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69 TITLE 28, APPENDIX—RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 25

in the exercise of a sound discretion if made long after the death—as can occur if the suggestion of death is not made or is delayed—and circumstances have arisen rendering it unfair to allow substitution. Cf. Anderson v. Yungkau, supra, 329 U.S. at 485, 486, 67 S.Ct. at 430, 431, 91 L.Ed. 436, where it was noted under the present rule that settlement and distribution of the state of a deceased defendant might be so far advanced as to war-rant denial of a motion for substitution even though made within the time limit prescribed by that rule. Ac-cordingly, a party interested in securing substitution under the amended rule should not assume that he can rest indefinitely awaiting the suggestion of death be-fore he makes his motion to substitute.

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1987 AMENDMENT

The amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended.

COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2007 AMENDMENT

The language of Rule 25 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and termi-nology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only.

Former Rule 25(d)(2) is transferred to become Rule 17(d) because it deals with designation of a public offi-cer, not substitution.

Changes Made After Publication and Comment. See Note to Rule 1, supra.

TITLE V. DISCLOSURES AND DISCOVERY

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1970 AMENDMENTS TO DISCOVERY RULES

This statement is intended to serve as a general in-troduction to the amendments of Rules 26–37, concern-ing discovery, as well as related amendments of other rules. A separate note of customary scope is appended to amendments proposed for each rule. This statement provides a framework for the consideration of individ-ual rule changes.

Changes in the Discovery Rules

The discovery rules, as adopted in 1938, were a strik-ing and imaginative departure from tradition. It was expected from the outset that they would be important, but experience has shown them to play an even larger role than was initially foreseen. Although the discov-ery rules have been amended since 1938, the changes were relatively few and narrowly focused, made in order to remedy specific defects. The amendments now proposed reflect the first comprehensive review of the discovery rules undertaken since 1938. These amend-ments make substantial changes in the discovery rules. Those summarized here are among the more important changes.

Scope of Discovery. New provisions are made and exist-ing provisions changed affecting the scope of discovery: (1) The contents of insurance policies are made discov-erable (Rule 26(b)(2)). (2) A showing of good cause is no longer required for discovery of documents and things and entry upon land (Rule 34). However, a showing of need is required for discovery of ‘‘trial preparation’’ materials other than a party’s discovery of his own statement and a witness’ discovery of his own state-ment; and protection is afforded against disclosure in such documents of mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories concerning the litigation. (Rule 26(b)(3)). (3) Provision is made for discovery with respect to experts retained for trial preparation, and particularly those experts who will be called to testify at trial (Rule 26(b)(4)). (4) It is provided that interrog-atories and requests for admission are not objection-able simply because they relate to matters of opinion or contention, subject of course to the supervisory power of the court (Rules 33(b), 36(a)). (5) Medical exam-ination is made available as to certain nonparties. (Rule 35(a)).

Mechanics of Discovery. A variety of changes are made in the mechanics of the discovery process, affecting the sequence and timing of discovery, the respective obli-gations of the parties with respect to requests, re-sponses, and motions for court orders, and the related powers of the court to enforce discovery requests and to protect against their abusive use. A new provision eliminates the automatic grant of priority in discovery to one side (Rule 26(d)). Another provides that a party is not under a duty to supplement his responses to re-quests for discovery, except as specified (Rule 26(e)).

Other changes in the mechanics of discovery are de-signed to encourage extrajudicial discovery with a min-imum of court intervention. Among these are the fol-lowing: (1) The requirement that a plaintiff seek leave of court for early discovery requests is eliminated or reduced, and motions for a court order under Rule 34 are made unnecessary. Motions under Rule 35 are con-tinued. (2) Answers and objections are to be served to-gether and an enlargement of the time for response is provided. (3) The party seeking discovery, rather than the objecting party, is made responsible for invoking judicial determination of discovery disputes not re-solved by the parties. (4) Judicial sanctions are tight-ened with respect to unjustified insistence upon or ob-jection to discovery. These changes bring Rules 33, 34, and 36 substantially into line with the procedure now provided for depositions.

Failure to amend Rule 35 in the same way is based upon two considerations. First, the Columbia Survey (described below) finds that only about 5 percent of medical examinations require court motions, of which about half result in court orders. Second and of greater importance, the interest of the person to be examined in the privacy of his person was recently stressed by the Supreme Court in Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). The court emphasized the trial judge’s re-sponsibility to assure that the medical examination was justified, particularly as to its scope.

Rearrangement of Rules. A limited rearrangement of the discovery rules has been made, whereby certain provisions are transferred from one rule to another. The reasons for this rearrangement are discussed below in a separate section of this statement, and the details are set out in a table at the end of this statement.

Optional Procedures. In two instances, new optional procedures have been made available. A new procedure is provided to a party seeking to take the deposition of a corporation or other organization (Rule 30(b)(6)). A party on whom interrogatories have been served re-questing information derivable from his business records may under specified circumstances produce the records rather than give answers (Rule 33(c)).

Other Changes. This summary of changes is by no means exhaustive. Various changes have been made in order to improve, tighten, or clarify particular provi-sions, to resolve conflicts in the case law, and to im-prove language. All changes, whether mentioned here or not, are discussed in the appropriate note for each rule.

A Field Survey of Discovery Practice

Despite widespread acceptance of discovery as an es-sential part of litigation, disputes have inevitably aris-en concerning the values claimed for discovery and abuses alleged to exist. Many disputes about discovery relate to particular rule provisions or court decisions and can be studied in traditional fashion with a view to specific amendment. Since discovery is in large meas-ure extra-judicial, however, even these disputes may be enlightened by a study of discovery ‘‘in the field.’’ And some of the larger questions concerning discovery can be pursued only by a study of its operation at the law office level and in unreported cases.

The Committee, therefore, invited the Project for Ef-fective Justice of Columbia Law School to conduct a field survey of discovery. Funds were obtained from the Ford Foundation and the Walter E. Meyer Research In-stitute of Law, Inc. The survey was carried on under the direction of Prof. Maurice Rosenberg of Columbia

TITLE 28, APPENDIX—RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26

Law School. The Project for Effective Justice has sub-mitted a report to the Committee entitled ‘‘Field Sur-vey of Federal Pretrial Discovery’’ (hereafter referred to as the Columbia Survey). The Committee is deeply grateful for the benefit of this extensive undertaking and is most appreciative of the cooperation of the Project and the funding organizations. The Committee is particularly grateful to Professor Rosenberg who not only directed the survey but has given much time in order to assist the Committee in assessing the results.

The Columbia Survey concludes, in general, that there is no empirical evidence to warrant a fundamen-tal change in the philosophy of the discovery rules. No widespread or profound failings are disclosed in the scope or availability of discovery. The costs of discov-ery do not appear to be oppressive, as a general matter, either in relation to ability to pay or to the stakes of the litigation. Discovery frequently provides evidence that would not otherwise be available to the parties and thereby makes for a fairer trial or settlement. On the other hand, no positive evidence is found that dis-covery promotes settlement.

More specific findings of the Columbia Survey are de-scribed in other Committee notes, in relation to par-ticular rule provisions and amendments. Those inter-ested in more detailed information may obtain it from the Project for Effective Justice.

Rearrangement of the Discovery Rules

The present discovery rules are structured entirely in terms of individual discovery devices, except for Rule 27 which deals with perpetuation of testimony, and Rule 37 which provides sanctions to enforce discovery. Thus, Rules 26 and 28 to 32 are in terms addressed only to the taking of a deposition of a party or third person. Rules 33 to 36 then deal in succession with four addi-tional discovery devices: Written interrogatories to parties, production for inspection of documents and things, physical or mental examination and requests for admission.

Under the rules as promulgated in 1938, therefore, each of the discovery devices was separate and self-con-tained. A defect of this arrangement is that there is no natural location in the discovery rules for provisions generally applicable to all discovery or to several dis-covery devices. From 1938 until the present, a few amendments have applied a discovery provision to sev-eral rules. For example, in 1948, the scope of deposition discovery in Rule 26(b) and the provision for protective orders in Rule 30(b) were incorporated by reference in Rules 33 and 34. The arrangement was adequate so long as there were few provisions governing discovery gener-ally and these provisions were relatively simple.

As will be seen, however, a series of amendments are now proposed which govern most or all of the discovery devices. Proposals of a similar nature will probably be made in the future. Under these circumstances, it is very desirable, even necessary, that the discovery rules contain one rule addressing itself to discovery gener-ally.

Rule 26 is obviously the most appropriate rule for this purpose. One of its subdivisions, Rule 26(b), in terms governs only scope of deposition discovery, but it has been expressly incorporated by reference in Rules 33 and 34 and is treated by courts as setting a general standard. By means of a transfer to Rule 26 of the pro-visions for protective orders now contained in Rule 30(b), and a transfer from Rule 26 of provisions ad-dressed exclusively to depositions, Rule 26 is converted into a rule concerned with discovery generally. It be-comes a convenient vehicle for the inclusion of new provisions dealing with the scope, timing, and regula-tion of discovery. Few additional transfers are needed. See table showing rearrangement of rules, set out below.

There are, to be sure, disadvantages in transferring any provision from one rule to another. Familiarity with the present pattern, reinforced by the references made by prior court decisions and the various second-ary writings about the rules, is not lightly to be sac-

rificed. Revision of treatises and other references works is burdensome and costly. Moreover, many States have adopted the existing pattern as a model for their rules.

On the other hand, the amendments now proposed will in any event require revision of texts and reference works as well as reconsideration by States following the Federal model. If these amendments are to be in-corporated in an understandable way, a rule with gen-eral discovery provisions is needed. As will be seen, the proposed rearrangement produces a more coherent and intelligible pattern for the discovery rules taken as a whole. The difficulties described are those encountered whenever statutes are reexamined and revised. Failure to rearrange the discovery rules now would freeze the present scheme, making future change even more dif-ficult.

Table Showing Rearrangement of Rules

Existing Rule No. New Rule No.

26(a) ................................................. 30(a), 31(a) 26(c) ................................................. 30(c) 26(d) ................................................. 32(a) 26(e) ................................................. 32(b) 26(f) .................................................. 32(c) 30(a) ................................................. 30(b) 30(b) ................................................. 26(c) 32 ..................................................... 32(d)

Rule 26. Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery

(a) REQUIRED DISCLOSURES. (1) Initial Disclosure.

(A) In General. Except as exempted by Rule 26(a)(1)(B) or as otherwise stipulated or or-dered by the court, a party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties:

(i) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information— along with the subjects of that informa-tion—that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment;

(ii) a copy—or a description by category and location—of all documents, electroni-cally stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use to support its claims or defenses, un-less the use would be solely for impeach-ment;

(iii) a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party— who must also make available for inspec-tion and copying as under Rule 34 the doc-uments or other evidentiary material, un-less privileged or protected from disclo-sure, on which each computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and

(iv) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34, any insurance agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judg-ment in the action or to indemnify or re-imburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.

(B) Proceedings Exempt from Initial Disclo-sure. The following proceedings are exempt from initial disclosure:

(i) an action for review on an adminis-trative record;


(ii) a forfeiture action in rem arising from a federal statute;

(iii) a petition for habeas corpus or any other proceeding to challenge a criminal conviction or sentence;

(iv) an action brought without an attor-ney by a person in the custody of the United States, a state, or a state subdivi-sion;

(v) an action to enforce or quash an ad-ministrative summons or subpoena;

(vi) an action by the United States to re-cover benefit payments;

(vii) an action by the United States to collect on a student loan guaranteed by the United States;

(viii) a proceeding ancillary to a proceed-ing in another court; and

(ix) an action to enforce an arbitration award.

(C) Time for Initial Disclosures—In General. A party must make the initial disclosures at or within 14 days after the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference unless a different time is set by stipulation or court order, or unless a party objects during the conference that initial disclosures are not appropriate in this ac-tion and states the objection in the proposed discovery plan. In ruling on the objection, the court must determine what disclosures, if any, are to be made and must set the time for disclosure.

(D) Time for Initial Disclosures—For Parties Served or Joined Later. A party that is first served or otherwise joined after the Rule 26(f) conference must make the initial dis-closures within 30 days after being served or joined, unless a different time is set by stip-ulation or court order.

(E) Basis for Initial Disclosure; Unacceptable Excuses. A party must make its initial dis-closures based on the information then rea-sonably available to it. A party is not ex-cused from making its disclosures because it has not fully investigated the case or be-cause it challenges the sufficiency of an-other party’s disclosures or because another party has not made its disclosures.

(2) Disclosure of Expert Testimony. (A) In General. In addition to the disclo-

sures required by Rule 26(a)(1), a party must disclose to the other parties the identity of any witness it may use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705.

(B) Witnesses Who Must Provide a Written Report. Unless otherwise stipulated or or-dered by the court, this disclosure must be accompanied by a written report—prepared and signed by the witness—if the witness is one retained or specially employed to pro-vide expert testimony in the case or one whose duties as the party’s employee regu-larly involve giving expert testimony. The report must contain:

(i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them;

(ii) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them;

(iii) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them;

(iv) the witness’s qualifications, includ-ing a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years;

(v) a list of all other cases in which, dur-ing the previous 4 years, the witness testi-fied as an expert at trial or by deposition; and

(vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case.

(C) Witnesses Who Do Not Provide a Written Report. Unless otherwise stipulated or or-dered by the court, if the witness is not re-quired to provide a written report, this dis-closure must state:

(i) the subject matter on which the wit-ness is expected to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705; and

(ii) a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify.

(D) Time to Disclose Expert Testimony. A party must make these disclosures at the times and in the sequence that the court or-ders. Absent a stipulation or a court order, the disclosures must be made:

(i) at least 90 days before the date set for trial or for the case to be ready for trial; or

(ii) if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) or (C), within 30 days after the other party’s disclosure.

(E) Supplementing the Disclosure. The par-ties must supplement these disclosures when required under Rule 26(e).

(3) Pretrial Disclosures. (A) In General. In addition to the disclo-

sures required by Rule 26(a)(1) and (2), a party must provide to the other parties and promptly file the following information about the evidence that it may present at trial other than solely for impeachment:

(i) the name and, if not previously pro-vided, the address and telephone number of each witness—separately identifying those the party expects to present and those it may call if the need arises;

(ii) the designation of those witnesses whose testimony the party expects to present by deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the perti-nent parts of the deposition; and

(iii) an identification of each document or other exhibit, including summaries of other evidence—separately identifying those items the party expects to offer and those it may offer if the need arises.

(B) Time for Pretrial Disclosures; Objections. Unless the court orders otherwise, these dis-closures must be made at least 30 days be-fore trial. Within 14 days after they are made, unless the court sets a different time, a party may serve and promptly file a list of the following objections: any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition des-


ignated by another party under Rule 26(a)(3)(A)(ii); and any objection, together with the grounds for it, that may be made to the admissibility of materials identified under Rule 26(a)(3)(A)(iii). An objection not so made—except for one under Federal Rule of Evidence 402 or 403—is waived unless ex-cused by the court for good cause.

(4) Form of Disclosures. Unless the court or-ders otherwise, all disclosures under Rule 26(a) must be in writing, signed, and served.

(b) DISCOVERY SCOPE AND LIMITS. (1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited

by court order, the scope of discovery is as fol-lows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense—including the existence, description, nature, custody, condi-tion, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable mat-ter. For good cause, the court may order dis-covery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant infor-mation need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations im-posed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).

(2) Limitations on Frequency and Extent. (A) When Permitted. By order, the court

may alter the limits in these rules on the number of depositions and interrogatories or on the length of depositions under Rule 30. By order or local rule, the court may also limit the number of requests under Rule 36.

(B) Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored Information. A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored informa-tion from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably ac-cessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may none-theless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, con-sidering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the dis-covery.

(C) When Required. On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that:

(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be ob-tained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;

(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the informa-tion by discovery in the action; or

(iii) the burden or expense of the pro-posed discovery outweighs its likely bene-fit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ re-sources, the importance of the issues at

stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.

(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. (A) Documents and Tangible Things. Ordi-

narily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in an-ticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative (includ-ing the other party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent). But, subject to Rule 26(b)(4), those materials may be discovered if:

(i) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1); and

(ii) the party shows that it has substan-tial need for the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.

(B) Protection Against Disclosure. If the court orders discovery of those materials, it must protect against disclosure of the men-tal impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.

(C) Previous Statement. Any party or other person may, on request and without the re-quired showing, obtain the person’s own pre-vious statement about the action or its sub-ject matter. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order, and Rule 37(a)(5) applies to the award of expenses. A previous statement is either:

(i) a written statement that the person has signed or otherwise adopted or ap-proved; or

(ii) a contemporaneous stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other record-ing—or a transcription of it—that recites substantially verbatim the person’s oral statement.

(4) Trial Preparation: Experts. (A) Deposition of an Expert Who May Tes-

tify. A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial. If Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires a report from the expert, the depo-sition may be conducted only after the re-port is provided.

(B) Trial-Preparation Protection for Draft Re-ports or Disclosures. Rules 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) protect drafts of any report or disclosure re-quired under Rule 26(a)(2), regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded.

(C) Trial-Preparation Protection for Commu-nications Between a Party’s Attorney and Ex-pert Witnesses. Rules 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) pro-tect communications between the party’s at-torney and any witness required to provide a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), regardless of the form of the communications, except to the extent that the communications:

(i) relate to compensation for the ex-pert’s study or testimony;

(ii) identify facts or data that the party’s attorney provided and that the expert con-sidered in forming the opinions to be ex-pressed; or

(iii) identify assumptions that the par-ty’s attorney provided and that the expert


relied on in forming the opinions to be ex-pressed.

(D) Expert Employed Only for Trial Prepara-tion. Ordinarily, a party may not, by inter-rogatories or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by an-other party in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial. But a party may do so only:

(i) as provided in Rule 35(b); or (ii) on showing exceptional circum-

stances under which it is impracticable for the party to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.

(E) Payment. Unless manifest injustice would result, the court must require that the party seeking discovery:

(i) pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) or (D); and

(ii) for discovery under (D), also pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses it reasonably incurred in obtain-ing the expert’s facts and opinions.

(5) Claiming Privilege or Protecting Trial-Prep-aration Materials.

(A) Information Withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise discover-able by claiming that the information is privileged or subject to protection as trial- preparation material, the party must:

(i) expressly make the claim; and (ii) describe the nature of the docu-

ments, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed—and do so in a manner that, without revealing informa-tion itself privileged or protected, will en-able other parties to assess the claim.

(B) Information Produced. If information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-prepara-tion material, the party making the claim may notify any party that received the in-formation of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to retrieve the information if the party disclosed it before being notified; and may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim. The producing party must preserve the information until the claim is resolved.

(c) PROTECTIVE ORDERS. (1) In General. A party or any person from

whom discovery is sought may move for a pro-tective order in the court where the action is pending—or as an alternative on matters re-lating to a deposition, in the court for the dis-trict where the deposition will be taken. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or at-tempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action. The court may, for good cause,

issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:

(A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery; (B) specifying terms, including time and

place, for the disclosure or discovery; (C) prescribing a discovery method other

than the one selected by the party seeking discovery;

(D) forbidding inquiry into certain mat-ters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters;

(E) designating the persons who may be present while the discovery is conducted;

(F) requiring that a deposition be sealed and opened only on court order;

(G) requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or com-mercial information not be revealed or be re-vealed only in a specified way; and

(H) requiring that the parties simulta-neously file specified documents or informa-tion in sealed envelopes, to be opened as the court directs.

(2) Ordering Discovery. If a motion for a pro-tective order is wholly or partly denied, the court may, on just terms, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery.

(3) Awarding Expenses. Rule 37(a)(5) applies to the award of expenses.

(d) TIMING AND SEQUENCE OF DISCOVERY. (1) Timing. A party may not seek discovery

from any source before the parties have con-ferred as required by Rule 26(f), except in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court order.

(2) Sequence. Unless, on motion, the court or-ders otherwise for the parties’ and witnesses’ convenience and in the interests of justice:

(A) methods of discovery may be used in any sequence; and

(B) discovery by one party does not require any other party to delay its discovery.

(e) SUPPLEMENTING DISCLOSURES AND RE-SPONSES.

(1) In General. A party who has made a dis-closure under Rule 26(a)—or who has re-sponded to an interrogatory, request for pro-duction, or request for admission—must sup-plement or correct its disclosure or response:

(A) in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing; or

(B) as ordered by the court.

(2) Expert Witness. For an expert whose re-port must be disclosed under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), the party’s duty to supplement extends both to information included in the report and to information given during the expert’s deposi-tion. Any additions or changes to this infor-mation must be disclosed by the time the par-ty’s pretrial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(3) are due.


(f) CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES; PLANNING FOR DISCOVERY.

(1) Conference Timing. Except in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B) or when the court orders otherwise, the parties must confer as soon as prac-ticable—and in any event at least 21 days be-fore a scheduling conference is to be held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b).

(2) Conference Content; Parties’ Responsibil-ities. In conferring, the parties must consider the nature and basis of their claims and de-fenses and the possibilities for promptly set-tling or resolving the case; make or arrange for the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1); discuss any issues about preserving discover-able information; and develop a proposed dis-covery plan. The attorneys of record and all unrepresented parties that have appeared in the case are jointly responsible for arranging the conference, for attempting in good faith to agree on the proposed discovery plan, and for submitting to the court within 14 days after the conference a written report outlining the plan. The court may order the parties or attor-neys to attend the conference in person.

(3) Discovery Plan. A discovery plan must state the parties’ views and proposals on:

(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures under Rule 26(a), including a statement of when initial disclosures were made or will be made;

(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be completed, and whether discovery should be conducted in phases or be limited to or focused on par-ticular issues;

(C) any issues about disclosure or discov-ery of electronically stored information, in-cluding the form or forms in which it should be produced;

(D) any issues about claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation materials, including—if the parties agree on a proce-dure to assert these claims after produc-tion—whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order;

(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these rules or by local rule, and what other limitations should be imposed; and

(F) any other orders that the court should issue under Rule 26(c) or under Rule 16(b) and (c).

(4) Expedited Schedule. If necessary to comply with its expedited schedule for Rule 16(b) con-ferences, a court may by local rule:

(A) require the parties’ conference to occur less than 21 days before the scheduling con-ference is held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b); and

(B) require the written report outlining the discovery plan to be filed less than 14 days after the parties’ conference, or excuse the parties from submitting a written report and permit them to report orally on their discovery plan at the Rule 16(b) conference.

(g) SIGNING DISCLOSURES AND DISCOVERY RE-QUESTS, RESPONSES, AND OBJECTIONS.

(1) Signature Required; Effect of Signature. Every disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1) or (a)(3) and every discovery request, response, or ob-jection must be signed by at least one attor-ney of record in the attorney’s own name—or by the party personally, if unrepresented—and must state the signer’s address, e-mail ad-dress, and telephone number. By signing, an attorney or party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and be-lief formed after a reasonable inquiry:

(A) with respect to a disclosure, it is com-plete and correct as of the time it is made; and

(B) with respect to a discovery request, re-sponse, or objection, it is:

(i) consistent with these rules and war-ranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or re-versing existing law, or for establishing new law;

(ii) not interposed for any improper pur-pose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and

(iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the action.

(2) Failure to Sign. Other parties have no duty to act on an unsigned disclosure, request, response, or objection until it is signed, and the court must strike it unless a signature is promptly supplied after the omission is called to the attorney’s or party’s attention.

(3) Sanction for Improper Certification. If a cer-tification violates this rule without substan-tial justification, the court, on motion or on its own, must impose an appropriate sanction on the signer, the party on whose behalf the signer was acting, or both. The sanction may include an order to pay the reasonable ex-penses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the violation.

(As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948; Jan. 21, 1963, eff. July 1, 1963; Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Mar. 30, 1970, eff. July 1, 1970; Apr. 29, 1980, eff. Aug. 1, 1980; Apr. 28, 1983, eff. Aug. 1, 1983; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 17, 2000, eff. Dec. 1, 2000; Apr. 12, 2006, eff. Dec. 1, 2006; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007; Apr. 28, 2010, eff. Dec. 1, 2010.)

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1937

Note to Subdivision (a). This rule freely authorizes the taking of depositions under the same circumstances and by the same methods whether for the purpose of discovery or for the purpose of obtaining evidence. Many states have adopted this practice on account of its simplicity and effectiveness, safeguarding it by im-posing such restrictions upon the subsequent use of the deposition at the trial or hearing as are deemed advis-able. See Ark.Civ.Code (Crawford, 1934) §§ 606–607; Calif.Code Civ.Proc. (Deering, 1937) § 2021; 1 Colo.Stat.Ann. (1935) Code Civ.Proc. § 376; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 16–906; Ill. Rules of Pract., Rule 19 (Ill.Rev.Stat. (1937) ch. 110, § 259.19); Ill.Rev.Stat. (1937) ch. 51, § 24; 2 Ind.Stat.Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 2–1501, 2–1506; Ky.Codes (Carroll, 1932) Civ.Pract. § 557; 1 Mo.Rev.Stat. (1929) § 1753; 4 Mont.Rev.Codes Ann. (1935) § 10645;


Neb.Comp.Stat. (1929) ch. 20, §§ 1246–7; 4 Nev.Comp.Laws (Hillyer, 1929) § 9001; 2 N.H.Pub.Laws (1926) ch. 337, § 1; N.C.Code Ann. (1935) § 1809; 2 N.D.Comp.Laws Ann. (1913) §§ 7889–7897; 2 Ohio Gen.Code Ann. (Page, 1926) §§ 11525–6; 1 Ore.Code Ann. (1930) Title 9, § 1503; 1 S.D.Comp.Laws (1929) §§ 2713–16; Tex.Stat. (Vernon, 1928) arts. 3738, 3752, 3769; Utah Rev.Stat.Ann. (1933) § 104–51–7; Wash. Rules of Practice adopted by the Supreme Ct., Rule 8, 2 Wash.Rev.Stat.Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 308–8; W.Va.Code (1931) ch. 57, art. 4, § 1. Compare [former] Eq-uity Rules 47 (Depositions—To be Taken in Exceptional Instances); 54 (Depositions Under Revised Statutes, Sections 863, 865, 866, 867—Cross-Examination); 58 (Dis-covery—Interrogatories—Inspection and Production of Documents—Admission of Execution or Genuineness).

This and subsequent rules incorporate, modify, and broaden the provisions for depositions under U.S.C., Title 28, [former] §§ 639 (Depositions de bene esse; when and where taken; notice), 640 (Same; mode of taking), 641 (Same; transmission to court), 644 (Depositions under dedimus potestatem and in perpetuam), 646 (Deposi-tion under dedimus potestatem; how taken). These stat-utes are superseded insofar as they differ from this and subsequent rules. U.S.C., Title 28, [former] § 643 (Deposi-tions; taken in mode prescribed by State laws) is super-seded by the third sentence of Subdivision (a).

While a number of states permit discovery only from parties or their agents, others either make no distinc-tion between parties or agents of parties and ordinary witnesses, or authorize the taking of ordinary deposi-tions, without restriction, from any persons who have knowledge of relevant facts. See Ark.Civ.Code (Crawford, 1934) §§ 606–607; 1 Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 16–906; Ill. Rules of Pract., Rule 19 (Ill.Rev.Stat. (1937) ch. 110, § 259.19); Ill.Rev.Stat. (1937) ch. 51, § 24; 2 Ind.Stat.Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 2–1501; Ky.Codes (Carroll, 1932) Civ.Pract. §§ 554–558; 2 Md.Ann.Code (Bagby, 1924) Art. 35, § 21; 2 Minn.Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9820; 1 Mo.Rev.Stat. (1929) §§ 1753, 1759; Neb.Comp.Stat. (1929) ch. 20, §§ 1246–7; 2 N.H.Pub.Laws (1926) ch. 337, § 1; 2 N.D.Comp.Laws Ann. (1913) § 7897; 2 Ohio Gen.Code Ann. (Page, 1926) §§ 11525–6; 1 S.D.Comp.Laws (1929) §§ 2713–16; Tex.Stat. (Vernon, 1928) arts. 3738, 3752, 3769; Utah Rev.Stat.Ann. (1933) § 104–51–7; Wash. Rules of Practice adopted by Supreme Ct., Rule 8, 2 Wash.Rev.Stat.Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 308–8; W.Va.Code (1931) ch. 57, art. 4, § 1.

The more common practice in the United States is to take depositions on notice by the party desiring them, without any order from the court, and this has been followed in these rules. See Calif.Code Civ.Proc. (Deer-ing 1937) § 2031; 2 Fla.Comp.Gen.Laws Ann. (1927) §§ 4405–7; 1 Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 16–902; Ill. Rules of Pract., Rule 19 (Ill.Rev.Stat. (1937) ch. 110, § 25919); Ill.Rev.Stat. (1937) ch. 51, § 24; 2 Ind.Stat.Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 2–1502; Kan.Gen.Stat.Ann. (1935) § 60–2827; Ky.Codes (Carroll, 1932) Civ.Pract. § 565; 2 Minn.Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9820; 1 Mo.Rev.Stat. (1929) § 1761; 4 Mont.Rev.Codes Ann. (1935) § 10651; Nev.Comp.Laws (Hillyer, 1929) § 9002; N.C.Code Ann. (1935) § 1809; 2 N.D.Comp.Laws Ann. (1913) § 7895; Utah Rev.Stat.Ann. (1933) § 104–51–8.

Note to Subdivision (b). While the old chancery prac-tice limited discovery to facts supporting the case of the party seeking it, this limitation has been largely abandoned by modern legislation. See Ala.Code Ann. (Michie, 1928) §§ 7764–7773; 2 Ind.Stat.Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 2–1028, 2–1506, 2–1728–2–1732; Iowa Code (1935) § 11185; Ky.Codes (Carroll, 1932) Civ.Pract. §§ 557, 606 (8); La.Code Pract. (Dart, 1932) arts. 347–356; 2 Mass.Gen.Laws (Ter.Ed., 1932) ch. 231, §§ 61–67; 1 Mo.Rev.Stat. (1929) §§ 1753, 1759; Neb.Comp.Stat. (1929) §§ 20–1246, 20–1247; 2 N.H.Pub.Laws (1926) ch. 337, § 1; 2 Ohio Gen.Code Ann. (Page, 1926) §§ 11497, 11526; Tex.Stat. (Vernon, 1928) arts. 3738, 3753, 3769; Wis.Stat. (1935) § 326.12; Ontario Consol.Rules of Pract. (1928) Rules 237–347; Quebec Code of Civ.Proc. (Curran, 1922) §§ 286–290.

Note to Subdivisions (d), (e), and (f). The restrictions here placed upon the use of depositions at the trial or

hearing are substantially the same as those provided in U.S.C., Title 28, [former] § 641, for depositions taken, de bene esse, with the additional provision that any deposi-tion may be used when the court finds the existence of exceptional circumstances. Compare English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 37, r. 18 (with additional provision permitting use of deposition by consent of the parties). See also [former] Equity Rule 64 (Former Depositions, Etc., May be Used Before Master); and 2 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9835 (Use in a subsequent action of a deposition filed in a previously dismissed action between the same parties and involving the same subject matter).


Subdivision (a). The amendment eliminates the re-quirement of leave of court for the taking of a deposi-tion except where a plaintiff seeks to take a deposition within 20 days after the commencement of the action. The retention of the requirement where a deposition is sought by a plaintiff within 20 days of the commence-ment of the action protects a defendant who has not had an opportunity to retain counsel and inform him-self as to the nature of the suit; the plaintiff, of course, needs no such protection. The present rule forbids the plaintiff to take a deposition, without leave of court, before the answer is served. Sometimes the defendant delays the serving of an answer for more than 20 days, but as 20 days are sufficient time for him to obtain a lawyer, there is no reason to forbid the plaintiff to take a deposition without leave merely because the answer has not been served. In all cases, Rule 30(a) empowers the court, for cause shown, to alter the time of the tak-ing of a deposition, and Rule 30(b) contains provisions giving ample protection to persons who are unreason-ably pressed. The modified practice here adopted is along the line of that followed in various states. See, e.g., 8 Mo.Rev.Stat.Ann. (1939) § 1917; 2 Burns’ Ind.Stat.Ann. (1933) § 2–1506.

Subdivision (b). The amendments to subdivision (b) make clear the broad scope of examination and that it may cover not only evidence for use at the trial but also inquiry into matters in themselves inadmissible as evidence but which will lead to the discovery of such evidence. The purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for facts, the names of witnesses, or any other matters which may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his case. Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (C.C.A.2d, 1943) 139 F.(2d) 469; Mahler v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (E.D.N.Y. 1945) 8 Fed.Rules Serv. 33.351, Case 1. In such a preliminary inquiry admissibility at trial should not be the test as to whether the information sought is within the scope of proper examination. Such a stand-ard unnecessarily curtails the utility of discovery prac-tice. Of course, matters entirely without bearing either as direct evidence or as leads to evidence are not within the scope of inquiry, but to the extent that the exam-ination develops useful information, it functions suc-cessfully as an instrument of discovery, even if it pro-duces no testimony directly admissible. Lewis v. United Air Lines Transportation Corp. (D.Conn. 1939) 27 F.Supp. 946; Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra; Mahler v. Penn-sylvania R. Co., supra; Bloomer v. Sirian Lamp Co. (D.Del. 1944) 8 Fed.Rules Serv. 26b.31, Case 3; Rousseau v. Langley (S.D.N.Y. 1945) 9 Fed.Rules Serv. 34.41, Case 1 (Rule 26 contemplates ‘‘examinations not merely for the narrow purpose of adducing testimony which may be offered in evidence but also for the broad discovery of information which may be useful in preparation for trial.’’); Olson Transportation Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Co. (E.D.Wis. 1944) 8 Fed.Rules Serv. 34.41, Case 2 (‘‘. . . the Rules . . . permit ‘fishing’ for evidence as they should.’’); Note (1945) 45 Col.L.Rev. 482. Thus hearsay, while inadmissible itself, may suggest testimony which properly may be proved. Under Rule 26 (b) several cases, however, have erroneously limited discovery on the basis of admissibility, holding that the word ‘‘rel-evant’’ in effect meant ‘‘material and competent under the rules of evidence’’. Poppino v. Jones Store Co.


(W.D.Mo. 1940) 3 Fed.Rules Serv. 26b.5, Case 1; Benevento v. A. & P. Food Stores, Inc. (E.D.N.Y. 1939) 26 F.Supp. 424. Thus it has been said that inquiry might not be made into statements or other matters which, when dis-closed, amounted only to hearsay. See Maryland for use of Montvila v. Pan-American Bus Lines, Inc. (D.Md. 1940) 3 Fed.Rules Serv. 26b.211, Case 3; Gitto v. ‘‘Italia,’’ Societa Anonima Di Navigazione (E.D.N.Y. 1940) 31 F.Supp. 567; Rose Silk Mills, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America (S.D.N.Y. 1939) 29 F.Supp. 504; Colpak v. Hetterick (E.D.N.Y. 1941) 40 F.Supp. 350; Matthies v. Peter F. Connolly Co. (E.D.N.Y. 1941) 6 Fed.Rules Serv. 30a.22, Case 1, 2 F.R.D. 277; Matter of Examination of Citizens Casualty Co. of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1942) 7 Fed.Rules Serv. 26b.211, Case 1; United States v. Silliman (D.N.J. 1944) 8 Fed.Rules Serv. 26b.52, Case 1. The contrary and better view, however, has often been stated. See, e.g., Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra; Stevenson v. Melady (S.D.N.Y. 1940) 3 Fed.Rules Serv. 26b.31, Case 1, 1 F.R.D. 329; Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., supra; Ap-plication of Zenith Radio Corp. (E.D.Pa. 1941) 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 30b.21, Case 1, 1 F.R.D. 627; Steingut v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1941) 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 26b.5. Case 2; DeSeversky v. Republic Aviation Corp (E.D.N.Y. 1941) 5 Fed.Rules Serv. 26b.31, Case 5; Moore v. George A. Hormel & Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1942) 6 Fed.Rules Serv. 30b.41, Case 1, 2 F.R.D. 340; Hercules Powder Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co. (D.Del. 1943) 7 Fed.Rules Serv. 45b.311, Case 2, 3 F.R.D. 302; Bloomer v. Sirian Lamp Co., supra; Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc. (D.Mass. 1944) 8 Fed.Rules Serv. 26b.31, Case 1; Pat-terson Oil Terminals, Inc. v. Charles Kurz & Co., Inc. (E.D.Pa. 1945) 9 Fed.Rules Serv. 33.321, Case 2; Pueblo Trading Co. v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500 (N.D.Cal. 1945) 9 Fed.Rules Serv. 33.321, Case 4, 4 F.R.D. 471. See also discussion as to the broad scope of discovery in Hoffman v. Palmer (C.C.A.2d, 1942) 129 F.(2d) 976, 995–997, aff’d on other grounds (1942) 318 U.S. 109; Note (1945) 45 Col.L.Rev. 482.


This amendment conforms to the amendment of Rule 28(b). See the next-to-last paragraph of the Advisory Committee’s Note to that amendment.


The requirement that the plaintiff obtain leave of court in order to serve notice of taking of a deposition within 20 days after commencement of the action gives rises to difficulties when the prospective deponent is about to become unavailable for examination. The problem is not confined to admiralty, but has been of special concern in that context because of the mobility of vessels and their personnel. When Rule 26 was adopt-ed as Admiralty Rule 30A in 1961, the problem was alle-viated by permitting depositions de bene esse, for which leave of court is not required. See Advisory Commit-tee’s Note to Admiralty Rule 30A (1961).

A continuing study is being made in the effort to de-vise a modification of the 20-day rule appropriate to both the civil and admiralty practice to the end that Rule 26(a) shall state a uniform rule applicable alike to what are now civil actions and suits in admiralty. Meanwhile, the exigencies of maritime litigation re-quire preservation, for the time being at least, of the traditional de bene esse procedure for the post-unifica-tion counterpart of the present suit in admiralty. Ac-cordingly, the amendment provides for continued avail-ability of that procedure in admiralty and maritime claims within the meaning of Rule 9(h).


A limited rearrangement of the discovery rules is made, whereby certain rule provisions are transferred, as follows: Existing Rule 26(a) is transferred to Rules 30(a) and 31(a). Existing Rule 26(c) is transferred to

Rule 30(c). Existing Rules 26(d), (e), and (f) are trans-ferred to Rule 32. Revisions of the transferred provi-sions, if any, are discussed in the notes appended to Rules 30, 31, and 32. In addition, Rule 30(b) is trans-ferred to Rule 26(c). The purpose of this rearrangement is to establish Rule 26 as a rule governing discovery in general. (The reasons are set out in the Advisory Com-mittee’s explanatory statement.)

Subdivision (a)—Discovery Devices. This is a new sub-division listing all of the discovery devices provided in the discovery rules and establishing the relationship between the general provisions of Rule 26 and the spe-cific rules for particular discovery devices. The provi-sion that the frequency of use of these methods is not limited confirms existing law. It incorporates in gen-eral form a provision now found in Rule 33.

Subdivision (b)—Scope of Discovery. This subdivision is recast to cover the scope of discovery generally. It reg-ulates the discovery obtainable through any of the dis-covery devices listed in Rule 26(a).

All provisions as to scope of discovery are subject to the initial qualification that the court may limit dis-covery in accordance with these rules. Rule 26(c) (transferred from 30(b)) confers broad powers on the courts to regulate or prevent discovery even though the materials sought are within the scope of 26(b), and these powers have always been freely exercised. For ex-ample, a party’s income tax return is generally held not privileged, 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 65.2 (Wright ed. 1961), and yet courts have recognized that interests in privacy may call for a measure of extra protection. E.g., Wiesenberger v. W. E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Similarly, the courts have in appropriate circumstances protected materials that are primarily of an impeaching char-acter. These two types of materials merely illustrate the many situations, not capable of governance by pre-cise rule, in which courts must exercise judgment. The new subsections in Rule 26(d) do not change existing law with respect to such situations.

Subdivision (b)(1)—In General. The language is changed to provide for the scope of discovery in general terms. The existing subdivision, although in terms applicable only to depositions, is incorporated by reference in ex-isting Rules 33 and 34. Since decisions as to relevance to the subject matter of the action are made for discov-ery purposes well in advance of trial, a flexible treat-ment of relevance is required and the making of discov-ery, whether voluntary or under court order, is not a concession or determination of relevance for purposes of trial. Cf. 4 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 26–16[1] (2d ed. 1966).

Subdivision (b)(2)—Insurance Policies. Both cases and commentators are sharply in conflict on the question whether defendant’s liability insurance coverage is sub-ject to discovery in the usual situation when the insur-ance coverage is not itself admissible and does not bear on another issue on the case. Examples of Federal cases requiring disclosure and supporting comments: Cook v. Welty, 253 F.Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966) (cases cited); Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D.Mont. 1961); Williams, Discovery of Dollar Limits in Liability Policies in Auto-mobile Tort Cases, 10 Ala.L.Rev. 355 (1958); Thode, Some Reflections on the 1957 Amendments to the Texas Rules, 37 Tex.L.Rev. 33, 40–42 (1958). Examples of Federal cases refusing disclosure and supporting comments: Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F.Supp. 476 (D.N.J. 1962); Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D.Tenn. 1962); Frank, Discovery and Insurance Coverage, 1959 Ins.L.J. 281; Fournier, Pre- Trial Discovery of Insurance Coverage and Limits, 28 Ford L.Rev. 215 (1959).

The division in reported cases is close. State deci-sions based on provisions similar to the federal rules are similarly divided. See cases collected in 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 647.1, nn. 45.5, 45.6 (Wright ed. 1961). It appears to be difficult if not impossible to obtain appellate review of the issue. Resolution by rule amendment is indicated. The ques-tion is essentially procedural in that it bears upon preparation for trial and settlement before trial, and


courts confronting the question, however, they have de-cided it, have generally treated it as procedural and governed by the rules.

