Paper prepared for the conference: ‘The language of difference: mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion of migrants 1945-2005’; Leiden University – January 14-15, 2010.

Nadia BourasLeiden UniversityN.Bouras@hum.leidenuniv.nl

Please do not cite without the author’s permission.

Shifting meanings of ‘transnationalism’: analysing academic and political discourse on contacts, with a case study of Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands (1960-2000)

1. Introduction

On 2 November 2009, a political meeting was held in Amsterdam to commemorate the murder four years earlier on Theo van Gogh, a Dutch filmmaker and notorious publicist, by a Moroccan-Dutch man. Several politicians and publicists were invited to discuss integration in Dutch society. The discussants agreed on the fact that Dutch society was seized by fear of ‘islamization’ and was in search of its national identity that had been undermined by the mass migration from non-Western countries. This political and social reality has its origin in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and intensified after the rise of the Dutch rightwing political movement PVV (Party of Freedom). In an introduction, a local politician expressed her concerns about the ongoing fierce political and public debates on integration that systematically excludes people because of their ethnic or religious background, most notably Dutch Moroccans.1 She concluded her speech by stating that social problems are more and more being interpreted as cultural or religious problems, leading to increased feelings of exclusion among large groups in society. A couple of days earlier, the Minister of Integration wrote in his Integration Memorandum that it gives him ‘an uneasy feeling’ when Moroccans and Turks live in rented houses in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, while they own houses in their countries of origin.2 The implicit message is that deprivation is a choice and that migrants and

1 This introduction was held at Youth center ‘Argan’ on 2 November 2009 in Amsterdam. The meeting was entitled: ‘Five years after Theo van Gogh: what’s next?’2 Trouw, 14 November 2009, p. 30.

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their children should choose for the country they settled in. Strong identifications with the culture of origin and orientations on the country of origin are perceived to be a hindrance to integration into Dutch society.

These two examples lead me to core of this paper. On the one hand, several Dutch politicians and publicists stress the undesirability of migrants’ engagement with the country of origin, since belonging both ‘here’ and ‘there’ is perceived to be conflicting with national interests and hindering to migrants’ integration. On the other hand, several scholars (discussed at length below) argue that migrants are not limited to one geographical location, but can engage in socio-cultural, political and economic activities that transcend national boundaries. This ‘new’ outlook on migration increased in popularity and attracted a lively debate among migration scholars in the 1990s. This ‘transnationalism’-approach shifted the focus away from host society-centred incorporation to transcending immigrant identities and commitments, challenging the dominant assumption in contemporary political discourse that integration into receiving societies and the maintenance of ‘transnational’ connections are contradictory social processes.

A neglected aspect in the literature on ‘transnationalism’ is the shifting meaning countries (of settlement and origin) and scholars give to migrants’ involvement with the country of origin. This brings me to the central questions I address in this paper: what meaning is ascribed to ‘transnationalism’ in academic and political debates? Who makes ‘transnationalism’ important and why? And to what extent did changes occur in how politicians and scholars qualify ‘transnationalism’? How did changes in the academic debate spill over into the public and political debate, and vice versa? These questions are prompted by the assumption that politicians in both the country of origin and settlement (and migrants and their organizations) give different meanings to what in academic literature is called ‘transnationalism’ for different reasons. These different interpretations of ‘transnationalism’ change over time and are (unintentionally) part of mechanisms of in- and exclusion.

In this paper I look from a historical perspective at how ‘transnationalism’ is understood in academic debates and in Moroccan and Dutch political discourses. In this paper I will not discuss how Moroccan migrants and their organizations respond to these qualifications (but this is part of my larger project). The purpose of this paper is to investigate how mechanisms of in- and exclusion and the different scholarly and politically interpretations of ‘transnationalism’ interact. My research questions will be answered by critically analysing the literature and the political discourse. The analysis of the literature provides an overview, but more importantly it shows how the academic literature on ‘transnationalism’ has changed over time and how the literature and changes within it have interacted with political discourse.

The analysis of the political discourse focuses on how contacts of migrants with their countries of origin were discussed in Dutch Parliament, and how they were encouraged and discouraged by Dutch policies. This section is preceded by a brief section about how countries of origin shaped ties with their emigrants. My discourse analysis of the political discussions focuses on how ‘transnational’ ties are mentioned and interpreted and how they are made important. In my analysis I distinguish between five clusters of arguments to assess what meaning is ascribed to ‘transnational’ ties: 1) sovereignty argument: both the country of origin and the country of settlement fear the destabilising effect of ‘transnational’

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ties; 2) remigration argument: both countries emphasize the importance of ‘transnational’ ties for a successful integration upon return; 3) loyalty argument: both countries give emotional interpretation to ‘transnational’ ties (positively in the country of origin and negatively in the country of settlement); 4) policy argument: ‘transnational’ ties are important for the justification of ‘guest worker’ migration (for both countries) and they are important for the justification and implementation of the integration policy (in the country of settlement) or for the rejection of this policy (in the country of origin); and 5) bilateral argument: collaboration between the two countries implies agreement on policies and organisation of social benefits (such as child support and pensions) and results in the institutionalization of individual ‘transnational’ ties. In the following I will analyse which arguments are used, by whom and why. This paper uses the Moroccan migration to the Netherlands as a case study. Moroccans are not only one of the largest migrant groups in the Netherlands, but their ‘transnational’ contacts are also the ones that are most often problematised in political discussions (as this paper will show).

2. ‘Transnationalism’ in academic debates

In the 1970s and 1980s, before the concept of ‘transnationalism’ was introduced in migration literature, the literature on Moroccan migration focused on the problematic sides of migration and migrants’ incorporation into Dutch society.3

These semi-academic studies, mostly in Dutch, were strongly policy oriented and served to legitimise integration policies. One of the first authors to publish on Moroccan migrants was Van der Berg-Eldering.4 She was interested in how Moroccan migrants’ settlement in Dutch society developed over time and to what extent Moroccan migrants maintained contacts with the country of origin. She argued that the Moroccan families who settled permanently in the Netherlands were hardly prepared for a life in modern western societies. That was partly due to the financial and social commitments they had towards the families that stayed behind in the country of origin. Accordingly, she concluded, the limited contacts with the Dutch society and the strong orientation on the country of origin would lead to a marginal position in society. This study followed the trend of the 1980s in which scholars, at government request, studied the position of ethnic minorities in Dutch society.5 This literature sometimes referred to migrants as living in two

3 J. Veenman and Th. Roelandt (eds.) Onzeker bestaan. De maatschappelijke positie van Turken, Marokkanen, Surinamers en Antilianen in Nederland (Amsterdam 1994); Ph. van der Meer, Omgaan met Marokkanen: regels, omgangsvormen, het psychosociale gesprek (Amsterdam 1984); H. Hoolboom, Gezondheidszorg en buitenlandse werknemers: Turken en Marokkanen (alphen aan den Rijn 1981); L. van Mulier, Huisvesting van buitenlandse werknemers: voorstudie voor een onderzoek naar de toedeling van woonruimte aan Turken en Marokkanen in Nederland (Nijmegen 1982); P.J. van der Meer, Problemen van Marokkaanse arbeiders: kultuurverschillen en kommunikatiestoornissen (Amsterdam 1976); M. Plooij and P.J. van der Meer, Marokkanen en de ziektewet (Utrecht 1977).4 L. van den Berg-Eldering, Marokkaanse gezinnen in Nederland (Alphen aan den Rijn 1979).5 H. van Amersfoort, Immigratie en minderheidsvorming. Een analyse van de Nederlandse situatie 1945-1973 (Alphen aan den Rijn 1974); L. Kloof-Monsels, Oud(er) worden in een vreemd land: een onderzoek naar de leefsituatie van Surinaamse, Turkse en Marokkaanse ouderen in Amsterdam (Amsterdam 1987); A. Boutros and M. Six, Ik was sterk en gezond: een onderzoek naar de levensloop van Marokkaanse arbeidsongeschikten in Nederland (Amsterdam 1986).

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worlds. For instance, in 1977 the Dutch sociologist Koopman addressed the subject of ‘transculturalism’ and described how Turks in the Netherlands lived between two cultures.6

In 1992, Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton-Blanc introduced the concept ‘transnationalism’ in the academic debates.7 These American scholars argued that migrants were increasingly involved in cross-border economic, political, social and cultural activities. This new social reality sheds a novel perspective on the migrant population. Accordingly they concluded:

Their lives cut across national boundaries and bring two societies into a single social field [….] We argue that a new conceptualisation is needed in order to come to terms with the experiences and consciousness of this new migrant population. We call this new conceptualisation ‘transnationalism’, and describe the new type of migrants as transmigrants.8

Since its introduction, the literature on ‘transnationalism’ boomed. Particularly, anthropological, sociological and political studies showed high interest in the ‘transnationalism’-approach, focussing mainly on migrants’ involvement with the country of origin. Initially Dutch migration scholars focussed on migrants’ integration into the country of settlement, but in the last decade several publications appeared on the ‘transnational’ activities of specific migrant groups in the Netherlands.9 Internationally, and also within the Dutch context, the ‘transnationalism’-approach shifted the attention away from a preoccupation with integration in the receiving society to multiple identities and ties of migrants. In these studies it became clear that integrating into the country of settlement and an orientation on the country of origin are not contradictory social processes, undermining the dominant assumption in recent political, and to a lesser extent academic debates, that involvement with the country of origin threatens migrants’ integration into the country of settlement.10

