlyinfavorofthebarwhichitwasintendedtocreate.”Harknessv.Fitzgerald,1997ME207,¶5,701A.2d370(quotationmarksomitted).AsisdemonstratedbytheveryoutcomeinBaker,thatprincipleofstatutoryconstructiondoesnotbyitselfforecloseadoptionofthecontinuingnegligenceprinciple.
16Baker’sclaimwasgovernedbyathree-yearperiodoflimitations.See24M.R.S.§2902.Here,theapplicablestatuteoflimitationsissixyears.See14M.R.S.§752.
33
particular, we noted that 24 M.R.S. § 2902—the statute of limitations for
“actions for professional negligence” against medical providers and
practitioners—identifies the event giving rise to the claim as an “act or
omission”butthattheHealthSecurityAct,ofwhichsection2902isapart,does
not define the term. Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 22, 26 A.3d 806. Elsewhere,
however, the Act defines “professional negligence” as encompassing the
pluralized“actsoromissions.” 24M.R.S.§2502(7)(A)-(B)(2018). Partlyon
thatbasis,weconcludedthatthesestatutesreflectalegislativerecognitionthat
asinglecauseofactioncanarisefrommultipleactsoromissionsthatcontribute
toanoverallharm.Baker,2011ME91,¶¶23,29,26A.3d806.Thisrecognition
in turn supports the application of the continuing negligence doctrine. Id.
¶¶23-24.But,becausethisportionofthediscussioninBakerrestsonstatutory
provisionsthatdonotextendtoorhaveanalogouscounterpartsinthestatutes
thatgovernlegalmalpracticeclaims,Packgendoesnotbenefitfromit.
[¶53]Thatisnottruewithrespecttothesecondreasonwhyweadopted
theprincipleofcontinuingnegligenceinBaker. Oursecondlineofreasoning
drawsonbothrulesofstatutoryconstructionandonjurisprudentialprinciples
thatareofmoreuniversalapplicationandpersuasivelyextendtothisactionfor
legalmalpractice.Seeid.¶27.
34
[¶54] Theconstructionofthephrase“actoromission”wasat issuein
Baker, just as it is here. As we discussed in that case, the Legislature has
explicitlystatedthat“[w]ordsofthesingularnumbermayincludetheplural,”
1 M.R.S. §71(9) (2018), so the use of “act or omission”—presented in the
singular—insection2902cannotproperlybelimitedtoeachindividualactor
omission.Baker,2011ME91,¶¶27-28,26A.3d806.Rather,asweconcluded,
section2902’s“plainmeaning”—thegoldstandardofstatutoryconstruction,
seeSchwartzv.UnemploymentIns.Comm’n,2006ME41,¶15,895A.2d96517—
encompassesmultipleactsandomissions.Baker,2011ME91,¶28,26A.3d
806.Thisconstructionaccommodatesthelegalprinciplethat“asinglecauseof
actionmayarisefrommultipleactsoromissionsevenifeachindependentact
oromission,viewedinisolationfromtheotheractsoromissions,constitutes
an independent deviation from the applicable standard of care.” Id. ¶ 24.
Correspondingly,thisconstructionavoidscreatingaseparatecauseofaction
based on each and every negligent act or omission arising from an ongoing
17InSchwartz,westatedthat“[t]hecardinalruleofstatutoryconstructionisthatwhenthewords
of the Legislature are clear, they are to be given their plain meaning and further judicialinterpretation is not necessary.” Schwartz v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 2006 ME 41, ¶ 15,895A.2d965(quotationmarksomitted).
35
professional relationship, which could be—or would need to be—pursued
throughsplinteredclaims.Id.¶¶25-26.
[¶55] This part ofBaker’s analysis, which is sufficient to support its
holding,18carriesoverseamlesslytoPackgen’slegalmalpracticeclaimagainst
BernsteinShurandthestatutesthatapplyhere.Thisistruewithboththeclose
examination inBaker of thewords in the phrase “act or omission” and our
broaderdiscussioninthatcaseofprinciplesgoverningthewaycausesofaction
areproperlyframed.