The amendment resolves this issue in favor of disclo-sure. Most of the decisions denying discovery, some ex-plicitly, reason from the text of Rule 26(b) that it per-mits discovery only of matters which will be admissible in evidence or appear reasonably calculated to lead to such evidence; they avoid considerations of policy, re-garding them as foreclosed. See Bisserier v. Manning, supra. Some note also that facts about a defendant’s fi-nancial status are not discoverable as such, prior to judgment with execution unsatisfied, and fear that, if courts hold insurance coverage discoverable, they must extend the principle to other aspects of the defendant’s financial status. The cases favoring disclosure rely heavily on the practical significance of insurance in the decisions lawyers make about settlement and trial preparation. In Clauss v. Danker, 264 F.Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the court held that the rules forbid dis-closure but called for an amendment to permit it.

Disclosure of insurance coverage will enable counsel for both sides to make the same realistic appraisal of the case, so that settlement and litigation strategy are based on knowledge and not speculation. It will con-duce to settlement and avoid protracted litigation in some cases, though in others it may have an opposite effect. The amendment is limited to insurance cov-erage, which should be distinguished from any other facts concerning defendant’s financial status (1) be-cause insurance is an asset created specifically to sat-isfy the claim; (2) because the insurance company ordi-narily controls the litigation; (3) because information about coverage is available only from defendant or his insurer; and (4) because disclosure does not involve a significant invasion of privacy.

Disclosure is required when the insurer ‘‘may be lia-ble’’ on part or all of the judgment. Thus, an insurance company must disclose even when it contests liability under the policy, and such disclosure does not con-stitute a waiver of its claim. It is immaterial whether the liability is to satisfy the judgment directly or merely to indemnify or reimburse another after he pays the judgment.

The provision applies only to persons ‘‘carrying on an insurance business’’ and thus covers insurance compa-nies and not the ordinary business concern that enters into a contract of indemnification. Cf. N.Y.Ins. Law § 41. Thus, the provision makes no change in existing law on discovery of indemnity agreements other than insurance agreements by persons carrying on an insur-ance business. Similarly, the provision does not cover the business concern that creates a reserve fund for purposes of self-insurance.

For some purposes other than discovery, an applica-tion for insurance is treated as a part of the insurance agreement. The provision makes clear that, for discov-ery purposes, the application is not to be so treated. The insurance application may contain personal and fi-nancial information concerning the insured, discovery of which is beyond the purpose of this provision.

In no instance does disclosure make the facts con-cerning insurance coverage admissible in evidence.

Subdivision (b)(3)—Trial Preparation: Materials. Some of the most controversial and vexing problems to emerge from the discovery rules have arisen out of re-quests for the production of documents or things pre-pared in anticipation of litigation or for trial. The ex-isting rules make no explicit provision for such mate-rials. Yet, two verbally distinct doctrines have devel-oped, each conferring a qualified immunity on these materials—the ‘‘good cause’’ requirement in Rule 34 (now generally held applicable to discovery of docu-ments via deposition under Rule 45 and interrogatories under Rule 33) and the work-product doctrine of Hick-man v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Both demand a show-ing of justification before production can be had, the one of ‘‘good cause’’ and the other variously described in the Hickman case: ‘‘necessity or justification,’’ ‘‘de-nial * * * would unduly prejudice the preparation of pe-

titioner’s case,’’ or ‘‘cause hardship or injustice’’ 329 U.S. at 509–510.

In deciding the Hickman case, the Supreme Court ap-pears to have expressed a preference in 1947 for an ap-proach to the problem of trial preparation materials by judicial decision rather than by rule. Sufficient experi-ence has accumulated, however, with lower court appli-cations of the Hickman decision to warrant a re-appraisal.

The major difficulties visible in the existing case law are (1) confusion and disagreement as to whether ‘‘good cause’’ is made out by a showing of relevance and lack of privilege, or requires an additional showing of neces-sity, (2) confusion and disagreement as to the scope of the Hickman work-product doctrine, particularly whether it extends beyond work actually performed by lawyers, and (3) the resulting difficulty of relating the ‘‘good cause’’ required by Rule 34 and the ‘‘necessity or justification’’ of the work-product doctrine, so that their respective roles and the distinctions between them are understood.

Basic Standard. Since Rule 34 in terms requires a showing of ‘‘good cause’’ for the production of all docu-ments and things, whether or not trial preparation is involved, courts have felt that a single formula is called for and have differed over whether a showing of relevance and lack of privilege is enough or whether more must be shown. When the facts of the cases are studied, however, a distinction emerges based upon the type of materials. With respect to documents not ob-tained or prepared with an eye to litigation, the deci-sions, while not uniform, reflect a strong and increas-ing tendency to relate ‘‘good cause’’ to a showing that the documents are relevant to the subject matter of the action. E.g., Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 17 F.R.D. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), with cases cited; Houdry Process Corp. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 24 F.R.D. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see Bell v. Commercial Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 514, 517 (3d Cir. 1960). When the party whose docu-ments are sought shows that the request for production is unduly burdensome or oppressive, courts have denied discovery for lack of ‘‘good cause’’, although they might just as easily have based their decision on the protective provisions of existing Rule 30(b) (new Rule 26(c)). E.g., Lauer v. Tankrederi, 39 F.R.D. 334 (E.D.Pa. 1966).

As to trial-preparation materials, however, the courts are increasingly interpreting ‘‘good cause’’ as requiring more than relevance. When lawyers have pre-pared or obtained the materials for trial, all courts re-quire more than relevance; so much is clearly com-manded by Hickman. But even as to the preparatory work of nonlawyers, while some courts ignore work- product and equate ‘‘good cause’’ with relevance, e.g., Brown v. New York, N.H. & H. RR., 17 F.R.D. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), the more recent trend is to read ‘‘good cause’’ as requiring inquiry into the importance of and need for the materials as well as into alternative sources for securing the same information. In Guilford Nat’l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962), statements of witnesses obtained by claim agents were held not discoverable because both parties had had equal access to the witnesses at about the same time, shortly after the collision in question. The decision was based solely on Rule 34 and ‘‘good cause’’; the court de-clined to rule on whether the statements were work- product. The court’s treatment of ‘‘good cause’’ is quoted at length and with approval in Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 117–118 (1964). See also Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958); Hauger v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. RR., 216 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954); Burke v. United States, 32 F.R.D. 213 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). While the opinions dealing with ‘‘good cause’’ do not often draw an explicit distinction between trial preparation materials and other materials, in fact an overwhelming proportion of the cases in which special showing is required are cases involving trial preparation materials.

The rules are amended by eliminating the general re-quirement of ‘‘good cause’’ from Rule 34 but retaining a requirement of a special showing for trial preparation


materials in this subdivision. The required showing is expressed, not in terms of ‘‘good cause’’ whose general-ity has tended to encourage confusion and controversy, but in terms of the elements of the special showing to be made: substantial need of the materials in the prepa-ration of the case and inability without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.

These changes conform to the holdings of the cases, when viewed in light of their facts. Apart from trial preparation, the fact that the materials sought are doc-umentary does not in and of itself require a special showing beyond relevance and absence of privilege. The protective provisions are of course available, and if the party from whom production is sought raises a special issue of privacy (as with respect to income tax returns or grand jury minutes) or points to evidence primarily impeaching, or can show serious burden or expense, the court will exercise its traditional power to decide whether to issue a protective order. On the other hand, the requirement of a special showing for discovery of trial preparation materials reflects the view that each side’s informal evaluation of its case should be pro-tected, that each side should be encouraged to prepare independently, and that one side should not automati-cally have the benefit of the detailed preparatory work of the other side. See Field and McKusick, Maine Civil Practice 264 (1959).

Elimination of a ‘‘good cause’’ requirement from Rule 34 and the establishment of a requirement of a special showing in this subdivision will eliminate the confusion caused by having two verbally distinct re-quirements of justification that the courts have been unable to distinguish clearly. Moreover, the language of the subdivision suggests the factors which the courts should consider in determining whether the requisite showing has been made. The importance of the mate-rials sought to the party seeking them in preparation of his case and the difficulty he will have obtaining them by other means are factors noted in the Hickman case. The courts should also consider the likelihood that the party, even if he obtains the information by independent means, will not have the substantial equivalent of the documents the production of which he seeks.

Consideration of these factors may well lead the court to distinguish between witness statements taken by an investigator, on the one hand, and other parts of the investigative file, on the other. The court in South-ern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968), while it naturally addressed itself to the ‘‘good cause’’ require-ments of Rule 34, set forth as controlling consider-ations the factors contained in the language of this subdivision. The analysis of the court suggests circum-stances under which witness statements will be discov-erable. The witness may have given a fresh and contem-poraneous account in a written statement while he is available to the party seeking discovery only a sub-stantial time thereafter. Lanham, supra at 127–128; Guil-ford, supra at 926. Or he may be reluctant or hostile. Lanham, supra at 128–129; Brookshire v. Pennsylvania RR., 14 F.R.D. 154 (N.D.Ohio 1953); Diamond v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 33 F.R.D. 264 (D.Colo. 1963). Or he may have a lapse of memory. Tannenbaum v. Walker, 16 F.R.D. 570 (E.D.Pa. 1954). Or he may probably be deviating from his prior statement. Cf. Hauger v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. RR., 216 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954). On the other hand, a much stronger showing is needed to obtain evaluative materials in an investigator’s reports. Lanham, supra at 131–133; Pickett v. L. R. Ryan, Inc., 237 F.Supp. 198 (E.D.S.C. 1965).

Materials assembled in the ordinary course of busi-ness, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are not under the qualified immunity provided by this subdivi-sion. Gossman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963); cf. United States v. New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators, Inc., 304 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1962). No change is made in the existing doctrine, noted in the Hickman case, that one party may discover relevant facts known

or available to the other party, even though such facts are contained in a document which is not itself discov-erable.

Treatment of Lawyers; Special Protection of Mental Im-pressions, Conclusions, Opinions, and Legal Theories Con-cerning the Litigation.—The courts are divided as to whether the work-product doctrine extends to the pre-paratory work only of lawyers. The Hickman case left this issue open since the statements in that case were taken by a lawyer. As to courts of appeals, compare Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950) (Hickman applied to state-ments obtained by FBI agents on theory it should apply to ‘‘all statements of prospective witnesses which a party has obtained for his trial counsel’s use’’), with Southern Ry. v. Campbell, 309 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962) (statements taken by claim agents not work-product), and Guilford Nat’l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962) (avoiding issue of work-product as to claim agents, deciding case instead under Rule 34 ‘‘good cause’’). Similarly, the district courts are divided on statements obtained by claim agents, compare, e.g., Brown v. New York, N.H. & H. RR., 17 F.R.D. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) with Hanke v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Transp. Co., 7 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1947); investigators, compare Burke v. United States, 32 F.R.D. 213 (E.D.N.Y.1963) with Snyder v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.N.Y.1956); and insurers, compare Gottlieb v. Bresler, 24 F.R.D. 371 (D.D.C.1959) with Burns v. Mulder, 20 F.R.D. 605 (ED.Pa 1957). See 4 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 26.23 [8.1] (2d ed. 1966); 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 652.2 (Wright ed. 1961).

A complication is introduced by the use made by courts of the ‘‘good cause’’ requirement of Rule 34, as described above. A court may conclude that trial prepa-ration materials are not work-product because not the result of lawyer’s work and yet hold that they are not producible because ‘‘good cause’’ has not been shown. Cf. Guilford Nat’l Bank v. Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962), cited and described above. When the decisions on ‘‘good cause’’ are taken into account, the weight of authority affords protection of the preparatory work of both lawyers and nonlawyers (though not necessarily to the same extent) by requiring more than a showing of relevance to secure production.

Subdivision (b)(3) reflects the trend of the cases by requiring a special showing, not merely as to materials prepared by an attorney, but also as to materials pre-pared in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial by or for a party or any representative acting on his behalf. The subdivision then goes on to protect against disclosure the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories concerning the litigation of an attorney or other representative of a party. The Hickman opinion drew special attention to the need for protecting an attorney against discovery of memoranda prepared from recollection of oral interviews. The courts have steadfastly safeguarded against disclosure of lawyers’ mental impressions and legal theories, as well as mental impressions and subjective evaluations of investigators and claim-agents. In enforcing this provision of the subdivision, the courts will sometimes find it necessary to order disclosure of a document but with portions deleted.

Rules 33 and 36 have been revised in order to permit discovery calling for opinions, contentions, and admis-sions relating not only to fact but also to the applica-tion of law to fact. Under those rules, a party and his attorney or other representative may be required to disclose, to some extent, mental impressions, opinions, or conclusions. But documents or parts of documents containing these matters are protected against discov-ery by this subdivision. Even though a party may ulti-mately have to disclose in response to interrogatories or requests to admit, he is entitled to keep confidential documents containing such matters prepared for inter-nal use.

Party’s Right to Own Statement.—An exception to the requirement of this subdivision enables a party to se-cure production of his own statement without any spe-


cial showing. The cases are divided. Compare, e.g., Safe-way Stores, Inc. v. Reynolds, 176 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Shupe v. Pennsylvania RR., 19 F.R.D. 144 (W.D.Pa. 1956); with e.g., New York Central RR. v. Carr, 251 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1957); Belback v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 40 F.R.D. 16 (W.D.Pa. 1966).

Courts which treat a party’s statement as though it were that of any witness overlook the fact that the par-ty’s statement is, without more, admissible in evi-dence. Ordinarily, a party gives a statement without insisting on a copy because he does not yet have a law-yer and does not understand the legal consequences of his actions. Thus, the statement is given at a time when he functions at a disadvantage. Discrepancies be-tween his trial testimony and earlier statement may result from lapse of memory or ordinary inaccuracy; a written statement produced for the first time at trial may give such discrepancies a prominence which they do not deserve. In appropriate cases the court may order a party to be deposed before his statement is pro-duced. E.g., Smith v. Central Linen Service Co., 39 F.R.D. 15 (D.Md. 1966); McCoy v. General Motors Corp., 33 F.R.D. 354 (W.D.Pa. 1963).

Commentators strongly support the view that a party be able to secure his statement without a showing. 4 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 26.23 [8.4] (2d ed. 1966); 2A Bar-ron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 652.3 (Wright ed. 1961); see also Note, Developments in the Law—Discovery, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 940, 1039 (1961). The fol-lowing states have by statute or rule taken the same position: Statutes: Fla.Stat.Ann. § 92.33; Ga.Code Ann. § 38–2109(b); La.Stat.Ann.R.S. 13:3732; Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. c. 271, § 44; Minn.Stat.Ann. § 602.01; N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 3101(e). Rules: Mo.R.C.P. 56.01(a); N.Dak.R.C.P. 34(b); Wyo.R.C.P. 34(b); cf. Mich.G.C.R. 306.2.

In order to clarify and tighten the provision on state-ments by a party, the term ‘‘statement’’ is defined. The definition is adapted from 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (Jencks Act). The statement of a party may of course be that of plaintiff or defendant, and it may be that of an indi-vidual or of a corporation or other organization.

Witness’ Right to Own Statement.—A second exception to the requirement of this subdivision permits a non-party witness to obtain a copy of his own statement without any special showing. Many, though not all, of the considerations supporting a party’s right to obtain his statement apply also to the non-party witness. In-surance companies are increasingly recognizing that a witness is entitled to a copy of his statement and are modifying their regular practice accordingly.

Subdivision (b)(4)—Trial Preparation: Experts. This is a new provision dealing with discovery of information (including facts and opinions) obtained by a party from an expert retained by that party in relation to litiga-tion or obtained by the expert and not yet transmitted to the party. The subdivision deals separately with those experts whom the party expects to call as trial witnesses and with those experts who have been re-tained or specially employed by the party but who are not expected to be witnesses. It should be noted that the subdivision does not address itself to the expert whose information was not acquired in preparation for trial but rather because he was an actor or viewer with respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit. Such an expert should be treated as an ordinary witness.

Subsection (b)(4)(A) deals with discovery of informa-tion obtained by or through experts who will be called as witnesses at trial. The provision is responsive to problems suggested by a relatively recent line of au-thorities. Many of these cases present intricate and dif-ficult issues as to which expert testimony is likely to be determinative. Prominent among them are food and drug, patent, and condemnation cases. See, e.g., United States v. Nysco Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (food and drug); E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416, 421 (D.Del. 1959) (patent); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D.Ohio 1947), aff’d. Sachs v. Alu-minum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948) (same);

United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) (condemnation).

In cases of this character, a prohibition against dis-covery of information held by expert witnesses pro-duces in acute form the very evils that discovery has been created to prevent. Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires advance preparation. The lawyer even with the help of his own experts frequently cannot anticipate the particular approach his adver-sary’s expert will take or the data on which he will base his judgment on the stand. McGlothlin, Some Prac-tical Problems in Proof of Economic, Scientific, and Tech-nical Facts, 23 F.R.D. 467, 478 (1958). A California study of discovery and pretrial in condemnation cases notes that the only substitute for discovery of experts’ valu-ation materials is ‘‘lengthy—and often fruitless—cross- examination during trial,’’ and recommends pretrial exchange of such material. Calif.Law Rev.Comm’n, Dis-covery in Eminent Domain Proceedings 707–710 (Jan.1963). Similarly, effective rebuttal requires ad-vance knowledge of the line of testimony of the other side. If the latter is foreclosed by a rule against discov-ery, then the narrowing of issues and elimination of surprise which discovery normally produces are frus-trated.

These considerations appear to account for the broad-ening of discovery against experts in the cases cited where expert testimony was central to the case. In some instances, the opinions are explicit in relating ex-panded discovery to improved cross-examination and rebuttal at trial. Franks v. National Dairy Products Corp., 41 F.R.D. 234 (W.D.Tex. 1966); United States v. 23.76 Acres, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D.Md. 1963); see also an unpublished opinion of Judge Hincks, quoted in United States v. 48 Jars, etc., 23 F.R.D. 192, 198 (D.D.C. 1958). On the other hand, the need for a new provision is shown by the many cases in which discovery of expert trial witnesses is needed for effective cross-examination and rebuttal, and yet courts apply the traditional doctrine and refuse disclosure. E.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 25 F.R.D. 192 (N.D.Cal. 1959); United States v. Certain Acres, 18 F.R.D. 98 (M.D.Ga. 1955).

Although the trial problems flowing from lack of dis-covery of expert witnesses are most acute and note-worthy when the case turns largely on experts, the same problems are encountered when a single expert testifies. Thus, subdivision (b)(4)(A) draws no line be-tween complex and simple cases, or between cases with many experts and those with but one. It establishes by rule substantially the procedure adopted by decision of the court in Knighton v. Villian & Fassio, 39 F.R.D. 11 (D.Md. 1965). For a full analysis of the problem and strong recommendations to the same effect, see Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party’s Ex-pert Information, 14 Stan.L.Rev. 455, 485–488 (1962); Long, Discovery and Experts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 38 F.R.D. 111 (1965).

Past judicial restrictions on discovery of an adver-sary’s expert, particularly as to his opinions, reflect the fear that one side will benefit unduly from the oth-er’s better preparation. The procedure established in subsection (b)(4)(A) holds the risk to a minimum. Dis-covery is limited to trial witnesses, and may be ob-tained only at a time when the parties know who their expert witnesses will be. A party must as a practical matter prepare his own case in advance of that time, for he can hardly hope to build his case out of his oppo-nent’s experts.

Subdivision (b)(4)(A) provides for discovery of an ex-pert who is to testify at the trial. A party can require one who intends to use the expert to state the sub-stance of the testimony that the expert is expected to give. The court may order further discovery, and it has ample power to regulate its timing and scope and to prevent abuse. Ordinarily, the order for further discov-ery shall compensate the expert for his time, and may compensate the party who intends to use the expert for past expenses reasonably incurred in obtaining facts or opinions from the expert. Those provisions are likely to discourage abusive practices.


Subdivision (b)(4)(B) deals with an expert who has been retained or specially employed by the party in an-ticipation of litigation or preparation for trial (thus ex-cluding an expert who is simply a general employee of the party not specially employed on the case), but who is not expected to be called as a witness. Under its pro-visions, a party may discover facts known or opinions held by such an expert only on a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.

Subdivision (b)(4)(B) is concerned only with experts retained or specially consulted in relation to trial prep-aration. Thus the subdivision precludes discovery against experts who were informally consulted in prep-aration for trial, but not retained or specially em-ployed. As an ancillary procedure, a party may on a proper showing require the other party to name experts retained or specially employed, but not those infor-mally consulted.

These new provisions of subdivision (b)(4) repudiate the few decisions that have held an expert’s informa-tion privileged simply because of his status as an ex-pert, e.g., American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Products Co., 23 F.R.D. 680, 685–686 (D.R.I. 1959). See Louisell, Modern California Discovery 315–316 (1963). They also reject as ill-considered the decisions which have sought to bring expert information within the work- product doctrine. See United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174, 176–177 (5th Cir. 1967). The provisions adopt a form of the more recently developed doctrine of ‘‘unfair-ness’’. See e.g., United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 597 (D.Md. 1963); Louisell, supra, at 317–318; 4 Moore’s Federal Practice § 26.24 (2d ed. 1966).

Under subdivision (b)(4)(C), the court is directed or authorized to issue protective orders, including an order that the expert be paid a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery, and that the party whose expert is made subject to discovery be paid a fair portion of the fees and expenses that the party incurred in obtaining information from the expert. The court may issue the latter order as a condition of discovery, or it may delay the order until after discovery is com-pleted. These provisions for fees and expenses meet the objection that it is unfair to permit one side to obtain without cost the benefit of an expert’s work for which the other side has paid, often a substantial sum. E.g., Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F.Supp. 21 (W.D.Pa. 1940); Walsh v. Reynolds Metal Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954). On the other hand, a party may not ob-tain discovery simply by offering to pay fees and ex-penses. Cf. Boynton v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F.Supp. 593 (D.Mass. 1941).

In instances of discovery under subdivision (b)(4)(B), the court is directed to award fees and expenses to the other party, since the information is of direct value to the discovering party’s preparation of his case. In or-dering discovery under (b)(4)(A)(ii), the court has dis-cretion whether to award fees and expenses to the other party; its decision should depend upon whether the dis-covering party is simply learning about the other par-ty’s case or is going beyond this to develop his own case. Even in cases where the court is directed to issue a protective order, it may decline to do so if it finds that manifest injustice would result. Thus, the court can protect, when necessary and appropriate, the inter-ests of an indigent party.

Subdivision (c)—Protective Orders. The provisions of ex-isting Rule 30(b) are transferred to this subdivision (c), as part of the rearrangement of Rule 26. The language has been changed to give it application to discovery generally. The subdivision recognizes the power of the court in the district where a deposition is being taken to make protective orders. Such power is needed when the deposition is being taken far from the court where the action is pending. The court in the district where the deposition is being taken may, and frequently will, remit the deponent or party to the court where the ac-tion is pending.

In addition, drafting changes are made to carry out and clarify the sense of the rule. Insertions are made to

avoid any possible implication that a protective order does not extend to ‘‘time’’ as well as to ‘‘place’’ or may not safeguard against ‘‘undue burden or expense.’’

The new reference to trade secrets and other con-fidential commercial information reflects existing law. The courts have not given trade secrets automatic and complete immunity against disclosure, but have in each case weighed their claim to privacy against the need for disclosure. Frequently, they have been af-forded a limited protection. See, e.g., Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1965); Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 235 F.Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).

The subdivision contains new matter relating to sanctions. When a motion for a protective order is made and the court is disposed to deny it, the court may go a step further and issue an order to provide or permit discovery. This will bring the sanctions of Rule 37(b) directly into play. Since the court has heard the contentions of all interested persons, an affirmative order is justified. See Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 Col.L.Rev. 480, 492–493 (1958). In ad-dition, the court may require the payment of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.

Subdivision (d)—Sequence and Priority. This new provi-sion is concerned with the sequence in which parties may proceed with discovery and with related problems of timing. The principal effects of the new provision are first, to eliminate any fixed priority in the sequence of discovery, and second, to make clear and explicit the court’s power to establish priority by an order issued in a particular case.

A priority rule developed by some courts, which con-fers priority on the party who first serves notice of tak-ing a deposition, is unsatisfactory in several important respects:

First, this priority rule permits a party to establish a priority running to all depositions as to which he has given earlier notice. Since he can on a given day serve notice of taking many depositions he is in a position to delay his adversary’s taking of depositions for an inor-dinate time. Some courts have ruled that deposition priority also permits a party to delay his answers to in-terrogatories and production of documents. E.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.R.D. 237 (D.Del. 1959); but cf. Sturdevant v. Sears, Roe-buck & Co., 32 F.R.D. 426 (W.D.Mo. 1963).

Second, since notice is the key to priority, if both parties wish to take depositions first a race results. See Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Pub. Co., 11 F.R.D. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (description of tactics used by parties). But the existing rules on notice of deposition create a race with runners starting from different posi-tions. The plaintiff may not give notice without leave of court until 20 days after commencement of the ac-tion, whereas the defendant may serve notice at any time after commencement. Thus, a careful and prompt defendant can almost always secure priority. This ad-vantage of defendants is fortuitous, because the pur-pose of requiring plaintiff to wait 20 days is to afford defendant an opportunity to obtain counsel, not to con-fer priority.

Third, although courts have ordered a change in the normal sequence of discovery on a number of occasions, e.g., Kaeppler v. James H. Matthews & Co., 200 F.Supp. 229 (E.D.Pa. 1961); Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. Distillers Co., 19 F.R.D. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), and have at all times avowed discretion to vary the usual priority, most commentators are agreed that courts in fact grant re-lief only for ‘‘the most obviously compelling reasons.’’ 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 447–47 (Wright ed. 1961); see also Younger, Priority of Pretrial Examination in the Federal Courts—A Comment, 34 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1271 (1959); Freund, The Pleading and Pretrial of an Antitrust Claim, 46 Corn.L.Q. 555, 564, (1964). Discontent with the fairness of actual practice has been evinced by other observers. Comments, 59 Yale L.J. 117, 134–136 (1949); Yudkin, Some Refinements in Federal Dis-covery Procedure, 11 Fed.B.J. 289, 296–297 (1951); Develop-ments in the Law-Discovery, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 940, 954–958 (1961).


Despite these difficulties, some courts have adhered to the priority rule, presumably because it provides a test which is easily understood and applied by the par-ties without much court intervention. It thus permits deposition discovery to function extrajudicially, which the rules provide for and the courts desire. For these same reasons, courts are reluctant to make numerous exceptions to the rule.

The Columbia Survey makes clear that the problem of priority does not affect litigants generally. It found that most litigants do not move quickly to obtain dis-covery. In over half of the cases, both parties waited at least 50 days. During the first 20 days after commence-ment of the action—the period when defendant might assure his priority by noticing depositions—16 percent of the defendants acted to obtain discovery. A race could not have occurred in more than 16 percent of the cases and it undoubtedly occurred in fewer. On the other hand, five times as many defendants as plaintiffs served notice of deposition during the first 19 days. To the same effect, see Comment, Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions Under the Federal Rules, 59 Yale L.J. 117, 134 (1949).

These findings do not mean, however, that the prior-ity rule is satisfactory or that a problem of priority does not exist. The court decisions show that parties do bottle on this issue and carry their disputes to court. The statistics show that these court cases are not typi-cal. By the same token, they reveal that more exten-sive exercise of judicial discretion to vary the priority will not bring a flood of litigation, and that a change in the priority rule will in fact affect only a small frac-tion of the cases.

It is contended by some that there is no need to alter the existing priority practice. In support, it is urged that there is no evidence that injustices in fact result from present practice and that, in any event, the courts can and do promulgate local rules, as in New York, to deal with local situations and issue orders to avoid pos-sible injustice in particular cases.

Subdivision (d) is based on the contrary view that the rule of priority based on notice is unsatisfactory and unfair in its operation. Subdivision (d) follows an ap-proach adapted from Civil Rule 4 of the District Court for the Southern District of New York. That rule pro-vides that starting 40 days after commencement of the action, unless otherwise ordered by the court, the fact that one part is taking a deposition shall not prevent another party from doing so ‘‘concurrently.’’ In prac-tice, the depositions are not usually taken simulta-neously; rather, the parties work out arrangements for alternation in the taking of depositions. One party may take a complete deposition and then the other, or, if the depositions are extensive, one party deposes for a set time, and then the other. See Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Pub. Co., 11 F.R.D. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).

In principle, one party’s initiation of discovery should not wait upon the other’s completion, unless delay is dictated by special considerations. Clearly the principle is feasible with respect to all methods of dis-covery other than depositions. And the experience of the Southern District of New York shows that the prin-ciple can be applied to depositions as well. The courts have not had an increase in motion business on this matter. Once it is clear to lawyers that they bargain on an equal footing, they are usually able to arrange for an orderly succession of depositions without judicial intervention. Professor Moore has called attention to Civil Rule 4 and suggested that it may usefully be ex-tended to other areas. 4 Moore’s Federal Practice 1154 (2d ed. 1966).

The court may upon motion and by order grant prior-ity in a particular case. But a local court rule purport-ing to confer priority in certain classes of cases would be inconsistent with this subdivision and thus void.

Subdivision (e)—Supplementation of Responses. The rules do not now state whether interrogatories (and questions at deposition as well as requests for inspec-tion and admissions) impose a ‘‘continuing burden’’ on the responding party to supplement his answers if he

obtains new information. The issue is acute when new information renders substantially incomplete or inac-curate an answer which was complete and accurate when made. It is essential that the rules provide an an-swer to this question. The parties can adjust to a rule either way, once they know what it is. See 4 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 33.25[4] (2d ed. 1966).

Arguments can be made both ways. Imposition of a continuing burden reduces the proliferation of addi-tional sets of interrogatories. Some courts have adopt-ed local rules establishing such a burden. E.g., E.D.Pa.R. 20(f), quoted in Taggart v. Vermont Transp. Co., 32 F.R.D. 587 (E.D.Pa. 1963); D.Me.R.15(c). Others have imposed the burden by decision, E.g., Chenault v. Nebraska Farm Products, Inc., 9 F.R.D. 529, 533 (D.Nebr. 1949). On the other hand, there are serious objections to the burden, especially in protracted cases. Although the party signs the answers, it is his lawyer who under-stands their significance and bears the responsibility to bring answers up to date. In a complex case all sorts of information reaches the party, who little understands its bearing on answers previously given to interrog-atories. In practice, therefore, the lawyer under a con-tinuing burden must periodically recheck all interrog-atories and canvass all new information. But a full set of new answers may no longer be needed by the interro-gating party. Some issues will have been dropped from the case, some questions are now seen as unimportant, and other questions must in any event be reformulated. See Novick v. Pennsylvania RR., 18 F.R.D. 296, 298 (W.D.Pa. 1955).

Subdivision (e) provides that a party is not under a continuing burden except as expressly provided. Cf. Note, 68 Harv.L.Rev. 673, 677 (1955). An exception is made as to the identity of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, because of the obvious impor-tance to each side of knowing all witnesses and because information about witnesses routinely comes to each lawyer’s attention. Many of the decisions on the issue of a continuing burden have in fact concerned the iden-tity of witnesses. An exception is also made as to ex-pert trial witnesses in order to carry out the provisions of Rule 26(b)(4). See Diversified Products Corp. v. Sports Center Co., 42 F.R.D. 3 (D.Md. 1967).

Another exception is made for the situation in which a party, or more frequently his lawyer, obtains actual knowledge that a prior response is incorrect. This ex-ception does not impose a duty to check the accuracy of prior responses, but it prevents knowing conceal-ment by a party or attorney. Finally, a duty to supple-ment may be imposed by order of the court in a par-ticular case (including an order resulting from a pre-trial conference) or by agreement of the parties. A party may of course make a new discovery request which requires supplementation of prior responses.

The duty will normally be enforced, in those limited instances where it is imposed, through sanctions im-posed by the trial court, including exclusion of evi-dence, continuance, or other action, as the court may deem appropriate.


Subdivision (f). This subdivision is new. There has been widespread criticism of abuse of discovery. The Committee has considered a number of proposals to eliminate abuse, including a change in Rule 26(b)(1) with respect to the scope of discovery and a change in Rule 33(a) to limit the number of questions that can be asked by interrogatories to parties.

The Committee believes that abuse of discovery, while very serious in certain cases, is not so general as to require such basic changes in the rules that govern discovery in all cases. A very recent study of discovery in selected metropolitan districts tends to support its belief. P. Connolly, E. Holleman, & M. Kuhlman, Judi-cial Controls and the Civil Litigative Process: Discovery (Federal Judicial Center, 1978). In the judgment of the Committee abuse can best be prevented by intervention by the court as soon as abuse is threatened.


To this end this subdivision provides that counsel who has attempted without success to effect with op-posing counsel a reasonable program or plan for discov-ery is entitled to the assistance of the court.

It is not contemplated that requests for discovery conferences will be made routinely. A relatively narrow discovery dispute should be resolved by resort to Rules 26(c) or 37(a), and if it appears that a request for a con-ference is in fact grounded in such a dispute, the court may refer counsel to those rules. If the court is per-suaded that a request is frivolous or vexatious, it can strike it. See Rules 11 and 7(b)(2).

A number of courts routinely consider discovery mat-ters in preliminary pretrial conferences held shortly after the pleadings are closed. This subdivision does not interfere with such a practice. It authorizes the court to combine a discovery conference with a pretrial con-ference under Rule 16 if a pretrial conference is held sufficiently early to prevent or curb abuse.


Excessive discovery and evasion or resistance to rea-sonable discovery requests pose significant problems. Recent studies have made some attempt to determine the sources and extent of the difficulties. See Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of its Effectiveness, Prin-cipal Problems and Abuses, American Bar Foundation (1980); Connolly, Holleman & Kuhlman, Judicial Controls and the Civil Litigative Process: Discovery, Federal Judi-cial Center (1978); Ellington, A Study of Sanctions for Discovery Abuse, Department of Justice (1979); Schroe-der & Frank, The Proposed Changes in the Discovery Rules, 1978 Ariz.St.L.J. 475.

The purpose of discovery is to provide a mechanism for making relevant information available to the liti-gants. ‘‘Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litiga-tion.’’ Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). Thus the spirit of the rules is violated when advocates at-tempt to use discovery tools as tactical weapons rather than to expose the facts and illuminate the issues by overuse of discovery or unnecessary use of defensive weapons or evasive responses. All of this results in ex-cessively costly and time-consuming activities that are disproportionate to the nature of the case, the amount involved, or the issues or values at stake.

Given our adversary tradition and the current discov-ery rules, it is not surprising that there are many op-portunities, if not incentives, for attorneys to engage in discovery that, although authorized by the broad, permissive terms of the rules, nevertheless results in delay. See Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Dis-covery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 Vand.L.Rev. 1259 (1978). As a result, it has been said that the rules have ‘‘not infrequently [been] exploited to the disadvantage of justice.’’ Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). These prac-tices impose costs on an already overburdened system and impede the fundamental goal of the ‘‘just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 1.

Subdivision (a); Discovery Methods. The deletion of the last sentence of Rule 26(a)(1), which provided that un-less the court ordered otherwise under Rule 26(c) ‘‘the frequency of use’’ of the various discovery methods was not to be limited, is an attempt to address the problem of duplicative, redundant, and excessive discovery and to reduce it. The amendment, in conjunction with the changes in Rule 26(b)(1), is designed to encourage dis-trict judges to identify instances of needless discovery and to limit the use of the various discovery devices ac-cordingly. The question may be raised by one of the parties, typically on a motion for a protective order, or by the court on its own initiative. It is entirely appro-priate to consider a limitation on the frequency of use of discovery at a discovery conference under Rule 26(f) or at any other pretrial conference authorized by these rules. In considering the discovery needs of a particular case, the court should consider the factors described in Rule 26(b)(1).

Subdivision (b); Discovery Scope and Limits. Rule 26(b)(1) has been amended to add a sentence to deal with the problem of over-discovery. The objective is to guard against redundant or disproportionate discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be directed to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry. The new sentence is intended to encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying and discouraging discovery overuse. The grounds mentioned in the amended rule for limiting discovery reflect the existing practice of many courts in issuing protective orders under Rule 26(c). See e.g., Carlson Cos. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F.Supp. 1080 (D.Minn. 1974); Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 33 F.R.D. 262 (M.D.Pa. 1963); Welty v. Clute, 1 F.R.D. 446 (W.D.N.Y. 1941). On the whole, however, district judges have been reluctant to limit the use of the discovery devices. See, e.g., Apco Oil Co. v. Certified Transp., Inc., 46 F.R.D. 428 (W.D.Mo. 1969). See generally 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §§ 2036, 2037, 2039, 2040 (1970).

The first element of the standard, Rule 26(b)(1)(i), is designed to minimize redundancy in discovery and en-courage attorneys to be sensitive to the comparative costs of different methods of securing information. Subdivision (b)(1)(ii) also seeks to reduce repetitiveness and to oblige lawyers to think through their discovery activities in advance so that full utilization is made of each deposition, document request, or set of interrog-atories. The elements of Rule 26(b)(1)(iii) address the problem of discovery that is disproportionate to the in-dividual lawsuit as measured by such matters as its na-ture and complexity, the importance of the issues at stake in a case seeking damages, the limitations on a financially weak litigant to withstand extensive oppo-sition to a discovery program or to respond to discov-ery requests, and the significance of the substantive is-sues, as measured in philosophic, social, or institu-tional terms. Thus the rule recognizes that many cases in public policy spheres, such as employment practices, free speech, and other matters, may have importance far beyond the monetary amount involved. The court must apply the standards in an even-handed manner that will prevent use of discovery to wage a war of at-trition or as a device to coerce a party, whether finan-cially weak or affluent.

The rule contemplates greater judicial involvement in the discovery process and thus acknowledges the re-ality that it cannot always operate on a self-regulating basis. See Connolly, Holleman & Kuhlman, Judicial Con-trols and the Civil Litigative Process: Discovery 77, Federal Judicial Center (1978). In an appropriate case the court could restrict the number of depositions, interrog-atories, or the scope of a production request. But the court must be careful not to deprive a party of discov-ery that is reasonably necessary to afford a fair oppor-tunity to develop and prepare the case.

The court may act on motion, or its own initiative. It is entirely appropriate to resort to the amended rule in conjunction with a discovery conference under Rule 26(f) or one of the other pretrial conferences authorized by the rules.

Subdivision (g); Signing of Discovery Requests, Re-sponses, and Objections. Rule 26(g) imposes an affirma-tive duty to engage in pretrial discovery in a respon-sible manner that is consistent with the spirit and pur-poses of Rules 26 through 37. In addition, Rule 26(g) is designed to curb discovery abuse by explicitly encour-aging the imposition of sanctions. The subdivision pro-vides a deterrent to both excessive discovery and eva-sion by imposing a certification requirement that obliges each attorney to stop and think about the legit-imacy of a discovery request, a response thereto, or an objection. The term ‘‘response’’ includes answers to in-terrogatories and to requests to admit as well as re-sponses to production requests.

If primary responsibility for conducting discovery is to continue to rest with the litigants, they must be obliged to act responsibly and avoid abuse. With this in


mind, Rule 26(g), which parallels the amendments to Rule 11, requires an attorney or unrepresented party to sign each discovery request, response, or objection. Mo-tions relating to discovery are governed by Rule 11. However, since a discovery request, response, or objec-tion usually deals with more specific subject matter than motions or papers, the elements that must be cer-tified in connection with the former are spelled out more completely. The signature is a certification of the elements set forth in Rule 26(g).

Although the certification duty requires the lawyer to pause and consider the reasonableness of his request, response, or objection, it is not meant to discourage or restrict necessary and legitimate discovery. The rule simply requires that the attorney make a reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of his response, request, or objection.

The duty to make a ‘‘reasonable inquiry’’ is satisfied if the investigation undertaken by the attorney and the conclusions drawn therefrom are reasonable under the circumstances. It is an objective standard similar to the one imposed by Rule 11. See the Advisory Commit-tee Note to Rule 11. See also Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 365 F.Supp. 975 (E.D.Pa. 1973). In making the inquiry, the attorney may rely on asser-tions by the client and on communications with other counsel in the case as long as that reliance is appro-priate under the circumstances. Ultimately, what is reasonable is a matter for the court to decide on the to-tality of the circumstances.

Rule 26(g) does not require the signing attorney to certify the truthfulness of the client’s factual responses to a discovery request. Rather, the signature certifies that the lawyer has made a reasonable effort to assure that the client has provided all the information and documents available to him that are responsive to the discovery demand. Thus, the lawyer’s certification under Rule 26(g) should be distinguished from other sig-nature requirements in the rules, such as those in Rules 30(e) and 33.

Nor does the rule require a party or an attorney to disclose privileged communications or work product in order to show that a discovery request, response, or ob-jection is substantially justified. The provisions of Rule 26(c), including appropriate orders after in camera inspection by the court, remain available to protect a party claiming privilege or work product protection.

The signing requirement means that every discovery request, response, or objection should be grounded on a theory that is reasonable under the precedents or a good faith belief as to what should be the law. This standard is heavily dependent on the circumstances of each case. The certification speaks as of the time it is made. The duty to supplement discovery responses con-tinues to be governed by Rule 26(e).

Concern about discovery abuse has led to widespread recognition that there is a need for more aggressive ju-dicial control and supervision. ACF Industries, Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081 (1979) (certiorari denied) (Powell, J., dissenting). Sanctions to deter discovery abuse would be more effective if they were diligently applied ‘‘not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.’’ National Hockey League v. Metropoli-tan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976). See also Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1033 (1978). Thus the premise of Rule 26(g) is that imposing sanctions on attorneys who fail to meet the rule’s standards will sig-nificantly reduce abuse by imposing disadvantages therefor.