6 D. Koopman, ‘Transkulturele problematiek binnen het Turkse migrantengezin’, in: C.D. Mak, De vrouw in het gezin van de buitenlandse werknemer. Verslag van een colloquium gehouden onder auspiciën van de Nationale Unesco Commissie te Helvoirt op 8, 9, 19 en 11 december 1976 (Rijswijk 1977) 42-50.7 N. Glick-Schiller, Basch, L., Szanton-Blanc, C. (eds.) Towards a transnational perspective on migration: race, class, ethnicity and nationalism reconsidered (New York 1992).8 Idem, 1.9 L. Nell, Transnational migrant politics in the Netherlands. Historical structures and current events (Amsterdam 2008); M. Kabki, Transnationalism, local development and social security. The functioning of support networks in rural Ghana (Leiden 2007); E. Snel, G. Engbersen and A. Leerkes, ‘Voorbij landsgrenzen. Transnationale betrokkenheid als belemmering voor integratie?’, Sociologische Gids, No. 4, Vol. 51 (2004) 75-100; R. Gowricharn, ‘De duurzaamheid van het transnationalisme. De tweede generatie Hindostanen in Nederland, Migrantenstudies, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2004) 252-268; F. Steijlen, ‘Molukkers in Nederland: geschiedenis van een transnationale relatie’, Migrantenstudies, No. 4 (2004); R. Gowrincharn, Januskop van transnational burgerschap. Surinaamse ervaringen (Utrecht 2002); H. Ghorashi, Ways to survive, battles to win: Iranian women exiles in the Netherlands and the US (New York 2002); R. Gowrincharn and J. Schüster, ‘Diaspora and transnationalism: the case of the Surinamese in the Netherlands’, in: R. Hoefte and P. Meel (eds.) 20th century Surinam (Leiden 2001) 155-174.10 For example: E. Snel, G. Engbersen and A. Leerkes, ‘Voorbij landsgrenzen; P. Ehrkamp, ‘Placing identities. Transnational practices and local attachments of Turkish immigrants in Germany’, Journal of ethnic and migration studies, No. 2 (2005); P. Kivisto, ‘ Social spaces, transnational immigrant communities, and the politics of incorporation’, Ethnicities, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2003) 5-28.

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‘Transnationalism’ relates to the contacts and ties migrants and their descendants sustain with their country of origin. However, scholars give a broad and almost all-inclusive definition to ‘transnationalism’. Over time the concept has been stretched beyond the useful and every contact came to be labelled as transnationalism. The result of the frequent use of the concept ‘transnationalism’ was that the notion became over-used to describe too wide a range of phenomena.11 In an attempt to provide a clear definition some scholars focus on those conditions that make contacts with the country of origin possible with persistence over time and over generations. The intensity of the contacts and the level of institutionalization are also seen as relevant for making contacts into transnationalism.12 Other scholars have given more meaning to activities. They consider ‘transnationalism’ as ‘occupations and activities that require regular and sustained social contacts over time across national borders for their implementation’.13 Portes et al. argue that within the study of ‘transnational’ activities the focus of analysis should be on individuals and their networks, taking into account the surrounding collective community and institutions. Accordingly, they differentiate between three types of activities: political, social-cultural and economic.14

In the literature on ‘transnationalism’ there is little agreement about the meaning of the concept. Some scholars perceive ‘transnationalism’ as a new trend of globalization; others argue that ‘transnationalism’ is a new notion for an old phenomenon. They consider ‘transnationalism’ mainly as a novel way of looking at social phenomena.15 Some regard ‘transnational’ activities as the result of globalization; others argue that ‘transnationalism’ will weaken as migrants integrate into the country of settlement. ‘Transnationalism’ is therefore not exclusively about contacts but also about the consequences of these contacts. It deals with the question to what extent (lasting and intensive) contacts influence the integration of migrants and their descendants. Having contacts with the country of origin supposedly prevents migrants from fully focusing on the country of settlement and as a consequence their integration would be hindered. That these contacts would slow down integration is more often assumed than proven. In addition, ties with the country of origin are assumed to be linked to migrants’ loyalty and with that contacts are considered a threat to the social cohesion within the country of settlement. A key underlying assumption is that because of the continuing technological improvements and globalization states experience pressure and risk losing their sovereignty.16 The continuous back and forth movements – of people, goods, money and ideas - between the country of origin and the country of settlement lead to ‘decentralized’ states, causing migrants not to feel primarily connected to the country they live in. The abovementioned scholars Basch et al. reached the same conclusion, although they qualified it positively. They argued that migrants create a social space that is located

11 L. Pries (eds.), Rethinking transnationalism. The meso-link of organisations (London/New York 2008) 2. 12 T. Faist, International migration and transnational social spaces (Bremen 1998).13 A. Portes, L. Guarnizo and P. Landolt, ‘The study of transnationalism: pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1999) 217-237.14 Idem, 220-221.15 Idem. 16 M. Kearney, ‘Borders and boundaries of state and self at the end of the empire’, Journal of Historical Sociology, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1991) 52-74; H. van Amersfoort, Transnationalisme, moderne diaspora’s en sociale cohesie (Amsterdam 2001), 18-23.

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between the country of origin and the country of settlement.17 Other scholars consider migrants in these ‘decentralized’ or ‘postnational’ space as ‘transnational’ citizens.18 The social cohesion can of course also be threatened by the contacts of subjects across national borders for example by pressure groups that challenge the regime in the country of origin from abroad. However, scholars of ‘transnationalism’ clearly find this subject less interesting.

Overlooking the academic debate on ‘transnationalism’ one can conclude that migrants’ involvement with the country of origin is generally interpreted in neutral or positive terms whereby the migrant involved in it is attributed cosmopolitan aura. There are, in the literature, some striking imbalances and lacunae which I would like to address here. Firstly, the attention in the literature on ‘transnationalism’ goes mainly out to the activities of migrants or their organisations and to a lesser extent to those of the state, both of the country of origin and of the country of settlement that encourage or hinder ‘transnational’ ties. Countries of settlement can, through a multicultural policy strengthen the orientation of communities on both the country of origin and the country of settlement.19 Discrimination can lead to a strong orientation on the country of origin. Preoccupation with migrants’ ‘transnational’ activities resulted in research that mainly focuses on the meaning of ‘transnationalism’ for migrants and their communities and much less on the meaning of ‘transnationalism’ for migrants’ countries of origin or settlement. Furthermore, attention is limited to contacts between the country of origin and the country of settlement, ignoring the ‘diasporic’ contacts between migrants in various countries of settlement.

Secondly, there is hardly any attention in the literature for changes in the contacts over time and across generations. As time goes by, ‘transnationalism’ can get a more symbolic meaning, while contacts can move from an individual level (family support) to a collective level (support to the community). Developments in the country of origin or the country of settlement can accelerate, decelerate or reverse this transition. Political changes both outside the country of origin or settlement can have consequences for the orientation on the country of origin as well. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks not only led to an increase of anti-Islam rhetoric in the Netherlands, causing a reorientation on the country of origin among migrants from Islamic countries, but also to a growing scholarly interest in ‘transnational’ religious and political movements including migrants’ involvement in these movements.20

Thirdly, the literature on ‘transnationalism’ pays little attention to how within migrant group differences occur according to regional origin or class and a, different meanings to what is perceived to be ‘transnationalism’. The same is true for differences according to gender. Because men and women have different roles, their ‘transnational’ contacts will differ accordingly.21 Contacts can have different meanings or functions for men and women. Moreover, contacts of men 17 L. Basch, N. Glick Schiller and C. Szanton Blanc, Nations unbound. Transnational projects, postcolonial predicaments and deterritorialized nation-states (New York 1994) 269. 18 Y. N. Soysal, Limits of citizenship: migrants and postnational citizenship in Europe (Chicago 1994). 19 S. Castles, ‘Migration and community formation under conditions of globalization’, International Migration Review, Vol. 36, No. 4 (2002) 1157-1160.20 For example: P. Levitt, ‘Between God, Ethnicity, and Country: An Approach to the Study of Transnational Religion, Paper presented at workshop on “Transnational Migration: Comparative Perspectives”, June 30-July 1 (Princeton University 2001); P. Levitt, ‘Redefining the boundaries of belonging: The Institutional Character of Transnational Religious Life’, Sociology of Religion, Vol. 65, No. 1(2004) 1-18.

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occur more often within the visible, organized public domain and those by women more in the less visible, informal private sphere.22 As a result migrant men’s contacts are more subject of political and public discussion than those of women. In the literature on ‘transnationalism’ migrant women’s activities are explained differently. Several scholars showed particular interest in ‘transnational’ motherhood, referring to migrant women as breadwinners who left their children behind in the country of origin.23 ‘Transnational’ fatherhood does not attract any scholarly attention, while for example Moroccan male ‘guest workers’ left behind their families as well and supported them financially from abroad. In some cases, differences in the possibilities of maintaining contacts occur between men and women. Furthermore, several scholars showed that access to mobility is gendered.24 For example, cross-border migration is in some countries more restricted for women than for men. Men can travel easier back and forth between the country of origin and the country of settlement than women.25

How men and women are involved in ‘transnational’ activities is closely linked to the availability and accessibility of these activities. In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, Moroccan migrant women were dependent on their husbands for information and contacts with the country of origin, because community buildings, such as mosques, were not equally accessible to men and women. Several migration scholars have argued that migration leads to a decline in social status or downward social mobility among migrant men, but leads to more freedom and an increase of social status among women.26 More empirical research is needed to test this hypothesis, but if it is true, it can have consequences for the interpretation of ‘ transnational’ activities. Men can strengthen their ties with the country of origin to compensate for their status loss while women can try to hold on to their newly achieved freedom or status by reducing or ignoring ‘transnational’ contacts.27

