HENRY SAMONTE, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. GINES ABELLANA, Respondent.A lawyer who willfully resorts to any falsehood in order to mislead the courts or his clients on the status of their causes exhibits his unworthiness to remain a member of the Law Profession. This is because he is always expected to be honest and forthright in his dealings with them. He thereby merits the condign sanction of suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.AntecedentsOn February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Gines N. Abellana who had represented him as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. CEB-6970 entitled Capt. Henry E. Samonte v. Authographics, Inc., and Nelson Yu of the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City.1 In the administrative complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious acts of professional misconduct by Atty. Abellana, to wit:1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear that he had filed Civil Case No. CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably with their agreement, although the complaint was actually filed on June 14, 1988;2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file the reply vis--vis the answer with counterclaim, with his omission having delayed the pre-trial of the case; (b) inform the trial court beforehand that Samonte could not be available on a scheduled hearing, thereby incurring for the plaintiffs side an unexplained absence detrimental to Samonte as the plaintiff; and (c) submit an exhibit required by the trial judge, only to eventually submit it three months later;3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled hearings; and4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments made by Samonte for his court appearances and his acceptance of the case.To support his administrative complaint, Samonte attached the following annexes, namely:1. Comparative photocopies of the cover page of the complaint on file in the RTC and of the cover page of the complaint Atty. Abellana furnished him;2. A photocopy of the order issued on January 16, 1989, and a photocopy of the order issued on January 19, 1990 in which the RTC observed that "[t]he formal offer of plaintiffs exhibits is rather very late;"3 and3. The motion to change counsel, in which Samonte stated that Atty. Abellana had failed to promptly attend court hearings and to do other legal services required of him as the counsel. In the lower left portion of the motion, Atty. Abellana noted the motion subject to the reservation that his attorneys fees should still be paid.4On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty. Abellana to comment on the administrative complaint.In his comment dated April 6, 1990,5 Atty. Abellana denied the charge of falsification of documents, clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint could be made only on June 14, 1988 instead of on June 10, 1988 because Samonte had not given enough money to cover the filing fees and other charges totaling P5,027.76; and that Samonte shelled out only P5,000.00, contrary to their agreement in April 1988 on paying to him P10,000.00 as the acceptance fee in addition to the filing fees. He asserted that the charge of dereliction of duty was baseless, because he had filed the reply on December 2, 1988 after receiving the answer with counterclaim of the defendants on August 2, 1988, attaching as proof the copies of the reply (Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment);6 and that it was the RTC, not him, who had scheduled the pre-trial on January 16, 1989.7 Anent his nonattendance at the hearings in Civil Case No. CEB-6970, he explained that although he had informed the RTC of his having been either stranded in another province, or having attended the arraignment of another client in another court, the presiding judge had opted not to await his arrival in the courtroom. He blamed Samonte for his inability to submit the formal offer of exhibits on time, pointing out that Samonte had failed to give the duplicate originals of the documentary exhibits despite his request because of the latters absence from the country. He countered that it was Samonte who had been dishonest, because Samonte had given only the filing fees plus at least P2,000.00 in contravention of their agreement on the amount of P10,000.00 being his acceptance fees in addition to the filing fees; that the filing fees paid were covered by receipts issued by the Clerk of Court; that no receipts were issued for the P200.00/appearance fee conformably with the practice of most lawyers; and that Samonte had not also demanded any receipts.Atty. Abellana branded as unethical Samontes submission of a motion to change counsel,8 stating that the latter did not thereby exhibit the courtesy of informing him beforehand on the intention of not meeting his obligation to him as the counsel; that Samonte had been forced to issue to him a check after the Branch Clerk of Court had told him that his motion to change counsel would not be acted upon unless it carried Atty. Abellanas conformity as the counsel; and that he had duly acknowledged the check.9On May 23, 1990, the Court received Samontes letter dated May 8, 199010 embodying additional charges of falsification of documents, dereliction of duty and dishonesty based on the reply and the annexes Atty. Abellana had filed. Samonte noted in the letter that the reply attached to the comment of Atty. Abellana was not authentic based on the categorical statement of the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 5 of the RTC in Cebu City to the effect that no such reply had been filed in behalf of Samonte; and that the rubber stamp affixed on the reply supposedly filed by Atty. Abellana in Samontes behalf was not also the official rubber stamp of Branch 5.11 Samonte denied being the cause of delay in the submission of the formal offer of exhibits, and reminded that the documentary exhibits concerned had been shown to the trial court during his testimony, with the opposing party not even objecting to their authenticity.Samonte declared that his agreement with Atty. Abellana on the fees for all his legal services stipulated the equivalent of 20% of the awarded damages; that the amount demanded was P1.12 Million;12 that he paid Atty. Abellana a total of P7,027.00 for filing expenses, plus P5,000.00 that he gave as a token payment for Atty. Abellanas services after discovering the latters inefficiency and fraudulent practices.On May 30, 199013 and July 30, 1990,14 the Court referred the administrative complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.Proceedings in the IBPOn November 3, 1994, the IBP notified the parties to appear and present their evidence at 10:00 am on November 18, 1994.15 However, the parties sought postponements.16 The hearing was reset several times more for various reasons, namely: on December 9, 1994 due to the IBP Commissioner being out of town, but telegrams were sent to the parties on December 6, 1994;17 on April 12, 2002, with the hearing being cancelled;18 and on March 7, 2003, with the hearing being cancelled until further notice.19On February 7, 2005, the IBP received a motion to quash dated January 7, 2005 from Atty. Abellana,20 seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint because of the lack of interest on the part of Samonte. Atty. Abellana observed therein that Samonte had always sought the postponement of the hearings.Reacting to the motion to quash, Samonte requested an early hearing by motion filed on February 9, 2005,21 declaring his interest in pursuing the administrative complaint against Atty. Abellana.On March 22, 2005,22 IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes set the mandatory conference on June 22, 2005. In that conference, only Samonte appeared;23 hence, the IBP just required the parties to submit their verified position papers within 30 days from notice. Nonetheless, the IBP scheduled the clarificatory hearing on August 18, 2005.24Samonte submitted his position paper on August 2, 2005.25 On August 9, 2005, Atty. Abellana requested an extension of his period to submit his own position paper allegedly to allow him to secure relevant documents from the trial court.26On August 18, 2005, the parties appeared for the clarificatory hearing. The case was thereafter deemed submitted for resolution.On August 29, 2005, Samonte presented a verified amended position paper, reiterating his allegations against Atty. Abellana.27Also on August 29, 2005, Atty. Abellana submitted his verified position paper dated August 17, 2005,28 in which he represented that although he had been at times late for the hearings he had nonetheless efficiently discharged his duties as the counsel for Samonte; that he had not caused any delay in the case; that it was Samonte who had been unavailable at times because of his work as an airline pilot; that the complainant had discharged him as his counsel in order to avoid paying his obligation to him; and that the complainant filed this disbarment case after he lost his own civil case in the RTC. He attached all the pleadings he had filed on behalf of the complainant, except the above-stated replies.On May 1, 2008,29 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Abellana negligent in handling certain aspects of his clients case, like not filing a reply to the defendants answer with counterclaims in order to deny the new matters raised in the answer; resorting to falsehood to make it appear that he had filed the reply; and being considerably late in submitting the formal offer of exhibits for Samonte, as noted even by the trial judge in the order dated January 19, 1990. It observed that although the negligence of Atty. Abellana did not necessarily prejudice his clients case, his lack of honesty and trustworthiness as an attorney, and his resort to falsehood and deceitful practices were a different matter;30 noted that he had twice resorted to falsehood, the first being when he tried to make it appear that the complaint had been filed on June 10, 1988 despite the court records showing that the complaint had been actually filed only on June 14, 1988; and the second being when he had attempted to deceive his client about his having filed the reply by producing a document bearing a rubber stamp marking distinctively different from that of the trial courts; that he did not dispute the pieces of material evidence adduced against him; that he had explained that the reason for his delay in the filing of the complaint had been the complainants failure to pay the agreed fees on time; and that he had only stated that he had filed a reply, without presenting proof of his having actually filed such in court.The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment of Atty. Abellana, observing as follows:x x x Apart from his negligent handling of portions of the civil case, said respondent has shown a facility for utilizing false and deceitful practices as a means to cover-up his delay and lack of diligence in pursuing the case of his client. Taken together as a whole, the respondents acts are nothing short of deplorable.WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Gines Abellana be disbarred from the practice of law for resorting to false and/or deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and trusthworthiness as befits a member of the bar.(Bold emphasis supplied)On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, suspended Atty. Abellana from the practice of law for one year, to wit:RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for resorting to falsehood and/or deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits member of the Bar, Atty. Gines N. Abellana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.31 (Bold emphasis supplied)On September 25, 2008, Atty. Abellana moved for reconsideration based on the following grounds:32A. That the imposition of sanction for the suspension of the undersigned from the practice of law for one (1) year is too stiff in relation to the alleged unethical conduct committed by the respondent;B. That the findings of the investigating commissioner is not fully supported with evidence;C. That the complaint of the complainant is not corroborated by testimonial evidence so that it is hearsay and self-serving.In support of his motion, Atty. Abellana rehashed most of his previous arguments, and stated that the "enumerations of failures are belied by the existence of Reply to counterclaims, which were attached as Annexes "8" and "9" of the Position Paper of respondent."33 It is noted, however, that Annex 8 and Annex 9 of Atty. Abellanas position paper were different documents, namely: Annex 834 (Manifestation and Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Change Counsel); and Annex 935 (Manifestation). Nonetheless, he argued that both documents were already part of the records of the case, and that anyway Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court, did not execute any affidavit or certification tothe effect that both documents were inexistent. He reminded that Samonte had only said that both documents "seemed to be falsified documents" based on the certification of Atty. Nazareth on the official rubber stamp of the court.The IBP required Samonte to comment on Atty. Abellanas motion for reconsideration.36In his comment dated October 21, 2008,37 Samonte reiterated his allegations against Atty. Abellana; insisted that Atty. Abellana did not refute the charges against him; and noted thatthe reply that Atty. Abellana had supposedly filed in the case was not even annexed either to his position paper and motion for reconsideration.On December 16, 2008, Atty. Abellana filed a motion requesting to be allowed to submit certified true copies of his exhibits, i.e., the pleadings he had submitted in the RTC.38On April 2, 2009, Samonte filed a motion for early resolution.39On September 15, 2009, Atty. Abellana filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration.40On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration of Atty. Abellana.41RulingWe adopt and approve the findings of the IBP Board of Governors by virtue of their being substantiated by the records.In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyers Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession, thus:XX Lawyers Oath XXBy the Lawyers Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others.42 It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that honesty, integrity and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to clients request for information.Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness in his dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as the trial court. He resorted to outright falsification by superimposing "0" on "4" in order to mislead Samonte into believing that he had already filed the complaint in court on June 10,1988 as promised, instead of on June 14, 1988, the date when he had actually done so. His explanation that Samonte was himself the cause of the belated filing on account of his inability to remit the correct amount of filing fees and his acceptance fees by June 10, 1988, as agreed upon, did not excuse the falsification, because his falsification was not rendered less dishonest and less corrupt by whatever reasons for filing at the later date. He ought to remember that honesty and integrity were of far greater value for him as a member of the Law Profession than his transactions with his client.Atty. Abellanas perfidy towards Samonte did not stop there. He continued misleading Samonte in explaining his mishandling of the latters civil case. Worse, he also foisted his dishonesty on the Court no less. To counter Samontes accusation about his not filing the reply in the civil case, he knowingly submitted two documents as annexes of his comment during the investigation by the IBP, and represented said documents to have been part of the records of the case in the RTC. His intention in doing so was to enhance his defense against the administrative charge. But the two documents turned out to be forged and spurious, and his forgery came to be exposed because the rubber stamp marks the documents bore were not the official marks of the RTCs, as borne out by the specimens of the official rubber stamp of Branch 5 of the RTC duly certified by Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court.43 He defended his dishonesty by lamely claiming that "court personnel were authorized to accept filing of pleadings even without the usual rubber stamp."44 In these acts, he manifested his great disrespect towards both the Court and his client.The finding on Atty. Abellanas neglect in the handling of Samontes case was entirely warranted. He admitted being tardy in attending the hearings of the civil case. He filed the formal offer of evidence in behalf of his client way beyond the period to do so, a fact that he could not deny because the RTC Judge had himself expressly noted the belated filing in the order issued in the case. Atty. Abellana was fortunate that the RTC Judge exhibited some tolerance and liberality by still admitting the belated offer of evidence in the interest of justice.In the motion for reconsideration that he filed in the IBP Board of Governors, Atty. Abellana challenged the sufficiency of the proof presented against him by Samonte, contending that such proof had consisted of merely hearsay and self-serving evidence.The contention of Atty. Abellana is bereft of substance. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the respondent lawyers. Preponderant evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.45 In order to determine if the evidence of one party is greater than that of the other, Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court instructs that the court may consider the following, namely: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.The complainants evidence preponderantly established the administrative sins of Atty. Abellana. To start with, Atty. Abellana admitted superimposing the "0" on "4" but justified himself by claiming that he had done so only because the complainant had not given to him the correct amount of filing fees required. Secondly, Atty. Abellana filed a spurious document by making it appear as one actually filed in court by using a fake rubber stamp. His misdeed was exposed because the rubber stamp imprint on his document was different from that of the official rubber stamp of the trial court. He defended himself by stating that court personnel accepted papers filed in the court without necessarily using the official rubber stamp of the court. He well knew, of course, that such statement did not fully justify his misdeed. Thirdly, Atty. Abellana did not present any proof of his alleged filings, like certified copies of the papers supposedly filed in court. His omission to prove his allegation on the filings conceded that he did not really file them. And, lastly, Atty. Abellana misrepresented the papers he had supposedly filed by stating that he was attaching them as Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment, but Annex 8 and Annex 9 turned out to be papers different from those he represented them to be.Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyers Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up ones misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his client and the Court to bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the handling of the client's case, were unmitigated. Still, the Court must not close its eyes to the fact that Atty. Abellana actually finished presenting his client's case; and that the latter initiated the termination of Atty. Abellana's engagement as his counsel only after their relationship had been tainted with mistrust. Thus, we determine the proper sanction. In Maligaya v. Doronilla, Jr., 46 the respondent lawyer was suspended for two months from the practice of law for representing in court that the complainant had agreed to withdraw the lawsuit when in truth the complainant had made no such agreement. The respondent admitted the falsity of his representation, but gave as an excuse his intention to amicably settle the case. In Molina v. Magat,47 the respondent had invoked double jeopardy in behalf of his client by stating that the complainant had filed a similar case of slight physical injuries in another court, but his invocation was false because no other case had been actually filed. He was suspended from the practice of law for six months for making the false and untruthful statement in court. For Atty. Abellana, therefore, suspension from the practice of law for six months with warning of a more severe sanction upon a repetition suffices.ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors subject to the MODIFICATION that Atty. Gines N. Abellana is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW effective upon receipt of this decision, with the stern warning that any repetition by him of the same or similar acts will be punished more severely.Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Gines N. Abellana as a member of the Philippine Bar, and copies furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts in the country.SO ORDERED.

RENATO M. MALIGAYA, complainant, vs.ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., respondent.Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate General's Service is before us on a charge of unethical conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778.1Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the February 19, 2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said:And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he [complainant Maligaya] filed before against the same defendants. We had an agreement that if we withdraw the case against him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So, with that understanding, he even retired and he is now receiving pension.2 (emphasis supplied)Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number of clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in writing and "file the appropriate pleading."3 Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no such pleading or anything else to substantiate his averments.On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.4 The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla with "misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of justice,"5 was referred to a commissioner6 for investigation. Complainant swore before the investigating commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits.7 Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two hearings to present evidence and explain his side, admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such agreement.8 Later he explained in his memorandum that his main concern was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial"9 and insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath.10 He pointed out, in addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his "alleged acts of falsity") had no effect on the continuance of the case and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.11In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a report and recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility12 and recommending that he be "suspended from the government military service as legal officer for a period of three months."13 This was adopted and approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors on August 30, 2003.14There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate in the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.15 The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly should not become a common reality.16 To this end, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility state:CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law."17Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to acknowledge the impropriety of what he had done. From the very beginning of this administrative case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had done nothing wrong in the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing so even after having admitted that he had, in that hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been meant for the information of Judge Daway but only as "a sort of question" to complainant regarding a "pending proposal" to settle the case.18The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its speciousness,19 cannot absolve him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate plain facts for the unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is in his favor, though, a presumption of good faith20 which keeps us from treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as an indication of mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only aim was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial,"21 perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that what he really meant to say was that he had intended the misrepresentation as a gambit to get the proposed agreement on the table, as it were. But even if that had been so, it would have been no justification for speaking falsely in court. There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not true. A lawyer's duty to the court to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor22 forbids recourse to such a tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to settle the case amicably, we must call him to account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that end.Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which in part declares:A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice x x x.The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the practice of law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's suspension from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a member of the legal profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyer's oath, his suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate General's Service. Of course, suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well follow as a consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason for us to impose it as a penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be going beyond the purpose of this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBP's recommendation as one for suspension from the practice of law.At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's recommendation on the duration of Atty. Doronilla's suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his liability somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge Daway's courtroom. Second, the absence of material damage to complainant may also be considered as a mitigating circumstance.23 And finally, since this is Atty. Doronilla's first offense, he is entitled to some measure of forbearance.24Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the AFP Judge Advocate General's Service.

SO ORDERED.

WALTER T. YOUNG, complainant, vs.CEASAR G. BATUEGAS, MIGUELITO NAZARENO V. LLANTINO and FRANKLIN Q. SUSA, respondents.On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating the lawyer's oath.1Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 00-187627 for Murder, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr.", pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27. On December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the "accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under detention."2 Upon personal verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana allegedly surrendered, complainant learned that he surrendered only on December 14, 2000, as shown by the Certificate of Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M. Mamauag, Chief of the Security Management Division of the NBI.Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, Branch 27, calendared the motion on December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing irregularity and other formal defects, namely, the lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant, violation of the three-day notice rule, and the failure to attach the Certificate of Detention which was referred to in the Motion as Annex "1".Respondents filed their respective comments, declaring that on December 13, 2000, upon learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail with the trial court. Then they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him to the NBI to voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the certificate of detention indicated that the accused surrendered on December 14, 2000. They argued that there was neither unethical conduct nor falsehood in the subject pleading as their client has voluntarily surrendered and was detained at the NBI. As regards the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that complainant, as private prosecutor, was not entitled to any notice. Nevertheless, they furnished the State and City prosecutors copies of the motion with notice of hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a motion on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of Court.3For his part, respondent Susa argues in his comment that he was no longer in court when his co-respondents filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail. Ms. Teofila A. Pea, Clerk III, received the said Motion and noticed that it was set for hearing on December 15, 2000 and the Certificate of Detention was not attached. However, the presiding judge instructed her to receive the Motion subject to the presentation of the Certificate of Detention before the hearing. Thus, the inclusion of the Motion in the court's calendar on December 15, 2000 was authorized by the presiding judge and, thus, was done by respondent Susa in faithful performance of his ministerial duty.In a Resolution dated August 13, 2001,4 the instant case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation or decision.On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, submitted her report and recommendation as follows:WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Atty. Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be suspended from the practice of their profession as a lawyer/member of the Bar for a period of six (6) months from receipt hereof. The complaint against Atty. Franklin Q. Susa, upon the other hand, is hereby recommended dismissed for lack of merit.5The foregoing Report and Recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline in Resolution No. XV-2002-400, to wit:RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and in view of respondents' commission of deliberate falsehood, Atty. Batuegas and Atty. Llantino are hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The complaint against Atty. Susa is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.6We agree with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner. Respondents Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood.A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.7 He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients."8 He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion.9 The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them.10 While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.11The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.12Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from them as members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted to deception.Respondents contend that their allegation of the accused's detention was merely a statement of an ultimate fact which still had to be proved by evidence at the hearing of the Motion. That they were able to show that their client was already under the custody of the NBI at the hearing held on December 15, 2000 does not exonerate them. The fact remains that the allegation that the accused was in the custody of the NBI on December 13, 2000 was false.In Comia vs. Antona, we held:It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police authorities on the same date "tentatively" scheduled for the hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such supervening event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve respondent judge from administrative liability considering that he should not have accorded recognition to the application for bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that point, were devoid of personality to ask such specific affirmative relief from the court.13In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his recommendation.14In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion for bail two days prior to the scheduled date. Although a motion may be heard on short notice, respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the non-observance of the three-day notice rule. Verily, as lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.15Finally, we are in accord with the Investigating Commissioner that respondent clerk of court should not be made administratively liable for including the Motion in the calendar of the trial court, considering that it was authorized by the presiding judge. However, he is reminded that his administrative functions, although not involving the discretion or judgment of a judge, are vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice.16 Thus, he should not hesitate to inform the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are contrary to the established rules of procedure.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty of committing deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.SO ORDERED.

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA, Respondents.Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of 27 April 2000 and the Resolution of 8 August 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451. The Court of Appeals upheld the Decision3 of 18 September 1998 and the Resolution of 24 December 1998 of the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98. The NLRC modified the Decision dated 23 December 1997 of Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante ("Labor Arbiter") in NLRC Case No. RAB VII-05-0545-94 holding that Allied Banking Corporation ("Allied Bank") illegally dismissed Potenciano L. Galanida ("Galanida"). The NLRC awarded Galanida separation pay, backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and other amounts totaling P 1,264,933.33.Antecedent FactsFor a background of this case, we quote in part from the Decision of the Court of Appeals:Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was hired by petitioner Allied Banking Corporation on 11 January 1978 and rose from accountant-book(k)eeper to assistant manager in 1991. His appointment was covered by a "Notice of Personnel Action" which provides as one of the conditions of employment the provision on petitioners right to transfer employees:"REGULAR APPOINTMENT: xxx It is understood that the bank reserves the right to transfer or assign you to other departments or branches of the bank as the need arises and in the interest of maintaining smooth and uninterrupted service to the public."Private respondent was promoted several times and was transferred to several branches as follows:"a) January, 1978 to March, 1982 Tagbilaran City Branch"b) April, 1982 to May, 1984 Lapulapu City Branch"c) June, 1984 Mandaue City Branch"d) July, 1984 to April, 1986 Tagbilaran City Branch"e) May, 1986 to May, 1987 Dumaguete City Branch"f) June, 1987 to August, 1987 Carbon Branch, Cebu City"g) September, 1987 to Sept. 1989 Lapulapu City Branch, Cebu"h) October, 1989 to Sept. 1992 Carbon Branch, Cebu City"i) October 1992 to Sept. 1994 Jakosalem Regional Branch, Cebu City" (Rollo, p. 47)Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned in the Cebu homebase, petitioner listed respondent as second in the order of priority of assistant managers to be assigned outside of Cebu City having been stationed in Cebu for seven years already. Private respondent manifested his refusal to be transferred to Bacolod City in a letter dated 19 April 1994 citing as reason parental obligations, expenses, and the anguish that would result if he is away from his family. He then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for constructive dismissal.Subsequently, petitioner bank informed private respondent (Rollo, p. 86) that he was to report to the Tagbilaran City Branch effective 23 May 1994. Private respondent refused. In a letter dated 13 June 1994, petitioner warned and required of private respondent as follows:"There is no discrimination in your transfer. In fact, among the officers mentioned, only you have refused the new assignment citing difficulty of working away from your family as if the other officers concerned do not suffer the same predicament. To exempt you from the officer transfer would result in favoritism in your favor and discrimination as against the other officers concerned."In furtherance of maintaining a smooth and uninterrupted service to the public, and in accordance with the Banks order of priority of rotating its accountants places of assignments, you are well aware that Roberto Isla, AM/Accountant, assigned in Cebu for more than ten (10) years, was, on February 14, 1994, reassigned to Iligan City Branch and then to Cagayan de Oro City Branch on June 8, 1994. Hence, your objection on the ground of your length of service is without merit.x x x"As discussed, your refusal to follow instruction concerning your transfer and reassignment to Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is penalized under Article XII of the Banks Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure [which] provides:XII Transfer and ReassignmentRefusal to follow instruction concerning transfers and reassignments.First and subsequent offenses The penalty may range from suspension to dismissal as determined by management. The employee shall be required to comply with the order of transfer and reassignment, if the penalty is not termination of employment."In view of the foregoing, please explain in writing within three (3) days from receipt hereof why no disciplinary action should be meted against you for your having refused to follow instructions concerning the foregoing transfer and reassignment." xxx4On 16 June 1994, Galanida replied that "(w)hether the banks penalty for my refusal be Suspension or Dismissal xxx it will all the more establish and fortify my complaint now pending at NLRC, RAB 7."5 In the same letter, he charged Allied Bank with discrimination and favoritism in ordering his transfer, thus:xxx What I cannot decipher now under the headship of Mr. Olveda is managements discriminatory act of transferring only the long staying accountants of Cebu in the guise of its exercise of management prerogative when in truth and in fact, the ulterior motive is to accommodate some new officers who happen to enjoy favorable connection with management. How can the bank ever justify the transfer of Melinda T. Co, a new officer who had experienced being assigned outside of Cebu for more than a year only to Tabunok Branch? If the purpose is for check and balance, is management implying that Melinda Co can better carry out such function over Mr. Larry Sabelino, who is a seasoned and experienced accountant or any of the Metro Cebu accountants for that matter? Isnt this act of management an obvious display of favoritism? xxx6On 5 October 1994, Galanida received an inter-office communication7 ("Memo") dated 8 September 1994 from Allied Banks Vice-President for Personnel, Mr. Leonso C. Pe. The Memo informed Galanida that Allied Bank had terminated his services effective 1 September 1994. The reasons given for the dismissal were: (1) Galanidas continued refusal to be transferred from the Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his refusal to report for work despite the denial of his application for additional vacation leave. The salient portion of the Memo reads:Therefore, your refusal to follow instruction concerning your transfer and reassignment to Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is without any justifiable reason and constituted violations of Article XII of the Banks EDPP xxxIn view of the foregoing, please be informed that the Bank has terminated your services effective September 1, 1994 and considered whatever benefit, if any, that you are entitled as forfeited in accordance with 04, V Administrative Penalties, page 6 of the Banks EDPP which provides as follows:"04. Dismissal.Dismissal is a permanent separation for cause xxxNotice of termination shall be issued by the Investigation Committee subject to the confirmation of the President or his authorized representative as officer/employee who is terminated for cause shall not be eligible to receive any benefit arising from her/his employment with the Bank or to termination pay."It is understood that the termination of your service shall be without prejudice to whatever legal remedies which the Bank may have already undertaken and/or will undertake against you.Please be guided accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)8The Ruling of the Labor ArbiterAfter several hearings, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank had abused its management prerogative in ordering the transfer of Galanida to its Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches. In ruling that Galanidas refusal to transfer did not amount to insubordination, the Labor Arbiter misquoted this Courts decision in Dosch v. NLRC,9 thus:As a general rule, the right to transfer or reassign an employee is recognized as an employers exclusive right and the prerogative of management (Abbott Laboratories vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 713 [1987]).The exercise of this right, is not however, absolute. It has certain limitations. Thus, in Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et al. 123 SCRA 296 (1983), the Supreme Court, ruled:"While it may be true that the right to transfer or reassign an employee is an employers exclusive right and the prerogative of management, such right is not absolute. The right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employee is limited by the paramount police power xxx for the relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual but impressed with public interest. xxx And neither capital nor labor shall act oppressively against each other.Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such (sic) as that of being away from the family."10 (Underscoring supplied by the Labor Arbiter)The Labor Arbiter reasoned that Galanidas transfer was inconvenient and prejudicial because Galanida would have to incur additional expenses for board, lodging and travel. On the other hand, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank failed to show any business urgency that would justify the transfer.The Labor Arbiter also gave credence to Galanidas claim that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special treatment. The Labor Arbiter stated that Allied Bank deliberately left out Ms. Cos name from the list of accountants transferred to Cebu as contained in Allied Banks letter dated 13 June 1994. However, Mr. Regidor Olveda, Allied Banks Vice President for Operations Accounting, testified that the bank transferred Ms. Co to the Tabunok, Cebu branch within the first half of 1994.Still, the Labor Arbiter declined to award Galanida back wages because he was not entirely free from blame. Since another bank had already employed Galanida, the Labor Arbiter granted Galanida separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters Decision of 23 December 1997 provides:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Allied Banking Corporation to pay complainant the aggregate total amount of Three Hundred Twenty Four Thousand Pesos (P 324,000.00) representing the following awards:a) Separation pay for P 272,000.00;b) Quarter bonus for 1994 P 16,000.00;c) 13th month pay for 1994 P 16,000.00;d) Refund of contribution to Provident Fund - P 20,000.00.SO ORDERED.11The Ruling of the NLRCOn appeal, the NLRC likewise ruled that Allied Bank terminated Galanida without just cause. The NLRC agreed that the transfer order was unreasonable and unjustified, considering the family considerations mentioned by Galanida. The NLRC characterized the transfer as a demotion since the Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches were smaller than the Jakosalem branch, a regional office, and because the bank wanted Galanida, an assistant manager, to replace an assistant accountant in the Tagbilaran branch. The NLRC found unlawful discrimination since Allied Bank did not transfer several junior accountants in Cebu. The NLRC also held that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special treatment by assigning her to Cebu even though she had worked for the bank for less than two years.The NLRC ruled that Galanidas termination was illegal for lack of due process. The NLRC stated that Allied Bank did not conduct any hearing. The NLRC declared that Allied Bank failed to send a termination notice, as required by law for a valid termination. The Memo merely stated that Allied Bank would issue a notice of termination, but the bank did not issue any notice.The NLRC concluded that Allied Bank dismissed Galanida in bad faith, tantamount to an unfair labor practice as the dismissal undermined Galanidas right to security of tenure and equal protection of the laws. On these grounds, the NLRC promulgated its Decision of 18 September 1998, the relevant portion of which states:In this particular case, We view as impractical, unrealistic and no longer advantageous to both parties to order reinstatement of the complainant. xxx For lack of sufficient basis, We deny the claim for 1994 quarter bonus. Likewise, no attorneys fees is awarded as counsels for complainant-appellee are from the City Prosecutors Office of Cebu.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated December 23, 1997 is hereby MODIFIED by increasing the award of separation pay and granting in addition thereto backwages, moral and exemplary damages. The respondent-appellant, ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, is thus ordered to pay to herein complainant-appellee, POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA, the following amounts:a)P 336,000.00,representing separation payb>P 833,600.00,representing backwagesc>P 5,333.23representing proportional 1994 13th month payd>P 20,000.00representing refund of Provident Fund Contributione>P 50,000.00representing moral damagesf>P 20,000.00representing exemplary damages===========P 1,264,933.33TOTAL AWARDAll other claims are dismissed for lack of basis. The other respondents are dropped for lack of sufficient basis that they acted in excess of their corporate powers.SO ORDERED.12Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in its Resolution of 24 December 1998.13Dissatisfied, Allied Bank filed a petition for review questioning the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC before the Court of Appeals.The Ruling of the Court of AppealsCiting Dosch v. NLRC,14 the Court of Appeals held that Galanidas refusal to comply with the transfer orders did not warrant his dismissal. The appellate court ruled that the transfer from a regional office to the smaller Bacolod or Tagbilaran branches was effectively a demotion. The appellate court agreed that Allied Bank did not afford Galanida procedural due process because there was no hearing and no notice of termination. The Memo merely stated that the bank would issue a notice of termination but there was no such notice.The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the NLRC in its Decision of 27 April 2000, thus:WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision of public respondent NLRC is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED. 15Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied in its Resolution of 8 August 2000.16On 26 April 2001, Allied Bank appealed the appellate courts decision and resolution to the Supreme Court. Allied Bank prayed that the Supreme Court: (1) issue a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction ex parte to restrain the implementation or execution of the questioned Decision and Resolution; (2) declare Galanidas termination as valid and legal; (3) set aside the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution; (4) make permanent the restraining order or preliminary injunction; (5) order Galanida to pay the costs; and (6) order other equitable reliefs.The IssuesAllied Bank raises the following issues:1. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN PETITIONERS EXERCISE OF ITS MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE.2. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS VIOLATIONS OF COMPANY RULES CONSTITUTE A GROUND TO WARRANT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL.3. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT ALLIED BANK AFFORDED PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE REQUIRED DUE PROCESS.4. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS, THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CANNOT RECOVER ANY MONETARY AWARD.17In sum, Allied Bank argues that the transfer of Galanida was a valid exercise of its management prerogative. Allied Bank contends that Galanidas continued refusal to obey the transfer orders constituted willful disobedience or insubordination, which is a just cause for termination under the Labor Code.On the other hand, Galanida defended his right to refuse the transfer order. The memorandum for Galanida filed with this Court, prepared: by Atty. Loreto M. Durano, again misquoted the Courts ruling in Dosch v. NLRC, thus xxx His [Galanidas] refusal to transfer falls well within the ruling of the Supreme Court in Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et. al., 123 SCRA 296 (1983) quoted as follows:x x xRefusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being away from the family."18The Ruling of the CourtThe petition is partly meritorious.Preliminary Matter: Misquoting Decisions of the Supreme CourtThe memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano and, worse, the assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter, both misquoted the Supreme Courts ruling in Dosch v. NLRC. The Court held in Dosch:We cannot agree to Northwests submission that petitioner was guilty of disobedience and insubordination which respondent Commission sustained. The only piece of evidence on which Northwest bases the charge of contumacious refusal is petitioners letter dated August 28, 1975 to R.C. Jenkins wherein petitioner acknowledged receipt of the formers memorandum dated August 18, 1975, appreciated his promotion to Director of International Sales but at the same time regretted "that at this time for personal reasons and reasons of my family, I am unable to accept the transfer from the Philippines" and thereafter expressed his preference to remain in his position, saying: "I would, therefore, prefer to remain in my position of Manager-Philippines until such time that my services in that capacity are no longer required by Northwest Airlines." From this evidence, We cannot discern even the slightest hint of defiance, much less imply insubordination on the part of petitioner.19The phrase "[r]efusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being away from the family" does not appear anywhere in the Dosch decision. Galanidas counsel lifted the erroneous phrase from one of the italicized lines in the syllabus of Dosch found in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated ("SCRA").The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports of Supreme Court decisions or resolutions is not the work of the Court, nor does it state this Courts decision. The syllabus is simply the work of the reporter who gives his understanding of the decision. The reporter writes the syllabus for the convenience of lawyers in reading the reports. A syllabus is not a part of the courts decision.20 A counsel should not cite a syllabus in place of the carefully considered text in the decision of the Court.In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and Atty. Durano began by quoting from Dosch, but substituted a portion of the decision with a headnote from the SCRA syllabus, which they even underscored. In short, they deliberately made the quote from the SCRA syllabus appear as the words of the Supreme Court. We admonish them for what is at the least patent carelessness, if not an outright attempt to mislead the parties and the courts taking cognizance of this case. Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority. It is the duty of all officers of the court to cite the rulings and decisions of the Supreme Court accurately.21Whether Galanida was dismissed for just causeWe accord great weight and even finality to the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, particularly when they affirm the findings of the NLRC or the lower courts. However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule. These exceptions are: (1) when the findings are grounded on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are conflicting; (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, has gone beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the judgment of the appellate court is premised on a misapprehension of facts or when it has failed to consider certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and (8) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.22 After a scrutiny of the records, we find that some of these exceptions obtain in the present case.The rule is that the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of the employers prerogatives.23 The employer exercises the prerogative to transfer an employee for valid reasons and according to the requirement of its business, provided the transfer does not result in demotion in rank or diminution of the employees salary, benefits and other privileges.24 In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of showing that the transfer is not unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced employee.25The constant transfer of bank officers and personnel with accounting responsibilities from one branch to another is a standard practice of Allied Bank, which has more than a hundred branches throughout the country.26 Allied Bank does this primarily for internal control. It also enables bank employees to gain the necessary experience for eventual promotion. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, in its Manual of Regulations for Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries,27 requires the rotation of these personnel. The Manual directs that the "duties of personnel handling cash, securities and bookkeeping records should be rotated" and that such rotation "should be irregular, unannounced and long enough to permit disclosure of any irregularities or manipulations."28Galanida was well aware of Allied Banks policy of periodically transferring personnel to different branches. As the Court of Appeals found, assignment to the different branches of Allied Bank was a condition of Galanidas employment. Galanida consented to this condition when he signed the Notice of Personnel Action.29The evidence on record contradicts the charge that Allied Bank discriminated against Galanida and was in bad faith when it ordered his transfer. Allied Banks letter of 13 June 199430 showed that at least 14 accounting officers and personnel from various branches, including Galanida, were transferred to other branches. Allied Bank did not single out Galanida. The same letter explained that Galanida was second in line for assignment outside Cebu because he had been in Cebu for seven years already. The person first in line, Assistant Manager Roberto Isla, who had been in Cebu for more than ten years, had already transferred to a branch in Cagayan de Oro City. We note that none of the other transferees joined Galanida in his complaint or corroborated his allegations of widespread discrimination and favoritism.As regards Ms. Co, Galanidas letter of 16 June 1994 itself showed that her assignment to Cebu was not in any way related to Galanidas transfer. Ms. Co was supposed to replace a certain Larry Sabelino in the Tabunok branch. The employer has the prerogative, based on its assessment of the employees qualifications and competence, to rotate them in the various areas of its business operations to ascertain where they will function with maximum benefit to the company.31Neither was Galanidas transfer in the nature of a demotion. Galanida did not present evidence showing that the transfer would diminish his salary, benefits or other privileges. Instead, Allied Banks letter of 13 June 1994 assured Galanida that he would not suffer any reduction in rank or grade, and that the transfer would involve the same rank, duties and obligations. Mr. Olveda explained this further in the affidavit he submitted to the Labor Arbiter, thus:19. There is no demotion in position/rank or diminution of complainants salary, benefits and other privileges as the transfer/assignment of branch officers is premised on the role/functions that they will assume in the management and operations of the branch, as shown below:(a) The Branch Accountant, as controller of the branch is responsible for the proper discharge of the functions of the accounting section of the branch, review of documentation/proper accounting and control of transaction. As such, the accounting functions in the branch can be assumed by any of the following officers with the rank of: Senior Manager/Acctg.; Manager/ Acctg.; Senior Asst. Manager/Acctg.; Asst. Manager/Acctg.; Accountant or Asst. Accountant.20. The transfer/assignment of branch officer from one branch, to another branch/office is lateral in nature and carries with it the same position/rank, salary, benefits and other privileges. The assignment/transfer is for the officer to assume the functions relative to his job and NOT the position/rank of the officer to be replaced.There is also no basis for the finding that Allied Bank was guilty of unfair labor practice in dismissing Galanida. Unfair labor practices relate only to violations of "the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization"32 and are limited to the acts enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code, none of which applies to the present case. There is no evidence that Galanida took part in forming a union, or even that a union existed in Allied Bank.This leaves the issue of whether Galanida could validly refuse the transfer orders on the ground of parental obligations, additional expenses, and the anguish he would suffer if assigned away from his family.The Court has ruled on this issue before. In the case of Homeowners Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. NLRC,33 we held:The acceptability of the proposition that transfer made by an employer for an illicit or underhanded purpose i.e., to defeat an employees right to self-organization, to rid himself of an undesirable worker, or to penalize an employee for union activities cannot be upheld is self-evident and cannot be gainsaid. The difficulty lies in the situation where no such illicit, improper or underhanded purpose can be ascribed to the employer, the objection to the transfer being grounded solely upon the personal inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the employee by reason of the transfer. What then?This was the very same situation we faced in Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v. Laplana. In that case, the employee, Alicia Laplana, was a cashier at the Baguio City Branch of PT&T who was directed to transfer to the companys branch office at Laoag City. In refusing the transfer, the employee averred that she had established Baguio City as her permanent residence and that such transfer will involve additional expenses on her part, plus the fact that an assignment to a far place will be a big sacrifice for her as she will be kept away from her family which might adversely affect her efficiency. In ruling for the employer, the Court upheld the transfer from one city to another within the country as valid as long as there is no bad faith on the part of the employer. We held then:"Certainly the Court cannot accept the proposition that when an employee opposes his employers decision to transfer him to another work place, there being no bad faith or underhanded motives on the part of either party, it is the employees wishes that should be made to prevail."Galanida, through counsel, invokes the Courts ruling in Dosch v. NLRC.34 Dosch, however, is not applicable to the present case. Helmut Dosch refused a transfer consequential to a promotion. We upheld the refusal because no law compels an employee to accept a promotion, and because the position Dosch was supposed to be promoted to did not even exist at that time.35 This left as the only basis for the charge of insubordination a letter from Dosch in which the Court found "not even the slightest hint of defiance, much less xxx insubordination."36Moreover, the transfer of an employee to an overseas post, as in the Dosch case, cannot be likened to a transfer from one city to another within the country,37 which is the situation in the present case. The distance from Cebu City to Bacolod City or from Cebu City to Tagbilaran City does not exceed the distance from Baguio City to Laoag City or from Baguio City to Manila, which the Court considered a reasonable distance in PT&T v. Laplana.38The refusal to obey a valid transfer order constitutes willful disobedience of a lawful order of an employer.39 Employees may object to, negotiate and seek redress against employers for rules or orders that they regard as unjust or illegal. However, until and unless these rules or orders are declared illegal or improper by competent authority, the employees ignore or disobey them at their peril.40 For Galanidas continued refusal to obey Allied Banks transfer orders, we hold that the bank dismissed Galanida for just cause in accordance with Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code.41 Galanida is thus not entitled to reinstatement or to separation pay.Whether Galanidas dismissal violated therequirement of notice and hearingTo be effective, a dismissal must comply with Section 2 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code ("Omnibus Rules"), which provides:For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds of termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.The first written notice was embodied in Allied Banks letter of 13 June 1994. The first notice required Galanida to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his refusal to comply with the transfer orders.On the requirement of a hearing, this Court has held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard.42 An actual hearing is not necessary. The exchange of several letters, in which Galanidas wife, a lawyer with the City Prosecutors Office, assisted him, gave Galanida an opportunity to respond to the charges against him.The remaining issue is whether the Memo dated 8 September 1994 sent to Galanida constitutes the written notice of termination required by the Omnibus Rules. In finding that it did not, the Court of Appeals and the NLRC cited Allied Banks rule on dismissals, quoted in the Memo, that, "Notice of termination shall be issued by the Investigation Committee subject to the confirmation of the President or his authorized representative."43 The appellate court and NLRC held that Allied Bank did not send any notice of termination to Galanida. The Memo, with the heading "Transfer and Reassignment," was not the termination notice required by law.We do not agree.Even a cursory reading of the Memo will show that it unequivocally informed Galanida of Allied Banks decision to dismiss him. The statement, "please be informed that the Bank has terminated your services effective September 1, 1994 and considered whatever benefit, if any, that you are entitled [to] as forfeited xxx"44 is plainly worded and needs no interpretation. The Memo also discussed the findings of the Investigation Committee that served as grounds for Galanidas dismissal. The Memo referred to Galanidas "open defiance and refusal" to transfer first to the Bacolod City branch and then to the Tagbilaran City branch. The Memo also mentioned his continued refusal to report for work despite the denial of his application for additional vacation leave.45 The Memo also refuted Galanidas charges of discrimination and demotion, and concluded that he had violated Article XII of the banks Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure.The Memo, although captioned "Transfer and Reassignment," did not preclude it from being a notice of termination. The Court has held that the nature of an instrument is characterized not by the title given to it but by its body and contents.46 Moreover, it appears that Galanida himself regarded the Memo as a notice of termination. We quote from the Memorandum for Private Respondent-Appellee, as follows:The proceedings may be capsulized as follows:1. On March 13, 199447 Private Respondent-Appellee filed before the Region VII Arbitration Branch a Complaint for Constructive Dismissal. A copy of the Complaint is attached to the Petition as Annex "H";5. On September 8, 1994, Petitioner-Appellant issued him a Letter of Termination. A copy of said letter is attached to the Petition as Annex "N";6. Private Respondent-Appellee filed an Amended/ Supplemental Complaint wherein he alleged illegal dismissal. A copy of the Amended/Supplemental Complaint is attached to the Petition as Annex "O"; xxx 48 (Emphasis supplied)The Memorandum for Private Respondent-Appellee refers to the Memo as a "Letter of Termination." Further, Galanida amended his complaint for constructive dismissal49 to one for illegal dismissal50 after he received the Memo. Clearly, Galanida had understood the Memo to mean that Allied Bank had terminated his services.The Memo complied with Allied Banks internal rules which required the banks President or his authorized representative to confirm the notice of termination. The banks Vice-President for Personnel, as the head of the department that handles the movement of personnel within Allied Bank, can certainly represent the bank president in cases involving the dismissal of employees.Nevertheless, we agree that the Memo suffered from certain errors.1wphi1 Although the Memo stated that Allied Bank terminated Galanidas services as of 1 September 1994, the Memo bore the date 8 September 1994. More importantly, Galanida only received a copy of the Memo on 5 October 1994, or more than a month after the supposed date of his dismissal. To be effective, a written notice of termination must be served on the employee.51 Allied Bank could not terminate Galanida on 1 September 1994 because he had not received as of that date the notice of Allied Banks decision to dismiss him. Galanidas dismissal could only take effect on 5 October 1994, upon his receipt of the Memo. For this reason, Galanida is entitled to backwages for the period from 1 September 1994 to 4 October 1994.Under the circumstances, we also find an award of P 10,000 in nominal damages proper. Courts award nominal damages to recognize or vindicate the right of a person that another has violated.52 The law entitles Galanida to receive timely notice of Allied Banks decision to dismiss him. Allied Bank should have exercised more care in issuing the notice of termination.WHEREFORE, the Decision of 27 April 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451 upholding the Decision of 18 September 1998 of the NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98 is AFFIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS:1) The awards of separation pay, moral damages and exemplary damages are hereby deleted for lack of basis;2) Reducing the award of backwages to cover only the period from 1 September 1994 to 4 October 1994; and3) Awarding nominal damages to private respondent for P 10,000.This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Decision, of the backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, due to Potenciano L. Galanida for the time his dismissal was ineffectual from 1 September 1994 until 4 October 1994.Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty. Loreto M. Durano are ADMONISHED to be more careful in citing the decisions of the Supreme Court in the future.SO ORDERED.

CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO, respondent.1. LEGAL ETHICS; MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL; VIOLATION OF OATH NOT DELAY ANY MAN OR MONEY OR MALICE; SUSPENSION FOR ONE YEAR FROM PRACTICE OF LAW FOR GROSS ABUSE OF RIGHT OF RECOURSE TO THE COURTS BY ARGUING A CAUSE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY WITHOUT MERIT. The cause of the respondent's client is obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was consistently denied, as he should have expected . . . By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court . . . For this serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership of the Philippine bar.R E S O L U T I O NPER CURIAM, p:In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on October 6, 1992, Concordia B. Garcia seeks the disbarment of Atty. Crisanto L. Francisco.On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her husband Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and Felisa and Magdalena Baetiong leashed a parcel of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25 years beginning May 1, 1964. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, Lee refused to vacate after the expiration of the lease. Lee claimed that he had an option to extend the lease for another 5 years and the right of pre-emption over the property.In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced various suits before different courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and that all these proceedings were decided against Lee. The proceedings stemmed from the said lease contract and involved the same issues and parties, thus violating the proscription against forum-shopping.Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in defense of his client's right only such remedies as were authorized by law.The tangle of recourses employed by Francisco is narrated as follows:1. On March 29, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed a complaint against Garcia and the other lessors for specific performance and reconveyance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2118. On June 9, 1989, Garcia filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action, laches and prescription. The case was dismissed by Judge Felimon Mendoza on August 10, 1989.2. On May 29, 1989, Garcia and the other lessors filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Lee in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1455. Through Francisco, Lee filed an answer alleging as special and affirmative defense the pendency of Civil Case no. Q-89-2118 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 5, 1989, Judge Marcelino Bautista issued a resolution rejecting this allegation on the ground that the issues before the two courts were separate and different.3. On October 24, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Bautista, Garcia and the other lessors. This was docketed as civil Case No. Q-89-3833. In filing this petition, Francisco knew or should have known that it violated the Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting the filing of petitions for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court.Francisco claims that what he appealed to the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was the denial of his prayer for dismissal of Civil Case No. 1455. This is not true. Civil Case Q-89-3833 was clearly a special civil action and not an appeal.On November 13, 1989, Judge Abraham Vera issued an order enjoining Judge Bautista from proceeding with the trial of the unlawful detainer case. Upon motion of the complainant, however, the injunction was set aside and Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was dismissed on January 9, 1990. Lee did not appeal.4. On April 6, 1990, Lee through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals against Judge Vera, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors. Docketed as CA G.R. Sp No. 20476, the petition assailed the January 9, 1990 order of Judge Vera dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-3833. On May 31, 1989, the petition was denied.5. On June 14, 1990, Judge Singzon decided Civil Case no. 1455 in favor of complainant Garcia and the other lessors. Lee did not appeal. Instead, on, June 21, 1990, through Francisco again, he filed a petition against Judge Singzon and the other lessors for certiorari and annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 1455 and damages with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil case No. 90-5852 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, presided by Judge Cesar C. Paralejo.In Francisco's comment before us, he alleges that Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 is an appeal from the unlawful detainer case. Again, he lies. Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 was a specified civil action and not an appeal.On July 2, 1990, Garcia's group filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 90-5852. On July 13, 1990, Judge Paralejo issued an order enjoining Judge Singzon from enforcing the decision in that case. Garcia attacked this order in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction docketed as CA Sp. No. 22392. The petition was granted by the Court of Appeals on September 19, 1991, on the ground that the judgment in the unlawful detainer case had come final and executory as June 30, 1990.6. On September 24, 1991, Garcia filed a motion for execution in the unlawful detainer case. On September 27, 1991, Lee, through Francisco, filed a motion to inhibit Judge Singzon and to defer the hearing of the motion. A writ of execution was nonetheless issued by Judge Singzon on October 8, 1991.7. Two days later, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors. This Court denied the petition on January 27, 1992, and reconsideration on April 8, 1992.8. Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to set aside and declare the writs of execution in Civil Case No. 1455. This was dismissed on August 4, 1992, and Lee, through Francisco, filed a motion for reconsideration. According to Francisco, he was relieved as counsel while this motion was pending.A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice.The cause of the respondent's client in obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was consistently denied, as he should have expected. He thereby added to the already clogged dockets of the courts and wasted their valuable time. He also caused much inconvenience and expense to the complainant, who was obliged to defend herself against his every move.By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defense only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court.Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer on March 2, 1956. Considering his age and experience in the practice of the laws, he should have known better than to trifle with it and to use it as an instrument for harassment of the complainant and the misuse of judicial processes. For this serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only as punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example.Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar.Let a copy of this Resolution be served immediately on the respondent and circularized to all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.SO ORDERED.

DANIEL LEMOINE, complainant,vs.ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR., respondent.On December 17, 1999, complainant Daniel Lemoine, a French national, filed a verified complaint1 against respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., for estafa and misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 99-679, was referred by the Commission on Bar Discipline to an Investigator for investigation, report and recommendation.The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:In early 1998, complainant filed a car insurance claim with the Metropolitan Insurance Company (Metropolitan Insurance), the insurer of his vehicle which was lost. As complainant encountered problems in pursuing his claim which was initially rejected,2 his friend, a certain Jesus "Jess" Garcia (Garcia), arranged for the engagement of respondents services.By letter3 of October 21, 1998 addressed to Elde Management, Inc., "ATTN: Mr. Daniel Lemoine," under whose care complainant could be reached, respondent advised complainant, whom he had not before met, that for his legal services he was charging "25% of the actual amount being recovered. . . payable upon successful recovery;" an advance payment of P50,000.00 "to be charged [to complainant] to be deducted from whatever amount [would] be successfully collected;" P1,000.00 "as appearance and conference fee for each and every court hearings, conferences outside our law office and meetings before the Office of the Insurance Commission which will be also charged to our 25% recovery fee;" and legal expenses "such as but not limited to filing fee, messengerial and postage expenses . . . and other miscellaneous but related expenses," to be charged to complainants account which would be reimbursed upon presentation of statement of account.The letter-proposal of respondent regarding attorneys fees does not bear complainants conformity, he not having agreed therewith.It appears that Metropolitan Insurance finally offered to settle complainants claim, for by lett