Because of the asserted reluctance to impose sanc-tions on attorneys who abuse the discovery rules, see Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of its Effectiveness, Principal Problems and Abuses, American Bar Founda-tion (1980); Ellington, A Study of Sanctions for Discovery Abuse, Department of Justice (1979), Rule 26(g) makes explicit the authority judges now have to impose ap-propriate sanctions and requires them to use it. This

authority derives from Rule 37, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court’s inherent power. See Roadway Express, Inc., v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 661–62 (D.Col. 1980); Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U.Chi.L.Rev. 619 (1977). The new rule mandates that sanctions be imposed on attorneys who fail to meet the standards established in the first portion of Rule 26(g). The nature of the sanction is a matter of judicial dis-cretion to be exercised in light of the particular cir-cumstances. The court may take into account any fail-ure by the party seeking sanctions to invoke protection under Rule 26(c) at an early stage in the litigation.

The sanctioning process must comport with due proc-ess requirements. The kind of notice and hearing re-quired will depend on the facts of the case and the se-verity of the sanction being considered. To prevent the proliferation of the sanction procedure and to avoid multiple hearings, discovery in any sanction proceed-ing normally should be permitted only when it is clear-ly required by the interests of justice. In most cases the court will be aware of the circumstances and only a brief hearing should be necessary.




Subdivision (a). Through the addition of paragraphs (1)–(4), this subdivision imposes on parties a duty to disclose, without awaiting formal discovery requests, certain basic information that is needed in most cases to prepare for trial or make an informed decision about settlement. The rule requires all parties (1) early in the case to exchange information regarding potential wit-nesses, documentary evidence, damages, and insurance, (2) at an appropriate time during the discovery period to identify expert witnesses and provide a detailed written statement of the testimony that may be offered at trial through specially retained experts, and (3) as the trial date approaches to identify the particular evi-dence that may be offered at trial. The enumeration in Rule 26(a) of items to be disclosed does not prevent a court from requiring by order or local rule that the parties disclose additional information without a dis-covery request. Nor are parties precluded from using traditional discovery methods to obtain further infor-mation regarding these matters, as for example asking an expert during a deposition about testimony given in other litigation beyond the four-year period specified in Rule 26(a)(2)(B).

A major purpose of the revision is to accelerate the exchange of basic information about the case and to eliminate the paper work involved in requesting such information, and the rule should be applied in a manner to achieve those objectives. The concepts of imposing a duty of disclosure were set forth in Brazil, The Adver-sary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 Vand. L. Rev. 1348 (1978), and Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 703, 721–23 (1989).

The rule is based upon the experience of district courts that have required disclosure of some of this in-formation through local rules, court-approved standard interrogatories, and standing orders. Most have re-quired pretrial disclosure of the kind of information de-scribed in Rule 26(a)(3). Many have required written re-ports from experts containing information like that specified in Rule 26(a)(2)(B). While far more limited, the experience of the few state and federal courts that have required pre-discovery exchange of core information such as is contemplated in Rule 26(a)(1) indicates that savings in time and expense can be achieved, particu-larly if the litigants meet and discuss the issues in the case as a predicate for this exchange and if a judge sup-ports the process, as by using the results to guide fur-


ther proceedings in the case. Courts in Canada and the United Kingdom have for many years required disclo-sure of certain information without awaiting a request from an adversary.

Paragraph (1). As the functional equivalent of court- ordered interrogatories, this paragraph requires early disclosure, without need for any request, of four types of information that have been customarily secured early in litigation through formal discovery. The intro-ductory clause permits the court, by local rule, to ex-empt all or particular types of cases from these disclo-sure requirement[s] or to modify the nature of the in-formation to be disclosed. It is expected that courts would, for example, exempt cases like Social Security reviews and government collection cases in which dis-covery would not be appropriate or would be unlikely. By order the court may eliminate or modify the disclo-sure requirements in a particular case, and similarly the parties, unless precluded by order or local rule, can stipulate to elimination or modification of the require-ments for that case. The disclosure obligations speci-fied in paragraph (1) will not be appropriate for all cases, and it is expected that changes in these obliga-tions will be made by the court or parties when the cir-cumstances warrant.

Authorization of these local variations is, in large measure, included in order to accommodate the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, which implicitly directs districts to experiment during the study period with differing procedures to reduce the time and expense of civil litigation. The civil justice delay and expense re-duction plans adopted by the courts under the Act dif-fer as to the type, form, and timing of disclosures re-quired. Section 105(c)(1) of the Act calls for a report by the Judicial Conference to Congress by December 31, 1995, comparing experience in twenty of these courts; and section 105(c)(2)(B) contemplates that some changes in the Rules may then be needed. While these studies may indicate the desirability of further changes in Rule 26(a)(1), these changes probably could not be-come effective before December 1998 at the earliest. In the meantime, the present revision puts in place a se-ries of disclosure obligations that, unless a court acts affirmatively to impose other requirements or indeed to reject all such requirements for the present, are de-signed to eliminate certain discovery, help focus the discovery that is needed, and facilitate preparation for trial or settlement.

Subparagraph (A) requires identification of all per-sons who, based on the investigation conducted thus far, are likely to have discoverable information rel-evant to the factual disputes between the parties. All persons with such information should be disclosed, whether or not their testimony will be supportive of the position of the disclosing party. As officers of the court, counsel are expected to disclose the identity of those persons who may be used by them as witnesses or who, if their potential testimony were known, might reasonably be expected to be deposed or called as a wit-ness by any of the other parties. Indicating briefly the general topics on which such persons have information should not be burdensome, and will assist other parties in deciding which depositions will actually be needed.

Subparagraph (B) is included as a substitute for the inquiries routinely made about the existence and loca-tion of documents and other tangible things in the pos-session, custody, or control of the disclosing party. Al-though, unlike subdivision (a)(3)(C), an itemized listing of each exhibit is not required, the disclosure should describe and categorize, to the extent identified during the initial investigation, the nature and location of po-tentially relevant documents and records, including computerized data and other electronically-recorded information, sufficiently to enable opposing parties (1) to make an informed decision concerning which docu-ments might need to be examined, at least initially, and (2) to frame their document requests in a manner likely to avoid squabbles resulting from the wording of the requests. As with potential witnesses, the require-ment for disclosure of documents applies to all poten-

tially relevant items then known to the party, whether or not supportive of its contentions in the case.

Unlike subparagraphs (C) and (D), subparagraph (B) does not require production of any documents. Of course, in cases involving few documents a disclosing party may prefer to provide copies of the documents rather than describe them, and the rule is written to afford this option to the disclosing party. If, as will be more typical, only the description is provided, the other parties are expected to obtain the documents de-sired by proceeding under Rule 34 or through informal requests. The disclosing party does not, by describing documents under subparagraph (B), waive its right to object to production on the basis of privilege or work product protection, or to assert that the documents are not sufficiently relevant to justify the burden or ex-pense of production.

The initial disclosure requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) are limited to identification of potential evidence ‘‘relevant to disputed facts alleged with par-ticularity in the pleadings.’’ There is no need for a party to identify potential evidence with respect to al-legations that are admitted. Broad, vague, and conclu-sory allegations sometimes tolerated in notice plead-ing—for example, the assertion that a product with many component parts is defective in some unspecified manner—should not impose upon responding parties the obligation at that point to search for and identify all persons possibly involved in, or all documents af-fecting, the design, manufacture, and assembly of the product. The greater the specificity and clarity of the allegations in the pleadings, the more complete should be the listing of potential witnesses and types of docu-mentary evidence. Although paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B) by their terms refer to the factual disputes de-fined in the pleadings, the rule contemplates that these issues would be informally refined and clarified during the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f) and that the disclosure obligations would be adjusted in the light of these discussions. The disclosure requirements should, in short, be applied with common sense in light of the principles of Rule 1, keeping in mind the salu-tary purposes that the rule is intended to accomplish. The litigants should not indulge in gamesmanship with respect to the disclosure obligations.

Subparagraph (C) imposes a burden of disclosure that includes the functional equivalent of a standing Re-quest for Production under Rule 34. A party claiming damages or other monetary relief must, in addition to disclosing the calculation of such damages, make avail-able the supporting documents for inspection and copy-ing as if a request for such materials had been made under Rule 34. This obligation applies only with respect to documents then reasonably available to it and not privileged or protected as work product. Likewise, a party would not be expected to provide a calculation of damages which, as in many patent infringement ac-tions, depends on information in the possession of an-other party or person.

Subparagraph (D) replaces subdivision (b)(2) of Rule 26, and provides that liability insurance policies be made available for inspection and copying. The last two sentences of that subdivision have been omitted as un-necessary, not to signify any change of law. The disclo-sure of insurance information does not thereby render such information admissible in evidence. See Rule 411, Federal Rules of Evidence. Nor does subparagraph (D) require disclosure of applications for insurance, though in particular cases such information may be discover-able in accordance with revised subdivision (a)(5).

Unless the court directs a different time, the disclo-sures required by subdivision (a)(1) are to be made at or within 10 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). One of the purposes of this meeting is to refine the factual disputes with respect to which disclo-sures should be made under paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B), particularly if an answer has not been filed by a defendant, or, indeed, to afford the parties an oppor-tunity to modify by stipulation the timing or scope of these obligations. The time of this meeting is generally


left to the parties provided it is held at least 14 days be-fore a scheduling conference is held or before a schedul-ing order is due under Rule 16(b). In cases in which no scheduling conference is held, this will mean that the meeting must ordinarily be held within 75 days after a defendant has first appeared in the case and hence that the initial disclosures would be due no later than 85 days after the first appearance of a defendant.

Before making its disclosures, a party has the obliga-tion under subdivision (g)(1) to make a reasonable in-quiry into the facts of the case. The rule does not de-mand an exhaustive investigation at this stage of the case, but one that is reasonable under the circum-stances, focusing on the facts that are alleged with par-ticularity in the pleadings. The type of investigation that can be expected at this point will vary based upon such factors as the number and complexity of the is-sues; the location, nature, number, and availability of potentially relevant witnesses and documents; the ex-tent of past working relationships between the attor-ney and the client, particularly in handling related or similar litigation; and of course how long the party has to conduct an investigation, either before or after fil-ing of the case. As provided in the last sentence of sub-division (a)(1), a party is not excused from the duty of disclosure merely because its investigation is incom-plete. The party should make its initial disclosures based on the pleadings and the information then rea-sonably available to it. As its investigation continues and as the issues in the pleadings are clarified, it should supplement its disclosures as required by sub-division (e)(1). A party is not relieved from its obliga-tion of disclosure merely because another party has not made its disclosures or has made an inadequate disclo-sure.

It will often be desirable, particularly if the claims made in the complaint are broadly stated, for the par-ties to have their Rule 26(f) meeting early in the case, perhaps before a defendant has answered the complaint or had time to conduct other than a cursory investiga-tion. In such circumstances, in order to facilitate more meaningful and useful initial disclosures, they can and should stipulate to a period of more than 10 days after the meeting in which to make these disclosures, at least for defendants who had no advance notice of the potential litigation. A stipulation at an early meeting affording such a defendant at least 60 days after receiv-ing the complaint in which to make its disclosures under subdivision (a)(1)—a period that is two weeks longer than the time formerly specified for responding to interrogatories served with a complaint—should be adequate and appropriate in most cases.

Paragraph (2). This paragraph imposes an additional duty to disclose information regarding expert testi-mony sufficiently in advance of trial that opposing par-ties have a reasonable opportunity to prepare for effec-tive cross examination and perhaps arrange for expert testimony from other witnesses. Normally the court should prescribe a time for these disclosures in a sched-uling order under Rule 16(b), and in most cases the party with the burden of proof on an issue should dis-close its expert testimony on that issue before other parties are required to make their disclosures with re-spect to that issue. In the absence of such a direction, the disclosures are to be made by all parties at least 90 days before the trial date or the date by which the case is to be ready for trial, except that an additional 30 days is allowed (unless the court specifies another time) for disclosure of expert testimony to be used sole-ly to contradict or rebut the testimony that may be presented by another party’s expert. For a discussion of procedures that have been used to enhance the reliabil-ity of expert testimony, see M. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 90.

Paragraph (2)(B) requires that persons retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony, or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly in-volve the giving of expert testimony, must prepare a

detailed and complete written report, stating the testi-mony the witness is expected to present during direct examination, together with the reasons therefor. The information disclosed under the former rule in answer-ing interrogatories about the ‘‘substance’’ of expert testimony was frequently so sketchy and vague that it rarely dispensed with the need to depose the expert and often was even of little help in preparing for a deposi-tion of the witness. Revised Rule 37(c)(1) provides an in-centive for full disclosure; namely, that a party will not ordinarily be permitted to use on direct examina-tion any expert testimony not so disclosed. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) does not preclude counsel from providing as-sistance to experts in preparing the reports, and indeed, with experts such as automobile mechanics, this assist-ance may be needed. Nevertheless, the report, which is intended to set forth the substance of the direct exam-ination, should be written in a manner that reflects the testimony to be given by the witness and it must be signed by the witness.

The report is to disclose the data and other informa-tion considered by the expert and any exhibits or charts that summarize or support the expert’s opinions. Given this obligation of disclosure, litigants should no longer be able to argue that materials furnished to their experts to be used in forming their opinions— whether or not ultimately relied upon by the expert— are privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure when such persons are testifying or being deposed.

Revised subdivision (b)(4)(A) authorizes the deposi-tion of expert witnesses. Since depositions of experts required to prepare a written report may be taken only after the report has been served, the length of the depo-sition of such experts should be reduced, and in many cases the report may eliminate the need for a deposi-tion. Revised subdivision (e)(1) requires disclosure of any material changes made in the opinions of an expert from whom a report is required, whether the changes are in the written report or in testimony given at a deposition.

For convenience, this rule and revised Rule 30 con-tinue to use the term ‘‘expert’’ to refer to those persons who will testify under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence with respect to scientific, technical, and other specialized matters. The requirement of a written report in paragraph (2)(B), however, applies only to those experts who are retained or specially employed to provide such testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of a party regularly involve the giving of such testimony. A treating physician, for example, can be deposed or called to testify at trial without any re-quirement for a written report. By local rule, order, or written stipulation, the requirement of a written re-port may be waived for particular experts or imposed upon additional persons who will provide opinions under Rule 702.

Paragraph (3). This paragraph imposes an additional duty to disclose, without any request, information cus-tomarily needed in final preparation for trial. These disclosures are to be made in accordance with sched-ules adopted by the court under Rule 16(b) or by special order. If no such schedule is directed by the court, the disclosures are to be made at least 30 days before com-mencement of the trial. By its terms, rule 26(a)(3) does not require disclosure of evidence to be used solely for impeachment purposes; however, disclosure of such evi-dence—as well as other items relating to conduct of trial—may be required by local rule or a pretrial order.

Subparagraph (A) requires the parties to designate the persons whose testimony they may present as sub-stantive evidence at trial, whether in person or by dep-osition. Those who will probably be called as witnesses should be listed separately from those who are not like-ly to be called but who are being listed in order to pre-serve the right to do so if needed because of develop-ments during trial. Revised Rule 37(c)(1) provides that only persons so listed may be used at trial to present substantive evidence. This restriction does not apply unless the omission was ‘‘without substantial justifica-tion’’ and hence would not bar an unlisted witness if

6 TITLE 28, APPENDIX—RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26

the need for such testimony is based upon develop-ments during trial that could not reasonably have been anticipated—e.g., a change of testimony.

Listing a witness does not obligate the party to se-cure the attendance of the person at trial, but should preclude the party from objecting if the person is called to testify by another party who did not list the person as a witness.

Subparagraph (B) requires the party to indicate which of these potential witnesses will be presented by deposition at trial. A party expecting to use at trial a deposition not recorded by stenographic means is re-quired by revised Rule 32 to provide the court with a transcript of the pertinent portions of such depositions. This rule requires that copies of the transcript of a nonstenographic deposition be provided to other parties in advance of trial for verification, an obvious concern since counsel often utilize their own personnel to pre-pare transcripts from audio or video tapes. By order or local rule, the court may require that parties designate the particular portions of stenographic depositions to be used at trial.

Subparagraph (C) requires disclosure of exhibits, in-cluding summaries (whether to be offered in lieu of other documentary evidence or to be used as an aid in understanding such evidence), that may be offered as substantive evidence. The rule requires a separate list-ing of each such exhibit, though it should permit volu-minous items of a similar or standardized character to be described by meaningful categories. For example, unless the court has otherwise directed, a series of vouchers might be shown collectively as a single ex-hibit with their starting and ending dates. As with wit-nesses, the exhibits that will probably be offered are to be listed separately from those which are unlikely to be offered but which are listed in order to preserve the right to do so if needed because of developments during trial. Under revised Rule 37(c)(1) the court can permit use of unlisted documents the need for which could not reasonably have been anticipated in advance of trial.

Upon receipt of these final pretrial disclosures, other parties have 14 days (unless a different time is specified by the court) to disclose any objections they wish to preserve to the usability of the deposition testimony or to the admissibility of the documentary evidence (other than under Rules 402 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence). Similar provisions have become common-place either in pretrial orders or by local rules, and sig-nificantly expedite the presentation of evidence at trial, as well as eliminate the need to have available witnesses to provide ‘‘foundation’’ testimony for most items of documentary evidence. The listing of a poten-tial objection does not constitute the making of that objection or require the court to rule on the objection; rather, it preserves the right of the party to make the objection when and as appropriate during trial. The court may, however, elect to treat the listing as a mo-tion ‘‘in limine’’ and rule upon the objections in ad-vance of trial to the extent appropriate.

The time specified in the rule for the final pretrial disclosures is relatively close to the trial date. The ob-jective is to eliminate the time and expense in making these disclosures of evidence and objections in those cases that settle shortly before trial, while affording a reasonable time for final preparation for trial in those cases that do not settle. In many cases, it will be desir-able for the court in a scheduling or pretrial order to set an earlier time for disclosures of evidence and pro-vide more time for disclosing potential objections.

Paragraph (4). This paragraph prescribes the form of disclosures. A signed written statement is required, re-minding the parties and counsel of the solemnity of the obligations imposed; and the signature on the initial or pretrial disclosure is a certification under subdivision (g)(1) that it is complete and correct as of the time when made. Consistent with Rule 5(d), these disclosures are to be filed with the court unless otherwise directed. It is anticipated that many courts will direct that ex-pert reports required under paragraph (2)(B) not be filed until needed in connection with a motion or for trial.

Paragraph (5). This paragraph is revised to take note of the availability of revised Rule 45 for inspection from non-parties of documents and premises without the need for a deposition.

Subdivision (b). This subdivision is revised in several respects. First, former paragraph (1) is subdivided into two paragraphs for ease of reference and to avoid re-numbering of paragraphs (3) and (4). Textual changes are then made in new paragraph (2) to enable the court to keep tighter rein on the extent of discovery. The in-formation explosion of recent decades has greatly in-creased both the potential cost of wide-ranging discov-ery and the potential for discovery to be used as an in-strument for delay or oppression. Amendments to Rules 30, 31, and 33 place presumptive limits on the number of depositions and interrogatories, subject to leave of court to pursue additional discovery. The revi-sions in Rule 26(b)(2) are intended to provide the court with broader discretion to impose additional restric-tions on the scope and extent of discovery and to au-thorize courts that develop case tracking systems based on the complexity of cases to increase or de-crease by local rule the presumptive number of deposi-tions and interrogatories allowed in particular types or classifications of cases. The revision also dispels any doubt as to the power of the court to impose limita-tions on the length of depositions under Rule 30 or on the number of requests for admission under Rule 36.

Second, former paragraph (2), relating to insurance, has been relocated as part of the required initial disclo-sures under subdivision (a)(1)(D), and revised to provide for disclosure of the policy itself.

Third, paragraph (4)(A) is revised to provide that ex-perts who are expected to be witnesses will be subject to deposition prior to trial, conforming the norm stated in the rule to the actual practice followed in most courts, in which depositions of experts have become standard. Concerns regarding the expense of such depo-sitions should be mitigated by the fact that the ex-pert’s fees for the deposition will ordinarily be borne by the party taking the deposition. The requirement under subdivision (a)(2)(B) of a complete and detailed report of the expected testimony of certain forensic experts may, moreover, eliminate the need for some such depo-sitions or at least reduce the length of the depositions. Accordingly, the deposition of an expert required by subdivision (a)(2)(B) to provide a written report may be taken only after the report has been served.

Paragraph (4)(C), bearing on compensation of experts, is revised to take account of the changes in paragraph (4)(A).

Paragraph (5) is a new provision. A party must notify other parties if it is withholding materials otherwise subject to disclosure under the rule or pursuant to a discovery request because it is asserting a claim of privilege or work product protection. To withhold ma-terials without such notice is contrary to the rule, sub-jects the party to sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2), and may be viewed as a waiver of the privilege or protec-tion.

The party must also provide sufficient information to enable other parties to evaluate the applicability of the claimed privilege or protection. Although the person from whom the discovery is sought decides whether to claim a privilege or protection, the court ultimately decides whether, if this claim is challenged, the privi-lege or protection applies. Providing information perti-nent to the applicability of the privilege or protection should reduce the need for in camera examination of the documents.

The rule does not attempt to define for each case what information must be provided when a party as-serts a claim of privilege or work product protection. Details concerning time, persons, general subject mat-ter, etc., may be appropriate if only a few items are withheld, but may be unduly burdensome when volumi-nous documents are claimed to be privileged or pro-tected, particularly if the items can be described by categories. A party can seek relief through a protective order under subdivision (c) if compliance with the re-


quirement for providing this information would be an unreasonable burden. In rare circumstances some of the pertinent information affecting applicability of the claim, such as the identity of the client, may itself be privileged; the rule provides that such information need not be disclosed.

The obligation to provide pertinent information con-cerning withheld privileged materials applies only to items ‘‘otherwise discoverable.’’ If a broad discovery re-quest is made—for example, for all documents of a par-ticular type during a twenty year period—and the re-sponding party believes in good faith that production of documents for more than the past three years would be unduly burdensome, it should make its objection to the breadth of the request and, with respect to the docu-ments generated in that three year period, produce the unprivileged documents and describe those withheld under the claim of privilege. If the court later rules that documents for a seven year period are properly discoverable, the documents for the additional four years should then be either produced (if not privileged) or described (if claimed to be privileged).

Subdivision (c). The revision requires that before fil-ing a motion for a protective order the movant must confer—either in person or by telephone—with the other affected parties in a good faith effort to resolve the discovery dispute without the need for court inter-vention. If the movant is unable to get opposing parties even to discuss the matter, the efforts in attempting to arrange such a conference should be indicated in the certificate.

Subdivision (d). This subdivision is revised to provide that formal discovery—as distinguished from inter-views of potential witnesses and other informal discov-ery—not commence until the parties have met and con-ferred as required by subdivision (f). Discovery can begin earlier if authorized under Rule 30(a)(2)(C) (depo-sition of person about to leave the country) or by local rule, order, or stipulation. This will be appropriate in some cases, such as those involving requests for a pre-liminary injunction or motions challenging personal jurisdiction. If a local rule exempts any types of cases in which discovery may be needed from the require-ment of a meeting under Rule 26(f), it should specify when discovery may commence in those cases.

The meeting of counsel is to take place as soon as practicable and in any event at least 14 days before the date of the scheduling conference under Rule 16(b) or the date a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b). The court can assure that discovery is not unduly delayed either by entering a special order or by setting the case for a scheduling conference.

Subdivision (e). This subdivision is revised to provide that the requirement for supplementation applies to all disclosures required by subdivisions (a)(1)–(3). Like the former rule, the duty, while imposed on a ‘‘party,’’ ap-plies whether the corrective information is learned by the client or by the attorney. Supplementations need not be made as each new item of information is learned but should be made at appropriate intervals during the discovery period, and with special promptness as the trial date approaches. It may be useful for the schedul-ing order to specify the time or times when supple-mentations should be made.

The revision also clarifies that the obligation to sup-plement responses to formal discovery requests applies to interrogatories, requests for production, and re-quests for admissions, but not ordinarily to deposition testimony. However, with respect to experts from whom a written report is required under subdivision (a)(2)(B), changes in the opinions expressed by the ex-pert whether in the report or at a subsequent deposi-tion are subject to a duty of supplemental disclosure under subdivision (e)(1).

The obligation to supplement disclosures and discov-ery responses applies whenever a party learns that its prior disclosures or responses are in some material re-spect incomplete or incorrect. There is, however, no ob-ligation to provide supplemental or corrective informa-tion that has been otherwise made known to the par-

ties in writing or during the discovery process, as when a witness not previously disclosed is identified during the taking of a deposition or when an expert during a deposition corrects information contained in an earlier report.

Subdivision (f). This subdivision was added in 1980 to provide a party threatened with abusive discovery with a special means for obtaining judicial intervention other than through discrete motions under Rules 26(c) and 37(a). The amendment envisioned a two-step proc-ess: first, the parties would attempt to frame a mutu-ally agreeable plan; second, the court would hold a ‘‘discovery conference’’ and then enter an order estab-lishing a schedule and limitations for the conduct of discovery. It was contemplated that the procedure, an elective one triggered on request of a party, would be used in special cases rather than as a routine matter. As expected, the device has been used only sparingly in most courts, and judicial controls over the discovery process have ordinarily been imposed through schedul-ing orders under Rule 16(b) or through rulings on dis-covery motions.

The provisions relating to a conference with the court are removed from subdivision (f). This change does not signal any lessening of the importance of judi-cial supervision. Indeed, there is a greater need for early judicial involvement to consider the scope and timing of the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a) and the presumptive limits on discovery imposed under these rules or by local rules. Rather, the change is made because the provisions addressing the use of con-ferences with the court to control discovery are more properly included in Rule 16, which is being revised to highlight the court’s powers regarding the discovery process.

The desirability of some judicial control of discovery can hardly be doubted. Rule 16, as revised, requires that the court set a time for completion of discovery and au-thorizes various other orders affecting the scope, tim-ing, and extent of discovery and disclosures. Before en-tering such orders, the court should consider the views of the parties, preferably by means of a conference, but at the least through written submissions. Moreover, it is desirable that the parties’ proposals regarding dis-covery be developed through a process where they meet in person, informally explore the nature and basis of the issues, and discuss how discovery can be conducted most efficiently and economically.

As noted above, former subdivision (f) envisioned the development of proposed discovery plans as an optional procedure to be used in relatively few cases. The re-vised rule directs that in all cases not exempted by local rule or special order the litigants must meet in person and plan for discovery. Following this meeting, the parties submit to the court their proposals for a discovery plan and can begin formal discovery. Their report will assist the court in seeing that the timing and scope of disclosures under revised Rule 26(a) and the limitations on the extent of discovery under these rules and local rules are tailored to the circumstances of the particular case.

To assure that the court has the litigants’ proposals before deciding on a scheduling order and that the com-mencement of discovery is not delayed unduly, the rule provides that the meeting of the parties take place as soon as practicable and in any event at least 14 days be-fore a scheduling conference is held or before a schedul-ing order is due under Rule 16(b). (Rule 16(b) requires that a scheduling order be entered within 90 days after the first appearance of a defendant or, if earlier, within 120 days after the complaint has been served on any de-fendant.) The obligation to participate in the planning process is imposed on all parties that have appeared in the case, including defendants who, because of a pend-ing Rule 12 motion, may not have yet filed an answer in the case. Each such party should attend the meeting, either through one of its attorneys or in person if un-represented. If more parties are joined or appear after the initial meeting, an additional meeting may be de-sirable.


Subdivision (f) describes certain matters that should be accomplished at the meeting and included in the proposed discovery plan. This listing does not exclude consideration of other subjects, such as the time when any dispositive motions should be filed and when the case should be ready for trial.

The parties are directed under subdivision (a)(1) to make the disclosures required by that subdivision at or within 10 days after this meeting. In many cases the parties should use the meeting to exchange, discuss, and clarify their respective disclosures. In other cases, it may be more useful if the disclosures are delayed until after the parties have discussed at the meeting the claims and defenses in order to define the issues with respect to which the initial disclosures should be made. As discussed in the Notes to subdivision (a)(1), the parties may also need to consider whether a stipu-lation extending this 10-day period would be appro-priate, as when a defendant would otherwise have less than 60 days after being served in which to make its initial disclosure. The parties should also discuss at the meeting what additional information, although not subject to the disclosure requirements, can be made available informally without the necessity for formal discovery requests.

The report is to be submitted to the court within 10 days after the meeting and should not be difficult to prepare. In most cases counsel should be able to agree that one of them will be responsible for its preparation and submission to the court. Form 35 has been added in the Appendix to the Rules, both to illustrate the type of report that is contemplated and to serve as a check-list for the meeting.

The litigants are expected to attempt in good faith to agree on the contents of the proposed discovery plan. If they cannot agree on all aspects of the plan, their re-port to the court should indicate the competing propos-als of the parties on those items, as well as the matters on which they agree. Unfortunately, there may be cases in which, because of disagreements about time or place or for other reasons, the meeting is not attended by all parties or, indeed, no meeting takes place. In such situ-ations, the report—or reports—should describe the cir-cumstances and the court may need to consider sanc-tions under Rule 37(g).

By local rule or special order, the court can exempt particular cases or types of cases from the meet-and- confer requirement of subdivision (f). In general this should include any types of cases which are exempted by local rule from the requirement for a scheduling order under Rule 16(b), such as cases in which there will be no discovery (e.g., bankruptcy appeals and reviews of social security determinations). In addition, the court may want to exempt cases in which discovery is rarely needed (e.g., government collection cases and proceed-ings to enforce administrative summonses) or in which a meeting of the parties might be impracticable (e.g., actions by unrepresented prisoners). Note that if a court exempts from the requirements for a meeting any types of cases in which discovery may be needed, it should indicate when discovery may commence in those cases.

Subdivision (g). Paragraph (1) is added to require sig-natures on disclosures, a requirement that parallels the provisions of paragraph (2) with respect to discovery re-quests, responses, and objections. The provisions of paragraph (3) have been modified to be consistent with Rules 37(a)(4) and 37(c)(1); in combination, these rules establish sanctions for violation of the rules regarding disclosures and discovery matters. Amended Rule 11 no longer applies to such violations.


Purposes of amendments. The Rule 26(a)(1) initial dis-closure provisions are amended to establish a nation-ally uniform practice. The scope of the disclosure obli-gation is narrowed to cover only information that the disclosing party may use to support its position. In ad-dition, the rule exempts specified categories of proceed-ings from initial disclosure, and permits a party who

contends that disclosure is not appropriate in the cir-cumstances of the case to present its objections to the court, which must then determine whether disclosure should be made. Related changes are made in Rules 26(d) and (f).

The initial disclosure requirements added by the 1993 amendments permitted local rules directing that dis-closure would not be required or altering its operation. The inclusion of the ‘‘opt out’’ provision reflected the strong opposition to initial disclosure felt in some dis-tricts, and permitted experimentation with differing disclosure rules in those districts that were favorable to disclosure. The local option also recognized that— partly in response to the first publication in 1991 of a proposed disclosure rule—many districts had adopted a variety of disclosure programs under the aegis of the Civil Justice Reform Act. It was hoped that developing experience under a variety of disclosure systems would support eventual refinement of a uniform national dis-closure practice. In addition, there was hope that local experience could identify categories of actions in which disclosure is not useful.

A striking array of local regimes in fact emerged for disclosure and related features introduced in 1993. See D. Stienstra, Implementation of Disclosure in United States District Courts, With Specific Attention to Courts’ Responses to Selected Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (Federal Judicial Center, March 30, 1998) (describing and categorizing local regimes). In its final report to Congress on the CJRA experience, the Judi-cial Conference recommended reexamination of the need for national uniformity, particularly in regard to initial disclosure. Judicial Conference, Alternative Pro-posals for Reduction of Cost and Delay: Assessment of Principles, Guidelines and Techniques, 175 F.R.D. 62, 98 (1997).

At the Committee’s request, the Federal Judicial Center undertook a survey in 1997 to develop informa-tion on current disclosure and discovery practices. See T. Willging, J. Shapard, D. Stienstra & D. Miletich, Dis-covery and Disclosure Practice, Problems, and Proposals for Change (Federal Judicial Center, 1997). In addition, the Committee convened two conferences on discovery involving lawyers from around the country and re-ceived reports and recommendations on possible discov-ery amendments from a number of bar groups. Papers and other proceedings from the second conference are published in 39 Boston Col. L. Rev. 517–840 (1998).

The Committee has discerned widespread support for national uniformity. Many lawyers have experienced difficulty in coping with divergent disclosure and other practices as they move from one district to another. Lawyers surveyed by the Federal Judicial Center ranked adoption of a uniform national disclosure rule second among proposed rule changes (behind increased availability of judges to resolve discovery disputes) as a means to reduce litigation expenses without interfer-ing with fair outcomes. Discovery and Disclosure Prac-tice, supra, at 44–45. National uniformity is also a cen-tral purpose of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2077.

These amendments restore national uniformity to disclosure practice. Uniformity is also restored to other aspects of discovery by deleting most of the provisions authorizing local rules that vary the number of per-mitted discovery events or the length of depositions. Local rule options are also deleted from Rules 26(d) and (f).

Subdivision (a)(1). The amendments remove the au-thority to alter or opt out of the national disclosure re-quirements by local rule, invalidating not only formal local rules but also informal ‘‘standing’’ orders of an individual judge or court that purport to create exemp-tions from—or limit or expand—the disclosure provided under the national rule. See Rule 83. Case-specific or-ders remain proper, however, and are expressly required if a party objects that initial disclosure is not appro-priate in the circumstances of the action. Specified cat-egories of proceedings are excluded from initial disclo-sure under subdivision (a)(1)(E). In addition, the parties


can stipulate to forgo disclosure, as was true before. But even in a case excluded by subdivision (a)(1)(E) or in which the parties stipulate to bypass disclosure, the court can order exchange of similar information in managing the action under Rule 16.

The initial disclosure obligation of subdivisions (a)(1)(A) and (B) has been narrowed to identification of witnesses and documents that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses. ‘‘Use’’ includes any use at a pretrial conference, to support a motion, or at trial. The disclosure obligation is also triggered by intended use in discovery, apart from use to respond to a discovery request; use of a document to question a witness during a deposition is a common example. The disclosure obligation attaches both to witnesses and documents a party intends to use and also to wit-nesses and to documents the party intends to use if— in the language of Rule 26(a)(3)—‘‘the need arises.’’

A party is no longer obligated to disclose witnesses or documents, whether favorable or unfavorable, that it does not intend to use. The obligation to disclose infor-mation the party may use connects directly to the ex-clusion sanction of Rule 37(c)(1). Because the disclosure obligation is limited to material that the party may use, it is no longer tied to particularized allegations in the pleadings. Subdivision (e)(1), which is unchanged, requires supplementation if information later acquired would have been subject to the disclosure requirement. As case preparation continues, a party must supple-ment its disclosures when it determines that it may use a witness or document that it did not previously in-tend to use.

The disclosure obligation applies to ‘‘claims and de-fenses,’’ and therefore requires a party to disclose in-formation it may use to support its denial or rebuttal of the allegations, claim, or defense of another party. It thereby bolsters the requirements of Rule 11(b)(4), which authorizes denials ‘‘warranted on the evidence,’’ and disclosure should include the identity of any wit-ness or document that the disclosing party may use to support such denials.

Subdivision (a)(3) presently excuses pretrial disclo-sure of information solely for impeachment. Impeach-ment information is similarly excluded from the initial disclosure requirement.

Subdivisions (a)(1)(C) and (D) are not changed. Should a case be exempted from initial disclosure by Rule 26(a)(1)(E) or by agreement or order, the insurance in-formation described by subparagraph (D) should be sub-ject to discovery, as it would have been under the prin-ciples of former Rule 26(b)(2), which was added in 1970 and deleted in 1993 as redundant in light of the new ini-tial disclosure obligation.

New subdivision (a)(1)(E) excludes eight specified cat-egories of proceedings from initial disclosure. The ob-jective of this listing is to identify cases in which there is likely to be little or no discovery, or in which initial disclosure appears unlikely to contribute to the effec-tive development of the case. The list was developed after a review of the categories excluded by local rules in various districts from the operation of Rule 16(b) and the conference requirements of subdivision (f). Subdivi-sion (a)(1)(E) refers to categories of ‘‘proceedings’’ rath-er than categories of ‘‘actions’’ because some might not properly be labeled ‘‘actions.’’ Case designations made by the parties or the clerk’s office at the time of filing do not control application of the exemptions. The de-scriptions in the rule are generic and are intended to be administered by the parties—and, when needed, the courts—with the flexibility needed to adapt to gradual evolution in the types of proceedings that fall within these general categories. The exclusion of an action for review on an administrative record, for example, is in-tended to reach a proceeding that is framed as an ‘‘ap-peal’’ based solely on an administrative record. The ex-clusion should not apply to a proceeding in a form that commonly permits admission of new evidence to sup-plement the record. Item (vii), excluding a proceeding ancillary to proceedings in other courts, does not refer to bankruptcy proceedings; application of the Civil

Rules to bankruptcy proceedings is determined by the Bankruptcy Rules.

Subdivision (a)(1)(E) is likely to exempt a substantial proportion of the cases in most districts from the ini-tial disclosure requirement. Based on 1996 and 1997 case filing statistics, Federal Judicial Center staff estimate that, nationwide, these categories total approximately one-third of all civil filings.

The categories of proceedings listed in subdivision (a)(1)(E) are also exempted from the subdivision (f) con-ference requirement and from the subdivision (d) mora-torium on discovery. Although there is no restriction on commencement of discovery in these cases, it is not expected that this opportunity will often lead to abuse since there is likely to be little or no discovery in most such cases. Should a defendant need more time to re-spond to discovery requests filed at the beginning of an exempted action, it can seek relief by motion under Rule 26(c) if the plaintiff is unwilling to defer the due date by agreement.

Subdivision (a)(1)(E)’s enumeration of exempt cat-egories is exclusive. Although a case-specific order can alter or excuse initial disclosure, local rules or ‘‘stand-ing’’ orders that purport to create general exemptions are invalid. See Rule 83.

The time for initial disclosure is extended to 14 days after the subdivision (f) conference unless the court or-ders otherwise. This change is integrated with cor-responding changes requiring that the subdivision (f) conference be held 21 days before the Rule 16(b) sched-uling conference or scheduling order, and that the re-port on the subdivision (f) conference be submitted to the court 14 days after the meeting. These changes pro-vide a more orderly opportunity for the parties to re-view the disclosures, and for the court to consider the report. In many instances, the subdivision (f) con-ference and the effective preparation of the case would benefit from disclosure before the conference, and ear-lier disclosure is encouraged.

The presumptive disclosure date does not apply if a party objects to initial disclosure during the subdivi-sion (f) conference and states its objection in the sub-division (f) discovery plan. The right to object to initial disclosure is not intended to afford parties an oppor-tunity to ‘‘opt out’’ of disclosure unilaterally. It does provide an opportunity for an objecting party to present to the court its position that disclosure would be ‘‘inappropriate in the circumstances of the action.’’ Making the objection permits the objecting party to present the question to the judge before any party is required to make disclosure. The court must then rule on the objection and determine what disclosures—if any—should be made. Ordinarily, this determination would be included in the Rule 16(b) scheduling order, but the court could handle the matter in a different fashion. Even when circumstances warrant suspending some disclosure obligations, others—such as the dam-ages and insurance information called for by subdivi-sions (a)(1)(C) and (D)—may continue to be appropriate.

The presumptive disclosure date is also inapplicable to a party who is ‘‘first served or otherwise joined’’ after the subdivision (f) conference. This phrase refers to the date of service of a claim on a party in a defen-sive posture (such as a defendant or third-party defend-ant), and the date of joinder of a party added as a claimant or an intervenor. Absent court order or stipu-lation, a new party has 30 days in which to make its initial disclosures. But it is expected that later-added parties will ordinarily be treated the same as the origi-nal parties when the original parties have stipulated to forgo initial disclosure, or the court has ordered disclo-sure in a modified form.

Subdivision (a)(3). The amendment to Rule 5(d) forbids filing disclosures under subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) until they are used in the proceeding, and this change is reflected in an amendment to subdivision (a)(4). Dis-closures under subdivision (a)(3), however, may be im-portant to the court in connection with the final pre-trial conference or otherwise in preparing for trial. The requirement that objections to certain matters be filed


points up the court’s need to be provided with these materials. Accordingly, the requirement that subdivi-sion (a)(3) materials be filed has been moved from sub-division (a)(4) to subdivision (a)(3), and it has also been made clear that they—and any objections—should be filed ‘‘promptly.’’

Subdivision (a)(4). The filing requirement has been re-moved from this subdivision. Rule 5(d) has been amend-ed to provide that disclosures under subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) must not be filed until used in the proceed-ing. Subdivision (a)(3) has been amended to require that the disclosures it directs, and objections to them, be filed promptly. Subdivision (a)(4) continues to require that all disclosures under subdivisions (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) be in writing, signed, and served.

‘‘Shall’’ is replaced by ‘‘must’’ under the program to conform amended rules to current style conventions when there is no ambiguity.

Subdivision (b)(1). In 1978, the Committee published for comment a proposed amendment, suggested by the Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association, to refine the scope of discovery by deleting the ‘‘subject matter’’ language. This proposal was withdrawn, and the Committee has since then made other changes in the discovery rules to address concerns about overbroad discovery. Concerns about costs and delay of discovery have persisted nonetheless, and other bar groups have repeatedly renewed similar proposals for amendment to this subdivision to delete the ‘‘subject matter’’ language. Nearly one-third of the lawyers sur-veyed in 1997 by the Federal Judicial Center endorsed narrowing the scope of discovery as a means of reduc-ing litigation expense without interfering with fair case resolutions. Discovery and Disclosure Practice, supra, at 44–45 (1997). The Committee has heard that in some instances, particularly cases involving large quantities of discovery, parties seek to justify discov-ery requests that sweep far beyond the claims and de-fenses of the parties on the ground that they neverthe-less have a bearing on the ‘‘subject matter’’ involved in the action.