‘Transnational’ involvement also differs according to class.28 In this case it is important to understand that maintaining ‘transnational’ contacts can be expensive. Migrants with more resources can give a different or broader meaning to ‘transnationalism’ than migrants with less money to spend. Because wives of former ‘guest workers’ came to the Netherlands within the framework of family reunification, and thus not primarily as economic migrants, their class position was almost always determined by their husband’s position. In this light it is understandable that in studies on ‘transnationalism’ in relation to class, migrant

21 See for example R. Salih, Gender in transnationalism. Home, longing and belonging among Moroccan migrant women (London/New York 2003); J. Itzigsohn and S. Giorguli-Saucedo (2005), ‘Incorporation, transnationalism, and gender: immigrant incorporation and transnational participation as gendered processes’, IMR Vol. 39, No. 4; P. Pessar and S. Mahler, ‘Transnational migration: bringing gender in’, IMR Vol. 37, No. 3 (2003) 814-815; M. van den Berg, ‘Dat is bij jullie toch ook zo?’ (Rotterdam 2007) 81-86.22 Micaela di Leonardo, ‘The female world of cards and holidays: women, families, and the work of kinship.’ Signs, Journal of women in culture and society Vol. 12, No. 3 (1987) 440-453.23 P. Hondagneu-Sotelo, ‘I’m here, but I’m there’. The meanings of Latina transnational motherhood’, Gender and society, 11 (5) (1997) 548-571. 24 R. Salih, Moroccan migrant women: transnationalism, nation-states and gender, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (2001), Vol. 27, No. 4, 655-671.25 R. Salih, Gender in transnationalism, 49-50.26 L. Goldring, ‘The gender and geography of citizenship in Mexico-U.S. transnational spaces’, Identities, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2001) 501-537.27 J. Itzigsohn and S. Gioguli Saucedo, ‘Incorporation, transnationalism, and gender’, 899-900.28 B. Skeggs, Formations of class and gender; becoming respectable (London 1997) 226.

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women are largely ignored. However, feminist researchers rightly stress that class should not be understood in static categories.29 The moment migrant women earn their own money they are more capable of maintaining ties with members of family that stayed behind in the country of origin. After many of the former ‘guest workers’ became redundant due to the economic crisis of the 1980s, women started to actively participate on the labour market. Moroccan migrant women became breadwinners, supporting their families in the Netherlands and Morocco.30 Other studies point to the important economic role migrant women play.31 These studies focus mainly on migrant women who travelled independently to foreign countries to support their families financially.

In addition, there are differences related to ethnic differences or differences in regional origin within migrant groups. The level of exclusion in the country of origin can influence feelings of connectedness to that country. People who occupy a minority position in the country of origin, who faced discrimination and social and cultural deprivation, will give other meanings to ‘transnationalism’ than migrants with positive experiences in the country of origin. Ties with the state of origin are less likely for the first group, but contacts with those who stayed behind can be warmer and closer, and can experienced by the state of origin as threatening.32

Fourthly, so far there has been little attention for the political connotations given to the concept of ‘transnationalism’. The concept carries a negative label in the political discourse and is, as has been pointed out above, considered to be an obstacle to integration. Academic research follows this line of argument and examines to what extent ‘transnationalism’ hinders integration.33 A recent study by Snel et al. on migrants in the Netherlands showed that ‘transnational’ activities are a standard part of all migrants’ lives.34 The authors distinguish in their study between three different categories of migrants: migrants that are regarded so-called ‘ethnic minorities’ within Dutch integration policy (as is true for Moroccans), refugees and migrants from western countries (such as the US). The authors shows that the connection between ‘transnationalism’ and integration differs according to country of origin and class.35 For migrants who hold a middleclass position in the country of settlement the revaluation of one’s cultural background

29 D. Reay, ‘Feminist theory, habitus, and social class: disrupting notions of classlessness’, Women’s International Forum (1997) Vol. 20, No. 2, 225-233. 30 N. Bouras, ‘Transnationalism and gender: Moroccan migrant women in the Netherlands and their ties with their country of origin, 1960 – 2000’, (unpublished) paper presented at the Social Science History Association 32nd Annual Meeting (Chicago 2007). 31 V. Chell, ‘Gender-selective migration: Somalian and Filipina women in Rome’, in R. King en R. Black (red.), Southern Europe and the new immigrations (Brighton 1997); A. Escriva, ‘Control, composition and character of new migration to South-West Europe: the case of Peruvian women in Barcelona’, New Community, 23 (1); N. Ribas, ‘Female birds of passage: leaving and settling in Spain’, in F. Anthias en G. Lazaridis (eds.) Gender and migration in Southern Europe (Oxford 2000). 32 For a comparison see: A. J. Schukkink, De Suryoye: een verborgen gemeenschap (Amsterdam 2003) 50-55; S. van Beuzekom, Local community: an unrecognized factor. Een studie naar de invloed van de lokale omgeving op de identiteitsconstructie en gevoelens van ‘home’ en ‘belonging’ van de transnationale Suryoye gemeenschap (Utrecht 2008) 20-25.33 E. Snel, G. Engbersen and A. Leerkes, ‘Voorbij landsgrenzen. Transnationale betrokkenheid als belemmering voor integratie?’, Sociologische Gids, Vol. 51, No. 2 (2004); N. al-Ali, R. Black and K. Koser, ‘Refugees and transnationalism: the experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2001) 615-634; Portes et al. ‘The study of transnationalism’. 34 Snel et al., 96-98.

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can have a symbolic value, without it causing a barrier for integration.36 For migrants with a weak social position in the country of settlement, the involvement with the country of origin can lead to a further rejection of the country of settlement, risking their last chance for social success.37

Snel et al.’s study shows that all migrant groups maintain intensive contact with family and friends in the country of origin, attend cultural meetings in the Netherlands related to the country of origin, are aware of the political developments in the country of origin, and send goods and remittances to the country or origin. ‘Transnational’ activities occur equally within all migrant groups, regardless of their level of education or social status.38 Snel et al.’s conclusion that there is no clear-cut connection between migrants’ involvement in ‘transnational’ activities and the degree of integration is no surprise. It is however striking that ‘transnational’ involvement is particularly considered a problem when it involves migrants from countries that are presumed to be less modern than the countries they settled in. The ‘transnational’ behaviour of migrants from so-called modern or western countries is less regarded a problem and less understood in terms of rejecting integration. This points to a paradox within the ‘transnationalism’ discourse. Participants in political debates in the country of settlement frequently fall in these paradoxical traps. In the next section I will describe how Moroccan migrants’ involvement with the country of origin is discussed in political debates in both the country of settlement (the Netherlands) and the country of origin.

In sum, this overview shows that long before the concept of ‘transnationalism’ was introduced in the academic literature, migrants’ contacts with the country of origin were problematised in semi-academic Dutch literature. In the 1990s ‘transnationalism’ was introduced as a seemingly neutral concept but very soon afterwards came to be used for all contacts between migrants and their countries of origin, and loosing a bit of the original emphasis of living in two worlds simultaneously. It soon came to be associated with loyalty and non-integration. Differences within and between groups according to ethnicity, gender and class were ignored. Most importantly, the ‘transnational’ contacts of some migrant groups – mostly those who are seen as to have come from so-called backward, non-Western or Muslim countries – were problematised, while contacts of other migrants were not. In addition, ‘transnationalism’ was mostly studied as something that sprang from the initiatives from migrants only, and not from those of the country of origin or settlement. In the next sections I will stress this last point by analyzing the attitudes of Moroccan state and the Dutch government towards migrants’ ‘transnational’ ties.

3. The Moroccan state and ‘transnationalism’

35 Idem, 78; A. Portes, ‘Transnational entrepeneurs: an alternative form of immigrant economic adaptation’, American Sociological Review: Official Journal of the American Sociological Society, Vol. 67, No. 2 (2002) 278-298. 36 M. Waters, Ethnic options: choosing identities in America (Berkeley 1990); H. Gans, ‘Comment: ethnic invention and acculturation: a bumpy-line approach’, Journal of American Ethnic History, vol. 11 (1992) 42-52.37 C. Joppke and E. Morawska, ‘Integrating immigrants in liberal nation-states: policies and practices’, in: C. Joppke and E. Morawska (eds.) Toward assimilation and citizenship. Immigrants in liberal nation-states (New York 2003) 25; P. Levitt, ‘Keeping feet in both worlds’, 183. 38 E. Snel e.a., ‘Voorbij landsgrenzen’, 87.

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The more recent literature on ‘transnationalism’ stresses that not only migrants are important actors in the construction of ‘transnational’ communities, but also that both the country of origin and the country of settlement shape ‘transnational’ involvement.39 In addition, some scholars argue that states not only shape ‘transnational’ processes, but they may also provide channels for transnational activities.40 An important aspect related to this is the interest countries of origin have in encouraging and sustaining ties with ‘their’ emigrants. In the 1960s countries of settlement benefited from the strong ties between the ‘guest workers’ and their countries of origin, because this kept the possibility of return open or the illusion of return alive. The countries of origin benefited from the ties with ‘their’ emigrant communities, since their remittances were and still are, an important source of income for the country.41 In early periods of ‘guest worker’ migration, when their migration was believed to be temporary, (political) ties with country of origin were considered undesirable and threatening to the regime in the country of origin. That goes mostly for countries of origin with an autocratic regime, like the Moroccan state, that feared political opposition from abroad. In the following I will look closer at how ‘transnationalism’ is understood in Moroccan migrants’ country of origin.