[¶56] First, as to the statutory language itself,Title14, section753-B
containslanguagedefiningtheeventgivingrisetoPackgen’sclaim—an“actor
omission”—that is identical to the language in 24 M.RS. § 2902, which we
analyzed in Baker. There, we applied the rule of statutory construction
providingthatawordinastatutepresentedinthesingularalsoincludesthe
plural,1M.R.S.§71(9),aprincipleofconstructionthatspanstheentiretyof
18TheCourtrejectstheapplicabilityofBakertosection753-Bbyreadingouropinioninthatcase
narrowlytosaythatitistheHealthSecurityActthatallowsasingleclaimtobebasedonmultipleactsoromissions.Court’sOpinion¶¶33,34.Although—asIhavediscussedinthetext—BakerrestsinpartonananalysisofprovisionscontainedintheHealthSecurityActthatarenotapplicablehere,BakeralsomakesclearthatourrationaleforadoptingthecontinuingnegligencedoctrineisnotaslimitedastheCourtsuggestshere.2011ME91,¶¶26-27,26A.3d806(statingthat“ourreadingofthe statutemust be squaredwith all applicable rules of statutory construction” (emphasis added)(quotation marks omitted)). And beyond this, as I explain in the text, much of the conceptualreasoning thatwarrantsapplicationof thecontinuingnegligencedoctrine tomedicalmalpracticecasesapplieswithequalpersuasivenesstothecaseatbar.
36
Maine’sstatutorycodeandinformsourconstructionofsection753-Bjustas
muchasitdidourconstructionof24M.R.S.§2902.Therefore,section753-B
mustbereadtoencompassmultipleactsoromissionstotheextentthatsuch
multiplerelatedoccurrencesmaygiverisetoasinglecauseofaction.
[¶57]Second,andmorebroadly,theconceptualobservationswemade
inBakerapplywithequalforceinthepresentcontext.Asasubstantivelegal
principle,multipleactsoromissionsthatcompriseindividualdeviationsfrom
thestandardofcarecancombinetoproximatelycauseadiscreteharmandgive
risetoasinglecauseofaction.Baker,2011ME91,¶24,26A.3d806.Relatedly,
aplaintiff shouldnotbe required to litigate those separatenegligent actsor
omissionsinapiecemealmanner.Seeid.¶25.Theseprinciplesapplydirectly
toclaimsforlegalmalpracticeeverybitasmuchastheydotoclaimsformedical
negligence.
[¶58] All of this—the dry process of statutory interpretation and a
conceptual consideration of the nature of a professional negligence claim—
demonstrates that, for many of the same reasons we stated in Baker, the
principle of continuing negligence is readily accommodated by sections 752
and 753-B in this legalmalpractice action. Iwould therefore applyBaker’s
conclusiontothiscaseand—toparaphrasethelanguageinBaker—holdthat,
37
when a single cause of action arises from an attorney’s multiple acts or
omissions while representing a client, and when the combination of those
multiple acts or omissions proximately causes the alleged injury, the single
resultingcauseof actionaccrueson thedateof the last actoromission that
contributedtotheallegedinjury,becausethatiswhentheallegednegligenceis
complete.SeeBaker,2011ME91,¶24,26A.3d806.
[¶59] This statement of the continuing negligence doctrine also
illuminatesitslimitingprinciple—thattheclaimwillbetime-barredifthelast
of the negligent acts or omissions that demonstrably and proximately
contributed to the injury occurred outside of the period of limitations.19
Consequently,ifthecaseweretoproceedonremand,asIbelieveitshould,in
order for Packgen to recover for negligent acts or omissions that occurred
beforeDecember11,2009,Packgenwouldberequiredtodemonstratethatat
least one negligent act or omission that occurred on or after
December11,2009, demonstrably and proximately contributed to the harm
alsocausedbythoseearlierrelatedactsoromissions.