The amendments proposed for subdivision (b)(1) in-clude one element of these earlier proposals but also differ from these proposals in significant ways. The similarity is that the amendments describe the scope of party-controlled discovery in terms of matter relevant to the claim or defense of any party. The court, how-ever, retains authority to order discovery of any mat-ter relevant to the subject matter involved in the ac-tion for good cause. The amendment is designed to in-volve the court more actively in regulating the breadth of sweeping or contentious discovery. The Committee has been informed repeatedly by lawyers that involve-ment of the court in managing discovery is an impor-tant method of controlling problems of inappropriately broad discovery. Increasing the availability of judicial officers to resolve discovery disputes and increasing court management of discovery were both strongly en-dorsed by the attorneys surveyed by the Federal Judi-cial Center. See Discovery and Disclosure Practice, supra, at 44. Under the amended provisions, if there is an ob-jection that discovery goes beyond material relevant to the parties’ claims or defenses, the court would become involved to determine whether the discovery is rel-evant to the claims or defenses and, if not, whether good cause exists for authorizing it so long as it is rel-evant to the subject matter of the action. The good- cause standard warranting broader discovery is meant to be flexible.

The Committee intends that the parties and the court focus on the actual claims and defenses involved in the action. The dividing line between information relevant to the claims and defenses and that relevant only to the subject matter of the action cannot be de-fined with precision. A variety of types of information not directly pertinent to the incident in suit could be relevant to the claims or defenses raised in a given ac-tion. For example, other incidents of the same type, or involving the same product, could be properly discover-able under the revised standard. Information about or-

ganizational arrangements or filing systems of a party could be discoverable if likely to yield or lead to the discovery of admissible information. Similarly, infor-mation that could be used to impeach a likely witness, although not otherwise relevant to the claims or de-fenses, might be properly discoverable. In each in-stance, the determination whether such information is discoverable because it is relevant to the claims or de-fenses depends on the circumstances of the pending ac-tion.

The rule change signals to the court that it has the authority to confine discovery to the claims and de-fenses asserted in the pleadings, and signals to the par-ties that they have no entitlement to discovery to de-velop new claims or defenses that are not already iden-tified in the pleadings. In general, it is hoped that rea-sonable lawyers can cooperate to manage discovery without the need for judicial intervention. When judi-cial intervention is invoked, the actual scope of discov-ery should be determined according to the reasonable needs of the action. The court may permit broader dis-covery in a particular case depending on the circum-stances of the case, the nature of the claims and de-fenses, and the scope of the discovery requested.

The amendments also modify the provision regarding discovery of information not admissible in evidence. As added in 1946, this sentence was designed to make clear that otherwise relevant material could not be withheld because it was hearsay or otherwise inadmissible. The Committee was concerned that the ‘‘reasonably cal-culated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’’ standard set forth in this sentence might swallow any other limitation on the scope of discovery. Accord-ingly, this sentence has been amended to clarify that information must be relevant to be discoverable, even though inadmissible, and that discovery of such mate-rial is permitted if reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. As used here, ‘‘rel-evant’’ means within the scope of discovery as defined in this subdivision, and it would include information relevant to the subject matter involved in the action if the court has ordered discovery to that limit based on a showing of good cause.

Finally, a sentence has been added calling attention to the limitations of subdivision (b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii). These limitations apply to discovery that is otherwise within the scope of subdivision (b)(1). The Committee has been told repeatedly that courts have not imple-mented these limitations with the vigor that was con-templated. See 8 Federal Practice & Procedure § 2008.1 at 121. This otherwise redundant cross-reference has been added to emphasize the need for active judicial use of subdivision (b)(2) to control excessive discovery. Cf. Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 1597 (1998) (quoting Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) and stating that ‘‘Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor dis-covery narrowly’’).

Subdivision (b)(2). Rules 30, 31, and 33 establish pre-sumptive national limits on the numbers of depositions and interrogatories. New Rule 30(d)(2) establishes a pre-sumptive limit on the length of depositions. Subdivi-sion (b)(2) is amended to remove the previous permis-sion for local rules that establish different presumptive limits on these discovery activities. There is no reason to believe that unique circumstances justify varying these nationally-applicable presumptive limits in cer-tain districts. The limits can be modified by court order or agreement in an individual action, but ‘‘stand-ing’’ orders imposing different presumptive limits are not authorized. Because there is no national rule limit-ing the number of Rule 36 requests for admissions, the rule continues to authorize local rules that impose nu-merical limits on them. This change is not intended to interfere with differentiated case management in dis-tricts that use this technique by case-specific order as part of their Rule 16 process.

Subdivision (d). The amendments remove the prior au-thority to exempt cases by local rule from the morato-rium on discovery before the subdivision (f) conference, but the categories of proceedings exempted from initial


disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(E) are excluded from subdivision (d). The parties may agree to disregard the moratorium where it applies, and the court may so order in a case, but ‘‘standing’’ orders altering the mor-atorium are not authorized.

Subdivision (f). As in subdivision (d), the amendments remove the prior authority to exempt cases by local rule from the conference requirement. The Committee has been informed that the addition of the conference was one of the most successful changes made in the 1993 amendments, and it therefore has determined to apply the conference requirement nationwide. The categories of proceedings exempted from initial disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(E) are exempted from the conference requirement for the reasons that warrant exclusion from initial disclosure. The court may order that the conference need not occur in a case where otherwise re-quired, or that it occur in a case otherwise exempted by subdivision (a)(1)(E). ‘‘Standing’’ orders altering the conference requirement for categories of cases are not authorized.

The rule is amended to require only a ‘‘conference’’ of the parties, rather than a ‘‘meeting.’’ There are impor-tant benefits to face-to-face discussion of the topics to be covered in the conference, and those benefits may be lost if other means of conferring were routinely used when face-to-face meetings would not impose burdens. Nevertheless, geographic conditions in some districts may exact costs far out of proportion to these benefits. The amendment allows the court by case-specific order to require a face-to-face meeting, but ‘‘standing’’ or-ders so requiring are not authorized.

As noted concerning the amendments to subdivision (a)(1), the time for the conference has been changed to at least 21 days before the Rule 16 scheduling con-ference, and the time for the report is changed to no more than 14 days after the Rule 26(f) conference. This should ensure that the court will have the report well in advance of the scheduling conference or the entry of the scheduling order.

Since Rule 16 was amended in 1983 to mandate some case management activities in all courts, it has in-cluded deadlines for completing these tasks to ensure that all courts do so within a reasonable time. Rule 26(f) was fit into this scheme when it was adopted in 1993. It was never intended, however, that the national requirements that certain activities be completed by a certain time should delay case management in districts that move much faster than the national rules direct, and the rule is therefore amended to permit such a court to adopt a local rule that shortens the period specified for the completion of these tasks.

‘‘Shall’’ is replaced by ‘‘must,’’ ‘‘does,’’ or an active verb under the program to conform amended rules to current style conventions when there is no ambiguity.

GAP Report. The Advisory Committee recommends that the amendments to Rules 26(a)(1)(A) and (B) be changed so that initial disclosure applies to informa-tion the disclosing party ‘‘may use to support’’ its claims or defenses. It also recommends changes in the Committee Note to explain that disclosure require-ment. In addition, it recommends inclusion in the Note of further explanatory matter regarding the exclusion from initial disclosure provided in new Rule 26(a)(1)(E) for actions for review on an administrative record and the impact of these exclusions on bankruptcy proceed-ings. Minor wording improvements in the Note are also proposed.

The Advisory Committee recommends changing the rule to authorize the court to expand discovery to any ‘‘matter’’—not ‘‘information’’—relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. In addition, it rec-ommends additional clarifying material in the Com-mittee Note about the impact of the change on some commonly disputed discovery topics, the relationship between cost-bearing under Rule 26(b)(2) and expansion of the scope of discovery on a showing of good cause, and the meaning of ‘‘relevant’’ in the revision to the last sentence of current subdivision (b)(1). In addition, some minor clarifications of language changes have been proposed for the Committee Note.

The Advisory Committee recommends adding a sen-tence to the published amendments to Rule 26(f) au-thorizing local rules shortening the time between the attorney conference and the court’s action under Rule 16(b), and addition to the Committee Note of explana-tory material about this change to the rule. This addi-tion can be made without republication in response to public comments.


Subdivision (a). Rule 26(a)(1)(B) is amended to parallel Rule 34(a) by recognizing that a party must disclose electronically stored information as well as documents that it may use to support its claims or defenses. The term ‘‘electronically stored information’’ has the same broad meaning in Rule 26(a)(1) as in Rule 34(a). This amendment is consistent with the 1993 addition of Rule 26(a)(1)(B). The term ‘‘data compilations’’ is deleted as unnecessary because it is a subset of both documents and electronically stored information.

Changes Made After Publication and Comment. As noted in the introduction [omitted], this provision was not included in the published rule. It is included as a con-forming amendment, to make Rule 26(a)(1) consistent with the changes that were included in the published proposals.

[Subdivision (a)(1)(E).] Civil forfeiture actions are added to the list of exemptions from Rule 26(a)(1) dis-closure requirements. These actions are governed by new Supplemental Rule G. Disclosure is not likely to be useful.

Subdivision (b)(2). The amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) is designed to address issues raised by difficulties in lo-cating, retrieving, and providing discovery of some electronically stored information. Electronic storage systems often make it easier to locate and retrieve in-formation. These advantages are properly taken into account in determining the reasonable scope of discov-ery in a particular case. But some sources of electroni-cally stored information can be accessed only with sub-stantial burden and cost. In a particular case, these burdens and costs may make the information on such sources not reasonably accessible.

It is not possible to define in a rule the different types of technological features that may affect the bur-dens and costs of accessing electronically stored infor-mation. Information systems are designed to provide ready access to information used in regular ongoing ac-tivities. They also may be designed so as to provide ready access to information that is not regularly used. But a system may retain information on sources that are accessible only by incurring substantial burdens or costs. Subparagraph (B) is added to regulate discovery from such sources.

Under this rule, a responding party should produce electronically stored information that is relevant, not privileged, and reasonably accessible, subject to the (b)(2)(C) limitations that apply to all discovery. The re-sponding party must also identify, by category or type, the sources containing potentially responsive informa-tion that it is neither searching nor producing. The identification should, to the extent possible, provide enough detail to enable the requesting party to evalu-ate the burdens and costs of providing the discovery and the likelihood of finding responsive information on the identified sources.

A party’s identification of sources of electronically stored information as not reasonably accessible does not relieve the party of its common-law or statutory duties to preserve evidence. Whether a responding party is required to preserve unsearched sources of po-tentially responsive information that it believes are not reasonably accessible depends on the circumstances of each case. It is often useful for the parties to discuss this issue early in discovery.

The volume of—and the ability to search—much elec-tronically stored information means that in many cases the responding party will be able to produce in-formation from reasonably accessible sources that will fully satisfy the parties’ discovery needs. In many cir-


cumstances the requesting party should obtain and evaluate the information from such sources before in-sisting that the responding party search and produce information contained on sources that are not reason-ably accessible. If the requesting party continues to seek discovery of information from sources identified as not reasonably accessible, the parties should discuss the burdens and costs of accessing and retrieving the information, the needs that may establish good cause for requiring all or part of the requested discovery even if the information sought is not reasonably accessible, and conditions on obtaining and producing the informa-tion that may be appropriate.

If the parties cannot agree whether, or on what terms, sources identified as not reasonably accessible should be searched and discoverable information pro-duced, the issue may be raised either by a motion to compel discovery or by a motion for a protective order. The parties must confer before bringing either motion. If the parties do not resolve the issue and the court must decide, the responding party must show that the identified sources of information are not reasonably ac-cessible because of undue burden or cost. The request-ing party may need discovery to test this assertion. Such discovery might take the form of requiring the re-sponding party to conduct a sampling of information contained on the sources identified as not reasonably accessible; allowing some form of inspection of such sources; or taking depositions of witnesses knowledge-able about the responding party’s information systems.

Once it is shown that a source of electronically stored information is not reasonably accessible, the re-questing party may still obtain discovery by showing good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) that balance the costs and potential benefits of discovery. The decision whether to require a re-sponding party to search for and produce information that is not reasonably accessible depends not only on the burdens and costs of doing so, but also on whether those burdens and costs can be justified in the circum-stances of the case. Appropriate considerations may in-clude: (1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of information available from other and more easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to produce relevant information that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available on more easily accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of finding relevant, respon-sive information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of the further information; (6) the importance of the issues at stake in the litiga-tion; and (7) the parties’ resources.

The responding party has the burden as to one aspect of the inquiry—whether the identified sources are not reasonably accessible in light of the burdens and costs required to search for, retrieve, and produce whatever responsive information may be found. The requesting party has the burden of showing that its need for the discovery outweighs the burdens and costs of locating, retrieving, and producing the information. In some cases, the court will be able to determine whether the identified sources are not reasonably accessible and whether the requesting party has shown good cause for some or all of the discovery, consistent with the limita-tions of Rule 26(b)(2)(C), through a single proceeding or presentation. The good-cause determination, however, may be complicated because the court and parties may know little about what information the sources identi-fied as not reasonably accessible might contain, wheth-er it is relevant, or how valuable it may be to the liti-gation. In such cases, the parties may need some fo-cused discovery, which may include sampling of the sources, to learn more about what burdens and costs are involved in accessing the information, what the in-formation consists of, and how valuable it is for the litigation in light of information that can be obtained by exhausting other opportunities for discovery.

The good-cause inquiry and consideration of the Rule 26(b)(2)(C) limitations are coupled with the authority to set conditions for discovery. The conditions may

take the form of limits on the amount, type, or sources of information required to be accessed and produced. The conditions may also include payment by the re-questing party of part or all of the reasonable costs of obtaining information from sources that are not rea-sonably accessible. A requesting party’s willingness to share or bear the access costs may be weighed by the court in determining whether there is good cause. But the producing party’s burdens in reviewing the infor-mation for relevance and privilege may weigh against permitting the requested discovery.

The limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) continue to apply to all discovery of electronically stored information, including that stored on reasonably accessible elec-tronic sources.

Changes Made after Publication and Comment. This rec-ommendation modifies the version of the proposed rule amendment as published. Responding to comments that the published proposal seemed to require identification of information that cannot be identified because it is not reasonably accessible, the rule text was clarified by requiring identification of sources that are not reason-ably accessible. The test of reasonable accessibility was clarified by adding ‘‘because of undue burden or cost.’’

The published proposal referred only to a motion by the requesting party to compel discovery. The rule text has been changed to recognize that the responding party may wish to determine its search and potential preservation obligations by moving for a protective order.

The provision that the court may for good cause order discovery from sources that are not reasonably accessible is expanded in two ways. It now states spe-cifically that the requesting party is the one who must show good cause, and it refers to consideration of the limitations on discovery set out in present Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).

The published proposal was added at the end of present Rule 26(b)(2). It has been relocated to become a new subparagraph (B), allocating present Rule 26(b)(2) to new subparagraphs (A) and (C). The Committee Note was changed to reflect the rule text revisions. It also was shortened. The shortening was accomplished in part by deleting references to problems that are likely to become antique as technology continues to evolve, and in part by deleting passages that were at a level of detail better suited for a practice manual than a Com-mittee Note.

The changes from the published proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) are set out below. [Omitted]

Subdivision (b)(5). The Committee has repeatedly been advised that the risk of privilege waiver, and the work necessary to avoid it, add to the costs and delay of dis-covery. When the review is of electronically stored in-formation, the risk of waiver, and the time and effort required to avoid it, can increase substantially because of the volume of electronically stored information and the difficulty in ensuring that all information to be produced has in fact been reviewed. Rule 26(b)(5)(A) provides a procedure for a party that has withheld in-formation on the basis of privilege or protection as trial-preparation material to make the claim so that the requesting party can decide whether to contest the claim and the court can resolve the dispute. Rule 26(b)(5)(B) is added to provide a procedure for a party to assert a claim of privilege or trial-preparation material protection after information is produced in discovery in the action and, if the claim is contested, permit any party that received the information to present the mat-ter to the court for resolution.

Rule 26(b)(5)(B) does not address whether the privi-lege or protection that is asserted after production was waived by the production. The courts have developed principles to determine whether, and under what cir-cumstances, waiver results from inadvertent produc-tion of privileged or protected information. Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides a procedure for presenting and ad-dressing these issues. Rule 26(b)(5)(B) works in tandem with Rule 26(f), which is amended to direct the parties to discuss privilege issues in preparing their discovery


1 In response to concerns about the proposal raised at the June 15–16, 2005, Standing Committee meeting, the Committee Note was revised to emphasize that the courts will continue to exam-ine whether a privilege claim was made at a reasonable time, as part of substantive law.

plan, and which, with amended Rule 16(b), allows the parties to ask the court to include in an order any agreements the parties reach regarding issues of privi-lege or trial-preparation material protection. Agree-ments reached under Rule 26(f)(4) and orders including such agreements entered under Rule 16(b)(6) may be considered when a court determines whether a waiver has occurred. Such agreements and orders ordinarily control if they adopt procedures different from those in Rule 26(b)(5)(B).

A party asserting a claim of privilege or protection after production must give notice to the receiving party. That notice should be in writing unless the cir-cumstances preclude it. Such circumstances could in-clude the assertion of the claim during a deposition. The notice should be as specific as possible in identify-ing the information and stating the basis for the claim. Because the receiving party must decide whether to challenge the claim and may sequester the information and submit it to the court for a ruling on whether the claimed privilege or protection applies and whether it has been waived, the notice should be sufficiently de-tailed so as to enable the receiving party and the court to understand the basis for the claim and to determine whether waiver has occurred. Courts will continue to examine whether a claim of privilege or protection was made at a reasonable time when delay is part of the waiver determination under the governing law.

After receiving notice, each party that received the information must promptly return, sequester, or de-stroy the information and any copies it has. The option of sequestering or destroying the information is in-cluded in part because the receiving party may have in-corporated the information in protected trial-prepara-tion materials. No receiving party may use or disclose the information pending resolution of the privilege claim. The receiving party may present to the court the questions whether the information is privileged or protected as trial-preparation material, and whether the privilege or protection has been waived. If it does so, it must provide the court with the grounds for the privilege or protection specified in the producing par-ty’s notice, and serve all parties. In presenting the question, the party may use the content of the infor-mation only to the extent permitted by the applicable law of privilege, protection for trial-preparation mate-rial, and professional responsibility.

If a party disclosed the information to nonparties be-fore receiving notice of a claim of privilege or protec-tion as trial-preparation material, it must take reason-able steps to retrieve the information and to return it, sequester it until the claim is resolved, or destroy it.

Whether the information is returned or not, the pro-ducing party must preserve the information pending the court’s ruling on whether the claim of privilege or of protection is properly asserted and whether it was waived. As with claims made under Rule 26(b)(5)(A), there may be no ruling if the other parties do not con-test the claim.

Changes Made After Publication and Comment. The rule recommended for approval is modified from the pub-lished proposal. The rule is expanded to include trial- preparation protection claims in addition to privilege claims.

The published proposal referred to production ‘‘with-out intending to waive a claim of privilege.’’ This ref-erence to intent was deleted because many courts in-clude intent in the factors that determine whether pro-duction waives privilege.

The published proposal required that the producing party give notice ‘‘within a reasonable time.’’ The time requirement was deleted because it seemed to implicate the question whether production effected a waiver, a question not addressed by the rule, and also because a receiving party cannot practicably ignore a notice that it believes was unreasonably delayed. The notice proce-dure was further changed to require that the producing party state the basis for the claim.

Two statements in the published Note have been brought into the rule text. The first provides that the

receiving party may not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved. The second provides that if the receiving party disclosed the information before being notified, it must take reasonable steps to re-trieve it.1

The rule text was expanded by adding a provision that the receiving party may promptly present the in-formation to the court under seal for a determination of the claim.

The published proposal provided that the producing party must comply with Rule 26(b)(5)(A) after making the claim. This provision was deleted as unnecessary.

Changes are made in the Committee Note to reflect the changes in the rule text.

The changes from the published rule are shown below. [Omitted]

Subdivision (f). Rule 26(f) is amended to direct the par-ties to discuss discovery of electronically stored infor-mation during their discovery-planning conference. The rule focuses on ‘‘issues relating to disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information’’; the discussion is not required in cases not involving elec-tronic discovery, and the amendment imposes no addi-tional requirements in those cases. When the parties do anticipate disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information, discussion at the outset may avoid later difficulties or ease their resolution.

When a case involves discovery of electronically stored information, the issues to be addressed during the Rule 26(f) conference depend on the nature and ex-tent of the contemplated discovery and of the parties’ information systems. It may be important for the par-ties to discuss those systems, and accordingly impor-tant for counsel to become familiar with those systems before the conference. With that information, the par-ties can develop a discovery plan that takes into ac-count the capabilities of their computer systems. In ap-propriate cases identification of, and early discovery from, individuals with special knowledge of a party’s computer systems may be helpful.

The particular issues regarding electronically stored information that deserve attention during the discov-ery planning stage depend on the specifics of the given case. See Manual for Complex Litigation (4th) § 40.25(2) (listing topics for discussion in a proposed order regard-ing meet-and-confer sessions). For example, the parties may specify the topics for such discovery and the time period for which discovery will be sought. They may identify the various sources of such information within a party’s control that should be searched for electroni-cally stored information. They may discuss whether the information is reasonably accessible to the party that has it, including the burden or cost of retrieving and reviewing the information. See Rule 26(b)(2)(B). Rule 26(f)(3) explicitly directs the parties to discuss the form or forms in which electronically stored informa-tion might be produced. The parties may be able to reach agreement on the forms of production, making discovery more efficient. Rule 34(b) is amended to per-mit a requesting party to specify the form or forms in which it wants electronically stored information pro-duced. If the requesting party does not specify a form, Rule 34(b) directs the responding party to state the forms it intends to use in the production. Early discus-sion of the forms of production may facilitate the ap-plication of Rule 34(b) by allowing the parties to deter-mine what forms of production will meet both parties’ needs. Early identification of disputes over the forms of production may help avoid the expense and delay of searches or productions using inappropriate forms.

Rule 26(f) is also amended to direct the parties to dis-cuss any issues regarding preservation of discoverable information during their conference as they develop a discovery plan. This provision applies to all sorts of


discoverable information, but can be particularly im-portant with regard to electronically stored informa-tion. The volume and dynamic nature of electronically stored information may complicate preservation obli-gations. The ordinary operation of computers involves both the automatic creation and the automatic dele-tion or overwriting of certain information. Failure to address preservation issues early in the litigation in-creases uncertainty and raises a risk of disputes.

The parties’ discussion should pay particular atten-tion to the balance between the competing needs to preserve relevant evidence and to continue routine op-erations critical to ongoing activities. Complete or broad cessation of a party’s routine computer oper-ations could paralyze the party’s activities. Cf. Manual for Complex Litigation (4th) § 11.422 (‘‘A blanket preserva-tion order may be prohibitively expensive and unduly burdensome for parties dependent on computer systems for their day-to-day operations.’’) The parties should take account of these considerations in their discus-sions, with the goal of agreeing on reasonable preserva-tion steps.

The requirement that the parties discuss preserva-tion does not imply that courts should routinely enter preservation orders. A preservation order entered over objections should be narrowly tailored. Ex parte preser-vation orders should issue only in exceptional circum-stances.

Rule 26(f) is also amended to provide that the parties should discuss any issues relating to assertions of privi-lege or of protection as trial-preparation materials, in-cluding whether the parties can facilitate discovery by agreeing on procedures for asserting claims of privilege or protection after production and whether to ask the court to enter an order that includes any agreement the parties reach. The Committee has repeatedly been advised about the discovery difficulties that can result from efforts to guard against waiver of privilege and work-product protection. Frequently parties find it necessary to spend large amounts of time reviewing materials requested through discovery to avoid waiving privilege. These efforts are necessary because materials subject to a claim of privilege or protection are often difficult to identify. A failure to withhold even one such item may result in an argument that there has been a waiver of privilege as to all other privileged ma-terials on that subject matter. Efforts to avoid the risk of waiver can impose substantial costs on the party producing the material and the time required for the privilege review can substantially delay access for the party seeking discovery.

These problems often become more acute when dis-covery of electronically stored information is sought. The volume of such data, and the informality that at-tends use of e-mail and some other types of electroni-cally stored information, may make privilege deter-minations more difficult, and privilege review cor-respondingly more expensive and time consuming. Other aspects of electronically stored information pose particular difficulties for privilege review. For exam-ple, production may be sought of information auto-matically included in electronic files but not apparent to the creator or to readers. Computer programs may retain draft language, editorial comments, and other deleted matter (sometimes referred to as ‘‘embedded data’’ or ‘‘embedded edits’’) in an electronic file but not make them apparent to the reader. Information de-scribing the history, tracking, or management of an electronic file (sometimes called ‘‘metadata’’) is usu-ally not apparent to the reader viewing a hard copy or a screen image. Whether this information should be produced may be among the topics discussed in the Rule 26(f) conference. If it is, it may need to be re-viewed to ensure that no privileged information is in-cluded, further complicating the task of privilege re-view.

Parties may attempt to minimize these costs and delays by agreeing to protocols that minimize the risk of waiver. They may agree that the responding party will provide certain requested materials for initial ex-

amination without waiving any privilege or protec-tion—sometimes known as a ‘‘quick peek.’’ The re-questing party then designates the documents it wishes to have actually produced. This designation is the Rule 34 request. The responding party then responds in the usual course, screening only those documents actually requested for formal production and asserting privilege claims as provided in Rule 26(b)(5)(A). On other occa-sions, parties enter agreements—sometimes called ‘‘clawback agreements’’—that production without in-tent to waive privilege or protection should not be a waiver so long as the responding party identifies the documents mistakenly produced, and that the docu-ments should be returned under those circumstances. Other voluntary arrangements may be appropriate de-pending on the circumstances of each litigation. In most circumstances, a party who receives information under such an arrangement cannot assert that produc-tion of the information waived a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material.

Although these agreements may not be appropriate for all cases, in certain cases they can facilitate prompt and economical discovery by reducing delay be-fore the discovering party obtains access to documents, and by reducing the cost and burden of review by the producing party. A case-management or other order in-cluding such agreements may further facilitate the dis-covery process. Form 35 is amended to include a report to the court about any agreement regarding protec-tions against inadvertent forfeiture or waiver of privi-lege or protection that the parties have reached, and Rule 16(b) is amended to recognize that the court may include such an agreement in a case- management or other order. If the parties agree to entry of such an order, their proposal should be included in the report to the court.

Rule 26(b)(5)(B) is added to establish a parallel proce-dure to assert privilege or protection as trial-prepara-tion material after production, leaving the question of waiver to later determination by the court.

Changes Made After Publication and Comment. The Committee recommends a modified version of what was published. Rule 26(f)(3) was expanded to refer to the form ‘‘or forms’’ of production, in parallel with the like change in Rule 34. Different forms may be suitable for different sources of electronically stored information.

The published Rule 26(f)(4) proposal described the par-ties’ views and proposals concerning whether, on their agreement, the court should enter an order protecting the right to assert privilege after production. This has been revised to refer to the parties’ views and proposals concerning any issues relating to claims of privilege, including—if the parties agree on a procedure to assert such claims after production—whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order. As with Rule 16(b)(6), this change was made to avoid any implica-tions as to the scope of the protection that may be af-forded by court adoption of the parties’ agreement.

Rule 26(f)(4) also was expanded to include trial-prepa-ration materials.

The Committee Note was revised to reflect the changes in the rule text.

The changes from the published rule are shown below. [Omitted]



Former Rule 26(a)(5) served as an index of the discov-ery methods provided by later rules. It was deleted as redundant. Deletion does not affect the right to pursue discovery in addition to disclosure.

Former Rule 26(b)(1) began with a general statement of the scope of discovery that appeared to function as a preface to each of the five numbered paragraphs that followed. This preface has been shifted to the text of paragraph (1) because it does not accurately reflect the


limits embodied in paragraphs (2), (3), or (4), and be-cause paragraph (5) does not address the scope of dis-covery.

The reference to discovery of ‘‘books’’ in former Rule 26(b)(1) was deleted to achieve consistent expression throughout the discovery rules. Books remain a proper subject of discovery.

Amended Rule 26(b)(3) states that a party may obtain a copy of the party’s own previous statement ‘‘on re-quest.’’ Former Rule 26(b)(3) expressly made the re-quest procedure available to a nonparty witness, but did not describe the procedure to be used by a party. This apparent gap is closed by adopting the request procedure, which ensures that a party need not invoke Rule 34 to obtain a copy of the party’s own statement.

Rule 26(e) stated the duty to supplement or correct a disclosure or discovery response ‘‘to include informa-tion thereafter acquired.’’ This apparent limit is not re-flected in practice; parties recognize the duty to sup-plement or correct by providing information that was not originally provided although it was available at the time of the initial disclosure or response. These words are deleted to reflect the actual meaning of the present rule.

Former Rule 26(e) used different phrases to describe the time to supplement or correct a disclosure or dis-covery response. Disclosures were to be supplemented ‘‘at appropriate intervals.’’ A prior discovery response must be ‘‘seasonably * * * amend[ed].’’ The fine distinc-tion between these phrases has not been observed in practice. Amended Rule 26(e)(1)(A) uses the same phrase for disclosures and discovery responses. The party must supplement or correct ‘‘in a timely man-ner.’’

Former Rule 26(g)(1) did not call for striking an un-signed disclosure. The omission was an obvious drafting oversight. Amended Rule 26(g)(2) includes disclosures in the list of matters that the court must strike unless a signature is provided ‘‘promptly * * * after being called to the attorney’s or party’s attention.’’

Former Rule 26(b)(2)(A) referred to a ‘‘good faith’’ ar-gument to extend existing law. Amended Rule 26(b)(1)(B)(i) changes this reference to a ‘‘nonfrivolous’’ argument to achieve consistency with Rule 11(b)(2).

As with the Rule 11 signature on a pleading, written motion, or other paper, disclosure and discovery signa-tures should include not only a postal address but also a telephone number and electronic-mail address. A signer who lacks one or more of those addresses need not supply a nonexistent item.

Rule 11(b)(2) recognizes that it is legitimate to argue for establishing new law. An argument to establish new law is equally legitimate in conducting discovery.



Rule 26. Rules 26(a)(2) and (b)(4) are amended to ad-dress concerns about expert discovery. The amend-ments to Rule 26(a)(2) require disclosure regarding ex-pected expert testimony of those expert witnesses not required to provide expert reports and limit the expert report to facts or data (rather than ‘‘data or other in-formation,’’ as in the current rule) considered by the witness. Rule 26(b)(4) is amended to provide work-prod-uct protection against discovery regarding draft expert disclosures or reports and—with three specific excep-tions—communications between expert witnesses and counsel.

In 1993, Rule 26(b)(4)(A) was revised to authorize ex-pert depositions and Rule 26(a)(2) was added to provide disclosure, including—for many experts—an extensive report. Many courts read the disclosure provision to authorize discovery of all communications between counsel and expert witnesses and all draft reports. The Committee has been told repeatedly that routine dis-covery into attorney-expert communications and draft reports has had undesirable effects. Costs have risen. Attorneys may employ two sets of experts—one for pur-poses of consultation and another to testify at trial—

because disclosure of their collaborative interactions with expert consultants would reveal their most sen-sitive and confidential case analyses. At the same time, attorneys often feel compelled to adopt a guarded atti-tude toward their interaction with testifying experts that impedes effective communication, and experts adopt strategies that protect against discovery but also interfere with their work.

Subdivision (a)(2)(B). Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) is amended to provide that disclosure include all ‘‘facts or data con-sidered by the witness in forming’’ the opinions to be offered, rather than the ‘‘data or other information’’ disclosure prescribed in 1993. This amendment is in-tended to alter the outcome in cases that have relied on the 1993 formulation in requiring disclosure of all at-torney-expert communications and draft reports. The amendments to Rule 26(b)(4) make this change explicit by providing work-product protection against discovery regarding draft reports and disclosures or attorney-ex-pert communications.

The refocus of disclosure on ‘‘facts or data’’ is meant to limit disclosure to material of a factual nature by excluding theories or mental impressions of counsel. At the same time, the intention is that ‘‘facts or data’’ be interpreted broadly to require disclosure of any mate-rial considered by the expert, from whatever source, that contains factual ingredients. The disclosure obli-gation extends to any facts or data ‘‘considered’’ by the expert in forming the opinions to be expressed, not only those relied upon by the expert.

Subdivision (a)(2)(C). Rule 26(a)(2)(C) is added to man-date summary disclosures of the opinions to be offered by expert witnesses who are not required to provide re-ports under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and of the facts supporting those opinions. This disclosure is considerably less ex-tensive than the report required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Courts must take care against requiring undue detail, keeping in mind that these witnesses have not been specially retained and may not be as responsive to counsel as those who have.

This amendment resolves a tension that has some-times prompted courts to require reports under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) even from witnesses exempted from the re-port requirement. An (a)(2)(B) report is required only from an expert described in (a)(2)(B).

A witness who is not required to provide a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) may both testify as a fact wit-ness and also provide expert testimony under Evidence Rule 702, 703, or 705. Frequent examples include physi-cians or other health care professionals and employees of a party who do not regularly provide expert testi-mony. Parties must identify such witnesses under Rule 26(a)(2)(A) and provide the disclosure required under Rule 26(a)(2)(C). The (a)(2)(C) disclosure obligation does not include facts unrelated to the expert opinions the witness will present.

Subdivision (a)(2)(D). This provision (formerly Rule 26(a)(2)(C)) is amended slightly to specify that the time limits for disclosure of contradictory or rebuttal evi-dence apply with regard to disclosures under new Rule 26(a)(2)(C), just as they do with regard to reports under Rule 26(a)(2)(B).

Subdivision (b)(4). Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is added to provide work-product protection under Rule 26(b)(3)(A) and (B) for drafts of expert reports or disclosures. This protec-tion applies to all witnesses identified under Rule 26(a)(2)(A), whether they are required to provide reports under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) or are the subject of disclosure under Rule 26(a)(2)(C). It applies regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded, whether written, elec-tronic, or otherwise. It also applies to drafts of any supplementation under Rule 26(e); see Rule 26(a)(2)(E).

Rule 26(b)(4)(C) is added to provide work-product pro-tection for attorney-expert communications regardless of the form of the communications, whether oral, writ-ten, electronic, or otherwise. The addition of Rule 26(b)(4)(C) is designed to protect counsel’s work product and ensure that lawyers may interact with retained ex-perts without fear of exposing those communications to searching discovery. The protection is limited to com-


munications between an expert witness required to pro-vide a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and the attorney for the party on whose behalf the witness will be testify-ing, including any ‘‘preliminary’’ expert opinions. Pro-tected ‘‘communications’’ include those between the party’s attorney and assistants of the expert witness. The rule does not itself protect communications be-tween counsel and other expert witnesses, such as those for whom disclosure is required under Rule 26(a)(2)(C). The rule does not exclude protection under other doc-trines, such as privilege or independent development of the work-product doctrine.

The most frequent method for discovering the work of expert witnesses is by deposition, but Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) apply to all forms of discovery.

Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) do not impede discovery about the opinions to be offered by the expert or the de-velopment, foundation, or basis of those opinions. For example, the expert’s testing of material involved in litigation, and notes of any such testing, would not be exempted from discovery by this rule. Similarly, in-quiry about communications the expert had with any-one other than the party’s counsel about the opinions expressed is unaffected by the rule. Counsel are also free to question expert witnesses about alternative analyses, testing methods, or approaches to the issues on which they are testifying, whether or not the expert considered them in forming the opinions expressed. These discovery changes therefore do not affect the gatekeeping functions called for by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and relat-ed cases.

The protection for communications between the re-tained expert and ‘‘the party’s attorney’’ should be ap-plied in a realistic manner, and often would not be lim-ited to communications with a single lawyer or a single law firm. For example, a party may be involved in a number of suits about a given product or service, and may retain a particular expert witness to testify on that party’s behalf in several of the cases. In such a sit-uation, the protection applies to communications be-tween the expert witness and the attorneys represent-ing the party in any of those cases. Similarly, commu-nications with in-house counsel for the party would often be regarded as protected even if the in-house at-torney is not counsel of record in the action. Other sit-uations may also justify a pragmatic application of the ‘‘party’s attorney’’ concept.

Although attorney-expert communications are gener-ally protected by Rule 26(b)(4)(C), the protection does not apply to the extent the lawyer and the expert com-municate about matters that fall within three excep-tions. But the discovery authorized by the exceptions does not extend beyond those specific topics. Lawyer- expert communications may cover many topics and, even when the excepted topics are included among those involved in a given communication, the protec-tion applies to all other aspects of the communication beyond the excepted topics.

First, under Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(i) attorney-expert com-munications regarding compensation for the expert’s study or testimony may be the subject of discovery. In some cases, this discovery may go beyond the disclo-sure requirement in Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(vi). It is not lim-ited to compensation for work forming the opinions to be expressed, but extends to all compensation for the study and testimony provided in relation to the action. Any communications about additional benefits to the expert, such as further work in the event of a success-ful result in the present case, would be included. This exception includes compensation for work done by a person or organization associated with the expert. The objective is to permit full inquiry into such potential sources of bias.

Second, under Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(ii) discovery is per-mitted to identify facts or data the party’s attorney provided to the expert and that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed. The exception applies only to communications ‘‘identifying’’ the facts or data provided by counsel; further communications

about the potential relevance of the facts or data are protected.

Third, under Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(iii) discovery regarding attorney-expert communications is permitted to iden-tify any assumptions that counsel provided to the ex-pert and that the expert relied upon in forming the opinions to be expressed. For example, the party’s at-torney may tell the expert to assume the truth of cer-tain testimony or evidence, or the correctness of an-other expert’s conclusions. This exception is limited to those assumptions that the expert actually did rely on in forming the opinions to be expressed. More general attorney-expert discussions about hypotheticals, or ex-ploring possibilities based on hypothetical facts, are outside this exception.

Under the amended rule, discovery regarding attor-ney-expert communications on subjects outside the three exceptions in Rule 26(b)(4)(C), or regarding draft expert reports or disclosures, is permitted only in lim-ited circumstances and by court order. A party seeking such discovery must make the showing specified in Rule 26(b)(3)(A)(ii)—that the party has a substantial need for the discovery and cannot obtain the substan-tial equivalent without undue hardship. It will be rare for a party to be able to make such a showing given the broad disclosure and discovery otherwise allowed re-garding the expert’s testimony. A party’s failure to provide required disclosure or discovery does not show the need and hardship required by Rule 26(b)(3)(A); rem-edies are provided by Rule 37.

In the rare case in which a party does make this showing, the court must protect against disclosure of the attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, opin-ions, or legal theories under Rule 26(b)(3)(B). But this protection does not extend to the expert’s own develop-ment of the opinions to be presented; those are subject to probing in deposition or at trial.

Former Rules 26(b)(4)(B) and (C) have been renum-bered (D) and (E), and a slight revision has been made in (E) to take account of the renumbering of former (B).

Changes Made After Publication and Comment. Small changes to rule language were made to conform to style conventions. In addition, the protection for draft expert disclosures or reports in proposed Rule 26(b)(4)(B) was changed to read ‘‘regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded.’’ Small changes were also made to the Committee Note to recognize this change to rule language and to address specific issues raised during the public comment period.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Evidence, referred to in subdiv. (a)(2)(A), (C)(i), (3)(B), are set out in this Appendix.

Rule 27. Depositions to Perpetuate Testimony

(a) BEFORE AN ACTION IS FILED. (1) Petition. A person who wants to perpet-

uate testimony about any matter cognizable in a United States court may file a verified pe-tition in the district court for the district where any expected adverse party resides. The petition must ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to depose the named persons in order to perpetuate their testimony. The peti-tion must be titled in the petitioner’s name and must show:

(A) that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action cognizable in a United States court but cannot presently bring it or cause it to be brought;

(B) the subject matter of the expected ac-tion and the petitioner’s interest;

(C) the facts that the petitioner wants to establish by the proposed testimony and the reasons to perpetuate it;


(D) the names or a description of the per-sons whom the petitioner expects to be ad-verse parties and their addresses, so far as known; and

(E) the name, address, and expected sub-stance of the testimony of each deponent.

(2) Notice and Service. At least 21 days before the hearing date, the petitioner must serve each expected adverse party with a copy of the petition and a notice stating the time and place of the hearing. The notice may be served either inside or outside the district or state in the manner provided in Rule 4. If that service cannot be made with reasonable diligence on an expected adverse party, the court may order service by publication or otherwise. The court must appoint an attorney to represent persons not served in the manner provided in Rule 4 and to cross-examine the deponent if an unserved person is not otherwise represented. If any expected adverse party is a minor or is incompetent, Rule 17(c) applies.

(3) Order and Examination. If satisfied that perpetuating the testimony may prevent a failure or delay of justice, the court must issue an order that designates or describes the persons whose depositions may be taken, specifies the subject matter of the examina-tions, and states whether the depositions will be taken orally or by written interrogatories. The depositions may then be taken under these rules, and the court may issue orders like those authorized by Rules 34 and 35. A ref-erence in these rules to the court where an ac-tion is pending means, for purposes of this rule, the court where the petition for the depo-sition was filed.

(4) Using the Deposition. A deposition to per-petuate testimony may be used under Rule 32(a) in any later-filed district-court action in-volving the same subject matter if the deposi-tion either was taken under these rules or, al-though not so taken, would be admissible in evidence in the courts of the state where it was taken.

(b) PENDING APPEAL. (1) In General. The court where a judgment

has been rendered may, if an appeal has been taken or may still be taken, permit a party to depose witnesses to perpetuate their testi-mony for use in the event of further proceed-ings in that court.

(2) Motion. The party who wants to perpet-uate testimony may move for leave to take the depositions, on the same notice and serv-ice as if the action were pending in the district court. The motion must show:

(A) the name, address, and expected sub-stance of the testimony of each deponent; and

(B) the reasons for perpetuating the testi-mony.

(3) Court Order. If the court finds that per-petuating the testimony may prevent a failure or delay of justice, the court may permit the depositions to be taken and may issue orders like those authorized by Rules 34 and 35. The depositions may be taken and used as any other deposition taken in a pending district- court action.

(c) PERPETUATION BY AN ACTION. This rule does not limit a court’s power to entertain an action to perpetuate testimony.

(As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948; Dec. 29, 1948, eff. Oct. 20, 1949; Mar. 1, 1971, eff. July 1, 1971; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 25, 2005, eff. Dec. 1, 2005; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.)


Note to Subdivision (a). This rule offers a simple meth-od of perpetuating testimony in cases where it is usu-ally allowed under equity practice or under modern statutes. See Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341 (1934); Todd Engineering Dry Dock and Repair Co. v. United States, 32 F.(2d) 734 (C.C.A.5th, 1929); Hall v. Stout, 4 Del. ch. 269 (1871). For comparable state statutes see Ark.Civ.Code (Crawford, 1934) §§ 666–670; Calif.Code Civ.Proc. (Deering, 1937) 2083–2089; Ill.Rev.Stat. (1937) ch. 51, §§ 39–46; Iowa Code (1935) §§ 11400–11407; 2 Mass.Gen.Laws (Ter.Ed., 1932) ch. 233, § 46–63; N.Y.C.P.A. (1937) § 295; Ohio Gen.Code Ann. ((Throckmorton, 1936) § 12216–12222; Va.Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) § 6235; Wisc.Stat. (1935) §§ 326.27–326.29. The appointment of an attorney to represent absent parties or parties not personally notified, or a guardian ad litem to represent minors and incompetents, is pro-vided for in several of the above statutes.

Note to Subdivision (b). This follows the practice ap-proved in Richter v. Union Trust Co., 115 U.S. 55 (1885), by extending the right to perpetuate testimony to cases pending an appeal.

Note to Subdivision (c). This preserves the right to em-ploy a separate action to perpetuate testimony under U.S.C., Title 28, [former] § 644 (Depositions under dedimus potestatem and in perpetuam) as an alternate method.


Since the second sentence in subdivision (a)(3) refers only to depositions, it is arguable that Rules 34 and 35 are inapplicable in proceedings to perpetuate testi-mony. The new matter [in subdivisions (a)(3) and (b)] clarifies. A conforming change is also made in subdivi-sion (b).


The only changes are in nomenclature to conform to the official designation of a district court in Title 28, U.S.C., § 132(a).


The reference intended in this subdivision is to the rule governing the use of depositions in court proceed-ings. Formerly Rule 26(d), that rule is now Rule 32(a). The subdivision is amended accordingly.




The outdated cross-reference to former Rule 4(d) is corrected to incorporate all Rule 4 methods of service. Former Rule 4(d) has been allocated to many different subdivisions of Rule 4. Former Rule 4(d) did not cover all categories of defendants or modes of service, and present Rule 4 reaches further than all of former Rule 4. But there is no reason to distinguish between the dif-ferent categories of defendants and modes of service en-compassed by Rule 4. Rule 4 service provides effective notice. Notice by such means should be provided to any expected adverse party that comes within Rule 4.


Other changes are made to conform Rule 27(a)(2) to current style conventions.

Changes Made After Publication and Comment. Only style changes are recommended in the published draft.




The time set in the former rule at 20 days has been revised to 21 days. See the Note to Rule 6.

Rule 28. Persons Before Whom Depositions May Be Taken

(a) WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. (1) In General. Within the United States or a

territory or insular possession subject to United States jurisdiction, a deposition must be taken before:

(A) an officer authorized to administer oaths either by federal law or by the law in the place of examination; or

(B) a person appointed by the court where the action is pending to administer oaths and take testimony.

(2) Definition of ‘‘Officer.’’ The term ‘‘officer’’ in Rules 30, 31, and 32 includes a person ap-pointed by the court under this rule or des-ignated by the parties under Rule 29(a).

(b) IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY. (1) In General. A deposition may be taken in

a foreign country: (A) under an applicable treaty or conven-

tion; (B) under a letter of request, whether or

not captioned a ‘‘letter rogatory’’; (C) on notice, before a person authorized to

administer oaths either by federal law or by the law in the place of examination; or

(D) before a person commissioned by the court to administer any necessary oath and take testimony.

(2) Issuing a Letter of Request or a Commission. A letter of request, a commission, or both may be issued:

(A) on appropriate terms after an applica-tion and notice of it; and

(B) without a showing that taking the dep-osition in another manner is impracticable or inconvenient.

(3) Form of a Request, Notice, or Commission. When a letter of request or any other device is used according to a treaty or convention, it must be captioned in the form prescribed by that treaty or convention. A letter of request may be addressed ‘‘To the Appropriate Author-ity in [name of country].’’ A deposition notice or a commission must designate by name or descriptive title the person before whom the deposition is to be taken.

(4) Letter of Request—Admitting Evidence. Evi-dence obtained in response to a letter of re-quest need not be excluded merely because it is not a verbatim transcript, because the testi-mony was not taken under oath, or because of any similar departure from the requirements

for depositions taken within the United States.

(c) DISQUALIFICATION. A deposition must not be taken before a person who is any party’s rel-ative, employee, or attorney; who is related to or employed by any party’s attorney; or who is financially interested in the action.

(As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948; Jan. 21, 1963, eff. July 1, 1963; Apr. 29, 1980, eff. Aug. 1, 1980; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 1, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007.)


In effect this rule is substantially the same as U.S.C., Title 28, [former] § 639 (Depositions de bene esse; when and where taken; notice). U.S.C., Title 28, [former] § 642 (Depositions, acknowledgements, and affidavits taken by notaries public) does not conflict with subdivision (a).


The added language [in subdivision (a)] provides for the situation, occasionally arising, when depositions must be taken in an isolated place where there is no one readily available who has the power to administer oaths and take testimony according to the terms of the rule as originally stated. In addition, the amendment affords a more convenient method of securing deposi-tions in the case where state lines intervene between the location of various witnesses otherwise rather closely grouped. The amendment insures that the per-son appointed shall have adequate power to perform his duties. It has been held that a person authorized to act in the premises, as, for example, a master, may take testimony outside the district of his appointment. Con-solidated Fastener Co. v. Columbian Button & Fastener Co. (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1898) 85 Fed. 54; Mathieson Alkali Works v. Arnold, Hoffman & Co. (C.C.A.1st, 1929) 31 F.(2d) 1.


The amendment of clause (1) is designed to facilitate depositions in foreign countries by enlarging the class of persons before whom the depositions may be taken on notice. The class is no longer confined, as at present, to a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States. In a country that regards the taking of testimony by a foreign official in aid of litigation pend-ing in a court of another country as an infringement upon its sovereignty, it will be expedient to notice depositions before officers of the country in which the examination is taken. See generally Symposium, Letters Rogatory (Grossman ed. 1956); Doyle, Taking Evidence by Deposition and Letters Rogatory and Obtaining Documents in Foreign Territory, Proc. A.B.A., Sec. Int’l & Comp. L. 37 (1959); Heilpern, Procuring Evidence Abroad, 14 Tul.L.Rev. 29 (1939); Jones, International Judicial Assist-ance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 Yale L.J. 515, 526–29 (1953); Smit, International Aspects of Fed-eral Civil Procedure, 61 Colum.L.Rev. 1031, 1056–58 (1961).

Clause (2) of amended subdivision (b), like the cor-responding provision of subdivision (a) dealing with depositions taken in the United States, makes it clear that the appointment of a person by commission in it-self confers power upon him to administer any nec-essary oath.

It has been held that a letter rogatory will not be is-sued unless the use of a notice or commission is shown to be impossible or impractical. See, e.g., United States v. Matles, 154 F.Supp. 574 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); The Edmund Fanning, 89 F.Supp. 282 (E.D.N.Y. 1950); Branyan v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, 13 F.R.D. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See also Ali Akber Kiachif v. Philco Inter-national Corp., 10 F.R.D. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). The intent of the fourth sentence of the amended subdivision is to


overcome this judicial antipathy and to permit a sound choice between depositions under a letter rogatory and on notice or by commission in the light of all the cir-cumstances. In a case in which the foreign country will compel a witness to attend or testify in aid of a letter rogatory but not in aid of a commission, a letter roga-tory may be preferred on the ground that it is less ex-pensive to execute, even if there is plainly no need for compulsive process. A letter rogatory may also be pre-ferred when it cannot be demonstrated that a witness will be recalcitrant or when the witness states that he is willing to testify voluntarily, but the contingency exists that he will change his mind at the last moment. In the latter case, it may be advisable to issue both a commission and a letter rogatory, the latter to be exe-cuted if the former fails. The choice between a letter rogatory and a commission may be conditioned by other factors, including the nature and extent of the assistance that the foreign country will give to the exe-cution of either.

In executing a letter rogatory the courts of other countries may be expected to follow their customary procedure for taking testimony. See United States v. Paraffin Wax, 2255 Bags, 23 F.R.D. 289 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). In many non-common-law countries the judge questions the witness, sometimes without first administering an oath, the attorneys put any supplemental questions ei-ther to the witness or through the judge, and the judge dictates a summary of the testimony, which the wit-ness acknowledges as correct. See Jones, supra, at 530–32; Doyle, supra, at 39–41. The last sentence of the amended subdivision provides, contrary to the implica-tions of some authority, that evidence recorded in such a fashion need not be excluded on that account. See The Mandu, 11 F.Supp. 845 (E.D.N.Y. 1935). But cf. Nelson v. United States, 17 Fed.Cas. 1340 (No. 10,116) (C.C.D.Pa. 1816); Winthrop v. Union Ins. Co., 30 Fed.Cas. 376 (No. 17901) (C.C.D.Pa. 1807). The specific reference to the lack of an oath or a verbatim transcript is intended to be illustrative. Whether or to what degree the value or weight of the evidence may be affected by the method of taking or recording the testimony is left for deter-mination according to the circumstances of the par-ticular case, cf. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, A.G. v. Brownell, 121 F.Supp. 420 (D.D.C. 1954); Danisch v. Guard-ian Life Ins. Co., 19 F.R.D. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); the testi-mony may indeed be so devoid of substance or pro-bative value as to warrant its exclusion altogether.

Some foreign countries are hostile to allowing a dep-osition to be taken in their country, especially by no-tice or commission, or to lending assistance in the tak-ing of a deposition. Thus compliance with the terms of amended subdivision (b) may not in all cases ensure completion of a deposition abroad. Examination of the law and policy of the particular foreign country in ad-vance of attempting a deposition is therefore advisable. See 4 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶¶ 28.05–28.08 (2d ed. 1950).


The amendments are clarifying.




This revision is intended to make effective use of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, and of any similar trea-ties that the United States may enter into in the future which provide procedures for taking depositions abroad. The party taking the deposition is ordinarily obliged to conform to an applicable treaty or conven-tion if an effective deposition can be taken by such internationally approved means, even though a ver-batim transcript is not available or testimony cannot

be taken under oath. For a discussion of the impact of such treaties upon the discovery process, and of the ap-plication of principles of comity upon discovery in countries not signatories to a convention, see Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).

The term ‘‘letter of request’’ has been substituted in the rule for the term ‘‘letter rogatory’’ because it is the primary method provided by the Hague Convention. A letter rogatory is essentially a form of letter of re-quest. There are several other minor changes that are designed merely to carry out the intent of the other al-terations.



Rule 29. Stipulations About Discovery Procedure

Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may stipulate that:

(a) a deposition may be taken before any person, at any time or place, on any notice, and in the manner specified—in which event it may be used in the same way as any other dep-osition; and

(b) other procedures governing or limiting discovery be modified—but a stipulation ex-tending the time for any form of discovery must have court approval if it would interfere with the time set for completing discovery, for hearing a motion, or for trial.

(As amended Mar. 30, 1970, eff. July 1, 1970; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007.)

NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1970 Amendment

There is no provision for stipulations varying the procedures by which methods of discovery other than depositions are governed. It is common practice for parties to agree on such variations, and the amendment recognizes such agreements and provides a formal mechanism in the rules for giving them effect. Any stipulation varying the procedures may be superseded by court order, and stipulations extending the time for response to discovery under Rules 33, 34, and 36 require court approval.


This rule is revised to give greater opportunity for litigants to agree upon modifications to the procedures governing discovery or to limitations upon discovery. Counsel are encouraged to agree on less expensive and time-consuming methods to obtain information, as through voluntary exchange of documents, use of inter-views in lieu of depositions, etc. Likewise, when more depositions or interrogatories are needed than allowed under these rules or when more time is needed to com-plete a deposition than allowed under a local rule, they can, by agreeing to the additional discovery, eliminate the need for a special motion addressed to the court.

Under the revised rule, the litigants ordinarily are not required to obtain the court’s approval of these stipulations. By order or local rule, the court can, how-ever, direct that its approval be obtained for particular types of stipulations; and, in any event, approval must be obtained if a stipulation to extend the 30-day period for responding to interrogatories, requests for produc-tion, or requests for admissions would interfere with dates set by the court for completing discovery, for hearing of a motion, or for trial.




Rule 30. Depositions by Oral Examination

(a) WHEN A DEPOSITION MAY BE TAKEN. (1) Without Leave. A party may, by oral ques-

tions, depose any person, including a party, without leave of court except as provided in Rule 30(a)(2). The deponent’s attendance may be compelled by subpoena under Rule 45.

(2) With Leave. A party must obtain leave of court, and the court must grant leave to the extent consistent with Rule 26(b)(2):

(A) if the parties have not stipulated to the deposition and:

(i) the deposition would result in more than 10 depositions being taken under this rule or Rule 31 by the plaintiffs, or by the defendants, or by the third-party defend-ants;

(ii) the deponent has already been de-posed in the case; or

(iii) the party seeks to take the deposi-tion before the time specified in Rule 26(d), unless the party certifies in the notice, with supporting facts, that the deponent is expected to leave the United States and be unavailable for examination in this coun-try after that time; or

(B) if the deponent is confined in prison.

(b) NOTICE OF THE DEPOSITION; OTHER FORMAL REQUIREMENTS.

(1) Notice in General. A party who wants to depose a person by oral questions must give reasonable written notice to every other party. The notice must state the time and place of the deposition and, if known, the de-ponent’s name and address. If the name is un-known, the notice must provide a general de-scription sufficient to identify the person or the particular class or group to which the per-son belongs.

(2) Producing Documents. If a subpoena duces tecum is to be served on the deponent, the ma-terials designated for production, as set out in the subpoena, must be listed in the notice or in an attachment. The notice to a party depo-nent may be accompanied by a request under Rule 34 to produce documents and tangible things at the deposition.

(3) Method of Recording. (A) Method Stated in the Notice. The party

who notices the deposition must state in the notice the method for recording the testi-mony. Unless the court orders otherwise, testimony may be recorded by audio, audio-visual, or stenographic means. The noticing party bears the recording costs. Any party may arrange to transcribe a deposition.

(B) Additional Method. With prior notice to the deponent and other parties, any party may designate another method for recording the testimony in addition to that specified in the original notice. That party bears the expense of the additional record or tran-script unless the court orders otherwise.

(4) By Remote Means. The parties may stipu-late—or the court may on motion order—that a deposition be taken by telephone or other re-mote means. For the purpose of this rule and Rules 28(a), 37(a)(2), and 37(b)(1), the deposition takes place where the deponent answers the questions.

(5) Officer’s Duties. (A) Before the Deposition. Unless the parties

stipulate otherwise, a deposition must be conducted before an officer appointed or des-ignated under Rule 28. The officer must begin the deposition with an on-the-record statement that includes:

(i) the officer’s name and business ad-dress;

(ii) the date, time, and place of the depo-sition;

(iii) the deponent’s name; (iv) the officer’s administration of the

oath or affirmation to the deponent; and (v) the identity of all persons present.

(B) Conducting the Deposition; Avoiding Dis-tortion. If the deposition is recorded non-stenographically, the officer must repeat the items in Rule 30(b)(5)(A)(i)–(iii) at the begin-ning of each unit of the recording medium. The deponent’s and attorneys’ appearance or demeanor must not be distorted through re-cording techniques.

(C) After the Deposition. At the end of a deposition, the officer must state on the record that the deposition is complete and must set out any stipulations made by the attorneys about custody of the transcript or recording and of the exhibits, or about any other pertinent matters.

(6) Notice or Subpoena Directed to an Organiza-tion. In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private cor-poration, a partnership, an association, a gov-ernmental agency, or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination. The named organiza-tion must then designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its be-half; and it may set out the matters on which each person designated will testify. A sub-poena must advise a nonparty organization of its duty to make this designation. The persons designated must testify about information known or reasonably available to the organi-zation. This paragraph (6) does not preclude a deposition by any other procedure allowed by these rules.

(c) EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION; RECORD OF THE EXAMINATION; OBJECTIONS; WRIT-TEN QUESTIONS.

(1) Examination and Cross-Examination. The examination and cross-examination of a depo-nent proceed as they would at trial under the Federal Rules of Evidence, except Rules 103 and 615. After putting the deponent under oath or affirmation, the officer must record the tes-timony by the method designated under Rule 30(b)(3)(A). The testimony must be recorded by the officer personally or by a person acting in the presence and under the direction of the of-ficer.


(2) Objections. An objection at the time of the examination—whether to evidence, to a party’s conduct, to the officer’s qualifications, to the manner of taking the deposition, or to any other aspect of the deposition—must be noted on the record, but the examination still proceeds; the testimony is taken subject to any objection. An objection must be stated concisely in a nonargumentative and non-suggestive manner. A person may instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(3).

(3) Participating Through Written Questions. Instead of participating in the oral examina-tion, a party may serve written questions in a sealed envelope on the party noticing the dep-osition, who must deliver them to the officer. The officer must ask the deponent those ques-tions and record the answers verbatim.

(d) DURATION; SANCTION; MOTION TO TERMINATE OR LIMIT.

(1) Duration. Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a deposition is limited to 1 day of 7 hours. The court must allow addi-tional time consistent with Rule 26(b)(2) if needed to fairly examine the deponent or if the deponent, another person, or any other cir-cumstance impedes or delays the examination.

(2) Sanction. The court may impose an appro-priate sanction—including the reasonable ex-penses and attorney’s fees incurred by any party—on a person who impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair examination of the depo-nent.

(3) Motion to Terminate or Limit. (A) Grounds. At any time during a deposi-

tion, the deponent or a party may move to terminate or limit it on the ground that it is being conducted in bad faith or in a manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the deponent or party. The motion may be filed in the court where the action is pending or the deposition is being taken. If the objecting deponent or party so demands, the deposition must be suspended for the time necessary to obtain an order.

(B) Order. The court may order that the deposition be terminated or may limit its scope and manner as provided in Rule 26(c). If terminated, the deposition may be re-sumed only by order of the court where the action is pending.

(C) Award of Expenses. Rule 37(a)(5) applies to the award of expenses.

(e) REVIEW BY THE WITNESS; CHANGES. (1) Review; Statement of Changes. On request

by the deponent or a party before the deposi-tion is completed, the deponent must be al-lowed 30 days after being notified by the offi-cer that the transcript or recording is avail-able in which:

(A) to review the transcript or recording; and

(B) if there are changes in form or sub-stance, to sign a statement listing the changes and the reasons for making them.

(2) Changes Indicated in the Officer’s Certifi-cate. The officer must note in the certificate

prescribed by Rule 30(f)(1) whether a review was requested and, if so, must attach any changes the deponent makes during the 30-day period.

(f) CERTIFICATION AND DELIVERY; EXHIBITS; COPIES OF THE TRANSCRIPT OR RECORDING; FIL-ING.

(1) Certification and Delivery. The officer must certify in writing that the witness was duly sworn and that the deposition accurately records the witness’s testimony. The certifi-cate must accompany the record of the deposi-tion. Unless the court orders otherwise, the of-ficer must seal the deposition in an envelope or package bearing the title of the action and marked ‘‘Deposition of [witness’s name]’’ and must promptly send it to the attorney who ar-ranged for the transcript or recording. The at-torney must store it under conditions that will protect it against loss, destruction, tam-pering, or deterioration.

(2) Documents and Tangible Things. (A) Originals and Copies. Documents and

tangible things produced for inspection dur-ing a deposition must, on a party’s request, be marked for identification and attached to the deposition. Any party may inspect and copy them. But if the person who produced them wants to keep the originals, the person may:

(i) offer copies to be marked, attached to the deposition, and then used as origi-nals—after giving all parties a fair oppor-tunity to verify the copies by comparing them with the originals; or

(ii) give all parties a fair opportunity to inspect and copy the originals after they are marked—in which event the originals may be used as if attached to the deposi-tion.

(B) Order Regarding the Originals. Any party may move for an order that the origi-nals be attached to the deposition pending final disposition of the case.

(3) Copies of the Transcript or Recording. Un-less otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, the officer must retain the stenographic notes of a deposition taken stenographically or a copy of the recording of a deposition taken by another method. When paid reason-able charges, the officer must furnish a copy of the transcript or recording to any party or the deponent.

(4) Notice of Filing. A party who files the dep-osition must promptly notify all other parties of the filing.

(g) FAILURE TO ATTEND A DEPOSITION OR SERVE A SUBPOENA; EXPENSES. A party who, expecting a deposition to be taken, attends in person or by an attorney may recover reasonable expenses for attending, including attorney’s fees, if the no-ticing party failed to:

(1) attend and proceed with the deposition; or

(2) serve a subpoena on a nonparty deponent, who consequently did not attend.

(As amended Jan. 21, 1963, eff. July 1, 1963; Mar. 30, 1970, eff. July 1, 1970; Mar. 1, 1971, eff. July 1, 1971; Nov. 20, 1972, eff. July 1, 1975; Apr. 29, 1980,


eff. Aug. 1, 1980; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 17, 2000, eff. Dec. 1, 2000; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007.)


Note to Subdivision (a). This is in accordance with common practice. See U.S.C., Title 28, [former] § 639 (Depositions de bene esse; when and where taken; no-tice), the relevant provisions of which are incorporated in this rule; Calif.Code Civ.Proc. (Deering, 1937) § 2031; and statutes cited in respect to notice in the Note to Rule 26(a). The provision for enlarging or shortening the time of notice has been added to give flexibility to the rule.

Note to Subdivisions (b) and (d). These are introduced as a safeguard for the protection of parties and depo-nents on account of the unlimited right of discovery given by Rule 26.

Note to Subdivisions (c) and (e). These follow the gen-eral plan of [former] Equity Rule 51 (Evidence Taken Before Examiners, Etc.) and U. S. C., Title 28, [former] §§ 640 (Depositions de bene esse; mode of taking), and [former] 641 (Same; transmission to court), but are more specific. They also permit the deponent to require the officer to make changes in the deposition if the de-ponent is not satisfied with it. See also [former] Equity Rule 50 (Stenographer–Appointment–Fees).

Note to Subdivision (f). Compare [former] Equity Rule 55 (Depositions Deemed Published When Filed).

Note to Subdivision (g). This is similar to 2 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9833, but is more extensive.


This amendment corresponds to the change in Rule 4(d)(4). See the Advisory Committee’s Note to that amendment.


Subdivision (a). This subdivision contains the provi-sions of existing Rule 26(a), transferred here as part of the rearrangement relating to Rule 26. Existing Rule 30(a) is transferred to 30(b). Changes in language have been made to conform to the new arrangement.

This subdivision is further revised in regard to the re-quirement of leave of court for taking a deposition. The present procedure, requiring a plaintiff to obtain leave of court if he serves notice of taking a deposition with-in 20 days after commencement of the action, is changed in several respects. First, leave is required by reference to the time the deposition is to be taken rather than the date of serving notice of taking. Sec-ond, the 20-day period is extended to 30 days and runs from the service of summons and complaint on any de-fendant, rather than the commencement of the action. Cf. Ill. S.Ct.R. 19–1, S–H Ill.Ann.Stat. § 101.19–1. Third, leave is not required beyond the time that defendant initiates discovery, thus showing that he has retained counsel. As under the present practice, a party not af-forded a reasonable opportunity to appear at a deposi-tion, because he has not yet been served with process, is protected against use of the deposition at trial against him. See Rule 32(a), transferred from 26(d). Moreover, he can later redepose the witness if he so de-sires.

The purpose of requiring the plaintiff to obtain leave of court is, as stated by the Advisory Committee that proposed the present language of Rule 26(a), to protect ‘‘a defendant who has not had an opportunity to retain counsel and inform himself as to the nature of the suit.’’ Note to 1948 amendment of Rule 26(a), quoted in 3A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 455–456 (Wright ed. 1958). In order to assure defendant of this opportunity, the period is lengthened to 30 days. This protection, however, is relevant to the time of taking the deposition, not to the time that notice is served. Similarly, the protective period should run from the service of process rather than the filing of the

complaint with the court. As stated in the note to Rule 26(d), the courts have used the service of notice as a convenient reference point for assigning priority in taking depositions, but with the elimination of priority in new Rule 26(d) the reference point is no longer need-ed. The new procedure is consistent in principle with the provisions of Rules 33, 34, and 36 as revised.

Plaintiff is excused from obtaining leave even during the initial 30-day period if he gives the special notice provided in subdivision (b)(2). The required notice must state that the person to be examined is about to go out of the district where the action is pending and more than 100 miles from the place of trial, or out of the United States, or on a voyage to sea, and will be un-available for examination unless deposed within the 30- day period. These events occur most often in maritime litigation, when seamen are transferred from one port to another or are about to go to sea. Yet, there are analogous situations in nonmaritime litigation, and al-though the maritime problems are more common, a rule limited to claims in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is not justified.

In the recent unification of the civil and admiralty rules, this problem was temporarily met through addi-tion in Rule 26(a) of a provision that depositions de bene esse may continue to be taken as to admiralty and maritime claims within the meaning of Rule 9(h). It was recognized at the time that ‘‘a uniform rule appli-cable alike to what are now civil actions and suits in admiralty’’ was clearly preferable, but the de bene esse procedure was adopted ‘‘for the time being at least.’’ See Advisory Committee’s note in Report of the Judi-cial Conference: Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure 43–44 (1966).

The changes in Rule 30(a) and the new Rule 30(b)(2) provide a formula applicable to ordinary civil as well as maritime claims. They replace the provision for deposi-tions de bene esse. They authorize an early deposition without leave of court where the witness is about to de-part and, unless his deposition is promptly taken, (1) it will be impossible or very difficult to depose him before trial or (2) his deposition can later be taken but only with substantially increased effort and expense. Cf. S.S. Hai Chang, 1966 A.M.C. 2239 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), in which the deposing party is required to prepay expenses and coun-sel fees of the other party’s lawyer when the action is pending in New York and depositions are to be taken on the West Coast. Defendant is protected by a provi-sion that the deposition cannot be used against him if he was unable through exercise of diligence to obtain counsel to represent him.

The distance of 100 miles from place of trial is derived from the de bene esse provision and also conforms to the reach of a subpoena of the trial court, as provided in Rule 45(e). See also S.D.N.Y. Civ.R. 5(a). Some parts of the de bene esse provision are omitted from Rule 30(b)(2). Modern deposition practice adequately covers the witness who lives more than 100 miles away from place of trial. If a witness is aged or infirm, leave of court can be obtained.

Subdivision (b). Existing Rule 30(b) on protective or-ders has been transferred to Rule 26(c), and existing Rule 30(a) relating to the notice of taking deposition has been transferred to this subdivision. Because new material has been added, subsection numbers have been inserted.

Subdivision (b)(1). If a subpoena duces tecum is to be served, a copy thereof or a designation of the materials to be produced must accompany the notice. Each party is thereby enabled to prepare for the deposition more effectively.

Subdivision (b)(2). This subdivision is discussed in the note to subdivision (a), to which it relates.

Subdivision (b)(3). This provision is derived from exist-ing Rule 30(a), with a minor change of language.

Subdivision (b)(4). In order to facilitate less expensive procedures, provision is made for the recording of testi-mony by other than stenographic means—e.g., by me-chanical, electronic, or photographic means. Because these methods give rise to problems of accuracy and


trustworthiness, the party taking the deposition is re-quired to apply for a court order. The order is to speci-fy how the testimony is to be recorded, preserved, and filed, and it may contain whatever additional safe-guards the court deems necessary.

Subdivision (b)(5). A provision is added to enable a party, through service of notice, to require another party to produce documents or things at the taking of his deposition. This may now be done as to a nonparty deponent through use of a subpoena duces tecum as au-thorized by Rule 45, but some courts have held that documents may be secured from a party only under Rule 34. See 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 644.1 n. 83.2, § 792 n. 16 (Wright ed. 1961). With the elimination of ‘‘good cause’’ from Rule 34, the reason for this restrictive doctrine has disappeared. Cf. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 3111.

Whether production of documents or things should be obtained directly under Rule 34 or at the deposition under this rule will depend on the nature and volume of the documents or things. Both methods are made available. When the documents are few and simple, and closely related to the oral examination, ability to pro-ceed via this rule will facilitate discovery. If the dis-covering party insists on examining many and complex documents at the taking of the deposition, thereby causing undue burdens on others, the latter may, under Rules 26(c) or 30(d), apply for a court order that the ex-amining party proceed via Rule 34 alone.

Subdivision (b)(6). A new provision is added, whereby a party may name a corporation, partnership, associa-tion, or governmental agency as the deponent and des-ignate the matters on which he requests examination, and the organization shall then name one or more of its officers, directors, or managing agents, or other per-sons consenting to appear and testify on its behalf with respect to matters known or reasonably available to the organization. Cf. Alberta Sup.Ct.R. 255. The organi-zation may designate persons other than officers, direc-tors, and managing agents, but only with their consent. Thus, an employee or agent who has an independent or conflicting interest in the litigation—for example, in a personal injury case—can refuse to testify on behalf of the organization.

This procedure supplements the existing practice whereby the examining party designates the corporate official to be deposed. Thus, if the examining party be-lieves that certain officials who have not testified pur-suant to this subdivision have added information, he may depose them. On the other hand, a court’s decision whether to issue a protective order may take account of the availability and use made of the procedures pro-vided in this subdivision.

The new procedure should be viewed as an added fa-cility for discovery, one which may be advantageous to both sides as well as an improvement in the deposition process. It will reduce the difficulties now encountered in determining, prior to the taking of a deposition, whether a particular employee or agent is a ‘‘managing agent.’’ See Note, Discovery Against Corporations Under the Federal Rules, 47 Iowa L.Rev. 1006–1016 (1962). It will curb the ‘‘bandying’’ by which officers or managing agents of a corporation are deposed in turn but each disclaims knowledge of facts that are clearly known to persons in the organization and thereby to it. Cf. Haney v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 330 F.2d 940, 944 (4th Cir. 1964). The provisions should also assist organizations which find that an unnecessarily large number of their officers and agents are being deposed by a party uncer-tain of who in the organization has knowledge. Some courts have held that under the existing rules a cor-poration should not be burdened with choosing which person is to appear for it. E.g., United States v. Gahagan Dredging Corp., 24 F.R.D. 328, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). This burden is not essentially different from that of answer-ing interrogatories under Rule 33, and is in any case lighter than that of an examining party ignorant of who in the corporation has knowledge.

Subdivision (c). A new sentence is inserted at the be-ginning, representing the transfer of existing Rule 26(c)

to this subdivision. Another addition conforms to the new provision in subdivision (b)(4).

The present rule provides that transcription shall be carried out unless all parties waive it. In view of the many depositions taken from which nothing useful is discovered, the revised language provides that tran-scription is to be performed if any party requests it. The fact of the request is relevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion in determining who shall pay for transcription.

Parties choosing to serve written questions rather than participate personally in an oral deposition are di-rected to serve their questions on the party taking the deposition, since the officer is often not identified in advance. Confidentiality is preserved, since the ques-tions may be served in a sealed envelope.

Subdivision (d). The assessment of expenses incurred in relation to motions made under this subdivision (d) is made subject to the provisions of Rule 37(a). The standards for assessment of expenses are more fully set out in Rule 37(a), and these standards should apply to the essentially similar motions of this subdivision.

Subdivision (e). The provision relating to the refusal of a witness to sign his deposition is tightened through insertion of a 30-day time period.

Subdivision (f)(1). A provision is added which codifies in a flexible way the procedure for handling exhibits re-lated to the deposition and at the same time assures each party that he may inspect and copy documents and things produced by a nonparty witness in response to subpoena duces tecum. As a general rule and in the absence of agreement to the contrary or order of the court, exhibits produced without objection are to be an-nexed to and returned with the deposition, but a wit-ness may substitute copies for purposes of marking and he may obtain return of the exhibits. The right of the parties to inspect exhibits for identification and to make copies is assured. Cf. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 3116(c).


The subdivision permits a party to name a corpora-tion or other form of organization as a deponent in the notice of examination and to describe in the notice the matters about which discovery is desired. The organiza-tion is then obliged to designate natural persons to tes-tify on its behalf. The amendment clarifies the proce-dure to be followed if a party desires to examine a nonparty organization through persons designated by the organization. Under the rules, a subpoena rather than a notice of examination is served on a non-party to compel attendance at the taking of a deposition. The amendment provides that a subpoena may name a nonparty organization as the deponent and may indicate the matters about which discovery is desired. In that event, the non-party organization must respond by des-ignating natural persons, who are then obliged to tes-tify as to matters known or reasonably available to the organization. To insure that a non-party organization that is not represented by counsel has knowledge of its duty to designate, the amendment directs the party seeking discovery to advise of the duty in the body of the subpoena.


Subdivision (c). Existing. Rule 43(b), which is to be ab-rogated, deals with the use of leading questions, the calling, interrogation, impeachment, and scope of cross-examination of adverse parties, officers, etc. These topics are dealt with in many places in the Rules of Evidence. Moreover, many pertinent topics included in the Rules of Evidence are not mentioned in Rule 43(b), e.g. privilege. A reference to the Rules of Evi-dence generally is therefore made in subdivision (c) of Rule 30.


Subdivision (b)(4). It has been proposed that electronic recording of depositions be authorized as a matter of


course, subject to the right of a party to seek an order that a deposition be recorded by stenographic means. The Committee is not satisfied that a case has been made for a reversal of present practice. The amend-ment is made to encourage parties to agree to the use of electronic recording of depositions so that conflict-ing claims with respect to the potential of electronic recording for reducing costs of depositions can be ap-praised in the light of greater experience. The provision that the parties may stipulate that depositions may be recorded by other than stenographic means seems im-plicit in Rule 29. The amendment makes it explicit. The provision that the stipulation or order shall des-ignate the person before whom the deposition is to be taken is added to encourage the naming of the record-ing technician as that person, eliminating the neces-sity of the presence of one whose only function is to ad-minister the oath. See Rules 28(a) and 29.

Subdivision (b)(7). Depositions by telephone are now authorized by Rule 29 upon stipulation of the parties. The amendment authorizes that method by order of the court. The final sentence is added to make it clear that when a deposition is taken by telephone it is taken in the district and at the place where the witness is to an-swer the questions rather than that where the ques-tions are propounded.

Subdivision (f)(1). For the reasons set out in the Note following the amendment of Rule 5(d), the court may wish to permit the parties to retain depositions unless they are to be used in the action. The amendment of the first paragraph permits the court to so order.

The amendment of the second paragraph is clarifying. The purpose of the paragraph is to permit a person who produces materials at a deposition to offer copies for marking and annexation to the deposition. Such copies are a ‘‘substitute’’ for the originals, which are not to be marked and which can thereafter be used or even dis-posed of by the person who produces them. In the light of that purpose, the former language of the paragraph had been justly termed ‘‘opaque.’’ Wright & Miller, Fed-eral Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2114.



EFFECTIVE DATE OF AMENDMENT PROPOSED NOVEMBER 20, 1972

Amendment of this rule embraced by the order en-tered by the Supreme Court of the United States on No-vember 20, 1972, effective on the 180th day beginning after January 2, 1975, see section 3 of Pub. L. 93–595, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1959, set out as a note under sec-tion 2074 of this title.


Subdivision (a). Paragraph (1) retains the first and third sentences from the former subdivision (a) without significant modification. The second and fourth sen-tences are relocated.

Paragraph (2) collects all provisions bearing on re-quirements of leave of court to take a deposition.

Paragraph (2)(A) is new. It provides a limit on the number of depositions the parties may take, absent leave of court or stipulation with the other parties. One aim of this revision is to assure judicial review under the standards stated in Rule 26(b)(2) before any side will be allowed to take more than ten depositions in a case without agreement of the other parties. A second objective is to emphasize that counsel have a profes-sional obligation to develop a mutual cost-effective plan for discovery in the case. Leave to take additional depositions should be granted when consistent with the principles of Rule 26(b)(2), and in some cases the ten- per-side limit should be reduced in accordance with those same principles. Consideration should ordinarily be given at the planning meeting of the parties under

Rule 26(f) and at the time of a scheduling conference under Rule 16(b) as to enlargements or reductions in the number of depositions, eliminating the need for special motions.

A deposition under Rule 30(b)(6) should, for purposes of this limit, be treated as a single deposition even though more than one person may be designated to tes-tify.

In multi-party cases, the parties on any side are ex-pected to confer and agree as to which depositions are most needed, given the presumptive limit on the num-ber of depositions they can take without leave of court. If these disputes cannot be amicably resolved, the court can be requested to resolve the dispute or permit addi-tional depositions.

Paragraph (2)(B) is new. It requires leave of court if any witness is to be deposed in the action more than once. This requirement does not apply when a deposi-tion is temporarily recessed for convenience of counsel or the deponent or to enable additional materials to be gathered before resuming the deposition. If significant travel costs would be incurred to resume the deposi-tion, the parties should consider the feasibility of con-ducting the balance of the examination by telephonic means.

Paragraph (2)(C) revises the second sentence of the former subdivision (a) as to when depositions may be taken. Consistent with the changes made in Rule 26(d), providing that formal discovery ordinarily not com-mence until after the litigants have met and conferred as directed in revised Rule 26(f), the rule requires leave of court or agreement of the parties if a deposition is to be taken before that time (except when a witness is about to leave the country).

Subdivision (b). The primary change in subdivision (b) is that parties will be authorized to record deposition testimony by nonstenographic means without first hav-ing to obtain permission of the court or agreement from other counsel.

Former subdivision (b)(2) is partly relocated in sub-division (a)(2)(C) of this rule. The latter two sentences of the first paragraph are deleted, in part because they are redundant to Rule 26(g) and in part because Rule 11 no longer applies to discovery requests. The second paragraph of the former subdivision (b)(2), relating to use of depositions at trial where a party was unable to obtain counsel in time for an accelerated deposition, is relocated in Rule 32.

New paragraph (2) confers on the party taking the deposition the choice of the method of recording, with-out the need to obtain prior court approval for one taken other than stenographically. A party choosing to record a deposition only by videotape or audiotape should understand that a transcript will be required by Rule 26(a)(3)(B) and Rule 32(c) if the deposition is later to be offered as evidence at trial or on a dispositive mo-tion under Rule 56. Objections to the nonstenographic recording of a deposition, when warranted by the cir-cumstances, can be presented to the court under Rule 26(c).

Paragraph (3) provides that other parties may ar-range, at their own expense, for the recording of a depo-sition by a means (stenographic, visual, or sound) in addition to the method designated by the person notic-ing the deposition. The former provisions of this para-graph, relating to the court’s power to change the date of a deposition, have been eliminated as redundant in view of Rule 26(c)(2).

Revised paragraph (4) requires that all depositions be recorded by an officer designated or appointed under Rule 28 and contains special provisions designed to pro-vide basic safeguards to assure the utility and integrity of recordings taken other than stenographically.

Paragraph (7) is revised to authorize the taking of a deposition not only by telephone but also by other re-mote electronic means, such as satellite television, when agreed to by the parties or authorized by the court.

Subdivision (c). Minor changes are made in this sub-division to reflect those made in subdivision (b) and to


complement the new provisions of subdivision (d)(1), aimed at reducing the number of interruptions during depositions.

In addition, the revision addresses a recurring prob-lem as to whether other potential deponents can attend a deposition. Courts have disagreed, some holding that witnesses should be excluded through invocation of Rule 615 of the evidence rules, and others holding that witnesses may attend unless excluded by an order under Rule 26(c)(5). The revision provides that other witnesses are not automatically excluded from a depo-sition simply by the request of a party. Exclusion, how-ever, can be ordered under Rule 26(c)(5) when appro-priate; and, if exclusion is ordered, consideration should be given as to whether the excluded witnesses likewise should be precluded from reading, or being otherwise informed about, the testimony given in the earlier depositions. The revision addresses only the matter of attendance by potential deponents, and does not attempt to resolve issues concerning attendance by others, such as members of the public or press.

Subdivision (d). The first sentence of new paragraph (1) provides that any objections during a deposition must be made concisely and in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner. Depositions frequently have been unduly prolonged, if not unfairly frustrated, by lengthy objections and colloquy, often suggesting how the deponent should respond. While objections may, under the revised rule, be made during a deposi-tion, they ordinarily should be limited to those that under Rule 32(d)(3) might be waived if not made at that time, i.e., objections on grounds that might be imme-diately obviated, removed, or cured, such as to the form of a question or the responsiveness of an answer. Under Rule 32(b), other objections can, even without the so-called ‘‘usual stipulation’’ preserving objections, be raised for the first time at trial and therefore should be kept to a minimum during a deposition.

Directions to a deponent not to answer a question can be even more disruptive than objections. The second sentence of new paragraph (1) prohibits such directions except in the three circumstances indicated: to claim a privilege or protection against disclosure (e.g., as work product), to enforce a court directive limiting the scope or length of permissible discovery, or to suspend a dep-osition to enable presentation of a motion under para-graph (3).