With over 340,000 Moroccans officially resident in the Netherlands, the Moroccan community is the third largest immigrant group in the Netherlands.42

Moroccans are considered a poorly integrated group in Dutch society that faces serious challenges in important social domains. A great part of the scholarly and political discourse on Moroccans deals with their weak position in society.43

39 L. Lucassen and R. Penninx, ‘Caught between Scylla en Charybdis? Changing orientations of migrant organisations in the era of national states, from 1880 onwards’, IMISCOE Working Papers, No. 26 (June 2009) 1-2; P. Levitt and R. de la Dehesa, ‘Transnational migration and the redefinition of the state: variations and explanations’, Ethnic and racial studies, Vol. 26, No. 4 (2003) 587-611.40 N. Al-Ali, R. Black and K. Koser, ‘The limits to ‘transnationalism’: Bosnian and Eritrean refugees in Europe as emerging transnational communities’, Ethnic and Racial Studies (2001), Vol. 24, No. 4; Smith, M.P. and L. Guarnizo (eds.) Transnationalism from below (New Brunswick/London 2004); A. Ong, Flexible citizenship: the cultural logics of transnationality (Durham 1999). 41 L.E. Guarnizo, A. Portes and W. Haller, ‘Assimilation and transnationalism: determinants of transnational political action among contemporary migrants’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 108, No. 6, 121-148. 42 The total population in the Netherlands is over 16 million. 43 M. Kleijwegt, Onzichtbare ouders: de buurt van Mohammed B. (Zutphen 2005); A. Eddaoudi, Hollandse nieuwe: drie generaties Marokkanen aan het woord (Rotterdam 2000); H.L.M. Obdeijn and P. de Mas, De Marokkaanse uitdaging: de tweede generatie in een veranderend Nederland (Utrecht 2001). L. Van den Berg-Eldering (eds.) Van gastarbeider tot immigrant: Marokkanen en Turken in Nederland: 1965-1985 (Alphen aan den Rijn 1986); L. van den Berg-Eldering, Marokkaanse gezinnen in Nederland (Alphen aan den Rijn 1979); K.S. Prins, Van ‘gastarbeider’ tot ‘Nederlander’. Adaptatie van Marokkanen en Turken in Nederland (Groningen 1996); N. Soetens, Gastarbeiders, hun vrouwen, hun kinderen: een verzameling schetsen over het leven van gastarbeiders in Nederland en met name over de problemen van de vrouwen en de opgroeiende jeugd (Rotterdam 1978); P. Andersson Toussaint, Staatssecretaris of seriecrimineel (Amsterdam 2009); J. de Jong, Kapot moeilijk. Een etnografisch onderzoek naar opvallend delinquent groepsgedrag van ‘Marokkaanse’ jongens (Amsterdam 2007); F. Jurgens, Het Marokkanendrama (Amsterdam 2007); H. Werdmölder, Marokkaanse lieverdjes. Crimineel en hinderlijk gedrag onder Marokkaanse jongeren (Amsterdam 2005); M. van der Linde, Marokkaanse jongens op het criminele pad: over repressie en preventie (Rotterdam 1998); H. Werdmölder, Een generatie op drift: de geschiedenis van een Marokkaanse randgroep (Gouda 1990); T. Pels, Respect van twee kanten: een studie over last van Marokkaanse jongeren (Assen

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Moroccan migration to the Netherlands started in the beginning of the 1960s, due to rapid post-war economic growth and an increasing shortage of semi- and unskilled labourers. In 1969, the Dutch government formalized the recruitment practices by signing an agreement with the Moroccan state. Most Moroccans, however, initiated their own migration, often supported by family members and friends who had already settled in the Netherlands.44 The Dutch and the Moroccan state and the Moroccan migrants themselves expected this migration to be temporary. However, during the 1970s Moroccan migration shifted into more permanent settlement of these ‘guest workers’ and their families. This was largely due to the changing economic and political contexts in both Europe and Morocco. The economic recession, the restriction of labour migration in the Netherlands and the political instability in Morocco made migrants reconsider their return to the country of origin. Although the authorities called for a recruitment stop, immigration from Morocco continued in the 1970s in the form of family reunification and later in the 1980s in the form of family formation.45 As a result of large-scale family reunification more women came to the Netherlands and as a consequence the sex ratio became more balanced.

Until today the Moroccan state considers all Moroccans living outside Morocco as its subjects, even if they belong to the so-called second or third generations.46 This falls both under the loyalty and policy arguments: by denying the right to renounce Moroccan citizenship the Moroccan state claims Moroccans’ (within the country and those abroad) loyalty to God, the homeland and the King. This ‘trinity’ is repeated and emphasized in all official speeches, declarations and even marks the closing words in the nation anthem. Since the beginning of Moroccan migration to Europe, the Moroccan state showed a strong interest in maintaining relations with Moroccans living abroad.47 During the decades of large-scale migration the Moroccan state instituted several programs and set up associations for its emigrants. In this period the policy argument played an important role: the official policies called for the establishment of programs and associations designed to strengthen the ties with Morocco. Primarily, these measures were intended to attract and channel remittances and to discourage the integration of Moroccans into European societies, because the

2003); F. Buijs, Leven in een nieuw land: Marokkaanse jongemannen in Nederland (Utrecht 1993).44 A. Cottaar and N. Bouras, Marokkanen in Nederland. De pioniers vertellen (Amsterdam 2009); I. van der Valk, Harde Werkers. Migranten van het eerste uur langs Rijn en Lek, 1945-1985 (Zutphen 2009); H. Obdeijn and M. Schrover, Komen en gaan. Immigratie en emigratie in Nederland vanaf 1550 (Amsterdam 2008); H. Obdeijn, P. de Mas and P. Hermans, De geschiedenis van Marokko (Amsterdam 2002); A. Benali and H. Obdeijn, Marokko door Nederlandse ogen 1605-2005. Verslag van een reis door de tijd (Amsterdam 2005); I. van der Valk, Van migratie naar burgerschap. Twintig jaar Komitee Marokkaanse Arbeiders in Nederland (Amsterdam 1996); W.S. Shadid, Moroccan workers in the Netherlands (Leiden 1979); S. Theunis, Ze zien liever mijn handen dan mijn gezicht: buitenlandse arbeiders in ons land (Baarn 1979). L. van den Berg-Eldering, Marokkaanse gezinnen in Nederland (Alphen aan den Rijn 1979).45 P. de Mas and M. A.F. Haffmans, De gezinshereniging van Marokkanen in Nederland, 1968-1984: een onderzoek naar de omvang, de aard en de gebieden van herkomst en vestiging (Den Haag 1985)46 The Moroccan state officially refers to all Moroccans living abroad as Marocains resident a l’etranger (MRE; Moroccans living abroad). 47 H. de Haas, ‘Between courting and controlling: the Moroccan state and ‘its’ emigrants’, Working paper No. 54, University of Oxford (2007) 17-18. Online available: http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/working_papers.shtml

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Moroccan state believed that a strong orientation on Dutch society might lead to estrangement from the country of origin, and as a result to less remittances.48

Besides, a stronger orientation on the country of origin would was believed to undermine the loyalty of Moroccan migrants to the King and their Moroccan and religious identity.

Facing growing unemployment, the government saw a clear link between emigration and the regulation of the domestic labour market. The policy and bilateral arguments came to play with the signing of recruitment agreements with European countries. The first emigration policies, in the post-independence period (1956 onwards), were economically motivated and were meant to encourage emigration in the 1970s. At the same time, European countries called for a recruitment stop and started to encourage return migration after the 1973 oil crisis. This shift in receiving states’ policies began to lay new grounds for Morocco’s involvement in their emigrant communities. Both Morocco and the countries of settlement states (and the emigrants) did not expect that emigration would be long-term or permanent. With family reunification the size of the emigrant communities abroad increased. With the change of the communities’ character, the relationships between the emigrants and the country of origin, as well as the ties, changed drastically. All these developments triggered new responses from the Moroccan state vis-à-vis its emigrants. Morocco had to formulate new state institutional responses to claim its subjects.49

It was not until the 1970s that the Moroccan state initiated its first institutionalized activities toward its expatriate communities. This time these initiatives were not inspired by economic motives. The growing participation of Moroccan workers in politics, mainly trade union activism, and as a result their role in the political opposition from abroad, triggered Morocco’s involvement. In addition, domestic political developments, several coup attempts and the growing support for leftist movements abroad, made the king realize that interference across borders was necessary to ensure domestic political stability.

The Moroccan state’s attitude toward its emigrant communities changed during the decades of emigration, as a result of the changing composition of the communities abroad. Often the institutions that were put in place were reflective of the communities at that time. For instance, in the 1960s and the 1970s, the emigrant communities were largely composed of men, some of whom were labour union or student activists seeking democratic change of the Moroccan regime in the county of origin. To protect the stability of the kingdom and to ensure the continuing flow of workers to Europe, the Moroccan state felt that worker and student activism had to be monitored and minimized. In this regard, the Moroccan state, via the Amicales (a Moroccan state-sponsored organization and controlling apparatus), protected its domestic sovereignty through involvement in extra-territorial communities. This is a clear example of the sovereignty argument.

In the meantime, the Moroccan communities abroad had undergone significant transitions; they became larger and more family-oriented. At the same time, western countries closed their borders for labour immigration, which made migrants’ stay longer. The more permanent settlement of these migrants raised a 48 H. de Haas and R. Plug, ‘Cherishing the Goose with the Golden Eggs: Trends in Migrant Remittances from Europe to Morocco 1970-2004, International Migration Review (2006), 40 (3), 603–634. 49 A. Belguendouz, La communauté marocaine à l’étranger et la nouvelle marche marocaine (Kenitra 1999).

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new set of needs, both from the communities abroad and the Moroccan state. Morocco could no longer assume that these Moroccans would ultimately return and bring back their savings. The Moroccan state could not expect that they would maintain ties of loyalty to their families, culture, religion or the king.

Secondly, and more importantly, it was the possibility of greater integration that western countries offered its immigrant communities that threatened the king’s claims on his subjects abroad, and thus triggered the Moroccan state to act and formulate new policies. Political and social participation in the countries Moroccan migrants were bound to settle, made the king realize that he might lose the political loyalty and economic contribution of some parts of the communities abroad. From the 1990s onwards, Morocco’s approach toward its emigrants shifted from rejecting integration as key to strengthen the ties with the country of origin to acknowledging that only by accepting that Moroccans were gradually integrating into European societies did Morocco have a chance of maintaining and preserving ties of loyalty and sovereignty with the communities abroad. This shows a shift from an emphasis on the sovereignty argument and to a lesser extent the loyalty argument to a changing policy argument in which the integration of migrants was considered necessary condition for migrants’ loyalty.

The unsuccessful repressive screening policies and a decline in remittances prompted the Moroccan state in the 1990s to change course. From then on, Moroccan citizens abroad, including their dual nationality and their integration into European societies, were welcomed.50 The changing attitude of the Moroccan state vis-à-vis its emigrants is above all inspired by economic motives. Accordingly, migrants were increasingly seen as important actors in the national (economic) development and modernization of the countries of origin.51

While the Moroccan state tried to strengthen ties with its emigrants, recently the Dutch state interpreted these attempts as interference with national affairs and a hindrance to migrants’ integration.52

In sum, Morocco represents a good example of a country that treats its emigrants as long-term, long-distance members and shapes and adopts new tasks in response to ‘transnational’ migration. The Moroccan state had several reasons for maintaining and stimulating ties with Moroccans abroad. At first there were major concerns – especially in the early years of ‘guest worker migration’ - about the political stability within Morocco and how migrants outside Morocco might try to influence the political balance. In this period the sovereignty argument dominated and accordingly, economic ties were encouraged and political ties were not. Secondly, remittances are an important source of income to the country and maintaining ties is seen as an instrument to continue this flow. In that regard, remittances continue to be an integral part of the policy argument. However, sending states’ policies with regard to their emigrant communities are not static, but dynamic processes that change over time, implying that different arguments prevail during different periods or that arguments might even interact, as was the case in the latest decades when the loyalty and policy argument were emphasized. Arguments shifted because Morocco’s involvement in emigrant affairs gradually changed and expanded as the nature and the size of the

50 H. de Haas, Between courting and controlling: The Moroccan state and ‘its’ emigrants, Working Paper, nr. 54 (Oxford 2007) 3-4. 51 Idem, 4.52 Ibidem.

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communities abroad changed. The emigration policies and the institutions that embody these policies should be understood as part of the Moroccan state’s ongoing attempts to reinforce the boundaries of the national community by stressing the economic, political and cultural “Moroccanness” of those living outside the territorial boundaries of the monarchy.53 The way Moroccan migrants and their descendants were perceived, at first as subjects with limited rights, shifted into more recognition of Moroccans as citizens, and corresponds with the changing ideas of the Moroccan state about who can be included (and excluded) into the nation-state.

4. ‘Transnationalism’ in Dutch parliamentary debates

In this section I will look at how Moroccan migrants’ involvement with the country of origin was interpreted in Dutch parliamentary and political debates since the beginning of Moroccan migration to the Netherlands. Receiving states’ responses to migrants’ involvements with the country of origin go beyond interpretations of ‘transnationalism’, they also deal with state-led policies to promote migrants’ engagements with and orientations on the country of origin. This aspect has been relatively less explored in studies on ‘transnationalism’, as has been pointed out above. It is clear that ‘transnationalism’ is foremost a scholarly concept often used in academic literature to describe migrants’ involvement with the country of origin. The term ‘transnationalism’ was never used in political discussions. To understand how and why the attitude of the Dutch state towards migrants and their involvement with their countries of origin has changed, requires an understanding of how and why immigration and integration policies have developed as they did.

Early on, the Dutch government showed interest in establishing economic relations with Morocco. When Morocco gained independence in 1956, Dutch authorities were quick to set up trade contracts with the new state regarding exports and fishing rights. Apart from economic contacts, the Dutch state also showed sympathy after the devastating earthquake in Agadir, a coastal town in southern Morocco, in 1960. Dutch marines, located near the Moroccan sea-side, were the first international troops on site to provide assistance. With reference to this special Morocco-Dutch bond, in Dutch Parliament, a speech was delivered which all parliamentarians listened to while standing. The parliamentarian who delivered the speech declared that people in the Netherlands cared deeply about what happened in Morocco, especially now that the speed of travel had increased so much and distances had decreased and accordingly ties between countries had strengthened as did the common interests.54 This example shows that there were ties between the two countries before there was any migration of importance.

The nature of the ‘guest worker’ recruitment implied close contacts between the nations. The recruitment agreement with Morocco stated that the

53 L.A. Brand, Citizens abroad, 46. 54 Proceedings Lower House, session part 1 1959—1960 :Toespraken Voorzitster en Minister van Volkshuisvesting en Bouwnijverheid Voorzitster mevrouw Stoffels-van Haaften 45ste vergadering - 8 maart '60 p 751.

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Dutch state and employers were responsible for the well-being of Moroccan ‘guest workers’ during their stay in the Netherlands. How the agreements between the two countries were organised points to an emphasis on the bilateral agreement in which responsibilities of both countries were stressed. This government’s task also became clear from questions that were asked in Dutch Parliament. A parliamentarian expressed her concerns about the deplorable state of ‘guest worker’ accommodations after nine Moroccan ‘guest workers’ died in fire when their hostel burned down.55 ‘Do you, Minister, believe it is appropriate to attract more ‘guest workers’, while the state cannot provide reasonable housing for these guest workers?’.56 The Minster responded that it was the responsibility of the government to give special attention to the accommodation of ‘guest workers’. In 1972 another parliamentarian questioned the arrest of Moroccan ‘guest workers’ who stayed illegally in the Netherlands. The MP demanded an investigation of ‘this raid on people in guesthouses in the middle of the night and with strong police presence’.57 Other questions were raised when Moroccan ‘guest workers’ were disadvantaged and mistreated. For instance, when sixteen Moroccan workers agreed to resign from there jobs by signing a letter they could not read,58 when the hostel where Moroccan ‘guest workers’ lived was trashed by hooligans59, or when it was found that Moroccans could only insure their cars with a firm (set up by all insurance companies collectively), which took on only high risk cases and charged high premium.60

Another example of collaboration between Morocco and the Netherlands that required close and frequent contacts, stressing the bilateral agreement, is the organisation of child support. Arrangements about child support were different for Moroccan (and Spanish) ‘guest workers’ than for other ‘guest workers’. Money was transferred to Morocco rather than given to the ‘guest workers’ in the Netherlands. A Moroccan state institution was responsible for the distribution of the money. In 1971 a daily newspaper reported that Moroccan ‘guest workers’ had to provide proof that they did support their children in Morocco, implying that some Moroccan ‘guest workers’ might commit fraud with child support.61 They had to show that money had been transferred to Morocco for their children’s support. Only if they did provide support themselves, they could qualify for state child support. The requirement that a parent, who does not live with the children, had to support the children was standard for everybody in the Netherlands. According to the newspaper Moroccan workers however had to send large sums of money and provide proof that they did support their children. In Parliament it was denied that this was the case.62 In the case of child support, the bilateral agreement - emphasizing Dutch need for interference in Moroccan

55 Proceedings Lower House, session 1970-1971 Aanhangsel tot het Verslag van de Handelingen der Tweede Kamer, 947.56 Idem. 57 Proceedings Lower House, session 1971-1972 Aanhangsel tot het Verslag van de Handelingen der Eerste Kamer, p. 293.58 Proceedings Lower House, session 1970-1971 Aanhangsel tot het Verslag van de Handelingen der Eerste Kamer, p. 59.59 Proceedings Lower House, session 1968-1969 Aanhangsel tot hef Verslag van de Handelingen der Tweede Kamer p. 2013 .60 Proceedings Lower House, session 1971 Aanhangsel tot het Verslag van de Handelingen der Tweede Kamer p. 603.61 „Haarlems Dagblad" van 10 juni 1971, blz. 1 en blz. 2.62 Proceedings Lower House, session 1971 Aanhangsel tot het Verslag van de Handelingen der Eerste Kamer, p. 63.

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national affairs - served as a justification for Dutch policy. In the 1970s, a new agreement was set up because Moroccan ‘guest workers’ could not prove they indeed had the number of children they claimed child support for. Partly this was because the population administration in Morocco failed to provide such proof and partly the reason was that fraudulent information had been provided at first instance.63 Originally, the Moroccan consuls were supposed to check the information that was provided by the ‘guest workers’. When this failed a new treaty was introduced (1 January 1973) which delegated the responsibility for checking data to the “Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale” in Casablanca.64

These close and formalised contacts between both states had an effect on the contacts of ‘guest workers’ with their countries of origin on a individual level.

In the course of the 1970s and 1980s migration issues attracted more and more parliamentary attention.65 Until then the government was the key player in policy making. The growing attention in Parliament for immigration policies should be understood as the result of the wider public relevance of the migration issue. With family reunifications ‘guest workers’ and their families became more visible in society and consequently more often subject for political debate.66 Until the mid-1980s, the central idea was that the Netherlands was not and should not be an immigration country. As a result labour migrants from Southern Europe, Turkey and Morocco continued to be seen as temporary migrants or guest workers.67 In this period, migrants’ ties with the country of origin were considered important and were justified as part of the remigration argument. Accordingly, policy focused on migrants’ return to their countries of origin. The parliamentary discussions on migrants’ return to their countries of origin illustrate this goal.

In the memorandum on foreign workers of 1974-1975 the Dutch government argued that the Netherlands should not encourage long-term settlement of labour migrants.68 That meant that the government implemented a restrictive immigration policy on labour migration and supported those who wished to return to their countries of origin. In that regard, the authorities thought it was important for migrants ‘to sustain warm ties with the home country and keep their aspirations on their future possibilities in the country of origin alive’.69

Maintenance of ties with the country of origin was mentioned frequently and positively, and always in the context of return. Accordingly, the main policy goal was a successful reintegration of labour migrants in their countries of origin.70 In line with this idea the government announced the introduction of a ‘return bonus’, a financial compensation of 5000 guilders (2500 euro) for labour migrants who returned to their countries of origin.71 This measure, or rather intention, met great resistance in Parliament and was soon labelled in less friendly terms (the get-lost

63 Proceedings Lower House, session 1ste vergadering - 31 oktober '67 Vaste Commissie voor Sociale Zaken Zitting 1967-1968.64 Proceedings Lower House, session 1972-1973 Aanhangsel tot het Verslag van de Handelingen der Tweede Kamer p. 3003.65 S. Bonjour, Grens en gezin. Beleidsvorming inzake gezinsmigratie in Nederland, 1955-2005 (Amsterdam 2009) 111-113. 66 Idem, 112. 67 Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR), Nederland als immigratie-samenleving (Den Haag 2001) 168.68 Proceedings Lower House, session 1974-1975, 10 504, nr. 12, p. 13.69 Proceedings Lower House, session 1974-1975, 10 504, nr. 12, p. 14. 70 Idem. 71 H.B. Entzinger, Het Minderhedenbeleid. Dilemma's voor de overheid in Nederland en zes andere immigratielanden in Europa (Meppel-Amsterdam 1984) 87.

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bonus).72 Other measures to promote return migration concerned return projects and socio-economic investments in the countries of origin in order to create labour opportunities in those countries so that the need to migrate for economic reasons would decline. Between 1973 and 1977 the government investigated the effects of labour migration on the countries of origin. This investigation was called: Reintegration of Emigrant Manpower and Local Opportunities for Development (REMPLOD-project). The aim of the research was to determine how migrants could contribute to the development of their countries of origin. Only three countries were targeted: Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. Based on the outcomes of the REMPLOD-project the Minister of Development Aid decided on a new policy: 90 percent of the available means would be spend on programs in regions from which many migrants originated. The remaining 10 percent would be spent on projects that would encourage return migration. Small scale, individual projects were meant to create new employment in the countries of origin.73 This new policy was developed when the economy took a turn for the worse and especially Moroccan workers were made redundant at a large scale or ended up on disability benefits after paying premiums for only a few years. These migrants who were on social security benefits were encouraged to return to their countries of origins with retention of their benefits. An enforcement of this new interference of the Dutch state into the countries of origin of the ‘guest worker’ migrants followed when the rules about benefits changed and Dutch authorities wanted to check if they were correctly implemented. All these state’s measures fall within the category of the remigration argument. In some cases, for instance when the social benefits were organised, the bilateral agreement served as an instrument to strengthen the remigration argument.

While the remigration policy remained a highly debated political topic in the next decade, the policies in the 1970s, that encouraged migrants’ orientation on and return to the country of origin, should be understood in the light of an overall restrictive immigration policy. Here the policy argument came to the forefront. The explicit message by the government was that the Dutch labour market should become less dependent on foreign workers. The immediate cause for the restrictive measures was the problematic accommodation of labour migrants and their families, due to shortages on the housing market. So, encouraging migrants’ ties with the country of origin was considered important, but as part of the idea of temporality and the expected return of labour migrants. This point of view was emphasized in several policy papers on labour migrants in the 1970s, in which they were encouraged to retain their own identity for the sake of an easy return to the country of origin.74 But, contrary to all prognoses, many guest workers did not return to their countries of origin. The rising unemployment rates among labour migrants and the arrival of their families required new policies. In this period an ideological gap occurred between the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work. The first still held on to the idea of temporary employment of ‘guest workers’, the latter was more and

72 Idem. 73 W.F. Heinemeijer, H. van Amersfoort, W. Ettema, P. de Mas, and H.H. van der Wusten, Weggaan om te blijven. Gevolgen van gastarbeid op het Marokkaanse platteland (Amsterdam 1976); Den Haag: Remplod / Nuffic; Remigratie van buitenlanders: niet terug naar af (Utrecht 1982); Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR) (1989) Allochtonenbeleid 1989. Den Haag: SDU uitgeverij (Rapporten aan de Regering: 36).74 Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Volksgezondheid, Nota buitenlandse werknemers (Den Haag 1970) 10.

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more confronted by difficulties in guiding ‘guest workers’ and their newly arrived families.75

One of the government’s key measures in the 1970s was the subsidising of organisations of ethnic minorities. As a result migrant organisations became dependent on the Dutch government, and it led to an emphasis on ethnic identity. That meant that Moroccan organisations got subsidies if they emphasised their Moroccanness.76 The Dutch government partly gave subsidies for ideological reasons (supporting the idea of multicultural society), and partly for reasons of efficiency (thinking that the organisations of migrants would be able to provide better care). However, an important explanation for subsidising was also that the Dutch government wanted to control organisations and decrease the (political) influence from the countries of origin.77 This is an example of the sovereignty argument: interference from countries of origin in migrants’ lives can lead to unrest in migrant communities and might undermine the national stability. Providing subsidies for migrant organisations was new, but the fear for too much influence from and interference by the country of origin on the migrants was not. Already at the end of the nineteenth century, and again in the 1920s and 1930s, Dutch authorities feared influence from the countries of origin on the migrants, which was at that time mostly Germany.78

In the 1970s, left-wing Dutch students and other Dutch volunteers played a crucial role in setting up left-wing ‘guest worker’ organisations, particularly for the Turkish and Moroccan workers.79 They favoured left-wing initiatives and successfully protested against government’s financial support for religious organisations set up by ‘guest workers’. This refusal created an opening in the religious domain for interference by the countries of origin, which send money and imams.80 As a result, the right-wing and religious migrant organisations were subsidised by the countries of origin and thus evaded interference by Dutch organisations.81

The way in which migrant group activities were subsidised made it advantageous to belong to an ethnic group. It was believed that by maintaining group-specific facilities the social cultural emancipation of groups could be enhanced, which would benefit individual social economic participation. Migrants’ activities had to be presented as ‘cultural’ and authentic in order to qualify for subsidies. The subsidies to the organisations were used by local and national governments to keep in touch with migrant communities. In that way they could

75 R. Penninx ‘Towards an overall ethnic minorities policy’, in Scientific Council for Government Policy, Ethnic Minorities, Report No. 17 (Den Haag1979) 156. 76 Proceedings Lower House, session 2003–2004, 28 689, no. 12, 127-128, 244.77 Proceedings Lower House, session 2003–2004, 28 689, no. 12, 138-139.78 Marlou Schrover, ‘No more than a keg of beer. The coherence of German immigrant communities’, in: Leo Lucassen, Jochen Oltmer and David Feldman (red.), Paths of integration. Migrants in Western Europe (1880-2004) (Amsterdam 2006) 222-238.79 Proceedings Lower House, session 2003–2004, 28 689, no. 12, 140, 142, 253; W. Tinnemans, Een gouden armband. Een geschiedenis van mediterrane immigranten in Nederland, 1945-1994 (Utrecht 1994) 238.80 Proceedings Lower House, session 2003–2004, 28 689, no. 12, 247.81 Nicolaas Landman, Van mat tot minaret. De institutionalisering van de Islam in Nederland (Amsterdam 1992); T. Sunier, ‘Moslims in de Nederlandse politieke arena’, in: T. Sunier, J. W. Duyvendak, S. Saharso and F. Steijlen (eds.) Emancipatie en subcultuur: sociale bewegingen in België en Nederland (Amsterdam 2000) 138–157; Proceedings Lower House, session 2003–2004, 28 689, no. 12, 139, 141.

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hold communities responsible for acts by individuals.82 This is again an example of the policy argument: promoting migrants’ positive identity formation was part of the integration policy; subsidising organisation was part of exercising control.

In 1981, the government’s stance towards subsidising shifted: the subsidy budget was reduced and from then on migrants were supposed to use general organisations when possible, rather than get financial support for their own organisations. Those organisations that still got subsidies had to adapt their goals; no more bonding, only bridging.83 It was believed that not all migrants were in need of representation, but migrants from Turkey and Morocco were seen as more problematic and more in need of support than others.84 Here the policy argument is used to justify the specific integration measures for Moroccans and Turks.

My analysis shows that the different positions towards the presumably temporary presence of migrant workers in Dutch society, coming from policy makers, the media, local authorities and academics triggered new responses from the government.85 In 1979, the Scientific Council for Government Policy published a report on ‘ethnic minorities’, formerly known as ‘guest workers’, in which it called for the recognition of the reality of the permanent settlement of a number of immigrant groups and for an active policy aimed at the integration of ‘ethnic minorities’ in Dutch society. The government developed an Ethnic Minorities Policy, which gained full parliamentary support. In the 1980s Dutch policy shifted its focus away from an ad-hoc policy to an ethnic minorities policy, stressing the equality of ethnic minorities in the socio-economic domain, inclusion and participation in the political domain and religious and cultural equity.86 This points to an emphasis on the policy argument: migrants’ ties are considered important and strengthening them is used as an argument in the justification of the integration policy.