19 This limitationwas illustrated inDickey v. Vermette, whichwe decided beforeBaker. See
2008ME179,960A.2d1178.InDickey,weconcludedthatthatcasedidnotpresenttheoccasionforustodecidewhethertoadoptthedoctrineofcontinuingnegligencebecausetheplaintiffsstipulatedthat they had not sustained any injury from any act or omission occurringwithin the period oflimitations.Id.¶9.Therefore,aclaimforanyandallactionablenegligencefullyaccruedoutsideofthelimitationsperiod,andadoptionofthedoctrinewouldhavebeenunavailingfortheplaintiffs.
38
[¶60]Basedontheamendedcomplaintaloneandwithoutthebenefitof
a record, theCourt iswilling to jump to the conclusion thatPackgenwill be
unabletopresentanyevidencesufficienttomeetthisrequirement.SeeCourt’s
Opinion¶33.There,theCourtstatesthatPackgen’sclaimarosefromasingle
act,namely,thedefectivenoticeofclaimsentin2008,andthatitis“reasonably
probable”thatPackgen’sinjuryisattributableentirelytothatact.Id.¶33.This
isaninappropriatelynarrowreadingoftheamendedcomplaint,whichalleges
negligencethatcontinuedthroughouttheperiodofrepresentation,from2008
into2011.Asisdemonstratedbytheuseofthephrase“reasonablyprobable,”
theCourt’sassertionembodiesafactualassessmentthatiswhollyoutofplace
in theproceduralcontextwhere thiscasenowstands.20 Packgen’sability to
presentevidencetodefeatBernsteinShur’slimitationsdefenseremainstobe
seen—itissomethingthatisimpossibletodetermineuntilafterPackgenhas
20 The Court’s reliance onBaker to reach that conclusion is similarlymisplaced because the
judgmentappealedinBakerwasasummaryjudgment, issuedonthebasisofadevelopedfactualrecord.See2011ME91,¶1,26A.3d806.Here,thereisnorecordonwhichtodrawthefact-basedconclusionsthattheCourtreachesinitsopinion.SeeBeanv.Cummings,2008ME18,¶7,939A.2d676(statingthatadismissalpursuanttoM.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6)isappropriateonly“whenitappearsbeyonddoubtthataplaintiffisentitledtonoreliefunderanysetoffactsthathemightproveinsupportofhisclaim”(emphasisadded));Houdev.Millett,2001ME183,¶11,787A.2d757(statingthat“[t]hequestionofwhetheradefendant’sactsoromissionsweretheproximatecauseofaplaintiff’sinjuriesisgenerallyaquestionoffact....”).
39
theopportunitytopresentevidencethatwillputsubstanceonthebonesofits
amendedcomplaint.
C. Conclusion
[¶61]Fornow,theonlyquestionbeforeusiswhethertheallegationsin
Packgen’samendedcomplaintmakeclear that theclaim is time-barred. See
Jackson,627A.2dat1013.Inmyview,theamendedcomplaintwithstandsthat
facial review, particularly given the “forgiving” notice-pleading standard by
whichthesufficiencyofacomplaintisreviewed,seeHowe,2014ME78,¶9,95
A.3d79.Packgenhasallegednegligencewithintheperiodoflimitationsitself,
throughsometimein2011whenPackgenterminateditsrelationshipwiththe
firm.Further,forpurposesofthepresentpleadingstageofthecase,pursuant
to the continuing negligence doctrine the allegations of Bernstein Shur’s
negligentactsoromissionsoccurringbeforeDecember11,2009,canproperly
betreatedasanintegratedpartofaclaimthatdidnotaccrueuntilonorafter
December 11, 2009—within the period of limitations. Accordingly, Iwould
vacatethejudgmentandremandforthetrialcourtproceedingstocontinue.
40
PhillipE.Johnson,Esq.(orally),Johnson,Webbert&Young,LLP,Augusta,forappellantPackgen,Inc.GeorgeT.Dilworth,Esq. (orally), and JeanaM.McCormick, Esq.,DrummondWoodsum,Portland,forappelleeBernstein,Shur,Sawyer&Nelson,P.A.CumberlandCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumberCV-2017-208FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY