# 5 CASE TITLE: Heinz Heck vs City Prosecutor Casiano A. Gamotin, Jr.A.C. 5329 March 18, 2014Bersamin J.

Petitioners Claim: Petitioner filed a complaint for disbarment against then City Prosecutor Casiano Gamotin of Cagayan de Oro City for faulty, highly improper, suspicious, anomalous, and unlawful practice by the respondent. Respondent also obstructed justice by delaying cases and disregarding proper court procedures, and displayed favor towards Atty Azada, respondents business partner and friends.

Respondents Claim: Respondent claims that he has no knowledge of the suspension of Atty Adaza because such information had not been disseminated to the public offices. He also claimed that there were no irregularities in the filing and resolution of the motion for reconsideration of Atty Adaza, in a different case. Respondent also asserts that he did not display any act of violence, particularly the kicking of the chair and slamming of the door.

Issue: Whether or not respondent breached any canon on professional conduct or legal ethics.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to prove the charges filed. The evidence adduced by the complainant insufficient to warrant the disbarment of the respondent. The power to disbar, being the most severe form of disciplinary action, must be exercised with caution. It must be exercised only for the most imperative reasons and in cases of clear misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.

#8 CASE TITLE : Judge Adoracion Angeles vs. Judge Maria Elisa Sempio Diy, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2248, September 29, 2010Facts:Judge Angeles filed a complaint for disbarment and dismissal against Judge Sempio-Diy, alleging that the latter violated the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, New Code of Judicial Conduct, Code of Judicial Ethics, Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials. This complaint stemmed from the consolidated cases of People vs. Pacay and People vs. Ganias, which was presided by Judge Sempio-Diy.It appears that in that case, the Decision, of which all accused were acquitted except one, was promulgated after 6 months from the time it was submitted for resolution. Moreover, when the accused filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, against which the prosecution filed an Opposition, it was not until more than 6 months later that Judge Sempio-Diy denied that Motion for lack of merit.For her part, Judge Sempio-Diy replied that the promulgation of the Decision was repeatedly postponed due to a medical check-up, and that she had recently arrived from a trip in the US to attend a symposium. Also, she stated that she had requested for several extensions from the Supreme Court pertaining to the repeated postponement of the promulgation.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Sempio-Diy was guilty of unreasonable delay in rendering the Decision.

Held:No. Judge Sempio Diy timely sought for three successive extensions of the period to decide the consolidated criminal cases, and those requests were favorably considered by this Court.However, there was indeed delay in resolving accuseds Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. When the prosecution filed an Opposition to that Motion, the defense failed to file its reply thereto. She readily admits that it was only after the semi-annual inventory that the pending incidents in the consolidated criminal cases were discovered. Considering that this is her first infraction due to inadvertence, admonition would suffice.

# 10 CASE TITLE : Makar vs. Honorable Indar

Petitioners Claim: Complainants charged respondents Judge Indar and Amilil with serious misconduct, grave abuse of discretion, oppression, evident bad faith, manifestpartiality and gross ignorance of the law in connection with the issuance entitled In the Matter of Insolvencia Voluntaria de Olarte Hermanos y Cia, Heirs of the Late Alberto P. Olarte, etc., Petitioners. Complainants allege that respondents Judge Indar and Amilil are "guilty of violating the permanent writ of injunction which the Intermediate Appellate Court issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 02613 and affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. No. 73457, (which voided the December 7, 1983 order of Judge Singayao), by resurrecting the same in an order issued ex parte on February 14, 2005, and directed the implementation thereof, despite knowledge of its nullity.