All the time remigration continued to be an important goal in Dutch migration policies. The 1983 Ethnic Minorities Report dedicated a paragraph on remigration policy that inspired parliamentary discussions in 1985. This time all actors involved embraced the idea of migrants’ permanent settlement. Parliament reached consensus about the fact that remigration policy should be an integral part of and not an alternative to the ethnic minorities policy.87 In addition, all political parties argued in line with the government’s position that remigration should only occur on a voluntary basis and that the decision to return to the country of origin is primarily that the migrants88 Apart from details concerning the age groups eligible for remigration options and the specific position of migrants’ children, all political parties agreed that the government is obliged to guide and (financially) support those who wish to return to their countries of origin.89

Migrants’ orientation on the country of origin was still encouraged, but it should now be understood as part of multicultural and integration policies. The central 82 Proceedings Lower House, session 2003–2004, 28 689, no. 12, 251.83 Proceedings Lower House, session 2003–2004, 28 689, no. 12, 137, 248.84 Proceedings Lower House, session 2003–2004, 28 689, no. 12, 130, 134, 253.85 M. Bruquetes-Callejo, B. Garcés-Mascareñas, R. Penninx and P. Scholten, Policymaking related to immigration and integration. The Dutch Case, IMISCOE Working Paper: Country report, No. 15 (Amsterdam 2006) 14.86 Idem, 15. 87 Bijzondere commissie voor het Minderhedenbeleid, Notitie remigratiebeleid 1985, 18 939, 89-1 -89-27. 88 Idem, 89-8.89 Idem, 89-8 - 89-24.

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idea in the ethnic minorities report was that ‘guest workers’ were here to stay and accordingly that policies should be directed at the integration of ethnic minorities in Dutch society.

Furthermore, the policy paper emphasized that integration is a reciprocal process: minority groups and the majority group in society need to respect and acknowledged each other’s religious and cultural beliefs. However, the new policy also stated that ethnic minorities should be more oriented towards the dominant culture and the society they lived in. The old motto of ‘integration with the maintenance of the own cultural identity’ gained a new meaning: maintaining the original cultural identity was believed to enhance the emancipation within the own cultural community and this would strengthen the integration into Dutch society.90 In this regard, the Dutch government facilitated, organized and financed education in the language and culture of the country of origin for children. The idea was that a stronger cultural identity and awareness would strengthen their position in Dutch society, but at the same time the rationale behind this measure was that migrants and their children should not cut off ties with their country of origin, because it could frustrate a return. These measures were supported by the remigration and policy arguments that stressed the importance ties as a justification for the implemented policies.

From the beginning, measures in the domain of education have been an important part of the ethnic minorities policy. Primarily, this education was meant for children of labour migrants who were believed to return to their countries of origin. Following the advice of the Scientific Council for Government Policy in 1979, that stated that the policy on ethnic minorities should assume a more permanent settlement of these migrants, the vision on education in the native language and culture changed, stressing three basic principles: it can contribute to the development of the assertiveness of the pupil, it provides a better understanding of and access to the culture of the country of origin that support contacts with family members and friends from and in the country of origin, and finally it facilitates an easy reintegration in the school system in the country of origin after remigration.91 The implementation of these educational measures for Moroccan immigrants’ children implied a bilateral cultural agreement between the Netherlands and Morocco in 1983, which stated that the Moroccan state was responsible for the recruitment of Moroccan teachers.92 With these perspectives, the discussion on education in the language and culture of the country of origin gained broad support from all political parties in Parliament, which indicates that a strong cultural identification was appreciated and that an ongoing orientation on the country of origin was positively interpreted.

Since the Dutch government emphasized a strong cultural group identity and encouraged minority’s emancipation and integration in society, active and passive voting rights in local elections for alien residents were introduced in 1985. The Moroccan King Hassan II instructed his subjects in the Netherlands not to participate in the 1986 local elections, and this triggered questions in Dutch Parliament.93 In the previous section, I highlighted that Morocco’s rejection of Dutch integration policy can be understood as part of Morocco’s loyalty and

90 Minderhedennota 1983.91 Proceedings Lower House, session 1982-1983, 16 102, nrs. 20-21. 92 Proceedings Lower House, session 1983-1984, 18 130, no. 5. Other agreements were signed with Spain, Turkey and former Yugoslavia. The Dutch-Moroccan agreement was criticized by leftwing political parties who objected cooperation with Morocco because of its poor record in human rights issues.

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policy arguments. Several MP’s stated that: ‘the comments made by the Moroccan King Hassan II caused great panic and unrest in the Moroccan community. Many Moroccans fear repercussions against their family members in Morocco if the Moroccan authorities find out they used their voting rights’.94 One MP considered King Hassan’s behaviour ‘an interference in Dutch national affairs’.95 The King’s statements were meant to discourage Moroccans’ integration in western societies. Several members of Parliament expressed their concerns about how the King’s statements would effect the integration of Moroccans in Dutch society. This points to Dutch repudiation of Morocco’s interference with their emigrants and the fear that this interference might destabilize Dutch sovereignty. The MP’s, supported by the Ministers of Foreign and Domestic Affairs, argued that social and political participation in Dutch society and the development of a strong cultural identity are not contradictory processes.96 This example shows that in political debates - as was characteristic to the 1980s - close ties with the country of origin and an emphasis on cultural aspects were encouraged, but at the same time pressure or interference by the country of origin were criticized.97 From a Dutch point of view, this exemplifies both the policy argument and the sovereignty argument.

Throughout the 1980s, the role of the government was defined as facilitative to ethnic minorities in the domain of culture, language and religion. However, in the late 1980s, the critique on the ethnic minorities policy was growing, causing intense political debate. In 1989 a new report of the Scientific Council for Government Policy stated that too little progress was made in the economic (labour market) and social (education) domain and too much attention was given to multicultural issues and the subsidizing of organizations.98 The explicit message to the government was to focus less on cultural rights and facilities and more on increasing minorities’ participation in education and on the labour market. In the 1990s this shift in policy resulted in a new political agenda that was no longer centred on the group but on the individuals, who occupied weak positions. The government recognized that a preoccupation with cultural differences undermined ‘real’ problems like labour market participation. The report stressed the need to shift the focus away from cultural factors causing migrants’ weak position in society to socio-economic incorporation.99 The emphasis on socio-economic progress and the rejection of an overemphasis on cultural identifications questioned the ongoing orientation on the country of origin. From that period on, a strong cultural or religious identity and orientation on the country of origin were linked to a failed integration in the country of settlement. It signifies a strong and sudden change in the debates. The policy argument dominated in this period as a justification for implementing new integration policies with a stronger emphasis on the assimilation of migrants in Dutch society.

93 Proceedings Lower House, session 1985-1986, Aanhangsel, 1269; Tweede Kamer, Vragen, 3982. 94 Idem.95 Idem.96 Idem, 3982-3984. 97 The same discouraging statements were made by the Moroccan King on the eve of the 1990 local elections and again the Dutch government repudiated these statements. 98 M. Bruquetes-Callejo, B. Garcés-Mascareñas, R. Penninx and P. Scholten, Policymaking related to immigration and integration, 17.99 Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR), Migrantenbeleid (Den Haag 1989).

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In the second half of the 1990s, the political debate increasingly resonated outside the parliament and in the media. In public debates the cultural and religious differences between groups came to the forefront. Frits Bolkestein, the former leader of the Dutch liberals, instigated this debate by questioning the compatibility of Islam and the western culture. According to Bolkestein migrants’ Islamic background hindered their integration into Dutch secular society. Accordingly, he rejected the state’s facilitative support in setting up migrant self-organizations. Social problems that occurred in society were more and more interpreted as a ‘clash of civilization’.100 In 2000 the scholar and publicist Paul Scheffer published his article entitled ‘the multicultural drama’. In the article he called for a parliamentary inquiry on the immigration and integration policy. His main concern was that the encouraging immigration and limited integration policies increased inequality and cultural segregation and contributed to feelings of estrangement towards the receiving society. All this caused danger to the public peace and harmony.101 This essay was the starting point of a widespread public debate in the Netherlands on immigration and integration and a turbulent period in Dutch politics. Scheffer’s essay revealed a political uncertainty on the effectiveness of thirty years of immigrant and integration policies. Above all, this essay revealed a great social discomfort about the multicultural society. Such beliefs were reinforced by international developments, such as the 9/11 attacks. For the first time, the loyalty argument came to play an import role in Dutch integration policy. In addition, in the same period, the sovereignty argument was stressed to point to the dangers of a failed integration of migrants. In earlier periods, the sovereignty argument was only used within the context of interference by the countries of origin and their possible effects of the national stability.

The main political and public concern was the poorly cultural integration of migrants and their descendants. Political parties stressed that migrant organizations were more oriented on the own cultural background than on the country of settlement, causing a fragmented or failed integration.102 The emphasis in political debates on the cultural differences between migrants and non-migrants as an explanation for non-integration marks a breaking point with past notions of integration. Political parties in the country of settlement can judge migrants’ involvement with the country of origin positively or negatively. It can be considered a sign of conservatism and a lack of integration or migrants can be portrayed as cosmopolitan citizens. Moroccan migrants are generally considered within the first category. For instance, in 2009, the Minister of Integration stated in his family migration policy that the failing integration and emancipation of marriage migrants brings great challenges to the government. The policy emphasized that especially migrants from Morocco and Turkey have great difficulties adjusting to Dutch society.103 This indicates that the emphasis in integration policies is on the cultural adaptation of migrants to Dutch society. Consequently, there is little interest in the political arena for migrants’ ties with the country of origin.

Interference by countries of origin is subject to political debate. In 2008 several incidents regarding the Moroccan state’s interference with the Moroccan 100 E. Snel, De vermeende kloof tussen culturen (Twente 2003). 101 P. Scheffer, Het land van aankomst (Amsterdam 2007) 49. 102 Commissie Blok, Bruggen bouwen. Eindrapport van de Tijdelijke Parlementaire Onderzoekscommissie Integratiebeleid (Den Haag 2004) 53.103 Proceedings Lower House, session 2009-2010, 32 175, nr 1.

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community in the Netherlands, triggered a parliamentary debate on this unwanted Moroccan interfering in national affairs. Within one year there was the arrest of a Dutch-Moroccan police officer on the grounds espionage for Morocco, the attendance of a conference in Morocco by 39 Dutch-Moroccan imams under the patronage of the Moroccan King, heated discussions about double nationality and about the so-called Moroccan name-list for Dutch-Moroccan children. Within these discussions it was forgotten that Moroccans (and Turks) were not the only ones with double nationality (the same was true for migrants from 17 other countries among whom migrants from France and Italy) and that a Dutch compulsory name-list had existed until 1971.104 The debates show that all political parties strongly criticized Morocco’s ‘long tentacles that are deeply penetrated in Dutch society’.105 All political parties agreed that ‘this long-term Moroccan interference hindered Moroccans’ integration and that those who live in the Netherlands should be free of any influence from the countries of origin’.106 Here we see again an emphasis on the sovereignty argument. In the same debate the rightwing political party PVV used the term loyalty in regard to the integration of migrants.107 A couple years earlier, in 2004, the Dutch Parliament discussed the outcomes of the parliamentary investigation on the immigration and integration policies. In that regard, the Christian Union (CU), a small Christian party, pleaded for a ‘loyalty declaration’ singed by immigrants who applied for Dutch citizenship.108 More and more, rightwing politicians and conservative publicists saw disloyalty and the lack of feelings of belonging as the central problems of the integration of migrants into society. In 2007 the PVV questioned the loyalty of two members of government who held dual nationality by proposing a motion of no-confidence.109 The PVV and other public figures feared that having two passports would lead to conflicts of interests, especially for politicians. The majority of the Parliament dismissed the motion, however, the public and political debate on loyalties and dual nationalities was and is still very lively. Migrants and their descendants who hold on to their cultural identity and continue to have attachments with their country of origin meet harsh rejections in public and political debates. Marrying a partner from the country of origin is discussed within the same context and is seen as a sign of conservatism and traditionalism, and therefore as unwanted and hindering to integration.

Although academic studies emphasise that involvement with the country of origin is not incompatible with integration into the country of settlement and that there are no real differences between immigrant groups in their ‘transnational’ behaviour, in political debates these differences are constructed for various reasons. Overlooking the migration and integration policies of the last three decades, we see that the attitude towards migrants’ involvement with the country of origin shifted from a positive to a negative connotation. The Dutch government used different arguments to justify migrants’ ties with the country of origin. In the early days of Moroccan migration the remigration argument dominated political discussions. In the same period, the collaboration between Morocco and the Netherlands was important as a means to control migrants’ social benefits and to

104 Herman Obdeijn and Marlou Schrover, ‘Mantra wordt stigma’, Socialisme en Democratie, jrg. 60, nr. 1/2 (2009) 67-71.105 Proceedings Lower House, session 2008-2009, nr. 18, p. 1304. 106 Idem, 1304-1331.107 Idem, 1308-1309. 108 Proceedings Lower House, session 2003-2004, nr. 94, p. 6082.109 Volkskrant, 24 February 2007.

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justify the integration policy that stressed the cultural identity of Moroccan migrants. In the 1980s, with the growing criticism on integration policy in and outside Parliament, the Dutch government no longer stressed migrants’ cultural identity, but promoted social and cultural adjustment and repudiated the influence of countries of origin on migrants. This led to a shift away from an emphasis on policy arguments to an emphasis on sovereignty and loyalty arguments. The loyalty argument became more centred in policies from the mid 1990s onwards.

The different meanings and the related qualifications states attribute to ‘transnational’ involvement can result in feelings of in- and exclusion. A rejection of ‘transnational’ attachments by the country of settlement can lead to feelings of exclusion among migrants, causing increasing orientations on the country of origin and identifications with co-ethnics.110 Migrants in weak social positions in the country of settlement are inclined to hold on to cultural ideas if they are confronted with or feel threatened by prevailing ideas and values.111

Consequently, the need to emphasize one’s own cultural identity and the differences between cultures becomes greater.112 On the other hand, experiences of acceptance and appreciation by the country of settlement can reduce feelings of exclusion.113

5. Conclusion

In this paper I analysed the shifting meanings of ‘transnationalism’ in academic literature and in political debates. Until the 1990s, labour migrants were studied mostly in relation to their position in the country of settlement. Within this discourse there was hardly any attention for migrants’ involvement with the country of origin, except when a reference was made to their expected return. Recently a new approach gained popularity. In academic circles it is argued that migrants are ‘transnational’ and simultaneously engaged in two worlds. Academic debates on transnationalism partly spilled over into public and political debates. We also saw that what is ignored in academic debates – no attention for differences within groups according to for instance region of origin, class and gender – are also ignored in public and political debates. In the academic literature ‘transnationalism’ was introduced as a neutral or positive term. In recent political debates ‘transnationalism’ – although the term itself is hardly used - is about the consequences of migrants’ involvement with the country of origin for the country of settlement, and has a strong negative connotation.

The academic literature sometimes follows these political debates and studies ‘transnationalism’ in relation to migrants’ integration into the receiving society. It is however striking that ‘transnational’ involvement is only considered a

110 H. Ghorashi, Ways to survive, battles to win: Iranian women exiles in the Netherlands and the US (Nijmegen 2001) 262-263. 111 L. Buskens, ‘Muslim identity in Dutch multicultural society’, in: A. Borsboom and F. Jespers (eds.) Identity and religion: a multidisciplinary approach (Saarbrücken 2003) 139-154. 112 T.H. Erikson, Ethnicity and nationalism (London 2002); Y.L. Espiritu, Home bound: American lives across cultures, communities, and countries (California 2003). 113 S. van Beuzekom, Local community: an unrecognized factor. Een studie naar de invloed van de lokale omgeving op de identiteitsconstructie en gevoelens van ‘home’ en ‘belonging’ van de transnationale Suryoye gemeenschap (unpublished MA-thesis) (Utrecht 2008) 31-32.

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problem when it involves migrants from countries that are presumed to be less modern or non-western. The ‘transnational’ behaviour of migrants from so-called modern or western countries – migrants for the US in the Netherlands for instance - is less regarded a problem and less understood in terms of rejecting integration. The emphasis on the ‘transnationalism’-integration nexus puts some immigrant groups to the forefront of academic research and excludes other groups from studies on ‘transnationalism’.

To understand the shifting meanings of ‘transnationalism’ in political debates in the country of settlement and country of origin I analysed what arguments were used to asses ‘transnationalism’, by whom they were used and why the different arguments were used. My analysis showed that Morocco’s involvement in emigrant affairs gradually changed and expanded as the nature and the size of the communities abroad changed. The emigration policies and the institutions that embody these policies should be understood as part of the Moroccan state’s ongoing attempts to reinforce the boundaries of the national community by stressing the economic, political and cultural “Moroccanness” of those living outside the territorial boundaries of the monarchy. In this regard, the loyalty argument continued to play an important role throughout the period under study. Morocco rejected the integration of its emigrants in Dutch society because it feared that a stronger orientation on the country of settlement would lead to a weaker orientation on the country of origin and thus to lesser remittances. In the early years of ‘guest worker’ migration, when the Moroccan monarchy was still taking shape after having become recently independent, the inference with the ‘guest workers’ abroad partly sprang from worries that they might destabilise the countries internal political balance. Accordingly, the sovereignty argument dominated Moroccan policy. Later remittances became more important to Morocco and maintaining ties are a way to ensure they continue. From the 1990s, the way Moroccan migrants and their descendants were perceived, at first as subjects with limited rights, shifted into a more recognition of Moroccans as citizens, and corresponds with the changing ideas of the Moroccan state about who can be included to the nation-state. In this period, the policy argument changed into an appreciation for double nationality and ongoing integration in Dutch society, because it was believed that only by promoting more integration migrants would continue to remit money to the country of origin.

This paper also analysed how the Dutch government interpreted migrants’ orientation on the country of origin over time. The approach of the government changed from a positive attitude into a critical attitude towards migrants’ engagements with the country of origin. In the 1970s and 1980s political choices created strong ties between Morocco and the Netherlands at a formalised, governmental level. The nature of ‘guest worker’ recruitment, the legitimisation of ‘guest worker’ migration by stressing temporariness and thus the importance of maintaining ties signify an emphasis on the remigration argument. This argument dominated policy because the Dutch government denied being an immigration country. The facilitation of education in the language and culture of the country of origin was meant to guarantee a successful integration in Morocco upon return. That explains why the Dutch state held on to the remigration argument in the 1980s. The bilateral argument played an equally important role in this period, because the Dutch government, for example made agreements with the Moroccan state on social benefits, the Moroccan state was supposed to provide teachers and provide information regarding child support. These arguments

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(policy and bilateral) served as a justification for integration policies that stressed the importance of retaining the own cultural identity.

This policy goal was dropped after growing criticism. After that the policy argument dominated policy again: the need was stressed to shift the focus away from cultural factors causing migrants’ weak position in society to socio-economic incorporation. The emphasis on socio-economic progress and the rejection of an overemphasis on cultural identifications questioned the ongoing orientation on the country of origin. From that period on, strong cultural or religious identity and orientation on the country of origin were linked to a failed integration in the country of settlement. Recently, the emphasis in integration policies is on the cultural adaptation of immigrants to Dutch society. Consequently, there is little enthusiasm in the political arena for migrants’ ties with the country of origin. Recently, some political discussions on integration are dominated by the loyalty argument: migrants’ ties with the country of origin are negatively interpreted and in some cases seen as disloyalty towards the Dutch state. With this perspective, it should be understood that Morocco’s interference in Moroccan migrants’ lives is perceived to be conflicting with national interests and thus the sovereignty argument is stressed in integration policy.

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