Paragraph (2) is added to this subdivision to dispel any doubts regarding the power of the court by order or local rule to establish limits on the length of deposi-tions. The rule also explicitly authorizes the court to impose the cost resulting from obstructive tactics that unreasonably prolong a deposition on the person en-gaged in such obstruction. This sanction may be im-posed on a non-party witness as well as a party or at-torney, but is otherwise congruent with Rule 26(g).

It is anticipated that limits on the length of deposi-tions prescribed by local rules would be presumptive only, subject to modification by the court or by agree-ment of the parties. Such modifications typically should be discussed by the parties in their meeting under Rule 26(f) and included in the scheduling order required by Rule 16(b). Additional time, moreover, should be allowed under the revised rule when justified under the principles stated in Rule 26(b)(2). To reduce the number of special motions, local rules should ordi-narily permit—and indeed encourage—the parties to agree to additional time, as when, during the taking of a deposition, it becomes clear that some additional ex-amination is needed.

Paragraph (3) authorizes appropriate sanctions not only when a deposition is unreasonably prolonged, but also when an attorney engages in other practices that improperly frustrate the fair examination of the depo-nent, such as making improper objections or giving di-rections not to answer prohibited by paragraph (1). In general, counsel should not engage in any conduct dur-ing a deposition that would not be allowed in the pres-ence of a judicial officer. The making of an excessive number of unnecessary objections may itself constitute

sanctionable conduct, as may the refusal of an attorney to agree with other counsel on a fair apportionment of the time allowed for examination of a deponent or a re-fusal to agree to a reasonable request for some addi-tional time to complete a deposition, when that is per-mitted by the local rule or order.

Subdivision (e). Various changes are made in this sub-division to reduce problems sometimes encountered when depositions are taken stenographically. Reporters frequently have difficulties obtaining signatures—and the return of depositions—from deponents. Under the revision pre-filing review by the deponent is required only if requested before the deposition is completed. If review is requested, the deponent will be allowed 30 days to review the transcript or recording and to indi-cate any changes in form or substance. Signature of the deponent will be required only if review is requested and changes are made.

Subdivision (f). Minor changes are made in this sub-division to reflect those made in subdivision (b). In courts which direct that depositions not be automati-cally filed, the reporter can transmit the transcript or recording to the attorney taking the deposition (or or-dering the transcript or record), who then becomes cus-todian for the court of the original record of the deposi-tion. Pursuant to subdivision (f)(2), as under the prior rule, any other party is entitled to secure a copy of the deposition from the officer designated to take the depo-sition; accordingly, unless ordered or agreed, the offi-cer must retain a copy of the recording or the steno-graphic notes.


Subdivision (d). Paragraph (1) has been amended to clarify the terms regarding behavior during deposi-tions. The references to objections ‘‘to evidence’’ and limitations ‘‘on evidence’’ have been removed to avoid disputes about what is ‘‘evidence’’ and whether an ob-jection is to, or a limitation is on, discovery instead. It is intended that the rule apply to any objection to a question or other issue arising during a deposition, and to any limitation imposed by the court in connection with a deposition, which might relate to duration or other matters.

The current rule places limitations on instructions that a witness not answer only when the instruction is made by a ‘‘party.’’ Similar limitations should apply with regard to anyone who might purport to instruct a witness not to answer a question. Accordingly, the rule is amended to apply the limitation to instructions by any person. The amendment is not intended to confer new authority on nonparties to instruct witnesses to refuse to answer deposition questions. The amendment makes it clear that, whatever the legitimacy of giving such instructions, the nonparty is subject to the same limitations as parties.

Paragraph (2) imposes a presumptive durational limi-tation of one day of seven hours for any deposition. The Committee has been informed that overlong deposi-tions can result in undue costs and delays in some cir-cumstances. This limitation contemplates that there will be reasonable breaks during the day for lunch and other reasons, and that the only time to be counted is the time occupied by the actual deposition. For pur-poses of this durational limit, the deposition of each person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) should be consid-ered a separate deposition. The presumptive duration may be extended, or otherwise altered, by agreement. Absent agreement, a court order is needed. The party seeking a court order to extend the examination, or otherwise alter the limitations, is expected to show good cause to justify such an order.

Parties considering extending the time for a deposi-tion—and courts asked to order an extension—might consider a variety of factors. For example, if the wit-ness needs an interpreter, that may prolong the exam-ination. If the examination will cover events occurring over a long period of time, that may justify allowing additional time. In cases in which the witness will be questioned about numerous or lengthy documents, it is


often desirable for the interrogating party to send cop-ies of the documents to the witness sufficiently in ad-vance of the deposition so that the witness can become familiar with them. Should the witness nevertheless not read the documents in advance, thereby prolonging the deposition, a court could consider that a reason for extending the time limit. If the examination reveals that documents have been requested but not produced, that may justify further examination once production has occurred. In multi-party cases, the need for each party to examine the witness may warrant additional time, although duplicative questioning should be avoid-ed and parties with similar interests should strive to designate one lawyer to question about areas of com-mon interest. Similarly, should the lawyer for the wit-ness want to examine the witness, that may require ad-ditional time. Finally, with regard to expert witnesses, there may more often be a need for additional time— even after the submission of the report required by Rule 26(a)(2)—for full exploration of the theories upon which the witness relies.

It is expected that in most instances the parties and the witness will make reasonable accommodations to avoid the need for resort to the court. The limitation is phrased in terms of a single day on the assumption that ordinarily a single day would be preferable to a deposition extending over multiple days; if alternative arrangements would better suit the parties, they may agree to them. It is also assumed that there will be rea-sonable breaks during the day. Preoccupation with tim-ing is to be avoided.

The rule directs the court to allow additional time where consistent with Rule 26(b)(2) if needed for a fair examination of the deponent. In addition, if the depo-nent or another person impedes or delays the examina-tion, the court must authorize extra time. The amend-ment makes clear that additional time should also be allowed where the examination is impeded by an ‘‘other circumstance,’’ which might include a power outage, a health emergency, or other event.

In keeping with the amendment to Rule 26(b)(2), the provision added in 1993 granting authority to adopt a local rule limiting the time permitted for depositions has been removed. The court may enter a case-specific order directing shorter depositions for all depositions in a case or with regard to a specific witness. The court may also order that a deposition be taken for limited periods on several days.

Paragraph (3) includes sanctions provisions formerly included in paragraph (2). It authorizes the court to im-pose an appropriate sanction on any person responsible for an impediment that frustrated the fair examination of the deponent. This could include the deponent, any party, or any other person involved in the deposition. If the impediment or delay results from an ‘‘other cir-cumstance’’ under paragraph (2), ordinarily no sanction would be appropriate.

Former paragraph (3) has been renumbered (4) but is otherwise unchanged.

Subdivision (f)(1). This subdivision is amended because Rule 5(d) has been amended to direct that discovery materials, including depositions, ordinarily should not be filed. The rule already has provisions directing that the lawyer who arranged for the transcript or recording preserve the deposition. Rule 5(d) provides that, once the deposition is used in the proceeding, the attorney must file it with the court.

‘‘Shall’’ is replaced by ‘‘must’’ or ‘‘may’’ under the program to conform amended rules to current style conventions when there is no ambiguity.

GAP Report. The Advisory Committee recommends deleting the requirement in the published proposed amendments that the deponent consent to extending a deposition beyond one day, and adding an amendment to Rule 30(f)(1) to conform to the published amendment to Rule 5(d) regarding filing of depositions. It also rec-ommends conforming the Committee Note with regard to the deponent veto, and adding material to the Note to provide direction on computation of the durational limitation on depositions, to provide examples of situa-

tions in which the parties might agree—or the court order—that a deposition be extended, and to make clear that no new authority to instruct a witness is conferred by the amendment. One minor wording improvement in the Note is also suggested.



The right to arrange a deposition transcription should be open to any party, regardless of the means of recording and regardless of who noticed the deposition.

‘‘[O]ther entity’’ is added to the list of organizations that may be named as deponent. The purpose is to en-sure that the deposition process can be used to reach information known or reasonably available to an orga-nization no matter what abstract fictive concept is used to describe the organization. Nothing is gained by wrangling over the place to fit into current rule lan-guage such entities as limited liability companies, lim-ited partnerships, business trusts, more exotic com-mon-law creations, or forms developed in other coun-tries.

Rule 31. Depositions by Written Questions

(a) WHEN A DEPOSITION MAY BE TAKEN. (1) Without Leave. A party may, by written

questions, depose any person, including a party, without leave of court except as pro-vided in Rule 31(a)(2). The deponent’s attend-ance may be compelled by subpoena under Rule 45.

(2) With Leave. A party must obtain leave of court, and the court must grant leave to the extent consistent with Rule 26(b)(2):

(A) if the parties have not stipulated to the deposition and:

(i) the deposition would result in more than 10 depositions being taken under this rule or Rule 30 by the plaintiffs, or by the defendants, or by the third-party defend-ants;

(ii) the deponent has already been de-posed in the case; or

(iii) the party seeks to take a deposition before the time specified in Rule 26(d); or

(B) if the deponent is confined in prison.

(3) Service; Required Notice. A party who wants to depose a person by written questions must serve them on every other party, with a notice stating, if known, the deponent’s name and address. If the name is unknown, the no-tice must provide a general description suffi-cient to identify the person or the particular class or group to which the person belongs. The notice must also state the name or de-scriptive title and the address of the officer before whom the deposition will be taken.

(4) Questions Directed to an Organization. A public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, or a governmental agency may be deposed by written questions in accordance with Rule 30(b)(6).

(5) Questions from Other Parties. Any ques-tions to the deponent from other parties must be served on all parties as follows: cross-ques-tions, within 14 days after being served with the notice and direct questions; redirect ques-tions, within 7 days after being served with


cross-questions; and recross-questions, within 7 days after being served with redirect ques-tions. The court may, for good cause, extend or shorten these times.

(b) DELIVERY TO THE OFFICER; OFFICER’S DU-TIES. The party who noticed the deposition must deliver to the officer a copy of all the questions served and of the notice. The officer must promptly proceed in the manner provided in Rule 30(c), (e), and (f) to:

(1) take the deponent’s testimony in re-sponse to the questions;

(2) prepare and certify the deposition; and (3) send it to the party, attaching a copy of

the questions and of the notice.

(c) NOTICE OF COMPLETION OR FILING. (1) Completion. The party who noticed the

deposition must notify all other parties when it is completed.

(2) Filing. A party who files the deposition must promptly notify all other parties of the filing.

(As amended Mar. 30, 1970, eff. July 1, 1970; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007.)


This rule is in accordance with common practice. In most of the states listed in the Note to Rule 26(a), pro-visions similar to this rule will be found in the statutes which in their respective statutory compilations follow those cited in the Note to Rule 26(a).


Confusion is created by the use of the same terminol-ogy to describe both the taking of a deposition upon ‘‘written interrogatories’’ pursuant to this rule and the serving of ‘‘written interrogatories’’ upon parties pur-suant to Rule 33. The distinction between these two modes of discovery will be more readily and clearly grasped through substitution of the word ‘‘questions’’ for ‘‘interrogatories’’ throughout this rule.

Subdivision (a). A new paragraph is inserted at the be-ginning of this subdivision to conform to the rearrange-ment of provisions in Rules 26(a), 30(a), and 30(b).

The revised subdivision permits designation of the deponent by general description or by class or group. This conforms to the practice for depositions on oral examination.

The new procedure provided in Rule 30(b)(6) for tak-ing the deposition of a corporation or other organiza-tion through persons designated by the organization is incorporated by reference.

The service of all questions, including cross, redirect, and recross, is to be made on all parties. This will in-form the parties and enable them to participate fully in the procedure.

The time allowed for service of cross, redirect, and recross questions has been extended. Experience with the existing time limits shows them to be unrealisti-cally short. No special restriction is placed on the time for serving the notice of taking the deposition and the first set of questions. Since no party is required to serve cross questions less than 30 days after the notice and questions are served, the defendant has sufficient time to obtain counsel. The court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the time.

Subdivision (d). Since new Rule 26(c) provides for pro-tective orders with respect to all discovery, and ex-pressly provides that the court may order that one dis-covery device be used in place of another, subdivision (d) is eliminated as unnecessary.




Subdivision (a). The first paragraph of subdivision (a) is divided into two subparagraphs, with provisions com-parable to those made in the revision of Rule 30. Changes are made in the former third paragraph, num-bered in the revision as paragraph (4), to reduce the total time for developing cross-examination, redirect, and recross questions from 50 days to 28 days.



The party who noticed a deposition on written ques-tions must notify all other parties when the deposition is completed, so that they may make use of the deposi-tion. A deposition is completed when it is recorded and the deponent has either waived or exercised the right of review under Rule 30(e)(1).

Rule 32. Using Depositions in Court Proceedings

(a) USING DEPOSITIONS. (1) In General. At a hearing or trial, all or

part of a deposition may be used against a party on these conditions:

(A) the party was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or had reason-able notice of it;

(B) it is used to the extent it would be ad-missible under the Federal Rules of Evidence if the deponent were present and testifying; and

(C) the use is allowed by Rule 32(a)(2) through (8).

(2) Impeachment and Other Uses. Any party may use a deposition to contradict or impeach the testimony given by the deponent as a wit-ness, or for any other purpose allowed by the Federal Rules of Evidence.

(3) Deposition of Party, Agent, or Designee. An adverse party may use for any purpose the deposition of a party or anyone who, when de-posed, was the party’s officer, director, man-aging agent, or designee under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4).

(4) Unavailable Witness. A party may use for any purpose the deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, if the court finds:

(A) that the witness is dead; (B) that the witness is more than 100 miles

from the place of hearing or trial or is out-side the United States, unless it appears that the witness’s absence was procured by the party offering the deposition;

(C) that the witness cannot attend or tes-tify because of age, illness, infirmity, or im-prisonment;

(D) that the party offering the deposition could not procure the witness’s attendance by subpoena; or

(E) on motion and notice, that exceptional circumstances make it desirable—in the in-terest of justice and with due regard to the importance of live testimony in open court— to permit the deposition to be used.


(5) Limitations on Use. (A) Deposition Taken on Short Notice. A dep-

osition must not be used against a party who, having received less than 14 days’ no-tice of the deposition, promptly moved for a protective order under Rule 26(c)(1)(B) re-questing that it not be taken or be taken at a different time or place—and this motion was still pending when the deposition was taken.

(B) Unavailable Deponent; Party Could Not Obtain an Attorney. A deposition taken with-out leave of court under the unavailability provision of Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(iii) must not be used against a party who shows that, when served with the notice, it could not, despite diligent efforts, obtain an attorney to rep-resent it at the deposition.

(6) Using Part of a Deposition. If a party offers in evidence only part of a deposition, an ad-verse party may require the offeror to intro-duce other parts that in fairness should be considered with the part introduced, and any party may itself introduce any other parts.

(7) Substituting a Party. Substituting a party under Rule 25 does not affect the right to use a deposition previously taken.

(8) Deposition Taken in an Earlier Action. A deposition lawfully taken and, if required, filed in any federal- or state-court action may be used in a later action involving the same subject matter between the same parties, or their representatives or successors in interest, to the same extent as if taken in the later ac-tion. A deposition previously taken may also be used as allowed by the Federal Rules of Evi-dence.

(b) OBJECTIONS TO ADMISSIBILITY. Subject to Rules 28(b) and 32(d)(3), an objection may be made at a hearing or trial to the admission of any deposition testimony that would be inad-missible if the witness were present and testify-ing.

(c) FORM OF PRESENTATION. Unless the court orders otherwise, a party must provide a tran-script of any deposition testimony the party of-fers, but may provide the court with the testi-mony in nontranscript form as well. On any par-ty’s request, deposition testimony offered in a jury trial for any purpose other than impeach-ment must be presented in nontranscript form, if available, unless the court for good cause or-ders otherwise.

(d) WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS. (1) To the Notice. An objection to an error or

irregularity in a deposition notice is waived unless promptly served in writing on the party giving the notice.

(2) To the Officer’s Qualification. An objection based on disqualification of the officer before whom a deposition is to be taken is waived if not made:

(A) before the deposition begins; or (B) promptly after the basis for disquali-

fication becomes known or, with reasonable diligence, could have been known.

(3) To the Taking of the Deposition. (A) Objection to Competence, Relevance, or

Materiality. An objection to a deponent’s competence—or to the competence, rel-

evance, or materiality of testimony—is not waived by a failure to make the objection before or during the deposition, unless the ground for it might have been corrected at that time.

(B) Objection to an Error or Irregularity. An objection to an error or irregularity at an oral examination is waived if:

(i) it relates to the manner of taking the deposition, the form of a question or an-swer, the oath or affirmation, a party’s conduct, or other matters that might have been corrected at that time; and

(ii) it is not timely made during the dep-osition.

(C) Objection to a Written Question. An ob-jection to the form of a written question under Rule 31 is waived if not served in writ-ing on the party submitting the question within the time for serving responsive ques-tions or, if the question is a recross-ques-tion, within 7 days after being served with it.

(4) To Completing and Returning the Deposi-tion. An objection to how the officer tran-scribed the testimony—or prepared, signed, certified, sealed, endorsed, sent, or otherwise dealt with the deposition—is waived unless a motion to suppress is made promptly after the error or irregularity becomes known or, with reasonable diligence, could have been known.

(As amended Mar. 30, 1970, eff. July 1, 1970; Nov. 20, 1972, eff. July 1, 1975; Apr. 29, 1980, eff. Aug. 1, 1980; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.)


This rule is in accordance with common practice. In most of the states listed in the Note to Rule 26, provi-sions similar to this rule will be found in the statutes which in their respective statutory compilations follow those cited in the Note to Rule 26.


As part of the rearrangement of the discovery rules, existing subdivisions (d), (e), and (f) of Rule 26 are transferred to Rule 32 as new subdivisions (a), (b), and (c). The provisions of Rule 32 are retained as subdivi-sion (d) of Rule 32 with appropriate changes in the let-tering and numbering of subheadings. The new rule is given a suitable new title. A beneficial byproduct of the rearrangement is that provisions which are naturally related to one another are placed in one rule.

A change is made in new Rule 32(a), whereby it is made clear that the rules of evidence are to be applied to depositions offered at trial as though the deponent were then present and testifying at trial. This elimi-nates the possibility of certain technical hearsay objec-tions which are based, not on the contents of depo-nent’s testimony, but on his absence from court. The language of present Rule 26(d) does not appear to au-thorize these technical objections, but it is not entirely clear. Note present Rule 26(e), transferred to Rule 32(b); see 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 164–166 (Wright ed. 1961).

An addition in Rule 32(a)(2) provides for use of a depo-sition of a person designated by a corporation or other organization, which is a party, to testify on its behalf. This complements the new procedure for taking the deposition of a corporation or other organization pro-vided in Rules 30(b)(6) and 31(a). The addition is appro-


priate, since the deposition is in substance and effect that of the corporation or other organization which is a party.

A change is made in the standard under which a party offering part of a deposition in evidence may be re-quired to introduce additional parts of the deposition. The new standard is contained in a proposal made by the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence. See Rule 1–07 and accompanying Note, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates 21–22 (March, 1969).

References to other rules are changed to conform to the rearrangement, and minor verbal changes have been made for clarification. The time for objecting to written questions served under Rule 31 is slightly ex-tended.


Subdivision (e). The concept of ‘‘making a person one’s own witness’’ appears to have had significance prin-cipally in two respects: impeachment and waiver of in-competency. Neither retains any vitality under the Rules of Evidence. The old prohibition against im-peaching one’s own witness is eliminated by Evidence Rule 607. The lack of recognition in the Rules of Evi-dence of state rules of incompetency in the Dead Man’s area renders it unnecessary to consider aspects of waiv-er arising from calling the incompetent party witness. Subdivision (c) is deleted because it appears to be no longer necessary in the light of the Rules of Evidence.


Subdivision (a)(1). Rule 801(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a prior inconsistent statement of a witness in a deposition to be used as substantive evi-dence. And Rule 801(d)(2) makes the statement of an agent or servant admissible against the principal under the circumstances described in the Rule. The language of the present subdivision is, therefore, too narrow.

Subdivision (a)(4). The requirement that a prior action must have been dismissed before depositions taken for use in it can be used in a subsequent action was doubt-less an oversight, and the courts have ignored it. See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2150. The final sentence is added to reflect the fact that the Federal Rules of Evidence permit a broader use of depositions previously taken under certain cir-cumstances. For example, Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that if a witness is unavail-able, as that term is defined by the rule, his deposition in any earlier proceeding can be used against a party to the prior proceeding who had an opportunity and simi-lar motive to develop the testimony of the witness.


The amendment is technical. No substantive change is intended.


Subdivision (a). The last sentence of revised subdivi-sion (a) not only includes the substance of the provi-sions formerly contained in the second paragraph of Rule 30(b)(2), but adds a provision to deal with the situ-ation when a party, receiving minimal notice of a pro-posed deposition, is unable to obtain a court ruling on its motion for a protective order seeking to delay or change the place of the deposition. Ordinarily a party does not obtain protection merely by the filing of a mo-tion for a protective order under Rule 26(c); any protec-tion is dependent upon the court’s ruling. Under the re-vision, a party receiving less than 11 days notice of a deposition can, provided its motion for a protective order is filed promptly, be spared the risks resulting from nonattendance at the deposition held before its motion is ruled upon. Although the revision of Rule

32(a) covers only the risk that the deposition could be used against the non-appearing movant, it should also follow that, when the proposed deponent is the movant, the deponent would have ‘‘just cause’’ for failing to ap-pear for purposes of Rule 37(d)(1). Inclusion of this pro-vision is not intended to signify that 11 days’ notice is the minimum advance notice for all depositions or that greater than 10 days should necessarily be deemed suffi-cient in all situations.

Subdivision (c). This new subdivision, inserted at the location of a subdivision previously abrogated, is in-cluded in view of the increased opportunities for video- recording and audio-recording of depositions under re-vised Rule 30(b). Under this rule a party may offer dep-osition testimony in any of the forms authorized under Rule 30(b) but, if offering it in a nonstenographic form, must provide the court with a transcript of the por-tions so offered. On request of any party in a jury trial, deposition testimony offered other than for impeach-ment purposes is to be presented in a nonstenographic form if available, unless the court directs otherwise. Note that under Rule 26(a)(3)(B) a party expecting to use nonstenographic deposition testimony as sub-stantive evidence is required to provide other parties with a transcript in advance of trial.



Former Rule 32(a) applied ‘‘[a]t the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding.’’ The amended rule describes the same events as ‘‘a hear-ing or trial.’’

The final paragraph of former Rule 32(a) allowed use in a later action of a deposition ‘‘lawfully taken and duly filed in the former action.’’ Because of the 2000 amendment of Rule 5(d), many depositions are not filed. Amended Rule 32(a)(8) reflects this change by ex-cluding use of an unfiled deposition only if filing was required in the former action.


The times set in the former rule at less than 11 days and within 5 days have been revised to 14 days and 7 days. See the Note to Rule 6.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Evidence, referred to in subd. (a)(2), (8), are set out in this Appendix.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF AMENDMENT PROPOSED NOVEMBER 20, 1972

Amendment of this rule embraced by the order en-tered by the Supreme Court of the United States on No-vember 20, 1972, effective on the 180th day beginning after January 2, 1975, see section 3 of Pub. L. 93–595, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1959, set out as a note under sec-tion 2074 of this title.

Rule 33. Interrogatories to Parties

(a) IN GENERAL. (1) Number. Unless otherwise stipulated or

ordered by the court, a party may serve on any other party no more than 25 written inter-rogatories, including all discrete subparts. Leave to serve additional interrogatories may be granted to the extent consistent with Rule 26(b)(2).

(2) Scope. An interrogatory may relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b). An interrogatory is not objection-able merely because it asks for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the applica-tion of law to fact, but the court may order


that the interrogatory need not be answered until designated discovery is complete, or until a pretrial conference or some other time.

(b) ANSWERS AND OBJECTIONS. (1) Responding Party. The interrogatories

must be answered: (A) by the party to whom they are di-

rected; or (B) if that party is a public or private cor-

poration, a partnership, an association, or a governmental agency, by any officer or agent, who must furnish the information available to the party.

(2) Time to Respond. The responding party must serve its answers and any objections within 30 days after being served with the in-terrogatories. A shorter or longer time may be stipulated to under Rule 29 or be ordered by the court.

(3) Answering Each Interrogatory. Each inter-rogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.

(4) Objections. The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specific-ity. Any ground not stated in a timely objec-tion is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.

(5) Signature. The person who makes the an-swers must sign them, and the attorney who objects must sign any objections.

(c) USE. An answer to an interrogatory may be used to the extent allowed by the Federal Rules of Evidence.

(d) OPTION TO PRODUCE BUSINESS RECORDS. If the answer to an interrogatory may be deter-mined by examining, auditing, compiling, ab-stracting, or summarizing a party’s business records (including electronically stored informa-tion), and if the burden of deriving or ascer-taining the answer will be substantially the same for either party, the responding party may answer by:

(1) specifying the records that must be re-viewed, in sufficient detail to enable the inter-rogating party to locate and identify them as readily as the responding party could; and

(2) giving the interrogating party a reason-able opportunity to examine and audit the records and to make copies, compilations, ab-stracts, or summaries.

(As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948; Mar. 30, 1970, eff. July 1, 1970; Apr. 29, 1980, eff. Aug. 1, 1980; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 12, 2006, eff. Dec. 1, 2006; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007.)


This rule restates the substance of [former] Equity Rule 58 (Discovery—Interrogatories—Inspection and Production of Documents—Admission of Execution or Genuineness), with modifications to conform to these rules.


The added second sentence in the first paragraph of Rule 33 conforms with a similar change in Rule 26(a) and will avoid litigation as to when the interrogatories may be served. Original Rule 33 does not state the times at which parties may serve written interrog-

atories upon each other. It has been the accepted view, however, that the times were the same in Rule 33 as those stated in Rule 26(a). United States v. American Sol-vents & Chemical Corp. of California (D.Del. 1939) 30 F.Supp. 107; Sheldon v. Great Lakes Transit Corp. (W.D.N.Y. 1942) 5 Fed.Rules Serv. 33.11, Case 3; Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1941) 42 F.Supp. 281; 2 Moore’s Federal Practice, (1938) 2621. The time within which leave of court must be secured by a plaintiff has been fixed at 10 days, in view of the fact that a defendant has 10 days within which to make ob-jections in any case, which should give him ample time to engage counsel and prepare.

Further in the first paragraph of Rule 33, the word ‘‘service’’ is substituted for ‘‘delivery’’ in conformance with the use of the word ‘‘serve’’ elsewhere in the rule and generally throughout the rules. See also Note to Rule 13(a) herein. The portion of the rule dealing with practice on objections has been revised so as to afford a clearer statement of the procedure. The addition of the words ‘‘to interrogatories to which objection is made’’ insures that only the answers to the objection-able interrogatories may be deferred, and that the an-swers to interrogatories not objectionable shall be forthcoming within the time prescribed in the rule. Under the original wording, answers to all interrog-atories may be withheld until objections, sometimes to but a few interrogatories, are determined. The amend-ment expedites the procedure of the rule and serves to eliminate the strike value of objections to minor inter-rogatories. The elimination of the last sentence of the original rule is in line with the policy stated subse-quently in this note.

The added second paragraph in Rule 33 contributes clarity and specificity as to the use and scope of inter-rogatories to the parties. The field of inquiry will be as broad as the scope of examination under Rule 26(b). There is no reason why interrogatories should be more limited than depositions, particularly when the former represent an inexpensive means of securing useful in-formation. See Hoffman v. Wilson Line, Inc. (E.D.Pa. 1946) 9 Fed.Rules Serv. 33.514, Case 2; Brewster v. Techni-color, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1941) 5 Fed.Rules Serv. 33.319, Case 3; Kingsway Press, Inc. v. Farrell Publishing Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1939) 30 F.Supp. 775. Under present Rule 33 some courts have unnecessarily restricted the breadth of inquiry on various grounds. See Auer v. Hershey Creamery Co. (D.N.J. 1939) 2 Fed.Rules Serv. 33.31, Case 2, 1 F.R.D. 14; Tudor v. Leslie (D.Mass. 1940) 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 33.324, Case 1. Other courts have read into the rule the requirement that interrogation should be directed only towards ‘‘important facts’’, and have tended to fix a more or less arbitrary limit as to the number of in-terrogatories which could be asked in any case. See Knox v. Alter (W.D.Pa. 1942) 6 Fed.Rules Serv. 33.352, Case 1; Byers Theaters, Inc. v. Murphy (W.D.Va. 1940) 3 Fed.Rules Serv. 33.31, Case 3, 1 F.R.D. 286; Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Laboratories, Inc. (D.Md. 1939) 30 F.Supp. 275. See also comment on these restrictions in Holtzoff, In-struments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil Proce-dure (1942) 41 Mich.L.Rev. 205, 216–217. Under amended Rule 33, the party interrogated is given the right to in-voke such protective orders under Rule 30(b) as are ap-propriate to the situation. At the same time, it is pro-vided that the number of or number of sets of interrog-atories to be served may not be limited arbitrarily or as a general policy to any particular number, but that a limit may be fixed only as justice requires to avoid annoyance, expense, embarrassment or oppression in individual cases. The party interrogated, therefore, must show the necessity for limitation on that basis. It will be noted that in accord with this change the last sentence of the present rule, restricting the sets of in-terrogatories to be served, has been stricken. In J. Schoeneman, Inc. v. Brauer (W.D.Mo. 1940) 3 Fed.Rules Serv. 33.31, Case 2, the court said: ‘‘Rule 33 . . . has been interpreted . . . as being just as broad in its impli-cations as in the case of depositions . . . It makes no difference therefore, how many interrogatories are pro-pounded. If the inquiries are pertinent the opposing


party cannot complain.’’ To the same effect, see Canuso v. City of Niagara Falls (W.D.N.Y. 1945) 8 Fed.Rules Serv. 33.352, Case 1; Hoffman v. Wilson Line, Inc., supra.

By virtue of express language in the added second paragraph of Rule 33, as amended, any uncertainty as to the use of the answers to interrogatories is removed. The omission of a provision on this score in the origi-nal rule has caused some difficulty. See, e.g., Bailey v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. (S.D.Cal. 1940) 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 33.46, Case 1.

The second sentence of the second paragraph in Rule 33, as amended, concerns the situation where a party wishes to serve interrogatories on a party after having taken his deposition, or vice versa. It has been held that an oral examination of a party, after the submis-sion to him and answer of interrogatories, would be permitted. Howard v. State Marine Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1940) 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 33.62, Case 1, 1 F.R.D. 499; Stevens v. Minder Construction Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1943) 7 Fed.Rules Serv. 30b.31, Case 2. But objections have been sustained to interrogatories served after the oral deposition of a party had been taken. McNally v. Simons (S.D.N.Y. 1940) 3 Fed.Rules Serv. 33.61, Case 1, 1 F.R.D. 254; Currier v. Currier (S.D.N.Y. 1942) 6 Fed.Rules Serv. 33.61, Case 1. Rule 33, as amended, permits either interrogatories after a deposition or a deposition after interrogatories. It may be quite desirable or necessary to elicit addi-tional information by the inexpensive method of inter-rogatories where a deposition has already been taken. The party to be interrogated, however, may seek a pro-tective order from the court under Rule 30(b) where the additional deposition or interrogation works a hardship or injustice on the party from whom it is sought.


Subdivision (a). The mechanics of the operation of Rule 33 are substantially revised by the proposed amendment, with a view to reducing court interven-tion. There is general agreement that interrogatories spawn a greater percentage of objections and motions than any other discovery device. The Columbia Survey shows that, although half of the litigants resorted to depositions and about one-third used interrogatories, about 65 percent of the objections were made with re-spect to interrogatories and 26 percent related to depo-sitions. See also Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 Yale L.J. 1132, 1144, 1151 (1951); Note, 36 Minn.L.Rev. 364, 379 (1952).

The procedures now provided in Rule 33 seem cal-culated to encourage objections and court motions. The time periods now allowed for responding to interrog-atories—15 days for answers and 10 days for objec-tions—are too short. The Columbia Survey shows that tardy response to interrogatories is common, virtually expected. The same was reported in Speck, supra, 60 Yale L.J. 1132, 1144. The time pressures tend to encour-age objections as a means of gaining time to answer.

The time for objections is even shorter than for an-swers, and the party runs the risk that if he fails to ob-ject in time he may have waived his objections. E.g., Cleminshaw v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 21 F.R.D. 300 (D.Del. 1957); see 4 Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 33.27 (2d ed. 1966); 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 372–373 (Wright ed. 1961). It often seems easier to object than to seek an extension of time. Unlike Rules 30(d) and 37(a), Rule 33 imposes no sanction of expenses on a party whose objections are clearly unjustified.

Rule 33 assures that the objections will lead directly to court, through its requirement that they be served with a notice of hearing. Although this procedure does preclude an out-of-court resolution of the dispute, the procedure tends to discourage informal negotiations. If answers are served and they are thought inadequate, the interrogating party may move under Rule 37(a) for an order compelling adequate answers. There is no as-surance that the hearing on objections and that on in-adequate answers will be heard together.

The amendment improves the procedure of Rule 33 in the following respects:

(1) The time allowed for response is increased to 30 days and this time period applies to both answers and objections, but a defendant need not respond in less than 45 days after service of the summons and com-plaint upon him. As is true under existing law, the re-sponding party who believes that some parts or all of the interrogatories are objectionable may choose to seek a protective order under new Rule 26(c) or may serve objections under this rule. Unless he applies for a protective order, he is required to serve answers or ob-jections in response to the interrogatories, subject to the sanctions provided in Rule 37(d). Answers and ob-jections are served together, so that a response to each interrogatory is encouraged, and any failure to respond is easily noted.

(2) In view of the enlarged time permitted for re-sponse, it is no longer necessary to require leave of court for service of interrogatories. The purpose of this requirement—that defendant have time to obtain coun-sel before a response must be made—is adequately ful-filled by the requirement that interrogatories be served upon a party with or after service of the summons and complaint upon him.

Some would urge that the plaintiff nevertheless not be permitted to serve interrogatories with the com-plaint. They fear that a routine practice might be in-vited, whereby form interrogatories would accompany most complaints. More fundamentally, they feel that, since very general complaints are permitted in present- day pleading, it is fair that the defendant have a right to take the lead in serving interrogatories. (These views apply also to Rule 36.) The amendment of Rule 33 rejects these views, in favor of allowing both parties to go forward with discovery, each free to obtain the in-formation he needs respecting the case.

(3) If objections are made, the burden is on the inter-rogating party to move under Rule 37(a) for a court order compelling answers, in the course of which the court will pass on the objections. The change in the burden of going forward does not alter the existing ob-ligation of an objecting party to justify his objections. E.g., Pressley v. Boehlke, 33 F.R.D. 316 (W.D.N.C. 1963). If the discovering party asserts than an answer is incom-plete or evasive, again he may look to Rule 37(a) for re-lief, and he should add this assertion to his motion to overrule objections. There is no requirement that the parties consult informally concerning their differences, but the new procedure should encourage consultation, and the court may by local rule require it.

The proposed changes are similar in approach to those adopted by California in 1961. See Calif.Code Civ.Proc. § 2030(a). The experience of the Los Angeles Superior Court is informally reported as showing that the California amendment resulted in a significant re-duction in court motions concerning interrogatories. Rhode Island takes a similar approach. See R. 33, R.I.R.Civ.Proc. Official Draft, p. 74 (Boston Law Book Co.).

A change is made in subdivision (a) which is not re-lated to the sequence of procedures. The restriction to ‘‘adverse’’ parties is eliminated. The courts have gener-ally construed this restriction as precluding interrog-atories unless an issue between the parties is disclosed by the pleadings—even though the parties may have conflicting interests. E.g., Mozeika v. Kaufman Construc-tion Co., 25 F.R.D. 233 (E.D.Pa. 1960) (plaintiff and third- party defendant); Biddle v. Hutchinson, 24 F.R.D. 256 (M.D.Pa. 1959) (codefendants). The resulting distinc-tions have often been highly technical. In Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964), the Supreme Court rejected a contention that examination under Rule 35 could be had only against an ‘‘opposing’’ party, as not in keep-ing ‘‘with the aims of a liberal, nontechnical applica-tion of the Federal Rules.’’ 379 U.S. at 116. Eliminating the requirement of ‘‘adverse’’ parties from Rule 33 brings it into line with all other discovery rules.

A second change in subdivision (a) is the addition of the term ‘‘governmental agency’’ to the listing of orga-nizations whose answers are to be made by any officer or agent of the organization. This does not involve any


change in existing law. Compare the similar listing in Rule 30(b)(6).

The duty of a party to supplement his answers to in-terrogatories is governed by a new provision in Rule 26(e).

Subdivision (b). There are numerous and conflicting decisions on the question whether and to what extent interrogatories are limited to matters ‘‘of fact,’’ or may elicit opinions, contentions, and legal conclusions. Compare, e.g., Payer, Hewitt & Co. v. Bellanca Corp., 26 F.R.D. 219 (D.Del. 1960) (opinions bad); Zinsky v. New York Central R.R., 36 F.R.D. 680 (N.D.Ohio 1964) (factual opinion or contention good, but legal theory bad); United States v. Carter Products, Inc., 28 F.R.D. 373 (S.D.N.Y.1961) (factual contentions and legal theories bad) with Taylor v. Sound Steamship Lines, Inc., 100 F.Supp. 388 (D.Conn. 1951) (opinions good), Bynum v. United States, 36 F.R.D. 14 (E.D.La. 1964) (contentions as to facts constituting negligence good). For lists of the many conflicting authorities, see 4 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 33.17 (2d ed. 1966); 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Fed-eral Practice and Procedure § 768 (Wright ed. 1961).

Rule 33 is amended to provide that an interrogatory is not objectionable merely because it calls for an opin-ion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact. Efforts to draw sharp lines between facts and opinions have invariably been unsuccessful, and the clear trend of the cases is to permit ‘‘factual’’ opin-ions. As to requests for opinions or contentions that call for the application of law to fact, they can be most useful in narrowing and sharpening the issues, which is a major purpose of discovery. See Diversified Products Corp. v. Sports Center Co., 42 F.R.D. 3 (D.Md. 1967); Moore, supra; Field & McKusick, Maine Civil Practice § 26.18 (1959). On the other hand, under the new language interrogatories may not extend to issues of ‘‘pure law,’’ i.e., legal issues unrelated to the facts of the case. Cf. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Assn., Inc., 22 F.R.D. 300 (D.D.C. 1958).

Since interrogatories involving mixed questions of law and fact may create disputes between the parties which are best resolved after much or all of the other discovery has been completed, the court is expressly authorized to defer an answer. Likewise, the court may delay determination until pretrial conference, if it be-lieves that the dispute is best resolved in the presence of the judge.

The principal question raised with respect to the cases permitting such interrogatories is whether they reintroduce undesirable aspects of the prior pleading practice, whereby parties were chained to misconceived contentions or theories, and ultimate determination on the merits was frustrated. See James, The Revival of Bills of Particulars under the Federal Rules, 71 Harv.L.Rev. 1473 (1958). But there are few if any in-stances in the recorded cases demonstrating that such frustration has occurred. The general rule governing the use of answers to interrogatories is that under ordi-nary circumstances they do not limit proof. See e.g., McElroy v. United Air Lines, Inc., 21 F.R.D. 100 (W.D.Mo. 1967); Pressley v. Boehlke, 33 F.R.D. 316, 317 (W.D.N.C. 1963). Although in exceptional circumstances reliance on an answer may cause such prejudice that the court will hold the answering party bound to his answer, e.g., Zielinski v. Philadelphia Piers, Inc., 139 F.Supp. 408 (E.D.Pa. 1956), the interrogating party will ordinarily not be entitled to rely on the unchanging character of the answers he receives and cannot base prejudice on such reliance. The rule does not affect the power of a court to permit withdrawal or amendment of answers to interrogatories.

The use of answers to interrogatories at trial is made subject to the rules of evidence. The provisions govern-ing use of depositions, to which Rule 33 presently re-fers, are not entirely apposite to answers to interrog-atories, since deposition practice contemplates that all parties will ordinarily participate through cross-exam-ination. See 4 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 33.29[1] (2 ed. 1966).

Certain provisions are deleted from subdivision (b) because they are fully covered by new Rule 26(c) provid-

ing for protective orders and Rules 26(a) and 26(d). The language of the subdivision is thus simplified without any change of substance.

Subdivision (c). This is a new subdivision, adopted from Calif.Code Civ.Proc. § 2030(c), relating especially to interrogatories which require a party to engage in burdensome or expensive research into his own business records in order to give an answer. The subdivision gives the party an option to make the records available and place the burden of research on the party who seeks the information. ‘‘This provision, without under-mining the liberal scope of interrogatory discovery, places the burden of discovery upon its potential bene-fitee,’’ Louisell, Modern California Discovery, 124–125 (1963), and alleviates a problem which in the past has troubled Federal courts. See Speck, The Use of Discov-ery in United States District Courts, 60 Yale L.J. 1132, 1142–1144 (1951). The interrogating party is protected against abusive use of this provision through the re-quirement that the burden of ascertaining the answer be substantially the same for both sides. A respondent may not impose on an interrogating party a mass of records as to which research is feasible only for one fa-miliar with the records. At the same time, the respond-ent unable to invoke this subdivision does not on that account lose the protection available to him under new Rule 26(c) against oppressive or unduly burdensome or expensive interrogatories. And even when the respond-ent successfully invokes the subdivision, the court is not deprived of its usual power, in appropriate cases, to require that the interrogating party reimburse the re-spondent for the expense of assembling his records and making them intelligible.