Respondents Claim: Respondents Judge Indar and Amilil deny the allegations in the complaint. Respondent Judge Indar claims that since the filing of the petition to revive the case was made on May 3, 2004, neither party made any reference to the fact that the Order dated December 7, 1983 of Judge Singayao had been nullified and set aside by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. He also asserts that he issued the Order dated February 14, 2005 on the ground that he found the party's motion for execution meritorious. It was only when complainants filed a motion for reconsideration to set aside the said order did he come to know of the said Court of Appeals and Supreme Court decisions. Respondent Judge Indar intimated that he even had to go through six volumes of rollo in the bodega and verify with the Court of Appeals the authenticity of its decision dated November 21, 1986 since what he found attached to the records was an unreadable and uncertified copy of the said decision. Respondents Judge Indar and Amilil contend that the administrative case filed against them is designed to harass and malign them. They allege that two other complaints have been filed against them by the complainants for indirect contempt and for graft and corruption. Thus, respondents Judge Indar and Amilil also seek the disbarment of complainants' counsels for allegedly being dishonest and in bad faith when they filed the instant administrative case.

Issue: W/N respondents should be admistratively liable.

Ruling:

Yes. The facts established from the records of the case and the pleadings filed before the Investigating Justice are insufficient to support a finding of gross ignorance of the law on the part of the respondent Judge. To be held liable therefore, "the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate and malicious." Respondent Judge may have erred in the issuance of the February 14, 2005 Order, but such error has not been shown to be gross or patent. He cannot, however, be completely absolved of administrative liability. Respondent Judge Indar failed to conform with the high standards of competence and diligence required of judges under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly the following Rules:

Rule 3.01.A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

Rule 3.02.In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interest, public opinion or fear or criticism.

Rule 3.08.A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.

Rule 3.09.A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.

In the instant case, respondent Judge Indar failed to exert due diligence required of him to ascertain the facts of the case before he came out with the Order. Had he taken time and effort to read and examine the pleadings and the records of the case, he could have known that the Order dated December 7, 1983 was already nullified and set aside by the Court of Appeals. With regard to respondent Amilil, this Court agrees with the Investigating Justice that the records and pleadings filed have established his administrative liability Indeed, the clerk of court is an essential officer of our judicial system. As a ranking officer of the court, he performs delicate administrative functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice. As custodian of judicial records, it is incumbent upon the clerk of court to ensure an orderly and efficient court management system in the court, and to supervise the personnel under his office to function effectively. A clerk of court plays a key role in the complement of the court and cannot be permitted to slacken his job under one pretext or another. In fact, it has been held that branch clerks of court are chiefly responsible for the shortcomings of subordinates to whom administrative functions normally pertaining to the branch clerk of court were delegated. Hence, clerks of court must be assiduous in performing official duty and in supervising and managing court dockets and records. Clearly, it is respondent Amilil's duty as OIC Clerk of Court to safely keep all files, pleadings and files committed to his charge. As custodian of these records, it is incumbent upon him to see to it that court orders were sent with dispatch to the parties concerned. Respondent Amilil should ensure an orderly and efficient record management system to assist all personnel, including respondent Judge Indar, in the performance of their respective duties. Unfortunately, respondent Amilil failed to live up to these standards. Respondents Judge Indar and Amilil are reminded that as public officers, they are recipients of public trust, and are thus under obligation to perform the duties of their offices honestly, faithfully, andto the best of their ability. Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility which court officials and employees are mandated to observe, inview of their exalted position as keepers of the public faith. They are constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence the performance of official functions must be avoided. The Court will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violatet the norm of public accountability and diminish the people's faith in the judiciary.

# 13 Case Title: Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Cader P. Indar (A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232)

Petitioners Claims:This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by JudgeIndar.According to JusticeBorreta, JudgeIndarsact of issuing decisions on annulment of marriage cases without complying with the stringent procedural and substantive requirements of the Rules of Court for such cases clearly violates the Code of Judicial Conduct. JudgeIndarmade it appear that the annulment cases underwent trial, when the records show no judicial proceedings occurred.Respondents Claims:JudgeIndarexplained, in a Letter, that this court is a Court of General Jurisdiction and can therefore act even on cases involving Family Relations.Issue:Whether JudgeIndaris guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.Ruling:Public office is a public trust. This constitutional principle requires a judge, like any other public servant and more so because of his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity. As the visible representation of the law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the people.JudgeIndar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.JudgeIndarmade it appear in his Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding marriages, when quite the contrary is true, violating Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge perform official duties honestly.Indisputably, JudgeIndarsgross misconduct and dishonesty likewise constitute a breach of the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility:CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION.In addition, JudgeIndarsdishonest act of issuing decisions making it appear that the annulment cases underwent trial and complied with the Rules of Court, laws, and established jurisprudence violates the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. Such violation is also a ground for disbarment.

# 15 CASE TITLE: Reynaria Barcenas vs. Atty. Anorlito AlveroA.C. No. 8159 April 23, 2010Facts: On May 7, 2004, Barcenas, through her employee Rodolfo San Antonio, entrusted to Atty. Alvero the amount of P300,000, which the latter was supposed to give to a certain Amanda Gasta to redeem the rights of his deceased father as tenant of a ricefield located in Barangay San Benito, Victoria, Laguna. The receipt of the money was evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt dated May 7, 2004. In the said receipt, Atty. Alvero said that he would deposit the money in court because Amanda Gasta refused to accept the same.Later, Barcenas found out that Atty. Alvero was losing a lot of money in cockfights. To check if the money they gave Atty. Alvero was still intact, Barcenas pretended to borrow P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 and promised to return the amount when needed or as soon as the case was set for hearing. However, Atty. Alvero allegedly replied, Akala nyo ba ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte na? Subsequently, Barcenas discovered that Atty. Alvero did not deposit the money in court, but instead converted and used the same for his personal needs. Despite repeated demands to return the money, Atty. Alvero refused. Hence, Barcenas filed a case with the IBP. Atty. Alvero stressed that there was no lawyer-client relationship between him and Barcenas. He, however, insisted that the lawyer-client relationship between him and San Antonio still subsisted as his service was never severed by the latter. He further emphasized that he had not breached the trust of his client, since he had, in fact, manifested his willingness to return the said amount as long as his lawyer-client relationship with San Antonio subsisted.Issue: hether or not Atty. Alvero breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional ResponsibilityRuling: Yes. Atty. Alvero breached 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. There is a clear breach of lawyer-client relations. When a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. These, Atty. Alvero failed to do. Jurisprudence dictates that a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and properties of his client in the course of his professional employment shall deliver the same to his client (a) when they become due, or (b) upon demand. In the instant case, respondent failed to account for and return the P300,000.00 despite complainant's repeated demands.

#16 Case title: Jessie R. De Leon vs. Atty. Eduardo G. Castelo, A.C. No. 8620, January 12, 2011.Petitioners claim: Respondent was accused of filing various pleadings on behalf of parties who were already deceased. To all attorneys, truthfulness and honesty have the highest value, for, as the Court has said in Young v. Batuegas: A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion.Respondents claim: the respondents claim in his comment that he had represented the Lim family was a deception, because the subject of the complaint against the respondent was his filing of the answers in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu despite their being already deceased at the time of the filing. The complainant regarded as baseless the justifications of the Office of the City Prosecutor for Malabon City in dismissing the criminal complaint against the respondent and in denying his motion for reconsideration.The Court usually first refers administrative complaints against members of the Philippine Bar to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and appropriate recommendations. For the present case, however, we forego the prior referral of the complaint to the IBP, in view of the facts being uncomplicated and based on the pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN. Thus, we decide the complaint on its merits.Issue: whether or not the respondent is guilty of falsehood.Ruling: We find that the respondent, as attorney, did not commit any falsehood or falsification in his pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN. Accordingly, we dismiss the patently frivolous complaint. A lawyers reputation is, indeed, a very fragile object. The Court, whose officer every lawyer is, must shield such fragility from mindless assault by the unscrupulous and the malicious. It can do so, firstly, by quickly cutting down any patently frivolous complaint against a lawyer; and, secondly, by demanding good faith from whoever brings any accusation of unethical conduct. A Bar that is insulated from intimidation and harassment is encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can then best contribute to the efficient delivery and proper administration of justice.The complainant initiated his complaint possibly for the sake of harassing the respondent, either to vex him for taking the cudgels for his clients in connection with Civil Case No. 4674MN, or to get even for an imagined wrong in relation to the subject matter of the pending action, or toaccomplish some other dark purpose. The worthlessness of the accusation apparent from the beginning has impelled us into resolving the complaint sooner than later.

#17 Case Title: Denis Habawel and Alexis Medina vs. The Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 174759, September 7, 2011Petitioners Claim: it is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over this instant petition; the grossness of this Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case and this Court lacked the understanding and respect for the doctrine of stare decisisRespondents Claim: the CTA First Division found the petitioners apology wanting in sincerity and humility, observing that they chose words that were so strong, which brings disrepute the Courts honor and integrity for brazenly pointing to the Courts alleged ignorance and grave abuse of discretion. the Court finds no sincerity and humility when counsels Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F. Medina asked for apology. In fact, the counsels brazenly pointed the Courts alleged ignorance and grave abuse of discretion. Their chosen words are so strong, which brings disrepute the Courts honor and integrity.Issue: Whether the petitioners were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct contempt.Ruling: Canon 11 of theCode of Professional Responsibilitymandates all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others.Rule 11.03 of theCode of Professional Responsibilityspecifically enjoins all attorneys thus:Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.By such statements, the petitioners clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds of propriety as attorneys, and disregarded their sworn duty to respect the courts. An imputation in a pleading of gross ignorance against a court or its judge, especially in the absence of any evidence, is a serious allegation,[30]and constitutes direct contempt of court. It is settled that derogatory, offensive or malicious statements contained in pleadings or written submissions presented to the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending are treated as direct contempt because they areequivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.[31]This is true, even if thederogatory, offensive or malicious statements are not read in open court

# 18 Case Title: In Re: Supreme Court Resolution Dated 28 April 2003 In G.R. Nos. 145817 And 145822

Petitioners Claim: No petitioner, this was initiated by SC.

Respondents Claim:

Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea alleges that the ponente in G.R. 145145817 And 145822, Justice Carpio, was bribed by the opposing counsel in those cases, Atty. Singson, which caused him to lose those cases. He hinged his theory on a phone call he made to Singson to confirm the outcome of the cases where he told Singson jokingly kaya pala may bagong Mercedez si Carpio eh, and that Singson remained silent and did not deny his statement.

He then filed a motion to make Justice Carpio inhibit from the case, asserting this theory.

Issue/s: Whether respondent Pea made malicious and groundless imputation of bribery and wrong doings against members of the Court.

Ruling per Issue:

Respondent Pea is administratively liable for making gratuitous imputations of bribery and wrongdoing against a member of the Court. In moving for the inhibition of a Member of the Court in the manner he adopted, respondent Pea, as a lawyer, contravened the ethical standards of the legal profession.

As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior before the court and must refrain from attributing to a judge motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.

While lawyers are entitled to present their case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of foul and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.

In the subject Motion for Inhibition, respondent Pea insinuated that the then ponente of the case had been bribed by Atty. Singson.

However, the Court, through a unanimous action of the then Members of the First Division, had indeed adopted the recommended and proposed resolution of Justice Carpio, as the then ponente, and granted the Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank. It is completely wrong for respondent Pea to claim that the action had been issued without any sufficient basis or evidence on record, and hence was done so with partiality. A mere adverse ruling of the court is not adequate to immediately justify the imputation of such bias or prejudice as to warrant inhibition of a Member of this Court, absent any verifiable proof of specific misconduct. Suspicions or insinuations of bribery involving a member of this Court, in exchange for a favorable resolution, are grave accusations. They cannot be treated lightly or be jokingly alleged by parties, much less by counsel in pleadings or motions. These suspicions or insinuations strike not only at the stature or reputation of the individual members of the Court, but at the integrity of its decisions as well.

# 19 Case Title: ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA vs. ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTEPetitioners claim:Noe-Lacsamanaalleged thatUlasosdeed of sale over a specific property was annulled, which resulted in the filing of anejectmentcase (Civil Case No. 9284) before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, whereBusmenteappeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed againstUlasowhereBusmentealso appeared as counsel.Also, she alleged that one Atty. ElizabethDelaRosa would accompanyUlasoin court, projecting herself asBusmentescollaborating counsel.DelaRosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005.Furthermore, Noe-Lacsamanaalleged that the court orders and notices specifiedDelaRosa asBusmentescollaborating counsel.She contended that upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered thatDelaRosa was not a lawyer.Respondents claim:Busmentealleged thatDelaRosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few years.Busmentealleged thatDelaRosas employment with him ended in 2000 butDelaRosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help ofRegineMacasieb,Busmentesformer secretary.Busmentealleged that he did not represent Ulasoin Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answerpresented as proof byNoe-Lacsamanawas forged.Issue:Whetheror not Busmenteis guilty of directly or indirectly assistingDelaRosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.Ruling: YES.Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:Canon 9.A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.The Court agrees with the findings of IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) thatDelaRosa was not a lawyer and that she representedUlasoasBusmentes collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. It was noted that whileBusmenteclaimed thatDelaRosa no longer worked for him since 2000, there was no proof of her separation from employment. It was further found that notices from the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent toBusmentesdesignated office address. Busmentesonly excuse was thatDelaRosa connived with his former secretaryMacasiebso that the notices and pleadings would not reach him.The Court ruled that the term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services.The Court further ruled that holding ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law.The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes ita misbehavioron his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law

# 21 Case title: A.C. No 7297September 29, 2009Imelda Bides-Ulaso v. Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana Bersamin, J.

Petitioners claim: Irene Bides filed a complaint against petitioner to which respondent Atty. Noe-Lacsama was her counsel. Irene Bides amended the complaint to demand declaration of nullity of the deed of sale pertaining to a parcel of land in San Juan of which Irene Bides was the registered owner. The amended complaint contained so-called amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping dated June 18, 2003, on which was a signature preceded by the word for above the printed name IRENE BIDES. The signature bore a positive resemblance to respondents signature as the notary on the jurat of the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss citing the defect as a ground. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and even declared petitioners in default. The RTC ultimately decide the action in favor of Irene Bides, granting reliefs like the nullification of the deed of sale between Irene Bides, as seller, and petitioner as buyer. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs judgment. Irene and respondent brought other proceedings against petitioner. Respondent herself commenced disbarment proceedings in the IBP against Atty. Yolando Busmente, petitioners counsel. To counteract the aforestated moves of Irene and respondent, petitioner initiated this proceeding against the respondent on March 2, 2005, praying for the latters disbarment due to her act of signing the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping attached to the amended complaint of Bides and notarizing the document sans the signature of Bides and despite the non-appearance of Bides before her.

Respondents claim: Respondent claiming an inadvertent mistake committed in relation to the signature appearing above the printed name of the affiant, but offering the excuse that the defective amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping had actually been only a "sample-draft" intended to instruct Mallari, Irenes new secretary, on where Irene, as affiant, should sign; that the signature had not been intended to replace Irenes signature; that the correct amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping to be appended to the amended complaint had been executed only on June 23, 2003 due to Irenes delayed arrival from the province of Abra; and that Mallari had failed to replace the defective document with the correct amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping.

Issue/s: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and Notarial Law.

Ruling: The Court held in the affirmative. Respondent in notarizing the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping in the absence of Irene Bides as the affiant constituted a clear breach of the notarial protocol and was highly censurable. The jurat is that end part of the affidavit in which the notary certifies that the instrument is sworn to before her. As such, the notarial certification is essential. Considering that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act, the faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in the jurat are sacrosanct. Thus, respondent, by signing as notary even before Irene Bides herself could appear before her, failed to give due observance and respect to the solemnity. It was emphatically her primary duty as a lawyer-notary to obey the laws of the land and to promote respect for the law and legal processes. She was expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. She ought to have remembered that a graver responsibility was placed upon her shoulders by virtue of her being a lawyer. Hence, respondent is reprimanded with a warning that a similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

# 23 CASE TITLE : Rolando Saa v. Integrated Bar of the PhilippinesG.R. No. 132826 (September 3, 2009)

Petitioners Claim:Petitioner Rolanda Saa filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Freddie A. Venida. In his complaint, Saa stated that Atty. Venidas act of filing two cases against him was oppressive and constituted unethical practice.Respondents Claim:Atty. Venida averred that Saa did not specifically allege his supposed infractions. He asked to be furnished a copy of the complaint. He also prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. Despite receipt of a copy of the complaint, Atty. Venida still did not file his complete comment within 10 days, as required.The matter was thereafter referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In a report dated August 14, 1997, Commissioner George S. Briones recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. It found no evidence that the two cases filed by Atty. Venida against Saa were acts of oppression or unethical practice. The Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the investigating commissioners report and dismissed the complaintISSUE: whether or not respondent was guilty of violating the Code of Professional ResponsibilityRuling:There was a dearth of evidence showing oppressive or unethical behavior on the part of Atty. Venida. Without convincing proof that Atty. Venida was motivated by a desire to file baseless legal actions, the findings of the IBP stand.Nonetheless, the Court declared that it strongly disapprove of Atty. Venidas blatant refusal to comply with various court directives. As a lawyer, he had the responsibility to follow legal orders and processes. Yet, he disregarded this very important canon of legal ethics when he filed only a partial comment on January 26, 1993 or 11 months after being directed to do so in the February 17, 1992 resolution. Worse, he filed his complete comment only on June 14, 1995 or a little over three years after due date. In both instances, he managed to delay the resolution of the case, a clear violation of Canon 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The charge of oppressive or unethical behavior against respondent is dismissed. However, for violation of Canons 1 and 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the lawyers oath, Atty. Freddie A. Venida suspendedfrom the practice of law for one (1) year.

#24 CASE TITLE: ANTERO J. POBREvs. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOPetitioners Claim: Antero J. Pobre invites the Court's attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago's speech delivered on the Senate floor:. . . I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots . . . .To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.Respondents Claim: Senator Santiago does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]", which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.Issue: Whether or not the Senator violated the Code of Professional ResponsibilityRuling: No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the people's faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:Canon 8, Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the people's faith in the integrity of the courts.\\#25 Case Title: Sesbreno vs CA and City of Cebu

Petitioners Claim: He should be paid higher Attorneys Fees as the City of Cebu paid the whole amount of backwages and allowances.

Respondents Claim: The Compromise Agreement between the City of Cebu and private respondents, as well as the agreement between private respondents and petitioner, as distinct and separate from each other. At any rate, the relationship between private respondents and petitioner had already been terminated as the case was already final and executed.

Issue: W/N petitioner should be paid an additional Attorneys Fees

Ruling: No; the claim is baseless as he had already been actually paid and the case executed.

# 27 Case Title: WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondentPetitioners Claims: Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay where the parties reside. Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.Respondents Claims: In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.Issue/s: Whether or not the respondent has committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer?Ruling: Yes. As punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations (Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules) This he failed to do. Such failure to comply constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

# 28 CASE TITLE: MANUEL L. LEE vs ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGOPETITIONERS CONTENTION: In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament. Complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its execution. The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965. Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate[footnoteRef:1] of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation. Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective voters affidavits. [1: ]

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: Respondent stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because the criminal case filed by complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman did not prosper. Respondent did not dispute complainants contention that no copy of the will was on file in the archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the contested will could be found there because none was filed. Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action against him as he (complainant) did not first file an action for the declaration of nullity of the will and demand his share in the inheritance.ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional ResponsibilityHELD: Yes. Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty. The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his office. Contrary to his claims that he exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regard to the provision of existing law and had complied with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties xxx, we find that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law.

# 30 Case title: Hadjula v. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, July 03, 2007Petitioners claim: Complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed that, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice and that, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the respondent that she would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets. Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter's act of disclosing personal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking respondent's legal advice. According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a Counter complaint with the Ombudsman charging her with violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two charges being based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the basis of the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted against her before the Professional Regulation Commission. Respondents claim:Respondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP.Issue: Whether or not Atty. Madianda is guilty of violating the provisions of the CPR?Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that a lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought. If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employments is established. Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the former's fees. Respondent indeed breached his duty of preserving the confidence of a client. As found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the documents shown and the information revealed in confidence to the respondent in the course of the legal consultation in question, were used as bases in the criminal and administrative complaints lodged against the complainant.

# 31 CASE TITLE: NAPOLEON CAGAS VS JUDGE ROSARIO B. TORRECAMPO A.M. No. RTJ-06-1979 March 14, 2007

PETITIONERS CLAIM:Complainant alleges: He is the brother of accused Genuival Cagas (Genuival). In 1992, criminal charges for murder were filed against Genuival, Wilson Butin (Wilson), and Julio Astillero, and they were arrested and detained without bail. Respondent failed to resolve the cases submitted for decision for over four years, prompting Genuival to file motions to resolve the cases. From June 2000 to January 2005, 55 months had elapsed before respondent wrote her decision. Each time respondent makes a certification that she has no pending cases for resolution, respondent must be criminally charged for falsification.

RESPONDENTS CLAIMRespondent contends: The records of Criminal Case Nos. P-2196 to P-2201 were remanded to the lower court sometime in the middle part of 1997. She had just assumed her duties as presiding judge of RTC, Branch 33, Pili, Camarines Sur. Due to postponements at the instance of the accused, they were finally arraigned on January 5, 1998. On November 14, 2001, she requested time to finalize the decision in several cases including Criminal Case Nos. P-2196 to P-2201, due to illness hounding her family. On January 15, 2002, she requested for another extension of 30 days to decide some cases including Criminal Case Nos. P-2196 to P-2201 due to lower back pains which prevents her from sitting down for a long period of time. On June 10, 2003, she requested for another extension to decide Criminal Case Nos. P-2196 to P-2201 due to health problems, resulting to her hospitalization on February 17 to 19, 2003 for hypertension and pulmonary Kock's disease. She took a two-month leave of absence on doctor's advice and returned to duty in May 2003. On August 13, 2003, the Court granted her request for extension of 30 days to decide cases including Criminal Case Nos. P-2196 to P-2201. During the early part of 2004 to date, she has been on treatment for enlarged thyroid gland. The foregoing circumstances which were beyond her control adversely affected and hampered her capacity to perform and not neglect of duty on her part.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING:Yes. Records reveal that the criminal cases subject of herein complaint were submitted for decision on December 8, 2000. The Court granted respondent's requests for several extensions of 30 days, i.e., November 14, 2001, January 15, 2002, and June 10, 2003, within which to decide said cases, due to recurring health problems, such as hypertension and pulmonary Kock's disease. However, despite all the extensions granted by the Court, respondent still failed to seasonably render decision on the subject cases. Record further reveals that the decision on the criminal cases subject of herein complaint was rendered only on January 10, 2005, or more than four years after the same were submitted for decision on December 8, 2000. This, to our mind, is a clear violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Constitution requiring the early disposition of cases so as not to erode the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary.

#32 CASE TITLE: ADVINCULA VS. MACABATA

PETITIONER'S CLAIM: Sometime on December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle their accounts as demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to step out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly.Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. Along the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.RESPONDENT'S CLAIM: Respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by malice.ISSUE: Whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.RULING: No. Immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.We perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie, 27 forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same.

# 34 Case Title: Clarita Samala v. Atty. Luciano Valencia

Petitioners claim: Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995. They further claim that respondent leads an immoral life since he sired illegitimate children. Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000- 657-MK for rescission of contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27, 2000, before RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he came to know of Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed on the same date, although in different courts and at different times.

Respondents claim:Respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore. Respondent further avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for rescission was filed in 2002. On the second issue, he avers that he does not consider his affair with Lagmay as a relationship and does not consider the latter as his second family. He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina.

Issue: Whether or not, the respondent is guilty for violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling: Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. In this case, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age, while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died, he married Lagmay. These admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable on the charge of immorality. The Court also found that the respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's ownership