Subdivision (c). The Committee is advised that parties upon whom interrogatories are served have occasion-ally responded by directing the interrogating party to a mass of business records or by offering to make all of their records available, justifying the response by the option provided by this subdivision. Such practices are an abuse of the option. A party who is permitted by the terms of this subdivision to offer records for inspection in lieu of answering an interrogatory should offer them in a manner that permits the same direct and economi-cal access that is available to the party. If the informa-tion sought exists in the form of compilations, ab-stracts or summaries then available to the responding party, those should be made available to the interro-gating party. The final sentence is added to make it clear that a responding party has the duty to specify, by category and location, the records from which an-swers to interrogatories can be derived.


Purpose of Revision. The purpose of this revision is to reduce the frequency and increase the efficiency of in-terrogatory practice. The revision is based on experi-ence with local rules. For ease of reference, subdivision (a) is divided into two subdivisions and the remaining subdivisions renumbered.

Subdivision (a). Revision of this subdivision limits in-terrogatory practice. Because Rule 26(a)(1)–(3) requires disclosure of much of the information previously ob-tained by this form of discovery, there should be less occasion to use it. Experience in over half of the dis-trict courts has confirmed that limitations on the num-ber of interrogatories are useful and manageable. More-over, because the device can be costly and may be used as a means of harassment, it is desirable to subject its use to the control of the court consistent with the prin-ciples stated in Rule 26(b)(2), particularly in multi- party cases where it has not been unusual for the same interrogatory to be propounded to a party by more than one of its adversaries.

Each party is allowed to serve 25 interrogatories upon any other party, but must secure leave of court (or a


stipulation from the opposing party) to serve a larger number. Parties cannot evade this presumptive limita-tion through the device of joining as ‘‘subparts’’ ques-tions that seek information about discrete separate subjects. However, a question asking about commu-nications of a particular type should be treated as a single interrogatory even though it requests that the time, place, persons present, and contents be stated separately for each such communication.

As with the number of depositions authorized by Rule 30, leave to serve additional interrogatories is to be al-lowed when consistent with Rule 26(b)(2). The aim is not to prevent needed discovery, but to provide judicial scrutiny before parties make potentially excessive use of this discovery device. In many cases it will be appro-priate for the court to permit a larger number of inter-rogatories in the scheduling order entered under Rule 16(b).

Unless leave of court is obtained, interrogatories may not be served prior to the meeting of the parties under Rule 26(f).

When a case with outstanding interrogatories exceed-ing the number permitted by this rule is removed to federal court, the interrogating party must seek leave allowing the additional interrogatories, specify which twenty-five are to be answered, or resubmit interrog-atories that comply with the rule. Moreover, under Rule 26(d), the time for response would be measured from the date of the parties’ meeting under Rule 26(f). See Rule 81(c), providing that these rules govern proce-dures after removal.

Subdivision (b). A separate subdivision is made of the former second paragraph of subdivision (a). Language is added to paragraph (1) of this subdivision to emphasize the duty of the responding party to provide full an-swers to the extent not objectionable. If, for example, an interrogatory seeking information about numerous facilities or products is deemed objectionable, but an interrogatory seeking information about a lesser num-ber of facilities or products would not have been objec-tionable, the interrogatory should be answered with re-spect to the latter even though an objection is raised as to the balance of the facilities or products. Similarly, the fact that additional time may be needed to respond to some questions (or to some aspects of questions) should not justify a delay in responding to those ques-tions (or other aspects of questions) that can be an-swered within the prescribed time.

Paragraph (4) is added to make clear that objections must be specifically justified, and that unstated or un-timely grounds for objection ordinarily are waived. Note also the provisions of revised Rule 26(b)(5), which require a responding party to indicate when it is with-holding information under a claim of privilege or as trial preparation materials.

These provisions should be read in light of Rule 26(g), authorizing the court to impose sanctions on a party and attorney making an unfounded objection to an in-terrogatory.

Subdivisions (c) and (d). The provisions of former sub-divisions (b) and (c) are renumbered.


Rule 33(d) is amended to parallel Rule 34(a) by rec-ognizing the importance of electronically stored infor-mation. The term ‘‘electronically stored information’’ has the same broad meaning in Rule 33(d) as in Rule 34(a). Much business information is stored only in elec-tronic form; the Rule 33(d) option should be available with respect to such records as well.

Special difficulties may arise in using electronically stored information, either due to its form or because it is dependent on a particular computer system. Rule 33(d) allows a responding party to substitute access to documents or electronically stored information for an answer only if the burden of deriving the answer will be substantially the same for either party. Rule 33(d) states that a party electing to respond to an interrog-atory by providing electronically stored information must ensure that the interrogating party can locate

and identify it ‘‘as readily as can the party served,’’ and that the responding party must give the interro-gating party a ‘‘reasonable opportunity to examine, audit, or inspect’’ the information. Depending on the circumstances, satisfying these provisions with regard to electronically stored information may require the responding party to provide some combination of tech-nical support, information on application software, or other assistance. The key question is whether such sup-port enables the interrogating party to derive or ascer-tain the answer from the electronically stored informa-tion as readily as the responding party. A party that wishes to invoke Rule 33(d) by specifying electronically stored information may be required to provide direct access to its electronic information system, but only if that is necessary to afford the requesting party an ade-quate opportunity to derive or ascertain the answer to the interrogatory. In that situation, the responding party’s need to protect sensitive interests of confiden-tiality or privacy may mean that it must derive or as-certain and provide the answer itself rather than in-voke Rule 33(d).

Changes Made after Publication and Comment. No changes are made to the rule text. The Committee Note is changed to reflect the sensitivities that limit direct access by a requesting party to a responding party’s in-formation system. If direct access to the responding party’s system is the only way to enable a requesting party to locate and identify the records from which the answer may be ascertained, the responding party may choose to derive or ascertain the answer itself.



The final sentence of former Rule 33(a) was a redun-dant cross-reference to the discovery moratorium pro-visions of Rule 26(d). Rule 26(d) is now familiar, obviat-ing any need to carry forward the redundant cross-ref-erence.

Former Rule 33(b)(5) was a redundant reminder of Rule 37(a) procedure and is omitted as no longer useful.

Former Rule 33(c) stated that an interrogatory ‘‘is not necessarily objectionable merely because an answer * * * involves an opinion or contention * * *.’’ ‘‘[I]s not necessarily’’ seemed to imply that the interrogatory might be objectionable merely for this reason. This im-plication has been ignored in practice. Opinion and con-tention interrogatories are used routinely. Amended Rule 33(a)(2) embodies the current meaning of Rule 33 by omitting ‘‘necessarily.’’


REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Federal Rules of Evidence, referred to in subd. (c), are set out in this Appendix.

Rule 34. Producing Documents, Electronically Stored Information, and Tangible Things, or Entering onto Land, for Inspection and Other Purposes

(a) IN GENERAL. A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of Rule 26(b):

(1) to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in the re-sponding party’s possession, custody, or con-trol:

(A) any designated documents or electroni-cally stored information—including writ-ings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or


data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained ei-ther directly or, if necessary, after trans-lation by the responding party into a reason-ably usable form; or

(B) any designated tangible things; or

(2) to permit entry onto designated land or other property possessed or controlled by the responding party, so that the requesting party may inspect, measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample the property or any designated object or operation on it.

(b) PROCEDURE. (1) Contents of the Request. The request:

(A) must describe with reasonable particu-larity each item or category of items to be inspected;

(B) must specify a reasonable time, place, and manner for the inspection and for per-forming the related acts; and

(C) may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be produced.

(2) Responses and Objections. (A) Time to Respond. The party to whom

the request is directed must respond in writ-ing within 30 days after being served. A shorter or longer time may be stipulated to under Rule 29 or be ordered by the court.

(B) Responding to Each Item. For each item or category, the response must either state that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state an objection to the request, including the reasons.

(C) Objections. An objection to part of a re-quest must specify the part and permit in-spection of the rest.

(D) Responding to a Request for Production of Electronically Stored Information. The re-sponse may state an objection to a requested form for producing electronically stored in-formation. If the responding party objects to a requested form—or if no form was specified in the request—the party must state the form or forms it intends to use.

(E) Producing the Documents or Electroni-cally Stored Information. Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, these pro-cedures apply to producing documents or electronically stored information:

(i) A party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of busi-ness or must organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the re-quest;

(ii) If a request does not specify a form for producing electronically stored infor-mation, a party must produce it in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily main-tained or in a reasonably usable form or forms; and

(iii) A party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than one form.

(c) NONPARTIES. As provided in Rule 45, a non-party may be compelled to produce documents and tangible things or to permit an inspection.

(As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948; Mar. 30, 1970, eff. July 1, 1970; Apr. 29, 1980, eff. Aug.

1, 1980; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 30, 1991, eff. Dec. 1, 1991; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 12, 2006, eff. Dec. 1, 2006; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007.)


In England orders are made for the inspection of doc-uments, English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The An-nual Practice, 1937) O. 31, r.r. 14, et seq., or for the inspec-tion of tangible property or for entry upon land, O. 50, r.3. Michigan provides for inspection of damaged prop-erty when such damage is the ground of the action. Mich.Court Rules Ann. (Searl, 1933) Rule 41, § 2.

Practically all states have statutes authorizing the court to order parties in possession or control of docu-ments to permit other parties to inspect and copy them before trial. See Ragland, Discovery Before Trial (1932), Appendix, p. 267, setting out the statutes.

Compare [former] Equity Rule 58 (Discovery—Inter-rogatories—Inspection and Production of Documents— Admission of Execution or Genuineness) (fifth para-graph).


The changes in clauses (1) and (2) correlate the scope of inquiry permitted under Rule 34 with that provided in Rule 26(b), and thus remove any ambiguity created by the former differences in language. As stated in Olson Transportation Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (E.D.Wis. 1944) 8 Fed.Rules Serv. 34.41, Case 2, ‘‘. . . Rule 34 is a direct and simple method of discovery.’’ At the same time the addition of the words following the term ‘‘parties’’ makes certain that the person in whose custody, possession, or control the evidence reposes may have the benefit of the applicable protective or-ders stated in Rule 30(b). This change should be consid-ered in the light of the proposed expansion of Rule 30(b).

An objection has been made that the word ‘‘des-ignated’’ in Rule 34 has been construed with undue strictness in some district court cases so as to require great and impracticable specificity in the description of documents, papers, books, etc., sought to be in-spected. The Committee, however, believes that no amendment is needed, and that the proper meaning of ‘‘designated’’ as requiring specificity has already been delineated by the Supreme Court. See Brown v. United States (1928) 276 U.S. 134, 143 (‘‘The subpoena . . . speci-fies . . . with reasonable particularity the subjects to which the documents called for related.’’); Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont (1908) 207 U.S. 541, 543–544 (‘‘We see no reason why all such books, papers and cor-respondence which related to the subject of inquiry, and were described with reasonable detail, should not be called for and the company directed to produce them. Otherwise, the State would be compelled to des-ignate each particular paper which it desired, which presupposes an accurate knowledge of such papers, which the tribunal desiring the papers would probably rarely, if ever, have.’’).


Rule 34 is revised to accomplish the following major changes in the existing rule: (1) to eliminate the re-quirement of good cause; (2) to have the rule operate extrajudicially; (3) to include testing and sampling as well as inspecting or photographing tangible things; and (4) to make clear that the rule does not preclude an independent action for analogous discovery against persons not parties.

Subdivision (a). Good cause is eliminated because it has furnished an uncertain and erratic protection to the parties from whom production is sought and is now rendered unnecessary by virtue of the more specific provisions added to Rule 26(b) relating to materials as-sembled in preparation for trial and to experts retained or consulted by parties.


The good cause requirement was originally inserted in Rule 34 as a general protective provision in the ab-sence of experience with the specific problems that would arise thereunder. As the note to Rule 26(b)(3) on trial preparation materials makes clear, good cause has been applied differently to varying classes of docu-ments, though not without confusion. It has often been said in court opinions that good cause requires a con-sideration of need for the materials and of alternative means of obtaining them, i.e., something more than rel-evance and lack of privilege. But the overwhelming proportion of the cases in which the formula of good cause has been applied to require a special showing are those involving trial preparation. In practice, the courts have not treated documents as having a special immunity to discovery simply because of their being documents. Protection may be afforded to claims of privacy or secrecy or of undue burden or expense under what is now Rule 26(c) (previously Rule 30(b)). To be sure, an appraisal of ‘‘undue’’ burden inevitably entails consideration of the needs of the party seeking discov-ery. With special provisions added to govern trial prep-aration materials and experts, there is no longer any occasion to retain the requirement of good cause.

The revision of Rule 34 to have it operate extra-judicially, rather than by court order, is to a large ex-tent a reflection of existing law office practice. The Co-lumbia Survey shows that of the litigants seeking in-spection of documents or things, only about 25 percent filed motions for court orders. This minor fraction nev-ertheless accounted for a significant number of mo-tions. About half of these motions were uncontested and in almost all instances the party seeking produc-tion ultimately prevailed. Although an extrajudicial procedure will not drastically alter existing practice under Rule 34—it will conform to it in most cases—it has the potential of saving court time in a substantial though proportionately small number of cases tried an-nually.

The inclusion of testing and sampling of tangible things and objects or operations on land reflects a need frequently encountered by parties in preparation for trial. If the operation of a particular machine is the basis of a claim for negligent injury, it will often be necessary to test its operating parts or to sample and test the products it is producing. Cf. Mich.Gen.Ct.R. 310.1(1) (1963) (testing authorized).

The inclusive description of ‘‘documents’’ is revised to accord with changing technology. It makes clear that Rule 34 applies to electronic data compilations from which information can be obtained only with the use of detection devices, and that when the data can as a practical matter be made usable by the discovering party only through respondent’s devices, respondent may be required to use his devices to translate the data into usable form. In many instances, this means that respondent will have to supply a print-out of computer data. The burden thus placed on respondent will vary from case to case, and the courts have ample power under Rule 26(c) to protect respondent against undue burden of expense, either by restricting discovery or re-quiring that the discovering party pay costs. Similarly, if the discovering party needs to check the electronic source itself, the court may protect respondent with re-spect to preservation of his records, confidentially of nondiscoverable matters, and costs.

Subdivision (b). The procedure provided in Rule 34 is essentially the same as that in Rule 33, as amended, and the discussion in the note appended to that rule is relevant to Rule 34 as well. Problems peculiar to Rule 34 relate to the specific arrangements that must be worked out for inspection and related acts of copying, photographing, testing, or sampling. The rule provides that a request for inspection shall set forth the items to be inspected either by item or category, describing each with reasonable particularity, and shall specify a reasonable time, place, and manner of making the in-spection.

Subdivision (c). Rule 34 as revised continues to apply only to parties. Comments from the bar make clear

that in the preparation of cases for trial it is occasion-ally necessary to enter land or inspect large tangible things in the possession of a person not a party, and that some courts have dismissed independent actions in the nature of bills in equity for such discovery on the ground that Rule 34 is preemptive. While an ideal solu-tion to this problem is to provide for discovery against persons not parties in Rule 34, both the jurisdictional and procedural problems are very complex. For the present, this subdivision makes clear that Rule 34 does not preclude independent actions for discovery against persons not parties.


Subdivision (b). The Committee is advised that, ‘‘It is apparently not rare for parties deliberately to mix crit-ical documents with others in the hope of obscuring significance.’’ Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association (1977) 22. The sentence added by this subdivision follows the recommendation of the Report.


The amendment is technical. No substantive change is intended.


This amendment reflects the change effected by revi-sion of Rule 45 to provide for subpoenas to compel nonparties to produce documents and things and to submit to inspections of premises. The deletion of the text of the former paragraph is not intended to preclude an independent action for production of documents or things or for permission to enter upon land, but such actions may no longer be necessary in light of this revi-sion.


The rule is revised to reflect the change made by Rule 26(d), preventing a party from seeking formal dis-covery prior to the meeting of the parties required by Rule 26(f). Also, like a change made in Rule 33, the rule is modified to make clear that, if a request for produc-tion is objectionable only in part, production should be afforded with respect to the unobjectionable portions.

When a case with outstanding requests for production is removed to federal court, the time for response would be measured from the date of the parties’ meet-ing. See Rule 81(c), providing that these rules govern procedures after removal.


Subdivision (a). As originally adopted, Rule 34 focused on discovery of ‘‘documents’’ and ‘‘things.’’ In 1970, Rule 34(a) was amended to include discovery of data compilations, anticipating that the use of computer-ized information would increase. Since then, the growth in electronically stored information and in the variety of systems for creating and storing such infor-mation has been dramatic. Lawyers and judges inter-preted the term ‘‘documents’’ to include electronically stored information because it was obviously improper to allow a party to evade discovery obligations on the basis that the label had not kept pace with changes in information technology. But it has become increas-ingly difficult to say that all forms of electronically stored information, many dynamic in nature, fit within the traditional concept of a ‘‘document.’’ Electroni-cally stored information may exist in dynamic data-bases and other forms far different from fixed expres-sion on paper. Rule 34(a) is amended to confirm that discovery of electronically stored information stands on equal footing with discovery of paper documents. The change clarifies that Rule 34 applies to informa-


tion that is fixed in a tangible form and to information that is stored in a medium from which it can be re-trieved and examined. At the same time, a Rule 34 re-quest for production of ‘‘documents’’ should be under-stood to encompass, and the response should include, electronically stored information unless discovery in the action has clearly distinguished between electroni-cally stored information and ‘‘documents.’’

Discoverable information often exists in both paper and electronic form, and the same or similar informa-tion might exist in both. The items listed in Rule 34(a) show different ways in which information may be re-corded or stored. Images, for example, might be hard- copy documents or electronically stored information. The wide variety of computer systems currently in use, and the rapidity of technological change, counsel against a limiting or precise definition of electroni-cally stored information. Rule 34(a)(1) is expansive and includes any type of information that is stored elec-tronically. A common example often sought in discov-ery is electronic communications, such as e-mail. The rule covers—either as documents or as electronically stored information—information ‘‘stored in any me-dium,’’ to encompass future developments in computer technology. Rule 34(a)(1) is intended to be broad enough to cover all current types of computer-based informa-tion, and flexible enough to encompass future changes and developments.

References elsewhere in the rules to ‘‘electronically stored information’’ should be understood to invoke this expansive approach. A companion change is made to Rule 33(d), making it explicit that parties choosing to respond to an interrogatory by permitting access to responsive records may do so by providing access to electronically stored information. More generally, the term used in Rule 34(a)(1) appears in a number of other amendments, such as those to Rules 26(a)(1), 26(b)(2), 26(b)(5)(B), 26(f), 34(b), 37(f), and 45. In each of these rules, electronically stored information has the same broad meaning it has under Rule 34(a)(1). References to ‘‘documents’’ appear in discovery rules that are not amended, including Rules 30(f), 36(a), and 37(c)(2). These references should be interpreted to include electroni-cally stored information as circumstances warrant.

The term ‘‘electronically stored information’’ is broad, but whether material that falls within this term should be produced, and in what form, are separate questions that must be addressed under Rules 26(b), 26(c), and 34(b).

The Rule 34(a) requirement that, if necessary, a party producing electronically stored information translate it into reasonably usable form does not address the issue of translating from one human language to an-other. See In re Puerto Rico Elect. Power Auth., 687 F.2d 501, 504–510 (1st Cir. 1989).

Rule 34(a)(1) is also amended to make clear that par-ties may request an opportunity to test or sample ma-terials sought under the rule in addition to inspecting and copying them. That opportunity may be important for both electronically stored information and hard- copy materials. The current rule is not clear that such testing or sampling is authorized; the amendment ex-pressly permits it. As with any other form of discovery, issues of burden and intrusiveness raised by requests to test or sample can be addressed under Rules 26(b)(2) and 26(c). Inspection or testing of certain types of electroni-cally stored information or of a responding party’s electronic information system may raise issues of con-fidentiality or privacy. The addition of testing and sampling to Rule 34(a) with regard to documents and electronically stored information is not meant to cre-ate a routine right of direct access to a party’s elec-tronic information system, although such access might be justified in some circumstances. Courts should guard against undue intrusiveness resulting from in-specting or testing such systems.

Rule 34(a)(1) is further amended to make clear that tangible things must—like documents and land sought to be examined—be designated in the request.

Subdivision (b). Rule 34(b) provides that a party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course

of business or must organize and label them to cor-respond with the categories in the discovery request. The production of electronically stored information should be subject to comparable requirements to pro-tect against deliberate or inadvertent production in ways that raise unnecessary obstacles for the request-ing party. Rule 34(b) is amended to ensure similar pro-tection for electronically stored information.

The amendment to Rule 34(b) permits the requesting party to designate the form or forms in which it wants electronically stored information produced. The form of production is more important to the exchange of electronically stored information than of hard-copy materials, although a party might specify hard copy as the requested form. Specification of the desired form or forms may facilitate the orderly, efficient, and cost-ef-fective discovery of electronically stored information. The rule recognizes that different forms of production may be appropriate for different types of electronically stored information. Using current technology, for ex-ample, a party might be called upon to produce word processing documents, e-mail messages, electronic spreadsheets, different image or sound files, and mate-rial from databases. Requiring that such diverse types of electronically stored information all be produced in the same form could prove impossible, and even if pos-sible could increase the cost and burdens of producing and using the information. The rule therefore provides that the requesting party may ask for different forms of production for different types of electronically stored information.

The rule does not require that the requesting party choose a form or forms of production. The requesting party may not have a preference. In some cases, the re-questing party may not know what form the producing party uses to maintain its electronically stored infor-mation, although Rule 26(f)(3) is amended to call for discussion of the form of production in the parties’ prediscovery conference.

The responding party also is involved in determining the form of production. In the written response to the production request that Rule 34 requires, the respond-ing party must state the form it intends to use for pro-ducing electronically stored information if the request-ing party does not specify a form or if the responding party objects to a form that the requesting party speci-fies. Stating the intended form before the production occurs may permit the parties to identify and seek to resolve disputes before the expense and work of the pro-duction occurs. A party that responds to a discovery re-quest by simply producing electronically stored infor-mation in a form of its choice, without identifying that form in advance of the production in the response re-quired by Rule 34(b), runs a risk that the requesting party can show that the produced form is not reason-ably usable and that it is entitled to production of some or all of the information in an additional form. Additional time might be required to permit a respond-ing party to assess the appropriate form or forms of production.

If the requesting party is not satisfied with the form stated by the responding party, or if the responding party has objected to the form specified by the request-ing party, the parties must meet and confer under Rule 37(a)(2)(B) in an effort to resolve the matter before the requesting party can file a motion to compel. If they cannot agree and the court resolves the dispute, the court is not limited to the forms initially chosen by the requesting party, stated by the responding party, or specified in this rule for situations in which there is no court order or party agreement.

If the form of production is not specified by party agreement or court order, the responding party must produce electronically stored information either in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms that are reasonably usable. Rule 34(a) requires that, if necessary, a responding party ‘‘translate’’ information it produces into a ‘‘reasonably usable’’ form. Under some circumstances, the respond-ing party may need to provide some reasonable amount


of technical support, information on application soft-ware, or other reasonable assistance to enable the re-questing party to use the information. The rule does not require a party to produce electronically stored in-formation in the form it [sic] which it is ordinarily maintained, as long as it is produced in a reasonably usable form. But the option to produce in a reasonably usable form does not mean that a responding party is free to convert electronically stored information from the form in which it is ordinarily maintained to a dif-ferent form that makes it more difficult or burdensome for the requesting party to use the information effi-ciently in the litigation. If the responding party ordi-narily maintains the information it is producing in a way that makes it searchable by electronic means, the information should not be produced in a form that re-moves or significantly degrades this feature.

Some electronically stored information may be ordi-narily maintained in a form that is not reasonably usa-ble by any party. One example is ‘‘legacy’’ data that can be used only by superseded systems. The questions whether a producing party should be required to con-vert such information to a more usable form, or should be required to produce it at all, should be addressed under Rule 26(b)(2)(B).

Whether or not the requesting party specified the form of production, Rule 34(b) provides that the same electronically stored information ordinarily be pro-duced in only one form.

Changes Made after Publication and Comment. The pro-posed amendment recommended for approval has been modified from the published version. The sequence of ‘‘documents or electronically stored information’’ is changed to emphasize that the parenthetical exemplifi-cations apply equally to illustrate ‘‘documents’’ and ‘‘electronically stored information.’’ The reference to ‘‘detection devices’’ is deleted as redundant with ‘‘translated’’ and as archaic.

The references to the form of production are changed in the rule and Committee Note to refer also to ‘‘forms.’’ Different forms may be appropriate or nec-essary for different sources of information.

The published proposal allowed the requesting party to specify a form for production and recognized that the responding party could object to the requested form. This procedure is now amplified by directing that the responding party state the form or forms it intends to use for production if the request does not specify a form or if the responding party objects to the requested form.

The default forms of production to be used when the parties do not agree on a form and there is no court order are changed in part. As in the published proposal, one default form is ‘‘a form or forms in which [elec-tronically stored information] is ordinarily main-tained.’’ The alternative default form, however, is changed from ‘‘an electronically searchable form’’ to ‘‘a form or forms that are reasonably usable.’’ ‘‘[A]n electronically searchable form’’ proved to have several defects. Some electronically stored information cannot be searched electronically. In addition, there often are many different levels of electronic searchability—the published default would authorize production in a mini-mally searchable form even though more easily searched forms might be available at equal or less cost to the responding party.

The provision that absent court order a party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than one form was moved to become a separate item for the sake of emphasis.

The Committee Note was changed to reflect these changes in rule text, and also to clarify many aspects of the published Note. In addition, the Note was ex-panded to add a caveat to the published amendment that establishes the rule that documents—and now electronically stored information—may be tested and sampled as well as inspected and copied. Fears were ex-pressed that testing and sampling might imply routine direct access to a party’s information system. The Note states that direct access is not a routine right, ‘‘al-

though such access might be justified in some circum-stances.’’

The changes in the rule text since publication are set out below. [Omitted]



The final sentence in the first paragraph of former Rule 34(b) was a redundant cross-reference to the dis-covery moratorium provisions of Rule 26(d). Rule 26(d) is now familiar, obviating any need to carry forward the redundant cross-reference.

The redundant reminder of Rule 37(a) procedure in the second paragraph of former Rule 34(b) is omitted as no longer useful.


Rule 35. Physical and Mental Examinations

(a) ORDER FOR AN EXAMINATION. (1) In General. The court where the action is

pending may order a party whose mental or physical condition—including blood group—is in controversy to submit to a physical or men-tal examination by a suitably licensed or cer-tified examiner. The court has the same au-thority to order a party to produce for exam-ination a person who is in its custody or under its legal control.

(2) Motion and Notice; Contents of the Order. The order:

(A) may be made only on motion for good cause and on notice to all parties and the person to be examined; and

(B) must specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination, as well as the person or persons who will per-form it.

(b) EXAMINER’S REPORT. (1) Request by the Party or Person Examined.

The party who moved for the examination must, on request, deliver to the requester a copy of the examiner’s report, together with like reports of all earlier examinations of the same condition. The request may be made by the party against whom the examination order was issued or by the person examined.

(2) Contents. The examiner’s report must be in writing and must set out in detail the ex-aminer’s findings, including diagnoses, conclu-sions, and the results of any tests.

(3) Request by the Moving Party. After deliver-ing the reports, the party who moved for the examination may request—and is entitled to receive—from the party against whom the ex-amination order was issued like reports of all earlier or later examinations of the same con-dition. But those reports need not be delivered by the party with custody or control of the person examined if the party shows that it could not obtain them.

(4) Waiver of Privilege. By requesting and ob-taining the examiner’s report, or by deposing the examiner, the party examined waives any privilege it may have—in that action or any other action involving the same controversy— concerning testimony about all examinations of the same condition.


(5) Failure to Deliver a Report. The court on motion may order—on just terms—that a party deliver the report of an examination. If the report is not provided, the court may ex-clude the examiner’s testimony at trial.

(6) Scope. This subdivision (b) applies also to an examination made by the parties’ agree-ment, unless the agreement states otherwise. This subdivision does not preclude obtaining an examiner’s report or deposing an examiner under other rules.

(As amended Mar. 30, 1970, eff. July 1, 1970; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Pub. L. 100–690, title VII, § 7047(b), Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4401; Apr. 30, 1991, eff. Dec. 1, 1991; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007.)


Physical examination of parties before trial is au-thorized by statute or rule in a number of states. See Ariz.Rev.Code Ann. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4468; Mich.Court Rules Ann. (Searl, 1933) Rule 41, § 2; 2 N.J.Comp.Stat. (1910), N.Y.C.P.A. (1937) § 306; 1 S.D.Comp.Laws (1929) § 2716A; 3 Wash.Rev.Stat.Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 1230–1.

Mental examination of parties is authorized in Iowa. Iowa Code (1935) ch. 491–F1. See McCash, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Discovery and Its Present Status in Iowa, 20 Ia.L.Rev. 68 (1934).

The constitutionality of legislation providing for physical examination of parties was sustained in Lyon v. Manhattan Railway Co., 142 N.Y. 298, 37 N.E. 113 (1894), and McGovern v. Hope, 63 N.J.L. 76, 42 Atl. 830 (1899). In Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891), it was held that the court could not order the physical ex-amination of a party in the absence of statutory au-thority. But in Camden and Suburban Ry. Co. v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172 (1900) where there was statutory authority for such examination, derived from a state statute made operative by the conformity act, the practice was sustained. Such authority is now found in the present rule made operative by the Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, U.S.C., Title 28, §§ 723b [see 2072] (Rules in actions at law; Supreme Court authorized to make) and 723c [see 2072] (Union of equity and action at law rules; power of Supreme Court).


Subdivision (a). Rule 35(a) has hitherto provided only for an order requiring a party to submit to an examina-tion. It is desirable to extend the rule to provide for an order against the party for examination of a person in his custody or under his legal control. As appears from the provisions of amended Rule 37(b)(2) and the com-ment under that rule, an order to ‘‘produce’’ the third person imposes only an obligation to use good faith ef-forts to produce the person.

The amendment will settle beyond doubt that a par-ent or guardian suing to recover for injuries to a minor may be ordered to produce the minor for examination. Further, the amendment expressly includes blood ex-amination within the kinds of examinations that can be ordered under the rule. See Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940). Provisions similar to the amend-ment have been adopted in at least 10 States: Calif.Code Civ.Proc. § 2032; Ida.R.Civ.P. 35; Ill.S-H Ann. c. 110A, § 215; Md.R.P. 420; Mich.Gen. Ct.R. 311; Minn.R.Civ.P. 35; Mo.Vern.Ann.R.Civ.P. 60.01; N.Dak.R.Civ.P. 35; N.Y.C.P.L. § 3121; Wyo.R.Civ.P. 35.

The amendment makes no change in the require-ments of Rule 35 that, before a court order may issue, the relevant physical or mental condition must be shown to be ‘‘in controversy’’ and ‘‘good cause’’ must be shown for the examination. Thus, the amendment has no effect on the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964), stressing the importance of these requirements and ap-

plying them to the facts of the case. The amendment makes no reference to employees of a party. Provisions relating to employees in the State statutes and rules cited above appear to have been virtually unused.

Subdivision (b)(1). This subdivision is amended to cor-rect an imbalance in Rule 35(b)(1) as heretofore writ-ten. Under that text, a party causing a Rule 35(a) exam-ination to be made is required to furnish to the party examined, on request, a copy of the examining physi-cian’s report. If he delivers this copy, he is in turn enti-tled to receive from the party examined reports of all examinations of the same condition previously or later made. But the rule has not in terms entitled the exam-ined party to receive from the party causing the Rule 35(a) examination any reports of earlier examinations of the same condition to which the latter may have ac-cess. The amendment cures this defect. See La.Stat.Ann., Civ.Proc. art. 1495 (1960); Utah R.Civ.P.35(c).

The amendment specifies that the written report of the examining physician includes results of all tests made, such as results of X-rays and cardiograms. It also embodies changes required by the broadening of Rule 35(a) to take in persons who are not parties.

Subdivision (b)(3). This new subdivision removes any possible doubt that reports of examination may be ob-tained although no order for examination has been made under Rule 35(a). Examinations are very fre-quently made by agreement, and sometimes before the party examined has an attorney. The courts have uni-formly ordered that reports be supplied, see 4 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 35.06, n.1 (2d ed. 1966); 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 823, n. 22 (Wright ed. 1961), and it appears best to fill the tech-nical gap in the present rule.

The subdivision also makes clear that reports of ex-amining physicians are discoverable not only under Rule 35(b) but under other rules as well. To be sure, if the report is privileged, then discovery is not permis-sible under any rule other than Rule 35(b) and it is per-missible under Rule 35(b) only if the party requests a copy of the report of examination made by the other party’s doctor. Sher v. De Haven, 199 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied 345 U.S. 936 (1953). But if the report is unprivileged and is subject to discovery under the pro-visions of rules other than Rule 35(b)—such as Rules 34 or 26(b)(3) or (4)—discovery should not depend upon whether the person examined demands a copy of the re-port. Although a few cases have suggested the con-trary, e.g., Galloway v. National Dairy Products Corp., 24 F.R.D. 362 (E.D.Pa. 1959), the better considered district court decisions hold that Rule 35(b) is not preemptive. E.g., Leszynski v. Russ, 29 F.R.D. 10, 12 (D.Md. 1961) and cases cited. The question was recently given full con-sideration in Buffington v. Wood, 351 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1965), holding that Rule 35(b) is not preemptive.




The revision authorizes the court to require physical or mental examinations conducted by any person who is suitably licensed or certified.

The rule was revised in 1988 by Congressional enact-ment to authorize mental examinations by licensed clinical psychologists. This revision extends that amendment to include other certified or licensed pro-fessionals, such as dentists or occupational therapists, who are not physicians or clinical psychologists, but who may be well-qualified to give valuable testimony about the physical or mental condition that is the sub-ject of dispute.

The requirement that the examiner be suitably li-censed or certified is a new requirement. The court is thus expressly authorized to assess the credentials of


the examiner to assure that no person is subjected to a court-ordered examination by an examiner whose tes-timony would be of such limited value that it would be unjust to require the person to undergo the invasion of privacy associated with the examination. This author-ity is not wholly new, for under the former rule, the court retained discretion to refuse to order an examina-tion, or to restrict an examination. 8 WRIGHT & MIL-LER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2234 (1986 Supp.). The revision is intended to encourage the exer-cise of this discretion, especially with respect to exami-nations by persons having narrow qualifications.

The court’s responsibility to determine the suit-ability of the examiner’s qualifications applies even to a proposed examination by a physician. If the proposed examination and testimony calls for an expertise that the proposed examiner does not have, it should not be ordered, even if the proposed examiner is a physician. The rule does not, however, require that the license or certificate be conferred by the jurisdiction in which the examination is conducted.



AMENDMENT BY PUBLIC LAW

1988—Subd. (a). Pub. L. 100–690, § 7047(b)(1), sub-stituted ‘‘physical examination by a physician, or men-tal examination by a physician or psychologist’’ for ‘‘physical or mental examination by a physician’’.

Subd. (b). Pub. L. 100–690, § 7047(b)(2), inserted ‘‘or psy-chologist’’ in heading, in two places in par. (1), and in two places in par. (3).

Subd. (c). Pub. L. 100–690, § 7047(b)(3), added subd. (c).

Rule 36. Requests for Admission

(a) SCOPE AND PROCEDURE. (1) Scope. A party may serve on any other

party a written request to admit, for purposes of the pending action only, the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) relat-ing to:

(A) facts, the application of law to fact, or opinions about either; and

(B) the genuineness of any described docu-ments.

(2) Form; Copy of a Document. Each matter must be separately stated. A request to admit the genuineness of a document must be accom-panied by a copy of the document unless it is, or has been, otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and copying.

(3) Time to Respond; Effect of Not Responding. A matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the re-quest is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney. A shorter or longer time for respond-ing may be stipulated to under Rule 29 or be ordered by the court.

(4) Answer. If a matter is not admitted, the answer must specifically deny it or state in detail why the answering party cannot truth-fully admit or deny it. A denial must fairly re-spond to the substance of the matter; and when good faith requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of a matter, the answer must specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the rest. The answering party

may assert lack of knowledge or information as a reason for failing to admit or deny only if the party states that it has made reasonable inquiry and that the information it knows or can readily obtain is insufficient to enable it to admit or deny.

(5) Objections. The grounds for objecting to a request must be stated. A party must not ob-ject solely on the ground that the request pre-sents a genuine issue for trial.

(6) Motion Regarding the Sufficiency of an An-swer or Objection. The requesting party may move to determine the sufficiency of an an-swer or objection. Unless the court finds an objection justified, it must order that an an-swer be served. On finding that an answer does not comply with this rule, the court may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served. The court may defer its final decision until a pretrial con-ference or a specified time before trial. Rule 37(a)(5) applies to an award of expenses.

(b) EFFECT OF AN ADMISSION; WITHDRAWING OR AMENDING IT. A matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended. Subject to Rule 16(e), the court may permit withdrawal or amendment if it would promote the presentation of the merits of the action and if the court is not persuaded that it would prejudice the requesting party in main-taining or defending the action on the merits. An admission under this rule is not an admis-sion for any other purpose and cannot be used against the party in any other proceeding.

(As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948; Mar. 30, 1970, eff. July 1, 1970; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007.)


Compare similar rules: [Former] Equity Rule 58 (last paragraph, which provides for the admission of the exe-cution and genuineness of documents); English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 32; Ill.Rev.Stat. (1937) ch. 110, § 182 and Rule 18 (Ill.Rev.Stat. (1937) ch. 110, § 259.18); 2 Mass.Gen.Laws (Ter.Ed., 1932) ch. 231, § 69; Mich.Court Rules Ann. (Searl, 1933) Rule 42; N.J.Comp.Stat. (2 Cum.Supp. 1911–1924) N.Y.C.P.A. (1937) §§ 322, 323; Wis.Stat. (1935) § 327.22.


The first change in the first sentence of Rule 36(a) and the addition of the new second sentence, specifying when requests for admissions may be served, bring Rule 36 in line with amended Rules 26(a) and 33. There is no reason why these rules should not be treated alike. Other provisions of Rule 36(a) give the party whose ad-missions are requested adequate protection.

The second change in the first sentence of the rule [subdivision (a)] removes any uncertainty as to wheth-er a party can be called upon to admit matters of fact other than those set forth in relevant documents de-scribed in and exhibited with the request. In Smyth v. Kaufman (C.C.A.2d, 1940) 114 F.(2d) 40, it was held that the word ‘‘therein’’, now stricken from the rule [said subdivision] referred to the request and that a matter of fact not related to any document could be presented to the other party for admission or denial. The rule of this case is now clearly stated.

The substitution of the word ‘‘served’’ for ‘‘delivered’’ in the third sentence of the amended rule [said subdivi-


sion] is in conformance with the use of the word ‘‘serve’’ elsewhere in the rule and generally throughout the rules. See also Notes to Rules 13(a) and 33 herein. The substitution [in said subdivision] of ‘‘shorter or longer’’ for ‘‘further’’ will enable a court to designate a lesser period than 10 days for answer. This conforms with a similar provision already contained in Rule 33.

The addition of clause (2) [in said subdivision] speci-fies the method by which a party may challenge the propriety of a request to admit. There has been consid-erable difference of judicial opinion as to the correct method, if any, available to secure relief from an alleg-edly improper request. See Commentary, Methods of Objecting to Notice to Admit (1942) 5 Fed.Rules Serv. 835; International Carbonic Engineering Co. v. Natural Car-bonic Products, Inc. (S.D.Cal. 1944) 57 F.Supp. 248. The changes in clause (1) are merely of a clarifying and con-forming nature.

The first of the added last two sentences [in said sub-division] prevents an objection to a part of a request from holding up the answer, if any, to the remainder. See similar proposed change in Rule 33. The last sen-tence strengthens the rule by making the denial accu-rately reflect the party’s position. It is taken, with necessary changes, from Rule 8(b).


Rule 36 serves two vital purposes, both of which are designed to reduce trial time. Admissions are sought, first to facilitate proof with respect to issues that can-not be eliminated from the case, and secondly, to nar-row the issues by eliminating those that can be. The changes made in the rule are designed to serve these purposes more effectively. Certain disagreements in the courts about the proper scope of the rule are resolved. In addition, the procedural operation of the rule is brought into line with other discovery procedures, and the binding effect of an admission is clarified. See gen-erally Finman, The Request for Admissions in Federal Civil Procedure, 71 Yale L.J. 371 (1962).

Subdivision (a). As revised, the subdivision provides that a request may be made to admit any matter with-in the scope of Rule 26(b) that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact. It thereby eliminates the requirement that the matters be ‘‘of fact.’’ This change resolves conflicts in the court decisions as to whether a request to admit matters of ‘‘opinion’’ and matters involving ‘‘mixed law and fact’’ is proper under the rule. As to ‘‘opinion,’’ compare, e.g., Jackson Bluff Corp. v. Marcelle, 20 F.R.D. 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); California v. The S.S. Jules Fribourg, 19 F.R.D. 432 (N.D.Calif. 1955), with e.g., Photon, Inc. v. Harris Intertype, Inc., 28 F.R.D. 327 (D.Mass. 1961); Hise v. Lockwood Grader Corp., 153 F.Supp 276 (D.Nebr. 1957). As to ‘‘mixed law and fact’’ the majority of courts sustain objections, e.g., Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 36 F.R.D. 1 (N.D.Ohio 1964), but McSparran v. Hanigan, 225 F.Supp. 628 (E.D.Pa. 1963) is to the con-trary.

Not only is it difficult as a practical matter to sepa-rate ‘‘fact’’ from ‘‘opinion,’’ see 4 Moore’s Federal Prac-tice ¶ 36.04 (2d ed. 1966); cf. 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 317 (Wright ed. 1961), but an ad-mission on a matter of opinion may facilitate proof or narrow the issues or both. An admission of a matter in-volving the application of law to fact may, in a given case, even more clearly narrow the issues. For example, an admission that an employee acted in the scope of his employment may remove a major issue from the trial. In McSparran v. Hanigan, supra, plaintiff admitted that ‘‘the premises on which said accident occurred, were occupied or under the control’’ of one of the defendants, 225 F.Supp. at 636. This admission, involving law as well as fact, removed one of the issues from the lawsuit and thereby reduced the proof required at trial. The amended provision does not authorize requests for ad-missions of law unrelated to the facts of the case.

Requests for admission involving the application of law to fact may create disputes between the parties

which are best resolved in the presence of the judge after much or all of the other discovery has been com-pleted. Power is therefore expressly conferred upon the court to defer decision until a pretrial conference is held or until a designated time prior to trial. On the other hand, the court should not automatically defer decision; in many instances, the importance of the ad-mission lies in enabling the requesting party to avoid the burdensome accumulation of proof prior to the pre-trial conference.

Courts have also divided on whether an answering party may properly object to request for admission as to matters which that party regards as ‘‘in dispute.’’ Compare, e.g., Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910, 917 (2d Cir. 1959); Driver v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 24 F.R.D. 473 (E.D.Pa. 1959); with e.g., McGonigle v. Bax-ter, 27 F.R.D. 504 (E.D.Pa. 1961); United States v. Ehbauer, 13 F.R.D. 462 (W.D.Mo. 1952). The proper response in such cases is an answer. The very purpose of the re-quest is to ascertain whether the answering party is prepared to admit or regards the matter as presenting a genuine issue for trial. In his answer, the party may deny, or he may give his reason for inability to admit or deny the existence of a genuine issue. The party runs no risk of sanctions if the matter is genuinely in issue, since Rule 37(c) provides a sanction of costs only when there are no good reasons for a failure to admit.

On the other hand, requests to admit may be so volu-minous and so framed that the answering party finds the task of identifying what is in dispute and what is not unduly burdensome. If so, the responding party may obtain a protective order under Rule 26(c). Some of the decisions sustaining objections on ‘‘disputability’’ grounds could have been justified by the burdensome character of the requests. See, e.g., Syracuse Broadcast-ing Corp. v. Newhouse, supra.

Another sharp split of authority exists on the ques-tion whether a party may base his answer on lack of in-formation or knowledge without seeking out additional information. One line of cases has held that a party may answer on the basis of such knowledge as he has at the time he answers. E.g., Jackson Buff Corp. v. Marcelle, 20 F.R.D. 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Sladek v. General Motors Corp., 16 F.R.D. 104 (S.D.Iowa 1954). A larger group of cases, supported by commentators, has taken the view that if the responding party lacks knowledge, he must inform himself in reasonable fashion. E.g., Hise v. Lockwood Grader Corp., 153 F.Supp. 276 (D.Nebr. 1957); E. H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy Enterprises, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 571 (E.D.Pa. 1954); Finman, supra, 71 Yale L.J. 371, 404–409; 4 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 36.04 (2d ed. 1966); 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 509 (Wright ed. 1961).

The rule as revised adopts the majority view, as in keeping with a basic principle of the discovery rules that a reasonable burden may be imposed on the par-ties when its discharge will facilitate preparation for trial and ease the trial process. It has been argued against this view that one side should not have the bur-den of ‘‘proving’’ the other side’s case. The revised rule requires only that the answering party make reason-able inquiry and secure such knowledge and informa-tion as are readily obtainable by him. In most in-stances, the investigation will be necessary either to his own case or to preparation for rebuttal. Even when it is not, the information may be close enough at hand to be ‘‘readily obtainable.’’ Rule 36 requires only that the party state that he has taken these steps. The sanc-tion for failure of a party to inform himself before he answers lies in the award of costs after trial, as pro-vided in Rule 37(c).

The requirement that the answer to a request for ad-mission be sworn is deleted, in favor of a provision that the answer be signed by the party or by his attorney. The provisions of Rule 36 make it clear that admissions function very much as pleadings do. Thus, when a party admits in part and denies in part, his admission is for purposes of the pending action only and may not be used against him in any other proceeding. The broaden-ing of the rule to encompass mixed questions of law and


fact reinforces this feature. Rule 36 does not lack a sanction for false answers; Rule 37(c) furnishes an ap-propriate deterrent.

The existing language describing the available grounds for objection to a request for admission is eliminated as neither necessary nor helpful. The state-ment that objection may be made to any request, which is ‘‘improper’’ adds nothing to the provisions that the party serve an answer or objection addressed to each matter and that he state his reasons for any ob-jection. None of the other discovery rules set forth grounds for objection, except so far as all are subject to the general provisions of Rule 26.

Changes are made in the sequence of procedures in Rule 36 so that they conform to the new procedures in Rules 33 and 34. The major changes are as follows:

(1) The normal time for response to a request for ad-missions is lengthened from 10 to 30 days, conforming more closely to prevailing practice. A defendant need not respond, however, in less than 45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon him. The court may lengthen or shorten the time when special situa-tions require it.

(2) The present requirement that the plaintiff wait 10 days to serve requests without leave of court is elimi-nated. The revised provision accords with those in Rules 33 and 34.

(3) The requirement that the objecting party move automatically for a hearing on his objection is elimi-nated, and the burden is on the requesting party to move for an order. The change in the burden of going forward does not modify present law on burden of per-suasion. The award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion is made subject to the comprehensive provi-sions of Rule 37(a)(4).

(4) A problem peculiar to Rule 36 arises if the re-sponding party serves answers that are not in conform-ity with the requirements of the rule—for example, a denial is not ‘‘specific,’’ or the explanation of inability to admit or deny is not ‘‘in detail.’’ Rule 36 now makes no provision for court scrutiny of such answers before trial, and it seems to contemplate that defective an-swers bring about admissions just as effectively as if no answer had been served. Some cases have so held. E.g., Southern Ry. Co. v. Crosby, 201 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1953); United States v. Laney, 96 F.Supp. 482 (E.D.S.C. 1951).

Giving a defective answer the automatic effect of an admission may cause unfair surprise. A responding party who purported to deny or to be unable to admit or deny will for the first time at trial confront the con-tention that he has made a binding admission. Since it is not always easy to know whether a denial is ‘‘spe-cific’’ or an explanation is ‘‘in detail,’’ neither party can know how the court will rule at trial and whether proof must be prepared. Some courts, therefore, have entertained motions to rule on defective answers. They have at times ordered that amended answers be served, when the defects were technical, and at other times have declared that the matter was admitted. E.g., Woods v. Stewart, 171 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1948); SEC v. Kaye, Real & Co., 122 F.Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Seib’s Hatcheries, Inc. v. Lindley, 13 F.R.D. 113 (W.D.Ark. 1952). The rule as revised conforms to the latter practice.

Subdivision (b). The rule does not now indicate the ex-tent to which a party is bound by his admission. Some courts view admissions as the equivalent of sworn tes-timony E.g., Ark.-Tenn Distributing Corp. v. Breidt, 209 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1954); United States v. Lemons, 125 F.Supp. 686 (W.D.Ark. 1954); 4 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 36.08 (2d ed. 1966 Supp.). At least in some jurisdictions a party may rebut his own testimony, e.g., Alamo v. Del Rosario, 98 F.2d 328 (D.C.Cir. 1938), and by analogy an admission made pursuant to Rule 36 may likewise be thought rebuttable. The courts in Ark-Tenn and Lem-ons, supra, reasoned in this way, although the results reached may be supported on different grounds. In McSparran v. Hanigan, 225 F.Supp. 628, 636–637 (E.D.Pa. 1963), the court held that an admission is conclusively binding, though noting the confusion created by prior decisions.

The new provisions give an admission a conclusively binding effect, for purposes only of the pending action, unless the admission is withdrawn or amended. In form and substance a Rule 36 admission is comparable to an admission in pleadings or a stipulation drafted by coun-sel for use at trial, rather than to an evidentiary ad-mission of a party. Louisell, Modern California Discovery § 8.07 (1963); 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 838 (Wright ed. 1961). Unless the party secur-ing an admission can depend on its binding effect, he cannot safely avoid the expense of preparing to prove the very matters on which he has secured the admis-sion, and the purpose of the rule is defeated. Field & McKusick, Maine Civil Practice § 36.4 (1959); Finman, supra, 71 Yale L.J. 371, 418–426; Comment, 56 Nw.U.L.Rev. 679, 682–683 (1961).

Provision is made for withdrawal or amendment of an admission. This provision emphasizes the importance of having the action resolved on the merits, while at the same time assuring each party that justified reli-ance on an admission in preparation for trial will not operate to his prejudice. Cf. Moosman v. Joseph P. Blitz, Inc., 358 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1966).




The rule is revised to reflect the change made by Rule 26(d), preventing a party from seeking formal dis-covery until after the meeting of the parties required by Rule 26(f).



The final sentence of the first paragraph of former Rule 36(a) was a redundant cross-reference to the dis-covery moratorium provisions of Rule 26(d). Rule 26(d) is now familiar, obviating any need to carry forward the redundant cross-reference. The redundant reminder of Rule 37(c) in the second paragraph was likewise omitted.


Rule 37. Failure to Make Disclosures or to Co-operate in Discovery; Sanctions

(a) MOTION FOR AN ORDER COMPELLING DISCLO-SURE OR DISCOVERY.

(1) In General. On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or at-tempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.

(2) Appropriate Court. A motion for an order to a party must be made in the court where the action is pending. A motion for an order to a nonparty must be made in the court where the discovery is or will be taken.

(3) Specific Motions. (A) To Compel Disclosure. If a party fails to

make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party may move to compel disclo-sure and for appropriate sanctions.

(B) To Compel a Discovery Response. A party seeking discovery may move for an order


compelling an answer, designation, produc-tion, or inspection. This motion may be made if:

(i) a deponent fails to answer a question asked under Rule 30 or 31;

(ii) a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4);

(iii) a party fails to answer an interrog-atory submitted under Rule 33; or

(iv) a party fails to respond that inspec-tion will be permitted—or fails to permit inspection—as requested under Rule 34.

(C) Related to a Deposition. When taking an oral deposition, the party asking a question may complete or adjourn the examination before moving for an order.

(4) Evasive or Incomplete Disclosure, Answer, or Response. For purposes of this subdivision (a), an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to dis-close, answer, or respond.

(5) Payment of Expenses; Protective Orders. (A) If the Motion Is Granted (or Disclosure or

Discovery Is Provided After Filing). If the mo-tion is granted—or if the disclosure or re-quested discovery is provided after the mo-tion was filed—the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct neces-sitated the motion, the party or attorney ad-vising that conduct, or both to pay the mov-ant’s reasonable expenses incurred in mak-ing the motion, including attorney’s fees. But the court must not order this payment if:

(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the dis-closure or discovery without court action;

(ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or

(iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

(B) If the Motion Is Denied. If the motion is denied, the court may issue any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, re-quire the movant, the attorney filing the motion, or both to pay the party or deponent who opposed the motion its reasonable ex-penses incurred in opposing the motion, in-cluding attorney’s fees. But the court must not order this payment if the motion was substantially justified or other circum-stances make an award of expenses unjust.

(C) If the Motion Is Granted in Part and De-nied in Part. If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may issue any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.

(b) FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A COURT ORDER. (1) Sanctions in the District Where the Deposi-

tion Is Taken. If the court where the discovery is taken orders a deponent to be sworn or to answer a question and the deponent fails to obey, the failure may be treated as contempt of court.

(2) Sanctions in the District Where the Action Is Pending.

(A) For Not Obeying a Discovery Order. If a party or a party’s officer, director, or man-aging agent—or a witness designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)—fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, includ-ing an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders. They may include the following:

(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the ac-tion, as the prevailing party claims;

(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence;

(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;

(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed;

(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;

(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or

(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental exam-ination.

(B) For Not Producing a Person for Examina-tion. If a party fails to comply with an order under Rule 35(a) requiring it to produce an-other person for examination, the court may issue any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vi), unless the disobedient party shows that it cannot produce the other person.

(C) Payment of Expenses. Instead of or in addition to the orders above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney ad-vising that party, or both to pay the reason-able expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circum-stances make an award of expenses unjust.

(c) FAILURE TO DISCLOSE, TO SUPPLEMENT AN EARLIER RESPONSE, OR TO ADMIT.

(1) Failure to Disclose or Supplement. If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. In addi-tion to or instead of this sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard:

(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure;

(B) may inform the jury of the party’s fail-ure; and

(C) may impose other appropriate sanc-tions, including any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vi).

(2) Failure to Admit. If a party fails to admit what is requested under Rule 36 and if the re-questing party later proves a document to be


genuine or the matter true, the requesting party may move that the party who failed to admit pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in making that proof. The court must so order unless:

(A) the request was held objectionable under Rule 36(a);

(B) the admission sought was of no sub-stantial importance;

(C) the party failing to admit had a rea-sonable ground to believe that it might pre-vail on the matter; or

(D) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.

(d) PARTY’S FAILURE TO ATTEND ITS OWN DEPO-SITION, SERVE ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES, OR RESPOND TO A REQUEST FOR INSPECTION.

(1) In General. (A) Motion; Grounds for Sanctions. The

court where the action is pending may, on motion, order sanctions if:

(i) a party or a party’s officer, director, or managing agent—or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)—fails, after being served with proper notice, to appear for that person’s deposition; or

(ii) a party, after being properly served with interrogatories under Rule 33 or a re-quest for inspection under Rule 34, fails to serve its answers, objections, or written response.

(B) Certification. A motion for sanctions for failing to answer or respond must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party failing to act in an effort to obtain the answer or response without court action.

(2) Unacceptable Excuse for Failing to Act. A failure described in Rule 37(d)(1)(A) is not ex-cused on the ground that the discovery sought was objectionable, unless the party failing to act has a pending motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c).

(3) Types of Sanctions. Sanctions may include any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vi). Instead of or in addition to these sanctions, the court must require the party failing to act, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the fail-ure, unless the failure was substantially justi-fied or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

(e) FAILURE TO PROVIDE ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION. Absent exceptional cir-cumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to pro-vide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.

(f) FAILURE TO PARTICIPATE IN FRAMING A DIS-COVERY PLAN. If a party or its attorney fails to participate in good faith in developing and sub-mitting a proposed discovery plan as required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after giving an oppor-tunity to be heard, require that party or attor-ney to pay to any other party the reasonable ex-penses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure.

(As amended Dec. 29, 1948, eff. Oct. 20, 1949; Mar. 30, 1970, eff. July 1, 1970; Apr. 29, 1980, eff. Aug. 1, 1980; Pub. L. 96–481, § 205(a), Oct. 21, 1980, 94 Stat. 2330, eff. Oct. 1, 1981; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 17, 2000, eff. Dec. 1, 2000; Apr. 12, 2006, eff. Dec. 1, 2006; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007.)


The provisions of this rule authorizing orders estab-lishing facts or excluding evidence or striking plead-ings, or authorizing judgments of dismissal or default, for refusal to answer questions or permit inspection or otherwise make discovery, are in accord with Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909), which distin-guishes between the justifiable use of such measures as a means of compelling the production of evidence, and their unjustifiable use, as in Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897), for the mere purpose of punishing for contempt.


The amendment substitutes the present statutory reference.


Rule 37 provides generally for sanctions against par-ties or persons unjustifiably resisting discovery. Expe-rience has brought to light a number of defects in the language of the rule as well as instances in which it is not serving the purposes for which it was designed. See Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 Col.L.Rev. 480 (1958). In addition, changes being made in other discovery rules requiring conforming amend-ments to Rule 37.

Rule 37 sometimes refers to a ‘‘failure’’ to afford dis-covery and at other times to a ‘‘refusal’’ to do so. Tak-ing note of this dual terminology, courts have imported into ‘‘refusal’’ a requirement of ‘‘wilfullness.’’ See Roth v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 8 F.R.D. 31 (W.D.Pa. 1948); Campbell v. Johnson, 101 F.Supp. 705, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). In Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958), the Supreme Court concluded that the rather random use of these two terms in Rule 37 showed no design to use them with consistently distinctive meanings, that ‘‘re-fused’’ in Rule 37(b)(2) meant simply a failure to com-ply, and that wilfullness was relevant only to the selec-tion of sanctions, if any, to be imposed. Nevertheless, after the decision in Societe, the court in Hinson v. Michigan Mutual Liability Co., 275 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1960) once again ruled that ‘‘refusal’’ required wilfullness. Substitution of ‘‘failure’’ for ‘‘refusal’’ throughout Rule 37 should eliminate this confusion and bring the rule into harmony with the Societe Internationale decision. See Rosenberg, supra, 58 Col.L.Rev. 480, 489–490 (1958).

Subdivision (a). Rule 37(a) provides relief to a party seeking discovery against one who, with or without stated objections, fails to afford the discovery sought. It has always fully served this function in relation to depositions, but the amendments being made to Rules 33 and 34 give Rule 37(a) added scope and importance. Under existing Rule 33, a party objecting to interrog-atories must make a motion for court hearing on his objections. The changes now made in Rules 33 and 37(a) make it clear that the interrogating party must move to compel answers, and the motion is provided for in Rule 37(a). Existing Rule 34, since it requires a court order prior to production of documents or things or permission to enter on land, has no relation to Rule 37(a). Amendments of Rules 34 and 37(a) create a proce-dure similar to that provided for Rule 33.

Subdivision (a)(1). This is a new provision making clear to which court a party may apply for an order compelling discovery. Existing Rule 37(a) refers only to the court in which the deposition is being taken; never-theless, it has been held that the court where the ac-tion is pending has ‘‘inherent power’’ to compel a party


deponent to answer. Lincoln Laboratories, Inc. v. Savage Laboratories, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 476 (D.Del. 1961). In relation to Rule 33 interrogatories and Rule 34 requests for in-spection, the court where the action is pending is the appropriate enforcing tribunal. The new provision eliminates the need to resort to inherent power by spelling out the respective roles of the court where the action is pending and the court where the deposition is taken. In some instances, two courts are available to a party seeking to compel answers from a party depo-nent. The party seeking discovery may choose the court to which he will apply, but the court has power to remit the party to the other court as a more appro-priate forum.

Subdivision (a)(2). This subdivision contains the sub-stance of existing provisions of Rule 37(a) authorizing motions to compel answers to questions put at deposi-tions and to interrogatories. New provisions authorize motions for orders compelling designation under Rules 30(b)(6) and 31(a) and compelling inspection in accord-ance with a request made under Rule 34. If the court de-nies a motion, in whole or part, it may accompany the denial with issuance of a protective order. Compare the converse provision in Rule 26(c).

Subdivision (a)(3). This new provision makes clear that an evasive or incomplete answer is to be consid-ered, for purposes of subdivision (a), a failure to an-swer. The courts have consistently held that they have the power to compel adequate answers. E.g., Cone Mills Corp. v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 33 F.R.D. 318 (D.Del. 1963). This power is recognized and incorporated into the rule.

Subdivision (a)(4). This subdivision amends the provi-sions for award of expenses, including reasonable attor-ney’s fees, to the prevailing party or person when a mo-tion is made for an order compelling discovery. At present, an award of expenses is made only if the losing party or person is found to have acted without substan-tial justification. The change requires that expenses be awarded unless the conduct of the losing party or per-son is found to have been substantially justified. The test of ‘‘substantial justification’’ remains, but the change in language is intended to encourage judges to be more alert to abuses occurring in the discovery proc-ess.

On many occasions, to be sure, the dispute over dis-covery between the parties is genuine, though ulti-mately resolved one way or the other by the court. In such cases, the losing party is substantially justified in carrying the matter to court. But the rules should deter the abuse implicit in carrying or forcing a discov-ery dispute to court when no genuine dispute exists. And the potential or actual imposition of expenses is virtually the sole formal sanction in the rules to deter a party from pressing to a court hearing frivolous re-quests for or objections to discovery.

The present provision of Rule 37(a) that the court shall require payment if it finds that the defeated party acted without ‘‘substantial justification’’ may appear adequate, but in fact it has been little used. Only a handful of reported cases include an award of expenses, and the Columbia Survey found that in only one in-stance out of about 50 motions decided under Rule 37(a) did the court award expenses. It appears that the courts do not utilize the most important available sanction to deter abusive resort to the judiciary.

The proposed change provides in effect that expenses should ordinarily be awarded unless a court finds that the losing party acted justifiably in carrying his point to court. At the same time, a necessary flexibility is maintained, since the court retains the power to find that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust—as where the prevailing party also acted un-justifiably. The amendment does not significantly nar-row the discretion of the court, but rather presses the court to address itself to abusive practices. The present provision that expenses may be imposed upon either the party or his attorney or both is unchanged. But it is not contemplated that expenses will be imposed upon the attorney merely because the party is indigent.

Subdivision (b). This subdivision deals with sanctions for failure to comply with a court order. The present captions for subsections (1) and (2) entitled, ‘‘Con-tempt’’ and ‘‘Other Consequences,’’ respectively, are confusing. One of the consequences listed in (2) is the arrest of the party, representing the exercise of the contempt power. The contents of the subsections show that the first authorizes the sanction of contempt (and no other) by the court in which the deposition is taken, whereas the second subsection authorizes a variety of sanctions, including contempt, which may be imposed by the court in which the action is pending. The cap-tions of the subsections are changed to deflect their contents.

The scope of Rule 37(b)(2) is broadened by extending it to include any order ‘‘to provide or permit discov-ery,’’ including orders issued under Rules 37(a) and 35. Various rules authorize orders for discovery—e.g., Rule 35 (b)(1), Rule 26(c) as revised. Rule 37(d). See Rosen-berg, supra, 58 Col.L.Rev. 480, 484–486. Rule 37(b)(2) should provide comprehensively for enforcement of all these orders. Cf. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958). On the other hand, the reference to Rule 34 is deleted to conform to the changed procedure in that rule.

A new subsection (E) provides that sanctions which have been available against a party for failure to com-ply with an order under Rule 35(a) to submit to exam-ination will now be available against him for his failure to comply with a Rule 35(a) order to produce a third person for examination, unless he shows that he is un-able to produce the person. In this context, ‘‘unable’’ means in effect ‘‘unable in good faith.’’ See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).

Subdivision (b)(2) is amplified to provide for payment of reasonable expenses caused by the failure to obey the order. Although Rules 37(b)(2) and 37(d) have been silent as to award of expenses, courts have nevertheless or-dered them on occasion. E.g., United Sheeplined Clothing Co. v. Arctic Fur Cap Corp., 165 F.Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y.1958); Austin Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pic-ture, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The provision places the burden on the disobedient party to avoid ex-penses by showing that his failure is justified or that special circumstances make an award of expenses un-just. Allocating the burden in this way conforms to the changed provisions as to expenses in Rule 37(a), and is particularly appropriate when a court order is dis-obeyed.

An added reference to directors of a party is similar to a change made in subdivision (d) and is explained in the note to that subdivision. The added reference to persons designated by a party under Rules 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of the party carries out the new procedure in those rules for taking a deposition of a corporation or other organization.

Subdivision (c). Rule 37(c) provides a sanction for the enforcement of Rule 36 dealing with requests for admis-sion. Rule 36 provides the mechanism whereby a party may obtain from another party in appropriate in-stances either (1) and admission, or (2) a sworn and spe-cific denial, or (3) a sworn statement ‘‘setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny.’’ If the party obtains the second or third of these responses, in proper form, Rule 36 does not provide for a pretrial hearing on whether the response is warranted by the evidence thus far accumulated. Instead, Rule 37(c) is intended to provide posttrial relief in the form of a requirement that the party improperly refusing the admission pay the expenses of the other side in making the necessary proof at trial.

Rule 37(c), as now written, addresses itself in terms only to the sworn denial and is silent with respect to the statement of reasons for an inability to admit or deny. There is no apparent basis for this distinction, since the sanction provided in Rule 37(c) should deter all unjustified failures to admit. This omission in the rule has caused confused and diverse treatment in the courts. One court has held that if a party gives inad-equate reasons, he should be treated before trial as hav-


ing denied the request, so that Rule 37(c) may apply. Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 15 F.R.D. 339 (E.D.N.Y. 1954). Another has held that the party should be treated as having admitted the request. Heng Hsin Co. v. Stern, Morgenthau & Co., 20 Fed.Rules Serv. 36a.52, Case 1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1954). Still another has ordered a new response, without indicating what the outcome should be if the new response were inadequate. United States Plywood Corp. v. Hudson Lumber Co., 127 F.Supp. 489, 497–498 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). See generally Finman, The Request for Admissions in Federal Civil Pro-cedure, 71 Yale L.J. 371, 426–430 (1962). The amendment eliminates this defect in Rule 37(c) by bringing within its scope all failures to admit.

Additional provisions in Rule 37(c) protect a party from having to pay expenses if the request for admis-sion was held objectionable under Rule 36(a) or if the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the matter. The latter provi-sion emphasizes that the true test under Rule 37(c) is not whether a party prevailed at trial but whether he acted reasonably in believing that he might prevail.

Subdivision (d). The scope of subdivision (d) is broad-ened to include responses to requests for inspection under Rule 34, thereby conforming to the new proce-dures of Rule 34.

Two related changes are made in subdivision (d): the permissible sanctions are broadened to include such or-ders ‘‘as are just’’; and the requirement that the failure to appear or respond be ‘‘wilful’’ is eliminated. Al-though Rule 37(d) in terms provides for only three sanc-tions, all rather severe, the courts have interpreted it as permitting softer sanctions than those which it sets forth. E.g., Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1957); Saltz-man v. Birrell, 156 F.Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 554–557 (Wright ed. 1961). The rule is changed to provide the greater flexibility as to sanctions which the cases show is needed.

The resulting flexibility as to sanctions eliminates any need to retain the requirement that the failure to appear or respond be ‘‘wilful.’’ The concept of ‘‘wilful failure’’ is at best subtle and difficult, and the cases do not supply a bright line. Many courts have imposed sanctions without referring to wilfullness. E.g., Milewski v. Schneider Transportation Co., 238 F.2d 397 (6th Cir. 1956); Dictograph Products, Inc. v. Kentworth Corp., 7 F.R.D. 543 (W.D.Ky. 1947). In addition, in view of the possibility of light sanctions, even a negligent failure should come within Rule 37(d). If default is caused by counsel’s ignorance of Federal practice, cf. Dunn. v. Pa. R.R., 96 F. Supp. 597 (N.D.Ohio 1951), or by his pre-occupation with another aspect of the case, cf. Maurer- Neuer, Inc. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 26 F.R.D. 139 (D.Kans. 1960), dismissal of the action and default judg-ment are not justified, but the imposition of expenses and fees may well be. ‘‘Wilfullness’’ continues to play a role, along with various other factors, in the choice of sanctions. Thus, the scheme conforms to Rule 37(b) as construed by the Supreme Court in Societe Inter-nationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208 (1958).

A provision is added to make clear that a party may not properly remain completely silent even when he re-gards a notice to take his deposition or a set of inter-rogatories or requests to inspect as improper and objec-tionable. If he desires not to appear or not to respond, he must apply for a protective order. The cases are di-vided on whether a protective order must be sought. Compare Collins v. Wayland, 139 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. den. 322 U.S. 744; Bourgeois v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 20 F.R.D. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Loosley v. Stone, 15 F.R.D. 373 (S.D.Ill. 1954), with Scarlatos v. Kulukundis, 21 F.R.D. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Ross v. True Temper Corp., 11 F.R.D 307 (N.D.Ohio 1951). Compare also Rosenberg, supra, 58 Col.L.Rev. 480, 496 (1958) with 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 530–531 (Wright ed. 1961). The party from whom discovery is sought is afforded, through Rule 26(c), a fair and effective proce-dure whereby he can challenge the request made. At the same time, the total non-compliance with which

Rule 37(d) is concerned may impose severe inconven-ience or hardship on the discovering party and substan-tially delay the discovery process. Cf. 2B Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 306–307 (Wright ed. 1961) (response to a subpoena).

The failure of an officer or managing agent of a party to make discovery as required by present Rule 37(d) is treated as the failure of the party. The rule as revised provides similar treatment for a director of a party. There is slight warrant for the present distinction be-tween officers and managing agents on the one hand and directors on the other. Although the legal power over a director to compel his making discovery may not be as great as over officers or managing agents, Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 13 F.R.D. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), the practical differences are negligible. That a di-rector’s interests are normally aligned with those of his corporation is shown by the provisions of old Rule 26(d)(2), transferred to 32(a)(2) (deposition of director of party may be used at trial by an adverse party for any purpose) and of Rule 43(b) (director of party may be treated at trial as a hostile witness on direct examina-tion by any adverse party). Moreover, in those rare in-stances when a corporation is unable through good faith efforts to compel a director to make discovery, it is unlikely that the court will impose sanctions. Cf. So-ciete Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).

Subdivision (e). The change in the caption conforms to the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1783, as amended in 1964.

Subdivision (f). Until recently, costs of a civil action could be awarded against the United States only when expressly provided by Act of Congress, and such provi-sion was rarely made. See H.R.Rept.No. 1535, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2–3 (1966). To avoid any conflict with this doctrine, Rule 37(f) has provided that expenses and attorney’s fees may not be imposed upon the United States under Rule 37. See 2A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 857 (Wright ed. 1961).

A major change in the law was made in 1966, 80 Stat. 308, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1966), whereby a judgment for costs may ordinarily be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States. Costs are not to include the fees and expenses of attorneys. In light of this legislative development, Rule 37(f) is amended to permit the award of expenses and fees against the United States under Rule 37, but only to the extent permitted by statute. The amend-ment brings Rule 37(f) into line with present and future statutory provisions.


Subdivision (b)(2). New Rule 26(f) provides that if a dis-covery conference is held, at its close the court shall enter an order respecting the subsequent conduct of discovery. The amendment provides that the sanctions available for violation of other court orders respecting discovery are available for violation of the discovery conference order.

Subdivision (e). Subdivision (e) is stricken. Title 28, U.S.C. § 1783 no longer refers to sanctions. The subdivi-sion otherwise duplicates Rule 45(e)(2).

Subdivision (g). New Rule 26(f) imposes a duty on par-ties to participate in good faith in the framing of a dis-covery plan by agreement upon the request of any party. This subdivision authorizes the court to award to parties who participate in good faith in an attempt to frame a discovery plan the expenses incurred in the attempt if any party or his attorney fails to participate in good faith and thereby causes additional expense.

Failure of United States to Participate in Good Faith in Discovery. Rule 37 authorizes the court to direct that parties or attorneys who fail to participate in good faith in the discovery process pay the expenses, includ-ing attorney’s fees, incurred by other parties as a re-sult of that failure. Since attorneys’ fees cannot ordi-narily be awarded against the United States (28 U.S.C. § 2412), there is often no practical remedy for the mis-conduct of its officers and attorneys. However, in the case of a government attorney who fails to participate


in good faith in discovery, nothing prevents a court in an appropriate case from giving written notification of that fact to the Attorney General of the United States and other appropriate heads of offices or agencies thereof.




Subdivision (a). This subdivision is revised to reflect the revision of Rule 26(a), requiring disclosure of mat-ters without a discovery request.

Pursuant to new subdivision (a)(2)(A), a party dissat-isfied with the disclosure made by an opposing party may under this rule move for an order to compel disclo-sure. In providing for such a motion, the revised rule parallels the provisions of the former rule dealing with failures to answer particular interrogatories. Such a motion may be needed when the information to be dis-closed might be helpful to the party seeking the disclo-sure but not to the party required to make the disclo-sure. If the party required to make the disclosure would need the material to support its own conten-tions, the more effective enforcement of the disclosure requirement will be to exclude the evidence not dis-closed, as provided in subdivision (c)(1) of this revised rule.

Language is included in the new paragraph and added to the subparagraph (B) that requires litigants to seek to resolve discovery disputes by informal means before filing a motion with the court. This requirement is based on successful experience with similar local rules of court promulgated pursuant to Rule 83.

The last sentence of paragraph (2) is moved into para-graph (4).

Under revised paragraph (3), evasive or incomplete disclosures and responses to interrogatories and pro-duction requests are treated as failures to disclose or respond. Interrogatories and requests for production should not be read or interpreted in an artificially re-strictive or hypertechnical manner to avoid disclosure of information fairly covered by the discovery request, and to do so is subject to appropriate sanctions under subdivision (a).

Revised paragraph (4) is divided into three subpara-graphs for ease of reference, and in each the phrase ‘‘after opportunity for hearing’’ is changed to ‘‘after af-fording an opportunity to be heard’’ to make clear that the court can consider such questions on written sub-missions as well as on oral hearings.

Subparagraph (A) is revised to cover the situation where information that should have been produced without a motion to compel is produced after the mo-tion is filed but before it is brought on for hearing. The rule also is revised to provide that a party should not be awarded its expenses for filing a motion that could have been avoided by conferring with opposing counsel.

Subparagraph (C) is revised to include the provision that formerly was contained in subdivision (a)(2) and to include the same requirement of an opportunity to be heard that is specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B).

Subdivision (c). The revision provides a self-executing sanction for failure to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), without need for a motion under subdivision (a)(2)(A).

Paragraph (1) prevents a party from using as evidence any witnesses or information that, without substantial justification, has not been disclosed as required by Rules 26(a) and 26(e)(1). This automatic sanction pro-vides a strong inducement for disclosure of material that the disclosing party would expect to use as evi-dence, whether at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion, such as one under Rule 56. As disclosure of evidence of-fered solely for impeachment purposes is not required under those rules, this preclusion sanction likewise does not apply to that evidence.

Limiting the automatic sanction to violations ‘‘with-out substantial justification,’’ coupled with the excep-tion for violations that are ‘‘harmless,’’ is needed to avoid unduly harsh penalties in a variety of situations: e.g., the inadvertent omission from a Rule 26(a)(1)(A) disclosure of the name of a potential witness known to all parties; the failure to list as a trial witness a person so listed by another party; or the lack of knowledge of a pro se litigant of the requirement to make disclo-sures. In the latter situation, however, exclusion would be proper if the requirement for disclosure had been called to the litigant’s attention by either the court or another party.

Preclusion of evidence is not an effective incentive to compel disclosure of information that, being supportive of the position of the opposing party, might advan-tageously be concealed by the disclosing party. How-ever, the rule provides the court with a wide range of other sanctions—such as declaring specified facts to be established, preventing contradictory evidence, or, like spoliation of evidence, allowing the jury to be informed of the fact of nondisclosure—that, though not self-exe-cuting, can be imposed when found to be warranted after a hearing. The failure to identify a witness or doc-ument in a disclosure statement would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence under the same principles that allow a party’s interrogatory answers to be offered against it.

Subdivision (d). This subdivision is revised to require that, where a party fails to file any response to inter-rogatories or a Rule 34 request, the discovering party should informally seek to obtain such responses before filing a motion for sanctions.

The last sentence of this subdivision is revised to clarify that it is the pendency of a motion for protec-tive order that may be urged as an excuse for a viola-tion of subdivision (d). If a party’s motion has been de-nied, the party cannot argue that its subsequent failure to comply would be justified. In this connection, it should be noted that the filing of a motion under Rule 26(c) is not self-executing—the relief authorized under that rule depends on obtaining the court’s order to that effect.

Subdivision (g). This subdivision is modified to con-form to the revision of Rule 26(f).


Subdivision (c)(1). When this subdivision was added in 1993 to direct exclusion of materials not disclosed as re-quired, the duty to supplement discovery responses pursuant to Rule 26(e)(2) was omitted. In the face of this omission, courts may rely on inherent power to sanction for failure to supplement as required by Rule 26(e)(2), see 8 Federal Practice & Procedure § 2050 at 607–09, but that is an uncertain and unregulated ground for imposing sanctions. There is no obvious occasion for a Rule 37(a) motion in connection with failure to supple-ment, and ordinarily only Rule 37(c)(1) exists as rule- based authority for sanctions if this supplementation obligation is violated.

The amendment explicitly adds failure to comply with Rule 26(e)(2) as a ground for sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1), including exclusion of withheld materials. The rule provides that this sanction power only applies when the failure to supplement was ‘‘without substan-tial justification.’’ Even if the failure was not substan-tially justified, a party should be allowed to use the material that was not disclosed if the lack of earlier notice was harmless.

‘‘Shall’’ is replaced by ‘‘is’’ under the program to con-form amended rules to current style conventions when there is no ambiguity.

GAP Report. The Advisory Committee recommends that the published amendment proposal be modified to state that the exclusion sanction can apply to failure ‘‘to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2).’’ In addition, one minor phrasing change is recommended for the Committee Note.



Subdivision (f). Subdivision (f) is new. It focuses on a distinctive feature of computer operations, the routine alteration and deletion of information that attends or-dinary use. Many steps essential to computer operation may alter or destroy information, for reasons that have nothing to do with how that information might relate to litigation. As a result, the ordinary operation of computer systems creates a risk that a party may lose potentially discoverable information without culpable conduct on its part. Under Rule 37(f), absent excep-tional circumstances, sanctions cannot be imposed for loss of electronically stored information resulting from the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic infor-mation system.

Rule 37(f) applies only to information lost due to the ‘‘routine operation of an electronic information sys-tem’’—the ways in which such systems are generally designed, programmed, and implemented to meet the party’s technical and business needs. The ‘‘routine op-eration’’ of computer systems includes the alteration and overwriting of information, often without the oper-ator’s specific direction or awareness, a feature with no direct counterpart in hard-copy documents. Such fea-tures are essential to the operation of electronic infor-mation systems.

Rule 37(f) applies to information lost due to the rou-tine operation of an information system only if the op-eration was in good faith. Good faith in the routine op-eration of an information system may involve a party’s intervention to modify or suspend certain features of that routine operation to prevent the loss of informa-tion, if that information is subject to a preservation obligation. A preservation obligation may arise from many sources, including common law, statutes, regula-tions, or a court order in the case. The good faith re-quirement of Rule 37(f) means that a party is not per-mitted to exploit the routine operation of an informa-tion system to thwart discovery obligations by allow-ing that operation to continue in order to destroy spe-cific stored information that it is required to preserve. When a party is under a duty to preserve information because of pending or reasonably anticipated litigation, intervention in the routine operation of an information system is one aspect of what is often called a ‘‘litiga-tion hold.’’ Among the factors that bear on a party’s good faith in the routine operation of an information system are the steps the party took to comply with a court order in the case or party agreement requiring preservation of specific electronically stored informa-tion.

Whether good faith would call for steps to prevent the loss of information on sources that the party be-lieves are not reasonably accessible under Rule 26(b)(2) depends on the circumstances of each case. One factor is whether the party reasonably believes that the infor-mation on such sources is likely to be discoverable and not available from reasonably accessible sources.

The protection provided by Rule 37(f) applies only to sanctions ‘‘under these rules.’’ It does not affect other sources of authority to impose sanctions or rules of professional responsibility.

This rule restricts the imposition of ‘‘sanctions.’’ It does not prevent a court from making the kinds of ad-justments frequently used in managing discovery if a party is unable to provide relevant responsive informa-tion. For example, a court could order the responding party to produce an additional witness for deposition, respond to additional interrogatories, or make similar attempts to provide substitutes or alternatives for some or all of the lost information.

Changes Made after Publication and Comment. The pub-lished rule barred sanctions only if the party who lost electronically stored information took reasonable steps to preserve the information after it knew or should have known the information was discoverable in the ac-tion. A footnote invited comment on an alternative standard that barred sanctions unless the party reck-lessly or intentionally failed to preserve the informa-

tion. The present proposal establishes an intermediate standard, protecting against sanctions if the informa-tion was lost in the ‘‘good faith’’ operation of an elec-tronic information system. The present proposal car-ries forward a related element that was a central part of the published proposal—the information must have been lost in the system’s ‘‘routine operation.’’ The change to a good-faith test made it possible to elimi-nate the reference to information ‘‘discoverable in the action,’’ removing a potential source of confusion as to the duty to preserve information on sources that are identified as not reasonably accessible under Rule 26(b)(2)(B).

The change to a good-faith standard is accompanied by addition of a provision that permits sanctions for loss of information in good- faith routine operation in ‘‘exceptional circumstances.’’ This provision recognizes that in some circumstances a court should provide rem-edies to protect an entirely innocent party requesting discovery against serious prejudice arising from the loss of potentially important information.

As published, the rule included an express exception that denied protection if a party ‘‘violated an order in the action requiring it to preserve electronically stored information.’’ This exception was deleted for fear that it would invite routine applications for preservation or-ders, and often for overbroad orders. The revised Com-mittee Note observes that violation of an order is an element in determining whether a party acted in good faith.

The revised proposal broadens the rule’s protection by applying to operation of ‘‘an’’ electronic informa-tion system, rather than ‘‘the party’s’’ system. The change protects a party who has contracted with an outside firm to provide electronic information storage, avoiding potential arguments whether the system can be characterized as ‘‘the party’s.’’ The party remains obliged to act in good faith to avoid loss of information in routine operations conducted by the outside firm.

The Committee Note is changed to reflect the changes in the rule text.

The changes from the published version of the pro-posed rule text are set out below. [Omitted]




AMENDMENT BY PUBLIC LAW

1980—Subd. (f). Pub. L. 96–481 repealed subd. (f) which provided that except to the extent permitted by stat-ute, expenses and fees may not be awarded against the United States under this rule.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1980 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 96–481 effective Oct. 1, 1981, and applicable to adversary adjudication defined in sec-tion 504(b)(1)(C) of Title 5, and to civil actions and ad-versary adjudications described in section 2412 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, which are pending on, or commenced on or after Oct. 1, 1981, see section 208 of Pub. L. 96–481, set out as an Effective Date note under section 504 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.

TITLE VI. TRIALS

Rule 38. Right to a Jury Trial; Demand

(a) RIGHT PRESERVED. The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution—or as provided by a federal statute—is preserved to the parties inviolate.

(b) DEMAND. On any issue triable of right by a jury, a party may demand a jury trial by: