pearl harbor attack

rE

\T?

Given By

t %< tC. ^'on

^

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGSBEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION

OF THE PEARL HAEBOE ATTACK

CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESSSECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING ANINVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARLHARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCESRELATING THERETO

PART 19

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 157 THROUGH 172

Printed for the use of the

Joint Committee on the Inyestigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGSBEFORE THE

^^.-.JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION

OF THE PEARL HAKBOE ATTACK

CONaKESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESSSECOND SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING ANINVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARLHARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCESRELATING THERETO

PART 19

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 157 THROUGH 172

Printed for the use of the

Joint Committee on the Investigation of the I'earl Harbor Attaclc

UNITED STATESGOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

79710 WASHINGTON : 1946

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEABLHARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLET, Senator from Kentucky. Chairman

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice ChairmanWALTER P. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative fromSCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois PennsylvaniaOWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Mlehi- tive from Californiagan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from WisconsinNorth Carolina -^T) 'H Ly/

COUNSEL

/)5-(Through January 14, 1946)

William D. Mitchell, Qentral Counsel . q yj /

Gebhard a. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel ' / / «?JCLE M. Hannaford, Assistant Counsel , fit

John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel ^-/i*/" /

(After January 14, 1946) 'r.

Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel L»'^^K<^Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel ' yJohn E. Masten, Assistant CounselEdward P. Morgan, Assistant CounselLogan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel

II

HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part

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XXIV INDEX OF EXHIBITS

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3441

EXHIBIT NO. 157

(This Exhibit consists of reports, findings, and conclusions of theRoberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court ofInquiry, and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements (See table of contentsattached to this Exhibit.) and will be found printed separately in theJoint Committee Record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 158

(This Exhibit is a compilation of documents relating to United States-Britishconversations concerning the Japanese situation, and consists of the followingitems

:

1. Memorandum of conversation dated February 7, 1941 concerning theFar Eastern situation and attached aide-memoire.

2. Letter dated February 11, 1941 from Ambassador Halifax to SecretaryHull with two telegrams, A and B. each dated February 11, 1941 attached.

3. Paraphrase of message dated February 15, 1941 for the President fromPrime Minister Churchill.

4. Memorandum for the President dated February 22, 1941.5. Paraphrase of telegram from the British Ambassador, Tokyo to the

Foreign Office, April 13, IWl.6. Memorandum for the President from Admiral Stark dated April 29, 1941

with attachments dated April 25, and 28, respectively.7. Memorandum for the President from Secretary Knox enclosing a reply

to certain U. S. proposals dated May 8, 1941 from Rear Admiral Danckwerts.8. Memorandum of conversation dated October 17,' 1941 concerning U. S.-

Japanese relations between Secretary of State Hull and Ambassador Halifax.with attachment dated October 16, 1941.

9. Telegram dated November 5, 1941 (5 sections) from Ambassador Winantto the Secretary of State being a message for the President from PrimeMinister Churchill.

10. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Halifax and Mr.Welle-s dated November 12, 1941 concerning U. S.-Japanese negotiations withattachment dated November 11, 1941.

11. Paraphrase of memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Mr. Deningof the British Embassy November 14, 1941.

12. Letter dated November 29, 1941 from the British Embassy, Washingtonto Secretary Hull.

13. Letter dated December 1, 1941 from Ambassador Halifax to SecretaryHull with enclosures dated November 30, 1941.

14. Letter dated December 8, 1941 from Ambassador Halifax to the Presi-dent enclosing paraphrase of a report from London on the military situationdelivered to the President from the British Embassy on December 8, 1941.)

3442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

>uL^>'»^^ 'MP::/-i^g"ji;;gr

DEPARTMC^^^ or srA-nt

I

pi/\mriir^iamtlaf^umCMTC:

PAimaPAKni

COPIISTOc

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•ai tlM MtaMf idiA Mt fM vwfei

3444 CONGRESSIONAL INV'ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Very Confidential.

AIDE MEMOIBE

Evidence is accumulating that tlie Japanese may already have decider! to push

on Southward even if this means war. Press reports indicate that Japan is

using her position as mediator between Thailand and Indo China to gain, be-

sides a preferential economic -position, a Naval Base at Camranh Bay, Air Bases

in Southern Indo-China and control of the Indo China customs. There is also

reason to suppose that some military agreement with Thailand, directed against

our territories and the Netherlands East Indies is under consideration.

The following are a few "straws in the wind"

:

(a) His Majesty's Ambassador in Tokyo reports a general feeling amongstthe Japanese that a crisis in the Far East will come within the next few weeks.

(b) Cancellation of sailings of Japanese ships to the United States and the

commandeering of ships by the Japanese Government have been reported. Thesereports have not so far been confirmed by the British Naval authorities in

Singapore.(c) Japan is continuing to supply munitions to Thailand. For instance, a

Japanese steamer arrived at Bangkok on January 29th with the following warmaterial for the Thai Government : 8,000 bombs, 20 tanks and 10,000 cases con-

taining unspecified arms and ammunition.(d) A telephone conversation was intercepted between two Japanese at Soura-

baya and Ljiwang to the effect that the Japanese attack would take place on

February 10th. The Netherlands authorities attach no undue importance to

the conversation but think that it cannot be disregarded.

(e) A Japanese Naval OflBcer recently stated to students of the Malay lan-

guage that time was very short indeed.

(f) The time-table of the "Asaka Maru" which is taking a Naval Mission to

Berlin and may be bringing back nmchinery and certain metals, seems to indi-

cate that action is not contemplated until the middle of March.

(g) A French source in Indo China reports concentrations in Formosa and

Hainan.While none of these indications may be conclusive in themselves, their accumu-

lative effect is to suggest that a further movement is impending. Most of this

information has already been given to the United States Naval Attache in London.

British Embassy,Washington. D. C, February 1th 1941.


///P

'^* SLf

'?^..


BRITISH EMBASSY.

WASHINGTON D C


Substance of Telebrnm A Kecc ived ^t tne

Brltieh Hmbtissy from the ?V)relgr Office on ;->."bru(jr.v lltru

The consequences of the J; panes'- inovvn.cr.ta

in Irdo-Ghinti ana Thuilund have been revi^ wee; onc-i

more by tne Chitfs of otaff, v,i*o iiMve rurnisrit-u tin

estimate of th^ imrnedlBt*. dtr^^jer to be nr ticii^tited.

This estimate Is as follows :-

The o'api^nese ere now en!.:at,ed in a movement

desifined both to Increase thPlr hold on Indo-Uhlnn

and to obtain strategic fecilitieu in Thf.iland. Âccordint, to the inform?ition in the poswestUon n^ the c-

British authorities it Ic unliKely that tne Japtnt se Z

will bt- content, v.ith this; it ie probr.ble t:wt they

are conteinpleting more drastic action, tn » xact natire

of wnlfh is as yet unc» rtain. The general efftct of --•

the present Japanese; movement is to weaken Uv "\

strategic position of the British K-midre in the Kar

KQSt by .enablinc; the Japanese to secure vantage polni.-

near Singapore. If th'^- . ap.nneae movrmont -a-cv v •

exten'ied, no', only .vonl^! t:.l.; terdfTc;, oe incre. •• c

but the Japanese irii-:ht obtain importL;nt economic

resources which would ^re%tly strer;^ th'.r their '.•apoc:ty

to carry on a war.

It JL ''V-lt certain '.hr-)t the Taporêst t:r--_

aotinv vita v. -i ci-'UrafcCmcRt oT J'- rran.-' one: tlît tt.i. y

are planning more vi-rnrou8 aggressive me-asure.. .:r.

direct abreement with the '.>ermBn liovernment. Por

these measures to help Oermony, they must directly

affect/

affect Britiah Intfireeta unci ure th' refore

pi'obably desl^^td to forof: ireut Brituin Into

war with JopDr. 3uch e wur woula exx'oae to attacK

British communlcotiona with Auatralio unci ] ew

Zealand, and Brltiuh tradf In tht Ffir Kast end In

the Indli n Ocean, nr.o mifcht even ;Jeopnrdli'.e the

communicati jna between the United Kingdom and tht;

Middle East. The efforts whjclt the British

authorities would be bound to mnke to prevent

exct-saive damage to theat- vittl mter'-ata wjuld

weaken tiieir wfiol'- war e fort agp.anyt >t rmany.

Indeed, 1*' ' h- threat t :ingupore becanic imrainert,

the Dritiah authoritiea ml^/ht be forced teiaporarlly

to trarsafer the Brititih fleet from the [iedlterrarear

in ord< r to free navnl f()rce8 "or act! )n in ti.

IndiL.n ucean.

It ,vill be ;jii]'rt.oi .1 tr u v'liat .•; pro('')'anu

set-back, tnis laat step v.o .Id conatitutt. Thus

war. with Japan would inevitably lengthen the war' v.itJi

xiermany and would, indeed, maKe ultimate :jrltish

aucceas iffipi"oba:jl' witn . articipt-tion

oi" t;iu r i ti d otrtea.

h«I.C' , Willi'.- t.;.. >; : i- ct lir.r .'i- V t /._'- •'

intereatii jn the :-'ar .'.aat corioti tuteu b.v •. '''ft • r

Japanese movement it; clear, the inoirect dargt r t

the United Jtatea iu i-ver mor'e aurioua. ircut , it

seert.a evi<;ert taat ,lup».reae bg-reaai-m afjUinat

•Brltliih int'. reat^; in the :-'i.r .Caat r'.ireaei ta a

seriou;i t.-irc-' * ' "i'- oa!>;t:» ' t; "ri^- -' Jtatea .)n

:> ;e J ant/


-3-

acco'ont of its effect on t;.e British war effort

as 6 Arijle. It is essential, th-;ref;re, ir. the

interests not only of the British itapire but of

the United States, to take steps v/hich v/ill

prevent the Japant-se from toKing the plunge.

79716 O—46—pt. 19 3

.^


Subetence of reletrau B receivea at the /hit

BritlBh Embasey from the foreign Office on February 11th.

In your further talka with the United States

Government you will no dcuct call attention to the views

of the Chiefs of Staff. i''he important point to emphasize

iB that the Initiative lieo *ith Japan. ^f Japan ie

bent on .var in combination with Gtfr;nany, mere attempts

on our part to avoid the i..,ue are unlikely to be

successful. The only thing likely to avert war ie

to make it clear to Ja,)an that further aggression will

meet .vith the opposition both of the United States and

of ourselves,

A joint declaration to the Japanese by the United

States an., •..w British Empire that any -attack on -he

Netherlands ;;a8t Indies or on the British possessions in

the Par iiast .vould involve Japan in war imi.iediately and

irreparably with both the United States and the British

.mpire is obviously the course most likely to achieve this

end. It is realised, hov/ever, that such a proposal

may present certain aifficultiee from the point of view

of the United btatcs,

3o far as His ulujesty's Government are concerned

the Poi-!jit.,n oecret'^i-y haa .nude it cleiir to the Japanese

Ambassador that if British territories are attacked they

will be defended with :he utmost vij,our. Speaking to

the Japanese Ai.ibassaaor on February 7th, ,i\v. Suen said

thdt while Hie iviajesty's Government had no aggressive

intentions they did not intend to s;.crlfice the 3ri tish

po . eKsions in the «'ar aast at th*^ dictation of any iOwer,

Noi- •-. - ^is „.Oe-ty'^ (Vovornnent pr-epare'-i to o^ree .that

Japan alcne wu'a entitled to control the destinies of the

peoples of trie '-Yr Hast. re!.t Britain intended to

aischarte/


-2-

discharge her cbli.'ti.r.s tc these people in that part

of the -.vorlci for •vno.T. she .vas -•espcr.si'ble and if

British territories vere attackadj the British people

would undoubtedly ciefend the..i with the utmOL=t vigour.

It would oe luOi: t useful if the Prt^sident,

.vhen seeing the ne-.v Japanese A.abassador on his errivsl,

could Si:eak tc him in some.vriat similar tt-ni-s and .make

plain beyond the possibility of misunderstanding the

interest oi" the Lniteu, otiites in Par Eastern' affairs.

If a ioint decl>^rr.ticn en the lines indicated above is

i:nppacticable then it is clearly of the greatest imjor-

tance that :he United States Governraent should indepen-

dently go as far as chey can to :nake i-.lain their attitude

to the jaranese Government,

/ith this object in viev/ you should seek an

interview with the rr--sider.t -.ind in placing before him

on the moat coiaprehensive lines cur infonx.tion regarding

the present situation in the ?ar East, inform him of

the line already taVen by the i^'ji'i-tm Secretary ..-ith the

Japanese Anbassaacr in London.

You should f\i rthersiore point cut that in the

view of the British authorities the situation would be

greatly i...proved if in addition to any statement or

warning that the' United States G-vernment may see fit to

.•nake.tc Ja.an, the American naval forces in the ^ar East

r-ere tc be increased, either by se'.uing reinforcercen.ta to

Manila or despatching a detachuient tc Singapore, At this

stage of events the :.;Obt effective check upon further

Japanese adventures would a_pear to be sane definite :r>cve

on the oart cf the American Fleet,


MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY 15, 1941 FOR THEPRESIDENT FROM MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL

(PARAPHRASE)

There are indications, from many drifting straws,that the (Japanese mean to make war on us, or to dosomething which would compel ue to make war on them,during the next few weeks or months. Personally I amnot sure that this Is not a war of nerves which IsIntended as a cover for Japaneee advances In Indochinaand in Slam. Nevertheless I consider that I should letyou know that should the weight of the Japanese Navybe thrown against us, situations beyond the capacityof our own naval strength would confront us,

Japan would not be likely, In my opinion, to dis-patch such a large military expedition as would benecessary to besiege Singapore. Doubtless they wouldoccupy oil fields and strategic centers in the Nether-lands East Indies and vicinity which they desire andIn this manner acquire a much better position for asubsequent full scale onslaught against Singapore.Also they would make raids on the ports and coasts ofNew Zealand and Australia, thus arousing much anxietyIn those countries who have already sent to the MiddleEast all of their best-trained men. However, I fearmost of all an attack by raiders, which might includebattle cruisers, against our communications and traderoutes In the Indian and Pacific Oceans. By Invitingdisaster elsewhere we could dispatch some powerful war-ships Into these great expanses of ocean. But escortswould be few and far between and It would be necessaryfor all shipping to go Into convoy. This would consti-tute an extremely serious additional limitation anddisarrangement of our entire war economy. Moreover,It would end altogether all the military reinforcementswhich we had Intended to develop In the Middle East fromIndian and Australasian resources.

Should there be a threat of a major attack of NewZealand and Australia we would be compelled, of ooizrse,to remove our navy from the eastern Mediterranean. Suchan action would result In disastrous military possi-bilities In that area, a certainty that sane accommoda-tion would have to be made by Turkey, and the reopeningof German oil supplies and German trade from the BlackSea. Thus, Mr. President, you will see what an awfulweakening of our war effort would come about; merely sho\ild

Japan send her battle cruisers and her 12 cruiserscarrying 6-lnch guns into the eastern oceans, and stillBore should there be any serious Invasion threat againstNew Zealand end Australia.


-2-

There are some who consider that m Japan's presentmood she would have no hesitation to entertain an attemptto make war against both your country and mine. Although r, a

It Is my personal belief that the a*|d«j?8^ aT* definitely otiULay

against such an event, one cannot tell. Whatever you areable to do to Instill In Japan anxiety as to a double warmay succeed In averting this danger. Nevertheless shouldwe alone be attacked. It would be difficult to overstatethe grave character of the consequences.


I ."tiiiH-

THE WHITE HOUSEWASHINGTON

Poughkeepeie , N. Y.February 22, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Renshaw In Secretary Hull'soffice phoned the following paraphrase ofa message for the President from the FormerNaval Person

I

"Have received better news concerningJapan. It seems Jap Foreign Minister Isshortly going to Moscow, Berlin and Romefor the purpose of covering the failure ofaction against us. The fear of the U. 3.

appears to have postponed attack whichseemed Imminent. While completely under-standing your situation pending enactmentof Bill on which our hopes depend, themore these fears can be aroused the better.

-

"Appreciation given in my last messageto you of naval consequences subsequent toJap attack against us remains the same inall circumstances.*

The message is dated February 20, 1941,

EXHIBITS OT JOINT COMMITTEE 3455

Telegram From the British Ambassador at Tokyo to the Foreign Office.

April 13. 1941 (Pabaphrase)

We have been furnished the information below by a secret source of reliability

who is in touch with the Prime Minister of Japan and who has been accurate ontwo previous occasions, namely, (1) advance notice (3 weeks) of the military

alliance in the Three-Power Treaty of September 1940, and (2) the occupation

of the Island of Hainan 14 days before the event.

We learn from this source that there is now at Hainan and Formosa anexpeditionary force, with transports at hand, of from 12 to 15 divisions. Onthe pretense of manoeuvers and at a time in mid-March when the disembarka-tion of foreigners at Nagasaki was forbidden, a total of 8 or 10 divisions weresent to Formosa. The exjieditionary force is composed of these troops plus sev-

eral divisions, 3 or more, which were already in Hainan.There is a plan for the synchronization of a direct attack on Singapore with

German action in blocking the Suez Canal in order that the passage of British

naval forces may be prevented. It is said that an attack on the Suez Canalof devastating force i.'j about to be launched. It is the idea of the Japanesethat if an attack on Singapore is made soon, America will not be prepared to

intervene, since opinion is not united at home and the United States is pre-

occupied with such matters as aid to Britain, the battle of the Atlantic and the

submarine menace. However, here is a Japanese fleet at Formosa besides light

naval forces which are based in the Mandates. The original plan of takingIndochina bases was abandoned since that would have warned America whichmight have taken action. The current plan for a direct surprise attack on Malayain force does not entail the use of such bases. Last night, although Americannewspaper correspondents had a story along these lines, they were unable to

send it.

File No. : 740.0011 P. W./191.


1 SKQRBT

Nayt DkpaktmbhtOmCE Of THK CHDDDr OT NAVAL OPESATtONS

WASHINGTON

29 April X9U

MEMORANDUM FOR THK PRgSIDIOTT

I am sendlag by special officer messenger eopyof the questions you asked us to send to the Britishwhen we were last in the Whit* House, and also asenclosing copy of their reply.

Please note the "secret status"*

Op-12-VBDAi6-i/Eri3(Serial 5)

SBCRET

SECRETApril 25, 1941.

My dear Admiral Danolcwerts:

1. The Chief of Naval Operations h&s iBstrueted me to ooovey toyou his view that the provisions of paragraph 6 of the laain reportof ABC-1 ought to apply to major changes in the disposition of theforces of the United States %dA the XJnited Kingd<»s, even in advanceof the tixte that the United States taay entar the nar. He proposes,therefore, to keep the British Chief of the NavAl Staff inforaed asto all contemplated shifts of United States naval forces, and toinvite the advice of that officer concerning suoh aovejsents. i

2. I have already inforaed you orally that one aircraft carrierand five destroyers are now en route frca the faoiflo to the Atlantic,and that the primary reason for this moveaent is hecause the U.S.S.BAICrSR (Atlantic 71eet) is soon to undergo an extensive navy yardoverhaul

.

«3. However, the Chief of Kaval Operations has in contemplatlort

other changes of a more Important nature. He therefore requests thatyou obtain the opinion of the Chief of the Naval Staff as to the fol->

lowing:

(a) Vith due regard to the existing political aitoatiosin the ?ar Sast, and to the present strength of thfUnited States Atlantic Fleet, would It be advisable,at this time, for the United States to transfer fromthe Pacific to the Atlantic three battleshipH, fourlight cruisers, and two destroyer squadronst (Note;that this force is nearly equal to the force to hi

transferred »ft»r the United States enter" *^" *

(b) If Axis pressure forces the British iiediterraneaxiFleet to leave the Mediterranean Sea, would thisFleet remain in the Indian Ocean or Far Eacsternwaters? Would it be desirable at the time thisBritish fleet retires to the eastward, for the UaitiiStates simultaneously to shift *tro«p AnvA'i fm-fAsfron the Pacific to the Atlantic?

SincerolY;

Bear Admiral T.H.DanokwerteBritish JImb&ssy,3100 Massaohusetts Avenueidashiagton, D.C.

Copy to:

*w Bians p> vision,;<{lear Admiral

Sear <!k<isiirc

IICOPT

03T aBCRBT

|lBRITISH EMBASSr,

Washington, D* C*

88th April, 1941

Vf tear Adalral Tnmert

I h«v« t««daj r«oeiT«d a tel«graphie roplyth« British Chl«f« of Staff to tho eontmta of jovir lettor4mt9A April SSth, 1941 {0p-12.VED A16-l/m3( Sorial 5.).)

8* 7h9 Chiefa of Staff exprass thalr gratituda for thaproposala aada in paragraph 1. of your letter, and aak thattha Ohiaf of Karal Operationa atay be informed of th<iir fullagreenemt with tbeae propoaala*

S» Aa regards the provision of reoiproeal inf«nBatloii»the Chiefs of Staff feel sure that the Chief of Haval Opera-tioaots viU appreoiate the dlffleulty of proriding a day teday report ef all changes, but propose that a regular peribdioalsuaaary of British najor dispositions should be ociBBianieated bythan. fkMy suggeat that it might be rei^ered weekly, and wouldbe glad to know St this sumsestion would be satisfactory to theChief ot SsTal Operatimm.

4« Tbe ehiefs of Staff consider that the sMBtwa propoawtta paxHigrii^ S(a) ef your letter would be advantaga«tta. Itwould audte more forees availabla for Westem Seai«phere DefeneePlan S«« 8f and in the event ef the Qhited States eiisariag thewar would reduce the time tak«ei for United States* 9aval forcesto relieve the British force at present basad on Oibraltar. TheChiefs of Staff feel aatlafied that the consequential reduoticHaila the strength of the Uhited States* Psoifle Fleet would notunduly encourage J'apan*

S* As regards the queetion posed in para^^aph 9(b) of yourletter, while the Chiefs of Staff do not anticipate that uarsuch oontingenoy is lilMly at preseatf they stats tiaat shouldthe oircuBBtance arise, and the Svws Canal still be open, th»Hoditerranaaa Fleet would probablr be sent into the XBdimOcaaa in Vi» first place* la that event they agree that aftuHther tj/ftnaference of ¥aval foroaa from tho Chitod States*Faclfie Fleet to the Atlsnticwould be desirable.

• 1^.


British Embassy,Washington, D.cJ

-2-

6. If the Medlterranesoi Fleet was not able to p^sa directinto the Indian Ocean owing to the blocking of the Suez Canal,the Fleet would be brou^t into the Atlantic through the WesternMediterranean; an operation which the GhSefs of Staff considerfeasible. In this event, and assuming that no other capitalship force had been sent to the Far East or Indian Ocean, afurther reduction in the strength of the Pacific Fleet would beundesirable.

7. As regards the reference to the movwaent of the Medit-erranean Fleet being limited to the Indian Ocean as a firststage, I believe it to be the views of the Chiefs of "^taff thatif Jai«n was a belligerent it would not be advisable to send tothe Far East itself, to be based on Singapore, a naval forceweaker than that pvt forward in ABC-1, Annex III, Page 15,Until, therefore, that strength w§s available it would be theirintention to retain the Mediteryanean Fleet (three battleships,etc) in the Indian Ocean based jxrobftbly in Trinoooalee.

8. Nevertheless, I interpret their re.]^y to aean that in their

|

view a U.S. naval strength aiiailar to that of the MediterraneanFleet could be transferred into the Atlantic, in addition tothose \inits proposed in mragraph 3(a) of your letter, if theMediterranean Fleet moved into the Indian Ocean and Jappn stillremained a non-belligerent. It will be realised that siKJh afurther tremsfer to the Atlantic from the Pacific Fleet wouldfacilitate an earlier despatch to the Far Saat of additionalBritish naval forces which, in oonjuhotion with the Medit^rraneeFleet, •would provide the necessary strength for satisfactoryoperation frcan Singapore in the event of Japan entering the vmr.

9. If the Chief of Uaval Operations wishes to pursue this ™matter further, perhaps we might have a discussion on the subject,after which I could question the Chiefs of Staff in more detail.

Tours sincerely

V.H.Dan&kwerts

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner,U. S. Navy Department,Washington, D.C,

^i^^-^^^^.

-'mffm^''^Si


OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

a^

f'^^rft-»^

M

JS Ji^-- - V~ rril


SECRET

REPLY TO CERTAIN UNITED STATES PROPOSALS

^ AIDE MEMOIRE.

Inform U.S. authorities that the iesuee raisedby this proposal have been considered by the DefenceCommittee of the Cabinet and that as such a move vitallyaffects Australia and New Zealand we have obtained theiropinions.

2. Our opinion which is concurred in in general byboth Australia and New Zealand is that any marked advanceby the U.S. Navy In or Into the Atlantic would be on thewhole more likely to deter Japan from going to war thanthe maintenance of the present very large U.S. Plieet atHawaii, and further that it might exercise a profoundInfluence on the present pritioal situation in Spain,Turkey and Vichy France. You should therefore stronglyencourage American action in this sense.

3. The problem for the U.S. authorities is so nicelyto Judge the degree of the transfer that while stillretaining the deterrent effect of a strong U.S. Fleetin the pacific, there will also be the deterrent effectof an Increased U.S. Jl.eet in the Atlantic.

4. It is not only the strength but also the compositionof the fleet in the Pacific which will act as a deterrent,and In our view the necessary effect will not remain unlessthe KLeet in the Pacific consisted of not less than 6capital ships and 2 aircraft carriers. Inclusion of thelatter is considered of the greatest importance.

6th Hay. 1941. * ILU^.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ,—

—

Memorandum of Conversation

UATF: ._._. 17, 1941

SUBJECT; uKxTuii STACKS- JAPAttiiSli UbLATIOi'lS

PARTICIPANTS: bhCHKTAi.:^ O" STATr- HULf, MO Tffi HiTiSH AMBASSkuOii,LOiu> HALi.;a

COPIES TO: t ,^

T|

'rue uritisu iUaoassador called and ntnded me tiie at- ,

Dtaohed copy oi a nemorandum oi' converaatlon between tue Am- _^

ba.ssRdor oi' Japan and iilmaeli' yesterday. r.j

Tiie n-bassedor said that he understood tne diri'icnlties jj

.J oountry and Jflr>an l.i : indintr ways and means oi' keen-

in- up tue Bpne-in.:. not-too-strt ined reliitlons between

o. ; tvio coantries wjille the present '^ov-irxuT.ont oi' Japan on-

defcvorp Lo l>!ij)''ove ::ubll'_- f'jntl'ient nnrt opinion in support

" I-.: oir.:...- ;!.'^;ii_ . . ^r viai on tiiis lovornmant^ s tonds urja

•'nvi3ar:e u :)."4' • '-' ^ o-.ent. In ttu: entire Phc Iflc

.•ir •; , lao A'ubassauji- .i: ir.oijlvt co:amuaii;ft te wltn nia

jovernraent in or<lei' to S'.;':; J I it nad any svi• -estloiis alon' il

I'n , t<h .ch woul. iciv ;i-nNient oi' Japan to move '^

in '. • direction on tiie i iuia«,iidntal insn-S iiivolvoa. J-

l/

The Jhi^hp ^e .mbaBbHdor »Bk«d rather .ayv^tpriously

tuls miirnin.' t'lr nn Int^nrle* », 1 th rse, and ctu.ie to a^e ;ae

this ...iternoon.

ile be-'sn by recaiiln'; « eonv->r.>»;t l-)n tJiHt »« h' u h»itf

«her he butl first j-r-rlved In '.shington .a '.o t:\<- t;f 8li%Dlllt>

of sjJtelntBinlng pffnce in th" "Hoiflc. in ' , >.8 I kne*,

he h- c for aomp tlsae b'v-n tt>lkln>.' *ith :^r. Hu.l, ^-ns; froiii th- . e

/

t!i)CS thPC" prir.clr!'-^ ; oints of dlfflcalty h»d «,i-r«:ed.

-vl

'idor dl «veiop t-is 1? :>t<;ii t;eyomi saylrvt t'->.*, the q' »(' t,htee ;','v«ri*!.3»»''tt sslshf •

"'^' ^~^

• , rittltud© thar- they h;..d iithf^pto fe:' ."

/j>>

CO

^ i: t *uald Ir.v.jivi t)' 7!""' :e.

y

ev'- 1 :'-

.

". r-

:

'

triHt t'l'.' ..,.;;-• r. r' t

"he oatlu.' : • .

PC, orted in th« ,'ir.,fU tylfs.

i..i;,-ortHnce, snd ulght be t1 i s r«gHPd«i.

.

•1th the J-^lteu tatas, n.-: t'.c /r.x.. .1 ri'-THnci

^rlce that should te ?«1>^ for it.

U- .evertln- to th»; 'r\- -rt't- >,ci

,

;;ibR3!;Bdor

aaid that thoigh *e uight diBngr"." , th" '

. n- rniscnt

of the tlirr hud r^.i'urCed f.dhTen •

i -y

th8t *H poseible for Ja;f«r t; ^.ir-'-e ..vU '^f ••;- tc; th"

erideroe of ^hat ha called ti 1 - ^ '-

»

.'St

I.St'*"!*

Freezing- nnd ei^bargo .-^hs res t I. e-, *-

effect very Bcriously th« ordinfiry o«.,erftS'» • i-; _ . -i--

• ho «er^ nccasto'aed to lo* Eta' (jnrc:;- . bit -.il^l .-r-»>hte

difficulty for JBjaPfS'i b..'ire83. -.. -k.^ ,. t :'t

tome .>8y out 'nuet be found.

5. I 8hiii tiiht noboii, .<«: ted t,o oti ,/i-' ••

.jr.. '-itu r

.'irre or in the ;rltl8ii Co. j:ion..efiith, pr vide,. .'Mi.Mneee policy

«aB no longer auch le to conetitate h threat. «io)'e.-.vi'r. If

hr woiclc' hllo- :•*' to Bbj 80, v'n..unee»! eoor . 1 '"; -. •;

..ere of hf^r o. • ..nrc;'. , ctsinl., ' .t

3.

of thf- difficuitlee 1-rgely c.rer.tni by on« wnr bj' ,,i.in. Ing

into Hnother.

y-oth '.hp ,r'lted "tntee « «' ;retet '(ritnlr. ^nvtfti to

ee" pet«ce pr^sstrv'-'.; ir; thf hcilic, nn... Vnf-re ah.-s no r«HBon

*hy peice sho.j;r not b«* rnf>int«ir. -c! If tht: .;a,ânea'^ nvernoK^nt

ttbanConerS 1» «, oens^'^lat ;oHcy, and ..er-f «illln^ to

reco,n,lse , rlnc.,aep .. ic': both the i-nltec : t«tf.' opd Orest

'.rlt'-lri «imi-.: t,: ?> e rk.irte ine J.

11^ " t the uspHi'."" vT-' f"" t -iiMice tha

ijtfiKe ol s.<'Cir '(

r-'-!!^ horst:. T c-'iTi. .•«11 ur,('»''rt>tij-iu

tr.i.t wittTi^ peo, ie iri Jtij-;^r= :-ii|rht b«^ .i' ;•!•. b. t.ti» Biccf^tnl

B'.purer.t r;,(>r victorl<.'e, tut let tiw,. r« .r,..b^r tiiut r;onf of

t*!»ef victories had j<^t 'br>d.;ht nenaBny within night of the

orl^ victory thst -ouic •Ir. the .<Br.

It :;il:'ht ir.-if.iâ weî be f.-rg.ed th»-t tfwy hftd li.rgflxy

<ii.vrhVf» t«i I' • t,

V i! ;';•,.,.. ;; .• '. 1 . . t ;'

, i \ ,-'

• •' .... 1 i,.o f ..:>aifi <?nu b^ -c . .in^ lritol'-r-,bie.

"hi- .1 < .ndor a I t !s ' ,; ir; Jh .Mr; i'.(.;r'-«u *ita

vil: vi-?», t'l,; th-t a^» hl.asii-lf ..i.'-j of 'î tnlo' t-ii.t .r,»> v'..;t'>ry

"^•"e -frf? not ?.n.- a.-» e t'lln,; »p h »vv.r-

t '

*

; i. , hf nO'-Pd ' rf* ..ht- t/i'T

• '. •-. h. • .-ir. -.^ y , .ft .= -.v- :

. t ' r •.,;., , , . . • • i v

.1- ' ihlc.'i h- !i'iu i-*-;- r.. >; *,^l^ oi- ',

. . -If! t:v- : ht. tt .,,.., ^ tre. ,«j.,, i; t.'lcaJ* - j . •*

)ver' :.'»: ". t . ? ^ .•, i .

• . , .

> Kr-' . • . .,- « •, • Ti'itl ;rf-' o' ' •

It.

79716 O—46—pt. 19 4


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t-:,e -prerv K-rt.

(, /I' can be

)l' '»A "e .« C i

''

iCth .'ctob.T, X?^:


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From


'm

-T r,i3tr.ncL

5j;ir,


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From

china


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Sr err tar-

,,,. ^1 -; .. ,,, ^„;.

-2~ 5257, Novcaber 5, 5 v. a., (SECTICV TK'CE) fromLondon,

of tbE Pacific banc*- uncr. lt« IndEES It Is not too

r.uch to sav t*-.p.t tbc outcome of the wv-olc wir .•r.ay

:-ang upon '. t. If China h?cl the air force she r.CE<is

T - uld be maklns!: nc pnncal to ••-:, becn-.iPE T shoulcl

'"'•: c^.>-.'^" 'Icrst of try nblllty to (Jcfrat tVr Irvpdcrr,

'•• ' ..,,-• r J ^p-v -."11 "*; rlr f-;rcc t^

', --- ..--..t 1-v.j- JapnncsE VN-^uld brlnr tc.^tnr

:• ' "r , T'r 'V "f.v be f'.irc t'-nt *'^cy will vj'^r

f 'nt- -•'••.:'•.:;• In -^'iIf b •*1e J-.i'T. 'k "Ir fir-'E cr be

•'. f^ *•'" r*nM r-r f> w^. 1 1 be t'-^*

• • -111 jT—iln


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM


) .

SUBJECT:

EJEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum- of Convenation

United Statea-Japanese n«eotlations

fe

DATE:

i;ov«nt>er 12, 1941

PARTICIPANTS:

COPIES TO:

-71'

•"f

British Ambassador, Viscoiint Halifax;Under Secretary, Kr. Welles

S, ?a/d, HXi, PA/h, PS

Txie British Jbnbassador called this juorninc at his

request.

i'Ue Ambassador read to me a nienioi-finduin ( thft text of

which Is Bttaciied herev/lthj reporting or. a recent con-

versation betv;een the Jrltlsb Ar.ibassador In "'oir;,-o arKJ

tlif? Jananese Minister for Forel^yn Affairs. : told thn

Ar.jbassauor that, as tiie aeoretary oX' Jtete :;fid fre^iuent-

ly pointed cut tc t]vi Japanese ";-.verr.:-ir.n t, thio !ir,I tlah

'.,v;rrii.'Tit would be Inrorriec; ' r:. •: aula for any

pi'ojactcd ncrotiatlona betwi-ion .'-^ ij! ci- ' i\>» L'nltedi

' StBteo If tho present conver.^^fit ! ..;r: nov. :

t

;:>'ive nny definite pr^^ralse -..-.' <::. -. r otlntionr. i.:ould

f

be 'itulertaken. 1 oo;mmnlcat/ed to the /•anbassati- r ,'.-

r

c

GI

(

i

0-


I'tjuorjt o:" .,tatc,

/

At a recent intervit . kyo liio

Ji-i-eneat; i:iniiit<jr Tor "orel ,n Affaire told His

Uriltcci otutf.'s noo TV).. •: ceedinj., . i-i;;t

.-iji'll, ord tiiat hi; •.•..:'':il i_:;:c<; in aiich mi.*

tnad« him pesijinuatic fi"i>.)ut the outcome o'' so dilatory

a process. Ir the Irivy ;.jun!,:il i!;;i.atlercf '.vjiH n -v —

toKir.. the iducc of th.,> hopes ori.;inally pli.^.

-

L.

. .acuoo ivjr.ii, ar; êrefnre hl;;hly -f

desiraol' t/; uisc-^vc:!' ,, ,,., , ., , ;'-)ru feelin-- T"

becasne too exacerbated. Kutt<:rs were 'bs'lr!- diac .. -J

Cwidca '.veru of t;vs utrnoat cuncer'n t intercut;-: •

end Mr. To Jo said he wus therefore soi-z.-whti t sui-i-rlsej"^•

that Hla hlajesty's CJovernrnent were ta/.in.j no purt in O"

the discussions, v/hili^ n'i could ur.durstanci that in

the early ata:;e3 we might prefer to li;av'e i.ôttera in

the hands of the United ototfio Ooverniiicnt, a iôint had

now been reached where a brcQiidown mi,^-)it havi reper-

cussions ur-on !iriti..ii interests. Vht; !.;inister aaid lie

had a strontj imx)re88ion tiiat, for reasons beat icnown z:.

themselves, the United atut'js Jovernnient were

deliberately drQg«;in.,; out the negotiations. If this

were so it woulc of course be Impossible for the

Japanetse Ooverru'.ient to continue them;

Speaking for liimself, 3ir Robert Cralgie

told the Japanese PoreioX ii:iniater that he felt aure

that there had been no desirw in any quarter

deliberately to drag out tho ne{;otiationM. 3ut as he

understood the position, the United States 'Jovernraent

had boers unable to elicit sufficiently definite

aesuranoea and undertakings in regard to Japan's

fu ture/

future intentlofta, ui miyht leud to u iiitc!:.

?h(r objective under discusaion wua un ambitious

one - niii.iely, the settloraent of the ai. tuation as a

v/hole - and It wan obviouo tru. t u task or . this

:-. -nitudc v/oi)l ' as we)?.l as latience on

both SI . /iij r-igarda the attitude of !!ia !,:ajesty's

jovcrn; .:;« negotiations, 3ir ;:obcrt

CraiiHe -uvcsted that it was one of ii;lpful

expectiincy

,

'hot whil.; the yoreifin Secretary was

deairon >' tlomer. t re.-iched witlch v/ould

be j-,isi. 1..! nil ',,,'. , .concerned, he was e'ûally

: t«rvene in -any mariner likely to

.: . the di: ^ :;j betvve'.-n the United 3tatea and

Japan.

Ui'Or. r».-c<.l;'t o'. .i-ove ropr'i't of his

'. ' '

, ^ . y

..

. . _ .i

. ;,^ as

llov/0.

j\l•

1.• ^-enty ';; Joverrment are not

fully ... ,.,'.;. .1 : - .' conversations

wiUch h;.ve bu>.n ta/iln,, ilôe, they are aware tiiat the

United \jtiit,c.z lovr.in-ricrt have been aeeKin. a baoio oV\

(Ji..c ;,. ,': vorriic.-nt to-.vi-,rds a

: •,tl' r. r t i! ....' Moh

'iov rn.' 'ttler.ient to be in their

o'.vn i: 'Veil u t',!U" , _ un are it

lu tn-. ir" ci-.yr-.r ' ^noulrl bit aehicêe.

It cun: '•

. , ,i:X sll Ih', iV'in,j

iihoul'i , jnu no advantace ia.

fL,.i• inu unl:;sa aoi.uj basia

To r/

-3-

fop cliecusston car be agreed upon in advance which

establishes principles upon wiiich agreement will be

aouiiht. The British Ooverni.vent have been content

to leave tJ^iis part of the proceedings in the hands

of the United States Oov.jrnnent who are well aware

of the British position, ilorf'over th- liiited otutes

Joverrunent iiavc assured the Britiah .Jovs.rr.raent (and

it iii believed that they have so informed tne Jaiunese

Qoverntnent) that should actual negotiations Lecon^j

possible the British jovemment will at once be

consulted. At that roint the British 'ii vv; rnr.en t will

be very ready tj collDuorute -'.'i th the United States

ana Japar.ese ;>j>verr.iacntG in see<tin:_; u solution of

tneir loint problef:.s.

Sir ii. Gr;ii,:ic: waa f .rther authorised, at

hj s own discretion, tT urtjc. upon the Jcpanese ksverw-ient

the advanteg*; of a eujireir.e effort t,. .ee:..ei,

t

with the United States, as a.,8in-'. '.:-- desiderate risks

to Japan of allDv.in;; a si tu.-, ti .in to devflop in „,,c;i

it cii.^'ht no Ion ;ei- be possible to control the issue of

peace or war.

.,. :uioo

;

lij-t'ol'.* '. .... _i.,

i;ovenib5,r 11th, 19L1.

79716 O—46—pt. 19-

MKMORANutM Handei) TO Mr. Hoknhfxk By Mr. Dkning of thk British EmbassyN0V?:MBKB 14, 1941 d'AB-APHRAKK)

It may be of interest to the Department of State to have the following indica-

tions as to the jxjssibility of an attack on Thailand by the Japanese. According

to a report by the Biitis'h Ambassador to .lapan, there are several factors which

indicates that early in 1042 is the most likely time for action against Thailand

uidess other factors result in precipitation of the crisis earlier.

It is stated by the British representative at Bangkok that there is no rain

In Thailand from approximately mid-November until May and thus the dry

weather lasts from December through April. Hf also reports that in the flat

country, that is, Central Thailand and ( ambodia, dining the dry seas<m the

earth in the rice fields is baked hard. He was infiirmed that at that time it is

not ditiicnlt to improvise airdromes for temporary use, and suggests that if anattack on Thailand is contemplated by the Japanese, the beginning of 1942 maywell be the bes^t time ff)r it.

Information has been leceived from the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, that

there are at present about .SO.OOO Japanese troops in Cochin-China and Cambodia

and that (me and perhaps two tank regiments are included among these. Large

quantities of anti-aircraft guns, motor transport and other tran.sportation ma-terial have been imported, including small vessels which could be utsed for

transport as far as the new boundary, situated in the northern end of Tonla

Saidle Lake. It is known that there are a number of air fields in the North

which have either asphalt or concrete runways and which can be used at any

time of the year. There are in the South metal runways at Tourane, Penon, Penhand Angkor, as well as an asphalt runway at Tan Son Nhut. Work is proceeding

rapidly on the construction of runways at other fields in the South, at which

heavy bombers will be used.

P^ile No. : 740.0011 P. W./1465.

''.'i-y^ >£*-«-* /V /f «^/ ^t^ ,i<^

/ z^c<^SR ITI8H EM8ASw/|5 ^ *

WASH I NCTQiT ff^ -^

/ ~2i'tfi Koveifiber-, ivui.

>e

\A^^-

^t>-tL^t>''t>^ ''7*-! if^jf

Le.r i.r. :iull.

Then I got bwck to tfi»' '•'linbagsy thia morning

I found a telegram fx-oin 'Aden asking VKh^ther 1 . would be

po.-sible to let him s«c th*? text of the docufnent given

to tfie JapHnese.

I have already toli him of Itfa gerserril

character r.3 ym ripccribed it to '.»", but I hnve no

doubt, if yoa hnvp no objection, he omild he- ji'n\.-^Vi\

for t*U» or:^: ; . _ ly of sopi-,- • h»< tf^xt.

C

c

Ynups ve.'v sincerely,

x-^

rhe Honourable Oordell Hull,

.'if»ci'«*tnry of tate to ' Htsa.


aH.TlSH EVBASSY.

WASHINGTON C

-J -

.1-

o

o-.i vrc

o

O

CO

sTpH^'Ax

o>D3

O

o


It i8 conceivable that United States

Ooverrunent may ralae with you the question of

ths compatibility of the opcratioo referred to

with our treaty of non-aggreaaion with Theiland.

It raoy be uBefil for yoa to icnow th;r8fore that

wtj nave giver careful consideration to this

point.

^'. Ir July laiit wo irtTirt.sd the Thai .

Jov^rnmort tht.t «e aaju^d regard the grant of

bases to Jajan 63 sn infraction of tnkt treaty.

.jl"-ilr.rly (altho-^,in we have as yet made no

cock-iunicotlon to trie Thai Jovcrninentj we ahouio

not fe- 1 Ae could tllo^v the trer.ty to bo a bar

t ; ou" 'Ttf'rlns rhtll'ind if a .Tapor.ese invasion

occarrrtd or w^ ; cleftrly inpendlnK. But it would

Dte ;rc»itly , •v.f-. ruble if 1^ those eventualities

wo Guuld act ir. eo-Oi^crati )r %ith Un: Thai

;o/'.:r;iiier't. If 'Jst;rcf>re it were decided to

ir «rt'-.K ' )..r-''atior, we shoald naturally do

Oir j;-ist tJ decirt- Thsis' consent. It woulc oe

impor-t' r , .'ijA'evc r not. to roveel to thi; »'hai

}o'."^r'?'Tt ;,'rv:i'! tursly '.h'. existence of our

; i' r; jv^r '^ ;,a,,- ijiinejer of It, u/tagu to the

'o.n.;a.


_

Faraphease of a Report From London on the Militaky Situation Delivered to

THE President From the British Embassy on 8th December

The inforinution provided is based <m reports received up to 7 a. m., 7th De-c-ember, 1941.

(I) NAVAL REPORTS

:

Air reconnaissance reported at 3 : 15 a. m. 6th December, 2 Japanese convoysof 25 and 10 ships (respectively), escorted by cruisers and destroyers, by Point

Cambo (Cochin China) on a course of 270 degrees West. Contact has been lost

and there is no further news at present. The armed boarding vessel inentioned

in yesterday's summary was sunk by torpedo aircraft. She had on board 300British wounded and 100 prisoners of war. 201 persons were rescued. A small

British merchant vessel was sunk off Cromer last night, it is thought by a mine.

(II) MILITARY REPORTS :

LIBYA. 6th December. We maintained pressure with our mobile columns on

the whole front Bardia-El Adem and also on the enemy lines of communicationbehind. Latest reports indicate that the enemy has concentrated his forces Southof El Adem and is moving South-East towards El Gobi which is held by our

troops.

RUSSIA. German pressure on Moscow continues.

(III) AIR OPERATIONS

:

6th December. Spitfires damaged seriously storage systems and buildings at

two alcoholic distilleries in the Cherbourg Peninsula. Our aircraft also attackedsimilar targets in the Dunkirk area. Off the Norwegian coast a Hudson claimedhits on a 7,50<J ton merchant vessel and Beauforts probable hits on a 4,000 ton

merchant vessel and a 5,000 ton tanker.

LIBYA. Nothing further to my previous report.

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN. 5-6th December. 20 Wellingtons attackedNap'.es for five hours. Over 25 1/^ tons of bombs were dropped, two 4,000 poundersstarting a large fire in the tori)edo factory, while other bombs fell on the arsenal,

air frame works, and the railway. We lost one aircraft.

(IV)G. A. F. 6th December.

A German bomber was destroyed by our fighters S<»uth of Plymouth.» MALTA. 5-6th December. Some 20 bombers approached the island during a

period of nine hours. Only 8 crossed the coast and caused some damage.

(V) AIRCRAFT CASUALTIES

:

In operations over and from the British Isles—German 1.

( VI ) 6th December.

The transfer from the Baltic States to Finland of broad gauge locomotives androlling stock, including tank wagons, will help to relieve the transport situation

and assist German economic exploitation. This confirms reports that the wholerailway system in the Baltic States is in the process of being converted to

standard guage and also the opinion that Germany intends to convert the gaugeof all railways in occupied Russia.

(VII)

Both empty and full oil trains from and to Italy have regular military escortson the R')umanian-Huiigarian section of the route which indicates the degree of

unrest in Hungary and Roumania.

FURTHER REPORT 7th DECEIMBER, 1941

Report received at 17 : 40 G. M. T. today from the Commander-in-Chief in Chinathat the Japanese were attempting lo land from 5 .ships at Kota Bharu on the

East coast of Malaya, immediately South of the Siam Malaya frontier.

3488 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

EXHIBIT NO. 159

This Exhibit is a compilation of material relating to United States—Chineseconveisaiions concerning the Japanese situation, and consists of the following

items:

1. Memorandum for the President by Lauchlin Currie dated Jlay 10, 1941

concerning the Chinese aircraft program attaching two documents, one pre-

pared by the Chinese Mission and the other written by Dr. Hornbeck.2. Telegram from Generalissimo Chiang-KaiShek cated July 8, 1941.

3. Telegram from Minister of Conmiunications dated July S. 1941 withattached telegram from Berlin dated July 4, 1941.

4. Cable to Lauchlin Currie from Owen Lattimore, Chungking, dated July

22, 1941.

5. Memorjindum for the President from Sumner Welles dated August 7,

1941 with two enclosures, being

(1) A note for the S'^cretary of State dated August 2, 1941 from the

Chinese Ambassador with enclosure and(2) Communications to the American Embassy, Chungking, dated

August 7. 194L

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May iO» X94X*

iiaiDHAiiixM WR me raSSIDlliT

!•: CliJHie8# Airemft Profpaa

Im Qommction wit! yo^or considerationof tJna taatatlTe aircraft program for ChinavltiolL I salsdttad yesterda^Tt jo\x may findthm attacliad doois&ants of 6c»i6 interest.fli0 Q»a without a title was prepared )]Qr tlM t

Chinese Misaion here and -^e other waswritten hy ^» Hombeck.

Lauchlin Ctirrie

<«HM

Singaiwre is the key to the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Its posi-

tion determines the control of eastern Asia regardless of the fate of the Philip-pines. All steps taken so far by Japan indicate their intention to prepare for a

move against Singapore.One may as.sume that although Singap<ire is well forti.'ied, small British land.

.><ea. and air forces there are likely to lind it difficidt to sustain for long the full

^impact of the Japanese fleet, air, and land forces unless outside assistance begiven.

The recent Soviet-Japanese pact has enabled Japan to release at least ten crackdivisions and some five hundred first line planes now in Manchuria for operationin other theaters of war.Singapore could be saved by active intervention of the entire United States

fleet with its attendant dangers and complications.Tliei'e is, however, a powerful means to clieck Japanese attack on Singap<^)re

and the South Seas or to assist in the effective defence of the beleaguered keyfortress, witliout the intervention of tlie United States fleet, and that is tlie crea-tion of a small but etticient air force in Ciiina.

This foice would constitute a threat to the flank of a Japanese advance south-ward. Every Japanese move, concentrations on Formosa or Hainan, convoys oftransports into China, Siani, or further west, tran.sport of troops across Indo-China, and above all, Japanese air concentrations in Tonkin and Cochin Chinawould be watched sytstematically, but more important, exposed to constant attackand diversion.

The configuration of southeastern Asia exposes Japan to such action on thepart of an efficient hostile air force. Such a force located between the Burmafrontier and the province of Kweichow, mostly on liigh plateaus, lias only to

cover some 350 miles to reach the Japanese air concentrations at Hanoi, wherehundreds of planes are crowding tlie few airports which the topography of thecounti-y permits to utilize. Further, it would interfere with Japanese militarytransports and troop concentration on Formosa, Hainan, Paraoels Island, whichare all witliin easy range. The force could as easily attack concentrations of

Japanese planes, troops, and shipping in southern Indo-China and Siam.The Japanese are sprawled all over China and the existence of tliis air force

wou'd enable the main body of the Chinese regular armies to undertake counter-offensive operations with good assurance of success, which they cannot do at

present until so provided with the requisite air arm. The Japanese armies in

central China depend exclusively for their supplies on the long and windingYangtze, wliich provides an ideal target for an air force operating on interior

lines. With the initial strength of the new air force tlie Chinese troops couldlaunch counter-attacks, the main purpose of which would be not only to hold exist-

ing Japanese forces in China but to compel the continuous dispatch of strongreinforcements.

Finally, the main industrial areas within Japan, tlie triangle Kobe, Kyoto.Osaka, as well as Yokohama and Tokyo, could be attacked by bombers operatingfrom existing air fields in <'h'na.

[2] All the above objectives can be achieved efficiently and successfully

by a force of 500 planes composed of 350 pursuit and 150 bombers. The existing

lines of communication from ports of entry from the west i)ermit to supply andmaintain in the field such a force, and would be doubly assured if urgently sup-plemented by some 35 transport planes of the DC-3 type. The American-operatedChina National Airways Corporation estimate that this would give an additional

capacity of 4,000 tons monthly from the rail head in Burma and- over the mostdifficult section of the Burma highway.The full strength of 5<X) p'anes could be reached by three stages.

The first stage when the 100 P-40's now on the water reach China and thepilots and ground crews now volunteering for service are already in the field.

In July the force of pursuits could begin protecting the ways of access to Chinaand particularly the Burma highway.

Second stage. A force ready to operate in September and composed of 200pursuits and 100 bombers could be constitutnd it immediate decision were takenand inten.se preparjit'ons wf»re n>ade to sunp^'" an additional 100 pursuits and100 bond)ers to be shipped during the month of May.Third stage. By the first of November a full force of 500 craft would be ready

to operate by shipment in June and July of 150 pursuits and 50 bombers. In

addition, replacements at the rate of 15 percent would have to be provided.

The gradual development of the operations would by then permit the full

force to attack all the objectives at the end of the rainy season. From the first


of November there is six months of clear weather over Burma and Yunnan^permitting extensive operations. Thus preparatory work would be accomplishedunder the cover of bad weather and the force would be ready to operate at thebest season, provided immediate decision and requisite practical steps are taken,which would imply certain diversions of planes, equipment, and personnel, andconcentrated preparation (including the question of shipping).

Permission has already been obtained to recruit pilots and ground crews forthe P-40's already on the way. If permission is given to recruit an additional150 pilots and 300 technical men for ground crews, the personnel of the forcecould be in the field by the end of July. There are 1,200 Chinese pilots and alarge number of ground crews available in China ; one-third experienced, one-third with fighting experience, and the remainder requiring more training, andthe existence of this renders it possible to limit the number of the foreign mem-bers of the force.

With this personnel and aircraft in operation this autumn, not only the deter-mined Japanese move toward the south could be prevented or rendered difficult,

but should this move materialize, vitally effective asisistanee would be afforded to

the defenders of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies by constant attacks in therear of the enemy forces.

To sum up:Effective air operations in China should follow a carefully planned program

which includes the procurement, shipment, assembly, and operation of specified

types of airplanes in order to attain prescribed tactical and strategical objectives.

13] The general outline of such a program follows.

First PhaseAirplanes Required:

1. 100 bombardment, modified Lockheed Hudson type.2. 100 pursuit, P-40 type.

3. 100 pursuit, P-43 type.

Note : Of the above listed airplanes, 100 P-40's have been procuredand are en route to China.

Volunteer Personyiel:

1. 100 pilots.

2. 160 technical and clerical.

Note : These men are now being employed.

Tactical Objectives:

1. Defence of air bases, Burma highway, supplies in transit and in storagein Yunnan province and industrial establishments in vicinity of Kunming,Yunnan, by

:

a. I ocal operation of pursuit airplanes.b. Counter-offensive operations of bombardment airplanes.

Strategical Objective:

To force the Japanese to divert a portion of the air force now availablefor expeditionary use to the defence of his bases in Indo-China and counter-offensive operations in Yunnan province.

Time Schedule:

1. The 100 pursuit airplanes, P-40 type, may begin initial operations earlvin July, 1941.

2. The 100 bombardment airplanes, Lockheed Hudson type, and 100 pur-suit airplanes, P-13 type, may begin operations early in September if theairplanes of both classes are made available without delay.

Second PhaseAirplanes Required:

1. Maintenance of initial strength of:a. 100 pursuit. P-40 type

;

b. 100 pursuit, P-43 t.vpe;

c. 100 bombardment, Lockheed Hudson type, by regular monthly re-placement of losses.

2. Provision of additional airplanes of following classes, types, and num-bers :

a. 100 pursuit, P-43 or P-47.b. 50 pursuit, P-39.c. 50 bombardment, Lockheed Hudson, B-26 or B-23.


\4] Volunteer Personnel:

1. Increase volunteer per.sonnel as follows:

a. Pilots, 150 additional.

b. Technical, clerical, 250 additional.

Tactical Objectives:

1. Defence of all establishments in Yunnan province.

2. Attack Japanese air bases in Indo-Chlna and on Hainan Island.

3. Attack Japanese supply dumps in Indo-China and Hainan Island.

4. Attack Japanese supply vessels, transports, tankers, and small naval

vessels in harbors of Indo-China and Hainan Island and at s^a between those

places.

5. Occasional raids on Japanese industrial establishments in Japan.

6. Attack Japanese supply vessels on Yangtze River.

7. Support of offensive operations of Chinese armies.

strategical Objectives:

1. Force diversion of considerable portion of available Japanese air force

to defence of Japanese establishments on "South China coast and in Japanand to counter-offensive operations in interior of China.

2. Enable Chinese armies to a.ssume operations which will make necessary

heavy reinforcement of Japanese troops in China.3. Destruction of Japanese supplies and supply ships in order to handicap

operations of an expeditionary force to the south of Indo-China.

4. Destruction of Japanese factories in order to cripple production of mu-nitions and essential articles for maintenance of economic structure in Japan.

Time Schedule:

1. The increase of the air force from 300 to 500 airplanes (350 pursuit and150 bombardment) should be completed by October 31. 1941.

When the railway between the Burma lioad and Siang Yun is completed, andthis could be effected by June, 1942, suflBcient carrying capacity would be amplyprovided for the maintenance in the field of 1.000 combat planes, or indeed anystrength it is desired to build up to.

Table of approximate distances in statute miles


power of India, Malaya, and most of the Dutch East Indies. While the British

Isles could perhaps carry on without access to these materials and to this manpower, the effect of such a loss upon the economic and financial resources

of the British Isles—would be considerable. Such a loss by seriously weakeningour own economy (rubber, tin, jute, quinine, vegetable oils, tungsten, antimony,mica are among the supplies that might be lost to us) would adversely affect the

extent of our economic aid to the British Isles.

2. More important, the British Isles cannot carry on in a defensive position

for an indefinitely prolonged period. However strong defensively, they must in

time succumb unless a sustained offensive can successfully be launched against

Germany. It is from this point of view [2] that Singapore assumes its

greatest importance in the defense—as directed to ultimate survival—of the

British Isles; i. e., the long-term defense of the Jsies.

From point of view of ultimate offensive action against Germany, the EasternMediterranean and the Near East are areas of major and of obvious importanceaffording as they do (1) the key to an invasion of Europe through the disaffected

occupied countries of the Balkans or through a weakened and perhaps collapsing

Italy and (2) a possible means of once more bringing into action against theAxis the French forces in Syria and in North Africa. The significance of Sing-

apore to the defense of the British position in the Near East lies in its domina-tion of the only remaining effective lines of communication for the supply of ma-terials and troops to that area. If these Japanese gained possesision of Singaporeit would seem that they could not only control Malaya and the NetherlandsEast Indies but most or all of the Indian Ocean as well. (See attached sum-mary of distances from Singapore to various points.)

Troop reinforcements for the British forces in the Near East come fromAustralia, New Zealand, India, Burma, South Africa and/or the British Isles.

Supplies for these forces come from some or all of the foregoing areas and/or[3] from among the following: Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and theWestern Hemisphere. As British naval power cannot ensure uninterruptedpassage of the Mediterranean by British transports or by British merchant ves-

sels (even though the increasingly doubtful assumption be made that the Axispowers will at no time during the war be able to close the Straits of Gibraltar),the only sure (for the present) route of access to the Near East from the areasnamed above is via the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

3. It must also be remembered that one of Britain's major weapons againstGermany is the blockade. The role of Suez and of the Eastern Mediterraneanin the enforcement of the blockade is readily apparent. Singapore's role is hardlyof less significance. The regions of the Indian Ocean and of the Pacific eastwardand southward and northward from Singapore are vast reservoirs of supplies.

While Great Britain controls the routes to those reservoirs, Germany can be keptin larger measure from drawing on them. Should Great Britain lose that control, not only would the British Isles be deprived of those supplies but those sup-plies would in substantial measure be made available to Germany—via thePersian Gulf and the Caspian and via Vladivostok. In the event of loss by theBritish both of [4] Singapore and of their position in the Near East, theAxis Powers would have direct and full access to each other and these suppliescould, therefore, be made directly available to Germany with the result that all

effectiveness of the strategy of the blockade would be lost.

In brief, were Singapore to be taken by Japan, Great Britain's tasks, bothof (1) defending the British Isles and of (2) winning the war, would be renderedvastly more difficult and her chances of survival be greatly diminished.

4. Singapore is, furthermore, important from point of view of more obviouslydirect interests of the United States. Were Singapore to fall, the blockade ofChina (except for the inade(fuate and unreliable northwest route from Russia)could be made complete and the defeat of China by Japan would be facilitated.The control over the natural resources of the South Seas area which Japanwould acquire if it took Singapore has already been indicated. Our own posi-tion in the Philippines—a far more valuable possession both economically andstrategically than is usually recognized—would, of course, be strategicallyprejudiced.

It is in its effect upon China's resistance, however, that the fall of Singaporeto Japan wou'd most [5] conclusively affect (adversely) the direct in-

terests of the United States (other than and in addition to our interest in sur-vival of the British Empire). Were China to succumb we would be Less ablethan now to protect our interests in the Far East. Our historic Far Easternpolicy and our whole position in the Far East would be seriously compromised.


Not the least of the disastrous results of China's defeat would be a serious drop,as a result of such a blow to our prestige, in popular morale in this countryand in the morale of the peoples of South America. The only remaining counter-weights to the power and influence in the Far East of Japan would be thoseof Russia. With the collapse of China, Japan would be master in East Asia andin the South Seas, and Japan would be able to draw freely upon China's naturalresources and manpower. The security of Australia and New Zealand—to bothof which we are bound by increasingly strong ties—would be endangered. Inaddition, Japan's access to the great economic resources of India would bedefinitely facilitated and Japanese political influence in India would increase.

The increase in Japan's strength vis-^-vis the Uniied States which would re-

sult from these various developments would be notable, and Japan's ability to

challenge our [6] economic (and before long our political) position in

Central and South America would be vastly increased. At the same time, ourgeneral commeirial and strategic position wou'd be considerably weakened—byour loss of the Chinese, Indian and South Seas markets for our exports (andby our loss of much of the Japanese market for our goods, as Japan would be-

come more and more self-sufficient) as well as by inevitable restrictions uponour access to the rubber, tin, quinine, jute, tungsten, tung oil and other vital

materials of the Asian and Oceanic regions.

5. It has been suggested that Japan would be only too glad to sell to theBritish and to us the products of the region, and that in fact, therefore, our(and the British) economic situation would not be adversely affected. The fateof British and American trade in Manchuria and in North China is persuasiveevidence that our (and British) export trade would certainly suffer. WhetherJapan's ability to dictate the terms upon which we could acquire rubber, tin,

and other products would also prove harmful to us in tvmes of peace need not con-cern us. The present and the immediate futures are times of war, and in thewar that is raging not only is Japan an open if nonbelligerent partner of Ger-many and Italy but the United States is openly aiding Great Britain and China.[7] Japan must—while and so long as she is an ally of Germany—aid Ger-many in the latter's attempt to destroy the British Empire, and toward thatend Japan must give support to Gerr^a^^'s nffompts to b.-^ms^^ring thp Brif-sh in

their (jperations—both general and particular—of resistance. Consequently,Tvere Japan to acquire control of Singapore (i. e. control of the key ways to

thf \ast natural resourcei": of Aa'^r^ anri *hp Son*^h Sen'^^ it couM not with an.v

warrant be expected that she would freely sell to the British or to us—we beingBritain's greatest armorer and supplier—what we severally and jointly need(with our expanding requirements) of the strategic materials of the Orient.

6. There is little if any warrant for the view, rather lightly advanced in vari-

ous quarters (and made without consideration of the above-enumerated reasonswhy successful Japanese aggression southward would make Germany's defeatfar less likely), that, if and when Germany shall have been defeated, it wouldbe an easy matter for Great Britain and/or the United States to put Japan outof any advanced positions which Japana may or might have taken while British

and American attention and efforts were concentrated upon problems in the At-lantic and in Europe. Were the Japanese during the present war to occupy Singa-pore without having had to pay a huge [S] price, the Japinese Empirewould be at the end of the war a very dfferent entity from that which it is today,

an entity much more powerful in a military sense than it is now. Is there anywarrant for an assumption that at that point the British would be so powerfulthat they would and could move with success against such a Japan as wouldthen exist? It may well be doubted, also, whether the people of the United Stateswould at that point be willing to embark upon far-flung overseas operations for

the mere purpose of driving the Japanese out of points in which they had estab-

lished themselves on the western side of the Pacific.


Distances from Singapore to Various Points, in Statute Miles by Great CibclkMeasurements

West coast of Ceylon—1,700 miles.

(Note : If Singapore could not be defended, certainly Ceylon could not be—from Colombo to the mouth of the Gulf of Aden it is 2,000 miles and fromColombo to the northwestern tip of Sumatra it is 1,100 miles. Furthermore,

Italian East Africa would be available for minor bases, thus permitting the

distances from Colombo to the coast of Italian East Africa—2,000 miles at

the mouth of the Gulf of Aden ; 2,700 miles at the frontier between Kenya andItalian East Africa—to be halved. B ;ses at Singapore, Sumatra, Colomboand Italian East Africa would give Japan control of the Indian Ocean withconsequent ability to blockade India and to cut all communications to the

Gulf of Aden.)

Mouth of Gulf of Aden—3,700 miles.

Northwestern point of Australia—1,800 miles.

(From Java, which is controlled by Singapore, the distance is 1,200 miles.)

West coast of Borneo—400 miles.

Southern tip of French Indochina—450 miles (thus controlling Gulf of Siam)

Jolu in Sulu archipelago of Philippines—1,250 miles.


CL^lJlo

'h M^mi'tm smMwrnM. mud Kiratria%

i^M ii^ t> j^m

Th« OavvniBsent has s«trur«<l dttfiBit* i&fosmMoR tbat

ths r«o«iit ;rap«Mse la^rial Coofwrene* wnS^ i^ im^tsttm to

atm sotttiivard against 8i»g«por« sad th* srsrtxofo Baat Indiss

first b»f<»r« <M»piii« with th« Slber-laa prow.**.

Ib aooordstuMi with thl» InformtioR all 4*p«rt9HOta

of tb* a&mnumkt have reovlvsd IxtJStraeticMis frtm tbe Q^ieml-

issivo to talc« li»»dl&t« Bttftsiires to mmt 1M» «otioB.

L ^^t^^-g^Ut^^^

79716 O—46—i)t. 19-

3498 CONGRESSiOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Sm^lri»9 *» rew* t»l«grm» ifo. If (bor&ac m%muS»*» viMt to

%rii» 'aOMm^ mimtiiteaaiiig mta riNMSIawd S8 to tlM» z-wipictlifw apbmxma

' r)0 ef &et|.«e» aoanwEgr tad l%e3y i»9ix9A jn—diat*~

"jia^ td vldfl^ Sattfo^tai. «oaM laot •«(«• o«iag to

Z fiov Imxn Hmt »ixmm Vm otitlrMik ^ tii* BoMcMIvnMm ooafUot

<xaqplet« nsrwHMmt taui bswi r«lelM»d n^idUdt mXXa for Mtrljr MtloB «c<dM«t

in Zc^b-CMaa aai TUmitaod pr»iitr«t«i7^ to «i SidhnKao* •cnttaMurd acftiwHi

Oiv IMa»is Immhi dselars tJiai d» sbo^Lld 1» %gr no mnoui dl»-

ecKSrAfKd ^ te«9lomeats ^md Im^W) tliat fxm mi^ atSll b* «lil» to riM±%.^

OKing to th» mmaemiMt dt dl^loHfttl« Zi«iljiti<Mui Z mi nmtiai i^T

t«L»graii Idaroogb StA\amri»a&. I «i prootdlBt tlwr* ^f««lf Bad hofw to

MlBtalo <»eiMi«et wltb oar jRrlMda fttm tbaaro.

(^ CA/^^-yU^C^Xj^^


iin.


THC MtUKCTAOV OT »TATVWAm»M»nm. p. c.

DEPARTMENT OF STATEWASHINGTON

Aueuat 7. 19i»l.

ICaiORANDUM FOR THE HOSIDBrr

There Is anolosed a copy of a telegram addressed

to you by General Chiang Kai-shek under date of

July 31, 1941 » together wlt4> a oopy of a note frost the

Chinese Ambassador, dated August 2, forwarding a OOpy

of the telegram in (Question. As General Chian«*» mes-

sage, in which he conveys to you his gratitude for your

having aooeded to his rec^uest to plaoe Chinese stsets

in this oouotry under freezing control, refers to other

requests which he has nnde in the interest of strengthen-

ing Cbiita, it seemed adTisable that reply sheuM !>• made

to his telegram without awaiting your return. I aooordia«>**

ly sent today & reply to Qeperal Chiang by telegraph throutfi

our Xmhassy at Chunglcing and enolose a oopy of w^ telegram

herewith. I trust that ay repl^f^ets with your approval.

Bnolosures:

X. From Chinese Ambasaado.Axigust 2, with enol

2. To Aaerlean Imbasey,Chuaelcing, August ?.


Ohinkse Embassy.Washington, Amjust 2. Wlfl.

Honorable Stjmnkb Wpxlks,Acting Secretary of State

My Drvr Mr. Secektabys I have just received a telegraphic message from Gen-eralissimo Chiang Kai-shek which he desires to be conveyed to the President. I

shall be grateful if you will be so good as to transmit it to its high destination.

I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Very sincerely yours,

Hu Shih.

Enclosure: Telegram as above.

Translation

Telegram to the President of the United States From Generalissimo ChiangKai-shek, Chungking, July 31, 1941.

My Dear Mr. President : I am most grateful to you for having acceded to

my request to place all Chinese assets under f'-eezing control. This is additionalevidence of your desire to assist China in every possible way, and is appreciatedby the Chinese people in that spirit.

I am sure that the action of your Government in freezing all Japanese assetswill prove an important body blow to the aggressor.The Chinese Government is sincerely grateful to you and your Government for

having brought about concerted action, on both these measures, by practically all

the friendly powers who are fighting aggression.I am confident that my other requests which I have made to you in the interest

of strengthening China's fighting power and meeting the emergency situation ofthe Far East, will receive .vour kind attention at the appropriate time.

Chiang Kai-shfk.

NAVAI. RADIO.\UGUST 7, 1941.

AmEmbassy,Chungking.

Please inform General Chiang Kai-shek that the Chinese Ambassador promptlydelivered to me for communication to the President General Chiang's graciousexpression of appreciation of this Government's action in freezing (Chinese assetsin this country pursuant to General Chiang's request, State further that thecommunication will be promptly conveyed to the President, who is absent fromWashington at this moment ; and that, speaking for the President, I reaflSrmthat it is the desire and purpose of the people and Government of the UnitedStates to aid China in concrete ways in the struggle which the Chinese Govern-ment and the Chinese nation are most courageously making to preserve andmaintain China's place and perform China's function as one of the great in-

dependent nations of the world.

3502 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIOJ^^ PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

EXHIBIT NO. 160

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

B«eaab«r 15 , 1941.

imiOEiNDUM

Rosarks of tlM Fresident on

%ht oco&fiion of tbe moting of hit

Cabinot at 8:30 and oontimiing at

9:00 with logislatlTo leadort, on

Pooottbor 7t 1941

•

( indicates inaudibility)The conversations were interrupted for six weeks to two montlis. They

were then resumed, with the same objective in mind. Despite the Japanese moveinto Indo-China, they continued until about two weeks ago, when we receivedindications from various sources—Europe and Asia—that the German govern-ment was pressing Japan for action under the tripartite pact. In other words, aneffort to divert the American mind, and the British mind, from the Europeanfield, and divert American supplies from the European theatre to the defense ofthe' East Asia theatre. About two weeks ago we b.^gaii to realize that the prob-ability of Japan being in earnest was so slim that it was time to make a finaland definite effort to pin them down on the one subject that they had never everbeen pinned down on, and that was that they were to agree to cease their acts ofaggression, and that they would try to bring the China war to a close.The result was that the Secretary of State sent a message on that point, to find

out whether Japan would be willing to discuss or consider that point of non-aggression. That was the 26th of November. From that time on we were gettingmore and more definite information that Japan was headed for war, and thatthe reply to the Secretary of State would be in the negative.About a week ago, in adding up some of the information in addition to

that, moving 100,000 men in Southern Indo-China, the importance of that lies inthe fact that geographically Indo-China was at a hub, from which any attack canbe made in a number of directions. It is only a very short distance from thereto the Philippines in the east. It is a relatively short distance from [2]there down to the Dutch East Indies, which is the most industrial part—southwestthere is Singapore—fortified. To the west there is the Malay peninsula, partsof Thailand, and parts of the Malay Straits, and slightly to the northwest is

the whole of Thailand—Siam, an independent kingdom, practically surrounded<m two sides by England and France. Only a short distance from there, of course,lies Burma, and the entry—the bottleneck to the Burma Road, a short distancefrom Siam. We are getting a very large proportion of our supplies—rubber, tin,

etc.—from that whole area of southwestern Pacific, and we are getting out overthe Burma Road—two-way road—we are getting a large amount of very importantmaterial, such as tungsten and some oil—for the manufacture of paint.

In addition to that, of course, is the fact that if the Japanese did move to thesouth, to the Dutch East Indies, from Indo-China, the Philippines would bevirtually surrounded. They would have the Japanese on both sides—Indo-China—the Mandated Islands to the west, this side of the Philippines, and the

Dutch Indies, and the Japanese possessions in the South. They would be com-pletely encircled by a military power.And so the thing went along until we believed that under the pressure from

Berlin the Japanese were about to do something And so yesterday

I sent a final message to the Emperor The Japanese, we learned, wereto b^ing the Secretary of State todav a reply to his note of November 26. Actually,

in iwint of fact (?), they telephoned to the State Department, after Hawaii hadbeen attacked, for an appointment. They came to the State Department

—

\S] they were given an appointment within three-quarters of an hour, andthey actually arrived at the State Department one hour after the terrific bomb-ing attack on the Island of Oahu.Which of coui'se was an act which is almost without parallel in relationships

between nations, equaled only by the Japanese episode of 1904, when two squad-

rons—cruisers—lying in the Harbor of Korea (?) and without any warning—

I

think on a Sunday morning, by the wa.v—Japanese cruisers sank all of them.There are other parallels, of course, such as the descent on Denmark and Norwayin this war, without any warning whatsoever. In fact right in the face of their

treaties of non-aggression.. . . Sending that message to Congress, which i.s—after you have read and

studied it—one of the most . . . falsehoods that I have had . . .

And finally while we wei-e on the alert—at eight o'clock—half-past seven—about a quarter past—half-past one, a gi-eat fleet of Japanese bombers bombedour ships in Pearl Harbor, and bombed all of our airfields. Shortly thereafterthis was followed—about eleven o'clock, three hours later—by a third attack,

which was not as violent, but most of the damage had already been done. Thecasualties, I am sorry to say, were extremely heavy. I cannot say anythingdefinitely in I'egard to the numlier of ships that have been sunk. It looks as if

out of eight battleships, three have been sunk, and possibly a fourtli. Two de-

stroyers were blown up while they were in drydock. Two of the battleships are

l)adly damaged. Several other smaller vessels have been sunk or destroyed.

The drydock itself has been <lama{red. Other portions [.'/] of the fleet

are at sea, moving towards what is believed to be two plane carriers, withadequate naval escort.

In addition to that, this afternoon, in Guam—Guam was being bombed by twosquadrons of Japanese planes, and we know—and it is entirely possible that at

this moment Guam—which was not defended except by a few Marines, withoutmuch in the way of guns—in all probability has fallen to the Japanese.Wake Island was also attacked, and we have no further word at the pre.sent

time.

We believe that Manila was attacked, but that has not proved true, and it is

possible that other ports of the Philippines—some ports in Mindanao—have beenattacked. Those are merely reports.

. . . Three or four, probably, of the landing fields were very heavily bombed,and a very large number of aircraft were destroyed in the hangars, or on thefields.

I have no word on the Navy casualties, which will undoubtedly be very heavy,and the best information is that there have been more than one hundred Armycasualties and more than 300 men killed and injured.

I do not know what is happening at the present time, whether a night attackis on or not. It isn't quite dark yet in Hawaii. I suppose it's four o'clock in

the afternoon, and it will pi'obably be dark in a couple of hours.There might be . . . nothing definite on it ... if the Japanese force turns

out to be a good deal lai-ger than we expected.The fact remains that we have lost the majority of the battle [5] ships

there. Of course, in the long run, probai)ly most of them can be salvaged, orrepaired, to take their place in the line of battle again. That, however, is a longprocess, and will last very many months, depending on the damage.

I think probably—Oh yes—one more thing—Out in Shanghai the one smallgunboat we have there has been taken over by the Japanese, and a British gun-boat has been blown up. We still have two hundred Marines there . . . andwe are not certain yet whether they have been gotten out or not. Probablv not.

The Japanese at the same time . . . which were set for one o'clock Wash-ington time—the Japanese made an attack on the Malay peninsula. Thatis definite. And the British fleet now in Singapore is now conducting war opera-tions against the Japanese ships in the Gulf of Siam, and on the eastern side of

the Malay peninsula, at the north end—top north end of the Malay Straits, justshort of the—we will have to look up the map—just short of the Siamese

—

Thailand part of that peninsula, short of what they call the (?) Isthmus.The Dutch government has declared that a state of war exists between the

Netherlands Indies and the Japanese.The British cabinet is in session. I have heard nothing from them on that

—

just the fact. And at nine o'clock tomorrow morning, their time, a special

session of the Parliament is being called.

The Japanese have attacked the Malay Straits.

Now I think (hat is all there is in the way of information, but it has beensuggested that the Army and Navy losses, and the [6] rather definite

statements that I have made about these shipe, could not be spoken of outside,

because we must remember that detailed military information, such as thedamage to ships, or even the lo«s of personnel—that information is of value to

an enemv. I think that is a matter of di.seretion, which all of you will accept.

Q. Didn't we do anything to eet—nothing about casualties on their side?The Prfsident. It's a little difficult. We think we got some of their submarines,

but we don't know.Q. Well, planes—aircraft?The Ppesident. We did get, we think, a number of their Japanese planes.

We know some Japanese planes were s^^ot down, but there again— I have seen somuch of this in the other war. One fellow says he has got fifteen of their planes,

and you pick up the telephone and somebody else says five. So I don't knowwhat tho report on that is. except that somewhere Japanese planes have beenknocked down on the Island. I should say that by far the greater loss has beenstistained by us, although we have accounted for some of the Japanese.

Q. There is a story coming over the radio that we got one of their airplanecarriers.

The Presidknt. I don't know. Don't believe it. It was reported about eight

o'clock. I didn't believe it. A Japanese carrier has been discovered off the


Panama Canal and sunk by our forces. I wish it were true. But about thesame time, the conunanding officer [7] in the Canal Zone said they wereon the alert, but very quiet.

So that is literally everything I have got here. I think I have even coveredthe rumors as well.

Of course, it is a terrible disappointment to be President in time of war,and the circumstances . . . came most unexpectedly. Well, we were attacked.There is no question about that.

I thought that tomorrow, if it was agreeable to Senator Norris (?) he wouldbe good enough to ask me to deliver a short message. I can't tell you what is in

it at this time, because of ... I will probably have ... It has been re-

ported but not verified that Japan has d,one one of two things. She has sent outword that her army and navy are in a state of hostilities with the Unied States;and the other reports state that they have declared war on the United States.

I frankly—I haven't any specific information whether both of those are trueor not. Of course, the fact is that the—it might be called the principal defenseof the whole west coast of this country and the whole west coast of the Americashas been very seriously damaged today. That is why I thought I would ask you

—

after all, there are two sides—I would ask you if it was all right if you wouldlet me come before you tomorrow—I think the regular Senate session tomorrow.

Q. Yes.The President. The HouseQ. Twelve o'clock.

Q. May I make one suggestion, Mr. President, and that is that you come asearly after twelve as possible, at your convenience. Are [8] you goingto suggest what the resolution will be before we leave?The President. I don't know yet.

Q. A resolution inviting you to come?The President. A resolution asking me to come.Q. You don't want to continue any further than that tonight?The President. No. I think what's happened in the last nine hours. I don't

know what's going to happen by twelve o'clock tomorrow.Q. My suggestion was made for this reason—after the prayer and the reading

of the Journal, we stopped the long speeches, but it is the habit now to askunanimous consent (?) I would like to introduce this resolution as soon as theJournal is read. Then you could come in at an early enough hour.. The President. Half-past twelve?

Q. Yes, I thinkThe President. In the Senate?Q. Five minutes to get there. We have to get that resolution—

—

The President. The concurrent resolution ?

Q Yes.The President. Well, if that's all right with you, I will I will come any time

—

roughly half-past twelve is all right with me. Is that all right?Q. Yes, yes. Sam and I discussed that.

The President. Well, it is an awfully serious situation. There is a rumorthat two of the planes—Japanese planes have a rising sun painted on them—buttwo of the planes were seen with swastikas on them. Now whether that is trueor not, I don't know. It was a rumor, and therefore news until something alittle more definite [9] comes in. But that is a rumor.

Q. I can't help wondering what can we do to do anythingThe President. The only specific thing to do . . . our ships—we don't know

what ships—are out trying to get the Japs at this moment. . . . They can't sendfor fear of disclosing their position.

Q. There are two airplane carriers of the Japanese navy over there.The President. Probably—in other words, if you take the timing out, those

planes—carriers and their attending cruisers, and probably battleships—I don'tknow—at sundown last night, at about dark, were roughly twelve hours ofdarkness-—standing in the dark, away from where they launched theirplanes. Now, let us assume that they launched those planes at a distance of ahundred miles at daylight. That means that they had twelve hours to get tothat point in the dark, and running at perhaps 25 knots, that would be threehundred miles further away. In other words, at dark, last night, they mightveiy well have been four hundred to five hundred miles away from the Island,and therefore out of what might be called a good patrol distance. Patrol out ofa given point—300 miles under normal conditions, but 500 miles is a long way


for reconnaissance patrol. The planes run all through the nipht. At dawn theywere one hundred miles away from their Island—they launched their planes

—

they steamed this way and that way, or reversed their course. The planesdropped their bomhs and went hack.

Q. Well, they were supposed to be on the alert, and if they had been on thealert. ... I am amazed at the attack by Japan, but I am still more astoundedat what happened to our Navy. They were all asleep. Where were our patrols?They knew these negotiations were [10] going on.

The President. . . . Here is a dispatch from General MacArthur in

the Philippines. All possible action being taken here to speed defense. Pursuitplanes are now reporting that by a counter-attack about fifteen enemy planes northof the Far (?) in Central (?) ... which means that those Japs are over theIsland of Onhu (?). Report has been received that bombing attack . . . farend of the Island of Mindanao ... In all probability . . . attack may comefrom the Japanese Mandated Islands, which lie to the west of the Philip-

pines The only damage caused, said the report, is a hangar of a civilian airport.A report has just been received of a bombing attack on Camp John Hayes at

Baguio.That message was sent twenty minutes ago, and it is just about dawn in the

Philippines at this moment—tomorrow of Monday.Two hundred Marines are in Northern China (?). They have been asked

by the Japanese array to disarm, to turn in all arms and ammunition, to

assemble . . . The reply accepts the demands as of two o'clock today. Thattakes care of that. You have got the rest of it.

Q. That means two hundred of our Marines are now prisoners of the Japanese?The President. Yes.Well, any of you good people got any questions?Q. I didn't hear you say anything about sinkings between Hawaii and Oahu.The President. Those are two reports. One was an armed transport supposed

to be carrying a load of lumber. Is that right Harry?[11] Mr. Habry (Hopkins)? Yes, sir.

The President. And the other one is—that was 1,500 miles off San Francisco

—

the other report which might release the same—that an American merchant shiphad been sunk 700 miles. But they are just flabby ( ??)

Q. If that report is true, it is pretty close to California, is that right. Harry?Q. Mr. President, you said you don't know what you are going to say tomorrow.

Are you g'ung to detail to Congress all the facts you have at that time, assumingthey don't get any better you might ... so far as the JapaneseThe President. Active hostilities, yes.

Q. Yes, that is what I mean.The President. Well, let me get a little more time on it.

Q. Yes.The President. In other words, at my Press Conference, they start off with

the question "If". It's a little bit of "if"—what I will say tomorrow at half-past

twelve.

Q. Have you any report of a mass meeting in Tokyo to be held at 7. 30, in

which Togo and Tojo and some otiier officials were to make speeches?The Presid'^-nt. I heard tliat the Prime Minister is going to make a statement,

or a declaration, or speech, in Parliament at two o'clock tomorrow afternoon.

Q. The radio inferred about eleven o'clock.

Q. That would be about 7.30 our time. That's another rumor. It isn't con-

firmed.

[12] Q. . . . make a formal declaration of war? They are so tangled

up in the Axis that a declaration of war by Germany on us . . .

The President. We have reason to believe that the Germans have told theJapanese that if Japan declares war they will too. In other words, a declaration

of war by Japan automatically brings . . .

Q. You haven't made any declaration yet?The President. It is awfully difficult to know.Q. Well. Mr. President, this nation has got a job ahead of it, and what we have

got to do is roll up our sleeves and win this war.The President. Doc (?) I am glad you said that because there are a lot of

people all over the country who have been saying for the past few weeks—saying,

well let's go in and clean U])—blank—blank—blank. But of course that popular

feeling—you can't do it—just wade in and clean tliem up.

Back in 1922-1923, I wrote an article for the Asiatic Magazine, and I pointed

out at that time that from what I had seen of the Navy Department, war between


the United States and Japan would be won by us; but that it would be wonprimarily by the starvation and exhaustion of Japan—starvation or exhaustion.And always remember that they have no naval bases—they have nothing. Andthe old axiom used to be that a fleet loses five percent of its efficiency for everythousand miles it gets away from base. Tiiat is a rule of thumb. We saw ourfleet at Hawaii, three thousand miles away to Japan itself ... If anythinghappens to the ship, there is one thing in particular. If you are in home watersyou can get it back to drydock or Navy Yard, but if you are in enemy waters[13] • you have an awfully tough time getting back home. And therefore afleet attack over in Japanese waters is almost an impossibility. And they aregoing to go through. We will have to, to prolong our national existence, but it

makes this treacherous attack impossible in the future. We may have some veryheavy losses. And the Japanese know perfectly well that the answer to herattack is proper strangulation of Japan—strangulation altogether.

Q. How big is the Russian Army now?The President . . The greater part of it is there. From our best informa-

tion there will be no offensive on land from now on until the end of April.

Q. Not much danger in Siberia . . .?

Q. Try to play this down, Mr. President, but I presume that we think of thisproblem—we probably have varied interpretations to place on the situation, sothat we will probably have a declaration against Japan. Whether it goes anyfurther will depend on conditions from now to then.The President. I think we ought not to say anything about it—what action

will be asked fOr, or what action will be taken by the Congress tonight.

Q. About all you can tell them is about the Message?The President. But lots of things may happen.Q. I was trying to get it from our points of view.The President. The fact is that a shooting war is going on today in the Pacific.

We are in it.

Q. By twelve o'clock tomorrow you will know whether Japan's formality hastaken a declaration of war on us, or a state of war [I4] exists.

Q. ... Japan had stated that a state of war existed between us, or thatwar existed. That does not necessary mean a declaration of war. That comesfrom some authority that has power to declare war.The President. Bill, this is the only thing that we have—from Shanghai.

Who is Stanton? Is he our Consul there?Q. Consul of China.The Pres dent. Ciptain Smith of the U. S. S.? reeeivetl a telephone call at

4.15 this morning. Japanese naval oflBcersi stated over the telephone that a stateof war exists between my country and yours. I am taking control over theU. S. S.? . That's the nearest oflScial thing I have got, and that's a telephonemessage. I tliink we had better not say anything about it. Remember that o-^tthere it is nearly just about dawn. They are doing things, and saying thingsduring the daytime out there, while we are all in bed.

Q. We are in bed too much.Q. Well, if that's-^well, that's all we can say.The President. What?Q. That is all we can say.The President. Yes.December 7, 1941

EXHIBIT NO. 161

-i^.,^:^:ii

I I

TTTP"' •I i|H||l|j

THC SECRETARY OF THE NAVY>A'ASMIN3TON

Vov«ttb«r 29, 1941y DivlBlon of

r FAR m\ii} m\

n II-

Xy d*«r Mr. rrcaldaati

I aa «aelo«lag bermrith a rwy ron^ draft ofwhat I hare sant orer to the State Separtaent as a aaaaaof helping la the draftlog of a aaeeage. I hope it aajr

tie helpftH.

I hare had the aealitance of both idalral Starkaad JUbilral Tttrner la the mugaatlon of the allttary eltuatloa.

fee neve thla momlac Indicate! that the Jap» aregoing to dellheratel7 etall for two or three dajre, eo unleeethle picture ehaagee, I aa extreaeljr hopeftd that jrou willget a two or three dajr reeplte down there aad will eoae hackfeeling Tory fit.

To«r* elneerelj,

She PresidentIn Route to

Vara Springe, Georgia

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To The Congress of the United States:

The relations between the United States and the Japanese Empire have nowreached a stage where I consider it incumbent upon me to acquaint the Congresswith the exact facts of the situation and their extremely serious implications.

For the past six months, conversations have been carried on between the Secre-

tary of State and the President of the United States and the Foreign Ministerand Premier of Japan, for the purpose of arriving, if possible, at some under-standing agreeable to both governments. Throughout this entire period, the gov-ernment of the United States has been steadfast in its support of basic principles

which should govern international relations. The principles for which we havestood in these discussions may be summarized as follows

:

(Insert here Secretary Hull's summary of our basic principles which hegave to Nomura.) .

We have employed every effort of which we were capable to reach, an agreement.With the utmost of forbearance and patience, we have sought to bring Japaninto accord with us on these principles. These efforts have failed. Japan hasrefused to change her posture, and relations between the two nations are threat-ened with rupture.

In our negotiations, we have kept in close contact with the governments ofGreat Britain, Australia, the Netherlands Indies, and China. We have foundthese nations in complete agreement with the position we have assumed. Inevery proposal submitted to Japan, the rights and vital interests of these fournations have been faithfully represented. In the firm position which' we havetaken with respect to the Japanese attitude and conduct, we have had the moralsupport of these nations. We also have assurance of their material and militarysupport if that becomes necessary.

[2] Simply stated, what we are confronted with in the Far East is a repeti-

tion of the tactics pursued by Hitler in Europe during Ihe past two years. Themethods which Hitler has used in Europe so successfully and which are beingfaithfully imitated by Japan, consist of a gradual expansion of power and controlover neighboring peoples by a slow, progressive infiltration through which onenation after another is subdued and enslaved either by actual force or by threatsof force.

If the Nazi power is to be defeated, the United Kingdom must not be over-

whelmed. British military power mans the gate which holds back from theAmericas the flood of German military strength. The supports of British powerextend to all parts of the ^orld. Weakening one support weakens the strength ofthe entire structure. A particularly important, possibly an essential part of thatstructure is Singapore, which, with the Philippines and the Netherlands Indies,furnishes great quantities of the raw materials required for the success of theAmerican and British defense effort. The Southwest Pacific, important as it

is to our economy, may be even more important as a military position, becauseit links together vital units of the British Commonwealth. Were Japan estab-lished in Singapore or the Netherlands Indies, the security of the British Isles

themselves would be endangered, and thus the security of the United Statesthreatened. Should this region fall, we would find that the brave troops of Aus-tralia, New Zealand, and India would necessarily be required at home to defendtheir own territories, and thus no longer could take part in checking the Nazithrust to the east and to the south. The British position in the Near East wouldbe undermined. Vichy France probably would fall c-ompletely under Nazi domi-nation. Under Nazi control would then fall all [S] the territories andbases of that part of Africa which we see poised like a bludgeon over our friendsin South America.Japan has faithfully followed the familiar pattern of German aggression. Each

proclaims a burning wish for peace, and each seeks that peace by making war onits neighbors, one by one. The united strength of these neighbors might oncehave checked this aggression, but each has faced his doom alone. Step by step,

country by country, the sinister military power of Germany and Japan hasswarmed forward until now, each abetting the other, both stand as remorselessthreats to all remaining, free peoples.During the past 10 years, Japanese military power has moved westward into

Manchuria ; and then has moved southward through China into Indo-China andthe islands of the sea. Today Japan has strong military, naval, and air baseswhich enclose three parts of the circle around the Philippine Islands, and directlyfront the British and Dutch in the southern rampart. Were the Malay States


and the Netherlands Indies tjo pass under Japanese military domination, two ofour strong friends in the Far East would disappear. Standing alone, we thenwould see, surrounded and in a desperate plight, our territory in the PhilippineIslands, and our friends, the Philippine people. We could not accept so intolerable

a state of affairs.

The situation holds unmistakable threats to our vital interests. The .successful

defense ot the United States, in a military sense, is dependent upon supplies

of vital materials which we import in large quantities from this region of theworld. To permit Japanese domination and control of the major sources of worldsupplies of tin and rubber is a menace to our safety which cannx)t be tolerated.

Unless the present course of events in the Far East is halted, and considera-tions of Justice, humanity and the principle of equality between [^] na-

tions, are restored, we will witness in that region of the world, precisely whathas already transpired throughout the continental limits of Europe where Hitler

seeks diOminion by ruthless force.

The progress and results of our patient negotiations with the Japanese Gov-ernment demonstrate that Japan will not accept conditions which are fair, andwhich we believe are fundamental if peace and prosperity in the Pacific Areaare to endure. It is clear that the Japanese Government has determined on im-

mediate further military adventures. They have enlarged the sphere of the so-

called "New Order" until now it even includes India, Australia, and New Zealand.Months ago Japan proclaimed total national mobilization. Their every available

resource is devoted to military purposes. The Premier and other leaders, againand again, have appealed for Japanese unity in order (and I quote) "To tide

over the gravest crisis that Japan has faced in all her glori^ous 1000 years of

history" (end quote). Their leaders assure the Japanese people there is no hopeof peace, and that large-scale war is directly ahead.

Information has reached us of dependable character that Japan contemplatesfurther measures of aggression. She has assembled both land, sea and air forces

for new conquests. She can go no further without seriously threatening the

vital interests of Great Britain, the Netherlands Indies, Australia and ourselves.

Unless Japan renounces such purposes and withdraws this threat of further con-

quest by force, the four nations involved must resort to force to prevent this

aggression, since arguments appear to have failed.

In a final effort to prevent an extension of hostilities in the Far East, I haveaddressed an appeal to the Emperor of Japan to join me in my efforts. In themeantime, while I await the result of this latest [5] effort toward peacefulsolution, I felt it incumbent upon me to apprise the Congress, and through you,

the people of the United States of the serious situation with which we are con-

fronted.


•I

DRAPf RECEIVED BY THE SECHETARY OP STATS PROM^EBE SECRETARY OF WAR OP MATERIAL FOR POSSIBLE IN-CLtJSIOK IN THE PROPOSED MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS ONTHE SUBJECT OP RELATIONS WITH JAPAN.

«

fC

is

O

t^

-z-' 'ftfi

m


**.. WAR DEPARTMENT^P |/. OFFflCE OF THE SECRETARY

•y MEMORANDUM

Division of

FAR ti^ltRH WJMRS^

OepartmeM of State


A ii

0BNTLB!J3M OF THE C0MORS33 ;

I have oome before you "to report to you on the 3>^

serious danger which Is threatening this oountry and its

interests in the Far Sast.

(here introduce such further opening matter as desired)

, Our interest in the safety of thePhilippines, the Netherlands and

Malaysia^

For over forty years our government has been

r A conducting the unprecedented experiment of training an

Asiatic people in the methods of freedom and self-government

as practiced by our own republic. While our immediate aim

has been the development of this dependent Filipino people,

thrown Into our guardianship by the accident of war, into

a self-governing and independent commonwealth, nevertheless

we have other far-reaching interests in the success of that

farslghted experiment. It is of the utaoat value to the

material welfare of the United States that there should exist

In that portion of the world a friendly nation bound to us

by the ties of association and gratitude which ovir long part-

nership in government has created. It has wrought hcane to

the nations and peoples of the Orient the name, the credit

and the possibility of extensive commerce with the United

States. It has helped to establish and stabilize close

7»7H; O— 4fi— pt. 1!>-


'#'1'

•!

relations on our part vdth that portion of the Paolfio,

Including particularly !,'alayela and the Hew Netherlands,

wliich secure for us supplies of indispensable materials

for our requirements both in time of peace and in war.

Thus for every reason, both spiritual and material, it is

of vital importance that the purpose which we undertooK

four decades ago should be carried out to its intended logical

fruition and that the people of the Philippines should aohiev*

their ultimate position in the fatally of nations, bound to

us by such ties of origin.

'

Our relations to Gbiaa

The Ataorican policy which was thus put into effect

in regard to the Philippines was in essence of the same far-

sighted character as that which during the same period we

applied to our relations with China. We were the founders

of the policy of the Open Door, - the policy which was sub-

3Qq,i-iently legalized in the so~oalled Mn« Power Treaty, and

which endeavored to preserve for that great nation its

territorial and administrative integrity and to permit it

to develop without molestfition its sovereignty and independtinoe

jiocordlng to the modern and enlightened standards believed to

obtain amoEg the peoples of this earth.

-3.

The Axis attaok upon this Aaarloata polieyin the gar BaiT

imriiig the pest decade, howiver, these ezaightaoed

policies of the Amerloeu gOTeraaeat, examplifiad by our

attitude towards China aM the Phlllppiaes, hare b«»a

eadangersd Y/y a soheoe of vcrld oonquest set on foot by

the so-oalled Axis powers - Germalny, Italy, and Japan;.

These nations hare without pzxnrooatioa <» oxsuse attaek»d

an<i coaq.uered and reduced to eoonoalo and poXitioal slavery

aost of the free goTemmentiOf Xurppe. la the Far Bast

their Axis has hesn represented toy the go'natmmnt of Japan

which In 1940 Joined with Oermaay and Italy in a coTenant

avowedly aim^d at the interests in the Orient of the

government of the ttedted States. Japan has for over five

years baen attempting to oarry out auoh a 80h«as of oonquest

and spoliation in the far X&st. In flat defiance of Its

own covenants In the Nine Power Tr«<aty it has invaded and

sought to overthrow the government of China. Step toy step

the fleets and forces of Japan, passing through the China

Sea in the iniaBdlate praximity of the Philippine islands,

have also invaded and taken possession of Indo China.. Today

its forces are proposing to go further southard and are

openly tbraetening an extension of this conquest into the

terrilbory of tKiailand. This step would dirsotly fflanaoe


'^^-4.

tbe port ftzul stredta of Slogepora tlurongb whloli getaway

runs the ocmmrom of th* world, Inoluding our oicoi, betuMB

tlM Pacific and tba Indlaa Ooean.

Oa the «astara side of the Phil^^^Anea, Japan baa

also been extending its thraatening aotiyitlaa thxsugh the

Caroline and Marshall Islanda nhare, in Tiol&tioa of tha

oandate under whiob it raoalTed'the ouatpdy of those i»Xauaft»t

it has been secretly establishing naval and air baaaa and

fortlfioatlons directly on the line bativaaa the United States

and the Philippine Islands.

By those steps Japaii has placed itself in a

position which encircles the western, aorthani and eastern

approaches to our territory and intereata in the Philippines.

Should it go further, it will coupletely encircle and

dangerously menace thtt irital interests of the United States.


Second: This Japanese campaign of oonquest and

exploitation Is now approaching and encircling the Philippine

Islands, It threatens the commerce of those lelends and

endangers their physical safety.

If it is successful, it will destroy the farsighted

experiment which America has been conducting in those Islands

and terminate their hope of index>endence and their peaceful

democratic government.

It will destroy the mutually profitable oonuaero*

which exists between those Islands and the United States ani

upon which thehigh standard of living of the FJLllpiaos now

depends.

It will ruin the lifelong efforts and investments

of thousands of Aaierican citizens who have l^ransferred their

homes and business activities to the Philippines on the *

faith that American principles of freedom Bad Anerioan msthods

of government would continue in those Islands.

It will forever teinainate th^^estlge and ifafluenoe

of the United States which the Anwrlcan ezparinent in tb«

Philippine Islands has been ©stabltsfalng throughout the Orleat,|

Third ; It will threaten to cut off and destroy

our oommeroe with the Netherlands Bast ladies and the MguLejraa

Settlements.If the Japanese are permitted to carry ovctu

their threat to attack and conquer these friendly ooontrifc*,' :


•l-6.

oxa* imports from these countries will be interrupted anS

destroyed.

These iaports, priaeipally rubber, are vital to

our welfare both iqftim of peeee and war.

Proa those ooimtries we reoeire our chief supplies

of rubber. (Here add other itens)

In tiBw of war, wll^ the spirit of exploitation

and destruction of ooanaffiree which exists in the tiorld today,

Sttoh aa interruption of our trade with the ITetherlasds Bast

Indies and the Mslayan States would be oatastirophie.


EXHIBIT NO. 161A

1^^ DEPARTMENT OF^STATEXI

Adviser on political Relations

c ^ ; t ^c^ i.-4^ ^^n 9uy ^iu^

^ *. ""TLi.

"^"t.

^^si^^

IDEPARTMENT OF STATE

Adviser on Political Relations

kÂ^jL "^^ti^ -^ «rH

J"^ '^^rdrwrv

^îî^*^

''^'^

^1.^

''*=>if-<Jl4-„>

3522 CbNGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

^ . ^*r'. ..,..¥*'

[The first cocument inclosed •*!=

f ore •' * " '^

'' '"""

of

•^ 'C*<Vv %,„^.<^,,xf»w '^^,0^-

(iumt latoNMNw* ii9»A ftncWMNr «i9«filtoi MiilNnr' «• l»»ifM|

M ff«0ilM6 If mof mm wmtSHUM* teUPMi m» %ismiil^%9 Aim

• 9Af«§0m9wSm 9mA iatmgmOum mmmsmvi^i^ wimmMiaa^

fIVflJMJMMi 4M9«iriUMHtil* X» Id «{r «»l> «IMM^ V«JNM» t* tlM»

aiEtaffiftji w^«hi «r taw mitift eiiiMMe ttt»i^ i^mm^ mm^-mfm^^

fgm mt%ims mM pm^* «it ib» «Nyi«i(t %a» mam, tiM

3524 COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1.~*r.;''w. :.-»i-*rrtv3('C^Kwr^~^>::.'.TJ,1iW3ti'^J»EW*L^^

9tttfttt«a« « «& im^ ^"i^ ^>^^ pvrUm 9t ^Im PMtfl«,

imAmUm fM«i««lAvSr leasgrw^ ant «m am MMavImbAa,

ffem 1^ «vwr 9—mm, hem «»irt«aal aai mt«ilttl, i« la

SIM Aniri«ftift »«l>i«r «U«i «<Mt tJwi y«» tet* •fr*««

itt f«0He« «• liM» i1iiUp9tJM>» wa S» •»««•• ©r «» •«• f»r-

•MAia MMMBft tM p(»09l«ll Of %H1« Mytili.


rwimirm^ jSEBmSiASSjBfcMJWffiMwaKt

IHeriBt tte jMCft attain, bewvtr, t^«M taiii^sSittnMl

9oU«i«» of tliM imt»lva» warmmmut, mmplXt±«A tfy «ear

a«d«ft«KNkl W • MluHW of wrlA eottqa««% sot oa foot ^ttM oo-oaUoA Axlo pewrs • a«nMAr» IteXy, aed JeyoA.

IboM aotiOM iMXTo «itlMittt pjP0f94NAtoa OCT «aM«M ett«eiB»d

•aft ooafoHToA oaS roftuooA to oocsmtdLo aai. poIiUosl al«v««r

aoot of tito froo cev«ra»tateof B«x¥9*« Xa tiHo ]fKr Saot

tb»ir Azift Hm 1»ooa roj^sroooatoe ^ %k» i^'vsxiBiflet ^ Stap^Si

«iii«b la 19^ JoSjmhI wiili Oamsaagfr «aS Italy la a eoTWi«s%

ftvewea^ ai^»a& a% tte iBi«ro«l>« la tJ^ CH^lo&t of sÎm

mtmmmnt of „1SIH» 1Kdt(o€ Statoa. jr«s>««i !»» fnr onror tiTt

jroars 1»o«a attaais»tiB« to a«r»y oat aae»% a soImmmi of ooaâat

aad syoXiatioa la tbe r«r Xaet. Xa ât Aeflasoo ^ lt»

OWK i^nraaaata ia tho Hiaa iîmr fâtr i% has IsvodoA aat

to ovsrtlurow tha fovasiâat of Qhioa. Stop bsr «t*p

tlw floota aad foroas of /apaa, $a«alag tJixro^ tha OMua

Boa la th» iaa»6i«t« proLiaity of tisa Philippiaa laUada,

Itavo alas lavaftaft aal takaa yaunmdaai of ZaAo caiiaa« 9o€iigr

ita foroaa aara proôBiAs to t» fttrâ? setitbaayd aad «xt»

ojpealy tlvaataaiat aa extaaaSoa of tbia eoa^peat lato tHa

t«rritor7 of ftoilaad. ¥tiia ata^ tntilA ftlraatly aaaa««


"!&

-4.

tte p«rt mA Stndts cdT Sioeapor* tlur«ai)i vbleh saWwqr

ruaa th« «OHMr«« of tb« «orl4, laoluding our owi, botwooa

tiM PMiflo Md tho Indian Oo«an.

Oft tlw aaatara aid* of tbo FtxillppiAoa, Japan baa

alao baaa axt«idlac ita «br«ai«iin« aatlrltlai thSDugb tha

Oaroliaa and Mnrshall lalanda iii«ra» in iolation of tha-

aadata «Mar i^ali 1% raaalTod tte auatody of tboaa ialazda,

it ham baaa aaaratlr aatabll^ilog aaTaX and air baaaa and

fortlflaatlona diraetljr on tba Una batwaaa tba tJaitad Stataa

and tha Pblllppiaa lalaoda.

Bf tbaaa atapa Japan baa plaoad Itaalf in a

poaitioa wblab afiairaXaa tba •aatara,.aortbaa^ and aaatam

i^proaabaa to our tarritery and iatareata la tba Pbilipplnaa.

Sbo«ld it 0D l!\»rtbar, it will eooplataiy aaeirala and

dMtcftroaslr Moaea tba vital lataraata of tba onltad Stataa ii

EXHIBITS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE 3527

*? f*>fffjfff*^yfc • poltyy of oonatt»»t i^

K»mo iSf th«t falXqr* oftWt «tliiK>»

•4-«A

(H«r« dasarib* tb* JMcotlatioas 9arrlmAom b7 S««r«tar7 Hull and thtir f«llur«)

SmBmmmBBm to 9ax Tltftl i&Wrvata

(Xa oaly)

jQlgllti JTftpftscM poli^ ot coB^wat «ad •xpleit»tloii

vHieii !• 88W tMiias o«rri«4 out im Qkimt IMM aljroodjr uttorljr

&m»trew*^ ia tlio pcMrtloso of Obia* oetttplod liy f«iMi tto

poftoofol aad irofltoliOLo oooMiroiad rolatloaa wtinix tho

%ltoA Statos ted inrovlonsix «Bi<iqF»d.

It IMS doraatotod aad Iiaa a^^^t to «oa«a«r %lm

aatioB abiob for mmf aaafcurlaa W ita dovetloa to tka arts

of pasMi and aoaaaroa has boaa tfea atoat staMIislag IftflaaBa*

fla tha mstam aids of tte Paoifla Oaoaa.

tba ^apaaaaa polioy tHoraateaa to tr«aaf«ra a

paaaafttX eostiMst into oaa davottag Itaolf to tlM praatioa

of wmr aad da«liuit«d hf ttm atllltary aad laadaralilp of 7apaa.

3528 COXGKESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

-5.

SggUAi This J^cpoBMC aaapiilca of ecmq^Ast •oA

«9KipIoi««tioa !• aam a^vTimttUm aad «netr4liag tb* »xillppia«

Xalwi4«* Zt tl»««t«a« tte ww—r»» of tteM X*l«4* aM

sagors th«dLr ipiiysioaX safotj*

It it it sttBocwBful, it idU 4*stro7 ^« forsistitod

luqpoviMBt «fei^ ^nwriM 1ml« Imnui «aDd»«tiiic ia tliOM laloads

MiA ti««ia«t« tbtir te>p* of lAAop«Bd«so« and timlf pMooftil

dffKoez'etio gomnrimsat.

It will &m»tvtiy %b» mitvmXlf profitablo eo«M«r««

w&ielt Mciotn %M>t«««B ttiMo ZoIftM* a&A tlM trait«4 Stat«s ubA

ayt^ nftlela tJMhi«& «tsadftrd of IIvIah ot tb« filipiaos now

It «iU rttiA tJtM lif«lc»c offorta ttnd iBVostsonts

«f ti»»tuMttia« of m»Tiwm eitiseiia «]to hm* ttwasttvA timlv

hmam «ad lmsia*0« ««tiiriti«» to tl» ?hiXippia«s <m. Xh*

t&ittk that AawneftB priaoipl.«« of tx'ooaoa tad Aaarle&a MthoAa

of gQfT«rnMat wrald oootintM ia tlaosa lalaada.

It will foxHtTW tontiaata tI>^«atigo aad iHfltUHieo

of tba Cf&itod etataii abicdi tho AMileaa ascpcriaaat ia tho

Philippia* lalaada has baaa aatablid&lxac througbout Xbm Oriaat,

m:

gy£<f t zt win tbaraataa to out off aad daatsray

oar aoBMBirea vit^ %hm RatlMKrXanda Saat Ssdiaa aad tJia li^ayaa

tJattlaaaata.If tht jTapaaaaa ara paraittad to oanr out

tteiy tbraat to attaak aad ooaquar thaaa fria&dXr oauatriaa.

jg.^'i/fe.j ti.j',., A Jiitf ^P^^^-'

•«•

I.

Mr matmf tetli i«iim «r 9—m «MI ««r»

Anm %teM •matoifa m m««Iv« mar «M«f mvvUm•f n^lMUP. (B«r« «M etiwv 1%«mi}

Zft tlM of wtt wlUt tte ayirit <tf •x9l«U«tloa

mamh m l»«»f««iitio« of our tr*A« with tit* lotlHNPlaada Uutt

XaftiM ftod tb* llidajM StoWa mhIA tea •«t«al»eiAd«.

7JJ716 O—46—pt. 19 8

•¥ppll«« by Colon*! tlio«, I

\j^j\/^jy^î^

If «jk« Itatl D<t««r 1« U b« <I«f*iiti«(l, tit* Oalt««

KJâôs MWt not b« <i«wirtwl«««. drltitb KlllUry pov«r

MRS U(« ff»t* wJli«h iMla* lMI«k fPOK tht MMrlMt «h«

n*»A •t 0»nM)n lllKiirjr sirvngUi. tb* •ttf^peirU «f SrlVi*li

pvm*t axttMS «o «11 i>«rt« of tiM worlA. ^Mkralng oa«

support w««li«iui tb* trcogtm of th* MSitir* «t3«0ttir«. a

p«rti««)il»rlf l«pert«»t, pc*«lbly tn ••csntUl part of that

«nt«t»r« i« Siaftapora, wbloli, wltb tba J'btlipriaa* a»A tfca

MailiarlaM* Xadlaa, fur«itliaa graat (*«aHtitl«« ar th« rav

aatarUla raqairaA Ur ttea avaaat* ©f tiia i^mriaan wA

îritiab «af«n«a affart. tba Swattovaat P«ain«, l»T>arti?«t

»• it it te oar aaoaoay, aay )»*«aft'ii»r* i«portaat a« «

allltarjr poaltloa. t>a«a««« It Itnk* tofathar »l«al unit*

of tfea ftritUb CMMMMwiaallA. «a«i Japan *«t«t>li«fcaa in

$iiie»por* or tba âârlaMa Xadia*, tha caaarity of tha

aritiab Zalaa tlumaalvaa wouia ba eadaafarad, as^ tlsa« tba

aaa«n.ty •<' *te tfaiti^ $tataa «bf»aa%*««<. Sboatfi tbi* ragloft

fall, «#a wMlA fln« tbat tba brava trtwp* »f A»atralla» Kav

£«Nftla»A, and XnAie v*ul« naaaasarity ba ra«:ttl4fatl at boat !•

aafand tba&r aim tarrltortaa, mA tlMa »» laagar aaalA taka

part >« MMolttnff tha Rati «br«tt fa tba aaat »«« to tba aoatli

Ifha trltiab patltiaa in tba Maar Xaat «i«ul4 ba ttaftaraisad.

Vibby Prabaa pr«bably naulA rail aoaplataly aiidifGr Rati

<I«wiAatlott. OMar Vati aontral aaald tbwt fall all tba

tarrttarlaa abA baaa* of tbat part of Afriaa «blab w* %^

paaaft llba a blb«tbab avar oar friaadia ia Hoath Asart -

v««e«, Mi4 t««te §••*• VMi% fNMo* ^ mkiflg wur oo l%«

aaigiilMirR, on* lijr om. Tte «»tt«4 •tMaslto cf ttMi*

••«ti iM» fMHKH Ma d<NMi Alfttt*. St>«9 tqr •%•»* tt««ii%i7 llf

e»«e»ry, tiM §iai»««r ailiicrir powsf of Qmtmmf. ita<f Jr«|wii

!!•• •'nmr—S. torwwHk mntlX now, •••H »lNi»ti«f tb* o«li«r« b««ii

«tit»d( «• vwiMPtvlMt tta'Mtt t* ell rwiiitilag fr«« i>«9f>t««.

D«riaf Kb* ptt*% %m y**r«, l«fMitt«»* wiliter; ptnrtr

bet aoirvA «r««t««M !»«« ll«»«iiiiriA{ «idI £fe«tt iuui bov«4

•o«tliw«r^. thyeufh Oiiiaft lato Iii4o»a»iit» mm. llw i«i«iiA« of

tUM ••». T»^*V <lapiii b«« ttrvns •ititkiri', &*«!, aM «lr

1»*t«« vbi9li •s«ld«9 «br«c 9«rfic of mm otr«l« «ar««s^ ^«

4Miiii«%X«i, *w9 9t Mir Ati^Mm trl»m» in Hbn fur £••% #»<>14

«i««fi^«r. stuMl&j^ ftlon*, »• tJMift «e«il4 §•«, •urvotittioA

«ai in • ft«tp»rcu pl.igbt» •«i> %mnMLto»s ia ttM ?itilli^iB«

I«1»imS«. oM o«r frlM^t, %iw i»bili|^|,n« p«#plc, v« «0uia

I I

THU altakUoa taoU* a»fll«l*k«bl« tbr»«t* to <»«r vital

iiit«r««tf. Tiw •»9e«a«r«l ««f«Bt« ©f «»• Visit«<i st«v««, m» aUltalr/ •••••, !• a«p«ii«»al npon ftippll** of vlUl

MttrUl* 'tOklmk wt tvfwrt in l*rf« nuantiti** fro« tlift«

rvfleft of th» v«rldi. To pcmit •'ttiMiicas <8o«ltw«lon nod

••atffvl of Um M)J«r «•«!*«•• of «•>!« mipplloi of lin •nd

mt»«wr U • MiM«« t» e«r taf^ty «^l«to Mnrot b« tol«rst«4.

OalMs Utm prvsMt voura* ^f •««nt« ta Um r*r ^tt

i« b«lt««, ttM •onal4cr«U(»A« of |iMUt«, httMalfif saA «h«

ftriaaiftla of •<<a«lity l»«iv««« natien* *r« r««ior*d, «• wilt

vHhms In tlw»| rttfioa of th* «K»rl<l, pr««i««ljr iriMt h««

•1ir«»4f tr«iiai>lr*<l tbrowgbout %b* aontiaentsl llvltA of

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•ot aaea^t ooaAitl&na MTitah ar* fair, anA vbiah va âliava

ara foaâaaatal If p«a«a an4 pvyipmriXjf In tha ^»eifi«

araa ara to anSttr*. It la ol««r that tha Jfr«e«o» Oevamaant

h«a AotaralaoA oa toôaiat* furthar ail. tar/ advantat^t.

. ttoof bava *alar(*4 Uio iptera of ttta ao-oallad *^-9u ordar'

KRtil aov It aVOR ioalotfaa XaAla, Auatralla, aa^ Umit 'aalvnd.

fiontlM aco JafMta vroalaiaaA total national aobllinatlon.

taalr avary availakla raaouroo ia laretad to allltary ourpoaaa.

fha Praolar amS othar laad*r«, air«la i>n4 fgaio, tutva apoanlad

for JapaAasa unltjr in er<t«r (and I Qvot*} *t<ct tide ever tft*

Rravaat arlau that rfapaa haa faaoA la all har glorleaa 1000

jr«ara

94ml9 w» i« 4llrf«%ljr «i»*t.

SSm ka* «it«ai%l«4i ivMi i«ttC » cm «M »ir fsMNNt fttr mw(Nm^iwtU. tH^ Mia f® m fwpfbMr i^llM»tatt carlcMs*!/ «&r««t<«li«i'''

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«aHt «(|«MUr«rwi tbU ttarMt of tmtVhm^ «0aM|«u»at l»f f«f>M» tikt


EXHIBIT NO. 162

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYOrriCE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON

i033-a(JFB)E#168

11 April 1946.

To: I'.r. Seth V. P.icharc.son.

In responce to your reouest of 9 April 1946, there is forwardeda T)hot06tatic cony of the loe of the V.'ntch Officer of the Office ofChief of i:aval Operations from 1145, 6 December 1941 to 20^0, 7

December 1941.

rCHlv FORD BAECmiR,Commander, US13R.

Encl.(l).


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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COAIMITTEE 3537


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Messagf:s Noted in the Log of the Watch Officer of the Office of NavalOperations From 1900 6 December to 2000 7 December 11)41

Table of Contents

(a) Spenavo London to Opnav dispatch 061535, December 1941.

(b) ComTaskGroup 4.(i to ConiTaskFor 4 dispatch 061730, December 1941.

(c) Opnav to Alusiia Havana dispatdi 07014a, December 1941.

(d) ComOne to OpNav dispatch 062330, Decenil)er 1941.

(e) CinCAF to Opnav dispatch 070327, December 1941.

(f ) CinCAF to Opnav dispatch 070715, December 1941.

(g) CinCPac to CinCLant, CinCAF. Opnav. di.spatch 071830. December 1941.

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EXHIBIT NO. 163

UNITED STATES SHIP W^^ Vedneadaf 26 Noreaber

IONS OEscfliPTioN -j^-:- T^ REMARKS

Oe-04 steaatng under boiler Noa. 3. 4, 7. &. S, on fleet course 000 T and pgr,

TfJJw patgc. standard speed 15 Isnots, 148 rpm, steaming at 12 knots, 113 rjsn.

Cruising turbines In operation. Steerliie control In Conning Tower. In companyirtth Cruiser Division NIKE (less TJS3 BOISE} "jruising in special division fonBatlon

» T, OSS HOITOlOLtJ, auide, bearing 340° T, distant JoOO yde, formation axio, JI^CP TOTC, COycaiBifffOS in ISS HCWOLUI-O. Average steaa 549. Arerage rpm 118.2.

W.'C. WKIXS,Sa8i»», D-V(O), U3MB.

04-08 steanlng as b fore on course 000*' ? and pgo, 349*" pstgo. standard speedIjlaota, 148 rpo. steaming at 2/3 standard speed, 12 knots, 118 rpm. CruisingC«rbii»a in operation. At 0415, sighted Cape TSMA. Light on the Island of Lanaibearing 025°, distant 8 miles. At 0600, shifted ship's control to Bridge, llgiited

fiMS under boilers numbers 2 and 6. At 0600, changed speed to st&ndard speed,

15 Smots, 14S rpm. Commenced steering various courses to fonn column aetern thetJSS ST LOOTS. At 0620, changed speed to 2/3 standard speed 12 knots, 118 rpm.

At 0626, changed speed to 1/3 standard speed 6 knots, 58 rpm. At 06U, changed

siMwjd to 2/3 standard speed 8 knots 78 rpm. At 0645, set course 215° T and pge,201'" pstgc and assumed position in formation 1000 yards astern the T!3S ST LOUIS.

At 0718, out in boilers number 2 and 6 on fl^ln and auxiliary steam linct>. At0726, changed owjrse to ise** T and pgo, 174® patgo. At 0734. changed oourte to028° T and pgo, 014*^ pstgo. Arerage steam. 545'. Average rpm 116.7.

S. L. COCffiJAIJE,

SnslsQ, O.S. Havy,

2 Steaming as before on course 028*^ f and pgo, 014° pstgo. Standard speed

_ibt8, 148 jcpm. Stoamiai? at standard speed. Mala turbines in operation. At0800, flustered crew on stations, no absentees. At 0801, oommanced steering variousaftKTses at various speeds conducting 6" 47 cal. control drill for DPB (T). At

0820, held Flight Siuarters. At 0901, catapulted plane #1108, pilot: Ins. P. aoiI>-

SK5IC, 1-7(N}, tJSfTR, passenger, HTOKO^Y, K.7., 8K3o, USH. At 0902, catapulted

plaae #1109, pilot: Lt-(jgT. C.R. r)08H?LIlWER, IBM, passenger, Ens. C.B. tIA.*^Y,

A-T(K), OSSR, At 0903, secured from Flight quarters. At 0925, ceased DBP tralaisirun*. At 0930, Oenerai Quarters, Condition "AFFISK" set, for DSP (T) firing runs.

At 0937, shifted blip's control to Conaing Tower. At 0945,<soittmenoed steamingvarious courses at various speeds eonduotiag DSP (T) firing runs. At 1110, oea-menoed firing DSP (T). At 1114, ceased firing. At 1115, changed speed to ataa-

dard epeed I5 knots, I48 rpm. Changed couree right to 000° T and pgc, 349° petgo.

^soared from Oeneral quarters and Material Condition "AFPIHM". At 1117, shifted

lAdB's control to Bridge. At 1118, changed course to right to OIOP T and pgc,057^ pstge. At 1X20. held Flight Quarters to. recover two aircraft, «DOG« method.

At 1120, changed course right to 150° T and pgo, 140° pstgo. At 1123, changed

course left to. 105° T and pgo, 095° patgc. Changed speed to 10 knote, 93 rpm.

At X134, Blane #1109, hoisted aboard. At 1137, plane #1108, hoisted aboard.

l«t fires die out under boilers |2 and #6. At 1145, secured main and auxiliary

steam stops on boilers #2 and i?6. At 1150, changed course left to 325" T and pgc,

315® pstgo. Changed epeed tc 20 knots, 198 rjan. At 1157, secured frooi Fliijht

(juarters. Avei^ge steam 547. Average rpm 203.6.

D. L. G. vtm.Ensign, tl.S. Havy.

Steaming as before on course 325° T and pgc, 314* pstgc. standard speed

^ ^ts, 148 rpo. Steaming at full speed 20 knots, 198 rpm. Wain turbines in

operation. At 1201, changed course left to 285° T and pgo, 374° pstgo. At 1220.

twld Flight quarters to recover two aircraft, -DOa" method. Commenced raaneuvorlng

QfS various courses at various speeds to recover riiforeft. At 1<;27. piano:->i'|

tolated aboard. At 1231, plane #1039 hois'

osptaln, U.S. Navy,. v^. t. ?aTf|feW>15R.Comaandi'"

'Si


Pat». // "7

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

iT HfrwaUftfl operating hX9%

20NE DESCRfPTION nUS lOf

,

1


fat*. // />

ADDITIONAL SHEET

y j( jijnnjENA Date 2.7 Noyember

18. a

12-l6 CCNT commenced recovering bombing target. At 1533. recovered bombing tar-get. At 1535, secured from divlalonal tactics- ' At 1545, sounded Flight Quarters,prepared to recover one (1) plane Independently "CAST" method. Average steam 547'ATorage rpm 11,1,. b.

R. S. WASHBUKI.^Jr.,Ensign, D-V{G), USNR.

16-18 steaming as before on various oouraea to recover aircraft. Standardspeed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at various speeds. Main turbines In operation.At l601, plane #1108, hoisted aboard. At 1606, changed speed to 20 knots 198 rpm.Set course 303° T and pgc, 293° pstgo. At 1738, catapulted plane |1108, EnsignH.F. SAUNDERS, A-V{N), UStJR, pilot. C'KEAX, V/.H.

, '86820, USN, passenger. At 1739,catapulted plane #1109, U-(jg), DOERJXINGEH, USN, pilot: HAMILTON, Tf.T., HMlo,tJSN, Passenger. At 1753, changed speed to 10 knots, 98 rpm. Average steam 550.Average rpm 155- 3-

km y. L. BAIlSY.Vr.,Snsign, D-y((J), TJSNR.

i 16-20 Steaming ae before on course 303 T and pgo, 293 petgo. Standard speed,

I

15 knots, 148 rpm, steaming at 10 knots, 98 rpm. Main turbines In operation.; At 1800, changed course to 120° T and pgc, 109° pstgo. At 1818, ooasaenoedSteaming on varioiw courses at various speeds conducting NBP "Surprise" exercise.At 1818, General Quarters. At 1948, completed firing NBP "Surprise"' and setcourse 180° T and pgo, 169 pstgo, at standard speed, 15 knots, 148 rpm. Securedfrom General Qjiarters and Condition "A?ISM". Average steam 545. Average rpm l6$.i^.

t.Z. BAIHD,Lieut. {Jg5, U.S. Navy.

20-24 Steaming as before on course 180 T and pgo, 169° pstgo. Standard speedx; knots, 148 rpm, steaming at standard speed. Main turbines In operation. At2001, changed course right to 340 T and pgo, 331? pstgo. Changed speed to 8knots, 78 rpm. At 2013, plane | 1109, secured on board. At 2020, plane #1108,secured on board. Changed course left to 180° T and pgc, 169° pstge. Changed spwidto 15 knots 148 rpm. At 2057, changed speed to 10 knots, 98 rpa. At 2129, ohangwspeed to 15 knots, I48 rpm. Commenced steering various courses in aocordanoe irtthslgzag Plan #13 on base course 180° T and pgc, 169° pstgo. At 2201, ceased islg-zagglng. Changed course left to 110°T and pgo, 098° pstgo. Changed speed to IXTknots, 198 rial. At 2224, changed course right to 115° T and pgo, 104° pstgo. At2305. sighted HONOLULU, ST LOUIS, PHOBNIX bearing 076° T, distaa* 20000 yds. At2330, commenced steering various courses at various speeds to tela position lacolumn 800 yds astern USS ST LOUIS. At 2345 took station in column astern US3ST LOUIS on course 130 T and pgo, 169° pstgo at fleet speed 12 kaots, 118 rpm.Average steam 550- Average rpm 152.2. } - ;/

-/' If' , [_y C''-»-*-~^"i^-'«p-T,!«^-,

.

p. V. TBDHPSOK,Ensign, U.S. Navy.

aptaln, tf.8. mvy,do«i>aadlaa.

If. L. TKLieut. S

(TU« |i*«» to b» sent va BorsBtt at livtygiSaaAvasxasSiij «t«ti iA« «3Me««i

?Ma>.IMI/'«<<<•

UNITED STATES SHIP. JWJSSA !9'.l

zone DEScnitTioNHM-i22 REMARKS

00-04 steaming under boilers r?3, i. 7. an* 8, on course 000 T and pgo, 349"

patgA. Standard speed 15 loiots, US rpm. Steaming at 2/3 standard, 12 knots, H8rpm. Cruising turbines in operation. Operating Independently in the Hawaiian

operating Area. At 0015, held Fire quarters for fire in the forward engine room.

At 0022, fire was reported as false alarm. Secured from Fire (Quarters. At 0030,

changed course to 090^ T and pgo, 079<= pstgo. At 0139, sighted MOKAPTtU Lightj,

bearing OI30 T, distant approximately 30 miles. At 0200, changed course to 180" T

and pgo, 169° pstgo. At 0245. changed course to 270° T and pgc, 258° pstgc. Ave

sage ateaa 5/3-7. ATerage rpm 98.1.

W. 0. BOLES,Lieut, iiz), D-V(G), imR.

04-08 Steaming as before on oourse 270° T and pgc, 258° pstgo, standard speed

irfeots, 148 rpm, steaMng at 2/3 standard speed 10 knots, 98 rpa. Cruising

turbines in operation. At O4OO, changed course right to 000© T and pgo, 348

Bstgo. At 0430, changed oourse right to 090° T and pgc, 078^ pstgo. At 0515,

ilghtod MAKAPUU ll^t bearing 010° T, distant about 28 miles. At 0550, changed

ootors* right to 180° t and pgo, 168° pstgc. At O636, changed speed to standard

stwaA 15 knots, I48 rpa. At 0645, launched plane 11178, pilot: Sns. R.W. TLSCK,

A-V{N), Vam, passenger, SLATOII, 2. J., Hl.!3o, 'DSN and plane /ClOS?, pilot: Sis.

H.I. SAtJOTEHS. A-7(K), tJSHH, passenger, OnrSAL, W.H.. Sea2o, TBN. At 0650,;^

lÂohed plani fll09. pilot: X,t-(jgT. <5.R. DOERPtlNCatR, VW, P««?en«sr: HAMILTON,

W.T.. Jan.0, OBN; and plane #1108, pilot: Bns. P. OOLDBBCJ:, A-V(K), OTlv-R, passenger

Bns. O.B. HAHEY, A-V{N), VSim. At 0651, Changed speed to 2/3 standard speed 10

toots, 98 rpm and changed oourse left to 170° t and pgc, 159° pstgo. ATerage

•team 541. 5- Average rpa 101.7.

3nBlgn,**D-T|o), vsm.

-32 ateaoing as before on course 170° T and pgc, 159** Pstgo, standard speed 15

14s rpm. Steaming at 2/3 standard speed 10 knots, 98 rpm. Cruising tw-*in»s In operation. At 0800, austered crew on station*; Bo absentees. At 0900,

ohaaged course to 090© T and pgo, 079° pstgo. At 0900, the Summary Court Martial

jrfSloh it-Comdr. , J.A. l«)H3CW, CSN, Is senior mamber met to try the oase of

TBIPUSTT. J.S., S«a2o, OSN and PBaOtlEIXA, A. J., IJo, VS«. At WU, stopped to

r«<?OTer sImtss from SDNOLULO planes and to resotep four {4) airoraft, ^BA«S"method. At 0950, the aummary Court Martial of whloh tt-Oomdr., J. A. IKJ8R0W is

emior jBeaber, adjourned. At 1016, recovered plane #1109. At 1019, recovered

tltm #1108. At 1021, recovered plane #1178. At 1024, recovered plane ;1!l089.

M 10%, oogasnoed steaming on rarlous courses at various speed to fora column oa

WB WWOtDltJ. At 1159, aseuaed position In column astsm of the USS HOKCLTTLtJ,

Alstaooe 800 yards. Average stsaa 550. Average rpm 9«.3.

^yi< ^^. <?1^ <(»« « . « ,

R. t, COCHRAMB,imalgn, U.S. Havy.

12-16 Steaming as before on oourse 000° T and •pgo, 349° pstgo. Standard spesd

ifAaota. \l& rpa. Stâaing at 10 knots, 98 rpaj. Main turbines In operation.

At 1200, sounded night «a«rt«r«. At 1227, ohatoged oourse to l»'t to 27^ '^."f-,MM 2580 pstgo. At 123K>, catapulted plane #1108, pilots Sas. P. OOLDBWJK, A-7(H),

^XSm Passengar: PAKKBR, D.R., caJlo, TOH. At 11!31, secured from Flight ^rters.At 1^31, oofflienced steaming at yarlou* speeds on various courses feoearry out*i.j.i«i«i tactios Atl235. strsafflsd bombing targst for Bx. A. A. 1. At, 1245,^ ,

Î oiSlllon m in AA Biuirles. At 1500. 'SMWsfl. MM., Seats, x^ceived fractuMJ

to the distal phalanx middle finger, right hAnd, wblle testing primers on the Isft

MM of Mount T&ree (3). Tfte man caught his fingers behind a powder ease whloh

^^ Iftjury. At 1506. secured from Condition III la AA Batt«rlM. At 15O?,

"xi

s. H. roouSH,Oaptals, tT.8. !l»»y.

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16-20 Moorsd as before. At 1745, Yard Oiler ffZl, made fast to port quarter.At 1815, conuBoiioo'l fueling ahip, draft forward 24' 4", draft aft 7^' 5". At18/,5, oompletml fuellni? ship havlns; received 529/,. 46 bbls. of fuel oil. Draftforward ?./,< 5", draft aft 24' S". At 1851, Yard Oiler #21, oast off.

Moored aa before.

W. VY. J0!I2S,Ensign, U.fe. Navy.

Ensign, A-V(N), USMR.

1. h. !SM>i,ilU!,

Captnla, U.S. Kavy,fcriaiandlng.

(o u«r«aa of MuTtgAtttgiB montMy tvHii tof itbo«t«}

lONB O68CHIPTI0N ElUS ISi REMARKS

00-04 stMffllng under boilers 3, U, 7, and 3 on oour»« 180*' T and pgo, 169°

pstge. standard spe^d 15 knots, H8 rpm, steaming at fleet speed, 12 tcnots, 118

rpm. Main turbines In operation. In ocwspany with CRUDIV NIKS (less VSS BOISl),

as part of Task ?oroe 1.5- In oolumn 800 yards astern of tbe tJ33 ST LOTIS. COliCHO-

BATFOR in US3 HC»JOLULU (O.T.C). At 0116, was joined by DESDIV 2. At 0130, Oban«e|l

ooarse to 270° T and pgo, 258*' pstgc. Changed speed to standard speed, 15 knots,

148 rpm. At 0330, ohanged course to 315° T and pgc, 304 pstge. Arerage stesoi

545. Average rpm 144.9.

D. L. 0. KTHOjBnelcp, 0.8. Bavy.

04-oa steaming as before on course 315*^ T and pgc, 305° pstgo. Standard speed 15Knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Main turbines looperation. At 0600, changed speed to full speed, 18 knots, 178 rpa. At 0604,ohanged course to 000° T and pgo, 348® pstgo. At 0605, ooamehoed zigzagging on

base course 000° T and pgo, 348° pstgo. At 0649, ceased zigzagging and ohanged

speed to 20 knots, 198 rpm. At 0655, changed course to 010° T and pgo, 359^ PStgoAt 0655, ooMttenced zigzagging on base course 010° T and pgc, 359° pstgo. ATerage•teaa 545. Average rpm 175 -l-

. A^'a. SMITH,*^<«t. U.a. Havy.64{

At

Steaming as before, zigzagging on base oouwse 010° T and pgo, 359° pstgo.ard speed 15 toots, 148 rpa. Steaming at full speed 20 knots, 198 rpa.

tSaln turbines in operation. At 0800, mustered ore* on stations; ao absentees.

0831, changed speed to standard speed, 15 knots, 148 rpm. At 0843» ceased zig-zagging and resumed base dourse 010° T and pgo, 359° petgo. At 0851, ooomenoed•teaming on various courses in execution of signals for division taotios fromCCICHDBATFOH. At 0854, ohanged speed to 18 knots, 178 rpa. At 0930, ohangedspeed to standard speed. 15 knots, 148 rpa and oommfflioed zigzagging according toplan on base course 350° T and pgo, 342° pstgo. At 0937, oeased zigzagging andoomanoed steaoiog on various courses in execution of signals as before. At 1043»,left formation and proceeded independently on various courses at vartoas speeds loapproach the harbor entrance. At 1139, with Pearl Harbor entrance channel buoy #2abeam to starboard entered Pearl Harbor, T.fi. , and ooamenced steaming on variouscourses at various speeds conforming to the channel. Captain and Havigator on th«Bridge, COD at the Conn. Average steam 550. Average r^ 166. 5-

W: C. WEUfl,Ensign, D-V{G), reUH.

12-16 Steaming as before on various oourses at various speeds, entering Paarliarbor, T.H. Standard speed, 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at 5 knots, 48 rpa.Main turbines in operation. At 1203, passed buoy #16 abeam to starboard. AtX251, moored In Berth Cast 5, with port anchor obaln out to buoy C-5, 1 5/8* wirestem line out buoy C-5-S. At 1307, secured main eaglnoa, unnecessary boilers.At 1309, secured steering gear. Boiler #3 steaming for auxiliary purposes. At1353, ooflKttenced fueling ship; draft forward, 23' 6" draft aft: 24' mean: 23' 9.

At 1353, commenced receiving aviation gas. At 1420, ccapleted taking on aviationgas. Amount received, 1850 gals. At 1530, fuel barge oaet off port quarter aftardelivering on boar« 152,502 gals fuel oil. At 1500, Lt-(ig), M.T. Ttm, leftoathree days leave. At 1545, pursuant to orders of Ooamanding Officer, the followingnamed men left the ship, temporary duty and course of instruction in the SAD^,having been completed: HAJiTriTON, W.R., Jr., 262 31 70, C5K3c, tJSH, SmdTm. S.T..

OEW, LIKK, C.K., 376 34 70, Sea2o, tSN, SOTTASON, S.B., 3l6 67 69, Saa2c, DSN.

,'. j,-^->t:..' * / ISneign/

R. H. •smxisH,captain, tJ.S. Havy,

CoamaAding. I4.eut. tr.S.ff./fialtfftir.

(Otlifitai (iraifaoa) oapjp of tid* pi«a to b« Mnt to BiattMa at timtt0ka<m mfmtiiir}


y^eisus-^ «ftN.A-M

M !^A -

1•

foif. .A^C

UNI-reO STATES SHIP

.

HMUW* gatttraay 29 Morwaber J9«.

K>NE oeacBirrioN _£lJW_iDi REMARKS

Ofr-04 Hoorad in b«rth C-5, Pearl Harbor, T.H., witfe port a&ohor obaln to buoyO--? ana 1 5/8" wits *t«ra line to buoy C-5-Si' Boiler #3 steaadng for RtsadliaryP«urpos«ii. Sbipa present: Various units of tr.S- Pacific Fleet with GoaiBatyorS0»& m T38S OALIf<H!SIA.

LfZ, BAIHD,Xlewt. (jg), TJ.3. Navy.

04-03 'Moorefl aes before.

r/c. WEUs.S&siga, Dr-fjO), USSR.

<^~;|^ llôred as before. At 0915> 'OBS CSSW and tSS ITME stood la. At 0824,

mmTtsI tbe foilo^liig atoree for ge&ei^ sesa, iospected as to quaatity by Eos.a.B. l^SM^Ci, 1>-T{CJ), OSKR, and as to quality by TiSSAXX, S.A., PitUZo, XBN, frois'Îm Coi* Storage Oo. 4000 lb« of lee. At 1045, reeeitêd tbe follo«»lcg storesfor tiie general boss, iiispeoted asto quality btr WHiDKlHASJ, B.tT. , PbUlo, TBR,aaft as to quantity by Sua. P.O. AKOBRSOH, D-7(G), 03KR, from Harder* Co. Ltd.400 Iba. of frait alxtupe. At 1130, tbe COManding Officer held aaet at thisdate aod awarded the folloviag puaishmenta: BGHKS.^.J., 71o, tlSSI; Offense:(1) Violatioa of seotloa 60S0 R.L-H. 1935 taallolous Ictjury) ja} Resistingarrest C3) Obsoeae langxiage. (4) Striking Shore Patrol. (5| Sinmlc. Ponishmei^:S«a<Mffiaaded for General Court Martial. CGZJiJsaa, A.a., SeaSo, V^; Offsase: iHhfor R period of 23 hours, 30 ainutcs from OICW, 21 Koreidêr 1941 to OO30, 22Soveaber i94J. Punlshaent; Suaia&ry Court Ifortlal. At 1145, reoelTOd the foi-lowiag stores for general mess, lBspeeted..as to quaatity by Sns. S.E. BJ5ISAH0,D»?(0}, XSmn, and as to qoallty by WOMS^JX, B- W. , PhMlo, ISN, froa Chon&lMke Co. Lt., X200 lbs of oelery. At 1200, BOHEE, J.J., Kto, TJSH, oonflned thisdate by ordesBî of the G<«aBaading Officer to await trial of General court Kartiai.

p. 0. ANDERSCH,3&uil^, 0-7(0), DSRR.

12-16 Hoored as before. At I4IO, pursuant to the orders of toe CcaamaadingOrsToer, FI3HBL1, H.C., 381 36 84, S6a2c, IBN, returned aboard in charge ofmtmJS, 3-.D., 332 27 75, 3ea2c, XJSK, and ^nilOm, A. (J., 393 47 32, Sea2o, T)BHharing oospleted two (2) weeks temporary duty at the ?leet Kaohine Q«n School,Har*- n-ang«, Pearl Harbor, ,^jj!>

TT. 3. Wavy.

lazBB.-'-^*^^-^- ^^ ^^®

2?Sf>^ Hoored aa bei^j-.

s^-%r

*^''*it. (3sf, TJ.sr, Na^y.

5. 1*. KELL?/2ad liout. U3MC.

Ap- ::B!llill<KJ

:

;. Ba-yy,

t7".t«"t«-; •.•^^(îO^'il; -iCJ>iv f>t r;i',« ^'



^E'^atlJ.farbor, T,''- to

rv

Ijf'JJTEO &TAT13 8HJP _^-l^'

< yoiisos^jfltPTiis^Kt^-lSs Pie:MA

OL-OB ;"c:ii:s'a -liy b^t:>;*.

CJ.UftrT,8r. Afc v"VJ'.', Oil;;

jAppto\.

captain, U.S. Xary,

tOrisJnaS <rfS>l>OR; cts-y i>f thl» p«ae to bu ctu* io !iu".>e=c :C !•«.« It;*tl-'


^

*ii9ml>m M«Mb».-'.

ti

;iil

UJST OF OFFICERS

to. Md oat bo»4 ef tte U. a. &-^l^!^

a S. K^ dorlnc tfei period Mm«d ]>7tUa U« BoiJk; with 4M««(

far itoty, <Ja*lcfc«««rfi imatm, w destit. fewa ~L5?2.^±5, , id W to ..li_DS2$?^fi?-

»Ott KUTf.

Ih C*.B53K{eiX. ' SaaiJBseriii

?l.5sr., «-v(-

1

1

J. J.

;,isut. (,

. ;sfc:M.v...fi,:

f»nt, . i'^

jec. 39

tfST ^P" ?iFnnrR«

rA«gs^i^ tt> s^Aoa >«lW!i C* ^^ t\ S S .. .-.M:

_, U, S. H., 4\\rrfiZ *fce ?«rf^'i <?*>'•

fi;«ai»ti5f lar iin^. toaciffotst, fTSBrfw, «»• <i«wti>t, from --'

TaW**©^"

raft.

LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP-

At Pearl Harbor, T.H.

ilELEi^A

lONE PE8CR{PTI0NPl^tS I Q'i... .J8^.ii.-_£UCiUSH.

(ItlenitflMllnfi NuinUr)

l^onday 1 December |g -U

ilH II

3

1

5

:i

;!

10 I

11

12

if Latitudf —

l(

UUtude

aj Lkiitude

ComatI Ctiti-

CVKOCOUrAM IN V*»:

Error-

CompM* Ko ,. „..

8.HError .

V*rii»Uoa

D»v<»tl<.u...

15(.

10 i

18I

19i^

>r> I

23,

24

:

t

!!

£

330 U330 4330 i6

330 "7

730

BABOUSTKB

!13

30.00130.001

29,9829.98:30. orU0.02,30.04'130.05;

i-^.05..02

TlfMI'KUATORF.

3 r-B

6/, '60I

63 i60

63 60 I

5^ '60'

62 '60

63 ;6o

62 :61 I

63 .61

!

P^ -^^

'

63 o368 6369 !68

;

3

t

3CSCDDBCOHORBOC _

no"

r!?cu157CTT

330 4330 ]/,

SICTT I 330 7STU I 330 i ?

330•

33f

i;une

3TCTrNB

STCU 3^0crcu 3'>o

DRIULa ANO

Onhanrf 6230lTMorning

I

tl Receive*)

.

- ' '

l>.»fl(or-d 2.4A..4" ._' 8

DrWtf... 2A'.7" Jl.fi

I

'>

'!( 2 J_j?ian«>f for IS^

'. f„rM. U.ino Drill.

' I'l-UrCHATUMUi,3/.^

Mmioium , ',y

j.ected smokele&s'^" aoEples.

1 ons noraal

.

•"jAA Direetcpc.acl:ln:: Driii.

;045I

030103C1 030•030030030

101010

idl

30^30,30.30.30.30.30.30.30.

0,5:

03.02r:r,4

'-4

07090^

6770'

70?0

6^:

6367'

67^"'

,',/

ri.

</,

6j

CI- i CT.'B 040

030


i-.'^'.-i;;* .-¥Sl»i-5w-arc;

•i^lKIU

2C-24 «oored as liator-.-.

ADDITJONAL SHEET

n^t,-1 r«OeQ:

i iM;-rcn STATES SHip" VSLSNA f^jOuAay

zuNE 06«ORipTioN ??-*f*.J^y2 REMARKS00-04 Itoored la berth C-5, Jearl Harbor, T.H. , with the port anchor chain tobuoy C- 5, and 1 5/8" wire stem line to buoy C-5-S. Boiler #3 ateaiaing forauxiliary purposes. Ships present: Various units of the U.S. Paclflo Fleot, YaraoM District Crart. S.O.F.A. (C0M3ATF0H) in HSS C/UJFOHJTIA.

H. F. SAUliDEHS,Ensign, A-V{H), IBNa.

Ofc:S5 ^ôored m. before. At 0515, blew tube.«< on fj boiler.

1 , I), y iru.',i.-

,

Suslgn, P-V{G), USIIR.

pS-lt .3 before. At 0800, held quartei-a for auster. Absentees: SZTtJÂJISKl

,

f7T^'' .-, .^-OL since 0100, 1' Deoenber 1941. At OSIO, hcSstwI #1 Motor Tôat

abc repairs. At 0S30, A Camp Andrews aecreatlou Party of 16 men, JOiISS,

a.' TG", tn charge, left the ship. At 0836, hoisted out plane /'1178,"AI3Y, A-¥{K), U3I-<R; Passeneer: .'iA.V.ILTOn, V.T., Ria<s, D5K. At

at rlane #1108, pilot: Ene. P. GOIiJBECK, A-7(.N'), USKS, passenger:, K-Oe, t©S. At 1015, li(;hted fires under boilers #1, 2, 4. At•lane «1108 aboard. At 1135, hoisted aboard plane #1178. At II30,

icut 1., v^^ - '-'i . 2 suid 4 on the main etea/a line.

' ' diB^^-—

-

H. A. BCVteAI?,

; Ensign, D-7(0}, lefia.

-'•';,,-.,.».-^ «3 before. At 1220, completed fflaklng preparations for getting under,1 1225, pilot 0. H. OTTERSEN came on board. At 1235, got underway for,r4, Pearl Harbor, T.H. , In obedience to CamCruBatTor despatch #302000 ofi'sber 1941. Pilot at the Conn, Captain and Ha%'igator on the Bridge.~ on various courses and at v&rioua speeds conforadng to the channel. At'ored pert side to berth f?3 Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with the follow-as: 1 5/6 " w1j^« *>«>* and atom linen, 8" manila, forward and after bow and

jquartei' apri-niJ; llnee and S" aianila bow and quarter hreaet lines. Ships present:!y5r3o\i» -inlts of the U.S. Pacifies fleet. CociBatFor la the U33 CALI50a?n:A (SOPA),

, sec'ored Special Sea I>etail. At 1320, lot fires die out under boileraAt 133c, disconnected boilers #1,2,3,4 froM the asain ateara line. Jioiler

;„-^. iiSMiing for auxiliary purposes- At 1339, pilot k ,\\, otts.TSE.! left the ahip.|At 1425, ooisaeaced receiving fresh wat^-r froai the DonJt. At 1425, pursuant to theiorders of the Cofflsaandioc Officer, US3 STIMKKHS, LOTO, S.P., fiealc, US»J, 346 ?3 77,iT-cfortfifi abc-ard for duty. Pursuant uo tue orders of th^ Gosncariding Officer,; '"'.ne Stetion, Pearl Harbor, T.K.-, Slv!l-tH, 376 35 44, SeaZc, US?;, reported

for duty» Records and acoouata of above aea receivs'l on board.

C. Wai',j

iietJt.(.ig), p-yio), us:m.!

Moored as before. At 1630, oo«aaenced reoeiTing telephone service from theit 1722, hoi9te'7 out plane |'117S, pilot; tns. R.". FISCK, A-V(H), CBJrr;,

'i,-.--ss;cig«T; SLA""'" "3o, IBH, At 17?5, hfelsted out plane #1103, pilot; Ens.

•;«,?. SAUi<TK-te, ', paissenser: Eos. 0.3. HAXiETf, A-VO}), (BUH. At I845,.teursiiaat to ths- civiers^ oi t>!f CosiK,andinc Officer, aef : ComCruBatFor aerial 3175 of,p.3 SoyesBbftr 1941. t«X>&AHD, ?., 27i 2"? 60, 0S3e, USH, was transferred to the,f ""'ag Barracks, Pearl Harbr:- " '• ^- - --" •— - »-- to Palmyra Ialan.1

';^g« and transfer pape-

wtxit SB ajarjXHt «f WswilfBi-sNMj BivM»tbJl


LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP. HKZKNA 01.50

ZONe tJCSCBIPTlON-

Tuesday 2 D«osfflb«i> ,> U—tl55) i^iS 92Sk)—

''"

I »»«ft:-'

BO STCtJ |035 1 4 30

3P If.5CT8

ii

-./..i

"t-

7, i9U,

Made raonthly iasjpectioftAt 1055, cosipleted hoisting

\ A,?. 346 ?6 ?? (2530,. DSN.„..,, R.o. 265 99 95 Sealo, tHKAt i030, Secured froffj Condition III lu AA Batteries.tOEtn C-? .?,-r.D>:elaffs por/iSer aamples. Test satisfaofcory. ._ , ._

s, tho Summary 3ou3?t MarUai, of whicfc Ueut/CoiBdr, , R.cT^.ne»il>9r, aet to try the case of COSAKOS, A.G., Sea2o» 5SSf,

|

t: Jjartial of which Lieut. Oomdr. , R.D. SiafH, is aentorI

further orders of the Ooi^asaing Officsr. At II40,j

&lane3,i

" K. A, imrnm,Ensign, 0,8, Havy.

sember adjotn-nef? f

oofflplote'i N

f At 1300, received the foliowlag stores for use ia theto qiwjatity by Ch. I^jc Clk, "r.M. WEIjOH, tJSJl, and ae to

':., HiMSe, ^3N, Ifi jars sreah. oiivee f-poa Amerlcaisve« orew at- quarters. At 1415, pursuant tJ> orSorsfollowicg sen vy^re traasfarreS to the Naval Hos-

H. , i'oi' trsatasect: BTmiKJya, 8. Jr., 261 89 59, tTSa, iJBSK,TRtT}. S5KH, D.H. , 3C0 13 93. Sea2c, tJSK, Mag; Daafaeas

received the foUowiag stores fortJie geaeral aess,?«(? Cikr, T.M. ^JELOn, t®B, aKd as to quality by •>

tai Hir.B Co., 90 tins of pio)cles. At 1515,.'ixillary suroosffls.

00, ift firos c!.ic< out utsiJer boiler #3,i*y 2t*am llm.

ti before.

7y716 O—46—pt. 1»- -11

UNITED STAft •

•'"

ZONE DEScniiTioN Sl^.iM REMARKS

OO-Ci Moorea port aide to 'berth #3, Kairy Yard, P«)arl Harbor,

7o'ilwins lilies: 1 5/8" wire bow and stern llaea, P" Manila rorward and after

bow and quarter sprlnj^ lines, 8" bow and quarter breaet llnee. RaceiTine rre«h

water and telephone service from the dock. Boiler ,f3 steaalng for avutlllsiry pur-

posea. Ships preaeet: Various units of the TJ.S. Pacific Fleet. S.O.P.A. (C'Cf,;~

BA'fFCa) in the XTSS CAi:" " '

t.'c, McCOfffiaCK,Ensl^, D-V(O), USSR.

j

^, . .-.? i-/-.„t.ed ae before. At 0630, oofsfflenoed provioionins ship. At 0730, tt-jjg)'17?' USK returned from three (3) days' leave. At 0735» the 'OSS CtaaKDJQS |

got .•- V ^'

<l^Ki^J: , v.. •^li-.s&t

'•

08-12 iioored as before. At 0600, held quarters for iau«ter. Absentee,.

'StfT'T., ?3o, TJSK, AOl since 0100, 1 Deoember 19A.1. At 08^5, completsG pro- ;

vislonlng ahips. At 0902, oomnleted hoisting out two planes. At 091$, ect Con- !

'.'.on III watch 11 tn ^A Batteries for exercise AA 3. At lOOO, pursusot to the i

ore of th* Coau:!S,nding Officer,, Beferenoe: CoaBasteFor despatch 160118 of Ro?«e.-

yer 1941 the following aar.ed men *!"-' ^ •"•'-^ferred to sailing .V3 for traosportatloi

and further transfer to coitimander ) '.ng One for duty, with records and !

.„^.~„ ,.».. .-vi-irKW, •!, . -.;•-. 1-. ,-.r,., TJS?J; lOSG, J.D,, 295 5* 66, AMKJO,

, vm. At 1000, pursuant to the orders of i

-, 295 03 27, 3?lc, OSK; was transferred witi :

.s to aai Xar trarisportatlon sr.d furthst tracBfer to'a, r?.,-: , Jiavy Yard., Breaertoa, Washington, for daf

1010, pursuant t« the orders of the C!ttiaoftiifiin&

uraed jaen ware transferred tria Sailing 48 to fh*}-^fei- iisoeivins Station, IJavy Tard Boston, Uase, forfie<:ord3 iiul acooutit.a deli»ei*ed - SSLTVIilU'JJ, 3.,, 2C'

.Oi., A.o,, 234 ?•" " ..3CSENT6, 3., 221 90 i3,:<.V?., 3«2 i» 3-; ; «•, 337 35 t3, Saalc,50 09, "' •-

. -.' •-.»9 38, no. t®>!, lar^T-

, WIIXI. FSo, t)SK, At 1010. pursii

<« vv i.i.1-- vCffimendi!i(.. •,..• "'f? folloirtflg Mined isen »••

red Via Sailing 48 for far coords jpd A^p>unts d«l.

j M^ SRRVICg ^iOi *^ J.T. TTTTTTT

Ay. T).-.:. 261 6a 15 :':::

-


.4»T;sa^j'.tjaia6^f! 'iK^s^^aHJKia


ZOMK oe»Oflll»TlO»* J^slfi -kV-

TtT TITI

MmUMltnrf*

;3JU4!.'U5,"

.// '/.A.

UNITED STATES SHIP

.

HKUiNA 3 B«e«abar19 U

XONC DfisoRimoN JEiLSft.JiSi Kfc.!vi A^-c^^.!^

00-04 MooMiS port 9i.de to bertii No. 3, Na^y Yard, Paarl Hertor, T-M. , with the

following lines: 1 5/6" wire bow and atem linos, 8" manila forward and afterbow and quarter sprias linea, 8" naaila bow and quarter t- . -fit liaea. Boiler

|6 steaming for auxiliary purposes. Receiving fresh water and telephone eervloeefrxxn the iJavv YSrd, Ships presents Various units of the 0.3. Pacific Tleet.

aOPA, COffiBat?or in the USS CATITOHOTA. At 0020, the OSS HEKDBP.SOK got undenmyand stood out.

W, W. J0JJE3,Bnslgn, t'-o. Now,

0^-08 Hoored <>,r 'o.-ifo-re.

,.xp. 0". ASJDRRSON,KxiBign, 0-7(0), tjsrm.

08-12 Hoored a*, bsfore. At OSOQ, held quarters for muster and physical drill

i

llseatees: SZTttvaSKl, ?., r3c, tJSK, absent over leave since 0100, 1 December19^.1. At 0812, e-sorolSBd orew at Btoergency Orills. At 0828, aecurod from

KEejêncy Drills, At 0905, hoiated. out tt« (2) plaasa for iaatrunent flight.

Plane #1109: JPilot lfe-{jg), CR. BOSBFOHaSH, xmi, paesenger: faa. H.F. aAUHDEBS,

A-t(K), tJSNR. Plane #1178; Pilot Ens. P. OOLDBBCK, A-V(Nl, TJSHH, passengers

Kas. C.B. HAKSY, A-VfN), OSHR. At 1040, received the following stores for use i^

t^tt Beneral mess, Inspected as to quality by ^nxtlNOKfeJ!, C.B. , FhM2o, VS&, as to

<;uaatity by Sne. C.".". BRQ'SN, D-V{G>, DSNR, frda Proviaioalng Co. Ltd., 900 bays

•'.le oreaa. At HOC jûrsuant to the ordern cf the Ooiaaandins Officer, KSIl?HARBt,

.;'.. ^50 'â 2fi, a?dc, trsfj, left tte ship to report to the Senior Patroi Offieop,

colttln, 1?.H. , for ''iJK'^ with Penaaneat patrol. Tc restime regular duties upon.uplstion of thir .it 1100, pursuant to the orders of the CoaHsandlng

rfioer. SAIX. H.' .0 91, WTlc, IT3U, left the ship for penaaaent duty wjtb

Be&ah GuaasS, to return uv regular uutles upoa oojapJetlon of this duty. At 1100,

pursuant to the or-lers of the CoMoanding Officer, the following named aen left

the Bhi-^ for temporary duty with Shore Patrol in Honolulu, T.H, : SHSEBTK, B.D.,

#258 21" 35, aao, LBIJ; m?C, r.V?. , ^360 02 06, ?C2c, DSJJ; SIJAICCAVICH, S-R.,

*-^5e $0 42, CBBJo, CPr. At 1115, the Casp .indrews Recreation Party of (16) «en

'OJISS, a.B., #272 C6 17, SFlo, USN, retumeA on board.

*At 1103, hoisted /^ 'lO? aboard. At 1105, hoisted plane #1178 aboard.

it^VSRO'WN,Ensign, D-Vfa), OSNR.

';^-l6 Moored as before. At 1300, muistered orew at Quarters. Absentees: SZYiSAN-

-SffrS"., F3e, Art j.'.'ss OICO, 3 •D.s.jesb^sr 1<>41. At 1505, tJ3S OOIAU got underwayi.v.-. shift te«rtl. '^'^ I^J^*^ "5^** ^0 ^"'^ etarboajil side.

"vi 1525, TJ3S Vr-' ia and. Bonre?,.

5ifoored as before. At 1822

Uôd. la to hArtoor.

mzli ov-«.^ aa b.ofc-rr.

.5. Havy.

way. At 1916, OSS aULBERT

A. It. ame.


1 n

OO.O'gt""

JpTgfr' .74(681-| Tfe-i

?5 ! %f'^


& Td£xovnI- trasat liuas.

..'uo*iiiag Xoi auaclllArjr purposes. S*ooivt-: -cho Yard, Ships prwsobfc; Tarlo«e auitp',.^ IJSS CSilLIFORKlJ^, At 0140, «i« fv«iitvora?y duty with tfc« Shor« Pairol"

M.V,-,, 360 02 06, K'

•'o'l Llaut . tJSWC

.

04-08 aoorefl as be

2 Uoov

'^.iC^K4^^y^j>.-*K TTI'TC^

aiujtersa crew at ^uiiriuji-s. ^oenfceea: ^dt&L.

) 5«io«ffl{)*x- lOfl. At. lOJC, pafcll«h«d tlj«"38, trl«a t>jr 30;*aS»er i9Al to 1700. »_

t-ue -•>"j,> -AT 55 at 063^1, 1 Hov«w3r'^

S fr«Bh water from

X bow. At

1st off star-^•'•&«

•-i

^4^^^'^* *^

K' :«;S?33E3

(Uar, nW

Page. Ui^

v^-^p^^sc-:


.^|;r^y^^Ya. fearl riarboT» JlJi.

CL50

ZONE DESCRIPTION' .1. H. Et-TOLISH5£*.iJLt?. f. AVwjr. 0«»»Mwv«»i.

•J

Pifl i

oro

—

M«ktJ

UABOMRTKK TaMPIt»JlTT!B»

JU«.

1

2

3

4

£

6

7

g I

10

11

12 I

i\ lomiidn-

^1 Longitude .^-.

jrijAitude..^

3( l^JltuJc

CttirtKat'Set

Etto -

-Ooatopasa No. _ ,. .,_

e.H

V.m.

r.n.I

18i

U\15 I

l« :

1'J

is;

19 I

20

30.060.05"

3,0,04^l3

0S,.Q.1C.

30,03

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30..

.

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73.171

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tperxM 25Q3i

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,^u._..,tter sataplea.iDjjn<a|,<fcijoj<lR norma 1.

)i29.97j '8170781 060 I SOftO" V5

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ISJM


r ??^??'S?yy^°yn*>y^'-''''*'y iy /!Tr 'y;,t^^^

'c 9.¥

ADDITIONAL SHEET

'Tira-rA , 5 Oeoeabtir

:or for Slioi-e Pdijrv'.'

I in ttr


i.f'S iST'

. Pilot.

iuiie* i


gJ*««-^ar

oeson»pTio« J

I

v.,

!1^^'-

'>!?!??! Pl'SS^i- m Pi^'l^^ !??«?! I Hn

• ».i- »« a.ina ^••'<»54:KW<J-*SV'*S#«L!ft.;/ i,' .il^aAV- • i'«.-"<ii"''

p«i* ^jLjLi-—LOG OF THE UHITEO STATES SHIP-

?r liliiillil*»-M I<mM4 I I 1

i

..'M-?—i-Hj.,.- I>r~T n__| _»2.

i

UNITED STATES SHIP

^'".'-\

20NC OC^fllPTiONÂ^sJoi re:mark5

00-QA Moored port side to Bert: -- •

-,,; ijaj-bor, T.U. , with

the following lines: 3« .asunlla line, 8" manila for-ward and after bow an<3 quarter s.jruic J.incr. , o" inoxiil:' b'w and quarter breastlines. IBS OGLALA moored port to starboai-d side. Boiler #3 steaniin/.; for aux-iliary purposes. Rsceivins fresh water ajid toleohonn services from the dock.Ships prasenl;: Various units of the U.S. Paeiflo'S'leet. SOPA in the IBS CAiI?Ci?-JTIA (CojaBatFor). At 0130, the follcwisg named "-••• ~-- ;•-,.., .»,- -^^ n„- =;.<,, v.,..,i^„

completed temporary tour of duty aa Chore Patrv., #261 GO 22 S'lft, OSVr, A'DSRSC';', J,p., 1243 -. .: : - --, -.:., . : ......

1375 62 20 mac, t3st:: jacosy, s.?., f/243 63 9i 01120, usi.'.

'v(<J), TTSJH.

O/f-OS JS>ored as before. At about C757, airpiic.e;; recognized ao Japanese asade asurprlae dive bomblns attack on Ford Islarid. Sotinded Ocnerai Oûarters. At about

j

0757i, a aeries of three heavy explosions felt .icarfcy. At about 0758, sh5

by vicleat explosion on starboard aide. This explosion caused by torpedotorpedo plane cofliing over oha.inel south of Ford Island. Hit oacur.:- ' rr,xi:iaj.<ik^

between frames 71 to 79.

/';v->d^<t^

s.'-io bellevad to"^t'lCi' s^pc^***^ to

and aomouTt-' I

0&^ UOOT9& &!} before. At about CSCySpinose planes, follov;ed iaaediately .

planes strafed boats and ships in harbor. On'-

hats baea hit falling toward Uavy T.ard Ir fl-i--

cc-asi8t of a strafing attaok in coc"

this aral other -vess-is in the harb'..

port. At OSIO, ?orvmrd boiler opsratiii^ sâv;..

I

!=it»6« power out frcm ship. Firs reported In c

oged off beoause of ao ¥;at'?r pressure, i* va.i i ;.,'.•' r ;i;:v>».-: ;

aa aotual firs b*t smoke frcn teroiadc ffxnloaioa. At 0310,..-.i-3. •.•i:l, confined in the b

-'-^ -.----

- --^.^ by cv"' --•' --•

I At about 0820, first, attao' laying; = > ,..1 <.^...,. .,„^.,y4; ^jje firt,-. «.ô,.,r,. ,^v .HJO, sian-,.. ^...^ ..>,•..-. «^- .,*...^-. .-....-.'...^

. At OS40, signal hoi-sted to ships present to sortie la accordAt 0340, report received tijataft^r bc-llo" ^--,«>-it.' - • i-r-sf.^,,-,

"oout OS4O, Janaaese submarine reported to I.

...,: CXJLALA taV.f.a it: lov; Ir.r tii-s vts 'iii^lc;*

aie ettaok coMng iv.

•:;.;. ., CiOo, OS!!, and al.^

repotted on »*<ird.. At OÔO, report received J'

I,D«h. Ay »J900, Jspaneou planes st^.scVp.d, ^.p:>r'.

ore? JIa'sry Va rd , ta'< i n.- su v -. n t a .-^

A*ta<ik confli.sited nf a .3c::.iflg ,-1'

i'ed alo,'--. - erersii:.lrorafT. action,

.:j TK-r ;i. . On: ' -..-- v-.v.-u

ii8«x. to f.3xl 1:" 1 Point.

acout 0900,tSS 3T J.CV1S ,

vriiif: suak i-

Southaast ;..

ard buildijigs.T bombi.isj att.aok.'t hits, ?i^rcd to aaUs-

«*»-/

,

ILOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

ZONE DS8CBIPT1C . r. a, Ak*if

t

23

<

6

6

7

8•

10

II

12

?r

ij LatttmJo

lllg

4 i»

+ -

Oyre—^- kti

£(AKOU£TKa

? I 9 1 to 11I

11

TBUF^ttiiTUKt!

II

r

-M:

Ui^-

R U U

.J j..

7 r^-^

^i^-

I Diiih

GiM/C0Mf*i» IX t;»i;

SSRnv—

8. _.iBrwB ^ _

Ui>vistl<>a_

ML-

120

\. boMbin;?, attack alised ;'. ^TEViSik. At 0930, lit..I. j.-'jut 09'V0, second attao'r Ki .-j-,. «>, ^.34-5, informed CoraOruBat-

le to get undewvay by 1015, apeta restricted to 15 laiote. At 0955,vraa reported floo&i'coatrolled. At 10vFor of a;j;ua<-ft tc r

;tance '

At 102:i3. order'•on of t:

r-- director a^ic aftjc'ilfi-.e<1 to .-nanual cc;

liO'-iltw

i.,i,'/Xcf_

por! ^lley flooded. At 1318. enemy reported landing: off IIAilAKUlI. OwnplQiiea ririag on them. At 1322, eneay ndval attac!: reported approaching nine (y;milns southeast of B/VJftBi.R'S POIWr. At 1335, eleotrical pov?er cut In galley, butsandwiches bei!\~, served to crev- "— --jlley. At 1350, reports recaived tliat six(6) enemy ships approaohing LI". ::cu*e, to aid lonolnc party at Tv'AJJAKt'i.I

.

At 1400, reoelvca report ar r ...i.d destroyer approacMrj;' '- •."„ At lU5itrani-.forrod planes and all • to Ford Island. At 1600, orev/ onetat<' - T^" followinfj ca_. rrvjorteO:^ TOAD Sent to j.;...„_., ;^'M, PH., T.H.

NAT-

•V20

:-a2fc

SeaZo

DSM

us?!

us:;

OAiprriR, A.J. TTSi:

.^t^3U.v

.7.

The folluwine laen were V-iZVXS.X> and transferred to U.S. Waval HoopStal, P.H., T.H.

:

"nalo '' "

Soaloic 3ca'.?c

J , ;;. i.falo-'""

Goai.o Iv,'"j:;,":

^

yic

-' £'0

Scale"00, L.K.

"C3c

?lo

Ic

I

BEARDSX.F-T, L.I- K.!3c

"'Isi^ii'i-, P-",

. o-2/.ao.— -..t^' I 11*111 llf.—».—

I FordlT'^ otUer caor-

jOne pi V at down to •.

I

thot tl;ese vmc^ friendly plm:'

it.: '. u-'f-J .. y ^i;,; ;

Infoiinatlen

6^>

<Tr.te i,»4f6 to !» m- -...K»a MiOO.1.11


EXHIBIT NO. 164

WAR DEPARTMENTWASHINGTON

1 April 19U6

MEMORAl^IDUM FOR MR. RICHARDSON

At the hearing on January 25, I9U6, Congressman Murphy

asked to see the reports of the attack on Cohu which were sent

to Washington by General Short and his subordinates. (Tr. 83^2,

83U6). The originals of tljose reports were shown to Congressman

Murphy the smne day, and coriies are enclosed herewith.

CARL R. ITELSON

Captain, AUS

;CTORY

BUYUNITSOSTATS*

3VARNDS

79716 O—46—i)t. 19 12

From^ £!

ihc W«( tJepartnumt MewosMunitir.B« BMt.. V'ljstivr.i >

CoptW/«»<»*«* «« «-"<"

lllU/7

tmcE-vr

WOlOZrJ

Received at the War Department Meiuiage Ctnicr

Room 3441 Munitioiw Bidg., Washington. D. C.

DJ;^.yB3i 7, 1941

'tWtikl

ASBKl.'TIES R£P'08TED TS!" Ti^:^"" «.: SF.TC!; tS;CEK3ER HINETSEN

.•/:;.; 'rtO;- ,at;.„,':: rts; INTO ATTA, .. _ _. :.

Sa'3T

A.; BKB/bos-17ii.

:Vfer Department. A.G.O., Decestber 7, 1941. - Toi'^A.C. of S., G-1-

!(Sxact Copy)

Exact Action CbDy To: A. C. of 3.,'

Exact Infonaation Cf-.vl^v'^.C. of S., Q-^, Cony Ifo, 2.,

V V V^-G' of S., Cr~3, Copy No. 3,- I

"" •XC. of 3., O-ij, Cony No. /,.,

^->A ^ f^'-tary <it the aeneral Sta.ff , Copy Ko

Arisy Air Forces, j Copy Jto. 6.,Copv So. ^7

Actiof> Copy


P7 WTJ1204?

From..

RJLQIOGKIK \ o-;-c

Received at the W»r Department Meeugte Center

Room 3441 Mumtione Bldg.. W»»hio«ton, D. C.

IXCEUEER 7, 1941

536P

HMBUI

To-uiismmSiMmk.

M.

f)Cf> ....7 iTTT

11

Ho. 1066, 7th

. M TSO EWOff AIR ATtiCK RESUMED ELEVEN Al: rj-JCM LESS

i IHTiaCE raWJ FORJffiR ATTACKS PERIOC IttNIU KEPORTS NO OVHiT

I

;i ACTS HAVE XET OCSDH^D THKtB SJCMED FIEUKR.

SHOKT

ijExaot Action Copy TojA.Olg'^ Cop7 Kc .

jiExact laforsiation Oopy^osV^l, Copy Ko. 2.

1*^,-3, Copy Ko. 3.,"^

D, Copy No. i.,k-ret-— -'-dVal St.*^^7 C°Pi' I^o* 5.

Action Copy

^ SKB/bjs-1712.i! y%r Depwrtfflwot, A.U.O., Dscetnber 7, .1941. - '^3:^-2.>l (Ewiot, Copy)

kUI I Mir».^«T«.>«MK|e >

' p5..TJ 5P

From-

SKr«

Coptts ftttmikM tu noted:

I I

Received at the War D«p«itin«nt Me»»age Center

Room 3441 Monitiooa Btclg.. Weshiogton. D. C.

To. CUxl..

NO.-1077. ''

i

ATTACKS "k^U-;C1

1;02A ^;(/

•APP.

=HT DAS

jILVLD S5.i/UjL,

i^y.JKLLi:j«X . ALL Ti<OuPS ON LAT-Ln. POSITIuNS iMPH TVvO

: . AT K}SITIONS. TOTAL LOS:,

EIGHTY FTr

rilCK>J« FIELD, STATUS 0? :: _ » :' AS 1-0IL0V;3: PLUiii?

..TL.-^.Li. 3 EI^HTEH;; MlrlE; B Si:;VglTEEN ^^^^jr

PURSUIT, FOTiTI .'TAL Sim SEVH>!. PlA.IiKi

H 2L I^FAIiSX) LOCHLLf: S

iiTV.O; A T;.E<TY

f Artxon Copy ij

ASSIS'iAf,':

:

: f/0 MiOl

XFTi; iLi/

t^^-'tio -*»«***» Hii.1* t9t* t


»t^


Received at the War Department Message Center

Room ;J44! Munitions Bldg., WasKington. D. C,

M.

From


tUi.

P 46 WTO«33P/9

PRIOR IT/

.JOClOfiiJAM-

Rtxcivei ot tke War 0«)»irtmcnt Meangc Cenlcr

Room ?44l Munitionj B!<ig., Washington, D. C.

DSCESiPER 10 X941PfilORTTY

?7 SRAFTRR TH

0-4-C

BJa"^

r,, TKB AD^ro'TASI' SBT^T?/'

..Af.

:,J5 D«CEKBSR TSSTH

'!S OK O'V iTlM&TB OF THS S..

fSAN ATTACK

, 3ED AfiaiHD F:. r PEBKUaRT FCSBS WSSE

T«CM*?S TO PERMIT SISFSESAT, f;F FLAKES AT HICKfeM FIBLS

. ;.SD ROT B AT TlJa! OF ATTACK STOP

AHB NW RTjr.HINS COSSTRCCtlOK OF THBSS DISHERSAt

FACILJ-':, .CKAM flElX; AUO AT aiCI Aiaft)R¥ AfiD it

OTHEH FISLDS.

ST'Wsyjf* C. of S., O-l^ Oopf i*, 2i

/ C of a., ^IPO, Copy .Vn 3--^ •.'{ Co-,:

^1 j-

.^*


'.

i|^-

25th Division, of tV;

.iivanee C^ of tlie Ticy^ftJisa'i. '"â ooprstij^g Id the-^^M<itmpl, t!^ ttic .fj.ivmi.cis ^1> cT the

--ring:j-'-cb. Is

/ -

sticg

'stitict atte;:

tbe secern soou-,

rsteiy fifteen ai

:

'.e storn'

•y s»tarj3?0tn

vere au5ceaEf(iliy suffloier.t atrrâ^tii to bring ot

auction. Ic the Aroy, tae -jrfiiflds, the pXaa«e oa tiie aio'uri!}

tloss at thft fields «ere the first oWf-ctiv*, There wisre a f*'

,-«,>-." -r.->3peii at Fort Sliafter and Fort AmAtrocg, thaae b#'l»g i?:tf-

in J1 '.':> that these tiso iiosts wsir*- also ical-oiSea p-s asllit«rv ob<cc-

t jvpi;.

b. The larpjttst aurbpr of plaaae oomseatra i aft on ?eari Ee:

each battleship, ortiiwr, and srouu of ôatroy*.-"; w.s » trca t;--

ty ft (JefinJto group of plants. TKroughotrt th'

pntlic ^tta>^k had iaeu aost carefully pl^r-P*^

part his jlane wâ t? plsy. Th»r^ wê "»-

boribiXig. ?rc» raps rstovered fr<« crss*.'

'te. teosLclng Pearl Harbor kiiew t&e ioeatijjt or.

.' f", r.i'O'/ .-ha- trtis Vie n/ip war ss^ -êrt»

*>e«Ii sir out-s it

--tiijihi -!*n?-r

ry yiRl4 anc

I 10

9. Balloiw yield •ttffer#d th« Issst.

hor* atA one •(juadron of P-/,Ob 3.c«t al"

10, By noon ca Siuwlsy the si scaeewfeat norael.- avweTCr,

vlllen poyulatlon w»b jart i hsppecod BaJ ro».<jB .vere b«-

-.--<f Jo-'i^iel vllV tTV.rfSo i'OiJW. J-. . ri. Tlia HoKoXalu Rspid Trannlt

Coopfcoyt hsp 0^ iJuseaiB ajuS hae by far tho largoet fran-.>i.i»f. in r 1;Kt» dlrtction of t:-. Si.r> «rii his CIvlllCS

id start"!•- the.

«ing d«y

Htsnujd to tb'Blr otjarter*

w

IhtA DBS ree:

|on ana »sny esroa^sotjfl rep«s*« recelvSbie -sine wfeethex" libflse imports

had at:

The Awry Jiae

hii';>i it v:p..

: cai of exert'

« vma d^tfeiar: ember ^'yaXit&ry Oovenaaea^ »a3?«» iali:tii.ts<}, with th«5«v«i-sor Biad the D«t»rt»ant yi.«lgs Mifoeatt; ''.

W!tti-?i>. The ooo?>»rs4ioK c£ th«- olYill«n r«s«3i<

ties V. t-hs fwture t'eseij-u? to be

'T3fK*sae:'

asiJ Caster. IgisaSa Jet- tn* purpose C?fey Jftaaarj- '=-'- :--. ---i fieMg ~-

ilss?ioa fit!-; Jaaa«a 1;

libmty for

<• fi'^nrr

for the sake of safety. The I-udingtoa on Deoembop 8th was en rout* frcr.

Christmas to canton cariylng I500 tons ot equipment for Canton, isolxriing

a large still to giaarantce a water supply. On orders fr\jBi Wnah-tngton theVary, for -purposes of safety, dlvfrted the Lidlnôn from 11 Samoa.CÂiiton is Trery close to points where the Japanese are ouoi i theItevy feels that it will be impossible to raroteot it at this tiB,s.

Also, the v.-ater slttjatlon in b short time wouldjfceriouB if the300 ciTllians now there remain. The deoleion vjks made yesterday to send theKBleakal^ frow here to Canton to take all civilian* to Chrletr»9P to bn em-ployed upon the works there. The dredge and tugs were sterte'' ly fromCer.ton to Christaias as the -jositlon '•.us too exposed to IpnvR ' -? t>:erR.

Two 75ira'. gvins, 6 Browning autoiaatic riflce, and 6 watr^

ell vitb antiairorflft iscunta, are êing sent on the H-..

the garrison at Canton, consisting of 45 En^neers, Jedical and Signal ê-ta"!:<nents. A detachment of ten Field Artilleiv is beiii,' e«tit to OT^crate

the 7.t!. $.ime. If approved by the Chief of Sf.ff, th i

on the Island. There is avallRll<t f'o3 for a îtilM

art s jjood nany thousands ofO -; ^*^t 1 i^T!

aiiythl'.

facilities It is believed that t'

itscaf ir.dpfinitely. All en î>'-

are beittr left at Canton are^

f*v& 1 "'

-"^ ' '• " ith the InoresEi

Kuo jng jBuoh faster •

ouvh -- '- /ijl islands, art v;u,. ,.4-. ..r- . ;,,j,' j-.uuii

to use this; route vlthout either Canton or bamoa,

the civilians from Canton to v^snioa -.-ms consli?---'

there at Samoa. The machinery on the Lidlagtc

omain e

'

- -.. , ,.ocline, oi^,

I r)roce&) with a limited

The advlsf.'. moving'-

-t the N^vy -û -.lor, r.?,nt

Samoa oan be use<S tovery great advantage at Nandi antJ the War Iênarxment is being re''nestf

authorisse the Ludington to unload this at Suva when the first oonroyceeda to the Philippine Islaais. To* norX at -is, Saudi, a::

will be pushed to th€> wax mum aa the necessi+ iis additlcnsito the Orient it :e, particularly El:;:

and Wake are bei to be In the handa ci

J-? jfinese.

16. Today nine E-i7s have arrived safe! ••.(-, mainland, aaklns? a total

of Z'j. now avpil'^blf if the t>epartKent -Îth t;. ..iHtl of" rt-pairirg t'*o !?«ore.

FP are 1-' ' ")3 left, vdth 52 ?-40s/"H<ê ?-40s and he

will b£ t scn-^r cf security is oossiblf. This 5r .;•-

fly true Ir. view of the aeve; h have !~

17. The ground troope in tr.? Department have suio hl.kh nrid s stPte of training th-r^<J-'JV 'rt is êrhar,:

for aforoomeuts,ril' lefonse uaitt

,

.^.,

regitrente in both divialona. Antlalrci^ft artilleryin J';nuQry »t>'' i,'<T'r>>i "hnyid be *!'"* '-i "^..1 a Kott-

ri-

baUylici. -. :.^: ::,.... .., , iditional ....,..:., ,; i ;, .

, : .s available in orier to provide any r«£erve wJiich Is -vcrtty of tve nsacc.

Our tfic.tlcnl -iroblern hert? is one of st-poa^ ftfiid fortiflcatlonB -ire oar- < '-^

oociip'iTjion, held lithtly •.ith lar.?* rtiS'^rvPS sreTsarcd to wore by r:otor

Inatent's notice. Counter-attacKs are eutcs""*''"- 'th ti^-- n't-x*; «•

to oe recplved wucfc ^ri»at6r use v;lll. be naie irfieldc

:.tlone h-.ive rerul -.clai.'rir.

. -f^ieMs to th« cy no'A- >i«ivc

ta - uiinient. Tivis has rfe£-^tsui ir. celtiLiii sble tt^

t-in ,'ii«h >er6 bs41y v-reoked. T&ese rscoiailssicne'

.

i-he t'j^al S'lOwn in the ".bore naragrenJi. There wifi ar'ic-

existing- run'eys ft the varic-as alrf elds. The airfi-'lfir

. ulf-: xtsafilon of runv/ays'to a rcinimiir. of 5/JOO feet to p"C-. : .lir

'iflf bo»r:h=-"s, i.'- bsim; ouahfed to the limit at all fieliis - ud

or exa-Tple, 1,^00 Teet has been a^ded to ths ^ 'cfee

'1>^ sine© Sunday, and part of the B-17 squ-i-lr -tr-

A on bellows yield. By the niddl. k t,he

:-"?ielA- I'-'t'* }'"

:ed.ly,.t^


m10

21, Affluairit cwerioi lis of the acticr••'^•oruiol «ind the Controa ...

: j t •• at Thcr.'i ~ "' '

fche flight of enBffiy plur.es -is cXott'

' ; C. S!fOPT ''

.'^nernl, C is. Arnr/,

Un -.

i;


p

' ynepy aircraft brllpfed used in i«lr r.sid 7 T^c-ct-r.ber 19A1-

1. Fi^-hter 97 ITakajina.

a. Nonretractible Isading sear.

b. Low wing, tlunt nose.

£. iiingle seat.

jl. Three machine '.uns, tv.o la -A-ings, 500 rounds per gun.

e. Sc-a level speed 2iO r.ili?'- — '

r, tnaxiwu:!'..

2. Fii,;hter Mitsubishi._a. T^TO i-OBuii cannon firfis tnm wings; two jnacVilne guns fire throu^gb

propellor._b. 5-50 pouai bomb load.

£. Speed 375 grilles ;>er hoiH", riinimus.

d. Maxiwur. ?^r.",,-(^ '?)

* 3. Boraber Ka;..ikii,i i jifi Observ-tion stnd Light Fomber Type 97 - -^^ I'^o

Diesel motor - (One shot dovm -rith Olesel motor near '*'ahiav,a. ^

&. dihedral (slight positive)._b. Lov; v;lag monoplane.

£. Three machine guns - bor.b load 661.3 T>ound.s - 300 kgji.

d. Speed 21?. 4 wiles oer hour, inaxlmus;.

it,. Dive coraber 97 (referred to sometl'seG 36 'Deck Type Reconnaissance^.a^. Lov- wing ir.onoolane.

b. Eetractlblc landing gear.

n_. Single strut.

£. Three In crew (°ilot, 2* Pilot and radioman)._e. Speed sea level 200 miles ner hour, maximun.

5. Tosrpedo Plane.a^. No description in T.i:. Aopfiared larger than other onen/ «irf:ri-.ft;

low Ting, carried one torpedo directly under fusel&ge.

• 6. Type 0-1 Fighter (Mitsubishi

;

a_. Ship board fighter.b. All netal lov 'vlng, Internally braced.

c. Fully retiractible landing gear.

£. Flush rivt-tting.

£. T o 20n-im cannons; each wing; tv.o 7-7 ff.achin© guns in f'jiselage. :.c

armor

.

f. FlOHtine gear and arresting gear. (This ship at HAD).

7- Aiohi Cloc5c Typeje. Ship board bomber.b. T^'-'o seater.

c. Internally bracetj.

d. V.'in^^s from cvol O'sn.

e_. All vnnifil ezcftf' Ip v.hich is weed.

£. Seml-retractiblt -_r-.,-.

£. Kinsei er.ane; , r.odel /.4, twin r ir cooled.

Page 1, "tncl. :''l.

797 IB O—46—pt. 19 13

<| 1SECBXS

h. Taigtat tmpty 2388.

T. Useful load 1272.

3- Loaded 3660 (over all).k. Balleiva bomb at S50 pounds.

_1. No azmor apparently.m. Two fixed guns fuselage.

5« Flexible gun rear cockpit caliber 7.7." (In possession Sary) .

*lndioates type of ship acoordlng to IM., July 1941, one of each

ires Ishot do«m and is in possession of Army or Nsry.

, Tsol No. 1

jmrnOt.

Ret'ort of Casualties .

1. The following data reference battle casualties from midnight5 December 1941 to midnight 9 Cecamber 1941 is hereby submitted.

(e) Number of patients in hosj-ital

prior to r.idnieht 6 Cecsmber 1941.(b) Aduilssicns:

1. Battle casualties (serl'uslyand slightly wounded)

.

2. Other than battle casualties3. Niunber dead u^<on arrival at

Eos; Ital4. Number died after admission.Dispositions:1. Battle casualties to duty.

2. All others.Total number of beds vacant..

Total JcnoTsn dead.Total seriously wounded.Total slightly woundedTotal Battle Casualties - -

(o)

H)(e)

Cf)

(g)

(h)

T. G. H.

V)

, M MiMMMrl«3r far «liaai«t#arl»s •«ftli« of tUs Mlnr«» m»

ewf«, tiCMl OMfsv* Alr«*«ft Vtndac* »mmiLi vlw•flMMT tatat *i^ MHVKMMriiac to Urn imr—— m« •ajpnî

A« «M r«|M«t tf «lMi eoBtrvl OmMTf aat VmnQ tUism OfTlMr•«r«Mi« t« ofwrnt* it* tetaMtwM WyMkK th* teily p«rl*< cf ta*

taifftr* wftil «M hnur lurtar <«nM Tiw flnt ««lM»dBl* rM|alr*a «f«m»iOmn •{ All ataM.ou erw 4 JkJU %» S F»M« tUXm solMtel* «m aoilft** i«

IdM k«ar« •; « iUX. %• 4 fJIU A %—fwwry Miut*»l» ma aMct ««rl««d «ld.«h

fMiirai Ul •««4ft«ii« %t •»«««• fiNB 4 A^M. «e U A.1I. «« t« fa«y«

laci «t«tlw« S*m I r«l. to 4 FOU te to««rte]r, raawaur 4, l»4l. I •»-«M««i «k« «aii«r«l OmMT «e r«fMW« WBtMrllv to 1mv« all •tatloM 9p«r-

at» Am 4 AJC *• T AOU (MOar «• 9>m»mr» Ihmmhmt T. IMii tttU «« acrM«t* ligr «>M eeatral MtlMT*

St Staff S«r««n* ftlMaUr <^^ «a<«iw«i. SCin^ Mtias nr OfflMr, rWMTte tin* IM mm avttJjm ttek wwM 1M •a—%r—< •• anapUlMa la th* ia-

rgnnriii rmtAÛ 19 thm tm Imtmrnmna^m Caactor fsraa 4 A.M. ta 7 A.ii.

«wlftft Pa«W>ir r» IMU Zkta U vwlfl«4 ^ Lt» KanaLt U lyiar. Air

OtWfa* «|M -mm tiM «n34r ^n««r iUi ttw XttfmnMttiafB Caatar flraa 4 iuK. t«

S* A« aiq^raisclaRtvly T«SO Aalt. « n^^nft «m rwaivad Araa « Qataatar

ttvHflB «t «;p«M> laiftt • Urc« anaaiar «f plaiiaa «aa appraai^das tehv oat •

MMT** lav^ S «a)pnM« ftfurtt «C a <fatsittaa of mfpnaOmkUlf 15S allaa. Sbia

lafarMtitan wut laaaAiotoI^r 1nr«WMd«««d hy tiM a«tta»baa«< eparater, IY».

JtMue^ mtSmaU ta iU» tyiuar« tiiw t«llM4 t« <^|M>a idMMt tba fUi^t. Tlia

atatiwart of Kfa. Ammi^ JMkmM, SCHO* tiM aidltMlMMml a^wrmtor la

4* flM l«7 UoiMtt Ofn«w** iwtitlMi vdtttlB tka Xafaraatlaa Cantar

mm aot wmm»* ^«um X rmalMt tiM Utmmiim Caatar at ateat 81SO AJLSIda ]M«&tl«i WM MMMai alMrtljr tlwu aoftaa* fegr faateiaal Sartaaat Maria S.

Sta«ff«a>, seflOl* «IM ramiaaC oa tlM yioaitiaa wtil appraslaatoly 4«MF.C vkaat tha |lo«itiatt ma takm orar liy Ba«aJl Offla

tto JifMwt aayatk aat. ^caofiB c» Mun* J»v

Sad Idant., Sieaal Carpa*

Slfaol aea9aa3r> Alraraft Varaiac* %aaU«

M« oaara ta bafaro »a VlH fjîMw of /A^^jû^Jufl* »*l

at Fart AMftaav f• K* . . ^^ /

Sa« Ua«t«» Micaal Oerfa,

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE • 3613

10

Pert ShafUr. T. K«}I M

Vnrritoi7 of BumU)

fwrmaaaMlly mppmr*A b«for« ns, th« tmdcraigiMd authority for mStda^

Istoriae oatha of thia oatura, cm* JoBupk P. Mtitra&U. 18006141, Pvt 1«1,

Slfaal C«RiMkay, Alromft Warning, Baomll. «ho aft«r baiae Avly amora mtf

MTillag to iMT dapoaaa awl aajrathi

I MM oa duty aa t«liq>hoa« operator at tho A)@ Infonwticm Cwitor ea

Bor&ias* DfKMab«r 7, 1941« 1 roeeived a talaptena sail trtm Opaaaat Tito A.M. atatlBC that a largo maibar of plaaea vwa boadiag tovardaOataa Aran Iwth 3 poiata oaat. X gavo th* iaforaatiaa to Lt. Sormit A.tyiar. Air Oorpa, 78th Pttraolt Sfoadroa, IHaaslar Tiold, T. H* and tibm

ll«tonant talkad with privato LoiOcard at tba Oi>aBa Station. Lt. Tylar•aid that it waan't anything of laportanoo. At that tin* tho planoa war*1st nilos out. I aakod if a* ahoulda't adriao Corporal Boatty and hava

tto plott«ra ooB* teak. Xha <^p«aa Ihxit atraaaod tha faot that it «aa aynry larg* ausbor of plaaaa and thay ao—ad axoitad. Lt. Tyler said thatit «a« not noooaaary to oall tha plottara or got in touoh with anyxmo.

r«rth«r tha dopooast aaya^ not.

^^. e ^u^^^. ;^2v<.«*^

ifoaoph P. IWHxBald,

Sig. C«», Airar«fi Waraing, Uowati,

Suteorlbod and •«e:i» t« boforo no thla

at Part SiMift«8>. f. K.

^^^ day of-^^i^Bji^^JUD. 19*1

^Jt^4^^^,ted Zdout.* Slcoal C«rpa»

Ofmary e«»rt.


N?cCTS«e Center

'a^TCP.

'r-n i ^7.

1

r.'.J;.^

J

EXHIBITS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE 3615

Rcc«ivca kt tb« Wm L><p«ttir^t ivUtm^ta Center

Room 344! Muaition* BWj., VCjuhh^ton, D. C

"Sif

; 0..

m. Re Aft C'JUa^ j

aOUBLRG PRESENT

-0.'JV!;i-r.

3618 CbNGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Received at tKc Ww t)ep«rtine»t Me««j« Center

Room ><! »' -:• f. 8tdg.. Wwh- '~> ^

To-

C^pitt Jutr.ijhfi ui -f'Ji'f'^.

l! --.1~

,:

A--,tir


M.JL i:iiUm^i^


4^SECRET AJ?"m

HEADQUARTERS HAW^inn '.-r.. r,n, Mi.n ,

OFriCK OP THC OCPARTHKNT COMMANOCR

roRT •MArreit t. h.

.vi:k

1&ra^r y*ter to t

AS 370.2/36 21 Dacewbor 1941.

:.ubjec+. ;; of attcok caa O&iia, 7 D«o«aiiber 19/J.

i«8 your radio t. ? 17 t>f; th*! roj>c

46 A O O

ihHWljr »•*«*«:

••• I

tvnAOQUAwrvfm Hawaiian departmsnt

romt sHArTKR, t. h.

30 I>«>osB2b«r 1941

SUBJECTi aaport of Snsay ittaok* Sunday, 7 D«os»fc«r 19-il.

iO» A* C. of S., -r DopBrtiaant, Hte»hington, D»C,

1. Tha follo'wtoy fact* have bsaa glasaeS from aomorouB

••oports of «y«-witaosB«8 and suppl«a9iit or correct report* saat you

by radio.

Z, The eneny sffort will bo oovored undor thrao gen«r»l heeui-

iajs: Hiok«K Field ars&j Wheeler Field Area; BsIIo-ab field aree.*

a. mCSiuM laSU) Am » At TiSS A.V.., Sea^ber 7, 1941, the

first. T.v-!l3ati5n of an e.ttWfc was 3 enemy single engiae, low »dae-'.jno">l-:ji32, carr^-.ln,- tcrv eaoes, whioh wore observed eotjthoast of

lUckaa •iald :iar.s«i* U"''. flytog at an altitude of abaui. 50- feat,

Hji^ tov«rd pearl Harbor, "hey vjers i& ti«2 aoholoas, 5 pl»aes in the

first and 4 ia the seooud. This flight aid not attask Eickass '''ioia.

At e.liQost the soffie tise, however, 3 dive boabers attacked tha a-awaiian

Air tJopot buildings ^"^ssn neld hansor line fron the Seuth, «ad

3 additional plesie. >i. the seme objactivee from the Horthwest.

Several rainu,os later 3 additional dive bombers bratabsd Kiolcsan Field

hon^or line frojr. the Southeast. Iianediately thereafter 7 additional

ivs bombers attac: rickajB field hanger line from the Ba«t.

All plaaes d- upproximataly 45 to 50 degrees from alti-

tudes of 3000 to 5000 feet, iorobo v.ore reloased at about 1000 feet

v.ith tha planes jullliir sut cf 'A-i'ss, froa 800 feet to approximately

J 00 feet.• n.^'p--..T

^ ,cff^ ar>d after borab release.

Z sinutfc;

.

-oi and subsesjueat

..,i-.,..- .,.... ...^ ,,w- - ,ter pla;.

—

The second .i vurrod at about .1 .ea bet-wewi" aad 9 planes appi , ... - Irom the south tu: . ,_.__.,_., llo, 1 Agua

stem, teoTinical builiicss iianediatoly behind hangar lines and

consolidated barracks, rhsse pianos when first observed were flying

level ar.d released bosOse from level flight at altitude of about 160

feet. LMrlng and irc3?{U?,tsly after this bombing attaok our planes

OH parking apron -A-ere attacked vdth sun fire. About <«ie minute

later (8:23) a fortiation o£ probubly 5 or 6 planes bojabed the base-

ball dieriond from a high altitude, evidently believing gasoline

storage systea to be in that aroa. The aeocxid attack lasted between

10 aril 15 minutes.

t^1 -


iijsii!*

1941, 'KpproxifiiatiJIy 'M plaitSfi' ».y':-

t^*Af^-^ f Ttpty^

^^^^^^^^K*

SMs»ra

Subjooti Report of Bnemy Attacks Sunday, 7 Doo«Ebor 1941 - Cont'd

To» A. C. of S., G-2, V/ar D»pt., WMhlngtoa.

Another attack struok '.'Shealsr s'ield a faw minutos after 9»00 A.a.,

s'-.T.a day. This attack coasiotod of 7 enemy planes wMoh approached

from the south, flying roughly in line at an altitude of .about 600

feet. They fired maohina guns at planes being taxied onto the air-

drome but It Is belie-yed that ao plane fired more than 25 to 50

rounds. All seven planes v,«ro eingia engine, low idng, moaopl&aas,

tw-seaters. They withdrew to the north. The irfiolQ second attack

less than 5 minutes. This oouid very reasonably have been a group

of planes expending the roaainder of their affiaunition,

o, BELLO'flS Fl'ji^W AHSA t The attack on Bellows Field waa

initiaTed by a single Japanese fiEhter piano at approxiwfttaly 8t30

A.U., Deoamber 7th. He oane directly from the sea (S&st) and

employed naohine-gua fire on the tent area apparently ejgiendlng

all his eBismmition in this one attack.

At about 9 1 00 A.M., nine fighters attacked fj-»m the north in

3 groups of 3 planes each in "V^ formation. This attack lasted

about 15 ainutes and consisted of gun fire only, it vat initiated

with a diving attack of all 9 plsmtm, after whioh the i formations

of 3 each peeled oi'f and attacked fi'os; various directions.

Aiter the single plane, tent-area attack, a S-17 which had

fc-Tivod fron the mainland ejsd which had been unable to lajid at

Hiokaa neld attempted to land at B»no7« Wsld but roll^ off

the run-way. This plana was repeatedly machine-gypaed by th» 9

olane attack.The attack at 3ello»8 ?i»ld appeared well plarjied, rehearaed end

well executed. One plana was reportad stot down by Infantry traop*

defending the area b'jit ao part of it -was reoovwre^t froa th« sea for

iisntifioation purposes.

S. QfaNiiaAL OgSiJiT/ATSOKS & RKa^KSSt Strafiag plmos a&mdov«i to a very" low altitude in prolotioalty «ll o«»«». Bema 50 to SO

f©«!(t from the' ground. Strafera uaed 50 caliber, ?.7 sal. Rn<i 2"^ cau

;1-,R torpedo planes t^loh were employed only agaiast pearl Harbor ssae

in CO alcJit flying very 1^- 'i not (jh".--"--•" '' - • "< '--f-^-

pedos Tuere dropped.

algid flijjHt diiolpJi.".-.. *.•..'.• ieEionatr..>-v.

accurate b<MBbia|r. was avidoseud. S«oll wn. att*v

carformed without nu!8i?r»u3 and <Safc'!.ilad rehott!

aeeaad to have bscn r«i««ar«9d ana ««.« exoijp'tit

Maiacru w th battle force Intel liger>.oe ii-

:>ut the genar&l tjnotiot of tho onesay actaok

r -joon 6 fcruote<5

.

A f«w bnifba war

ftility th;

•:^T*- !l»pf.'

'Subjeoti Raport of Satmy Attsok* .Suadmy, 7 Uoo«o»bi»r 1941 - Cont'o

Toj A. C. of S., (r-2, iv*r Pept., ttMhlngtoa.

4. aCSSOyoSlOB t it is iapo»»iblo at t.his tijae to •tate hoif

PAay pianos or how maxTy attrriera a«r» anployed, but it la jrtill

bolievad that »t l«Mt throa o*rrlor8 •w»r« Involr^d. I,Uc0«fi«o,

it is iapoeslblo t^ dofiait«ly <s«tabliBh wh«th«r or not «jiy plausM

returned to a carrior, re-ioaUed and participated ia s'j'?3««ijuent

attaolcB. It is the opinion of this oifio« that no plartea did »o.

It is nore probable that pl«ii«e w»v» Xaunohad from diffarant oarrlsra

at different tia^o or that diffaraat groupe of planes were launohedat eta^gerod intfl-aa'a. It Kaa r.cfc he.m; eatablished from what dirootloaor dist(uio«s th« Tfsre nj lanfte wars laanohed, althoughthe Ka-vj' believe. ,_ -i.. least w. . .-. .X»r operated fraa 150 ailesnorth of Oehu. It is astabliohsd that no land basad' planes wora«aploysd ir. the atte-'''. '-^-' "*^'i9 waay reportjs coswa ii; relatlTeto onecty platuM «it;- .e botor no positive idwitificationof such plfjioB has b&«^^ 3t.v»^iiohed, It is halJ--- -' • - 3ti-

Eotor planes reported were our own B-17'«, a fli arrlTOdfrow the Kainlec ' " ^r '^ - ^'-".aotan

^-*- ^. « ^ jC^'

£»y\—

A. C. ot'^., G-2.

;CRET

HK/»DauAFSTRir«» HAWAIIAN DSPAHTMSEWerrm. •»' tm oMOSwit ttsw w »?i« ran miirtitt tvmjjsmtK

t^«T 8HArrt£R, r. h.

^ '41 At 0766, 7 S»«««b©r 1941, th» J«.piui«s« X)ârisa itiHTy «oat. it* alJiJl isa*«OTor Pârl Harbor, Hlakfta Fl»ld, Keasoh* Hav«a Air Station, &9II0W Fiwld,«v««l«r PteXd, 3ohofl3l«• batwsea the lâitaii States •ud tho J&^Kxoafi SSpira.Lt, Col. K«i«!rU J. Fi«14«r» Asatetwit Chief af Staff, G-Z, an-iT«d

in the 0-2 0.î&» ia tte» headqvMurtiar* buiXdlag tit Pert Shafter at ©SOSand v(aa followed at short intsrvale by oth«r Kowber* of fch« ««ati«a td»osae froB all p&rta of the city. Tha 8<»<3tioa was in oparatioa by OSSOalthough it httjsdlad a voIuie* of a9ssag9« prior to that tl«»,

By08S0 zh« followlag subaeotieaa of th« d«j>ari»«tit 02 wars in fallop«ratioa» Combat latftlllgaaoa, Publio R«latiaa«, Adainistratiiât ArsyCanta*3t Office {oownter-subvarsiTO asuJ coaa«or>aspiona^*)

«

Contaot with tha iat«lllgeno« sections of the various posts in th*Separt5B»nt -wrb ostablished by tslophoas beginalag at 0815»

iBBadiato uaa of tho radio stati<m* in Hwiolula, KOC «a4 £:SiB, «&»aad« by tha section.

The "first asseage put on the ».ir by the aestioa mui that *Oah« h<ur besasubjected to a sporadic air raid* 3o not driva oa the atraete or higSswaj-a,Keep off the streets."

Xha radios then •warned people to gat vehiolee &£"f atrsets, -so r«a«iaoalSR, to keap off the telephones, t« keep their ra-Sios oa, -aad that ther«Twuld be aQRounceoeats ixi. Japeaese end Filipino axx-i that they should notbe alarsAed if they heard a foreign language on the air.

All .military and naval personnel iwere warned to retum to their jwstsimnediately.

Clrilian and all other ssaergensy workers vfyo had been - organised fordisaster relief vwre ordered to their prsdesignated pests.

About 0330 it was lamounoed to the press that the planes had h»tsadefinitely identified as Japanese.

The Hi&r Dapartaeat was adrised by this eeetioa of prellainary detailsot tho attack about 0850.

The Contact Otfioo which had been operating ©a a 24 hour basis wasinstructed to tske particular preeautlons to watoh sabotage and iscCemaldisorders. All agents of the Contact Offioe were functioning at this tSae.

Liaison between the section and the offioe of the Director of SivllisnDefense t»as established about this tlaie.

Shortly thereafter joveraor Poindexter declared tha Territory in astate of eaorgency thereby placing the Territory's "jKDay" la* into effectat 1000.

As various intelligence sections of the different posts On the depart-ment ware oontaoted, they wore instructed to report all enoiay plaaes doiei,all enemy prisoners captured, all en«^y aotivity ia their respectivesectors although those orders already were included in the StandingOperating Procedure for the Departngat*

79716 O—46—l)t. 19 14

"#.« asessoi (HSKSwumciUt, smm - «<Jttt'

ZtSovtK mte b«^. .iioa* Tf^';

jêttuoa, )»o1f& Amy Md aoimnmof ^«> isaj.

1680 «Sw& It vtts AimcHaice^ tisj:- « '^^.i.;.-, v.««w.v.i-r-:

.•hip 06 th* looftl j?r*«» imd E«aio •i»o «(^ l»?^cva as^cwt

a-ss^B «8£« t4ln^ 1*7 the 3«et'ic% to «];;r«â«d hH •sengr *smeAa es-j

The t»io HcBoimu ««Jlc «t»tioafl, SSJ mi 30X9, w«3f« c«* jrff 'WB* «4*aliertjt? ftftsr IIXO to prevent ^«^ plesaa I^km «oaii»g is «»^» %iM«u

St^tioa SX90 flat! SCSE la MIo, BoKedl mi tiim*, Hvaed, imv9 cmt etS «%««lr shortly *««rwae4«. tli<w««ft»T «il rwiio »tat;l<!a« *«n1i <ks *J» «ir oaiyfsor short iat»ma» ^ l)T»»488*t 93m«*^s«»«at« &i»si«>y#« fcy this •fftlon

Abottt 1400 th« ectdtat lBt«Uig»s«« aoitweeiioK ttafssi ao.visg ifito th«forward #ob8loa s<'"i't'l<^ ^b ^^ Allaaaa« {h<et«r. 9!ui reur i)^l<» )Nnull»A

eoBbat l!it*lUg*ac3i fros th« Eead(juert«2-« Solldiae, ?ort Slusftvr, tb«ay«l«y<»ei iBformatloa to th« Joiwird I!kjii«l«B «» they cea^lsiod tlwilr aoT»<naat lal^ tlx« atatbtt i>oeitlos.

Kartlftl 'l«ii «C4 «>mcua3«$ hy {l«ii»ral 31iort at ISMS *t^«T a aoitf«r«!UM

iMtvMB, GoTiraor foia&»x%9r, QeaemOl Sbor^, and tlM flkS, Colonel 7t«ld«r.0»B«i»i Sli^rt aaisoimo«d tha blexilcoul; at t&ia tU^t, end biâakaat

wttaiinsa w»r« bsoaaoaist froa radto »tatl»a« «t lat«issltt«at lBt*rv»Js i»"tw»«& this hoar aad ausAoom,

A «t«t«a«it ««« l9»u«d at 1«00 <soae«salag aextial i«* aaS tfe<» blstdcontto «I1 prose aaA r«uf!ic &3«a«i«s «it tbis tiaa.

0<3tt|>lete blackout of tb« aati;« Tarrltory vact Into effect at «mdo«a,1600 aftsr wamiasa bjr pivss sad 7«dio tbroaglsroat the IslaxMSte,

Th3fo'aghout the night tb« eatly* »«8tlc>a fuaotion»a froia th« forwardechelon, th« p»ar aohelon aad th« Heaolalu Ooatact Office.

OurlBg tb« ••coa3 elr raid th« r«ar aohsloa was aubjeoted to fallingshell fpegaseata and maohina gua ftra from Aisarloaa goaa shootio^ at th«JTapiMxtsa plaaaa

Many aasaagaa war* haadlad durlEHg *ha nl«ht ralatlre to pareclmtetroops, aaeny Itrndioga, ead aabota^w, all ware foaad to ba falsa.

Throuîout Saoeobar 7 eM 6, kaowa «Ba«7 areata asd aaapect Japaaaaa,Oamaa aad Italian aliaas war« appraheisdad and datatnad. The Tajpanasa

Conaul was held IneooBunleado in his Coasolata. The 0«2 taatlcs ooordlaatadarrangaB«3t9 for iatazXDMat and azaaisatloa of those a^prehaaded.


>•* •.•

0-3 SBCriOW OBROHCLOglCAL REPORT - Cont*d.r,€n«Tal Hemarka - Cont'd.

Efforts w«r8 started shortly after the attaoJc on Decsrabor 7 to recoa-struct thrt enemy tactics ot t^-3 attack. This Involved Interrogeticg dosaaaof eye nltnossss, most of whom told widely diffaring stories, end the trans-lation and daoodlng of many maps and papara. These efforts ars at.lli inprOijrass and a full report will bs made es a separate oonaunloaticsa.

Attached h'srato Is a HorJc Sheet of Journal in Combat IntalligeiiaeSection.

1 Tnel: (In dup)WorJr Shtset - Journal7 Deoeraber 1941 -

{7 sheets)

^S*Lt£j^^k..)^

Llautaaaat Ooli

A. G. of S

2 -

SECRETi

Sf>-

'O VSBBtOlf

: vac} ^>y

:!iSL HlftSBOS }ajM«4. ClTlli&a paUa« eaiiaot basdlvjj

Têfejjtft. tr-cop* Xeiadijsg n*ar S&aBEas KSZKS - ajti

S6h9fia3il BBrr*«i:s» T-wscsta* as llaicas

1032 5lpo«)Mi Tii5»r*iiisi5 ia filrMtloa 0t TStOfbaf firca

. ;«d at iaSRSSS POUff. %ww«ifi««.

* t&easifi»« R» i««HS"l3»g bits* fiotferalXe wltls re*

J Ksr« orS«r»4 toget off tb« «ir,

raft W9r« B»Jsg 4Is« bwuw t« «<3b>z""'

sjytiroT«Ml til* «ct- ..

3SSS9 f roa manage* of SW^SX ?5UK$a2;iCSi "Ho ?ay«ctot«

(•.;-

'

42/,'.

OlTlilf-,'-

1245 ProYoa* sfeuriwal a«a*j?a3 «» ficlOBal iîoldsr. (S^SStkL

orvT.'J; :: toM B( Oenaral to,«4ifl»« ~ the Jy**!***!* lai»

I .>3}«)!»itioa fti>4 i3lx«ct«d thctt «e i»i%iftt« ourz^^,.. ;.s5SB aiix4 Qtrt«ntioB PXea.

' 4«sl re-

Bo 4ih«.Q$» la ^

J*0*ti> '11

for Zitb Siiflston. Piufiuebot«

.vvx sjr© not «0ft£'inse3.

- ---'-^ *iot «oaJtrs!*4.

7 SaCSfeitt A-îX

•,^<5

i?ac;*;t

KO, lOiiS

"f 0T?«Ls3f« s*>

BS 1320 Sfe»«ttoa r® e?<ife-rif

»s>l^l9r to jwiBP bl»« At-

;-iJ 1330 i<sadiB« party p«|aart«d b»t»st!-<?r^- SisSiwSc

aABAXCU, beiog finsd ©« ^;-

IH5 1235 ^0* SusBJsa «hxn% %o Itod ia fj-ojxfc st iStJVjrjAISl

,

Bgiaras utwa- 1KSK tosasft.

Mt UiO iVwaclatt* tro©p» a»ar SASEKa ^XSBEa oa 3'J. £5'-^-- *«"'

Sot •wsrlftsa.

VW 1510 r«l»t3r!» belEs ww«a frm W &aA3*1S8 *.2 to «B«t^B,

W 1525 ît« a s^&er ot j«r«t«3BaUa«« l«iaa«d la BSlfOA fm -

So tiJBe OMPT. OfaUIOBaBASS:, 1«. ItMSB, Ka. KJSSI, 5TC. »0Bit. mt, mmm> i^^n ?r smnsa «isoat ui5 for iiXioa^??

ajTitt** «t Forward S«h»l<at abotxt 1550.

OT Ho Mas ???. OXKEJ, 6418 C, A. , a»fi»i**l7 idtatitlod plsus* ascsBH&H BESîox 113, tdtb Jiu>issss wasiRa.

Zr 1532 cot. DIKvâAH report* »U ll/^t» «t PRARL SAEBCSH Kdll Vrts

^l*ci:«« out, imless ae«»8««u«7 tor ar««at n»Tal wirSr.

i535 nv» pajpaohut* troops IsMsdwd o

l>lu« deslm with reA D&ritSc

TT ,1631 aiastout toni«iit. BfflOia.

15 BSXOHXS «9crtQS

ISffi 1325 O^T. m»Ear» msi. IsmmaSSf bus nmAmi up n&setmv laXmaS} SiSm »a& was tai« to iwpon ta ?3?OT<M!t Sasafettll.

SHE 1330 OOL. BOHE&M r«ll«v«>l du« ô iK«atal eo2\dlti<3(i.

COO Bo tlBw All Balooaa etosMsd, no li^wor to be sola.

KEE 1845 Bleokout «»iM>aao«4 to HIBmiSf OmmOSSS,

9A I84O BUa>c»i' light oa HED HIX.

t 19IA laadlng of pBraohato troops provofi false,

7 1917 Slinltlng ll^t.

I. A H 1^ - 2 -

O'ECrf^ "4

? KK!aiiS:;';v

mmaam

fort SjwrtKT, «. H,

(those wcwk9&e«te iaoljais tb» pprioA *!*la<s «a4«&op«r«tloa» w»r» a»i«t«ln«4 <it 9iK% Ssitft*?,, •« twii

<Mli»lcm after the tormfA •ebeO.oa SwS m% vq? *s«.4T«ao«4 0, P. J

iffisaffg, BO, TOflt iBia

9 1925 BliB]09r.H«fe« IS'Bss* SswSi.

iJila^j Sii St HI"'"

Will l>a acfej.fleft 2 iivtit* i.i'-»v'xv-'.*i

R»0)i»4 eJatAIP iy»J3Si5S, 0-2, Kser ?

JkAJ^.

•^i;;^*

mw 3 Sarfs,«» ?e

ss

»

2 3X Sffi U 5:^wu22. KSOiS.

Jcjus- ^Rp&i3cs.« ir«ssj:c-rts off SSM^^

Ha3<*naf fttJCaas** of PesrX Harbor r^jxsrt t SS icaatioa

^4i7y revoyfca i20i-4«Htifi«S afjip* flytcg off laaUsAlJKI •.

apjjTOacihiag ^ore. S^o ccaflraatloa.

• EftSSOHS y©p<a't« havlvsg «apV.flw-; !?i<x usesat , ass^-"'- •" '

JSaoay Burfeoe ex-sft xss>>ojrt«d 20 fisgrs'sa, ?X n'-r.-isst'- ~

a o«ii>t«i', Ssafiins torp«a.« olsiswift to att«8'<. t^t

H A V A L

SEO«ET7 DBCMSBE 1941

mAs)^}iJSfEs:s^nKiuaus csFAPiMEtrr,

Fort Stofter, T, H.

A.C. of 8., 0-2 - FORJMRD BCHKUal

7 OKSiCSS 1941

:^y$4 X»>H? plMws dlT« bonMDg ftsd aiM^hliw gumJing HtOmiaa<! WJSn;KIi yjaXOB end H2&KI. HAilBOJa. WBEgata nSIfl lafleases. Tfo Mjtort or •sesy 9urf«ee tdiin*

AH plattJB ocenli« in off ^0208. yijrlng low. Tlait is til.

-^ ?18W-: ooatag ia nort!i«»at of CBOBB, Vbst l« sU.

t)8 Order B fcwnd on ?R-n 'Pilot irt» wftffhsd at

slittd St Co 'ic« ead wnt

t5.W.i?V SA-'TJ'^V. -j-^r^-.r-f.^rt ^-f- a'<'iy/_

tift*i «fc acaofinD aasRAiJKs.

-;• att«i!5as4 Odin)

>5» 'fter

IlUfSI «tet(t 1200.

f saSSJiSfr 'cy «t»ll «nMt fire.

' UBSmr Hf «mll umaUbu :&<^> Si^nea VXNa,

U30 «3»jrpi>4 t>oi)

4«: cci.. »sas<

'h

SH

SOT

ss

AM

BBS

1

ceo

LtX,

n

35

15

16

21

19

20

26 fti

A I

-Vi^l'.-. :"^^. SWfAIiJiS- ESfoJSaK'.

te»b»*, iBBdiftg o3ff B«B«as 2«ea?r. skwx •t*»9js» '?o S8ii»»off BASOOS FOBTT.*

l>*fC OK KBOfS Tvports ©wr ta«k fwo« «&.!(<; cruiah«r«, a«-»ralde«tn»9«r* Smmi&b& we»fc off BAHESSe K*lSr) , flr«a oa tyeottsr aircraft. Sep«rt «iw»riae«.

14},; PiEr«^iute fomvd OB ira£? S£bW a«ar ^spcMiw plajM «)sji«k

8r*»h»«sara«d, j>ild4 >cill«a. &»ylo«ai Sr»y piiat«

araahsd is «&» «et»ity. Hlot «&& «nll»lj«a aam isotb killed.

U£0 7«o fiMd Bvlsitors > «ie SM(reh«S • aiiafe dona la SSiffil. H£aSQS

1^0 Airplane apprcudilng fr«a aorth toiwrda KiiBDro JOIBT,

abottt 15 Mllas off. »ot idanfclfiafi.

1515 liarss wMaw planes flying aoath froa SCaonUS Biaa2Cl®.

Signed BIHB, Bo ooafiPKSttioa.

1515 SbsII oarriar bRssd pljaae, 2 ^atsr {feoth »«b daad), <®6

.^ Cal. M. 0,, earburetor atada la Japan, ie dowa a*»T XAli aisd under gi»r4. Owurd ralierad t>y GOIOflBa

TZSUSR'S orderii.

1640 Ho actmtlae off KAHDKU «p to 5 wllec ovt to »•«. Qaeplsca over tSSUXOe TOSUi at 15^000 f«et. Xdantitr oskBenr.

1649 A iarga cutter (proarj^bly J^P^SSSZ) ia raportad at 55 J® 23

•fey BAiaaTt CSEOTJP. Sa&Xl boat so1b« baok aad ftwth fwai

boat to shore. Xdaatit^ ttautaaoicEk.

1735 BASaSBS lOIOT to KASOKU 5 adlaa owt, 500 feat, no aotirity,

JJAHItro to 2AHUKW,

1

1745 One sttrfaea eraft {Carrlar?) reported at lat aoOegreea, 32

ffllauteBf long. I58 dagraae, 16 ada«t«8. Bourse 271.

Sending torpedo airemft to attaolc.

18C0 S*rong radio interference reported tiy J«K£L HARBOB.

1928 towsy dhip \jeiiJ« will OK^CB HIUI.

210* HICIAM ?ISU» asd EBARL HAHBOB being boKbed. Six or Bewnplaaee wlthonit lights; on plane waa afaot deira.

20A5 OnldeHtiflad plane flying toward HBASL HA8BC® (law).

2059 Tfaldentiflad flight otndng in.

2101 HICKAM being bojabed.

2102 HICXAM & VtKSL SABBOB being bo«bed.

2110 SICKAK attaeked. Sot oonfir»ed.

2112 PEARL HARBOR attaokod. Hot eonfin»d.

30 2U3 AboT]

3'6"^p^'eit

ng to land.

HEAKiDABISSSnKuaXAlI vKPAseomaFort Shatter, *. H.

A,C. of 8., 0-2 - fORMRD KHJLOS7 EBOXMEBR 194I

43

91

Bri<Jga near gun position of 8^ FA mtJwa KLtbphoaphoroas Hriil«h ws ot>Xlt«rat»d irltb aud by gun ermr.

643s Tk Sa reports BCABL HA3B0R r«eel-rln« naval boabardaast

.

Saran plaaas rapnrtad trying to laad at ALA UOASA and

ar« balng flsad on.

Ho attaek on Aastraliaa araa; one Battalion of AastraliaaXiq^erial 7ore«a earouta to Kalj^ag.

cox£)HEi msmam (Uaison HA^ mKBtM . to vt. mm vss, .

Uaieon FOKUBO ISSmom). - ICUHAr balag attacked byships 12 aiiea aoatb and west of raaf at 09X0.

At KtlX&T, vua actual btwMag, but gtms west into action •*

lBdieatle« plaltae looloaa. Bela^ shelled. 24 direet Ut>. ^

t^dantltlsd ^blji in ar«i.

jIS secre;t 7 HdUBSS, X9^

I

HKADQUARTCRS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMKNTOFFICt or THI ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, 04

FORT SHAFTEB, T. M.

FonHurd Boh«loai«

20 D«e«Hb«r 1941

tfi^Jvoti Op«rfttions Eamdian d^piurtaaat, 7 D4N»«ab9r 1941.

Te t ConMndiac Qrmxvnl, Eamiiim S«p«rtauRit.

1* larvwith nfort eorwriag eoaduot of oporatlons of troop«

«r îa ooMHUHl dorlsc; th« &ttask oa PmutI Harbor on 7 DMsabor 1941*

a« Treofs of tha'B«mil»& Dopartnost tad outlyiag isl«nds

WHO^ oa ftlort rUtas usder Jlort So* 1 b«t«»«a ISOO aad 1615 on Horr«iib«r

£7, ld4i« OD Boerot InfenMtioaa frcm tk« Hur DoparbMOt* Votlfioatioa

of «n«Bjr air attaok <» Poarl Mrhor and Hielcui Flold ms roooivod at

aW«rt (^lO. Ibiji^ lokolcat CoBBUôrs and Diatrlet C<«waad«r« ««r«fistifiod of tli« «sm9- air oporatiotu and erdorod to faootlan laMdiatolym&w M«rt Io» S» S«P B9> 6 Iov«ab«r 1941* Bosixmine at abottt 0900,

7 I>*s«Bb^ X941* iitit&al d«fo&so pealtimu «sro oooupiod* Iko oporaticoia

8Mitie& ffiovod to tk» f^mwrd CoaMUBd Po«t at 1@00*

b. tmnWi ilSL FCBggy Eiekm Fi«ld« l&oolor Piold sad

BollOMS Fiold ww^ aWid:od bjr Japaaoso airoraffc about 07SS« 7 Deoasbor

X941« Tfeo flrat «tNiok iiaa by diTO boKbern on th« baogarsi alroraft,

barra«ks« SaMiiiazi lie S^êt and Saj;ia««rlBg Sbop«• 7b« sooond attaolc

at about @SSO» prooodad bjr koavy gronad straffins a(aiast alroraft aad

antiairoraft dofanaos. Tbo ond of attaek nas at about 0950. fbonmaiiaa Mr Foreo fttrtoaiatieally turaod oror IStb BoaiNMrdaoat Wiag to

iairal o<»)trol poi' i»ix^ iraisr - Savy ijô«a«at« it 0800 all AirIWEtag Sorrloo forS'Cnmol woro ordorod to Jlr Waraiag Sarrieo laforaa-

tiott 6«Dt«r. Sarrieoablo parsuit alroraft waro ratriorod aad took

off It about C^60« Fofir AfZQ*» aad two B«17*« «ar« inaediatoly aalTagod,

assanad aad took off at aboat 1140 aadar Wnj ocmtrol* Qrdora vorolasQOd at 01^0 to pot all a^milablo alroraft in ooHBlssion.

o. mmus oQAsr mmmi cmumt aii troop* nwftt«rt«d at WM tmi'iiook vf poaitloeas aador Floy drdar lo* 1, Eaimii«ft

Oocat Artillorjr CoMMOid* •xampt m followst Battory "A." 41st Coaot

ArtlUory aad Battory *B,* 4lit Coaat ArtiUory in position at Port

fffiMMuarita, Battory Bsi^daa, t«o S-iB<di soa ooast gu&8> Fert EaaM^taMdMi,

MUmod by lNaîiart«H'« Battary* l&tb Coast ArtiUory. Znt«reeptorCi—and •»wvmiA <^p«rt,tioaal ocaaHuod of S8d Coast ArtiUory Brigado (AA).

%«ratio&ii darinc tbo porlod of tho raid as follows t fiMsqr plaaos«tta«kiag ov Fort KMsshsmtha at OS0O». 1000> a^ 1120 takoa laador

ftro by autoaatio miôas of Jburbw 8«foasos of Poarl Bkrbor aad 5SdCoaat ArtiUory Bricado oalts at Fort KaaMkaaMA*. At loast ooe pianonas b«>o«4^t doaa* Caoaaltioot Eillod* tliroo) aeandod, flfto«x* loiskt«risl dSEtacod*

*» >4^î:WA3l!HtY gITI8iai« lasaiy air attaek oa»o at

iavroadUMtoly TkXO, i ôaôr ii41. llaîlno gua squads, autoiatio

" 1 «•

i/mJ' 'T^

I

tir* ef AttAoklDg ?!«&••• Initial 024D41 field poaltlon* oooupl*d

nii—inlin. «t OeSO* 7 Deo«aber 1941. All units ww la position and

rM^ to qpwat* tador Alort Ho. 8 vltb Initial lasuo of •aranltloa

ftt 1700, asoopt 240nft Hoirlt««r battarlat. 24GaM battarlai raady to

fir* at 128^ 8 Daosabar 1941. Othar aotlon duriiic the period oonelsted

of tnoreaalns msaber and strength of ataadlng guards and patrols, already

<^peratlBf en antl-eabotage ulssions at tke beginning of the period, and

iBTestigatlng false reports of .ensngr landing aotlon In this Division*

s

8e«fecr« Jtll units ordered to lat«aslfy fortification projects. Rraot

line unite were In position at 1100*

•. 26th IHPAarRY gIVI8I«t It the tiae of the raid, thle

IH.Tleloa ms f^metloning ooder Alert Xo« 1, in the petroling of the

niMMiHl end Tire Control Cable »fstea and ê guarding of rltal Instal-

latlene in Its assigned sector. At 0850 the Dlrlsion CoBMLxtder dlreoted

the dr«(«iag of all alert eMnmltlan« At 0900 Alert Vo. 8 vas plaoed la

effeet* At 0960 the DlTlsion departed for defense positions. Troops

already la the field tamediately laoreased the strength of anti-sabotage

guards on. the ao«t vltaal installations and plaoed additional posts on

seoendary Installationc* 2eth Infantry OlTlsion Journal records Iheeler

?ield bcaibed at 0800j at 0825 troops with SBall arss and antlairoraft

aee^lTtH' guns fêd ca enoy airoraft} at 0830 the 26^ Dlrlsion Artillery

nae ordered to drair their intiial issue of Field Artillery aanmition}

at 0845 a seotxoi air raid of about fmrty ennqr planes is reported} at

0900 orders rooelTe* to ooatq»y nar positiene aintalxiing two hundred

yards botween tr«M]ca«

1015 - Zmn lafaatry io'oops clear Sohofleld Barracks for John

Sodgers Air fort*

1040 • Wfcter tank of 2Sth Medloal Battalion s<«t to Hiokan Field

Hospital. Mo water aTailable at Hickaa Field.

1108 - RsMaiader of 298th I^sifaBtry cleared Sohofield Barracks for

Bellom Field area (one battalion on duty that area sinee

27 VoTsatber 1941).

1118 • t&kits of S&th Infantry in war positl(ms. Baa Sector.

1180 •> 29th Infantry Bands take over guard duty at Bchofield Barracks.

1810 - Firing Batterie* of 25ai DiTision Artillery earoute to war

petitions with one-half unit of fire.

1846 " ft^siaeer sv^lies, coasleting of 80,000 sand bags, barbed

wire and plokets, etc., nade aTailable to eaoh Infantry

Rdîisent and Artillery Battalion by DiTision Cosmander.

1800 - 2&th DiTision Artillery Cossuuid Post closed at Sohofield

Barracks sad opened at Forward CcssMad Post. All troops

la war positions with at least one uait of fire all types

of aoKunltion, except Zi/Oim Howitiers. iaanmition supply

built up during the night to two units of fire, the 25th

DiTision cleared the Post of Sohofield Barrackj a half hour

ahead of oaloulated schedule.

WILLIAMLieutenant Col

2 Znolst Aast. Chief of Staff, G-3 f\

il- Heport Eawalian Interceptor Coanander ^S£^^ f% fsww^

2 - Report Base Operations, Hickaa Field, T. H. ^^^tV/Mt I. '-...v .r^ iv; § ^ «•

l«»

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN INTERCEPTCR CfflMAND

18 Deeefflber 19/11.

Subject: Report of Enemy Activity over Oahu, 7 December 1941,

To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

At approximately 0802, a large formation of enemy airplanea wereheard approaching Wheeler Field from the Rorth at approxlraately 5000 feet.They pealed off and attacked the hangar line with Dive Bwabero, relWMingin all about thirty five bonbe - of tlMse, approxiaately four were 60Q:lNtfabout three were 250 Iba; about eight were 100 Ibs} the reraainder were amalierand sone appeared to be oil or other type of incendiary bonbs. The airplanesappeared to release their bombs froK an altitude of fron 500 to 1000 feet.There were two types of bombers in the attack - one with non-retractablewheels appeared to bm of the A-17 type, and the othare were a little fasterand had retractable*wheels, Sach type had a crew of two.

Bombs struck and burned Hangar No. 1 whmra the Base Bngineerii^; wassittiated and Hangar No. 3. They also burned a building used -as a store houseby the Post Exchange and a mobilization-type warehou»a filled with cement.One bomb struck the 6th Pursuit Squadron barracks on the Souttawast corner en-tering a window on the second floor where it eiqplodad causing considerable dam-age to pers«inel and rendering the building unserrioaable. One bcmb whichlanded in the open made a crater approximately 15 feet in diameter and six feetdeep.

After tfa* airplanes bad expanded their bomba, they came to a vary lowaltitude and machine-gunned the air^^uies parked in traat of the hangars. Theyalso fired bullets throdgh the windows of buildings, attempting to set tbem a-fire with incendiary ammunition. From belts of amntmition in one of tbe cap-tured planes, it was noted that the aaroinition was loaded two AnBoc-plarcing,one tracer; two Armor-piercing, one tracer; two arsor-pierolng, one locendiary.The bullets punctured the gasoline tanks of the airplanes and aet th«t aflrawith tracer oad inoeadlary amiaanitlon. This method ot attack «as very success-ful ttsd destroT** fifty four airplaiMs bgr fire and twenty nine airplanes byother means. After the first raid, tha persomwX (M^t^aa post fwre M^loyad lapolling away unbomed airplanes from those that «er« burning and removing asmany as possible tma the ixsraiag hssigara, fbrny were 'vXao MQtliisred in filingthe nnmeroue fires caused by the raid and in rescuing the womdad.

Before the r>J^, all aJjcpLanea were tied down oa the ramp la fr«st ofthe hangars or were i»41i« tb«> hangars. Sone of ibem were load«d «lt& (»amd«tioB. After they b»& bewi rescued flrom the ftre and r<^l«d amy ftc« t&« h£&«ger liae, the crevs began amdng them.

wAolPlty-0,'î:rTi3tr'^!tmimmmmaKs^r^<rs>'»ietA:i^MP-2, Utr, Bneny AoWHty-Oafaa, 7 Dec U, fr CCTIC tJ^GHAF, 18 T)«e UAt approxinataly 0910, a second attack vaa nede by aevsQ airplanes,

but little daiaage was done. These airplanes appeared to be expending onWheeler Field what ajnrounltlon was left after the raid on HiekaiB Field andPearl Harbor.

The following members of the i6th Pursuit Squadron took off fromWheeler Field about 0850 and were ordered by the Ck>ntroller at the lafonaationCenter to i>roco6d to the vicinity of Diamond Head at 8000 feet:

1st Lieut. L. U. SAUNiaStS

2d Lieut. J. M. THACKER2d Lieut. G. - STESflLING

2d Lieut. P. - BASUUSSSRThey proceeded to the vicinity of Bellows field and there attacked a formationof nine Japanese two-seater airplanes with retractable landing gears. Lieut.Saunders and Lieut. Raanussen each shot dorm a Japanese aii^lane and Lieut.Sterling was shot down by the eneeay. Lieut. Saunders reports that the Japanesetwo-seater airplanes could out-ollab the P-36 airplanes used by the il6th PursuitSguadron. By about 0920, 1st Lieut, K. A. Moore and 2d Lieut. 0. Norris of thei.bth Pursuit Squadron got into the air. Lt. Hoore fired at a Japanese airplanewlthoot result.

The 47th Pîrsuit Squadron was located at Haleiwa and, between 0815end 1000, made two flights. In the first flight were 2d Eleut. Kenneth Taylor,2d Lieut. George Welch, 1st Lieut. JOhn 'Webster, 2d Lieut. John Dainea, eachflying P-40'8 and Ist Lieut. Robert Sogers in a P-36. In the second flightwere let Lieut. Robert Rogers, 2d Lieut. George Welch, 2d Lieut. Kenneth Taylorand 2d Lieut, Harrj' Brown In T-AO'a and 2d Lieut. John Daines in a P-36. Lieut.7elch shot down two Japanese planes in the first flight and two during the sec-ond flight. Lieut. Taylor shot down two Japanese planes during the first flight,Lieut. Brown shot down one Japanese plane during +he second flight. Lieut Daineswas shot down at approxlinately 0915 over Schofield Barracks, probably by our ownanti-aircraft troops.

The* 44th Pursuit Squadron was on Detached Service at Bellows Fieldfor Gunnery Training. Dpon being notified of the attack at Wheeler Field, thecrews began arming the airplanes. In- aa effdrt to take off imder heavy fire

from the enemy, Lieut. Tniteman was shot down imffiediately after take-off, Lieut.Hans C. Christensen was killed while getting Ir.to a P-40 to teke-off. Lieut.

Samuel T. Bishop took off end was whot down into the ocean. jU.though wounded inthe leg, this pilot swan ashore.

The follottlng casualties were incurred at Wheeler Field, excepting offi-cers who were killed in flight:

38 Enlisted Men Killed,59 Btolisted Men TTounded

.

These casualties wei'e suffered mostly hy the men sleeping in the tents and thosesleeping in the 6th Pursuit Squadron barracks that was hit by a boab.

The Infonaation Center for the Interceptte Conanand which had been set

up irt a temporary installation near Fort Shafter was operated «u) follows on 7

December 1941$

(a) 0403 - 0700

(1) All six detector stations operating per orders C/6, HBD. ^ \

(2) lot Lieut. KERMIT A. TBI&, AC, was la^jjÔgJifej^ ^^ ____- 2 -

P-3, Ltr, Enemy Acftvity-Oahu, 7 Dec 41, fr CG«IC tS CGH&F, 18 Dec iX -

(3) A piot'tiEg detail consisting of cne KCO and 10 enlisted

men was on duty.

(4) The Control Center at Wheeler Field was manned by Sgt Starry,

(b) 0700

(1) All detector stations closer} down except ona, the Cpana Sta-

tion at Kahuku Point, which reaained in operation in orde:*

to continue training a new man opersting the oscilll scope.

This Station picked up plot at 0702 indicating airplanesat 136 miles bearing 0" to 3° and kept ti-ackirg the target.

(2) Lieut. Tyler continued as Watch Officer as his schedule sti-

pulated that he remain en duty imtil 0800.

(c) 0720

(1) The Opana Station called to infom the Information Centerswitchboard operator that they were plotting a large group

.

of airplanes. In vier: of contempiatf^d arrival of B-17'8from the mainland and probability of Naval aircrnft opera-ting, the Watch Officer did not consider it neceBsarj-- totalte any action.

id) 0800

(1) Attack underway and all AlfS personnel were called to duty.

(e)

il) Lieut. Grover C. White, Signal Corps, Conaminications Officer,

and Master Sergeant Harold Taylor, Infonwtion Center Chief,

arrived.

(f) 2S22-

(1) Major Lorry ». TiMal, Mr CJorps, arrived and took avfer the i

duties of Controller.

(«) 2SS2-

(1) lot Lieut.. Bdwin K, Granberry, CAC, arrived and manned AAposition.

(1) let Lieut. A. A. X<»ikel, SC & Captain N. L. Tittle, SC, arriT«d«

(i) m^ 1

(1) 2d Lieut. Y. A. Herrii, CAC, arrived at AA position.

(J) amL.

(1) Major E. P. BeriKl'iiet, Air CSaypa, arrived,^v*'SECRET \_^


P-i, Ltr, BiiMijr Actimy - Oahu, 7 D«C U, tr CGHIC fl^GHiF, 18 Dec 41 -^%C

IXSSL

(k) 1030

(1) Lt Coodr r.E.G. Taylor, arrived,

(1) J^n PW..

Since 0800 the Station lx.a renained in continuous operation.

The following is a recapitulation of the airplarwB at Wieeler Field as of

9 December 19A1:

Stock In Repairable Repair Upon Receipt Destroyed

Record Coacission Locally of Llgjor A^aembl? Firt- O^her Ceugeg

P-40B

^^' I

13 IJnae*

10 t OowMuadittC ®»3M«P*3l, BapMKLUa Air IW»#, ^wrssr^ s«3s.4.s?ii, i«

X Mtl**! tlw tlM te b* 074&. Z «»«1« ««1slakt« itm tMmek 9m<wrr«&

vitkU Urn. (10) alMtât.

*. th« Ivmaiu Air l)»p«t r^s***" hwie"* **» *i'»» !*«*•« arrt»

pr*s««4 )Ma» %• • Tvry lav «ltlt«i9.

«. The «irpl*a*i p»rtMNl «a tha tMcti ««•» strsufAd aft«ir tli» (tt«»

boBcbias eT th* kaaeers. tMNnr*! pUsM ««7» f«t ft£lir«« X BC*«d • bri|^red fltoM on the gr*«»4 tader aa airplaoM pu1t»A tt«xt to Bu^pur 6« Z an«Mbl» tD vtat* ii)M»th»r tklo Yas «a iBMMttSlarjr beitb »ir aa airplsae S^tiw*The plame vera the >ea« tjrpe ia eea* oasas* X awald sajr tinat tin dlYaboiftwr* ««re«l«e aaai for atraflas*

d. The haagare ead pXaaea wtf alee ttrafad bjr plaaa* fljlacparpandioular to ii» hangar liaa. TM« aetioB faXlaaad Uka vkratUicattaek in o^, ahiah aaa parallel te Hf Una*

a. All atrafing attaoka eaiw rery eloaa to «ia ff^mA Mid eaaacdonly idvMi alapBt on t<9 of the obJeetlTea.

P: f. Thare aaa a ahort lall (aboat tMrty (80) siaittaa} WtVMRtha flrat and aoooad atta<dca. Daring i^M aaeoM attack, 19^ attwtian waaoette«at««tad on a hi^ altltuda attack hy a foraiftien of abavt taalta <12)plaaaa ahioh flaw ia froa the aoul* la a Ta»y ti|^ fenwtiaak. n>aai ^Mapproach, i^cli wu directly al<M% l*e haasara oa the aait A4m, I aaiild aaythat thia attaok aaa iateaded for the haagar lia^. alôugh it hit lOia areaJttat weat of â haagar liao (barraoka, parado groaad, ata.,). I baU«««thia srovf of beaSba aaa over aad te the left of tJM iafceadad tatrgata.

g. The aeaoQd attaok aaa aeoe^âaled by atrafing. althoa^ Itaaaaed leaa aoTore than dnrisg the flLrat attaok.

V -1- /y

7971« O—46—^pt. 19 15

POO t* 00, BUT. 12^-41.K»pert on Botfelag Atfak. OinrtiU

h. IWMt»ly after thm kl^ alUtad* attMk, I •bsarrwl ahmtLTj dlV* bartdng attaak on Ik* Paarl Harbor aroa. Ihla aaa praaaadboa* againat am lofcaaaa amtl-airoraft fir*, altbovgh I taw urn plaaaa•hot doan* The howt^r* ia tbia afctaok did aot ooa» a« law aa tboae'hioh oesdootod tba attaak ia b abara.

^. I obaanrad only aiagla aagiaa planoa*

J[.I aav no aaaay pliOMa aotually fkll, althoagh I obtarrad taa

(2) ahieh vara aai^kiiig and appaarod to ba la troabla.

k* Tha attaoka wara flnlahad about 091S • 0990*

. QCRTXm A. BL1K8,Major, Air Cerpa,

Poat Oparatlans Offlaar*

-2- __ -^.^i *y


EXHIBIT NO. 165


UD757The Pentagon

10 April I9I16

MEMORAIIDUM FOR MR. RICHARDSON:

In response to Con^-essman liurnhy's inquiry at page U532 of theCommittee transcript, there Is enclosed a copy of a partial translationof a document rel.-^ting to a ?/} February IQUl conference between GermsnForeign Minister Ribbentrop and JpTj^nese Anba,esador Oshima. The rj.'^r-tial

translation was obtained from the Office of the United States Chief ofCounsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality.

CARL H, ifflLSON

Cent., AUS

Incl

CTORY

BUYVNITSD•TATSa

.WARiNDS


Partial Translation of Document 1834-PSForeign Office

Ram No. 56/RBerlin, 2 March 191)1.

Strictly Secret

Personal

In the inclosure is forwarded, for strictly confidential and purely personal

information, an extract of a report on my confyence witli the new JapaneseAmbassador Oshima In Fiischl on 23 February 1941. These statements are of

fundamental significance for orientation on the general political situation facing

Germany in early Spring 1941.Signed : Ribbentkop.

To: The German Embassy in

AnkaraMadridMoscowRome (Qtiir.)

Rome (Vat;)The German Legation in

AthensBelgradeBernBudapestBukarestHelsinkiLisbonPressburg (Bratislava)SofiaStockholmone each

65215

EJnclosureTo RAM No. 56/R

Strictly Secret

Extract from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign MinisterWITH Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 Fhbruary 1941

After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM (Reich Foreign Minister)

declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved right in the policy 2 hadpursued regarding Germany in the face of the many doubters in Japan. ByGermany's victory in the west these policies had been [2] fully vindicated.

He (the RAM,) regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for

which he had been working with the Ambassador for many years already, hadcome int(» being only after various detours, but public opinion in Japan had not

been ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are together

now.Expanding upon the general political situation the Reich Foreign Minister

declared: The Fuehrer had always looked for an understanding with Englandand he (RAM) had himself been sent to England as an ambassador in his time

to undertake a last attempt in this direction. A certain possibility had existed

In the person of King Edward, even though it had been doubtful from the beginning

whether the king would prevail. He (the RAM) had been more than skeptical

already at his arrival in London, and had considered the chances for an under-

standing as 100 to 1. Thus the war-inciter clique in England had then won the

upper hand. When he (the RAM) left England, war was ntiaroidable. Thenwhen it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a treaty ivith Russia—a necessity

for avoiding a two-front war. Perhaps this moment was difficult for Japan. Thetreaty was, however, in the interest of Japan, for the Japanese empire wasinterested in as rapid a German victory as possible, which was assured by. the

treaty with Russia. Furthermore he (the RAM) had made it clear to Stalin

as well as to the public that the treaty between the Reich and Russia in no wayaffected the German-Japanese relationship. Now the German-Japanese alliance

has been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from


the Japanese side. After conclusion of tlie alliance the question of its furtherdevelopment now stands in the foreground. How is the situation in this respect?

* * If * * * m

As for the war against England, we had poor weather for our bombers duringthe Fall and Winter to be sure, but in spite of this, heavy damage has been donewhich has had a strongly retarding effect on English war production, etc. Thebombings would continue in increasing measure so that we hope to destroy verymuch more than America was able to replace. We now had air supremacy overthe whole continent. The time when we should win air supremacy over Englandwould depend on further developments.At sea the commitment of U-boat weapon had thus far been comparativefly

slight ; after the end of March the commitment of the U-boat weapon would mul-tiply in a short time. Then with the combination Air Force-U-Boat weapon wewould deal terrible blows to England. The loss of tonnage already was makingconsiderable ditficulties for the English food supply. Meat and fats were alreadyscarce. It was now a matter of reducing imports by sinkings to a definite level

below the absolute minimum for English existence. Thereby England's situationwould take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is prepared;its execution, however, depends on various factors, above all on weatherconditions.

[3] Concerning America, the Reich Foreign Minister went on, it must benoted that Roosevelt is the most bitter enemy of Germany and Japan. As faras he was concerned he would like to enter the war. However we have aninterest in keeping America out of the war. Should America enter the war in

spite of this it could not wage the war militarily lat all. The vast spaces of theoceans lying between us and America made this impossible. In East Asia,America would hardly dare to send its fleet beyond Hawaii, as it would thenbe threatened with destruction by the Japanese fleet. In the Atlantic Oce^nthere is a lack of commitment possibilities with the exception of England.Landing in Europe is impossible, and Africa also is too far removed. Supplypoints for the fleet and land troops are lacking. This points to the creation ofAmerican air b'ases in England for practical purposes. But in an air war weare located in a strategically advantageous position with respect to England.We could bomb England concentrically from the broad basis of the Europeancoast while England had to spread out in fanlike fashion in its attacks onEuroi)e and must thereby split up its forces. In an air duel—^Europe vs.

England—Germany would always be superior. We believed, however, that it

should be possible to keep America out of the war by skillfully coordinatedpolitics of the allied powers.The Fuehrer would beat Engl'and wherever he would encounter her. Besides

our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined English-American airforce at any time. The number of pilots at our disposal was unlimited. Thesame was true for our airplane production capacity. As far as quality is

concerned ours w^s always superior to the English (to say nothing about theAmerican) and we were on the way even to enlarge this lead. By order of theFuehrer the antiaircraft defense too would be greatly reinforced. Since thearmy had been supplied far beyond its requirements, and enormous reserves hadbeen piled up (the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of theimmense stock of material), production would now be concentrated on submarines,airplanes and antiaircraft guns.Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won today mili-

tarily, economically and politically. We had the desire to end the war quicklyand to force Engl'and to sue for peace soon. The Fuehrer was vigorous andhealthy, fully convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quickand victorious end. To this end the co-operation with Japan was of importance.However, Japan, in its own interest, should come in as soon as iwssible. Thiswould destroy England's key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand,would thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could acquireonly tl^rough war. There were three reasons for quick action :

1. Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center ofthe British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-w!arfare, etc.) The effect uponthe morale of the British people would be very serious and this would contributetoward a quick ending of the war.

[jj] 2. A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America outof the war. America, which at pi-esent is not armed as yet and would hesitategreatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could do this even less


so in such a casf. If Japan wtmld otherwise respet-t the American interests,

there would not even he the possihility for Roosevelt to use the argument oflost prestitre to make war plausible to the Americans. It was very iinlikely thatAmerica would declaiv war if it then would have to stand by helplessly whileJapan rakes the i'hilippines without America being able to do anything about it.

.S. In view (»f the coming new world order it seems to be in the interest ofJapan also, to secure for herself already during the war the position she wantsto hold in the Far East at the time of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshimaagreed with me entirely and said that he would do everything to carry throughthis policy.

The Keich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should declarewar because of Japan's entry into the war, this would mean that America hadhad the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even though it wouldbe preferable to avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, beby IK) means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of the countriesof the Three-I'ower Pact. The Foreign Ministei- further expressed his belief

that a temporary lift of the British morale caused by America's entry into thewar would be cancelled by Japan's entry into the war. If, however, contrary to

all e;:pectations. the Aniericans should be careless enough to send their Navy in

spite of all. beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would represent the biggestchance for th«> countries of the Thiee-Power Pact to bring the war rapidly to anend. He, the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japan'^se fleet would then doa complete .lob. Ambassador Oshima replied to this. that, unfortunately he doesnot think the Americans w(mld do it, but he is convinced of a victory of his fleet

in Japanese waters.The Minister for Foreign Affairs further explained that closest cooperation was

required for the common waging of the war, particularly as far as intelligence

service and press were concerned. The cooperation with the Italians is alreadyexemplary; the same is true for the cooperation with Ru.mania, Hungary andSlovakia. The press, radio, etc. of the.se countries were already so .synchronized

with each other that they form one single weapon. The same kind of doSecontact must be established with Japan. The Ambassador welcomed this andintends to set up a program with our men determining how our Japanese propa-ganda can be most effectively intensified in all fields.

Ambassador Oshima explained that when the Three-Power Pact was concluded,vai'ious opinions were still present in Japan. It was then that the Emperorintervened with an edict. It must be stated, however, that, impressed by theGerman victory in the West, the Japanese people are now entirely for the Three-Power Pact.

[.5] Ambassador Oshima remarked further that in Japan, under the influenceof the events, the hard feelings against America had risen considerably. TheRei'h Foreign Minister referred to the recent statement of Nomura, the JapaneseAmbassador in the U. S. A., concerning Japan's attitude in case of America'sentry into the war, and mentioned that he considered it appropriate to talk plainlane-uage with the U. S A. Ambassador Oshima remarked hereto that the JapaneseMinistry of Foreign Affairs had given instructions to that effect. The Ministerfor Foreign Affairs pointed out that particularly in view of the desire to keepAmerica out of the war, plain language must be used. Only if the U. S. realized

that the.v were confronting firm determination, would they hold back. The peoplein the U. S. did not like National Socialism. However, they were not willing to

eacri''ce their sons and therefore were against an entry into the war. TheAmerican peoi)le felt instinctively that they were drawn into the war for noreason, by Roosevelt and the Jewish wire-pullers. Therefore, our politics withthe U. S. should be plain and firm, but, of ccmrse, not aggressive. In the U. S.

they must realize that Germany, Italy and Japan had no hard feelings for theAm'^rican i)eoj)le. but that .should the U. S. A. have any aggre.ssive desires, theywould confront an iron fi-ont of determined people, a front, at that, which includespractic-'dly the whole world. One would therefore have to work in close coopera-tion against the attempts of misrepresentation by the British propaganda. As faras speeches and addresses of a principal nature are concerned it would be neces-

sary to keep up a continuous exchange of ideas. In this connection the Ministerfor Foreign Affairs i-eferred to a recent remark by Matsuoka concerning Japanesewillingness to act as mediator for peace negotiations. This remark had beenextensively exploited b.v the enemy propaganda.The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was Japan's friendship

which Jiad enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded.


On the other hand, Japan had beoii able to penetrate deeply into the English

sphere of Interest in China. Germany's victory on the continent has brought

now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great advantages for Japan.

France, as a power, was eliminated in the Far East (Indochina). England too

was considerably weakened, Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore.

Thus, Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the future

fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical situation we should have to

carry the main burden of the tinal battle in the future, too. If an unwantedconflict with Russia should arise we should have to carry the main burden also

in this case. If Gernlany should ever weaken, Japan would tind itself con-

fronted by a world-coalition within a short time. We were all in the same boat.

The fate of both nations was being determined now for centuries to come. Thesame was true for Italy. The interests of the three countries would never inter-

sect. A defeat of Gerinany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic

idea.

[G] Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and em-phasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial position. TheReich Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems which would arise

after the war for the parties of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a neworder in Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a bold

solution. Thereby no overcentralization should take place, but a solution should

be formed on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regard

to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchangeof trade should take place between the two spheres of interest on a liberal

basis. The European-African hemisphere under the leadership of Germany andItaly, and the East-Asia sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. As heconceived it, for example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agree-

ments directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere, as here-

tofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade agree-

ments witl) the independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such as

China, Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two economicspheres, each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with regard to

third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with this thought.

The Reich Foreign Minister then touched uiwn the question, explicitly pointed

out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be required, on the basis

of new affronts by the U. S. A,, to break off diplomatic relations. Germany andItaly wore fundamentally determined on this; after signing of the Three-PowerPact we should proceed if the occasion arises, but also jointly in this matter.

Such a lesson should open the eyes of the people in the U. S. A. to the situation

and under certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public

opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America found herself

entirely in the wrong. The common step of the signatory powers should be

exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question, however, was in no wayacute at the time.

EXHIBIT NO. 166

wnx iNMOATC Winn— IrFiNrali

Cai>«a{D*yMtariNlgUMtar

CMf(v iNiMnwwb

FiRrali

DqrMtwlll(W l«ner

Clurg.

S

Telegram SentI

Deomber S, 1941.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

U»iDQN

x' FOR THE AMBASSADOR

With reference to your 5876< p:pleaee read the folloiring

J)*cable to Eden personally but leave no text of' the neeeage:

v'WfUff,^ One. As proof of AaerloBn policy of aid to

Russia, this OoTcmiBent recently sent representatbrea to th«.

Soviet Onion In order to diecues the furnieblng of supplies

to the Soviet Union to assist it in its struggle •gainst

the Nazi invasion. These representatives eat'ei-ed Into an

agreement with the Soviet Oovemaent as' to suppllesjan

agreement which waa coordinated with a similar effort by

the British Government.

Two. It is our conviction that the test of our good

faith with regard to the Soviet Union le the measure to

which we fulfill the commitments our representatives made

o8

i

4o03

EnclpltenJ ty _.

Str^ iy optralor A«, »_0?

1—14M 1. ». •evceaam miitim •rp^ac


li^MMMMIitt^JMiMi^TS lit tMMMMTRS

I I

ifMntt Telegram Sent NaNaaMnaamM.«btlMt DayMI* Mumtw

f«8 Mto '

Ctwf*to

t -8--

la Moeoov. Ve are exerting everr effort to oarrj cmt

tbeee obllgattoas and vill oontlaue to do so antiX the

final !story.

flaree. In so far aa our poet var pollelea are eoaoemed.

It 18 oar belief that these bare beea delineated in the

Atlantic Charter irtU.eh today repreeente the attltixde aet

only of the United States but also of Oreat Brltala and of

the Soviet Oaloa.

Poor. In view of this faot la onr considered opinion

It would be unfortunate were any of the three goTemiients,

now on eommon ground In the Atlantic Charter to express any

vllllngness to enter Into coBualtaents regarding speclfle

teras of the post war settleaent. Sieousslons between the

several govemaents looking toward fullest possible agreeaent

on basic polleles and toward later asnrangeaent s at the

proper t'lae and with full public knowledge will of course

be expected to oontlnue. Upon the conclusion of hostilities

those nations oontrlbutlng to the defeat of the Hitler

forces will Join in an effort to restore peace and order.

£nc^*trWiy „.

a. I. •tmtm»mmr mamiim wnm

3650 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR AITACK

CellKt

»€»*»! NO Omct I TO M THAmWIT llDWILL INDICATE WHCTHCR __ _ COWriDINTIAL OOOC

f"""t« Telegram Sent

Bppartm^nt of 9fate

NONCOMFiaCMTIAL OOOC

PAICTAIII0«y letti^r

Nl)|>it Utter

diarge Oepartmwit:

FutI nlF

Day letttr

Nlidit letter Waihlntton.

Char|^ to

$ -3-

The partlclpctlon at that time of the Soviet Government

will be no lees' than that of Great Britain and our oirn.

In order not to Jeopardize the alnre we shall all share

In common looking to an enduring peace It Is evident

that no commitments as to Individual oountrles should be

entered Into at this time. It would be unfortunate If we

should approach the peace conference thue hampered. Above

all there must be no secret accords.

Five. Our basic policy of aid to England is no less

strong thjin thst of aid to Rusala and we are confident thatf I

there le no doubt in the British mind as to our good faith

In carrying out our policy. It was In this spirit the

Atlpntlc Charter was conceived, to which the Soviet Qovena-

aent has now given its adherence. Given the llmltatlone

of this Government, It woiild be difficult if not lorooeelble

for us to Implement this oosuaon understanding by agreements

of n more detailed nature at this time, rurthermore, the

consitutlonal llmltetlop to which this Government la bound

must be keot in mind.

Entipi-nHy

Sad hy ii^iiii^w J#, /f_


racPAHiNa orricEwiu. mnCATC whcther

(Fotl r>t«

CellKt {Dty letter

INIght l«tt«r

Charge D«p«rtment:

Full rate

Dijr letter

Nl^ letter

Charge to

%

Telegram Sent

TO• tXANWirmoCOWIOCNTIAL OOOC

HONOOMriDeMTiAL cooe

MltTAHl

-4-

¥e have very frankly Indicated our position In order

that in Tlev of the short tine before Mr. Eden's dep&rtare

he may have no mlstinderetandlng as to the general lines of

our position.

As to numbered paragraph seven of your telegram ire

abstain from comment because of uncertainty as to its •

meaning. In the event that further dlsoueslons on this

are contemplated we would like to have fuller infor)&atiaB»

Ka:RA:RIC

fm^Jmti l|)

Stnl is tfitnim

.

.«,. .» ..

••.•vnmmm* tmrnnm *

3652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION I'EAHL HARBOR ATTACK

EXHIBIT NO. 167

,

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3racTi.Y -ouFiyznTiuL

Hovember "6, 1941

Tho roproentfltlVBS of tli« OoverriTient of th« United

:tate« an; of the Sovarnment of Japan have been carrying

on durln;' the pnet several monthe Infortnni n l exnlora-

toiry oonveraatlona for the curoone of arrlv*. t

settlement If poealble of r'uwBtlons rel tin- tc tr."

entire Paolflo area biaed U'->on the nrlnclnlfs of oeaoe,

law and or-Jar nnd fair aeallnr amonr nations. fheee

prlnolplea include t'.e ^rlnclnle of inviolability of

tarritorial integrity an.3 aoveroli'inty of eaoh and all

nations; the principle of non-interfaranoe In V.f^ in-

ternal affaire of other oountriee; the ^rlnolnlft of

equality, Inoludinr' equality of oommerolal opioi-tutilty

ana treatment; an l the rrlnoi.^lo of irelianoe u^'on in-

ternational cooperation an; oonoillation for the nre-

,«ntlon and paoifio settlement of oontrovereltH an

for Imorovenjent of intarnatlonal oondltlon:i by peaceful

methods and prooeaees.

It is believed tnat in our lloouesionn ;io;:8 protrreas

has been rnAds In referanoo to the K^n^ral principles

whiUh


-2-

whloh conntltute the baeiia of a peaceful eettlenient cor-

erlng the entllre Faolflo area. ecently the JapanPee

Ambaeeador haa stated that the Jspanese UoTcrnment le

deelroua of continuing the oonr«*rBatlone direct' d tow«>rd

a oomprehenclYe and peaceful settlement In the Faoiflo

area; that It would be helpful toward creating an ataoa-

phere favorable to the aucoeaaful outooae of the conver-

aatlone If a teaporary modui TlTendl could be agreed uoon

to be m effect while the oonvereatlons looking to a

peaceful aettlement In the Pacific were continuing.

On November 20 the Japanese Aabaaaador oommimloated to

the Secretary of State propoeale In regard to temporary

meaeurea to be tnken reepeotlvely by the Government of

Japan and by the Government of the United Statea, wt ioh

meastirea are underatoed to have been daalgned t» aoooapliah

the porpoaes above indicated.

The Government f the United Statea moat earneatly

dealrca to contribute to the promotion and maintenanoe

of peace and atabllity in the Paoifio area, and t« afford

every opportunity for the sontlnuanoe of dlaouaalons JhBwith the Japaneee Oovernment directed toward working out a

bro«d-*gav^e program of peaoe throughout the Paoifio are*.

The propoaala whleh were preaented by the Japanea*

Ambaaaado*

aontrlns -iroYl«lonc ttonllnjr with th» pr««tl««l «o 11-

i-.i our oonT«r»«tlon« orf?tlt.ut<» t'9 onlf toun'^^ bueli

r->r vr»rthvr»-.vi» lnt<»rn»tl pnul relations. ** hoym that

t<tT '."!-»-! ~ur txo nov«»rr:-'^--t« may b« «3r^«4it«''»


praiqTLY coNrin^NTiAL .

Cooy of document hended by the

Secret iry of State to the

JsDPneae /îrbpsspsir onNovember ?6. 1341.

RoTMiber 86, 1941.

Saotlon I

Th« OoT«rTUB«nt of the Unitad Stataa and the (k>T«m>

mcnt of Japan both bvlng solloitoua for Che psao* of tha

Paolflo affira Chat thslr national polloi»a zâ air««t«d

,vH towaru lasting and axtanalva psao* throughout tha Paolflo

area, that thay hava no tarrltorlal daalpcna In that area,

that thay have no Intention of thraatanln^ other ooun-

trlea or of using ailltary foroa aggraaalvaly aâlnnt any

" neighboring nation, and that, a«oordlnKly, In thalr na-

tional pollolaa thay will aotlvely aupport and give

praotloal apolloatlon to tha following fundamental

prlnolplaa upon whloh their relatione with eaoh othar

and with all other t/ovemmentB are baaad:

(1) The principle of Inviolability of territorialIntegrity and Boveralfi;nty of eaoh and all nations.

(2) The prlnolnla of non-lnterferenoe In tha Internalaffairs of other eountriee.

(3)


(3) Th« prlnolpl* of •quality, inoluAlng tquallty ofooaasroial oppertualtjr and traataant.

(4) Tha prlnolpla ^f rallanoa upon Intamatlonal eo>oparatlon and oonolllatlon for tha prarentlon andpaolflo aattlaaant of oontroTaralaa and for !»•proTaaant of Intamatlonal oonditiona hj paaeafalaathoda and p):^>aaaaaa.

Tha Oovamaant of Japan and tha Oorarmiant ^t tha

Unltad Stataa hara agZHtvd that toward allalnatlng ehronle

pelltloAl inataMllty, pravantlng raourrant aoonoBle «olo

lapaa. and orovidlng • baala for paaoa, thay will aotlraly

aupport and praotleallj apply tha following prlnelplaa la

thalr aooaoale ralatlona with aaoh othar and with othar

natloaa and paopl«a:

(I) The prlnelpla of aoB-dlafiorlalnatloa In Intama-tlonal oomarelal ralaitloaa.

(e) Tha prlnolpla of Intamatlonal aeoaealo ooopcra-tloa and alwlltlon of axtraaa natlonallaa a« ax>praaaad la ax«aaalva trada raatrlotlona.

(3) Tha prlnelpla of aon-dlaerlalnatory aeaaaa byall natlona to raw aatarlal aappllaa.

() Tha prlnelpla of full protaatlon of tha Intar-aata of eoaamlng eountrlaa and pepulatlona ••rafarda tha oparatlon of Intamatlonal eoaaodltyacraaaaata.

(9) Tha prlaelpla of aatahllabaaat of aneh laatlta-tlena and arr«ac«aanta of Intaraatloaal fiaaaea•a aay lend aid to tha aaaantlal antarprlaaaant tlM eeatlitnotta davalepatant of all oeitntrlaama& aay paralt payaaata throoi^ prooaaaaa oftrada eenaonant with tha welfare of all.eevstrlee.

, ::.«!«^i:;SJi;.}:?;*a5;i«ii-?*

79716 O—46—pt. 19- -16

S*etioR IZ

aitBi to \n Tuita bx thf ffaTtnuifttt of tbt ymnaatatti and by th* OoT^rMtnt of Japan

Th« doTaraaant of tha Dnltad Btataa and tha (>ot>

araaant of Japan propoaa to taka atapa aa followa:

1. Tka OoTarnnant of tha Unltad Stataa and tha Oot-

amaant of Japan will andaaTor to ooneluda a aultllataral

non->agfraaalon paot aaong tha Britlah Caplra, China,

Japan, tha Natharlanda, tha Soviat Union, Thailand and

tha Dnltad Stataa.

Z. Both QbranuMRta will andaaror to oonoluda aaong

tha Aaarloan, Britlah, Chlnaaa, Japanaaa, tha Natharland

and Thai OovainiBanta an afraaaant wharaundar aaeh of tha

OoTamaaata would pladga Itaalf to raapaet tha tarrltorlal

Intagrlty of fraaeh Zndoehlna and. In tha arant that thara

ahoald daralop a thraat to tha tarrltorlal Intagrlty of

Indoohlna, to antar Into laaadlata oonaultatlon with m

law to taklnc aaoh aaaauraa aa wmj ha daaaad naoaaaarj

and adrlaabla to aaat tha thraat In qaaatloa. Sueh mgr*<h'

aant would proTlda al ao that aaeh of tha OoTamaaata party

to tha ayraaaant would not aaak or aaeapt prafarantlal

traataaat In Ita trada or aeoaoala ralatlona with Indoohlaa

and


-4-

snfi would u«« Itp innuene* to obtntn for titeh of th«

algnptorlta equality of tr«>atment in trad* and eommero*

with franoh Indochina.

3. Tha TeiTiment of Jnnan will withdraw all mili-

tary, nflval, air and polloa forcas fram China and froa

Indochina.

4. The OoTemiaeBt of tha United States and the Qor-

ernment of Jpptn will not aupoort — llltarlly, politi-

cally, eoonoBlcally — any go^^^^nm•nt or regiaa in China

other than tha National OoT«rn»iant of tha Haoubllo of

China with oaoltal tes'-orarlly *>t Chungking.

ft. Both Ckfrernieenta will glra up all extraterrltorlul

rigbta In China, Including rights and Interests In and

with ragprd to Intt^rn^tional settlements and concessions,

and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both QoTsrnaents will eni^earor to obtain the agres-

ment of the British pnd othur govemTentB to give up

extraterritorial rights in Chins, including rights in

International ssttlementq and la oonossslons and under

the Boxer Protocol of 19nl.

6. Tne OoTernmfnt of ths United 3t«tes and the

OoTernmeat

0«Trrnffi«nt of •'»o«n will •nt«r late ni^KotlAtlon* for

th« oonolualon betvoen tho tJnlC«d Statoa «i>(i 'i^pma of •

trad* agrtsaMtt, bnc^d upon r«aiprctflal noot>f 4vor«»d-

ntitlon trvetsont and reilnotlort of tr^de bp/riwm by

both oountriaa, Including mn undortakin^^ by th« Unlt«d

States to bind raw cllk on tha fr«« list.

7. Tha Oovamnant of tHp n-it'n '• t ' " «•

OoTemaont of Jap»n vlll, ra«paot!v«'7y, riis807» tha

fraaelng reatrlotljnf on J!>i>«nei?e fan<^« In tba United

Stt's nu or, Affiarloan funda In Jrp-'n.

8. Both uoTarn<B*nta will spr*^ .. ^~- i-- f-j, t^j^

stabllliatlon of tha dollar-yan rata, lix- the -<llooa~

tlon ot fuQds 9d»quata for file c«rt>oae, half to ho

auppllad by Jnpnn and h-ilf by tha United St^-ta*.

9. ootb i>o»arnfflanta will sgree- thnt no .'ftraewant

V Ich either hptt concluded irlth anj t*"lrd i>ot«»r or power*

ahall Ve l't8T*^rat*d by It In auo' vqy na to eonfllot

with V .'•' t' 1 = <?Kr9»»'»">-t, tha we-

t '.bllshaent • .,„,,.... »;>^, ,, „. _.,,. -„ t r r the

10. Both ^oTamaanta will us* thalr Influano* to

oauaa othor gorarwaenta to adhere to and to give praotloal

application to tha baaio polltloal and acoios-lo prlnwlplaa

•t forth In tMa agraasant.

I

'I


OsAL Statement by State Depabtment Spokesman to the Pbbss, November26, 1941

The Japanese representatives were handed for their consideration a document

that is the culmination of conferences back and forth during recent weeks. It is

unnecessary to repeat what has been said so often in the past that it rests on

certain basic principles with which the correspondents should be entirely familiar

in the light of many repetitions.Depabtment of State,

For the Press. December 7, 1941.

No. 585.

The text of the document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese

Ambassador on November 26, 1941, which consists of two parts, one an oral

statement and one an outline of a proposed basis for agreement between the

United States and Japan, reads as follows :

"ORAL

"Strictly confidential."November 26, 1941.

"The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Gov-

ernment of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal

and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if pos-

sible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of

peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include

the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and soverignty of each andall nations ; the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other coun-

tries ; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity andtreatment ; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and con-

ciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for

improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

"It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference

to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement

covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated

that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed

toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area ; that it wouldbe helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of

the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in

effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific werecontinuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the

Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respec-

tively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States,

which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes

above indicated."The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute

to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, andto afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the JapaneseGovernment directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peacethroughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the JapaneseAmbassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this

Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the

general settlement under consideration and to which each Government hasdeclared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes

that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ulti-

mate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area,

and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of viewsin regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already

mentioned.With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the

consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement

covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a programwhich this Government envisages as something to be worked out during ourfurther conversations.The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between

our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a

new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific

settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application


of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our ocnversations con-

stitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hopethat in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our twoGovernments may be expedited."

"Strictly confidential,

tentative and without commitment."November 26, 1941.

"Outline of Proposed Basis foe Agreement BetweenTHE Uniteid States and Japan

"Section I. Draft mutual declarations of policy

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both beingsolicitious for the peace of the Pacific aflSrm that their national policies arediVected toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, thatthey have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention ofthreatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against anyne'ighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will

actively support and give practical application to the following fundamentalprinciples upon which their relations with each other and with all other govern-ments are based

:

"(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty ofeach and all nations.

"(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries."(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity

and treatment."(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and concilia-

tion for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for inprove-ment of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

"The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States haveagreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recur-rent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will activelysupport and practically apply the following principles in their economic relationswith each other and with other nations and peoples

:

"(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial rela-

tions.

"(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition ofextreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

"(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw materialsupplies.

"(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countriesand populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

"(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements ofInternational finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the con-tinuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processesof trade consonant with the welfare pf all countries.

"section II. STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND BTTHE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan proposeto take steps as follows

:

"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan willendeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the BritishEmpire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and theUnited States.

"2. Roth Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British,

Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement where-under each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integ-rity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat tothe territorial integrity of Indochina, toenter into immediate consultation with aview to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meetthe threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of theGovernments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treat-ment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence


to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commercewith French Indochina.

"3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police

forces from China and from Indochina."4. The government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not

support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in Chinaother than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital tempo-rarily at Chungking.

"5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, includ-

ing rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements andconcessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

"Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British andother governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in

international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901."6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will

enter into negotiat' as for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of

a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment andreduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by theUnited States to bind raw silk on the free list.

"7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will,

respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the UnitedStates and on American funds in Japan.

"8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-

yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be suppliedby Japan and half by the United States.

"9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concludedwith any third power or jwwers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to

conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment andpreservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

"10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments toadhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economicprinciples set forth in this agreement.


"t*nP:

V.

\'^3f?S£3H|

D«o«m1>«r 2, 1941

1

MB'.ORAia>OM

Oirlalon of

At thB Pr»»ldent'5 prass oonferenc a this aftamoon,

the Fresldent aunoxuiced that ha had reoalved a lattar from

tha Bfiierganey Railway Board concaitiing the settlement of

the Hallway demands. He read a part of the lattar and

said that tha rest of it wotild be given to correspondents ^

by Mr. Early. 7"

!nia President coiasented that he trusted that that Is the ^end of their trouble and that tomorrow he would be given

the fonoal report and a transcript of the proceedings.

Tb.9 President was asked if the Japanese marohed into

Thailand what would the Dnitad States Government doT The

President evaded tha question. Another correspondent asked

if the President oould give any indication of the nature of

tha information requested from the Japanese Representatives

this morning. Xha President said let us put it this way,

and this answers again many questions at the same time.

Since last April we have bean disouasing with the Japanese

some method to arrive at an objective that is pesvumeat peace

in the whole area in the Pacific and at times It seemed that

progress was being made. During tha whole period up to tha

end of June we assuaed ttiat as both nations ware negotiating

toward that objective - there would be no act contrary

to the desired wid of paace. We ware therefore somewhat

aurprlsed whan the Japanasa Govarranent sent troop* to

a specific over-all total Into ZndOrChina after vary brief

negotiations with tba Viohy Ckivammant at tha ooneluslonI.

of #iloh tha Viehy Govenmaat let it be understood clearly

titiat they had agreed to this msBd>ar of troops principally

becavM*

01

I

CD

a

at

-xjMmmiacam


p:

-2-

beoa»ise they were powarleao to do anything else.

Sometlffl* later convoraations wars reaumed with th«

United States and again we made it perfectly clear that

the objective we were seeking meant the taking of no

additional territory by anyone in the Pacific area. We

received word the other day that there were large

additional bodies of Jaoa.;ese forcaa of various kiixis,

including troops, planes, war vessels, etc., in Indo-Chlna

and that other forces were on the way. Before these forces

had arrived the nxamber of forces already there had greatly

exceeded the original amoxmt agi^ed to by the French and the

number on the way were much greater, and the question asked

this morning very politely, at my request, was as to what

the purpose and intention of tha Japanese Government was as

to the future, eliminating the necessity of policing

Indo-caiina which is a very peaceful spot and we hope to

receive a reply in the near future.

In reply to a question as to whether any time for &

i»eply liad been set, the President said that there had

naturally been no time limit set.

W^ffiW


EXHIBIT NO. 168

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Letter dated November 18, l&il, from Secretary of the Treasury HenryMorgenthau to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, transmitting a memoran-dum dated November 17, 1941, which had also laeen sent to the President,entitled "An Approach to the Problem of Eliminating Tension with Japanand Insuring Defeat of Germany."

2. Memorandum dated November 18, 1941, of conversation between Secretaryof State Hull and the British Minister concerning "Conversations BetweenSecretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassadors."

3. Memorandum dated November 19. 1941, of conversation between SecretaryHull and the Netherlands Minister.

4. Memorandum dated November 19, 1941, of conversation between SecretaryHull and the Australian Minister.

5. Memorandum dated November 26, 1941, of conversation between Stanley K.Hornbeck and the Canadian Minister Counselor.

6. Memorandum dated November 29, 1941, of conversation between SecretaryHull and the Australian Minister.

7. Memorandum dated November 30, 1941, of conversation between SecretaryHull and the Australian Minister concerning "Conversation BetweenAustralian Minister and Ambassador Kurusu."

8. Dispatch #280 dated December 1, 1941, from the State Department to theAmerican Embassy, Chungking, concerning the Chinese opposition to theproposed modus vivendi and the U. S. negotiations with Japan.


^^ftJiSfe5">:|:i

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURYWASMINOTON

Kovenber 18, 19^1 JlL.

t)e(i«dm«frf »f St»t»

Dear Ck>rdoll:

I am enclosing copy of a

letter and memoranduffl which I

am sending to the President.

Sincerely,

/l

The Honorahle,

The Secretary of State.

Enclosures

4/^A

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t«rn* of rslf tloribir J<»ll; ' v...'F'if»; c h-

portunltlt* lost 'c: v«;'. • '-^vl

ij-r«VOOiitlj to « C3urii'» of fctl-^- io •' tn«» -cv > ,-

oi«« eiioia«, to »oeept x>tt9Tm »>ns^ (fc«K'» ;->' 'itl '•.!».

*f tuft . r«rl -.lint .sir* t -rr>rô»« iOTtthl:..-' Ilk' * •,«•

s '»9n«l««! afTf'fnent -â- tr.» • t, th<» whol world

woul<l fc« •l«olrifl»d by th* auco9*<8ful tr^nsforairtlon of «

liirvnivninK «r.J t*lll,-.-.; »nt --yw^rful '»n«»?ay Into f. pesc-ifuX

fcfiu ',>rosp«rou« nei/htor. "ft*^ -.-rwettj^ -n ' *': <» !««» '•ri-'ii'-

^f tnm rr«sid«nt both «t ho»*» ;rocA»t

tjr bo brilliant i»n*5 !»aat«ntou» 8 U^-lossptlc vlftory -.« ».

victory th»t p»<>ulr»« no v«n<7ulch«i<S, « victory th t

lawful-. t«ly voulrt Trln>'- p«»o«, n^ ^«ln*8« »n *> TotrTlty

i-, hun»!r«»d* of million* of «tt»rn r«ir.-l^», pn*! «' ?>ur« th«

8ttb«9cu«nt <1«f«flt nf -trftAnyl

Th« prope*i»l I" workr-tl* rn^ o * •r<»ctRoul'>rly

•iM««««riii, If J^-^sn ro'jl'^ fc* i- hj #d t.~ «eo#-t t!--' -r-^nfr^-

B«ntf and th» êf.t »n5v«at».-»» It t?ffi^r^ tn *)>,r»»n, s'tmi th9

fiiot tr-.nt th« likely *ll«rn*tlT» Is wi-r "*i.«ht Iniiûe* ^»vitti

Tho V'ro<,>oi>«l Is «;i^N»n t>*l««f only in bar* outXin* and

In -nl; #nour:ft (l«t«ll t« lr««l"iit«» tn* •••imtL.Al r>olnt«.

"txist \(s f»o»t n*«<1l«d At t'ds .ôatant Is not e oajr«fulVj

worked vût '>rotnrw>, but rather -« Oaoicion tn •»T>l»y an

Bll<»ottt llnlMiAtio «r-.>rea«h In tu« ourrant <il80utii«ia

with the «;«,î»n#«a.

^S^^BT'"-'

rtfjBjTlfftni frtrngflliifM CwMtrilifffliULUH01alil..Mij|lMi

1, "ss b«tv«en t^«» i'nit»* ^tates «tn4 Jii|>fifi v««1d ©ett

tl'>n>'an&9 of Uvea, billlMlt of aell»»r«} i#fmlii l«av«

voald fo»t«>r iool.iX ^!l«ra?tl«a, «»d v<ml<! ii«tS lumow

l>«ae« .-ftifln-;; war «hitir»n*f llv*»r, nor '^.*rm?m«nt'lf

t»(? eoantrl»«.

?• Th« tfnit«kl ^t«t*« ^]*«f«rti a J««t and p««««fu^ ••%%!•»

nt«ntit.o war as a ««Aiia ef MttXing iatarnatloMil

aiffioultl«s, and it wilXlay^ t© r« wftra than half way

t;o settla oeaeaably She Itaitas th^t ttand in »h« wajr

of -ftoro friendly iataramtraa batvaaa %h« tva ©evMitrlaa.

.?. -••- •r.t«-.» -r-.t--! r-"^'-"<f'»'s t!T*t Jp-ân, b»«a««a cf

•1 ^ • « ,. . 1 :^- ' .,, ,,v » ; « |» ti*'** TrV,''••?? of fO*ir

'if niâd >tat«« r««o^Tala«« thtt oar iaislgratlOB

law» h$iV9 In fnot uajustly dlaorljslni; t«»ci aâinAt tlM

6, rh« ''nltad 't*t-'; h<»iiPTo» that In tr* loa rt»n tha

lnZf>v9t« of botJ iR«fl«» r,#onlFi n ch« vm«rloaA

•o "» e - ''• rt h*) p«rT"f1 by •at'^bllrhln fulr and

r••• e^ful cori.:ltl"na uftviwr ^'hloh - 'lor nslo^hbor*

C'-n TOfoer,


onno«v


41.1* ay n

%c

mv

.79716 O—46—pt. 19 17

f,.- . -.^.n. ". f .„^M^..-%.r3i?'.A'.,:i~«iaamc

:«cmnB9 of th« ford<;oliVi f*cL«, U-« rnlted ^t&t«»

^;-o>)0««i' to •nter Into ftn A^«*Mi«nt wltii Japar. • * "ic»

imd«r whloh th« Utiit«d 0t«&«a and Japan will a«;r^ to do

o«rtaln thins* » aa follovit

On h«r port, tlx» Unit«d ::»t«t#8 ôvenuaant propoaoa to

dc th« f ollowlritj;!

1, To withdraw tiiw bulk of titm Urnriom Mnval foro««

froa tha ?a«lflo»

2. To aliin a Ô^ywar non-»,igra»»lon paet with Japan.

5. To promote « final ••ttlanant of th« Manahurian

:ju9»tlon,

h* To actively ad-vooata thw placlajj of Indo-Chlna

und«r tr-« Oovemmant of « Jc nt British, Pponei;, Japanoso,

C.lnese and American CoB»:l*8ion, which w.aI inaur* ..o«t-

favc red-nation treatinent or t oae fir© couatrioa imtil th*

••iropaan •ar la ended, «sral «f Ic;-. will ,;;oTern ti\» country

prlnarilj '-: t.he L-iereats , ,. .e inclo-Chirjoa© paopla,

' .-i«« u- all axtra-t«rrltorial ri^,ht» In China,

and t: o&taln ,u^m>i.'B a,.,ramueint to jlva up h«sr axtra-

territorial rli^htla 1^ China, and tîve lion^^ Kon^ back to

China,

6, To pre* ant to Conjraaa and puan for enactmant a

bill to repeal tha latml.^ration Aot of 1>17 whle.\ pro.hlblta

l.TCul jraticam Into the United J^tatea oi Japaneae, and place

Japuneae and tha C)ilr.e«e tiiB aaae baala aa ot-her

oiotlate a trade a^reewent with Japan, giving

her (a) -.cat-favcred-nat-on treatmont and (b) a ich conoesaloriB

on lm->ort« *• con X.a .r.utuail'i siiUisf act r' i; ^-.v- . -' , '-

-

oludln.^ an u.jC6«:.. . raw t

20 yot.-«.

', , ô 0JLt»ntl IX <- .l.l.cu . C-yosLT crfU t t.l .

Cfer.t Ir.toresfct to L« drtti»n u^jon tit tlie rate not to ©ACfee>I

7200 rjlllioii a I'^nup txca t wit a,.^>rcvji-. cl 'J\e roeiuant

of tha rnlt«<l £t&t*«.

'y. To set up a .ÔO .-iillon i»t*.l^:^;-il .

atipplied b^' Japan anJ -.alf by the ' nited . tat^c, I o

usad for th« •tabllisatlon .if t:*e doilt.*'-^ en r.i'cc.

10* To ranova th« rostriotions on Jaâiios* fun^s a

tha Unicad Stat«a«

li. re u»« Itt Uiflxience to the full to »tta.t.pt to

eliminate eourcee of ..otentlal friction ustwien Japan and

her naiîhbora, and to assure Japaji access lo tlê r*» ..Uiterlala

of ti.e world on the aase baala a* ..c» e:-..'c.!id b; '.n-tod

3t«taa and araat Bri tain*

8« On Ita j>art, the Japaneie Oovemnent ..ro- cst-s tc do

the followlnjx

1* Withdraw all alllter?, nuval, air cllee fcroea

frcn China iuounuir lea aa cl ly^l) fro*. indo-C.ina md

trtm Thailand.

^, wxtbdra* ail aup.)ort — allitury, ôlltical» cr

aeonoatlo — fron any ^ôvemriont In China oth«r tiian that

of tlM national govarnoaatu

>• Replaea with jvx ourrenoy at a rate agreed upon

tmoTiQ, tlie Treaaurlea of China, Japan, inland and l-nited

Statea all military acrlp, yen ai-â :vu.->;jet iot«e c ' rcUatlno

In China.

. I •

U* ilv up nil •xtr«-> territorial ri^^ita In China.

5, Vottatid to China a billion y^n loan at Z per o«nt

tc aid In r«oc>!>atructln>^ China (ut x*«t« of IOC million

yan a yaar)

•

6, *lt5idraw all Ja;.ana»« trccy/a from Manchuria

exea:^t for a few dlvlMlona naceasar, ua r ^cIIca force,

provided .-".,3,R. wltHdrawe all h«r troops froro tiie Far

'•;aeterr. front o..cept x or au oviuivalent rcrvalndar.

7, SeLl to txie Vnlted itat^s uj Lc thrae-f o'lrtha

of .or current output <^f war .literlal — 'ncl-jlln^ .-.aval,

ttlv, ordnance arid co 5:©;'cJLi i a''. l;.>a on a coat-pluc .;0 per

cent '.aala aa tV.e <;nit«iu . tatds uay aeleot.

,. i;.x;jel all ;er!-.ta.u ttc -iical ---.mn, .llltar;* oificlala

and ;.)roi;o jandlata,

9. Aooord tne "nlted States a-ii Cvl'.a .cai-favcred-

natlon treatnent In the whole Japanese Lmpivo,

10. }<o jot late a iO-yaar non-a.^jresalo:. pact with

rn'ted states, '.•.n**, -^rl'lah '.,lr-€, ..\H,c'. in.lles (and

: l.illpplnes;

.

C. Inaamnch as ti;f T'niteU tatec caniiot ;jerK' t ti.'' ;r«3ent

M'^.certa'n statua between the 'r't'-c' ::tatea ani ^$.ut^i t con-

:,:.n-je In view of world devolci-nieriti, and feols ocs.ve

action is called for now» the 'nltcd ntataa aLoul-J extend

the above offer cf a -enercsa and poacefnl t-^lutlrr. .' the

difflc iltlr-e betneer t'.<r, trtc coun-rles fcr or.l; & ilrllt;^

tl:2e. If t-ie Japanore ". ^vern-.aent doea not Indicate Ita

Aooe tanco In nrlnclpl- ft least of t-.-i ,,.'offered terrska

• 10 •

b«for* th« •xplration of Vtxmt %tM», It Mm —an <mlj

th4Lt th« pr«««nt Japanasa Qor^rxmmnt prafsra othar aadi

laaa paaaaful waya of aelvla^^ thoaa dlffiexiltiea, and

la awaiting tha prapitloua Bonent to attaapt to cmrvj

out furtlxar a plan of oonq[aaat«

- 11 -

11-

Arivfnt«>fi;e« to Jtr^n and United9t«t »(i of Sttob an"Ai:r><—nT"

th* ftii'rantegei aooruiog to each goT*mn«nt sr<

listed below

t

. To tht Onlt»d 8t«t»t

1. In th« erent thi»t J«»ri»n el«cte<^ to rtjtot th«

offtr of p««o*ful solution undtr terwe herein Inflicatefl,

the tynited States would here a clearer Idea of whrt tc ^x-

peot and eonld therefore know better ho« to ah6|.e her own

pollejr.

2. Our naval power will be greatly inereaeed at

oaoe hjr the freeing of our Paciflo fleet for duty eleewhere.

3. T^e would he able to eend wore of our equipment

to Saglaad and Ruitl* without inoreaeing our vulnerahilitf

t« mm attaok froa the &««t.

k, ff« will hare stopped the war in Ohiaa and have

regained for her hor freedoa.

3. We will have paved tho ««y for • aubetantial in-

oreeo* in pott««ar trsda.

€, Ve would greatly strengthen the Allied poaitioa

wla-a-wli (KinMugr.

7. «• will haw* lawed ourealTOi froa a war with Japan.

f. fha aoaey it would ooet ue would be a very saall

part of eiut wa weald aawe hy not haTiag to fight Japaa«

or hy not haTiag to \k» prapara« for a two-oeeaa war.

9, A pretperoaa Japan and Ohiaa oan greatly help to

roetora our noraal trade, ead thao aahe easier oar owa

traaaitioa ta a peaaa tiae eaoaoay.

- X2 -

10. Iitaur« for oum«XT«a an inor«as*d wpplj of

tin, antlaoajr and vood oil and rubbar from tba Far Cast.

11. Handicap Oaraany In Ita orasant llltary oaai-

oalgn and ct tha aaflM tlaia giro graat isoral anoouragaaaat

to tba British and Kuaalf>n oaorla.

1?. rinwllj, military »;nd nhv^l axparte ^ho noir

f««r a "two front" niwol thr«e.t will be move eatnuslaatlo

obout •ll out help to SnRlpnd ond Huaala. Tbara will ba

•"uch lft.= p osutta to ot poua tha *dpjinl««itr»tlon' » foraign

r>oMcy.

B, To J ftpan

1. Inataad of bain^ oonfronted »lth prosiâct of a.

Tore aerlouB war i.nC certain defi^fet In tha and, ahe oan

fifva pefeoe • t onca.

2. Shp ct-n croooed *»t onca to shift from a wt?r aco-

nofliy to pe&oa aoonoay and et the oarae tlfe exparlenoe

•roaperlty rrther thf^n » aarlous aa:r3aalon.

3. uhs o&n withdraw from tha China Incident without

loaa of *f<,ce'*,

U. She oan letrangthen her currency f^nd reduce her

•ubllo debt.

Her foreign trade will greatly Inoreoae.

6. 3ha oan ferote her enarglaa and oiôital to re*

oonfltznjctlnfj Ja^fn, building uu ânohurl«, and developing

ne* trtUe oaHlbllltloa at f tl-ae •«hen other coun'.rlea ara

engaged i'l -^n" or prepsrotlon for wnr.

{, Jhe *111 rt one atroJte have nolrad aoae of her

thorniest crobloâ In h9r Internationfll relatione.

g. :ihe will earold tha BOolal « laruptlon that la bound

to *;r«.e circe In Jnor^n after f>n ex >&ndad end prolonged war

effort.

. 13 -

tk« •• d«aff«r iakMrMt la tte pr*p«M4 «•••••«!•••

! %lut if •eo«pt«d b7 Jap*ii It «o«k<l pr«TiA« h«r «i«h •

%r«athlac •»*•• ^rlaf which th* ••vlA ffrsatly atrwHrthtM

h*r Bllit^nr and •o«M*i« potential, th* sight thM W •

graatar thi*aat to «a a faar or %«• haa«« thaa aha la bo«.

Acainat that poaaih&llty mrm tha fallawiac faatarai

1. Owinc to tha aearaitj af many raw watarlala aha will

not ba ftbla to axpafi4 har nrtTf «tt4 air foraa during

tha naxt year naarljr aa mioh i>a wa oan » partioul-

arl7 in Tlaw of tha proTiaion in tha egraaaant that

wa eaa huj flO pareast of har awrraiit outpwt of arao-

anta.

S. Tha naxt two yaara ara amoial for uo. Xf wo oan

obtain tho t%\.9»»% of tho Itaiaaian. Britlah and Aaari*

ean foroaa now baing tiad up la tha far laat by Japan**

thraatoning, wa will hawo dono aero to •traagthon

Unitod lingdoa and Rutaia wia-a-wia Oarsany than wa

oould with a wbola year*t ovtput of plaaaa aad taaka

and ahipi.

3. Tha Japanaaa poopla would ba ao mliawad by tho

aattloiBont of tha Ohiaa *inoidant*, and tha and of

the throat of war with oMiJor powora, and would bo ao

happy at tha oasaatloa of aeonoaie atrangiilation and

tho aaarganoa af rafil proaparity, that it it hardly

likaly that any military olloua oould «tlr ut> tigni-

fionnt trouble fcr yaara to ooraa.

Altogathar, tha llkallhood of jAp^n'a atrangthan-

iag har rotition and ?»a-antarlng tha world eeaaa aa

a balligaront aggro taor in tha naatt f«» yaara ••••%

^%Tf alia — prowidod Oomany i« daftatad.

- 11^ -

It would, of courae. "" e n«?ceespry to obtain

Congree«lon«l » TOTî sefore n«xln£ d«flnlt« of'trf,

ût through rrelluilni-ry ocnfld«ntl»l contTpnocB with

l*«d«r« <?f botn p^rtlBi «nd with ^cpror.rlot* ooi«»ltt««i,

th« ground ould b« nulokly pr9?«red •« that n«gotl«tiont

could go forward.

i^ oompl«fc»d docuNwnt could In .-. *-«•* or two b« of-

fered to th« Js^Mie'i's ôvemwent. Vhe worln, Including

Xhm J&panea* p»opl» . would snow the aiotlvsB bnd th« oon-

ttats of our offer. If th« Jiiptne«« uoT»rn««nt would not

acovrt, it would hftT* »t least th« greet K.dvitnta(*a of

(i) clarifying jur own policy and rallying aucpor* bahlnd

tha Br-sldant, (?) cr«»ate eeriout diTlaion in Jar»R.

If tba J«i^»a'»»a Oovemaant ware to indieata ita tan-

tatlTa aoQtotanoa In nrlnol'-la, tha rr«dldant oould at'

onoa call a oonfaranoa ia vâhinfton to be attandad by

Chinane, Brltiah, Rufaian, and ocaaibly lAitoh iutist Indian

And hillrtTJina rapraaentstires. InaasiuoJa s>: all tba im-

^>ortant conoaMSiona are to be s^da by United States aa4

Japan, the pcrtioipation of other goremaanta in tha eon>

ferenee need not eftspllcate negotiation**

The above propoacd progriss of mutual ooneesciona

MA be euoeeeeful only if oertAin Tital eoneeeelona »r%

not left out. If adopted vith those oonoessiona oeaee in

the >âeifio would be gained, whereas if adooted without

the« *arrea8e«ent' would be the result, ths threat of

war would not be sTerted* and an axoeptional opoortuaitj

to eettle the if cue on terns farorable to defeat of

Oemany would be lost*


- 15-

VlfilMia ecnoctflomt t« %• o^talaai fr»a /«p«B tfMvlA

b« vlthdraval of tro«p* frea t^ Mlala»4 9t Atla aai •*!•

to ua of tho balk of b«r ««rr«at prodvetlen of ftraaaoat*.

If «t do not •ohltTt thlt« «t thall not obtaia aay •lf«l-

floaat r«litf to •lllo4 «tlit»ry forvot In tho OAtt vlillt

«• would bo aakinc ^^ ooofiUlo for Jovaa to otroactlsoa

iMiroolf for DOaillBlt lator afcroooloa vhoa tho oitaotloa

la aora orooitloaa for aff«rat«lvo «ato oa har part. Thm

vlalava otjaotlraa awat bo to froa tba Aaarleaa, Vritlali

•nd Raaalaa forcaa from tht Paolflo.

HDW:dla11/1 7Al.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


DATE: NOViMBKF. 18, 1941

SUBJECT: COUVEKSATION BET.VKhN SKCRi,TA>.Y HULL AMD TI-iB

JAPANiiSii Al-itiASSADOKS, ADtii U-.AL ztlCHiSABUKO KOMHRAAND Mi- . SABUhO KUWiSU

PARTICIPANTS,- SKCRKTAi.Y Ob' STATti HULL AliD THE BKIXiSh MBJiS'iius,

SXh K. 1. CAJ,'.PKKLL /

COPIES TO:

The British Minister caH«d at my request. I said

that I nad engaged in a lengthy conference with the two

ranking Japanese represents tives. Including Mr. Kuruau,

who is hero for the purpose of carrying on converstitions

with this Government. I added that the conversetlon re-

lated to the question of a proposed peaceful settlemenlf''

for the Pacific area. I stated that nothing; was agreed<g

upon at this meeting and that the discussioii included

the subject of two opposing policies - of conqueat by

force on the one hand and a policy of peace, law and

order on the other. I wont on to say that the three

inain points on which we "nave encountered serious diffi-

culties in former converst-tlons wltii Ambassador Notmira,

namely.


namely, ttis bringing of Japanese troopa out of CbiziA,

the Tripartite Pact and certain pbaaes of conmercial

policy, wore dlacuaeed at length; but that the Japaneae

made no conoeaelona on the troop matter or on the matter

of the Tripartite Pact. I told the Miniater that 'the

Japaneae finally inquired **iether a brief temporary

partial arrangement could not be worked out that would

enable them to improve public sentiment in Japan along

tJae lines of peace rather than of military action. Thia

would also Include the idea of Japan's coming out. of

China, They said while the United States and maybe Great

Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, if they should

be so disposed on consultation, would to a partial ex-

tent relax embargoes on exports to Japan, Japan on its

part would correspondingly take steps in the direction of

a peaceful policy and in organizing and educating its

public opinion in support of auch a policy during the

next few months. The Japanese suggested further that

the whole question of a general peaceful settlement for

the Pacific area would be gradually developed and public

opin'on in Japan woulo enable them to meet us more satis-

factorily themselves, and presumably satisfactorily to us,

on

on the more diiilcult questions such as removinf; their

tr<'Ops from China and tho Tripartite Pact. They did not,

nowever, make any definite conanitmenta as to just now

fg)- they could comply v.'itii our position with respc.t, to

these two points.

I si.ld to the liritlaii Minister- that I had made It

clear to the Japanese that, if their Oovarnment cared to

present aometninc on this point, X woula i-.lve it considera-

tion in the event it appeared to he feasible of considera-

tion, out tiiftt i covil.^ lacke no, promise, and that if it

should bo deoiiked letsible, i woulc confer with ti.e

;_rti.sii, trie buLcn, the Chinese and the Australians

about any pnase of tiie matter in which they woulc be

intei-esled to -.vuich tney would v'.ive consideration. I

«.lso seld t.o the Japanese that, of course, unless Japan

decides on a peaceful policy rather tnan a policy of

force and conquest, we coulo not get far in any kind of

discussion but thHt i coulc understand why tliey might

need a little time to educate public opinion, as stated.

C.H.

c. CH:^iA

I UcJ^DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Convenation

DATE: NOVEMBEK 19, 1941

SUBJECT: CONV]r:HSATIOW BETH .--iiETAllf HULLkm THE TWO JAPAZUSK AMBASSADORS

PARTICIPANTS: SECRKTAHY OF STA"": >iD THE MUaSTJiK OFLOUDON

COPIES TO:

The Minlstor ol tac< "letherlands -all-ijd f-<t ray re-juest

ft-ui i. ro,jaa':*}d Lv^ air. niie subai,- rj'.ateri to

tiw Brlti".!-! yinl=it«r on yostoraa,v iii re^orii ta -ny coa-

i** two Jtt!)aue8« Arnliass*»'i'.r.:j . : was

very apprecla* tMf. Infomation, and <*;?

o: tile dlaposi*. 1- iq ooopyrate

wlioleheartedl, tjtofore with his Government,

(D

—

ro

0)(0

I.H.

11

I I

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


L-'<'/ \^

DATE: JJOVeW' 1941

SUBJECT; CO:r7SR3AT10K or secretary hull •,• BRITISH KISISTER.-li»ARDI':" •• ''"SD STATES-JAPANESE .-..-.i-.-^- . fiiS.

PARTICIPANTS.- SECRSTARY OF STATE HULL AJSD MINISTER OF AU^RALIA,THE "-GKT HONORABLE RICHArD &. CASEY. /

COPIES TO:•>J

The Minister of Australia called at ay request

and I gave him the substance of my statement to the

British Minister yeeterday afternoon.

C.R.

S;CK;DFB

'y« K.ti^^iW^*^'^-'"-- -' • ^ -


DEPARTMENT OF STAl C


DA ' f.

SUBJECT:

PARnClPANTS: ,p^ , „ ,, y I r. 1 -f

r . a I

COPIES TO:

•is-

c

^-^-'^ - oope'' aodue yXvetw

to Uie matter

included sar.rv

-aniicier. UcvirnEen

PA/H:SKH:FLB

EXHIBITS or JOINT COMMITTEE 3689

Department of state .—

»


DAU- I,'OVEliBER 29, 1941

auHjECT AUSTRALIAN' OFFER TO ACT AS MEDIATOR BST'./EKH THE UHITEDSTATES A:iD JAPAI>i

HA:*riciPANrs- 3ECKKTAF,*.' HULL A. L ..._ .. ;3rRAl,IAN L.I.jISTEB, ;..yH?

COPIES TO:

71

Tiie Austrsllfin :-,lnlDter cnllec. at; nls reruost anu :.pue"^

eosie referencij n t^.e -- ; -Ibl Ity that ,- ' :ht cauee Kurusu

to call on hi ., at v,'::ic;. ti:.)e t.e w;>u1j L.ji<t:ii36 the pros and

cons of the -iroserit relations ^' ~t'.- - between all of the

f?ovorn.:.cr;ts interfsted In the r-tL. i and wind up by suj'-

f;estln:- that Austr.^llfi woulr' be "' tc ant as ir.ecllator or

pj.-.r.* '• cf^ ttie sort. I re-^" •"' ' latter no aerioua

nt... •^' f * r- ; : '' - "'^

^ ^ -^ - -- vns

I Ir.terr Veu ..',. v; ;.a..<.' I 1.^ ^- ,,c.>v ^-^fore the

.'.Inleter ooulc -.nke a deta-j-c- .,» .,^. .ont of the natter on ^

t ^o asnu:. 'tlon that he wouia i^ewe.o^'- a set "f facts nlonf:

xt-.fi t.iat -iC bi- Pi' ',' ".tl-nate. .

79716 O—46—pt. 19- 1H


raoent week* by the BrltlaJa Ambaaaador, th^s Australian

Minister, and tvloe by the Netherlands Minister,

C,H.

!A;A?.

Oittg^ Hi

,'iMt^:AM^X

.

Tli8 l;»p6*"i!ioe-Bt notCB frva you? o«l»gj«aiB ub4<^

«ne« that tJha CMa«S8 Foreign Winistiar ir.tovHtf"* >

on Moveaber 28 the China •« Aaiba,««a&er «1; W©ah^.;e<'«>* "Mis-

informed th« l>eip««t»»Bt; thftt %h.» attltufis of CMHa t;ow«rt

th« temporary «rpftr»g«ment with Japan uad#r tdBtstit'e -

Biatratlon At that tlew wna iWfS ncgatlT^'"^••""^-•

vill he.v« obesrvea froa th* 0«p*rta»nt»8 tfiPgrtiB uncor

ref«r«nc« reportilng l^^fy il^a th« GMn««* As«tM»8«ftaDr*ft

oonyeraatlon with tii« 3eer9t«ry on llove«l>tr 28 that

China's attitude w«« m&da knowi to thlt OoTamaant ar«i x.c

various clrol«a In Washington through vai'lou* ohannals

end through telagrans to aavar&l Indlvlduala.

Th« Saoretery of State, whanavar ha has diseuesad

with tha Ohinasa Jjubasaador tha aiat^tr of tha ourrant

oonT»r«atlonB with tha JaiMsasa, has Mi&a it plain thattjKMfihtnd tit ——- .-—

—

5M if <i|tMtratM'

.

»_ oi—MM «. » •««»*«<«« Miaiisa WMl


îÛ

vj-i*. ^ ^ G '- .. >..

"' --' '-• "best of o«r -•'•-ty; and

. u!>,:.v. :, oonoeirn t&lun ov.-j.v"'-

d»sopro«a frnnXly aid -with

j«s p6i'otkoXtite'ik«iX «ff»ets on th« Clilntoe puWic

. ChlnRse will to continue re«l3tftnee vhloh »lght

3t«il should %ht>T« be atdopted «a arrang»««nt euoh

ilSîM. TATI^r'^^ *• ^*^ und«r considftrstlon at that

!;-..>. It vlll b« recalled that the (Jenorallsalao in hi«

.ii»»aag9e to the Pr-eaJ,aent suad the Prime Mlnl8t«r

at England also «poli« frankly enA forcefully of the psy-

chological ®ff«ct« of a «ueces«ful Japaneae Invasion of

Yttnnaa ?roTlnoe. Ag you were Informed In the Department's

telcgran under reference the Secretsry of State In speak-

ing to the Chinese Aabaasador on Noveasber 26 pointed out

that one of the prlae point 8 of the draft temporary

mo&nM. ylyen^,! vhlch this Goyemaieat wae then tentatively

considering ,va8 to protect Yunnan Province and the Burma

Ettetphnttig , ,

SiKtifaptftaer i#,. . t$„. ___„„.

t'

WatJtlnthn.

WILL INOtCATt WHCTMDI TELEGRAM SENT(Full rttt

CollKt JDtjIttter

(Nlfht lettv

Ctarg* Oepartmwit:

FuU rM«Oay Mltr»(lgMl«tt«r —"

Cfcarg* to

* Road from the Imninunt d«a^»r deacribod by th« Gôn«r«l-

Issimo &nd in Addition to lemmm th« Jmpaaeat meD*c9,

for at least tlire* months, to the iôle South Pacific

area and the Fhlllpplaes.

In his oenversatlon with you the Chinese Foreign

Ulnlatep described serldxis and difJTleult internal and

external probXeios of China. 55ils Qovertaaent is not un-

aware of thoae probletas and we bellcTire that the (%ln»se

tki7en»aent ia also aware of many seritms and difficult

problems facing ua and other simllajply ai»-">s«" powers

such as Giât Brltliln and the Betharlands. ^.j*^-^,

We have on many appropriate odoaalon<j"and we msy

now again aa«\a*e, China th»it in these trying and dlff.i-

cult days its interests hs?e teen and are being given

moat careful oonslderatlon in our fctudy of oxar own

piH>blea5S and "dk^ the .probiwas of other nationa and

peoples.

It may bo noted umt t:*are iiave ocoxirred reoentJ.y

eeveral examples of ^Sfcg^. badly oonfuaod aeohanlos for th

conduct of dlplomntir. i>»l6tlc'm> bfltwc

pe«i«t1iig aggression. TJiose r loatsd


WILl. INIMOATI WtnrTMCII

Btpattmstd of &tuUiVtaktngkn.

ro M TKAMSMimcO

soHrioCMTiAi. cooe

No««ooNf(DcimM. cxioe

PtAIH

-4-

Telegram Sent

CeOeet {Otr IttW

Outft Ott*rtiawti

Fii)l n^eOtflattKr

KlgktlcttK

* that It la Bioat difflctilt to oa*ry on »uch ralatlons in

a syatomatle Knd ao-ansi manner. 2h«re have for sxample b«en

«x«mpl8a of Intrusion Into delicate and serious situations

on the past of individuals who are not cosipletely or adequately

informed of the facts. Before taking action of any sort

it would seem to be advisable to understand ccaapletely

each other's vieva. Bach of the nations resisting the

courses of aggression now rangpant in the world should

endeavor to realize thAt the other nations are in the

Itrflt !^f all oonslderatione ^vmtivAm^ the best possible

! ^.^/J.

coui^ss, ind it therefore would seem to be desirable for each

suck lation to continue a resolute course in the present

critical world situation.

Tou are authorised, if a favorable opportunity

pj-Bsents itself, to laake use of the foi-egoing *«ib«««»W

or portions thereof, providing you believe that it

might be helpfxa in ^MtaHMito^the points raised by the

Porelg?! Minister as reported in your telegraa under reference.

}8£&:IIB»'^.-^y'r/.

-. 19.

FA/'H H--^:t

J""-^'-hi

« -ifcMaiWWiiT »*««»« ••»M»


EXHIBIT NO. 169

SELEX?nON OF

State Depaetment Documents Relating to Thailand.

TABLE OF-OSNTENTS

1. State Department Information Bulletin No. 132 dated Aug. 6, 1941, concerningstatement made by Secretary Hull that date at a press conference on thesubject of Thailand.

2. Dispatch dated Aug. 7, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bang-kok, concerning the Secretary's press conference of Aug. 6, 1941.

3. Memorandum of Conversation dated Aug. 7, 1941, between the Thai Ministerand M. M. Hamilton concerning "American press reports in regard to this

Government's attitude toward developments relating to Thailand."4. Dispatch dated Aug. 8, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation,

Bangkok, concerning item No. 3 above.

5. Dispatch dated Aug. 8, 1941, from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State Depart-ment concerning reaction in Thailand oflBcial quarters to statements ofSecretary Hull on Aug. 6, 1941.

6. Memorandum of Conversation dated Aug. 12, 1941, between the Thai Ministerand M. M. Hamilton concerning "Thai Government's desire to obtain anexpression of the attitude of the American Government toward Thailand."

7. Memorandum of Conversation dated Aug. 14, 1941, between the Thai Minister

and Mr. Peck concerning "Request of Thailand for permission to purchasearms in the United States."

8. Dispatch dated Aug. 15, 1941, from U. S. Minister Foote, Batavia, to State

Department concerning British reports of position of U. S. and Britain in

relation to Netherlands East Indies and Thailand.9. Memorandum of Conversation dated Aug. 18, 1941, between Secretary Hull

and the Thai Minister concerning "Attitude of tl. S. Government towardThailand in event of Japanese attack".

10. Dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bang-kok, concerning aid to Thailand.

11. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 4, 1941, between British Minister

Sir Ronald Campbell and Under Secretary Sumner Welles concerning

"Situation in Thailand."12. Dispatch dated Nov. 6, 1941, from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State Depart-

ment, concerning aid for Thailand.13. Memorandum by S. K. Hornbeck concerning Aide Memoire handed the

British Minister Sir Ronald Campbell on Nov. 6, 1941, and the attached

Aide Memoire concerning material aid for Thailand.

14. Dispatch dated Nov. 11, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation,

Bangkok, requesting itiquiry on Thailand's petroleum requirements.

15. Dispatch dated Nov. 18, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bang-kok, concerning military aid to Thailand.

16. Dispatch dated Nov. 22, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation,

Bangkok, concerning policy of this Government toward assistance to Thai-

land in the event she should be Invaded.

17. Memorandum of Conversation dated No. 22, 1941, between First Sec'y.

British Embassy and Mr. Smyth concerning "Reported request of Jap-

anese for use of Thai airdromes for 'survey flights' ".

18. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 25, 1941, between the British

Ambassador and Under Secretary Sumner Welles concerning "Aid Neededby Thailand."

19. State Department Radio Bulletin No. 280 dated No. 26, 1941, concerning

press conference of Secretary Hull that date and information furnished

press concerning th'^ delivery of the so-called "Ten point note" to the

Japanese Ambassadors.20. Dispatch dated Nov. 27, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation,

Bangkok, concerning the withdrawal of nationals from Pacific areas.

21. Memorandum dated No. 27, 1941, ot conver.sation between the Thai Minister

and Mr. Smyth and Mr. Adams, concernirtg the Minister's inquiry about

press reports of the note handed the Japanese Ambassadors on Nov. 26,

1941 by Secretary Hull.


22. State Department Radio Bulletin No. 282 dated Nov. 28, 1941, which relates

briefly the President's Press Conference of that date at which he men-,

tioned the U. S.-Japanese negotiations.

23. Memorandum of Conversation dated November 28, 1941, between the ThaiMinister and Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Smyth concerning "Aid to Thailand."

24. Dispatch dated Nov. 28, 1941, from U. S. Minister, Bangkok to State Depart-

ment concerning radio speech by Thai Prime Minister on Nov. 27, 1941.

25. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 29, 1941, between the Thai Minister

and Mr. Smyth concerning "Thailand's treaties with Great Britain andJapan."

28. Memorandum of Conversation dated Dec. 1, 1941 between the Thai Minister,

the Thai Military Attache and Mr. Adams and Mr. Smyth concerning "Aidto Thailand."

27. Dispatch dated Dec. 2, 1941 from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bang-kok, concerning talks with Japanese.

28. Dispatch dated Dec. 2, 1941 from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkokand attached dispatch of same date to American Consul, Singapore, concern-

ing contemplated aid to Thailand in concurrence with British in form of

aviation petroleum products.29. Dispatch dated Dec. 3, 1941 from U. S. Minister, Bangkok to State Depart-

ment reporting conference he had with Thai Foreign Minister concerningrecent Japanese attitude toward Thailand and assistance offered by British

and U. S.

30. Dispatch dated Dec. 4, 1941 from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State Depart-ment concerning his conversation that morning with Thai Foreign Minis-ter who said the Thai Government hoped the American and British Gov-ernments would issue public statements that Japanese invasion of Thailandwould incur armed resistance of those two countries in addition to Thal-

Jand's.31. Dispatch dated Dec. 5, 1941 from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State Depart-

ment relating conversation between Thai Foreign Minister and JapaneseAmbassador concerning Japanese forces in Indochina.

32. Dispatch dated Dec. 6, 1941 from Ambassador Gauss, Chungking, to StateDepartment reporting rumor regarding proposed occupation of Thailand byBritish.

33. Dispatch dated Dec. 6, 1941 from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkokconcerning credit extension to Thailand.

34. Memorandum of Conversation dated Dec. 7, 1941 between First Secretary,British Embassy and Mr. George Atcheson concerning "Reported desireof the Thai Government that British forces not move into Thailand."

35. Dispatch dated Dec. 7, 1941 from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State Depart-ment reporting Japanese attack on Thailand.

36. Dispatch dated Dec. 8, 1941 from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State De-partment reporting the agreement of Thai Government to allow Japanesepassage through Thailand for their troops in order to attack Burma andMalaya, and related matters.

3698 CONGRESSIONAL IxNTVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1 I

(NOT FOR THE PRESS)(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of StateDivision of Current Information No, 132

COUNTRY JAPAN DATE Aug. 6, 1941

Subject: Inoreaslng indications that Japan la makingdemands on Thailand; statement In House of Commonsby Mr. Eden that anything that threatensThailand was of Immediate Interest to Qreat Britain

At the press conference today Secretary Hull said:

THAILAND

A correspondent remarked that there are IncreasingIndications that Japam Is making demands on Thailand, Hesaid that Vir, Eden stated today in the House of Commonsthat anything that threatens the security and Integrityof Thailand was of Immediate Interest to Groat Britain,and he inquired if the Secretary would care to say any-thing on the situation in regard to our own policy. TheSecretary replied that he believed we have many timesdiecueeed the question of conquest by force on the partof certain countries and that this has included thePacific area. He said that we have made very clear ourconcern and our interest in respect to steps c£U?rylngout that sort of policy. He stated that Mr. Welles Justa few days ago had occasion to give the press a statementon that general question as it relates to the Pacific areaand that he might refer to the fact that prior to givingout that statement Mr, Welles read to the press his own(the Secretary's) statement of the issues that were pre-sented when he himself appeared before the House ForeignAffairs Committee in support of the Lease Lend Bill lastJanuary and that he need not repeat those things here.Asked if the Secretary could say whether this Q-overnnenthad had occasion to express any views to the Gtovernmentof Thailand concerning the present crisis there, Mr. Hullreplied that he could not go into detail s now because itis not at a stage whei:e he could be very definite on ac-count of the many angles to the matter. A correspondent

remarked that certain steps followed the occupation by?h^r. 1.^?'^°"'!:^"^ """"^ ^^ ^^^«^ if " "as fair to assôthat certain other stops would follow the occupatior or

?en?ied^?h«ri'?''?^°? f Thailand by Japan. The Secretaryreplied that it is fair to liave increasing concern aboutany novement which would include the step to which the

cou^rC^rth^ff^'f• / correspondent asked if the press

nv^; «,, V^^?*^^^ls Oovernment has increasing concern

h^wn! tf f°"^ ^^''''^'

J^' ""1^ ^«Pli«<i ^hat this is whathe was trying to say and that anything that Ifr. Wellessaid regarding the Pacific area and Indochina would havei r^rZlr!^

application to Thailand in the present situation,

^nt ThnT r.înquired if there have been some indications

^n^ni-^ ^^"""w ^° ^^^" Offered what a-iounted to a protoo-inni^ ho,Tr«^^^r t^

"""^^ ""^ Indochina so that the Japanesewoul.. have a protectorate einllar to that of the BritishCommonwealth of Nations over Canada. Mr. Hull replied thatwe had not been advised on that subject. Hs saidT of

t?,^lt'^' Â*^® P^® = ^ ^®"' *^^^® -'^'^ l=3en a nultlDllclty ofrumors and reports coming out of that area lately and thatthere are many angles to different and important piiases ofthe situation, all of which we are observing as closely as

^R£PARIRO OFFICE«AI.I. INCICikTC WHtTHKII

CollMt

Full rtt«

Oay latter

Nl^t lett«r

Clltrge Depirtment:

Full rile

Dty letter

Night letter

Cliwge to

Telegram Sent

IBepariamttt of 0iait

Watkintbjn,

Aui.-ust 7, 1941

/

A-X2'

/ /^ ( / /' T'-.are in ^-epeated for "o-r Inf or-îptlon^.n extract'^

7 / / / // / ^f>j> f'- /radlo'Sul''.etln'or :/5, 1341 In re-rrd to"^

/ / / / / /r.7/ore8-~ 'cont?renc5e of/t:irt date'^ra fgllowsf

? f.M

8-~ 'confgrenoe

/ / / ^-âtions t;-;.- t'^J,; -.'r.'^'.''2 •'."Iclarf Jê-n-nc^s ''on

-4

Ooo

'rererrf»o -' .' -:.i<?n'n c-êeol. l.':''!:iie

' -ri; !• tv-R^,i- f'-.e 'Secre-

'•>.- -'-'^-'-''anythln,.- w; ti.o situation/in

. -.<- -y. -.viicy. The Secretar/oflia that'ê'''^

. . v^ ...r'thr.t -.-^c :.rrj/~nny times €lacussea/the "uestlorr

ronruesjrby force /fep She tJtrt of oertaln'countrisB/

:;- .hr-x At inoluSea 4h0 Paclf i</ai-ea. He sal-i<*t;h''t we '

-.:<1 rtiade Very clegT ''jui/ ooncern'anar cur'lnterest in'

'icyto ste-.s'oDiTj-in- ovt'thr-t/sort'of ôî^lc:'.' He

it; -id 'jut'that'Kr./weil-s' jufit/e faV daye '^ - '^ '

/ / / / #^

0)

fiKf/Jhinf Ij

M^. - »__.

.

i—M« ff.«.«M»»aM»»»wim«»r»^

. TMttn.iffitt^:^

pffVAniNei orriocwill INOICATr WHETMUt

- (Full r>l«

Collwt {Day lettw

(Night lettef

Cbirjê Deptrlmenli

Full rito

Ovf letttr

Niglit l«tt«r

Ckwge to

Telegram Scnt

-2-

tenerr area.?.l'ûostiori^ £• It 'related 4o the ?aclflo*ai

- . . /T' vA- :-:-t,';er this (Jovernrent ^^ J / ^ j<h"S ii'-. occ-slon fo exnress'^pny vlevs ô the irovernnent

c" '. --'^concernlri' ^ke oresent^rlsls'ûlr t,

it/>'SB not •

Into details

there, ^

'now'oecaupe

ite.'

A rr

7t-rhether it

„ion 4?y

. .,- ;e coulc. l-'^''v"ry'''aef In

"ut/^hatêrt;-.<in ^te'cs Î'ollowed/'^

r /fndochlna an-' '-" J^ i---

i-i-ume thr'.t'cert. ^.. .v -s'^

would 'foil cw^the ocou'?atloiTor^tteTnpted''c

Thalland/sy Jaian. The S^cretaryêpllea ti,

falrô have increasing concern 'bcut p ^—

-

vould/lnolu'" -^- -'--/-- --'-^^^-/the co;-.

ferred/

Asksd if^thij ôrresoondentQ

-•r.t re-

tMasd if/thi3 Correspondents could Infer tnat th

ôvsrnraent hos/Lncrerslnsr Concern ^bout evente/over»

:.; re, the Seeretaryiâid thaf^hat was'-h

:.'!;' to eay. " %hat nnythinÂh*/ / y 7"

""

'%€ SiTBR end Indochina"

/"

liijg-^Che i"aolfl-d y

&>i< ^ «)Mntloriw—

"

!>-.!!*<»*fl'»k -;v . r

nid "and the

DBPAKTMENT OF STATE

STfflSSJ^

Memvainkm of Ccawm^kmDITISZOH Of TAB. UBmSSm kfTKlM

DATE; August 7,1941.

PARTICIPANTS;

COPIES TO:

Joerioan press xnpottm in xeg&rd to tblaQoTemmeat'fl attitude tcnrard derelopiBentareXatiiig to Thailand

The Tb&i Miniataxand

Mr. Haaiilton

pj^

The Thai Uinieter called this afternoon at hia re-

queat. He aaid that'' he had noted reports in the prese

last evening and again this aorning in re^rd to mat-

ters relating to his country; and that, in as much his

Qoremment was .very busy, at times it did not take occa-

sion to Inform him of ourrent developments. The Minister

then said that he wished us to knew that, if there should

be any items of informatl<m which we would wish to bring

to his attention, he was constantly available and would

be plad to cwne to the Dooartment at any time for that Mpurpose. I inquired whether the Minister had anything

particular in mind. ,He replied in rather general term»

and said that he was not in position to make an express

inquiry

8


..-^ K*'-/"iS?-- 'JtT^.l/.V:-'i'i;'~ ••^. "^:..'j:**p!««,- ' A*p»'»w:^j»-»i.- 'si.a.ijii-vftB-* 'i;*

-a-

Inquixy In as much as be bad reoeived no Instructions

from bis GtoTemment. After some general remarks Z men-

tioned that we would of oouree be glad to Inform bia at

any time upon request of exactly wbat tbe Secretary may

have said at a prass oooferenoe. The Minister then in-

dicated eageToesB to be informed of what tbe Secretary

had said yesterday which bad formed the basis of many

stories in the American press.

I told the Minister that I had anticipated that be

ml^t wish to inquire in regard to the basis for the

etoriee In the press and that I ted at hand, tbe record

of what the Secretary had said at hie press conferences

yesterday and today. Z then gar© tbe Minister orally

tbe eubatanoe of an extract from the Radio Bulletin of

August S, as follows

J

*A correspoiaient stent ioned that there wereinoreaalng Indiostions that Japan was making de-mands c» fhailaiid and be referred to Mr. Men'sspeech in the House of Ooaanons to the effect thatanything that threatened the security and integrityof Thailand »8« of immediate laterest to Britain,and he wondered whether tbe Secretary would oare to•ay anything on the situation in regard to our ownpolicy. Tbe 8«»retary seld that he thought tl»t webad many times dlaouseed the Question of conquestby force on the oart of certain countries, and thatit included tb« l>aclfie area. H« said that we hadmade very clear our coaoem and our interest in re-spect to steos carrying out that sort of policy

.

He pointed out that Mr. Wellss just a few days agohad occasion to give tbe ooxrespondents a statementon that general question as It related to tbePaotflo area.

. I

i

"Asked


-»-

"Aatod If h« oould aay whether this Oovern-«eat had had oooasion to ez^xeee any views to th«

• Odreroment of Thailand ooacemlng the preaentorlslB out there, Mr/ Hull said he oould not gointo details now beoauee It was not at a stagewhere he oould be tery definite. A oorreapondentpointed out that certain steps folloirad the occu-pation by Japan of Indoobina and he Inquired whetherit was fair to assume that certain other steps wouldfollow the oooupation or attempted oooupatlon ofThailand by Japan. The Secretary replied that itwas fair to have inoreasing ooncem about a moTementthat would Include the step to whioh the correspondentreferred,

"Asked if the correspondents oould infer thatthis QoTernaent has increasing concern about eventsover there, the Seoretaxy said that that was whathe was trying to say. He added that anything thatMr. Welles had said regarding the Paoiflo area andIndochina would have a special application to.Thai-land and the present situation.*

I then informed the Minister that at the Secretary*

s

press conference today the Secretary had been asked whether

he had anything to say in regard to newspaper reports that

the iaario&n and the British (Sovemments had adready

prooleed jnwiiland aid if it shwld resist Japanese ag-

gression; that the Secretary had replied that he did not

have anything eepeoially in mind on that subject; and that,

when the Secretary had been pressed to confirm whether or

not we had made such a coaiauaiioatlon to the Thai Oovern-

ment, the Secretary had replied that he did not know of

any such communication.

I added that the Thai Hinister of course was fully

aware of the general attitude and policy of this Oovem-

aent in regard to countries which were resisting attack

by


Ijy foTOa* of a^rgrMvioni. I n«nttoMa that tb«x« ww a

oouatrir nearliy to llMlltUjMi, xuuMXy, OtvlJU, which w«s a

good lllxietrftttoa of tii« attl«ud« and pollojr pureuwd toy

this eotintry in this x«»p«ot.

The Kiniatei seestd r«Tf appreolatl've of ay baring

given hln an aooount of vbat the Beoretaxy had said at

hie press ooaferenoee yeetezday attd today in ttgnA to

fhailaad.

TS'.vmfBSti

, 1<) 1;.

3708 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

msmi&&'

DEPMrTMENT OF STATU.,^

^^^<ifi>

^DATV:

PARTICIPANTS:r. IsBiitm

QyCOPIE

Ml* hmA Miem^i Ms t» mwrnA tm BvptrtMM «i«^ «

tta to 06atflii« 1M» M ~ titat tiw AmI ««i«raMB% «Mir««

«• rwMla « faliway t«r«i ultia «n •wtttr&M towt ttet

tto fhal ««raraMmt wwOd, if TlMdlMA atettU ^ «tU«teC

^'-.im£?^,:'!»

DEPARTMENT OF STATEJ^':^-

Memorandlom of CbnverscrfKMmVIBlO]i OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OATS: August

SUBJECT: Request ot Thailand for |>erml88lon to-|jurcha.se arse inthfi United Stfttee

r-

PARTic|feANTS;_ Mcujg ^Jewong'se Seni Pramoj, fhal Minister

COPIES liO:

IV-J;

Th« Thai Minister called to see Mr, Hamil'

the latter »&» engaged, h«» sefeed to se« fe, PeoJt-

The MintBter recalls*, for thft infara^

tiiat h® had s»ll«a on Augast m Jfe. H^--.

that he hsd Just reflslved « ti»iegr»v: >o«3rarR5ifr

which pointed out that the fbal Sovemsent bad fAjwRsli-

aanot»nc«sd Ita Intsntlon of resisting with f^y><--

«ggreB«lon that laisSit ba sttwwptsd .•«^5.r

the basis of this &«claratlm.

vhat the attitude of tim Aae-ricsB *trv»-

toward Thailsuid If such ernst?. s>r

%skA pl&oej tsertlfiular

r»nd«r"any aesigtence to th«

1

)

,^

•I

3712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACxL

-2-

The MiniBter eald that Mr. Hamilton had outlined to

him the Amerloan Government's attitude and policy toward

rendering assl stance to countries which were re slating

aggression, and Kr. Hamilton had Instanced the aid that

the United States ie giving to China. The Minister^ said

further that Mr. Hamilton had Indicated, before an

authoritative reply could be given to the Thai Govern-

ment's Inquiry, he would wish to lay the matter before

higher authorities of the Government.

The Minister said that today he had received another

telegram from his Government which, In the gravity of Its

tone, indicated that a critical state had been reached

in respect of the thi'eat of invasion. His Government

urged him to spare no effort to obtain an expression of

the views of the Amerlo/»n Government in this situation.

Reverting to his oonvereetion two days^ago with

Mr. Hamilton, the lilnlster said that from the circumstance

that Mr. Hamilton referred to American asei stance to China,

he inferred that Mr. Hamilton had in mind asBlstance of

the Lend-Lease variety. Assuming this to be the case, the

Minister wished to say that the Thai Government was not

asking for armament on credit, but was prepared to make

purchases on a oommeroial baelo. The early acquisition of

the arms


the arme It sought was of the utmost importance to the Thai

Government, which, at present. Is poorly auopllefl with

equipment. Consequently, the Thai Oovernaient would be very

grateful to leara how soon, if the American Government Wcould make arms available for purchase, ahipmentB could be

arranged and eould begin.

The Minister said that, speaking as man to man, the

Thais were traditionally suspicious of Japan; he personally

felt that in the recent contact with Japan his country had

"played with fire", but he trusted that 1^. Peck understood

the background of the matter.

The Minister observed, as his own nersonal reaction to

recent news, that the- large number of troops dispatched by

Japan into Indochina was an ominous sign. The Japanese must

have been aware that they would meet with no resistance in

Indochina, which was under the control of Vichy and hence

of Germany, and these forces must be Intended for use else-

wh(?re. Mr. Peck remarked thst the newspapers sus-^jested

they might toe Intended for use a.mlnst Malaya. The Minister

reolled that the Japanese, in his opinion, would never dare

to make an attack on Malaya without previously occupying

Thailand, because to do so would be to leave their flank

open to attack from Burma. He deduced that these forces

were Intended for the occupation of Thailand end that the

danger to Thailand was accordingly imminent end serious.

The fact


-4-

The faot of the matter now le that Thailand la deter-

mined to maintain Its Independence, If It 06ui poselbly find

the means of doing so. In this emergenoy the Thai Govern-

ment Is anxiously waiting to learn the nature of the reply

that the American Oovernment will give to the Inquiry

transmitted on August IE.

Mr. Peck eald that he would report to Mr. Hamilton at

onoe the observations made by the Thai Minister.

#?E:Peck;MHP

\>amtmsMim»^


-«.- Bcitftvi

uosan0«.to tho aovftrnoi? vcnor&l-

Oa a quootlon in- relation tc cnio atr.i;onont idcn

oonfIrnod that in tho event of aa attack toy Japon

tho British EDplrc will back us up con ' ' '. . Tho

Doclrx(ifctv:;n of thu British Oovornncnt cr.n do considorcd

satioJ'actory politically but it is aiscpp frraa

a atratogicttl point of viotr. On the olgh-th insinnt

a conforoncc v.lll bo hold with Edon tc discuss tho

poaaibilltj of drnwlnj up r^-nothcr f '' >*iich

tho proposed staff diacugslDni. ccnc autajaati sally into

action, atncc it hc.$ bocoac cl. ' c Onitod

States and England will net rc:5ist •Jr.pcr.csc cooupation

of "niailwid -with foroo of anas. It is also brcii^t

to your attontlcn that any suarantcc or cortainty of

United Stntos participation by force of arws is ab-

solutely oxcludcd."

T!tiroo« Whllo tho gonorr.l public hts no icnowlcdgc

of tho abovo quoted tologrcri it has boon circulated

rctlior frcGly cj.;-. h officials "tAxcTo it hr.s

aroused vcrying dogrooa of r^looti, pesslislari, rjid

bittor fooling against tho tfnitod State,

'.*?W

FOOT!

NPL

Hi m n

'M^"::'


DEPARTMENT CH^ STATE ,; ^— j „. ..

• »

Mtfmonmdi/m of Conversatkui

DATE:AMNMt.|% VHL,

SUBJECT: MTIIVM W ff«^ 9i0fWHtBKt fVUMti timAif St WfWHt 99mam.

s*PAm-iciPANTS: MMMMMOt MUU AX9 fW MSKUSM Of fUSUMl,

COPIES TO:

>^

v^ 4^'•î^". n W^ ^m>' î^^r»-^»ii

^^-r?-...''if

«• Ida fiWMOMMSl Mt «MM««EiM Willi MMkHP WAiMpa «M «r tm ttlwwr ii— ifftti—j thaS tBi* «vMg»s «r

IMICMC BM«lMlt. ^1* M« ar «M ^îKlMI «i»t ilMlP ftMl

•l»|«««ivt !• to 0» Htttti ifaA attMk siaipiMMM* s« imIA


OUna acaiMt W» acpwMlM «r aip«ft»««tAlttg Imp la m^m^M "tttA «t*« «« wnM »Ut» nMiimft la Um mmut m^t^

wofi llM« z luem aixMir mm liMUi «wni mi^Hmmt.

«t«l«a «r fM««« a^ptdally «7 wwitviM Hke t«M^r

I

«• tarn xuntrmtXmg imp ff^iaaai'

ttaft gaaiy mtsAMr mm m^ttM 0iftta tmtffitf^MR* mn ^ i^M «9 mc^iMti «» «fA«&i&#

lA tiMmyd «r m» maXmm jmgmit aai. laf^m Hmk «f «lMi

a««ta aaA mmmt •« »wUna« Z »Mi&«gr mm «wi S

tt» yaiyaaa af aMteagiai .l»fisni»^ aliMt* laft*- mmsm'

IdLM.'^ta yawaafcal laait ffnatlmw tmt. m^ mtmr m prsm Htm wmmSM. «ms inwr imm Wm lm pmskmm m

MILL IM04CA1C WHt'

(Full Ut«Coiln-t .Oai Irttfi

iSi(tM Irii^r

Full n(F' Bay l.'tt'f

Niirhl If'lrt

• i4Tel€GRAm Sent

Srpart«u»nt of S>tatr

I'j D( rflANIMilIlD

;, <ONf lOtMTtAL COOey^

ttcjHf .;Nt <Dt**TIAL OOOC

rAXTAIII

Waahinglon,

:k (that:

(L- , Cc';obs! ?, 10 n.".

irtloularly lnter.s8ted in the

"rl ti;;:<£)

RL&^

':e-,>a:-t-.c"~.t; was on "ormla^• Vne drlu\t',r

Sir,V>a38y. .n re-ly lo ar; Inciulry , thst It fnvored t:\e

ln.^aoore, but t**i ret>ly^h8B/s A

'ei«- led

i• consideration of

litttia of Will III liMMWL. till

A

•\3

C'v.

>o

/

Kl3: LJH

Stnt iy optraUn hi

m OE


C«3fAN-fft

MifMrtankan io/ CmviemahR

OATS; llQ-^mt^bap 4, 1941

aoWBCT: Situation In •Rjailand.

PARTicfPAMtSi Sir Ron&M Gsu^bwll, iJriiElah Ministsr;Mr. Well«9, Under Ssorofcary.

CtM>tESTO: s, A-B, PA/H, PE, SU

••« i—

M

sir Honald Cej^ball oall»d to »«« ms tiiio momtng at

hla request.

He inquired wbsths>r this Government could as yet

give the British Qoverninant e reply to th» coasai^mlcatlon

he had left with b» a few daya ago regarding th® 8ltt.a-

tion In Thailand.

I told the Minister that I had assumed that a reply-

had al3Mady been made to him by ttr. Hornbook In aa aiuoh

as I had approved a draft reply some days ago and that It

was my understanding that the Secretary of State had llke-

wiae approved this draft. I then called Dr. Hornbeck on

the telephone who told »e that tlM delivery of tha reply

fC

s

r

79716 O—46—pt. 19- -20

sij>&*"-*<i i»t JtEtp&nssA hf mk7 of ihdoeMxut on

Hivnali that e«rt»lB. qutctlon*

t. ™. ,. ^,. .-.- •--^„ .uiaA as well &« K»ilartd

bad arl««n Juat as jDr. Horribeok waa About to glva the

ifplj of tbla Qo^spnment to tfas Barltleh Emb*««y, «nd that

for tJW tism beiftg, tliar«for«, our reply would have to be

pontpo&ad.

Sir Ron#ld said he f-olly -underatood tUe olrounstancaa.

^^

UjSWjIJ


^ TELEGRAM RECEI)^^,,This tclcgl-ttn wuat-liCclOBEly parfphTGgcd be-fore being oc«nmunioc.ted

to anyone, (C>, FROM Rec 'd 6:10 p.m.

Doted November 6, 1941 Cs^[^i

Secretory cf Stntc

Washington >

.^^

Y-'^

504, Kovenbcr 6, 5 Ptr. , ( -ji.'.. -i-^i> v i»- .

D* • • '3 137, ^.Vb*fr p, 10 r .' .

Cnie. Dcth the British !..i.>.lstEr cm. i, -r,

jnK- E;;tirtg th' t 24 flglr-ter plr.nca bK trnnsf errE^Jv

" E i r' r


I I

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

1" t.-o' •,

I

BfljigkokMA

0l08Ely'f«4#R|MSMLRECEI5fiBfi> November 6, 1941fore being oom-nunlORtEato anyone. (C) Rcc'd 9:66 p.m.

Seorctary of State,

Washington.

FROM

UROENT.

504, November 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

Schemce haj been of oonalderRble advantage to

the United States and Great Britain becauee if Japan

had acquired a dominant position in this country it

would have had a favorable position from which to

negotiate for seaports and airfields and to obstruct

American and British aoccpR to the tin and rubber

resources here. If Thailand had in any Important

-•ri-ticular during recent :'Jonth8 sided with Japan as

tiRE sel'f styled champion of Asia against American ejid

British I.mperlall era the benefit to Japan's pro.j'ra:^

v;oald have been imT.ense, As things stand Great Brit~

ain has been left undisturbed in control of three

fourths of the tin output and our Joint rubber r;-.::--

chasEs begun 3D{. <««> tr "l8 are proceeding at the rate

of over 3,000 tons j.-vor.thly. Our extensive missionary

'! '^Erprlsee are continuing without the xolestation

they have cncpuntErEd in Japanese controlled areas.

itnry Implications

PECK

[*.*SSW«5i»S,»..- ., -^\-:^:\;^-. , , r\fi.;Jt.;-.'^'l¥V*/*r'/:


r&XG$tAM-RECEIVED

FROM

m ifEot

3728 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACKItTELEGRAM RECEIVED

GS !<;ingkok:

Thla telegram must be _ ^closely paraphrased be-f ""'^ Dated Novcr.ber

fore being conimun cotedto anyone, (C

)

Re« d 10:04 > .n.

Secretory of State,

Washington

,

504, November 6, 5 p.ri. {SCCilOX ?1VE)

56 piccEs of artHlrrty over a period cf ;bcut nine

months anrt a pironlse to ooo.',:iiv Soiitrirrn 'Miailand with

ar'"'"'i f.vT'i vji-rn '.':

, r Inv'.inx, :..-..., .

''r. :'rr v.^rth,

Dlsi . .-, , ,. --ir-Eras ons thin ^^ _. . ...;,, .^

rrturn to ;,-,.. ...i : -^ •.,•:- >! ndvaiitager- we Mrt re-

cc'vitiK and for the r5ak ,.»^',nd ly incisD'injr tSirough

1 1 wou _,...;:.;'•'""'

countr> , ., ^. ..,.,:.. ' "'-'• nlli. ..

to cnvlsT,-'; p?.rt' .„ ,. : ,_,,[.,, ~. ex-

pedient, Mircovtr. 11. iiiitiKj i.' '-ll iah ov.'ncd

tin iriJn ca sncl "''''-.c rubber pl'^ntai lor:? are In '.:-

aonth and If ukj weri^ snved nnd the bulk of the or'ini ry

^ ' ' '""''* '' -. '^'.f; i'ro.""i'nnd:^ would allEt-e this

;n ' ' ;t',>oj mi our i3 In the Orient,

Four, Indochina ena miiinu will be dry and

PECK

HTM

SPTT—m^--

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

'"\

"~^'

«''"

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

3729

-i-./ i»-r-.*,ii-:.

r..i a tEl£i.: -

llltKrv jj.'.uarv to

• ' -arasSTiu':

cv-

ild gun-

g there --111

i,ianEB for v':'

til fo


I:%c>

ject was di

iXlativ© Si: rom

t >:

/^"%,.

x

^^j^'SrlmAtars'


rxe&s*a put this on

the ^gands for fhs next

seating of th® Mmi330B

Coital tt«e.


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 7,1941.

Mr. Welles:

It seems to me that thequestion of planes for Thai-land has reached a pointwhere the only way to getforward with the matter isto have It considered byhigh officers of the Warand Navy Departments alongwith officers of this Depart-ment. I therefore suggestthat you may care to discussthis with General Marshalland %cith Admiral Star^,

1

892.24

FE!MMH:HES


^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^R^^T^^^^^^^^^^^^^

<*«s.

DEPARTMENT OF STAT«* \/'

\^iO'^&mmr 6, 1941

3

hersynder

was haiia^t hj m^ to Sir

HonaM Campbell this JBorning.

itSKn:BM

7971 fi O—46—pt. lit 21


fr'Vf'

TrT.f.rNT or

Department joeSTArtiv,v«?

THE RjNDEFAii^iiiiAa'

FE - Mr./^milton:

I oonciiT entirely in tii©

views set forth in the suggested

memorandum to the Bi^itish Embassy.

I suggest that this he given to

the Secretary to read and if he

concurs, that Dr. Hornbeck ask

Sir %)nald Campbell to come in,

and hand him the reply as drafted.

•-"^H-iT^

'J:SV/jIJ

wwa*

.-.-. ^ LWi^--''

•'i»?.-as,49s '^*»'«m-

"'^ra£j'^^M

^mwrnrnm^^ miFim^-<

ijjg J99eiwsiis>l^fl«

/:'H-."„ î^ vso^-'s'

;,as*.--,--,. ,

,

.--»/ is* iif

îi^%^ i? 1Jij& g-

'«r^ *ite«*«SF«,

ntlmis^ .tmsi aliss^s

4 %« 3i$mmMi» %^ *ig#

.'-a sîpsifs %t( WB qimx%20m ©«• a'f-r.

9M lwl«i«5Bil*s^ «(|1 #^ «M «»S. *!-» !?»«<««, î« ««,tft%,r

.f H. t ". .. -

sffJajamt 1-'.? SS_*?;« .

3PA/S


NOVEMBEB 11, 1941.Ip. m.

AmlegationBangkok (Thailand).

'

145Ck)nfldential

Department's 137, November 3, 10 p. ra. and 141, November 6, 1941, 6 p. m. to

you.In connection with consideration which the Department is giving to the

question of making available to Thailand certain supplies, the Department re-

quests that you endeavor discreetly to obtain information in regard to specifica-

tions and quantities of aviation gasoline and aviation lubricating oil that mightreasonably be made available to the Thai air force under present circumstances.In sending to the Department your report and any recommendation which youmay feel in a position to make, you should bear in mind the circumstance that,

because of great and Increasing demands upon this country's production of highoctane gasoline, careful disposition of available supplies is imperative.

(SKH) HtJix.

EXHIBITS or JOINT COMMITTEE 3743

WILL IHOICATK W««TH«t

ColUct J0«yletter

iNlgbt letter

CK»f(R [>«p>rtn«nti

full nt<Dijr letter

Rigtt letter

Cktrge to

S

Telegram Sent

liovembor

TQ aC TR*)«»MITT«0

XcofWioeMTiM. eoec xNOftOOM^IOeXTIM. c«oc

PAKTAm

flAM11,t»

'+?.

-f^..^ v^..,>.

'-3 t! ;.t'

ErxSfkcrtd ^ „.

-aircref

*

A...

anao j.-i-ogra.-;. s.3 wei

l\

C"


NOVEMBEB 22, 1941.

8 p. m.AmlegationBangkok153.

Your 520, November 15, 2 p. m. and previous messages in regard to assistance

for Thailand.One. The Department has on several occasions informed the Thai Minister

in regard to the policy of the United States of extending assistance to countriesresisting aggression and has stated to him that in the event that Thailand shouldbe invaded and should endeavor in good faith to defend itself, the United StatesGovernment would place Thailand in the same category as China.The question of supplying planes to Thailand has been under active con.

sideration by this Government and by the British Government. An officer ofthe British Embassy informed the Department November 18 that in view of theserious demands on British resources, the British Government was unable to

supply any planes at the present time and that it was doubted whether bombingor fighting planes would be supplied from other sources, although inquiries werebeing made. The United States Government has also explored every possibility

of supplying planes to Thailand, but it has been found impossible to spare anyplanes for Thailand at this moment in view of the tremendous demands of ourown defense program as well as the urgent needs for planes by countries nowactively resisting aggression.The question of supplying aviation gasoline and aviation lubricating oil to

Thailand (your telegram no. 518, November 14, 7 p. m.) has also been underactive consideration by the United States and British Governments. In a recent

instruction to the British Minister at Bangkok, the British Foreign Office stated

that the British Government was prepared at once to furnish limited amountsof aviation gasoline sufficient for the current requirements of the Thai air force.

The appropriate authorities of the United States Government are now endeavor-ing to arrange for the supply of aviation lubricating oil to Thailand, and the

Department expects to telegraph you further in this regard to the near future.

Two. It may be stated for your information that the British Government hasrecently authorized the British Minister at Bangkok to offer to Thailand twelvefield guns and twenty-four howitzers ; if this offer is accepted, twelve howitzerswould be released at once from Malaya. The British Minister has also beenauthorized to assure the Thai Prime Minister that in respect to general defense,

the British Government is ready to furnish QUOTE unobtrusive advice UN-QUOTE ; for this purpose the British Minister has been authorized in his dis-

cretion to obtain the agreement of the Thai Government to the appointment of

three additional assistant British military attaches to Thailand.Htnx.

(DA)FE:RLS:MBW FE PA/H DE EA/T A-A.


DATE: NoTcmfcer 22, 1941.

SUBJECT: Reported request of Japanese for uee of Thai, alrdjcooieefor •survey flighte*. ,

PARTICIPANTS: Mt. W. Q. Haytsr, Flret Secretai^y of the British Siabassy,

Mr. Siayth.

COPIES TO:

x^^JtjKrtjMirt «f

Mr. Hayter of the BrltiBh Eiabaaey informed Mr. Smyth

dui'lng a call on November 22, 1941 that aooordlng to a

recent telegraa from the British Minister at Bungkofci

japsneee members of the Thai-Indochina Boiuifiary CoBal«fiiOK

are asking for the use of some Thai alrdroses for "giirv^y

flights'! and also for aviation gasoline from Thailand,

presumably to be used in these flights > Mr. Hayter

added that thie Information had been givon to th« British

at Bangkok by the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs,

-4

FS;S!5rth:?IHS


MX'

as t

be«i iisfor«6id by b

^ . . iiil'iJiitsiy

luable i

all&nd.

ttift Asabnseedor then - ii^a Qorer

•ent that the eUuation sslgiit b« «selior-&>=6d c-y a credit

of 110,000,000 to TbsUand hj fm tJnltsd States. I l-pIA

that this iBf^ttsr wo-ilA rie giv^r, i-iu.'.-.?!!. ideration.

V

3748 congressionj^l investigation pearl harbor attack

, Department of State,Division of Cuebbnt Information,

November 26, 1941.

Radio Bulletin No. 280

Note : This digest has been compiled from press and other sources and Is in no way anexpression of official opinion.

WHITE HOUSE

Yugoslavia.—At his press conference this morning Secretary Early informedcorrespondents that information had reached this Government from several of

its Intelligence Services to the effect that the Germans have decided to make afinal assault on Belgrade. He said that the reason behind the German plans is

that the Nazi Army believes Belgrade to be the base of operations for the Chetniks.

He continued that according to declarations of high German oflBcials the bombard-ment to which Belgrade has been subjected will be nothing to compare to whatis now in store for the city, and that the Germans have decided to raze Belgrade,

which will be surrounded by troops and exposed to bombardment by artillery andfrom the air. He added that the sources of this Government's information areconvinced that the Germans have decided to carry this attack on in the same wayas they have done previously with the city of Chabatz.

STATE department

Press Conference.—A correspondent said that according to reports two Amer-ican military observers have been captured in liibya by the Axis forces andinquired whether we had the right under international law to demand their return

or whether they were to be regarded as legitimate prisoners of war. The Secre-

tary said that he would first have to look at the law to be certain of his answer.

In reply to an inquiry as to the position that would be taken with regard to the

further report that some newspaper correspondents have been captured, the Secre-

tary said that then he would certainly have to look at the law.

Questioned whether we had received any request to intervene in or preventthe reported plans of the Germans to bombard Belgrade, Mr. Hull indicated that

he had no knowledge of any request so far as concerned the bombardment itself

but that if he should learn anything he would be glad to tell the correspondents.

Asked about the conversations with the Japanese envoys today, the Secretary

pointed out that he did not think he would serve either the correspondents or

the Government any good purpose by undertaking to go into those matters at this

time. In reply to a question whether he was going to meet the envoys agaib

today or tonight, he said that the matter was now receiving attention. A cor-

respondent pointed out that an allegedly authoritative Tokyo despatch took agloomy view of the discussions because of the continued conference with the

so-called ABCD powers, on the ground that these discussions were regarded as

a threat against Japan. Mr. Hull replied that, as he had stated, he thought that

it would not be of any advantage to go into these matters at the present.

Asked for comment on the reported news item from Buenos Aires to the effect

that Argentina was reluctant to accept a three-year embargo on Argentine sales

of strategic materials to the Axis powers in return for our agreeing to purchaseArgentine commodities, the Secretary said that all he could say offhand was that

we had been having some conversations on those sulsjects but that he thoughtthat, perhaps with one or two exceptions, the discussions had referred to a one-year

period.

Requested to elaborate on intimations received by the press from Mexico City

this morning that we may soon begin a series of general staff talks with the

Mexican Army, the Secretary said that we would naturally have to look to the

Army and Navy for accurate knowledge on this subject.

DEFENSE

Lend'Lease.—Lend-Lease Administrator Edward R. Stettinius on Monday an-

nounced that total lend-lease expenditures at the end of October were approxi-

mately 919 million dollars and that increases since then have brought the figure

to more than a billion dollars. The announcement added that the steady increase

in lend-lease aid is shown by the following monthly amounts in millions of dollars

:


Concurrently he announced that an aluminum fabricating plant, costing ap-

proximately $22,000,000 and having an annual capacity of approximately 60,000,-

000 pounds of fabricated aluminum, will be constructed on a 115 acre tract of

land at Fairview, Oregon, and will be operated by the Aluminum Company of

America.Defense Housing Priorities.—Acting FWA Administrator Edy has announced

priorities for building materials which will expedite the defense public worksprogram now in the construction stage are being obtained for contractors from0PM. He said projects in the $150,000,000 community facilities program will re-

ceive priority ratings generally ranging from A-2 to A-8.

USHA Administrator Straus reported the USHA is building defense homes at

an average cost of $2,789. The Lanham Act sets a $3,500 limit on construction

cost of such homes.President Roosevelt asked Congress for $15,000,000 in supplemental funds for

defense housing. The funds would be used to build 3,000 trailers, 4,400 dormitory

units and 3,550 portable houses.

Labor Supply.—The Social Security Board reports that estimates of labor needs

in selected defense industries show that approximately 475,000 workers werescheduled to be hired in 9,900 establishments in 26 defense industries during the

six-months period September 1941-February 1942.

Aircraft and shipbuilding industries are expected to take on nearly 250,000

workers, expanding current employment 32 and 38 percent respectively. Employ-ers in 6.400 iron and steel and nonelectrical machinery establishments estimated

they would need more than 87,000 additional workers in the next six months.

The estimates forecast a layoff of 59,00 workers in the automobile and automobileequipment industry with 20,800 new hires. The tire and inner tube industry

also anticipated a net reduction in employment. The number of workers engagedin manufacture of industrial rubber goods will also decline somewhat by the

end of next February, the Board said.

The Board also reported labor shortages are expected to develop prior to Janu-ary 1, 1942, in 179 of 306 selected defense occupations. Shortages were alreadyoccurring in 146 of these categories in mid-September. Suflacient employmentservice registrants are available to meet all reported demands in the remaining127 occupations, the Board said.

Navy Enlistments.—At a Navy Department press conference this morning Ad-miral Nimitz, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, said that the Navy now needs

13,000 volunteers a month to keep pace with expansion under the two oceanNavy shipbuilding program, and that by next July 15,000 or more volunteers a

month would probably be required.

Aircraft Merger.—The press today reported a prospective merger of VulteeAii'craft, Inc., of Downey, California, which has plants in Downey, Nashville,

and Wayne, Michigan, with the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation, whose prin-

cipal plant is in San Diego, California. It was pointed out that such a merger,if carried out, will unite two concerns which have defense orders totaling about$1,000,000,000 and are turning out every type of plane—from small commercialvehicles to large 4-motor, 28-ton bombers.The press quotes Major Reuben H. Fleet, president of Consolidated, and Mr.

Richard W. Millar, president of Vultee, in a joint statement issued yesterdayin part as follows : "Of our own volition we have for some time been mutuallyexploring the business aspects of a possible future association. The facilities,

products, proximity of location and experience of Consolidated and-Vultee so com-plement each other as to make possible the more expeditious completion of their

defense assignments."MISCE3XANE0U8

Crude Oil Prduction.—According to the press crude oil production in the UnitedStates for the week ending November 22 shot upward to 4,300.000 barrels, estab-

lishing a new all time high record by a wide margin. The crude oil outputhas been increasing steadily since the beginning of this year on an average of

about 3,500,000 barrels daily according to statistics of the U. S. Bureau of Mines.The Office of the Federal Oil Coordinator for National Defense has estimatedthat the demand might readi 4,500,000 barrels daily by next year.

Life Insurance.—According to the press the Prudential Life Insurance Companyof America today announced that its reserve basis would be cut from three andone-fourth to two and one-half percent and that premiums on new ordinary life

Insurance policies would be increased about eight percent on January 1. This


action follows the lead of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company which last

week announced a reduction of its reserve basis from three to two and three-fourths percent. Both companies attribute this move to lower yields on high-grade bonds.

Cost of Living.—Labor Secretary Perkins has reported that the cost of goodspurchase by wage earners and lower-salaried workers in large cities increased1.2 percent from mid-September to mid-October. "Advances in rents and in

prices of food—clothing, automobiles, and certain house furnishings, resultedin an increase of al)out 1.0 percent," she said, "and excise taxes levied by theRevenue Act of 1941 caused the further increase of about 0.2 percent." MissPerkins said the cost of goods index for October 15, 1941 was 109.4 compared with100 as the 1935-39 average.

Construction Prospects.—The 0PM Bureau of Research and Statistics hasissued a survey which predicts the volume of all construction next year will behigher than any year between 1930 and 1940 despite an expected 65 percentreduction in non-defense building. Total defense building, the survey stated, is

expected to reach $9,000,000,000 in January 1942; $12,000,000,000 by July 1942

;

and $15,000,000,000 during 1943.

Home Building.—The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has announced materialand labor costs for a standard six-room house as of September 1941, increased13.2 percent above costs for the same period for 1940. Building supply costsdui'ing the 12-month period rose 12.3 percent as compared with a 15i2 percentlabor cost increase.

Washington Rental Rates.—Acting Commissioner Hinrichs, U. S. Bureau ofLabor Statistics, has reported that rents wei-e raised for approximately one-seventh of homes occupied by white tenants in Washington suburban areas duringthe 22-months period from October, 1939 to August, 194^1 Most of the increasesin the suburban counties of Alexandria, Arlington, Montgomery and PrinceGeorges occurred after October, 1940 and were attributed to the increasing numberof Government employees brought to Washington by the expanding nationaldefense program.

Radio.—Lloyd A. Free, Director of the FCC Foreign Broadcasting MonitoringService, has announced the establishment in London of a listening post to reporton European radio propaganda. The London office, Mr. Free said, will utilize themonitoring facilities of the BBC and wil have a four or five-man force. Thepurpose of the office wil be to (1) listen to and record propaganda broadcastsmade by Governments of the European continent to their own people, and (2)sift from these broadcasts any information which might be of value to the UnitedStates.

According to the press the office would be essentially a part of the IntelligenceService of the Government which at present has in operation monitoring stationsin Washington, Puerto Rico and Oregon, supplying information to about 19Government agencies.

Coal Strike.—Dr. John Steelman, appointed by the President to represent thepublic on the three-man board to arbitrate the captive coal mine dispute, todayconvened the board at the Hotel Commodore in New York City.

Stock Market.—"Volume of trading on Tuesday: 840,000 shares. Dow-Jonesclosing stock averages: Industrials—116.96; Railroads—28.10; Utilities—15.80.

Stocks turned down today in moderate trading. Curb stocks were mixed andChicago stocks irregularly lower. In Chicago wheat closed off one-half to seven-eighths cents and corn was off one-fourth to five-eighths cents.Japanese Discussions.—Following a conference this evening between the Secre-

tary and Ambassadors and Nomura and Kurusu correspondents were informedby a State Department official that the Japanese representatives were handedfor their consideration a document that was the culmination of conferences backand forth during recent weeks and that it was unnecessary to repeat what hadbeen said so often in the past that it rests on certain basic principles with whichthe correspondents should be entirely familiar in the light of many repetitions.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Convenai'^.»

DATE: November 27, 1941.

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: V.OT. Bsla-. Smyth

COPIES TO:

II'

Jewongse Seni PrfimoJ, tne Thfll Minister, ./- "^..njaMMyth T:d Mr. Adams (C^ ^^ TÔ^^J^

NT' ".!/•

"

toÎ

'. • e ;:i=l Kinlsttr cplled uoon his ov-n lnltl°tlvf.

.

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r n ii(- r.-'u 'ny ut .- t;.on to aek In re si^d to

:nîl.-'nd he should not iieeltate to call

^Yri /•*««i»*J«t»»-i«wBB***W|^ :v..o. ;fk u.!-; tlons hlch he hed In mind.

1.1 v?ntat;e of -'!•. Hflmllion's klnd-

;:~ t if Tiornlr.^ .

th s^na r,jld tiif Tnai Klnister t.ru-t

3 !n oonferetiof "mi v ^ thfit he himself

.-1 ;-ll:-ilEtrr.

* t:ip follo>-lng s; ort

', - in The M(^v York Times wae

accurate: ,\1

-. A


accurate:

"The State Department said: '

' The Japanese representatives were handed for their

consideration a document that is the culmination of con-

ferences back and forth during recent weeks. It Is, unnecessary

to repeat what has been said so often in the past that it

rests on certain basic principles with which the correspon-

dents should be entirely familiar in the light of many

repetitions. '"

Mr. Adams replied that he understood that the statement

was substantially accurate. The Thai Minister asked whether

the last sentence might be interpreted to mean that the

United States insisted that the Japanese evacuate both

French Indochina and China.

Mr. Adams replied that he had no information or

authority which would enable him to be specific In his

reply to the Thai Minister's oueetlon. Mr. Adams said,

however, that the President and the Secretary of State had

on Miny occasions outlined the attitude of this G-overr.ment

tov.'^srd scouislt'one of territory by force. Mr. Adams said

that there hed been no change in this tiovt^rnment 's attitude

in that respect.

The Thai Minister thanked Mr. Smyth and Mr. Adams

for the Information wh.l ch they had given him. Ke added

that neturRlly his Govcrruient war vitally intf^rested In the

subject matter of the statement and he v?lFhtd to keep his

Cfovern'n'nt


DEa?ARTMENT OF StATE,Division of Cubrent Information,

Radio Bulletin No. 282 November 2S, 19Jfl.

Note : This digest lias been compiled from press and other sources and is in no way anexpression of official opinion.

White House

Merchant Ship Arming.—The Wliite House today made the following announce-ment :

"American merchant vessels sailing on routes between the United States ports

and ports of Spain, Portugal and their adjacent island possessions will not be

armed."American merchant vessels sailing in the inter-American trade between ports

of the United States and ports in Central and South America will not be armed."American merchant vessels sailing on routes in the Pacific Ocean will not be

armed under existing circumstances."Public announcement will be made of any change of policy affecting any of

these routes."

Press Conference.—The President informed correspondents that he planned to

depart from Washington at 3 : 00 p. m. today for Warm Springs, Georgia, on avacation that had twice been postponed, and that while he did not know when hewould return, he hoped that it need not be before December 2, adding that hemight have to return because of existing conditions in the Pacific. Asked howlong he expected these conditions to exist, the Pre.sident referred the correspond-

ent to Tokyo and not Washington. A correspondent inquired whether the Presi-

dent could comment on further developments concerning the Japanese situation

and the President indicated that while not able to do so, no reply had beenreceived to Secretary Hull's note (see Radio Bulletin No. 279 of November 26),

but that talks had not broken down. He added that the American policy con-

tinued to be one of infinite patience.

A correspondent asked what the Administration's policy was with regard to

legal and lobbying activities on the part of former public officials, particularly

in the matter of construction projects in connection with the defense program.The President said that he had discussed this with the Attorney General andthat they were in favor of legislation which would prevent such avtivities on the

part of persons having previously held responsible Government positions. Hepointed out that in the past certain Government departments had prohibited suchactivities within a two-year period of holding public office.

A correspondent mentioned a report that the people of Puerto Rico were appre-

hensive over the outcome of an economic survey to take place regarding countries

in the Carribbean area because the so-called "plan" would prejudicially afCect

their country. The President replied that there was nothing in that story aspresented by the correspondent. He said that a study was under considerationin which Puerto Rico would take part as well as other places in that area. Headded that he did not see how the Puerto Ricans could worry about a study that

has not yet begun and in which they would participate. Asked whether therewas any possibility of joint Anglo-American consideration of certain problemsinvolved, the President said that that might be possible.

The President was asked if he had any information concerning the attitude

of the independent steel companies with regard to the three-man arbitration

board appointed by the President in the captive mine dispute and he replied thathe knew nothing other than what had appeared in the press on the subject.

State Department

Finland. In response to inquiries as to developments in the Finnish situation,

the Secretary of State today stated that the Finish note had been given careful,

consideration but that it had thrown no light upon the question uppermost in

the mind of this Government, that is, how far and to what extent the Finnishmilitary policy is one of combined operations of the Germans and Finns vitally

to injure Great Britain and her associates and to threaten the northern supplylines over which Russia is now receiving supplies and assistance from GreatBritain and the United States to aid Russia in resisting the Hitler forces of in-

vason and conquest, and to what extent that Finnish policy is a menace to all

America's aims for self-defense. The recent journey of the Finnish ForeignMinister to Berlin to join with Hitler's puppet governments over Europe in sie»-


ing the "anti-Comintern Pact" used by Hitler solely as an instrument to wage awar of conquest and domination against free peoples, is highly significant

and cannot be camouflaged or explained away by propagada attacks on nationsengaged in defending themselves.The Secretary went on to say that the Department was giving careful attention

.0 all the reports and information which might furnish a definite answer to this

question. The concern of this Government, which has been emphasized by the

studies made by the War Department and the statement of the Secretary of Waron November 25, as to Finnish policy in this regard, has been made abundantlyi;iear to the Finnish Government, the Secretary said.

The Secretary concluded by saying that every act of the Finnish Governmentsince the delivery of its note has confirmed our apprehensions that it is fully

cooperating with the Hitler forces.

CONGRESS

Anti-strike Legislation.—As movements continued within the House Rules,

Labor and Naval Affairs Committees for various types of legislation designed to

curb strikes in defense industries, the Senate Judiciary Committee today approvedthe bill sponsored by Senator Connally, the principal feature of which wouldpermit seizure and operation of strike-bound defense plants (see Radio BulletinNo. 277 of November 22 )

.

Concurrently the House Labor Committee today voted favorably on the Rams-peck bill which is described by the press as foremost among the various Houseproposals which have received the backing of Administration leaders and is

regarded as a compromise of various proposals. According to the press, the bill at

present embodies the substance of various proposals made including a strengthen-ing by statute of the powers of the National Defense Mediation Board; a "cooling

off" period before strikes could become operative; compulsory arbitration underPresidential discretion ; and, as a last resort. Government seizure and operation of

strike-bound plants. The press says that proponents of the bill regard it as a"reasonable measure" and thus likely to receive Presidential support, notwith-standing the anticipated opposition of the AFL as well as the CIO. PresidentGreen of the former yesterday was reported to have stated that no need existed forany such legislation in so far as concerns the AFL as it has allegedly supported nostrikes of serious magnitude in defense industries. The CIO is said to oppose all

anti-strike measures generally as of a "repressive" nature.

According to the press, representatives of management for the most part are in

support of legislation of the type under consideration, with the exception ofcompulsory arbitration, which was yesterday denounced by the National Associa-tion of Manufacturers.

DEFEINSE

Explosives.—The War Department today aimounced that production of Tri-

Nitro-Toluene (TNT), the Army's most important high explosive, has increased111 percent in the first three weeks of November at the two Government-ownedplants now in operation. TNT is used alone or mixed with ammonium nitrate asa bursting charge for high explosive shells and bombs.Army Construction.—Brig. Gen. Somervell, former Chief of Army Construction

Division, now Assistant Chief of Staff, .speaking at the annual meeting of theNA'ashington Society of Civil Engineers, said "a blitzkrieg of building" during thefirst 15 months of the $3,r)0O,O0O,OO0 emergency building program has put theprogram "on schedule and we intend to keep it there". To date, he said, "promptand superior" shelters and training quarters have been provided for 1.500,000troops and "two-score" munitions plants have been erected "from-the ground up,"many of them months ahead of schedule. The construction effort, "the greatestever undertaken in this Nation," is not "puncture-proof or perfect". Mistakeshave been made "but they have been frankly admittted and promptly rectified,"

Gen. Somervell said.

Stinison.—War Secretary Stimson said at his press conference yesterday thatoptimistic press reports on performance of American equipment used by theBritish in Egypt and Libya had been borne out by meagre despatches from ourmilitary ob.servers. but that "The whole campaign is still in a state of flux, andit will be some time before we have the whole story. So far as it has gone, ourequipment has been satisfactory, and the press has not overemphasized ourtanks." He said that the Army "has shown really wonderful progress, and I


think along the right lines," in the current maneuvers in Carolina, and that theArmy's goal is to develop hard-hitting combat units, whether armored or infantry,adding that this meant an "application all along the line of that principle whichthe Germans showed only in their panzer divisions." He pointed out that forthe past year the Army has been concentrating on developing new self-propelledguns and other anti-tank weapons as the answer to the armored division andthat progress is being made.

Tawfcs.—Following the reported wide interest shown in the performance ofU. S. -built tanks in Libya, the War Department has announced that plans forthe construction of new facilities or the expansion of existing facilities for theproduction of rivetless armor casting for tanks have resulted in commitmentsthrough the Defense Plant Corp. of sums totalling $53,500,000. Major GeneralWesson, Chief of Ordnance, yesterday said that production plans have for sometime contemplated the complete elimination of the riveted type of constructionon all combat vehicles. Cast steel hulls are now being made in considerablequantities for the medium tank and a minimum of 30 pei'cent of future productionwill have the cast steel hull. The balance will be of welded construction. Hewent on to say that no reports from Libya criticizing the M-3 tanks, which areriveted, had been received and no orders have been issued cancelling the produc-tion of these tanks. However, the development of the cast armor plate and theuse of welding puts the American tank far in advance of any known tanks. Suchtanks are already in production and when the new facilities are completed, theentire output will be rivetless.

Flight Strips.—The Army Air Force has announced that it will cooperate withthe Bureau of Public Roads in expediting the projected $10,000,000 chain of"flight strips" along public highways for landing fields in connection with thedefense program. The Department said the strips are urgently needed in theNortheast, the Appalachian mountains, and Northwestern regions of the UnitedStates.

Glider School.—The War Department has announced that a new glider train-ing school for officers of the Army Air Forces will open at 29-Palms, Calif., aboutJanuary 1. The school will have an initial class of 12 students, the Departmentsaid, but will ultimately train 24 pilots every four weeks until a total of 126students have been trained. The 29-Psllms school is the third Army glidingschool, the others being located at Lockport, 111., and Elmira, N. Y.^Merchant Ship Arming.—Secretary Knox stated in a press conference on Wed-

nesday that the Bureau of Navigation has been training gun crews since April 15,

1941, but that the program was not designed originally for providing armed guardson merchant vessels. Beginning October 15, he said, special schools were. estab-lished and training was designed specifically for duty on armed merchantmen.He continued : "The results of the training program are highly satisfactory andtrained crews are now available in any size to fit the armament of merchantships as fast as they are armed." For administrative purposes, he said, twoarmed guard centers have been established, one each on the East and West coasts,which will serve as pools to receive the output of the training schools and willcontinue to train men, assign them to vessels and handle replacements.Defense Plant Corporation.—The largest Defense Plant Corporation agreement

made to date has just been signed with the Columbia Steel Corporation, to con-struct facilities for the production of pig iron, steel, and steel plates, near Provo,Utah. The cost is estimated at $91,000,000 and brings to $250,000,000 the amountsobtained by U. S. Steel for its affiliates in the 10,000,000-ton steel expansion pro-gram. Altogether, Defense Plant Corporation has invested $391,039,000 in theexpansion of the steel industry.

MISCELLANEOUS

Treasury Bonds.—Treasury Secretary Morgenthau yesterday announced thatthe Treasury expects to borrow $1,000,000,000 or more in another "major financialoperation" next week, and "barring unforeseen developments in the internationalsituation," the Treasury would issue new bonds, but that no refunding would beincluded in next week's operation.The Treasury also announced it will issue refunding bonds in January to retire

more than $700,000,000 of Government obligations maturing early in 1942. Inaddition, the Treasury said, $339,000,000 in Farm Mortgage Corporation bonds willbe refunded if the Corporation's Board approves.

Taxation.—Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Sullivan yesterday told a pressconference that the Treasury does not plan to ask for any further increased taxes

3760 COXGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

on incomes earned during 1941 and that it does not intend to suggest to Congressany increases in the capital gain and loss tax that would apply to financial transac-

tions made in 1941. The Treasury, however, is continuing work on new levies that

would apply to 1942 earnings, he said.

Chairman Eccles of the Federal Reserve Board, speaking in New York City,

said, "By the middle of next year defense expenditures will probably be runningat an annual rate of somewhat more than 15 billion dollars above the middle of the

current year. The conclusion is inescapable . . . that additional taxation must be

imposed and further restraints applied . .." He said he hoped "further taxa-

tion . . . will first tap the corporate excess profits and the middle and upperindividual income brackets and close numerous conspicuous loopholes in the

corporation, individual income, inheritance and gift tax structures . .."

Public Works.—Acting FWA Administrator Edy has announced that pro-

spectuses from which will be built the national shelf of post-defense public worksand service projects are being received in the Public Work Reserve Washingtonoffice. The prospectuses list and describe public works and services proposed byStat^, municipal and other Governmental subdivisions for inclusion in the Reserveon which preliminary studies indicate that between 25 and 30 billion dollars maybe expended over a six-year period. ^

Football Standinffs.—In what the press referred to as an up-set, the Universityof Texas football team yesterday defeated Texas A. and M. by a score of 23-0.

Both teams were included in a sports writers' poll held on November 25 listing thecountry's ten leading teams in the following order : Minnesota, Texas A. and M.,

Duke, Notre Dame, Duquesne, Michigan, Missouri, Fordham, Northwestern, Texas.The same poll listed the second ten teams : Navy, Vanderbilt, Penn, Mississippi,

Ohio State, Clemson, Oregon State, Alabama, Harvard, Georgia.

A>'my-Navij Game.—The Army-Navy game to be played tomorrow at Philadel-

phia at 1 : 15 p. m., E. S. T. will be broadcast by short-wave for foreign reception

over the following stations to Europe and Latin America : \VNBI, New York, 15,150

kilocycles or 19.8 meters ; WRCA, New York, 17,780 kilocycles or 16.8 meters

;

WBOS, Boston, 11,870 kilocycles or 25.26 meters; WGEA, Schenectady, 15,330

kilocycles or 19.56 meters. To Orient : KGEI, San Francisco, 9,670 kilocycles or

31.02 meters.i^tock Market.—Volume of trading on Thursday : 810.000 shares. Dow-Jones

closing stock averages : Industrials—115.64 ; Railroads—27.33 ; Utilities—15.69.

Stocks today reached new lows since June 1940 in moderate trading. Curbstocks were irregularly lower and Chicago stocks lower. In Chicago wheat closed

approximately unchanged and corn was up one-fourth to one-half a cent.

Memorandum of Conversion

Depabtment of State,Date : November 28, 19Jtl.

Subject: Aid to Thailand.Participants : Mom Rajawongse Seni Pramoj, Thai Minister,

Mr. Hamilton,Mr. Smyth.

Copies to:

The Thai Minister called on his own initiative on Mr. Hamilton on November28. He referred to recent newspaper reports in regard to increased Japanesetroop movements to Indochina and stated that he was apprehensive that a Jap-anese attack on Thailand was inuninent. He expressed the opinion that of theseveral possible areas in which the Japanese might attack, Thailand appeared tobe the most logical ; he commented that a Japanese attack on Siberia wouldbring Soviet air attacks on Japan, an attack from Indochina against the BurmaRoad would have to go through very difficult terrain, while an attack on Malayaor the Netherlands East Indies would be met by strong opposing forces. Hesaid that the situation of Thailand was very different from that of China wherethe great extent of the country had permitted the Chinese to withdraw far into

the interior in the face of Japanese attack. Thailand, however, was a very.small country and retreat into the interior was not possible.

He continued in substance as follows: A Japanese attack on Thailand wouldprobably be carried out by a drive of land forces through Cambodia, and by asimultaneous Japanese naval attack in the Gulf of Siam which would meet with


only feeble resistance from the few small gunboats constituting the Thai navy.The Cambodian area is chiefly jungle, but one good paved road cuts through it

;

Japanese mechanized forces could proceed along that road. Conscription formilitary service exists in Thailand, but while the army includes some 200,000men. only about 40,000 are properly trained and equipped. A part of the Thaiarmy, including most of the small mechanized force, is now stationed in thearea ceded to Thailand by Indochina in May, 1941. During the dry season,mechanized forces can operate without difliculty through the plains of Thailandwhere Bangkok is located ; Bangkok is the nerve center of Thailand and its

occupation by an invader would practically put a stop to resistance. Thailandhas only one first-class airport (at Bangkok) where heavy bombers can operate;there are two or three other small air fields in Thailand but these can accommo-date only small planes, such as fighters. The capture of the Bangkok areawould cut off the transportation route for relief supplies coming by railroadover the narrow peninsula from Malaya and there would remain only a fewrough roads over the mountains into Burma which could not be used exceptin the dry season.The Minister stated that in the event of a Japanese attack, Thailand would

resist with all its forces. He expressed the hope that the United States couldnow supply a number of airplanes to Thailand, as this would have a very impor-tant effect on Thai morale and would "raise their spirits" immensely. Referringto statements made to him by the Department that, in case of attack on Thailandby an aggressor, the United States would place Thailand in the same categoryas China and would offer assistance, he suggested that immediate considerationbe given to the problem of making such supplies available in Thailand, and sug-gested in particular that the question of transportation of supplies to the Thaimilitary forces be carefully studied and plans made so that supplies could goforward without delay in the event that hostilities occur. Mr. Hamilton informedthe Minister that this matter would promptly be brought to the attention ofthe appropriate authorities of this Government.

In discussing the general situation, the Minister remarked that Thailand hasa non-aggression pact with Great Britain in which Great Britain promises torespect the territorial integrity of Thailand, but that this is not the case inThailand's treaty with Japan ; Japan merely promises to promote coi'dial rela-tions, exchange information, and cooperate in economic matters. This fact, hecommented, increased his apprehension in regard to a Japanese attack onThailand.FE: Smyth: NHS


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

^

SUBJt

PARTICIPANTS:

COPIES TO:


DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

EHuUand'a treaties withSr'eat Britain and Japan.

DATE: Noveattor 2Q,1941.

Th« Thai Mland

Mr. 8«yth

A'

The Thai Mlnlater telephoned Mr. Smyth on Novea-.

ber 29, 1941, and, referring to his oonvereation with

«r. Hamilton on November 2a, eald that he wuld like to

make clear a point **iereln Thailand' e treaty with Great

Britain differe from l»r treaty with Japan.

Re stated that Article 1 of the Anglo-Thai Pact of

Kon-aggreeelon of June 12, 1940, read* aa follows:

*Eaeh high oontraeting party undertakes notto reeort In any case either to war or to aay actof violence or of a^freseioa against the otlier,

either alone or in oono««»* with one or «ore thaaone third power and to reepect the territorialintegrity of the other hig^ eontraotlng party .s^g

mHe then said that Article I of the "Treaty toet^ai:

Thailand and Japan oonoertiing the Oontlnuanoe of -^

! Prieilttly

-4

••"•J

n

3764 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK!

f.

Friendly Relations auid Mutual Respect of Each Other's

Territorial Integrity* of June IZ, 1940, reads as

follows:

The high contracting parties shall mutuallyrospeot each other's territorial Integrity andhereby reaffirm the constant peace and pex^jetualfriendship existing between them."

The Minister pointed out that a non-aggression

clause Is found In the British treaty but not In the

Japanese treaty.

F5:Ba7thtRES



Department of State,Date : December 1, 1941.

Subject : Aid to Thailand.Participants: Mom Rajawongse Seni Pranioj, Thai Minister,

Lieutenant Colonel Mon Luang Kharb Kunjara, Thai Military andAir Attache,

Mr. Adams,Mr. Smyth.

Copies to

:

The Thai Minister called on his own initiative, accompanied by his MilitaryAttache, Colonel Kunjara, on Mr. Adams and Mr. Smyth December 1, 1941. TheMinister said that he had brought Colonel Kunjai-a along in order to explain thegeneral military situation.

Coloiiel Kunjara said that according to his latest information the Japanesehave approximately 150,000 troops in Indochina, about equally divided betv^'een

northern and southern Indochina. He expressed the conviction that the realobjective of any Japanese attack from Indochina would be the Burma Road,and he felt that it would be far easier for the Japanese to reach the BurmaRoad by going through Thailand than by attacking from northern Indochinathrough the difficult mountain country of Yunnan. He^ said that the Japanesecould attack from southern Indochina into Thailand, using mechanized equip-ment, and then proceed north along the railroad from Bangkok

;just south of

Chiengmai a paved motor road branches off from the railroad and the Japanesecould go north along this road to the Thai-Burma border and/or the Thai Indo-china border. He believed that the Japanese would then probably cut througha corner of Burma toward the Burma Road. He pointed out that the passthrough the mountains of northern Thailand would be far less difficult to crossfrom a military viewpoint than would be the passes which would have to becrossed by an army attacking from northern Indochina. For this reason hewas extremely apprehensive that the Japanese intended shortly to launch an at-tack against Thailand from southern Indochina.

Colonel Kunjara gave the following information in regard to the Thai mili-tary and naval forces; the total strength of the Thai army is about 200,000but only 40,000 are well-equipped and trained. The Thai air force possessesabout 200 combat planes, of which 108 are pursuit planes (slower than currentJapanese pursuits), 30 bombing planes and the balance observation and generalservice planes. There are about three pilots for every plane. The Thai artilleryincludes 15 regiments of field artillery (12 guns to a regiment) and one regimentof medium artillery. The mechanized equipment includes 80 tanks (all eighttons or under), several hundred trucks, and one platoon of armored cars. TheThai navy is composed of the following vessels: two heavy gunboats (2400 tons),two light gunboats (1200 tons), two sloops, nine first-class torpedo boats, five sub-marines, five smaller torpedo boats, twelve mosquito boats, and 36 naval planes.The naval personnel amounts to about 6,000 men.

Colonel Kunjara expressed the belief that a Japanese attack against Thailandwould be carried out by a land attack through Cambodia and by a simultaneousnaval attack; he believed that one Japanese naval force would attack alongthe coast in the region of Bangkok, while a second force would attempt to landmen along the Kra peninsula in order to cut railroad communications withMalaya.

Colonel Kunjara said that the military equipment now most urgently neededby Thailand was heavy artillery, bombing planes and pursuit planes. TheMinister expressed the hope that means could be found to make this equip-ment available immediately in order that Thailand might be better able to re-sist aggression by Japan.Mr. Adams informed the Minister that the information given by Colonel

Kunjara and the request of the Minister would promptly be brought to theattention of the appropriate authorities of this Government.


1

WLt IMOtOATt WMCTMUi

[Full r>t<

CotlKl p«y Idttv

INIftit l»H«r

Chtffe OefMrtmvnti

Full rttt

Oty l«n»r

NIgtt l«tt«r'

Cli«r(« tg

S

Telegram Sent

.a. Wathbigton,

TO we TwANtttirnto

COHriOCNTIAL COMMmoowioaHTMi. oooc

rAWTMn

MJUtt

Bearing In mind your requeatf for Information

re.-ording the talks with the Japanese whloh might hare

possible effect upon the situation In Thailand, the

Department would expect to inform you promptly of any

information In this regard which might be of especial

Interest to you.

\jX*

W1?M

Enciphertd hy ....

Stnihif op€TtioT

H.\P

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19.

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^'^''"'^''^•^'^'^y^gg?^?^!^^

mtvMiKa orrtcE

full r»tt

Telegram Sent

CallKt \0»f MetiNlgtrtUtttr

Oiugt Dtpvtoxad

Full mUD*7 letter

Nl(ht l<lt«r

Ckufe to

S

AMLECATION,

Drown

Deoember^ 1941

TO K TDAMMirT^CONriOCKTIAl. OOM

NgMOOKTIOntTIAI. cooc

i "(n<s ->^'f -• -'•

BANOiCOK.

'The follovlng telegraoi sftn? to the Ajaeric&n Consulate

at SlngftTJore If? repeated for your Inforscstlon;

(Telegraph Section: nsert text of &ttache<l

telsgrflm to Singapore,.)

You are isuthorlted In your 4l8C2'»tlon to Inforia th«

approprldte Thai authorities of the foregoing.

\luil/%

C(A

"J?"'

)K%:*-i.'J;,'tj-,.i S-.--


79716 ()—46—pt. 19-

3770 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK"

This tti

for oOBjraunla«*«4.to h- , (0)

B«n£kok

Rtc'd. 4 p. m.

FromSEcretarx of St«tc,

Wr

547, Decc , . m. (STCTIOIJ THO)

The thai* are well aware that these two nations

arc opposing Japaoese aggrcaalon e'ên at the risk of

^T and naturally Infer Oiat their own efforts will

TJrlt*. sh and iteicricsT! giipport. Sec the

Lc^vibv,., rsrasa &Â, r 26, 11 p. m.

para^rai:*! no. s, quoting S«o popular radio ccRimentatora

as aayin^ tMt Thailsret will have friends to eoac to

her asalatanofi-.

Thrcf. if Mjmn invades this oeunfcry and no aid

Bs* .'ri-scrSbri?. is nt'ov Idcri t^-i«rc is bound t-s 'bR -noinilar

j»'.,:i <jtions and ir

citlrrn-. "This ss! rtsmcntcfl b^ the Jap&neac an^

-•"- -.5rnC3.fl': nnî:'" :• t th.£-*T tiic Brltiali

:.il'blv:'"lnfcr;

,i/aalo«,

ill iHliillHJU l I liHIWMp^ lilllllil

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

'Vhl.3 tcliigrar. must beclosely paraplirasEd R»©Mfcrc being corHVJuri.l--

to ciiycnc. (G)

r 3, 1S41

2:55 p.m.

Secretary of Statr,

V/ashln<jton.

547, DcoCRbrr 3, 5 p.n» {S'^CTIOK THRtE)

This will enablE the govcrreaent to plan, for

thE futtir-e intcllisc'ntly elthtr for rcslstancE

to tii£ last cxterJ-ty in '-.hE hope of ultitiatE

victory throx^h supporting British and Ancrican

•r IT a truce while ewnitlng a later

settleT-ent, Prelliiinary advice will also do ;:iuch

to vert •^ rev\ilsion of reEllnw If Aricricm rmd

British aid Is nDt speedily i .Ing, The Tbci

tovE confidence in Britciu and the TJhited States

in spite of refuacl to supply theis with nilltary

Efjiiipr.iEnt r.nd I feel chat it would fc fsir to in-

fore: thFM -if our- intentions wd th reference to their

sit'Oiitic-n as soon as those intentions can be cor.~

aunicattd.

My British colleague is tclErgrcphlng

the .rr.it ftneral line,

(EIID OF MESS-ISE).


.^^

.TELEGRAM RECEIVEDKA. JBaRgkokThia telegram must beclosely paraphrased be- Dated Dcoaabcr 5, 1941fore being conuainloatcd FROMto anyone. (C) /*->~*..^ Hcc'd. 1:30 p.m.

Secretary of S

Washingt

551 , December

During a call or. the Minister for Foreign Af-

faire this aornlng in reference to gasoline eup-

' '-s he informed roe thmt the Jappjscse Ambassador

.;ur,t sailed and ififortned faim that ths: Japanese

toi-ccs in Indochina definitely would not be used

to invade Thai and that they were coneratrated fcr

use against the ^rtm Road. Consequently Thailand

need feel no anxiety. The Minister for Foreign Af-

fairs infoi?mcd me that Ma Govcrnsscnt, In spite

" "apancsc aeoaraitccs, 4b nevertheless greatly

becausf ocived additional evidence

^'tort :

-4 '

o6

>o

nt. He


-^rbl, Dcctrofccr 5, 3 p.m. from Sr.ngkok.

ToTtXi-r: MinistEr inqulrEd anxl :i£thEr I had

reported to ths; A'scrlcan G-ov-rmniEnt the hopE of tM "

Thai Gove blic etfttEmcnts would hz

issuL Britain nnd the United States prom-

1-. Ailr.nd if invaded by Jnp-an

(sCE : 550, December 4, 3 p.m.).

P£CK .V'^'


477, DeoEinbEr 6, noon.

The ChlEf of thE Infornntlon Departraent of the

Foreign Office InforKied a member of my staff yesterday

that the British "wtmted to move into Thailand but

hesitated to do so In the absencE of a clear Indi-

cation of the American attitude. He sold that this

report came from a very reliable source In th? United

Str.tea., I -Attr^ch n,- slgnlflcancE to the repop^ cxotpt

aa IndlccstlvE ereatlng and somewhat prevalent

tendency to pliy \ip the situation*

G...USS

>

UJ

./.-i««*«xiv- =s?M;»>EsaK

:

ifuli fStt

Colfec! jOsy Istt-r

INigtif l«tt«r

full Ml-

Oay Ifitc

Nifhl Iftltr

Telegram Sent

£^

-/,

Washin^an,

Deceaber 6, 1941

TO ««! IH/kNSWmtO

fWneottriccNTiAt ccoe^'

(>*«T»1R

/f^

AMERICAN UKJATIOS.

,, BANGKOK , (TfrniUkNC).

Your ^pp, DuofflBber 4,^ p.®.

You B«y assure Thai Authorltlee that extension of

a credit to Thailand for current needs ie fully agreed

to in principle, and that 'Department expects no delay

in working out det«il8 with the aooroprlate lending

sg«'noy of this Sovernment.

A.

3I \

01

WCO

FDtFLtKS

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PAimClPAMTR

:#!i» TQi

D£>»A«Tfc'iENT Of STATC

A^*9»«nw<^*w fl/ CawrtwMsrWrtp

o»» h«'i BOT« into fhailsniA

Mr. W. ». Hiyftsr

Mr. Atoii«ii©n

•Sii^f

\in»nw^ t r.WJi>i»L llilli'l^ ir

Of;:.

During a e«ll er» Ki-. Atatueaon this aorair--

in zHieponse to an iaqulry wheth«r there *fas aarsy ««««,

stated, after 8c»» iyssltatloB, that tha Brltiah JCinl«t»r

In Thailand had sartt a »»8«age to. tiia foralga Offiee

whloh began "For dod's aaka* and whlsh waa andorsad by

tha Thai foreign Mlolatar raqueetlnii that British armed

forcea jjg^ ssovfi- into Thslland.

O-r,

Q

>

6

i-^- ^*

re;i6oh»eon:HES


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From •

^^^"^

BANGKOK

Pd^

V

S'Ecrctary of StatE,

Washington,

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

55Sj, BccEmbEr 7, 8 a,fn.

The correspondEnts Imvc beEn officially InformEd

that th£ JapanESE attacked Thailand at various places

on the laiid and ar.a. fponticrs at 2 a,is«, DECEBitoer 8,

and that Thai forces reslstEd, The GovErnmcnt ordered

cEasE firing 7;30 a.ra,, and nEgotlationa arE taking

r'T-'x-.r, Bangkok la q,ulEt, AmErican citizEns will con-

- "-itE in thE Legation In oasE of disorders.

PECK

HM pa

ooo

13>o

o

>"^

OCO

CO

>m


r-x'


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ircTC'

F RO Mhrs^rc'.

not l!

-Tt F ,

;r rc't>liE:d

that since

fC-


557, Deotiabcr 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION r.X)) from Ban^ok.

by the Foreign Mmietcr and the latter was told

that Japan was fighting for Its life with Great

Brltc.m and the United States and Intended to

make wide spread attr.oks on their territory at

1 o'clock In the morning of December 8,

PECK

JRL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

^^ From ^"S^t'^'fTb3-3 tElc,5P(in miat be »-rom

oloaely oflrRnlireacrt be- Dnted DEOErr.bci* B, 1941f'->rc bcln^ ccremnJortedto cnyone. (0) êc'd 2;39 n,Fi.

1ccrc*;ary '>f Stote,

"/nahin-'ton.

THiri£ PRJOHItT

557, DccEnbcr 8, 5 o.;.. ( SECTION TI'^?:":)

pert '•f th.eat nttacka w-uW be *nr.dE through

TTir.ilontJ r.nd Japan dcnp.nded thnt pooacgc <^f

troops be allowed. Jr.pnn offered this country

certain cbi^lcca {nnt) t^- join Jr.pan In the vrar

cjtlnat the United Stfttea nnd are-^t Britain

in return for nMch Jnocn itould not onl^-

gunrantee the aotrcreisnty, independence and

ho(T->r ^f the country but vj-ûld restore nil

trrrltirlea lost prosectors to foreign ry^-ticrtj;

(tv-) '^;'^l^nnd c-nild Join the tliree Dowcr prct

rp<\ ocr'ilt pv.3n".Qt of troop3 in which nortlfleri

nrooog^l there rôuld be no nror.iae "f rcstor-

rtlon ->f territory. Tlic Th'ila refuact to ôin

-.>r ')o:-t ' nrl the flnol r.~rcencnt )-.'\-i been deacrlbe-i

"D-c 7hr i reore3cntp,tlvC3 acAA thr\t In the rbjcncc

t!ic ' inlater w^^' la Co-t-mivler-ln-Chlef n-

{repcf'-.t no) reply cui • n* '^rdera

coxiirt be

79716 O—46—pt. 19- -24

TELEGRAM RECEIVEDvv.

This tclcgrr;-- ^ -*-

closely portfore being couini.i;;

to anyone . (C)

BSngkok

j-^^£d fcccnhcr 0, IQ-ll

Rec'd G:35 T.n.

"--y of State,

TMVLZ PRIORITY

557, Decer.bfrr a, 5 p.u. (SECTION FO'OR)

Thnl troopa; they naked thtrcforc thct the

forclbit ftttEnpt to enter -TJir.llr.nd at ont

-o'clock ^houlrt b€ t.t least defErrert. The

Jn»-r.nc3e rEollEd thi- 1 no change would be .n«<a£

in the planned attack.

Fighting occurred during the ni^ht ana

thl3 nornlng at olngora, Pattani and Prachuab

on the southern coast und ct Vctana nnd Aranyn

on the Eastern frontier. The Thftlrj lo:)t

possibly n bnttcllon n.f troops at Pcttanl.

The Foreign lUniater wns ^^ctnly novel;

he re CO lie rt the efforts r^-iue by hi a {») to

(«) arms (?) an<3 he exnrtaosd gratitude for

the fricndllnesa shown by the United Stotea.

Fc aald tiin t the hpr-.rta of the Tlinl were with

the United Stfttea und. Greet Brittsln end I

f'5

{ *) anparenfc oraisalon


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Ilf Bon^kokThla tclcgran nust be Fromoloacly pornphrnacri be- Dated Dccenbtr 8, 1941f'>rc bcln^ oonnunlcntcd

ne. (C) ncc'd 4:52 o.-i.

lEcrrt-tr;- -f 3totc,

'Vashinxton.

557, DeocnbEr 0, 5 p.n. OtCTIOJI PIV-:)

c-'Uld nt-t but frdrilt the alnccrlt:* -^f this

country's effort t^^ reaist Jctmn rnct the ovcr-

whtlning force t" which It fliwlly yielded.

It l3 the Intention "f the British .'tlnlstcr

r.nd rty^Elf t-i continue •'\xr duties n^rrw lly ra

fcr 0.3 v»E oen. It la olfaoab IrDoa^lblc for our

nntionals under exlstins circumstance fco lervc

nnd they have bren offereil quartcra In the

Lc3"tion if they wlah then.

Tlie Le.j'tlon telegra-ohc' Ar>crlcnn eltlzena

In northern Thai Ic I. iin^ then to conalder

Ic-vlnj ity aeeno ns oenccfiil

aa tuiuftl.

{ tro « V H

)

t;'3

pec:


EXHIBIT NO. 170

(Nora.—Documents contained in this Exhibit were obtained from files regard-ing Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short in the War Dept. and are supplemental tothose documents appearing in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 140)

Table of Contents

section a. documents ke relief of gen. short from command and his subsequentretirement (page 3794)

Dec. 18, 1941 Message to War Dept. reflecting the relief of Gen. Shortby Gen. Emmons as commander of Hawaiian Dept.

Jan. 12, 1942 Message reporting departure of Gen. Short and othersfrom Hawaii for mainland.

Jan. 12, 1942 Message reporting arrival of Gen. Short and others atSan Francisco.

Jan. 13, 1942 Telegraphic orders to Gen. Short to proceed to OklahomaCity, Oklahoma for temporary duty.

Handwritten memo by H. L. S, (Sec'y Stimson) re Gen.Short case.

Handwritten note (Gen. Marshall) on wording of theacceptance of Gen. Short's retirement.

Feb. 17, 1942 Memo by Gen. Hilldring for TAG re action in detail

required re Gen. Short's retirement.

Feb. 17, 1942 Memo for file by Col. Ostrander re actions taken withreference to handling Gen. Short's retirement.

Feb. 17, 1942 Acceptance of Gen. Short's retirement by ar Dept.

Feb. 17, 1942 Letter to Gen. Short accepting his retirement effective

2-28-42.

Feb. 18, 1942 Receipt from Gen. Short of retirement papers.

Feb. 19, 1942 Notes from Col. Ostrander and others re handling ofpress release on Gen. Short's retirement.

Feb. 14, 1942 Copy of letter from Sec'y Stimson to Sec'y Knox suggest-

ing wording of saving clause in acceptance of retire-

ment of Gen. Short and Adm. Klmmel.Feb. 25, 1942 Blind memo stating President intends to ask for a courts-

martial of Gen. Short and Admiral Kimmel on ques-

tion of dereliction of duty.Article of War 97.

Feb. 26, 1942 Memo for Chiefs of Staff from JAG division re proposedcourts-martial of Gen. Short.

Feb. 26, 1942 Final draft of press release on Gen. Short's retirement, asapproved by President.

Feb. 27, 1942 Memo from Gen. Marshall for Sec'y of War relating that

approved news release was read to Gen. Short over thephone before release.

Feb. 28, 1942 Press release on Gen. Short's retirement.

Feb. 28, 1942 Wire service bulletin on announcement of retirement of

Gen. Short and Admiral Kimmel.Feb. 28, 1942 Navy Dept. Communique #47 announcing retirement of

Admiral Kimmel.Mar. 9, 1941 Letter from Gen. Short to TAG asking retirement be

changed to read "for physical disability in line of duty.''

Mar. 17, 1942 Letter from TAG to Gen. Short stating his request of

Mar. 9, 1941 for change in retirement was not possible.

SECTION B. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO WAIVER OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PAGE 3818)

Sept. 10, 1943 Handwritten memo of H. L. S. (Sec'y Stimson) suggest-

ing War Dept. get waiver from Gen. Short.

Sept. 10, 1943 Memo from JAG to Sec'y of War re obtaining waiver as

had been done by Navy Dept. with Adm. Kimmel.Memo from Lt. Col. Wm. J. Hughes, Jr. to JAG re validity

of agreement in advance to waiver statute of limitations.


Sept. 7, 1943 Letter from Adm. Kimmel to Sec y of Navy and waiverof statute of limitations.

Draft of letter from Sec'y of War to Gen. Short askingfor waiver and proposed waiver.

Sept. 25, 1943 Memo from Gen. Green to JAG transmitting attachedwaiver dates Sept. 20, 1943 from Gen. Short.

Sept. 22, 1943 Telegram from Gen. Green to JAG re completion of hismission.

Sept. 28, 1943 Memo from Gen. Green for JAG re trip to see Gen. Shortand obtain waiver.

Sept. 27, 1MB Memo from JAG to Sec'y of War suggesting a public an-nouncement of the waiver.

SECTION C. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE ROBERTS COMMISSION RECORDS (PAGE 3830)

Mar. 2, 1942 Memo from Gen. Hilldring to JAG transmitting RobertsCommission entire file to JAG for use niconnection withpreparation of charges against Gen. Short.

Mar. 4, 1942 Memo from Lt. Col. J. L. Harbough, Jr. to Col. P. GranvilleMunson for use in preparing charges against Gen. Short,transmitting the entire Roberts Commission file.

Memo from Col. R. N. Young to JAG asking that entireRoberts Commission file be forwarded to the ExecutiveOfficer,' Operations Division, War Dept. General Staff.

Nov. 23, 1942 ' Memo from Col. J. M. Weir to Executive Officer, OPD,WD6S, transmitting the entire record of the RobertsCommission.

June 26, 1944 Memo from Gen. Green to Gen. Weir stating Gen. Shorthad requested he be furnished complete copy of RobertsCommission proceedings.

June 23, 1944 Letter from Gen. Short to TAG asking he be furnishedcomplete copy of proceedings of Roberts Commission.

June 30, 1944 Memo from Gen. White to Chief of Staff suggesting thatGen. Short's request for a copy of Roberts Commissionproceedings be put to the Pre.sident for decision.

July 4, 19^ Memo from Sec'y of War for President asking for decisionon furnishing Gen. Short copy of Roberts Commissionproceedings bearing OK of the President.

July 25, 1944 Informal action record ordering that Gen. Short be furn-ished a photostatic copy of Roberts Commission pro-ceedings.

July 29, 1944 Memo from Col. West to TAG asking that an extra photo-static copy of Roberts Commission proceedings be pre-pared for use by the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Aug. 9, 1944 Receipt from Gen, Short to TAG for photostatic copy ofRoberts Commission, transcrip, less Exhibits.

SECTION D. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR OEN. SHORT (PAGE 3847)

Feb. 27, 1944 Message from Col. Greer to JAG re appointment as counselfor Gen. Short.

Mar. 1, 1944 Letter from Col. Greer to JAG re defense of Gen, Short.Mar. 10, 1944 Letter from JAG to Col. Greer re taking of testimony in

Gen. Short's case.

Mar, 4, 1944 Transcription of conversation between Gen. Weir and Col.Springer re counsel for Gen. Short.

Feb, 29, 1944 Letter from Gen. Short to TAG asking that Col. A, J,

Greer be detailed to act as his counsel in any courts-martial.

Mar. 22, 1944 Letter from Gen. Short to JAG requesting that he be al-

lowed to enter agreement with War Dept. safeguardinghis rights if he participated in a program of recordingt-estimony of certain witnesses.

July 24, 1944 Letter from Gen. Short to TAG requesting that Gen. T. H.Green be detailed as his military counsel.


July 31, 1944 JAG memo to TAG approving assignment of Gen. Greenas counsel to Short.

Aug 15 1944 TAG memo appointing of Gen. Green as counsel for Gen.

Short.

SECTION E. DOCtJMENTS KELATING TO ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD AND PRESERVATION OF

TESTIMONY PRIOR TO IT'S ORGANIZATION (PAGE 3858)

Feb. 25, 1944 Report of Navy Sec'y Press Conference when it was an-

nounced that Admiral T. C. Hart had been assigned to

collect testimony from Navy oflScers concerning the Pearl

Harbor attack, and that courts-martial would be post-

poned until after "war situation had subsided."

Mar. 2, 1944 Extracts from Sec'y of War's Press Conference where it

was stated that War Dept. was cooperating with the

Navy Dept. in assembling evidence in the cases of Gen.

Short and Adm. Kimmel.July 18, 1944 Letter from Gen. Short to TAG requesting detail of two

oflScers as observers for him at all hearings of the ArmyPearl Harbor Board.

July 21, 1944 Memo from Gen. White to Gen. Grunert transmitting

request of Gen. Short for officer observers at APHBhearings.

July 26, 1944 Memo from Gen. Grunert to Asa't Chief of Staff, G-1, WarDept. recommending that Gen. Short's request for officer

observers at APHB hearings be denied.

Aug. 3, 1944 Letter from TAG to Gen. Short denying his request for ap-

pointment of two officer observers at APHB hearings.

Aug. 2, 1944 Message from TAG to Gen. Short advising him APHB con-

templates calling him as witness and asks him for sug-

gested list witnesses which he thinks have knowledgeof facts bearing upon the investigation.

Aug. 4, 1944 Message from Gen. Short to TAG saying list of prospective

witnesses will be furnished after consultation with his

counsel.Aug. 14, 1944 Action sheet memo, 1st endorsement by Gen. Grunert

referring to request of Gen. Short that he be furnisheda copy of APHB testimony befere board, etc. Recom-mends he be furnished copy of his testimony beforeBoard, that he be denied request for copy of all othertestimony taken before the Board and that he be allowedto have access to Board's Exhibits at convenience of

Board, the Exhibits to remain with the Board.2nd endorsement to above by JAG recommended allowing

copy of testimony of APHB be furnished Gen. Short,

less Exhibits.Aug. 20, 1944 Memo for record, Ass't Chief of Staff, G-1, approves re-

quest of Gen. Short for copy of APHB proceedings asset forth in 2nd endorsement above.

Aug. 11, 1944 Letter from Gen. Short to TAG requesting he be furnisheda copy of transcript of testimony before APHB andaccess to its Exhibits, and TAG'S approval as attached.

Aug. 31, 1944 Letter from Gen. Short to t!A.G requesting he be furnishedj^opies of synopses of testimony before APHB.

Sept. 20, 1944 Memo by Gen. Grunert recommending disapproval of Gen.Short's request for synopses of testimony taken beforeAPHB.

Sept. 28, 1944 Memo from Col. R. E. Kunkel to TAG recommending dis-

approval of Gen. Short's request for synopses of testi-

mony taken before APHB.Oct. 1, 1944 Memo of approval by Ass't Chief of Staff, (J-1, of the

recommendation of TAG above denying Gen. Short'srequest for synopses of testimony taken before APHB,and attached TAG letter to Gen. Short so advising him.

Oct. 3, 1944 Memo from Gen. McNarney to Gen. Grunert transmittingletter from Gen. Short to Sec'y of War and reply theretoby the Sec'y re testimony before APHB.


Sept. 29, 1944 Letter from Gen. Short to Sec'y of War referring to fact

that APHB has apparently not been furnished full de-

tails re intercepted Jap messages, and asks that all suchinformation be made available to the Board.

Oct. 2, 1944 Reply to Gen. Short's letter of Sept. 29, 1944 by Sec'y ofWar assuring him the APHB was exploring all sourcesof evidence bearing on the Pearl Harbor attack.

Aug. 24, 1944 Memo by Col. West for Staff and members of APHBre handling of Board's transcript of testimony.

Sept. 2, 1944 Letter from Col. Wm. J. Hughes, Jr. to Col. Chas. W.West, Recorder, APHB re copy of Major Clausen'smemo of July 10, 1944 to Mr. Amberg, which he did notthink should be furnished to Gen. Bragdon, as counselfor Col. Wyraan.

Sept. 2, 1944 Memo from Col. Hughes to Maj. B. R. Powell re ordercreating APHB and referring matter of Col. TheodoreWyman, Jr., to Board, with attached copy of order of

Sec'y of War dated July 8, 1944 creating the APHB,and memo of acting Sec'y of War dated July 12, 1944referring Wyman matter to Board.

Sept. 4, 1944 List of personnel of APHB making trip to Hawaii in

connection with its investigation.

Sept. 13, 1944 Letter from Col. West to Col. Hughes re APHB transcripts.

Sept. 21, 1944 Memo from JAG to Gen. Weir stating that on recom-mendation of Gen. McNarney, the APHB be advisedthat Col. Hughes of the JAG office be allowed to familiar-

ize himself with APHB proceedings to facilitate reviewof APHB Report by the JAG when report submitted to

him for opinion.

Oct. 23, 1944 War Dept. Press Release reporting APHB report had beenreceived by the Sec'y of War, who had referred it to

the JAG for consideration.

Oct. 26, 1944 Excerpt of Press Conference of Sec'y of War in whichthe Sec'y stated the situation had not changed re APHBand refused any comment on the report.

Nov. 30, 1944 Semi final draft of statement for Sec'y of War on APHBreport indicating partial approval and disapproval of

• criticism by Board, and that further investigation wouMbe conducted under his direction. Handwritten JAGnote concludes "errors of judgment only". . . . "Reason :

forestall demand for Ct. M."Aug. 12, 1944 Message from TAG to CG, 9th Service Command request-

ing he facilitate work of APHB which would holdhearings at San Francisco.

Aug. 29, 1944 Message from Gen. Somervell to Gen. Richardson re trip

of Gen. Bragdon to Honolulu as counsel for Col. Wyman,and preparation of records for his examination.

Dec. 6, 1944 Memo from JAG to Sec'y of War re effect of inactivationor discharge of APHB military personnel upon amena-bility to prosecution for unauthorized disclosure ofclassified information.

Memo from Harvey H. Bundy to Col. Hughes re com-bination of safe containing documents to be examinedby Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen.

*

p. CONGltESSIONAL COKBESPONDENCE WITH WAE DEPT. AND UOCXTMENTS RELATING TOLEGISLATION EXTENDING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (P.\GE 3903)

Feb. 14, 1942 Letter from Sen. Hayden transmitting copy of letter ofconstituent and War Dept. reply of Feb. 19, 1942.

Sept. 11, 1943 Letter from Sen. Brooks and War Dept. replies of Sept.

16, 1943 and Oct. 8, 1943, and JAG memo of Oct. 4, 1943saying delay in answering letter, and proposed draft ofletter to Sen. Brooks.

Nov. 22, 1943 Letter from Sen. E. C. Johnson to JAG re Gen. Short'scase and reply dated Nov. 25, 1943 stating waiver ofstatute of limitations had been obtained.


May 18, 1944

May 25, 1944

June 3. 1944

June 1, 1944

Dec. 9. 1943

Dec. 13. 1943

June 9, 1944

June 6, 1945

June 8, 1945

June 15, 1944

June 15, 1944

June 15, 1944

June 15, 1944

June 17, 1944

June 24, 1944

June 30, 1944

Dec. 30, 1943

Reply of Sec'y of War to letter from Congressman Mans-field dated May 10, 19^4 stating he does not consider

a trial of Gen. Short must be held during war time andwaiver obtained would permit trial later.

Memo from JAG for Legislative and L'aison Division anddraft of letter to Congressman Celler in reply to hisletter of May 18, 1944 re H. J. Res. 283 to extend statute

of limitations.

Letter from Sen. Ferguson to JAG re question of "mani-fest impediment" stated in Article of War 39, and replydated June 1, 1944 enclosing memo re "meaning of'Manifest Impediment' in Article of War 39" preparedby Col. Hughes.

Letter from JAG of Army to JAG of Navy transmittingcopy of his letter to Sen. Ferguson of same date andcopy of memo re "Manifest Impediment."

Letter from Attorney General to Director of BudgetBureau re H. J. Res. 199 stating he had no objectionto it.

Letter from Attorney General to Director of BudgetBureau re H. J. Res. 199 stating that he does not thinkthe resolution will accomplish the purpose its sponsorshave in mind, but he has no objection to it.

Letter from Attorney General to Director of BudgetBureau re S. J. Res. 133 stating he has no objectionto it.

Letter from Sec'y of War to Director of Budget Bureaure S. J. Res. 66 stating the Department regarded thelegislation would be ineffective to extend the statute oflimitations.

Transcript of conversation between JAG and Ass't Solici-

tor General Hugh Cox re meaning of legislation direct-ing Sec'y of War and Sec'y of Navy to commence in-

vestigations of the attack on Pearl Harbor.Transcript of Conversation between JAG and Gen. Mc-Narney re legislation directing Sec'y of War to investi-

gate attack on Pearl Harbor and for similar action byNavy.

Memo from J.A.G. of Navy to Sec'y of Navy re legislationdirecting investigation of Pearl Harbor attack.

Memo from JAG of Navy to Sec'y of Navy re legislationrelating to Pearl Harbor Prosecutions.

Draft of statement for Sec'y of Navy re Joint Resolutionregarding Pearl Harbor catastrophe.

Memo from C. H. Bull, Navy, to Gen. Weir re Kimmel-Short courts-martial suggesting it be decided by thePresident.

Memo from JAG of Navy to Sec'y of Navy re S. J. Res.133 recommending a Navy Court of Inquiry.

Memo from JAG to Sec'y of War re Public Law 339. 78thCong, directing investigation of Pearl Harbor attackby Secretaries of War and Navy, recommending a boai'dof officers be appointed to conduct the investigationfor the Sec'y of War.

Memo from Adm. Gatch to Gen. Cramer re copies ofRoberts Commission testimony.

Memo from JAG of Navy to Sec'y of Navy re H. J. Res.1P9 saying it could be ignored.

Memo from Lt. Col. Hughes for Gen. Cramer re legalaspects of extending statute of limitations for courts-martial proceedings.


Section A

9. crannM*.!!

»*.iL„, «n,« »»t>«»,JIUCClDtO W Room S441. Munition* BolMtov.

^

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From FT 5.naFT£R

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NO. 1649--JANUAftY 12

EY :

/FREWIC-

TRUMAN IS procl:

telTH ROaERTS C0'» !

PLcTION Th

YOOR 0«^nCE

Short

47 A G O •

9:iOP

>-!«'A ACCOfcSPANii

"RUVtAN Iftf CO'AJA AND

.iPPEft ELEVEfjTH

i5«MFNT STOP CAPT

rs -• *• rEMPORARY Dt/TYp fj*

iEMICOLDN l#ON OOw- P '^

-.IXJTEC REPORT ^ ^I

v.Tn»4 OF GENFRfL -^

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229 WVY.GL 27 PTY WD

Hft «DC AND 4TH 4RJY PRES SANFRAÎ 121 P JAN .12

AG

WMDC

MAJOR GEMERALS WALTER C SHORT DASH 1621 AND FREDERICK L ..APTJ M DA

2507 REPORTED THiS HQ FOR DUTY JAN TWELFTH COMPLIANCE ,vAR DEPT ORDERS^

DEMTT CG .VDC ATvD FOURTH AR^Y .^j \

'*' 853P

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WAR DEPARTMENTOFPtCC OF THK SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

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WAR DEPARTMENTWAR 0«FA«TMCNT aKNCnAL BTAT^

MmVOMMlL DIVIIIUN «. I

WASHINOTON

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\



The application of Major (Jeneral Walter C.

Short, United States Army, for retirement is

approved by the President, and by his direction

Uajor General Short is retired fron active service

to take effect February 2P, 191*2, under the pro-

visions of Section 12/*3, Revised Statutes, after

more than thirty-nine years • service.

^ZFebruary / /, 1942.

APPROVKDBy order of the Secretary of War:

E. 5. ADAUS,Uajor General,

Ttie Adjutant General.

.MNFiDFNTIAl

kXahoM ai%f, CkiataMM.

iMKivMMiting ratirowMi w»(l«r ttw i»r«rt»l«a» 9f X* tl« UMJliU U. S. C. 94:)t i-<. I. 19P^, »«e. J3bf /cu *r* MhrUMdi%tMt TV^ir ^p|»l,lMi%&«n for rctlrwMiit l« Mnnyttt, «nrM>ti««fmhramry 24, l<y4W, vlttwo^ •oadonatlon ef aajr off«n»« «rprajaitfi** to any rvtar* <t—Ipttwory Mitl«B»

tf Mm »<wiy»Mfy af ftri

ik. S. ADAI43^

APt:

RF. ^

ri..i<iLiv»it Si>i»


IN mmvMtrvft TO

WAR DEPARTMENT

THE ADJUTANT GEf^RAt-S OFFICE

WACHINCiTON

Ul V4 >

O*-

i2i:ii_i£SIES:L:

S-f/OKTFebruary 19, ;9i»P.

Notes - (From Col. Ostrander)

1. At 9:45 A.i;. - Feb. t9. If nothlnf>; hoard from '>nfral;-5hort - call Colonel Walsh (G-1 office) and report fact. .Valsh /2606.

2, Vait for Secretary oi .Var's relefM-n on order, (Hep;, mail -

n'turn receipt demind^d)

Notes by Col. Hemenway

Herewith - 1. Het. order (original ami two carbons)

2, I^t of trans.Tiittal with one form.

3, Memo to AG from G-1, Fob 17th with one carbon.

k, I'mmo - Sequence of events (by Col. Ostrander)

5. T/lcned receipt from '''.en. Jhort for letter advislni^

re rftlrement.

6. Copy of letter to iJen. jhort ,

7. Copy of rf>t ; r<»rTf»nt order as orirlnally drafted showingadministrativB correction reference P/A.for shlnment

of H.I!. >foods.>*âMel îî-^tcM*

9; 45 A.K. - February 19th

— Calle 1 ;<-il. Jalsh fjr instructions.— Heport'.'U no word fron Vrif-ral. :,hort,,

— I'ialsh stat.f'd that last nirht '^neral Hill In ad, stating.•;ec. jlmoson haa t=ii;<Bd to iTesident (a.^.'iumcd 3ec. Knoxwas 1n on this) and t.!,;it 'iny coriwinnical ion to press wouldh< resident.

iors to issue v;ntii rflfar.o obi.-iVned from :ec,

'ia.r or 'J-l

.

7/^,/

\^


Februaby 14, 1942.

Dear Frank : Here is my own revised suggestion as to the saving clause to beinserted in the acceptance of the retirement':

"without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any action on behalf of theGovernment."

Any reasons we want to give for our action can be said to the press. I am in.

favor of leaving the acceptance itself in this language if the Attorney Generalsays that it is sufficient to keep open the power to court martial. I will talkwith you about it on Monday if you desire.

Faithfully yours,/S/ Henry L». Stimson,

Secretary of War.Hon. Frank Knox,

The Secretary of the Na/vy.

HLS : ECN

February 25, 1942.

The President Intends to ask for a court-martial on the issue of whether asstated in the report of the Roberts' Commission, there was a dereliction of dutyon the part of Admiral Kimmel and General Short ; the court to be held as soonas the public interest permits. It is the privilege of the officers themselves to askfor such a court-martial.


ARTICLE OF WAB 97i Wb«n «nd by irtuw orctorMlt

A court of inquiry to •xmin* Into th« nature of

any tran«*etion of or aocu«atlon or laputation ai^alnst any

officer or «oldi«r may ba ord«r«d by the President «49r by any

coramandlng officer; but a court of inquiry shaai not be

ordered by any oonnandlng officer except upon the requeet of

the officer or aoldler whoae conduct la to be Inquired into.

#'

Sharfea and a pecifications awom to.

Anybody subject to military law may awear to them. No officerhaa a rl^fht to Inatitute a court martial againat hlmaelf

.

4^ ^

/

CO

Kabruary 2t>, 1»4E.

._fli;.«-., )^ If for th» Chi»f of Staff.

). a«)«r».j Short «M ;• »., ?"of i-«tlr«-

:n»nt ««• •ooopt^d •ff»<!tt»« f'«bra*ry XK, l!**i, "*).\.ftout aondt-

of any orf«n»» or pr»J»J<*l«« to •ny futur* di»olplinw> »8t,lo,

1 us4*r«t«n4 tJ»««» *t **»• tt<»o U»l« ««i!.i«« »w»« A^Hthic^* t« «•»««•*!

atwi't h» «• or«lly «otift»d by »J»» o<5«rl«r 4«lt»»rl»ii Wm i»vt*r

that If h» Md •my «»te>crtl»«» to swka thaji »)j«uirlnf

hl« to trl«i b»fore oourt-Kurtlal «r« jir»»»rv»^ (n» ;>t«fcut» cf Llaltlitl«nn»

i*i«n It amy b« In th» pubilo int«r««t ta du »o.

S. It wrrMli utmat lirMnJ»l»«bl» •t thS» tiw* •« • «>»tt«r of

poliay to !••«• « »t«t«Bwnt Uait tii«»« on'le»r« will b» trl»« by

oourt«-(mrtl*i »t «Ay »p»»i:l«4 futur* Ms»e- !»oi,h'.>v. wouli! 'a f:«la»a

by »a9J< ooanitntmt, Th» «j(lR-3.nsl«« of tn« ••r»^.

It «U1 b« laij«»«4iltji» »t tmmt tl*» t© '.ry W)«»«

tinw, •s.ii* oJrio«r« «ho would •• r«q.ilr®4 «« W te !> « «« • «i

probiibl • i^s »9«itt«r»<! ali OT«r th» »orW, « nt, »» « i,.h^••.o»l

lap««»iblUt,y t* ••••rahi. tK*™ for suoft » tt . . .ftKemar*,'

ttMM ottiamra »1 ?l »o»t Hk"ly «>• «>f.»e»^ ie •««•<- lJ»t>of«'«»>»- ûtl**

from wStlnJi th«y OMmot t>» r»ll«»»<3 withwit ••rlcra« <1»ji»p« ts t.h»

wmr •ffort. Tha <J»f«v»« «<*>jl<l <J»rt»iniy •tl.«R;>i to y**a pTt of ti>*

bllmm to th« »*r ••;><irt»»rA . .'iuoh fl»l*}^:o« 4r «r,-KB«>?.. if pubU^j!;/

•dlr»<t, would t«nd to rfl»ar«'iSt -aRwal «Bd os»»» • Uas

of îfld«tie« ty Uie ;.««?)« in «'•)•• «'" **<• '«'• '|^^«»i^«

ThS» »o»irt e«rt«'. nl/ ^'» »« ii t^'* -i .

« » .

or « ^'5 1 ft»nl«io«.

r«f»rMio« to th« •«r-g»»*-'<'*^ '• ^^ priori l»f„

of th» orfi«»r« th««««iv«« to ft»lr far »

f»r •• a«.«r«l Short i» a»nn«fr» n»r» »

ht« to r*(}u««t « »imirt-î»r ^

.>f Isr. fl«ii»a<l • apurt of *

siOh • r«qu««t lB*«.»"a»- «" ' -*•

, .-••ti.£*t<»4 th* ««tt.«r »-i.' I. • ««

»o>aa • iUtijry oourt of Inqt-il- ..afnor*. ..',•.. J .«r».«» »r»


•yMSn«««t«M. vr «tM»t km km* 1m**»%t0tim§ «k* MtlMMrs mNi

•)MUV*« iMw •« ywt Va«K pr»f»rr*4, «Ml it lafVHT th* rr*«l««»t 1» wiiiii la U^mmtt af mm* |w«r*nwB«tiM afrtaM-a aaaa

a

w>«4 »%Xl b« fcrla4, a« fetla talac •• *•*!' C^«a« ^g9«r«aBl.t7 «a Ui* 4MtaMM t« allac* Wm* Mm f>rMl4a«* tatsika «*«aMfMr m* t« aJMsri^ tiMt v»m mmrit mm»mm4 %y til«* MMa«ataMM» •/ wkiait l« mhjtmt tm kla apfHtaval, la Nat »n IfartjUl

na.


fMvwursr U, 1%2*

Tto SMTttaxx of lur tMMtneod today tlM •ao^ptmum,

•ffeotlT* Prt>nMU7 28, 194S, of Mb* appUeation far MiirMMBt

of 0«Mral WaUor C. Short, i*«itheut oondonatlon of mj ottmm*

or prajttdloo to aigr futura UmatpHaMry aotion."

Tha 8aeretax7 of lur annouiieod mt tha Mia tlaa

that, baaad upoo tha flndlxwa of tha rapcnrt of tha BOharta*

Coandaalon, ha had dijraetad tha prapara^Un of ohargaa fbr tha

trial tj eoort-oartial of 0«Baral fttort, idl^v^ doMliotlen «^

dutj. Tha 8aoretar7 of lar aada it olaar, hovanrar, that tte

trial upon thaaa diargao would not ba hold a&tll mttOx tlaa ••

tha public Ijiberaat and aafaty weald paxnlt*

WAR OCPARTMWfTOrPICK or THK SKCItaTAItV

MKMORANOUM

c/0 aiti m

/ '-^

s?«aupc¥-*-»-r¥»j" .v-^-jp^ -?;:^.

RTMEf

M/iuJy^J^ /-/iEPAfttKfENT '/y^^^

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF '/J

WASHINOTON

( :

»;v;ot<ANDUK ron lift, si-x^mtaky ok .';aj;!

Kebruary 27, 19li2.

'W^'General Htiidrlnt' rt^aa the ai^nroved news reiejise to

Uenerax ^tiort over the telephone yestertiay wvening at about

seven o'clock. A copy of the news rei«aae was glso sent hy

elr mall, special delivery, to cioneral Sfiort et :-ort Saa

Houston, Texas, where he is visitini; at pz^sent.

S^-

1? AM

^;V/ - ^>

SECRET

\

Vol

PM 'I I)


1>


(Cci^

':. "^R^^cv.

sen) af jre neai

••NFTDK^^

Na-.-y Oepartment i^tar.uniquc if i/7 , 28 Kobniar;' 19^2.

"Die Cc'TPtar:/ of the '•.'"'.•y wir.ourioeJ tod-iy the acoejit.'uicc effuctiv; L^arch 1,

^'r ^^' " '• n;;:"-'' • ••'->.> :•• f ,, ener t of Ttcnr /.dniral H. S. Kirael, U.':.

, ii.,, n. ;. ,• of any of!'«..-o or prejudice to any future

i', nclplinary iicticn." ^'.\f ''ccretary ol' liie Kavy tui.'iounced at the sane

'.ime t^-at '-.""J''. 'J' '•-< '" '' '.>r the report of tht:» f'.oberts CoranltBlon

h« had ;' •'•'1 the jircpar ^i for the tr'al by covi.-t

nArtial of ;tear ...inlrcl KiiniTiel uliwiKidC dereliction of duty. The

Secretary of :.'nvy made it clear, however, that thp trial upon these

Phnri'cs would not '>e held imtil ::u'h tis.*- .*is tiits publ'.c '.ntcr'iflt mid

safety 'v^'jI I ••emJ.t.

OONFirF>^>'7

;^jyKr

Kort i>«n HouBton, T«Xk«,torch 9, 1941.

Sublet: PhjrBlc«l Condition.

To : Th« Adjutant G«n«r*l,Unlt«d St«t«* Anay,Washington, D. C.

'

1. On February 21, IhkZ, tha un^Jorelgnad reiwrtad to the station Hospi-tal, fort -iaffl Houaton, T«xa», and requested • thorough physical exa^ninationprior to cont«aipiat«d retlrament. Thie examination wae contpletwd on Fsbruary28, 19«*2, and th« r«port of the same is a matter of r«cord at the hospitalnaasd above.

2. Aa a result of tha eocajalnation, including, nscesaary Laboratory pro-cedure, 1 waa advised by the eocamining phyaiciana that on account of a he*rtand lung condition I should limit and restrict my physical activities. At thessjM time 1 was advised Informally that njy physical condition existing at thetltoe of the examination and necessarily for sorrs tim* prior thereto was suchas would have warranted and required ay retirement froia active service onaccount of physical disability.

i

3- In view of tho fortsgoing it is recuested that a copy of the report ofthe physical examination pertaining to lay case and referred to above be obtainedfrom thft Comraanding Officer of the Station Ho«f.i<«l, Fort Oam Houston, Texas,and that appropriate action, based upon tht> 1 physical findings, be takenby your office.

4. Although thfc effective date of ajj' r«tirefflent was f ebrwary 28, 1942, itis reouested that, if possible, action be taken to change my status to retire-ent on account of physical disability incurred In line of duty and incident tothe military service,

5. I am aware of the probable legal difficulties in the way of such acourse of action. In the event the action requested can not be now legallyaccomplibhed, then it is recuoeted that V.it rejort of the physical «xaniinationbe filed with my retirement papers. If the report of the physical exajni nationsufficiently establishen physical disability in line of duty and Incident to themilitary service which, but for the accomplished fact of retirwnent at tuy ownreriuest, would have warranted or required my retirement for physical disability,then 1 reouest that a finding to that effect be entered upon the same and in-cluded with the record of my retirement.

6. I disclaim any intention to embarrass or annoy the VJar Department intime of war with ray personal affairs. However, having now discovered for thefirst time Biy physical condition, 1 very naturally desire that it be made ofrecord with ^ rffclrement file and tfiat any corrective action deemwi aonroprlatsb* taken ^1.r»' C9nn*cWon with the same.

Mk .. ,_ WALTiiH C. SHCHT,

(M 1» ^* ' lia.lor General, U. S. Amy. (''Xc^

V

'4rr

ili 201-'}h*rt, •alter C.rutxh n, xf^

. ..rt -.-.

ort, '

yiigttî, txtXMM.

r»d.

tiousvon, t«xAS, fui. twstiiMitiafe iM:i-l<»»i b« i*k«»n to ci-..!aif« your»t»lu« to r«itir««*tot o« •ccowft .'i ;t!y»io*i. <si«&i)tlitjr.

2. kftmr r<ttlr« «nt an-J«r ' ;« provl«tein« of -ectlon 1243,R«Tl»od .';tBtut«i», t>#ea»»« mftmot^va, th,:re 1» no i«t*l •athorityt« cKwig* Bmm ts^ r«tlrMi«ot lor phy»lc<.i ies lllly, "owoire'

,

the report, o- /Oir ./nvslcal ctj î-,af lo' nl n '' .- iK-»,a.'.->B- -•'i

ril«t« wit!i vewr r»cor<t-

Th« A^ju ,*!ii.» ..TîiBii'^kr''^

v-^^

79716 0—4(5—pt. 19- -2fi


Section B

WAR DnPAirrMENT

^..^ ^ OFFICK OF THK SKCRKTARV/• O ^^"^ ' MEMORANDUM

WAft OCTARTMENTARMT SCNVICt FONCC*

flvnci or Twt Moot advocatc otMuiM.

W*»MIWaTOW

0\JL^J»^

8PJ0J10 SU' rj43

LBUO<-iANlArM FOR TUK SKCHSTAKY OF 1UR.

SubJ«oti Court-martial of Major 0«n«ral VTaltor C. Stiort,

1. Th* atatuta of llmitatlo&s will bar trial of Ganaral onort andAdmiral Kljra al 7 Ueeambar naxt.

2. To m««t thl* «ltuatlaa tha Havy Datwrtaant ha* obtalaad froaAdnlral Klsr:el a waivar of th« abatuta of Iljnitaiioaa. Copy of lattarof Saoratary Knox to Aciiairal Kimaal «ad photoatatt of hla reply and wlrmrara attaotvad harato*

a. In obtalalae tha walvar froai Admiral Klnsoal tha Navy Dapartaaatuaad a* an intarmadlary iiaar Admiral Harria, iiatlrad. with whan AdadrmlKlmaal practloaa oi»il enginaaring in Haw York City. It ia baliayaddaalratjla tiiat if a walrar 1» praaantad to Ganaral Snort, ha should llk«>wiaa ba approachad by a paraonal friaad.

4. nua offioa haa haard, though it oaonot varlfy, that tha KavyDapartmant'a action in gattlng tna waivar waa approTad in advanoa by th«Prasidant. Tha poaaibility that Ganaral Short will not axaouta a waivaria fully appraoiatad but an affort in that diraetion by a truatad intar*aMiiary, who oan if naoaaaary diaplay Adairal Kljanal** wal-var, aaama ontha whola worthtrtiila. Tha undaairabla altaraatirae would ba to raquastlaglalation axtanding tha statuta of limitatioaa in Oanaral Short* a eaaaor to ordar an iaaaauiata invaatigatioa uadar Artlola of War 70 and '-'.fartha oaaa for trial bafora a court ooaipoaad of offioars aanior to OanaralSinort. Arraigrmant bafora auoh a court would atop tha running of thaatatuta but tha court could hardly prooaad with tha trial aua to thaiapraotioability of obtaining witnaaaaa who ara aoattarad all ovar thaworld and could only adjourn inJaf initaly. A< othar poaaibility would b«to drop tha mattar antirely, daolaion aa to wTiloh, in viaw of hia fonnarinatruotiona, would doubtlaaa ba a aattar for tha Praaidant.

6, In tha avmt a wai-rar froai Oanaral iihort la daalrad, thara anInoloaad harawith lattar to hin to ba aignad by you, for dalivary by handand form of waivar.

*

Tlifyroa C. Cramar,Major Oanaral,

8 Inola. nta Judga Advooata Owaaral,Incl. 1 - Copy Itr. of Sao. of Navy.Inol. 2 - Photo, copy Itr. 1'/9/4S

w/l Inal.Inol. 3 - Ltr. to Oan, S lort w/l Inel.

WAR DEPARTMENTARMV SCAVI'.f FOHCU

'irrirt or THt JUOOI AOVOCATl ocnihal

WAAMINOTON

MI'llrKAnnUM >T)h OEKEHAL CHAWiK.

)*i Validity of agrBoMnt In advanM to waiva atatuU of liaitatloM.

Ex*inln*tir.ri of the meagre applicable authortUo indicate* that•n ajtreement made !n advance to waive a orlMnal atatuta of Uadtationa!• nf very dubioua validity. While the law n that if the bar of tha..Utute 18 mt aaeerted It 1« waived, the baalo of tha statute ofllnu tatl„r^ ie the oownd public fxjllcy that pro.eoutlng officer, auitbe diligent to prcseoute while the witneosea are available and thadetail, of the crtme are fresh in U.elr adnde . It is a quaaUon whatharan accufled can agree to waive thle public policy. But aaavaalng ha can•o a^ree hia agreement ie at moat a oontract. If ha braachae it ha

, '^TJr^^"^^^^ °^ """*='' "^ ^-ntract. Hie aubatantaUve right toplead the Statute would not, in my opinion, be daatroyed by an advanoaagreonent not U> plead it. He ml;;ht eay the agi^anant waa without

ooneideration or Uiat t)»re waa no warrant of law for hia agraatMntin adv.,«j. to waive the atatute of limltaUona. Aa to undlacloaadoffenaee, charges aa to wfiich had not then baan InraaUgatad andserved on Mm within t^ie meaning of ArUcle of War 70 nor rafarradfor trial and aa to which a court lad not even been appolnUd at thatime of tha waiver, a aubetantial ahowlng might be made of hiainability to waive a aubatantive n.'.ht under theae oondltlona.

No caaeaof agreements to waive a criminal statute of limitatlonacan be found in the books, itself a strong indication that no ona!**.*T*''

^^'»Pt*<l it. There is a statement In 16 Corpus JuriabaaiaiiiM, page 228, repeated in 22 Corpus Juris Sacundiaa, paga 235,

"An indictment, found after tha expiration of thatime for beginning the prosecution, is barrad by thasUtuta of limiUUons, and it is not saved by tha factthat the proaecutlon waa withheld on account of anagreement with accused."

ohow«^t*!IL''^^'^''"'''•^•'' Co«. V. Werner, 5 Pa. Superior, 2ii9-25l,ahows that the agreement was not an agreenant to walYTth. atatutebut an agreement to support tha prosecutrix and her children.


In civil cases a sp«clllc agreement not to assert the statuteof limitations is usually upheld. However, in such cases the debtorhas reaped aii artvantage from his nronise and the basis of the decisionIs the eaultable c^^^^d °^ estoppfl. In I30 A.L.R. 21 there is aainorlty yiew illustrated by i>hapley v. Abbott, li2 N.T. Ui3, containixi^the treticl ant . statement!

"No case has occurred to me in which a party can. Inadvance, ioake a valid promise that a statute founded inpublic i-ollcy shall be inoperative".

Thm case relied upon by the Navy, Mullan v. U.S., 212 U.S. 516,la hardly conclusive. There a Naval officer hm convicted by a courtof inquiry as a result of wfiich ha was liable to discharge fron theservice. In this situation he applied to the ^cretary of the Navyfor a court-martial to try him on charges based on the findings oft>» court of inquiry. The Secretary of the Navy agreed to the trialby court-martial provided that the accused would agree that theevidence before the court of inquiry, which a statute prohibitedbein« Bubedtted to the oo urt-nartial, could in fact be submitted tothe court-raartlal. The Supreme Court on the baeiB of Schick v. U.S.,195 U.S. 65, permitting waiver of trial by jury, held that theaccused could waive his right to have the witnesses appear personallyat the trial and that as the Secretary was under no legal obligationto call a court-tnartial and did so for the benefit of the accused,\)B could convoite the court under such conditions exacted in advanceas he saw fit. The case finally turned on the fact that the accueedliad been deprived of no substantial right as he was allowed to calladditional witnesses if he wa:tted to.

My conclusion therefore, from a quick search, la that a waiverin advance is, as an abstract question, of doubtful legality.

As a concrete question, if the accused executes a waiver hecould only repudiate it at the trial by pleading the statute oflimitations. The court mjuld probably overrule the plea on the basilof the waiver wtilch tiie prosecution would thereupon submit in evidence.

Under Capone v. Aderhold, 2 Fed. Supp. 280, affirmed in 65Ked. 2d 130, error in passing upon the validity of a plea of thestatute of limitations is error committed in the exercise of Jurl,«-dlctlon wiiich can not be reached on habeas corpus. The only thingthe accused could do, therefore, would be to sue in the court of claimafor his pay which court, under Dynes v. Hoover, 20 Howard 65, Swaim v,U.S., 165 U.S. 563, undoubtedly irould refuse to open the record andretry the case on this point.

Uy recommendation therefore is that an attempt should be madeto secure a waiver from the accused and that the waiver should followtlie form, in general, of that obtained by the Navy.

/William J. liu^l^los, Jrlt

Lieutenant Colonel, J.A.O.D.


280 BRONXviLtE Road. Bronxville, N. Y., September 7, 19^3.From

:

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N., Ret., 280 BronxvilleRoad, Bronxville, N. Y.

To: The Honorable Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, Navy De-partment, Washington, D. C.

Reference (a) Letter from Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, to Rear AdmiralHusband E. Kimmel, U. S. N., Ret., proposing a waiver of theStatxite T)f Limitations.

Enclosure (A) Agreement not to plead the Statute of Limitations in bar of trial

by General Court Martial.

Sib: Receipt is acknowledged of your undated letter. Reference (a), delivered

to me by hand August 27th, 1943, concerning a General Court Martial in my case,

in which letter you state that the two-year statute of limitations controlling NavalCourts Martial will have run on my case on December 7th, 1943, and you proposethat I should now agree not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial

and you enclose a proposed form of waiver.You state in Reference (a) that you think that the public interest and safety

would now permit proceeding vdth my trial, but that you further beUeve that solong as the war continues it will be manifestly impracticable to have a numberof important witnesses appear before the court on account of their war duties.

For this reason, among others, you feel that it would be in the best interestsof all concerned if I should now agree not to plead the statute of limitations in

bar of trial and you give me your assurance that the trial will be held at theearliest practicable date.

It is my personal desire to be brought to trial by Gteneral Court Martial in

open court at the earliest practicable date. Delay in the matter is opposed to

my personal interests, since the passage of time and the circumstances andcasualties of war and of the period following may make it difficult, perhaps im-possib e, to assemble and produce the evidence and the witnesses required. I haveat all times been anxious to subordinate my own interests to the national welfare,which appears to require that my trial be delayed. I am therefore forwardingto you herewith a waiver, Enclosure A, executed by me which I hope will besatisfactory to you.

Respectfully,Husband E. Kikmel.

End. (1)

KN0L08URE (A) TO LETTER DATESJ SEPTEMBER 7TH, 1943, FROM BEAR AOlCIUAL HtTSBAXDE. KIMMEL, V. 8. N., RET., TO THE 8ECBETABY OF THE NAVY

I, Husband E. Kimmel, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Retired, herebyagree on my honor as an offl?er and a gentleman that I will not plead, norpermit any attorney or other person on my behalf to plead, the statute of limita-

tions in bar of my trial by General Court Martial in open court for any alleged

offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before Dr^mber7th, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six (6)months thereafter.

I take this action voluntarily, believing it to be in the public interest.

Husband E. Kimmel.

mt

IQr tear QmmmiI Sh»rti

Xa MMMMtian vitb ]K>ttr t»*»«t.>>I» trial bf ensMuml wsrli*

of Kur J9 mH, «m1m« MtiUn 1« t4yHn t« |#«viHit t%, tat ]rmi»>

%te ttAtute of XimlteUaa* «»td.4 )m «rt^pp*i bf- aittfar A

whioto, pxvbaMjTt vonU •d^ettm th« omm tntll latel**

8« long M th» wur aaatlnaM it will b« impm&ViMak&» 1m«. ntadMr or impttrUmt wltuMswi •^|mmu' bafor* llw Mnvt oa a««of thair «ar dKiU««. I& «iiia «iiwaUo« t% haa aaaarwMl to aa iMHtha praoUeal tMn« to do la W p4Mi%mm aor yaantrnt^trial uaMllator and t)M% yva tmy <lMii« far tMa piurpaaa ta maaota a aasMmr /af tha ««atuta of UMtatioaa. Xa tlia 9-9^0% tiMt |ro« aaa f&t ta /do tttu, I gSLrm fnu agr panooaX aaattraaaa ttet aagr trial ^atawrinawlviKm will b« iMd at tfaa aarliaat praetiaalOa data.

If yoM ateidd acraa with iht forafolnf /owr proapt rattan oftte looloaad font of waivMTf duljr aaaauiad by ]««« la laquaatatf*

ainaaxtljr rotunit

I laal. Sa«ra«ai*r of liar.

Valvar.

)^

J>t«no('.r»ip!»lo notvs mna poui^h dr»:t in thl« orb« hairo ooon deatroyod.

DlBintorootod erfioor VT"<^Custodial / .T

""' '

'

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WAIvn

teptrabMr , 19U3.

I, aiLTKR C. 3inft, Major 0«n«rkl, Dnlt«d 9t*t«* Ai«gr,

ftetlrsd, harvby mgrmm on ^y honor •• an offio«r and a gantXavMI

that I vlll not plaad, nor pandt anjr attomajr or otbar p«r«an on

mj bahalf to plaad, the atatuta of lialtatlona in bar of agr trlftl

by Oanaral i^uurt Uartial In op«n court for an/ all«c«d off«n*«a

vlth ahioh I aajr ba ohargad ralating to thm pariod oo or iMfor*

^ca^bar 7Ui. 191*1, ahould / trial ba bald during tba prsMiit

war M- within aiz (6) aontba tharaaftar.

i tak* this action voluntarily, baliavlng it to ba in

tha public Intai^at.

Waltar C. Short,Major Uanaral, 0. 3. krmr, aaiixwl.

^^^


25 September 1943,

Memorandum for: The Judge Advocate General.

There is attached hereto a waiver dated September 20, 1943, signed by MajorGeneral Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired, in which he agrees to waiver thestatute of limitations in bar of his trial during the present war and within six

(6) months thereafter.

The above waiver was obtained pursuant to your verbal instructions.

T. H. Green,Brigadier General, U. S. Army,AHHiatant Judge Advocate General.

Incl.

Waiver & pertinent papers.

WAIVERSeptember 20, 1943.

I, Walter C. Short, Major General, United States Army, Retired, hereby agreeon my honor as an officer and a gentleman that I will not plead, nor permit anyattorney or other pers(m on my behalf to plead, the statute of limitations in barof my trial by General Court Martial in open court for any alleged offenses withwhich I may be charged relating to the i^eriod on or before December 7th, 1941,should my trial be held during the present war or within six (6) monthsthereafter.

I take this action voluntarily, believing it to be in the public interest.

Walter C. Short,Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

TUB ««»*>« wm, »»fwe<!U-m vmammm *«« ttn ?«•*<!» oommm^ «* •mnvm:

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3830 CONORESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

a-1/-

Section C

J 9

WAR DEPARTMENTWA« DEPAKTMINT OKNKnAI. STAirr

nM*ONNtt. DIVIIION •'I

WASHINOTON

mnn^nr-t-

Maroh 2, \042.

iiubloct,i

T)iM s«or«jt rlo<'

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; tjio aboV«!•<• !'.'>H V t)i; ;

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-:.. i'A connaotlonT'ln' propnr.od trial

..! ri . "! be connidartn! -i

:rr

f GFRWftD N. BmtWKajor. 1. mtry

Af i.itant Kx'Outif»

• 3ECRET '

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inaii'i" ;• :i"curl.1.y Giri'ê '.::. 7 '.'.1

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WAR DEPARTMENTOFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

WASHINGTON(

lOafORAnKJII POR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEXERALt

Sobjeoti Btport of Roberta CoaBlasion*

It is desired that yon forward to tha BxaeatiT* Of-

ficer , Operations Dirision, WDGS, for file, the rvpoort of the

Roberts Co—iision, together with all supporting papers and

reoords in connection therewith, now in your possession.

Bj direction of the Chief of Staff

t

R. lyTOTOO,^Colon*!, O.S.C,

Secretary, OeneriLl Staff*

19

ISECHETWAR DEPARTMENT

•utvica Of luffit

arrKi 0* TM ntixj >ovocati ccmiiui.

Nov««b«r

SPJUE

MEMORANOim to KxeouUvw Officer, Op<'r«Uorvfl Dlviaicn, ir-

DepirtiiMnt General Staff.

Subjecti Hoport of Rob< rts Oonimisaion.

1. tûraiant to undated alrecUw of tSia Chler of Staff tlKtrc in

transmitted h«r«v.itii, for fUe in your ..iTice, th« ronawlng enumt-rBted

pmpero aJid documenta conatituUna the kaport of the Holxsrts Corainiasioii

luS supporUng pai.ers and reeorde in cofM,*oUon with 8».ld ComaiasAon

Report s

^listshowln^' doouitinta fjmlshe i tiie S/rtar }

Incorporated in

Uat showing docuiaonta f..rni3!.f.i the S/N»vy) Mnutes

Minutes of Conmiaaion to ascertain and report facts

mUtin,: to ihe -ittaok rmde b:; Jap. ^rmod forces upon

Territory of Hawaii, 12-7-41.

X packare containijii; shorttiiiiid iK>i«a of torti-a-.i..^

Got»-ni33ion ajipointed by the Preaidont, U-V-.-hj., -o

inv«3ti-atr ,i!.L.n.;k by Japanese of Doc. 7, l>.il, on

2 pa.LX^/ônt-.-.-... io vol««.«3 transcript of testimony (Vol. 1-8. in 1

before Co«mx33ion investl, attack on P*«J«^«- ,

to-.Ui, 12-7-41. a«3 1 ..- •^

:,«,t.-,orv. (Vol.9-16 in Ol*.r,

1 package eontalni.^; secret, coidid«nta«i «nd unclassified

documents as numbtred 1 to 36, inclusive as fo.lowss

No.

1

1-A

2

3

4

"inmorandum of 12/23A1, Capt.G.A. Kcngla, A...., to "^«^^"^'-

Officer. iUiwaliar. Interceptor Conmand, rom;erning l>*«i»«

aâ3 a^d bunkera ut *l-el«r, Haleiwa, and ^^\^"'^, '^j]'''

together Kitl' '-'-"- .- --"^yH^t; ti»« -:r.orar.i'.'.r (ti»« latUr

being rolled ,e charts ,

..atallations",Secret -'OP:. ;...>, -.- ;corai'any

..ataiiaLions,

Island of Oahu.Aircraft

'

Seo'-et top "Hawaiian Uufenat Project î-Axrcraiv

DisinaiUons" ^ ,

,, ^<

j.-ap Hhcmtne "^litary r^«.rvation3 on .. ^ > --â (1 cojy.

S-tcial ViliU.rv :iap kJ- of Kawaiian Islands (1 .'op^ ,

XIa exrlanalory adder,.* .howi.ui ,jro.md delenar. at

;Srt"^f'atck;« Field nho-^n. diB.osition of aircraft at

tiro'- of attack ( 1 copy)

:^'C

:rfti

otîteinent ><y :.laJor GentTai i.'al•

I'.rnli'ioiis lea-tin,; up '£> 'he .

"jl-ier niefflo. ma;:; .

•;(. :rab.,T ,:T. 1 /..: . .

ort of even la and.it. t^t <

^- , IP "f r.i r »* f 7

,

' s from OOOl r iJ4l

y Kcijorta of K.I.. IJugân, 5ij .

Caj.t. Iiif., tirvund iJefeii:;', „-

victiviU«3 at Bellows Field ;

Ijiil. (2 oopiea, carbon not i .. ,,

30 L»;tter, ^'3 IJec- lV4l, Leomu-t: D. vj

Cotansandirt iiellowa Kielri to C.i..

records of oijerationa tiy all umto U730, 7 Dec. 'Al, .md neld OruAlert F'rocedure (3 coinoa - all le

11 Letter, 22 Dec. 'U, Jay P. Tho--",

Ôj.]i) , Oj)«-ratloiia Officer, UCO. Bellows ilel-'. •-'- • -•

instructions reo»U to G7^" ' •>

12 Sdeoio. 22 i> "-.C/ol

BcllcTfs I

position

B'-",it)W3 Field acconqianyi;

13 otaLtp.iwnt 'ialcd 22 Uec. '^1, l,

Gi'ound Defi'nae Orficer, Be-lo.• lefe.'.:ie activities at aai

thcrfafter (2 coi-ies)

L4 :knni}, 22 Uei.:. '41, l/f-omfd

GoBBianuirn; Bellowa r'leXd,

Air Force, rcj. ortiii:; action r -u.îr,

ijlven by Use reaponsiblc coas.iander:

jec. 7 '41

15 ;.'C'mor)»nd'i)r., Iceland C. ):urd,

...^ ,..^:... .„-uen3e

1 to Eiecei'ibrT 7,

, Lt.Col. A.C.,v^-t. , reporting

Iroia 0<JOl, IJ Nov. '/'.I

t ris or Instructions forS3 Inol. indicated).

'*. Soth Oban. S^.

ept, , throu.:;h

., rations of and, fn)m 0001 1> IJov.

;c(>rnint; !_;rvund

r; u,,.-.. 7 '41 and .

t.Col. A. .

,

,Cj-3, Hawn.

it. i.ai:; j'ield on ordera, for 3«:carity aince

jmnandin;; Hick an

d iar. Al

lb .L<:":

socarity of iTl-ieeler Fiflo

17 U-tter 23 Deo. 'U, vT.U. Hudoi,

IBtli Uomb..rdaent tiinc, Air Co;

npriccrnlng arran,;ement3 or Ij-

security jlnce nee. 7 (1*38 X

or-

1 ui'jcra :or

:«o, 7lenl. U3A, Comrian'UnB

. ;. ilAwn, Air Force,ij and orders for

. cated)

PRET^


SECR'^T18

IV

20

21

22

24

25

26

272B29

303132

33

3iV

lAHBorandua 22 Oac. '^, CL. Tinker, Brig. 0«nl. U.S.A.,Coiamarfilrif; l!aw*ll»n Air Forc«, diacloding ord«r» orIn tn.ctlon* for security and employment of HswaliknAir Korc«9, Kiv«n by him sinoo his arrival.

LetVrr 23 Uec. '41, H.C. Darldaoh, Brig. Oenl. A.C.,CoBBnantAng iUwalian IntercBptor Coamand, to C.C>.

Hawaiian Air Force, outlininj; arrangecwnta and n«n» Inatrue-tiona or orders for security after raid ot 7 Dec. 1941

Copy of letter F.L. Martin, Kajor Oeneral, U.S.A. COMaandlngJlawn. Air Korce, to C.j. Kami. Dept. dated 20 S«pt. 1941,concerning Joint Ara(y-Navy Air Force Exercise

Copy of letter Cheney L. Bertholf, Lt.Col. AGD Adjt. Generaliiawn. Air Farce, to C.C. 18th Bo«fc«irx]tiaBnt Ulng - aubject.Attack of Navy Croiaing Dioi'Oaition (less Inol. indicated).

Copy of letter dated Feb. 7 '41, Henry L. Stiaaon, Secty. oftor, to the Secretary of the Savy - aubjeot. Air Dafenee ofPearl Harbor, Hawaii.

iteaorandua dated 26 Dec. '4l> Robert K. Dunlop, Col. AOD,Adjutant Oenl. Kawfi. Dept., to Major Srooke E. Allen, AirCorps, containing tabulation ahoiring percentage of strengthof all major echelons, poat and district cotaaanders presentat 8 a.nu 7 Dec. W4l, exoept Kaul Diat.

Letter 12/25/^, fiSaxwell Murray, Uajor Oenl. USA, to MajorGen-'ral Frank l4«2oy, supplewenting Oeneral Hurray'stestimor.y before the investigating coaraiaslon.

Menio. 26 Dec. '41, A../. Meehan, Uajor A.C., A.C. of S. , 0-3,Hq. Hawn. Air Force, to Roberts Coiaaiaaion, ahowrlng nuiiibera

and types of aircraft for Hawaii, specified in Defenae Flan;airplanes on hand 7 Deo. '41} airplanes rea^y for inriediate

uoej planes on hand after raid sum! usable after raid; andairj.'lanes that took to ^he air Dec. 7

Uemoranduffl 25 t*c. '41 Robert H. Dunlop, Colonel, A.G.D., Adji.Goneral, to "distribution 'B' and 'F' leas 5 and 6" -

Subject, Priority of Gorwtruction ProjectsTranalatlon of Mori conversationStancS.ng Opc-raUne Frooedure 25th Inf. !». dated 12/2/41atansiing Opt^rating Procedure 24th Inf. Div. dated 27 Hot. '41

Standing Opuratint; Procedure 24th Inf. Div. dated 1 Dae. '41

Standing Operatin,; Procedure Hawn, C.A. dated 26 ttov. 1941Standing (derating Procedure l{awn. Dept. dated 5 Nov. 1941Certain inolosures (2 in nuai'Hsr) from .eneral Short's report,

copy of i^;ich is in rfar Department in fca»hin«,ton (33-^33-1).

Copy of letter 11/17/41 F. L. Uartln, Major Genirral USA,Coamandlng Air Officer to C. . Hawn. Dept* forwardingspecial reports ooacming provisions for security ofinstallations at hickam and Wheeler Fields andilawalian Air Depot.

SECRE

I

- 3 -

(,0

35 "A Plan for Uw sjnpiojment of Lon,;-Riir ' ' 'vrdinent

Avi«U,cn in thp Deferise of OaJiu", ^ in, MajorCien«?ral USA Commandinj; iiawaiian Ai- *" '.itny

Air Fc»'C*«, 'Jiron ;h CO Hawtiian &-;

30 Stateaunt by ijerseral iero* before " '

.aamxara'jit

12-18-<1.

2, Koceipt of the forp oin/ docuaents is reqaeated b;/ inUoroa-ment hereon.

For The Jud^je Advocato Onnr-rals

John li. '.feir,

Colonel, J.A.ij. J.,Executivw.

OPO 311. i Oog D (U-53-4i) 1st Ind.

OPERaTIO»S division, '.(AH DEPARTLENT CJEKERAL STAFF, V.aaiangton, 0. C,Noveinber 26, IVW. TO: Offic« of th« ^ijdg« Advocate i}«ner«l, '><Ar Depart-

ment, Washington, D. C.

The iindersigned has received the docmaents and papers listed in the

basic letter for file in this Division.

THOS. 1. HANDT,Uajor General,

Aseistaitt Chief of Staff.

C. •!. LiliiT,

Lt. Colonel, j.S.C,Custodian, H«ii.y. stored Uocuments, OPD.

- ^ - C/

ftflft&ji^ ifMîîiMr WrMim r gin -TS JWÂrniy Sffmci FMca

OMtOK or THK JUCNM MMKMBAt*

I»<ltfd iMrvvltli for tlMoffi«« HIm !• a Mfy «f m%0^^ti9 fwvB MtaJttP fliwillnil"IklUae 0* aMHrft» ivtis^» totim Mlv^BMKt fliitoirfcX» datoA^F ^BHIW^ WHj^ tt ** I^^P^V J^ wi*0 ^WW«w^^wO ^BWI^W^WIF*^îî

WMVi^VIHV ^^ w* ^^^B^lOîWIlF ^^Ww ^^^fr 9i^^^ ^w ^^^fc îwmBw^^ww^^F'^p

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Ml tk* MlvlMll

air !•'wwinliit . ijifrt mtmS.lm mtm

tiAp tla* «

i«J«r0*

WAR DEPARTMENTWAM DCFARTMKf<T OMNCKAL S r«r)'

immc**»^WL o>vt««OM a.

I

WABMINOrON

NIXMP 201 Short, W»lt«r C.

50 Jon* X944.

mMORAjfntw )roH tub chubt o» tmatt

Sobjflctt Raquaat for copy of th« RobertaCc«B!t»«lon )Proc«»4i«i*5t.

1. Ib » I«tt«r to th« MJutnat ftanana CCa^ A),Kôr Osnaral Waltar 0. Short, Retired, rvqaaat* that h« b*furnlohail « oopjr of the full prQC««dluc« of th« SoTi^rtg Coml»-•loo.

2. Th« War I>«n*rtsi«nt !• infcrsad th«t th»S«oret«kry of th» Kiivj {Mr. Ilaoi) Mr^wa oonth* itgo fur»l«h»dAdmiral Klwwl a photoatatic copy of th« report of th« Ho^«rt»CoHsi««loB. TJie H»r? Q*p*rt»»nt i* tuiAliX* to stat* whsthor3«cr»t»ry Knox ofataloed l&foMoftl approyal from the Pr«si'di»Rt

b«for» thlt aiotioo ««• talc«n.

3. Th« J'udc* AdvooKt* a«fi»r&X 9xpra«a«> th«oplalon th&t a«n«r*l Short 1* MitltXad to and aho-altl be fumlthad& copy of tb« report of th« Roberta CoBoniaatoa; that the ConBi'a-

elon \m» sppottitad by aod reported to the Prealdent of the UnitedStatec; and that a copy ahûld not be furnlahed Oaoeral Shortwithout prior approval by tha Prealdont.

IX. »^xn rftfiga»ffi4t.!»>

1. That the attached aeworaadua for the I>reeldentbe al|;ned and dlapatched.

2. That whea the rasBoraaduss h«« beeo dispatchedthle file be returned to 0-1 for further acttoa.

lool*. ^

9ab ABMkft ef M««a «> ^heF»»a*taB« -#er wti^Datuire of the S/V.

L^'^^

>. VHITB,General

,

Aaotatant Chief of Staff.

NO'lU î^^"^'" ^

''(' v.<

^"^

^|)jt*li>W»*»«itMi< liWpiWiMII>*WilWII^«>HW*.MJ»ywti»rjjiW»lltl^

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

I I

3843

lot fKB mMtmmi

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WAR DEPARTMENTWASHINCSTON

'\^\h'-

bl!'-.;'-"

. ',<-J•'» ^'

iis8i"n, the sa--; to

kj:j^cx.^t. // f)'^,t

x1


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-A»*^^^,,rf»,4«" ^ J'^^'

of th& Soobarts Coawu

^it, i'flKeral 'Photostated copy

-irswi.

li*


Section D

Pi-i'-'.f- ro TO LT COL ERANA ,^,

7 105 />v ,>ii C"

/^y

VA2

«MU V WARG MR 9

FROM ALLEN J 6SEEB COLONEL RETIREB VWS. BUFFALO m 27 MFT

TO JUOCE ADVOCATE CENERAL OS ARMY ttAI SEFT aASH0C

CR NC BT

CENERAL WALTER SHORT TELEPHOBIP IJSIlirUt JOOR 8E?lfSE»TATIVE WILL SEE

HIM TUESDAY AN!> ASKED ME Al RIS COUNCIL Tc'^SEE YOU MONDAY A« LEAVING

HERE TONIGHT AND ARRIVINft''WASHINGTON KONjyfY HS^NING S«ALL GO

IMMEDIATELY TO YOUR OFriCE PLMSE SESaSPlK'oiNTMEWT

a: 02032

py^i


\ i WS

'^ '

..„.. ^m.

. n L«p«rt-

• t.'.ut j'.e

..a.i realize^'.. le officer,"'K? t accept th«

hJs honor.. ;...„^.,r. toci.-'>en done arn.; ' t

: ' ^ head forfurther -

ai'tment of^ t 'at t>'>se

• " ..f

not Tf'fkl' T'r.r

r«sprten

neroua 8

f c'1sft«t.er :*'

'ipsrtmonts &.-.

ait L©yon<^ t

the nocoss!ty r

rh« very fact t'

n-r r'ifide !t •;;'

.l.tch t^

't was TiOt alona*hal the M&r, the

htrnself Kust share->!can people fornrp!cness are also

such f.

or t,.

".Var ',

'fcl t&kes placM *. t w!'l

In svic'i 'asues us the lacArtJ.;f0rce_ pi;llt5cal naC not f«ctuthat cannot be othar ihs^n unf

i comrnda of Spunlshrespect auc. personal

^OSS' bli5 to > - ; ,,^ ..•

.era which will

upon your time tut couplefew words.

recep-uriv.ulj pi-«surr.'

nj_,

le ciscusaed In a

79716 ()—46— i)t. 19 28

1M4

U«-«lt •la tteMt,

0«1«m1

« r«««ra of %mmnl ««ir froi his m&mt^rmk— -AVk

M^. t—riT Wtlr took &4mtac* o^ Wla« la BalUaIjjpjjt Mvvnd Jwlf* •4v*aA«« oTAmm Lb that TislBitjri

is a gMMTttl froisst%t«i# a—r>l Ihart afyrs %•

^ . . ^Tl^ «• «h« rrsfW4 taklK •' •••t""^|l ! <*• •••

MTt m4» <M r«f«M« %• Mm cfrMt «ba% a««hiac ^ aWrtaA

tefw* «IM first •* AyAl b«M«s« ids vlfo ms «• wisrts «

Mwr ofSTBUsB sM IM «sslrs« «• «id« uatLl sIm ha« fMsrrsrsA

frsB tks% bsfsrs n^Miiiv wm 4sms« TtaA%« of ssurss* is sys'

•bis to «hs

Z wk« «IM s^gostisas s4« la your lottor. Of

sourso m^ •wak s«ci«o%lflas will hsw %o «m1% furthsr

«i«B of Hko M«%«r.

foty siaooroly ]roiu>s«

%roa a. OrMor,•Jer Ooaor*!,

fko J«t4ffO 4«vo«««o Ooaoroi,

^^Vi.« ^rasv »j»:*.T-»«>»-i-;te!«M;c»,-!SMa!'2«SSW«s-i2StM«il<««*«S

iISNTIAt.

W*lrt

•ad Oolrtrsel »prlng«r, 4 M^roh 1044

Sow with r«f«r«ao« to th« o*»« up th»r« - rmumborl Toll (l«B«r«2

Cr«»«r th*t h« wvata Toa M MtiT* •rrlo* md •• th« JA oouaMl,

aprlngT t W«Lit ju«* * nlBttts - h» w*nt« Ten «• » Wh«tt

Tfairt Aetlv* amrri.0* - on »otlv« duty. In oth»r words ho has a rrfcirod~~~*

offioor. K« also would wmat » JA wid •omooao ow aotlTO duty. Howould Ilk* to haTO To«.

Bpriagori Tom, rl^ht hore.

Woiri

Sprtngor t

WjjlTl

Springar t

Ifolri

Y««h. As woll •• Coloaol Cir»*r, r«tir«d. Oroer la about 67, $B,if I rooall It. H« wants offioors on the oourt who would b« saaiorto hia as of th« tla« In quastion. In othor wcorda h« doasn't wantany tamporary Iteutonaat gensrals or soaaone liVa that who ara wayJunior to him now - junior to hln on tha Regular list, on any oourt.^

Ha' 11 hara oivlliaoB counsel at tha ti»e In quastion. Ha has notyat aBiployed oouasal but he Intends to. He's all for this investi-gation of o«u-s« as I told General Craaar yesterday, but he doesn'twant to start on anything before tha first of April. His wife isto be operated on in the hospital in Dallaa sometiaa tha forepartof this month and it will be a couple of weeks probably before he'lXwant to begin on that. Of course he wants the testiauHsy preservedbut as I told General Cramer these depositions, or T^aterer we»ragoing to call tham, should be used only if the witness is not aliveor available at the time. One of ids prinoipal witoeases andprobably a prinoipal witness on both sides, is now dead, so we'relost that man's tostiraony - got itt

Yes, I got th&t all rifht. John, Oenaral Craiaer said when I talkedto you to ask you if Morse and Daincsr wore still to go up to theoonfsrenoeT

riflXl I had planned to have Daincw up there to the oooferenoe to editthe -

"Vo 1, that's what I figured so I told him to count on it.

It's not dreadfully important about Morse - I tiiourht Morse wouldhave an opportunity to see the people up there and cheoip on theirlibrary so he wcwldn't have to make those trips all over the west.

Well he's made moat of his trips hasn't he7

He's siade a oouple but he hasn't gone very far west. You slightoheok with him on that. I'sc checking here with people as I goalong. Jones will bo there.

Is Jones getting his own carders?

.<»it a isinute - he's getting, his own orders and they've been

^


* ' approved h«r« go ho' 11 b« thore. Kow what«» th« dope on th*OonferoDO* - eTorytJilnr. rolnp alonr, ••11 rlKht?

V


3141 Southwestern Botjlen'ard,

Dallas 5, Texas, Feb. 29, 19^.

Subject : Detail of Colonel Allen J. Greer, U. S. Army, Retired as Counsel.

To

:

The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. I request that Colonel Allen J. Greer, U. S. Army, Retired be detailed to

act as my counsel in any court-martial that may take place as a result of the

attack of tlie Japanese on Pearl Harbor, T. H.

2. I request that Colonel Greer be placed on active duty at once to represent

me and to assist in the preparation of depositions to be taken in the case, accom-panying the officer detailed by the War Department to prepare and take the

deposition. As a preliminary to this work I request that Colonel Greer be

directed to report to me and go over with me the preparatioxi of the interrogatories

of the witnesses for the defense.. Walter C. Shobt,

Major General, U. 8. Army, Retted.

3141 Southwestern Boulevard,Dallas, 5, Texas, March 22, J944-

Subject : Testimony of witnesses with knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor.To

:

The Judge Advocate General, U. S. Army.

Recently I was interviewed by Brigadier General John M. Weir, J. A. G. D.,

at my home in Dallas, Texas. Among other things General Weir informed methat the Secretary of the Navy had appointed Admiral Hart to take testimony

of witnesses who had knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor and record their

testimony in order that it might be preserved against the possibility of the trial

of Admiral H. E. Kimmel in the future. He stated that the Secretary of War con-

templated taking similar action in my case and that the War Department desiredan expression of my views on the matter. In reply I stated that I desired to

cooperate with the War Department to the fullest extent consistent with theprotection of my rights, and that while I concurred, in principle, with the pro-

posal to perpetuate the testimony I believed myself entitled to such stipulations

as might be necessary to safeguard my rights.

Since my interview with General Weir I have given further consideration to

the matter. I am sure that there is no intention on the part of the War Depart-ment to place me in the position of being compelled to release any rights I mayhave in the premises.

In this connection I believe that before the commencement of any proceedingsto which I am to be a party it would be only fair and just that I be apprised ofthe basis of the proceedings, their scope, the use to wJiich the records may beput and such other details as will permit me to save my rights. I believe it wouldbe a relatively simple matter to make an agreement as to those details and thatsuch an agreement would insure that the proceedings will be disposed of in anorderly and efficient manner. It seems to me that some such agreement is soessential to the safeguarding of my rights that I would be compelled in self-

defense to insist on it as a condition pi-ecedent to my participation in the proposedproceedings. If, therefore, the War Department decides to proceed with theperpetuation of the testimony in my case as contemplated, I would appreciatebeing informed before the commencement of the proceedings as to the viewsof the War Department on this point.

In a letter which I handed to General Weir I asked that in the event proceed-ings were begun Colonel Allen J. Greer, Retired, be made available to me ascounsel. I reiterate that request. I stated informally to General Weir that I

would like to have Brigadier General T. H. Green, J. A. G. D., as my counselunder the same circumstances providing he was willing to serve in that capacity.This latter request is now reduced to writing.

Walter C. Short,Major General, U. 8. Army, Retired.


• y

ASrO-M .TOl Short, ir*lt»r C. l«t Ind. Aff!C/»b/i>44«

(M Jul 44)

WD, too, ¥ft«hln«ton- 28, t. C, 9 Aa^«t 1944.

TOi Kajor (>«n«r«l Wnlt«r 0. Short, V. S. Armjr, Hatlr«d, 3141 SouthwastarnBoulavnrd, Dalla* 6, Texaa.

ApproTad proTld^d it will not unduly Intorfxra with Brigndlar aeaaralOrgan's i^rosant dutlen. ThiB ft{»pro»«l ta ^iVen with tha ajtpraaa xjadaratwvdlngthM; tha detftjl wilt ba in ndditlos to hi« other ilxjtlns.

Bjr order of tha 8«cratftry of Ifarj

J. A. tn.10.

Major *an«r»l,Tha Adjutunt G»aar«l.

00*^y^_ / '" '^' ^t^%> ' %f

.^^.'

^..i.-

Section E

Secretaiy Knox «mouao9d that tlie Unit*' St/»tet tutk 7ore» wMch struck SalponM\fl ilnlan l«land« hiu' d««tro;'»4 X38 eneny nlnne* in th« nlr >«»A on th« ôunrt vlththo loea of but 8lx of our -ilnnet. In qdiîtton two ahlty* v«r« sunk ntiA nine otharad«in/;e<l,

llthou^ the United Stnte* forca w«8 A»tect»d by th» enuoy "hile aonronchin^;the isl.-mda on Ftbruary 21 and nttaokod by enemy land-based 'jlanes for nearly twodays.aot one of our ships was sunk or eren dacin/?e4, Snaray install f\tlons «er« bomb-ed and strafed by "Innes froa our Onrrlers, On ?ebruf«ry aStllberatore of the 7thAray Air Forces took âurt In the bombing of Husale.an^ on the sa«e ('ny other' planespfirtlcipited vith Ka^y planes In bonbln^ four en«iy-held atolle in the Marshalls.

In con lentln^ unon foe recort from the Pacific Fleet Headquarters', SecretaryKnox said that the ajBasing t/dn/; was the hea^y dar!a,-:e our iDllote had Inflicted onenaay aircraft '4 th such «nBll loss to t lien selves, Purther, he said, deeolte thetwo-da;' attadk by enBny tornedo nlanes an'', bonbars on our forcesiannarentl;' not aBln,^le B'.i-o had been hit.

In response to a question,h« said t'l^t renorts ê hnfi. received Indicated t'lat

t:M Janancse have lanroved their -nlanes, but the quaj.lty of their lilots Isdeteriorating,

*he Secretary aimounoed that Admiral f, 0. Hart had been aesi.'sic'd to collect ^

testimony from Havy officers concerning th» iJimnnese nttack on Pearl Hnrbor for useat thf court martial of Adniral Elrmol am' fleneral Short. Ho said that t-ile was

bein.~ -"o.ie because wan;'' of the offlcars wero acitterod throu^'iout the world and

n:\n: -rngef^ in h.-^zardotts <'utln8. Ho saii' th't It was "an atterrrit to be abso-lute!.. -„^.:ro '"ith Adfilrnl Kiamol * mS. that tho t.jstlnony shoult* bo talten by a

hlga ranJcing offloor in ••'horn both tho accused ai«i tho ITnw DcDartnent hnd cdnfl-donco, Kq cxnlninnd tlitTc was no ohmge in tho decision to Tjoot'nocf!_th<- courtnrtrtl-^l until -iftar the; ""fir situation hnd subsided <\nf th<^ trlnl Ofvn bo hnld

•^'.-ir.'* I

"h ' whethor t'lis notion ".-48 being t?\''<.n in conjunction •--it'-, siciil-tr

iction V <r I>(rof\rtn-^nt,;ii? r<îll'd t;vit it '-tna not nw* tVt hr fliA not Sfno"

Arriy '•'oul'' tike li'rr. ttoDS or not.

VlCi. Admlrnl Bon Korocl, Chi'.-f, Buronu of Tarda nK* Bocks, nttcnr on-

f or- noo »...? roiortrd briefly on tho "ork of t'T is'-r^b.^.-â ir. tho Pacific Ich

hn hid tourid recently '-1th Uni'or Siorntnry Forroe' said t; ;t

100,000 m n In fv i^-i'-ic construction bittnllona y ••"^rf <• ., nt

"ork in ronalrl^. to o»^t'irt>d Inst"!'' i.ti'M-.a -» ••oil f<s bull b-^sfs.

On', o" t '•- miot---. a '.r;e J-vjg haTB ffln''>% .'if S'^.ld, i"^B to nndfr~c«tl... . ; anoed

'•»lth '-.Ich Am..ric"r.8 con.ld rostorft b-nsro -ujd rf^/».ir &nr.rr,r. !'ot onJ./ -(mx the Sr'v

bocs fr.r Buntrior to tho J.Tnanesfl in aJrlll but also In the eunnly of cenatructloB

oouliM'.nt. K.- enid tlv ttoabffs Snoci-'l, or tho stisTodorft df^tnc?-; "nte, ^•'cm doing

rU» OUtst ',0b.

I

fiS

ALT/j"sFr<.ae Br^'noh

8ur"u of Public Enlatlons

lrkr*o% froi TmuMrlpt «f ft— C«ar«r«no* of 3»crmt»X7 of Wtr

PSISSt

Is ti» Iter tepturlMoat plutBisi; to record tho toMuBooy of offleora«lio Mty bo Ut<« unavkilAblo «tia bavo kno«l«48« of ovonts for um latbo eoM of iKjor 0«Mirml Wtdtor C. SHbort, os «b»o«»o*<1 bjr tiio I017?

ttM l»r Soportatet !• »oarklit( Ic full eooportttloa wlU) tho lotjr

D»p«rtWMnt 1b acuMibllna; suob tovtJjKttiy

.

TSB83t

lo It ta^wM**^ tbo Joiat Cfal«fJ,jrf-etiff «p» »'

tho fcMtM^MTof « OoportaMSt jjMKlSlWl Dof

(

^aj^'^MTpnt into offoet^boM^ tbo oloto $

I am toldthot sabj

PBZSSs

t 1 ls«t» no iitwiitfrrto m»km o%,A«fC««—'""^

0000 jrour roply to Um prorloiMi quootloa mmh tiuit you aro takisftoatiaoajr?

SBCRKTARZt

!••, I uBdorntoad ao. Wo «ro taklas etopc to proaorr* tiuit

•vld«nte«> whlolk wmuis tltat «• auBt b« taking toatlAonjr.

oamuL soRUESt

Too, «« aro working with tbo Vary Dopartaont.

Could you aay alto la taJcio^ tlunt taatlaottTt

SaCKRABXi

1 tttink tbat la a aattar irttleh la oaually not dlseuasod ia

publle a laayor poitepa.

^>


WaS3«

I thlni( tha raason th« queutlon •• a8)c«4 la b«c«u0« th« Mary

D«p«rt««nt umouno*d that Adalral Hart mo\xld »m tb« offlear In

eharc* of as8«Hbllng tb* t»»tiaooy In ttoa Mavy. *• vondarad If you

had daalcnatad a apaeifle officer for that.

SECRETARY

I

I oan't anawar that. I didn't know that Adiiiral Bart bad b««n

appolntad. My li\fora«tlcn waa Juet us I put It, that wa ara acting

1th tha Nary to praearva that taatlvony.

>^

V,-,., -ûth-'ês'-fT-n 3oul«r»ard,

9ubj«ott Detail of offloarw «» ^bs^rrBff bo«r4 of offl<?<»r« t »•»*< «r,».t;'.

km- th'i Tf,prn«8o AttftcK -.f D90#al3ar •7,iv?4i.

¥» I Tli« Adjuts-rit 'jenwal.tJ. S. Affly.

i. At th» r«(jtt8st of t1i« W«r D«j)«rta«Bt,OB S«.ite-.ber ?a,l<?43,I pl.'r!««-

rnmt not *- plvd th» stfittit* of lim^.t^tior-.n m bBP of wy tr-lel 'h'/ nîf.îy^l' -ttel*

Ijs op« ny nllt(»d(p;>id off- '• '«

or wtthttt aix wont' .-:»• rstfijid

of Conpriitu ." ., Kfi- f oonsid.

offioe- a purpop* of InvaetiKottîe f^n<S reporting the ft c '«^

S, 1 «i'n I'.nui t.TK? !!l--'-v tiji-.!^ V.ix'.r !''' ir t'i '* 9 f '• ffti'-X or "

Inquiry et "or «ny Asflolen'.- sd or

•H9(.-.«d as>. . ,, ._ .. . ,..:..^ rJly Mltwod fr -J. It Is

By fssBiaytioii tVvnt tb» pwjooMd bopird la belr.r onven'tJ for tU; puri>oe« of det'smiiaiag

Bn:' fiiid bU B\l«f-<5<J iiapropar pctn or onslsfl--^" ^" "•• '•^^ '•n or before D«««raber 7, 1941,

la order to expedite txiy future trial, t her. 't I b<» p.-rmltt«d t-) hB're

elt with t^!o Boord et the oxamliwtlon »f «Xl «,..«,=.,..« v.-. offlcerc of sny 8«l9otioa,

to r'jpreaont me pt «ueh hecrlne?! i' w*!!- «if! to crotsB-sjiRmiive "11 vfitnosaea opp«' rlnf/, fee#

fore the Borrd, I dentr* to point out th«t lo '.he ovsrit of irsy beirif; required to

»e*t ?iay future resultaist oh.'.-f.es thl? privilege ^«ill «»:r<i''tly fbrid>:e the tline aeo-

'esatiry Bd'jouf'teiy to prepare t(iy def snso. I da»lr« to point out «leo tVint siich r«pr»- ,

«ont'«tlon win »Mi«t m brlUfliv to Itfjht more oleerly triy ponltlon nvA the sltwtionprior tT "nd on Owjember '!', 1941, end " *e pioturo to the Bof.rd

end the Secretrr;/ of War. It Is u -ntftd In fnlrnoRjs to

tile underslijned » veil fis to the Ui.ited Stf ts-.sr Jn t'vi ^nd It should rnsult In the

nfvKnr, of time for flX "c^nearned.

^. If the ebove-mentlone-1 viou i-antad T nhi-ll b*i ,-l"d to submit the oetmes

of the offloors vfr.ora I doslre •' • •.«>.

TRlter C. Sho>",

.>jor Oon^rnl,';, . . ired.

n"?

(I

WAR DEPARTMENTWAR uePARTMCNT GENERAL STAFF

I'niinnii Dfvt«KiM o-i

WASHINGTX3M

:i'.ri,\i' tux jilort, lialtfr C. 21 July ivhSi

^loiic I^w ^^;', 7dth Con(ire33.

1!3A Ketx;. ^, -..^- -..-

At^Jutant Gtnerfc.1, lii, 13

ooura for reruirk ana rtcuniai'na.ivioji in C(

the ClTico of Vhi. <hidce Auvocate ui;neral.

:ort.

•.A.K^ii with

{;;aiVr General,/vSsiataJu. Chief of Staff

End.Memo to TACi (lb '^ui .4.U;

ir Cifin Short.

|li


1st liBiao Izid.

201-SHC«t, Walter C.Headquarters Aray Pearl Harbor BorJPd, Munitions Building, W&shlagtrm, D,C.,

26 JvOy 1944.

To J The Assistant Chief of StpJTf, G~l, War Department.

1. Following consultstion with the Offi-- ' 'Vhe Judge- teGeneral the Board has conaliietwd the "rarious trwolv* cncludsdthat the recme^t of Jfejor Gene- ter C. !: i-od,

that he be permitted to h:ive ; th« Boh: of all.witnesses two officers of hia selection, to represant hiis at, «uch heaxi^g188 well as to crOB .--ex?, mine all witnesses apr^jarlag before the Board, shouldbe denied.

2. Although it is recognized that certain ad-rantages might be gainedwere the request granted, it is beHevcd that such a course of action wouldalso entail' numerous undesirable' consequences, a com iderat ion of which,«uggests the advisability of not permitting the refsuested procedure.

3. In this connection it is pertinent to note that the Board is terely« fact find tog agency of the Wfex Department, and not initially charged withan investigation of any specific alleged acta of comiaiasion or omission onthe part of Major General Short or |iny other lndividu.il In the militaryservice. However, should aubstantial evidence of such acts b« adduced, theBoard contemtjlates affording an early opportunity to the indivldiai.l orindividuals concerned to appear before it, with or without counsel, and toteotify, cpll •"ttnesses, and offer anything that iaay be desired in his ortheir behalf. The Board also cc.ni (•nu-.intff^ 'i«rmlttli5g such .oerson or personsagain to appear after all othe been adduced, to offer ar^ythingfurther that as-y be desired in lu^- i wue « behalf.

Jt. It appears proper to point out tJ i:he event forsaal ch-.rges

phould result from the Board's invest i^at, y accused j^er-son snust alsoun-ier Article of '"ar 70, be afforded fm"t;;er opportunity fully to presenthis oase prior to iny Rnbf;pr>n«nt trial on f-uch charge?.

It is recoracasiivir-. -,.. t M-'jor General Short 'h^ r,dvieed acccru iiigiy

.

For the Boards

ht. General, U.S. krvf^,

Inol.President.

dpy of Uem> faGen. Short '. ''d

l1

AOro-Jll-r an »mr\, ii«ut«r C.

im/m!t/aiM

3 Aa4m% 19U.

to

BigliUt 8«rriM CoodmhUU

8. luraqrj S«tlr«4,

1. X»nr lAiw at I* JtOjr 19k4« 8ia>jMii «0«rt»U oi efiri«Mni at vb-

mad • »aiwm ef m4um wamXA »ijm antAU, simmnhm MudtwiaraM.* MMWitiMBaM*ft tiMwHwwitlm »f vMlali ««•««• iiw MtwlMMUtr «f net jMraitttlat tha r«»

a* At %*!• «ianM%iMi i« &a jHWiSiMBi W a«t* th«t th* itPMurtt ! Mfl«34r

•n liiVM%t#Kl4«i «ur (My tffitUttt tiXtti Mit* of •wMd»«lMi or owJiOrton oa %)m

l^wi of Miy' i«&iti4Mil. la Um a&MXatfr Mrviao* Hovovwr, ohattU wdxifitMUiUftl

«iM4aM« •? »«ili aAo Ni aMttmit, %im Bo«rd »«li ipa.ii»o> mlt»r4&mn m mrlf

wUh or «ltfa»«l «Mii««I, «^ to itMSyt oftU »ite««io««« an4 «ff«r MgruaacXhA mtf bo Aostnrf i» M» or ttolr tMitftUr. tho iiooHi •!«» oont upAatoo

jMnilMtjac aaoh yaraon or ]H)^wmi« ft«ftla %• ap^Mwr oi^tor aXl othor ««14hmo hu|

booe (UMMotlf ie offw snjrtMas fuHiior %h^ amy t>« 4o«lro4 in hto or Umi4vbohaU.

)• H fcypoypo ivopor to jwtrat o«t iiwt la th* «v«nt fomtol ûuôchoall4 iHMnit tvtm th« Ba«Ni'o inv*«t>ic»tlc»n, any «ocaa««l ftaraoe aaat alaowtuiar Artialo •i itiir ?0, t>o aôrôA fwttoar opjortimU? fully to proaani hSMaaaa iwior «« oajr aabavqttwrk iMPlal on aasli abarfoa. Ceaaa<^Mntljr, jnttr ra»qaaat ih«i |mi te fmradttatf to iaaitfucta tao offlaora of /oar aalaotlon to

riVKraaant y^ at hmkri»g» hmtor* ttta Boar<di <9f Cffloaraof Pttblla x^w 339, TOth Ooiisraaa« ia

ary of %J>i

un4ar ttta

Î*-!

u^^

OanaraX,utaat'îaaaiiai.*

(8 1 a Aug 44)

WAR DEPARTMBNT-OrnCUtt. BUSINESS

OUTOOINO CULSSimnD MESSAGE

OffiM of origin }^..^mP9.0itimuLliaLmtlt I imm9».J&nB0M.. D.t« a Jtacuat.l9k4.

.Afl?M!l.J»lJS»Brl*.JWJU* jC,...to.A^^ Takphoa. Tgaa

Cl»irific»tion ^J^^^ff^^^ :>V8<»denc« JftttUJUt

Toe oomMoim cmmAL siohw ssmci oc»ttHi)

ARMT PSARI, mtmi BOAKD C0!JTiaeiJl»5 CAU-BO frXI A.-, A '.ITM,^. ^ asHIMOTQII

DC co!««iiGi«a THURami Aixsisr tasffH 3top tot wMyis omrgs too to rawiiaH

IT BT AIR MAIL AT ONC» !!tX>M P UR S8Vaf FsJUH TlllSS MmjITIOtS BUILOOiG A

SUOC»ST«D USX CSf WITNS33S3 JTMJCH III mm (S»lStIO» H.va KX0.ri.gDG8 0KIACT8

SAB£iD UPON THS xrivssrzaATXuR sffop XDifft Rs^fcsT FOR ccsT H(»)aa-s amoMsim

RS CWT APJ'WWrSD STOP AMTICIP Tffll PHDToaTAflC CJOPT- SAUI WILL iiS COIb'LirJU)

AND ATAi^o UTOB sooR ARRXTAL TiA^iiKiK« «?» mm nmmxs moABmin

COURSXL iJXZMO COieZD]CRX> BSiOaST lUI AUKJiQflJPGie aSSXHT or THIS lUaZOORAW

3PIP0 OASfl M Al«) IWUflM TIGS OTFICa MM U$f (^ WISSiSa 33 MAT i« atPlCTKD

tmOODT]

(JLZO THS AOJVTAKt <mWUX.

ai^l^ladUm»m»Mm Cwitw. «uth«utifat«d by ,

Opmxmtiana Siiw, WOM,Amr P««rl liftriim- -a»«ni, M 474? MitnltiaR*..

V. ».. A. a. o. *n#nt sro. «m

»e

79716 ()—46—pt. 19 29

I IWAR DEPARTMENT

Ci.,^SSIFIED MESSAGE CENTtl^

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

n\,y^

1,/

uDOt- IW _n prm "___

!) Mil va

IJIS1

<»TOBAaB_HUNT

*n)««i9fs mji j9%ja 2«<|amu tuooi f\tw *nja^tf»t») t{)(M */|*A}iri.r

tint •» <aw<r• -«i« •« "MM "O » » "a ••

:.iiu r>u> f»)*T> Kwuiui'u i/sm 'nnivM |«t>|n| -JO) lamg -g

OMmoq) MVPV^ ••& t

woawwiievf

^f/^.nit. If


I

Si, AW* #u.a.«..

K» 9. $» I%Mii Itap^iiMi »mm*f ni^MX m%m%*9 m

no«*t1»l« ai

«I2Qt e.

t*.

^t.^,

RUghes.'fJ.Jr. .-ra/vaf *11 «• tea aj. /•• been

J - CONFIDENTIAL |

NAR DEPARTMENT 6ENERAL STAFF

DISPOSITION FORM

PUSOnXL OITISIOH, 0-1

n 1.: MMAP 201 flhart, WUfr C. Mt.: X Aii«Mt 1%A.

tURJCCT: CwMFkl Otttomr.

TO

roR

_ $A — u»« *sw »si»» — c* --

(J.J a-» 9-« — on _ e«—«Ma jA« — «o — 'a — I"*"-© — cs_

J *rThrou<>» ofrie* Chl»f <rf auff)

^ g/K I) I rtct

»

f.c«(itfi< or CO(icurr«ivc« Ncctitiry action

Ortft o* r«l>tr »»«ark and recomoenda t Ion tnforaiat Ion

Olrtct raaly information for raplr PriBary Intoraat

tyyrovad »n< ratyrntoa-t ^Ho

.|)lt«p»roy*it

I. Th»t tl»» r»qB««t of Stojor Owwr*! Widtsr C. Short !• •pproTOd, r^i^

cenettiTod la tgr tht TJ*0, in tho ••oond lador»MMnt. i-,r

II. rtuki. aU oono«n»«l bo •«tn«Kl Moordlatlof* \r

ror tlM jU«lat«it Chiof of SUff , 0-lt ^C

y ^^/i'^ 0.

r^/laeXo.

lafonMl action shoot

fr. AGO to 0-1, 18 A«g W», -^

uwirigAmmt FOR RB(»8Bt In ^h* *tt»ehod lottor, Gonoral Short ro^Mooto to bo SiSTnTlhoS Aa roSwr of hi. toott»oay boforo tho Po*rl Harbor Boardt . oo«r\k

of th» to«tlj»ny taJtwi to data by tho Board j and that boroaftor ho bo fi»i>- ^nl^od with a oopy of tho roinaijidor of tlB» toatiaoigr froa day to day aa 1« lUR

Proaidoat of tha Board roooMwirta UuS. lk«*fG SS&rt'a poquoai'w b* fttmiahod

ulth a copy of tho to»ti«o«jr tak«» to dato by th*4 Board and that hwroaftor bo

bo fumtabod with a oopy of tho rw»iador of tha taaUjKnyr fro« day to dajr MIt i« takong'ba <i»niod. TJAfi ooaeura ia Oanoral Short 'a ro<9ioat.

AUG 22 I'^H'!

,0-1

•«->Mi«-aa

MnUKTt iaqwvt far Qmpf mt VMctlMMqr (ktinM tttmm «h» Bm«4 «r ftfftiiw.

TOt The AdjwUat 0«9Mrr«l of tk» Anigr*

1. Cki •ppMuriim thla aamSjif b«r«r» tte aM«UI Board ctf Offloagr«h«J41af • iMNOrtac la «amMHiUeii altt tlM i»f««tlfRUaii «f tlui faot*Mrraiaidiju tiw AtUek oti ?*«rl BartMr on Dttcnn^r 7, 2'741, X rvqiwvtatfW IM twndwlma aith a aaio^ «f agr U«%ir«Bgr bafarc tlw Ba«NI «« aecH tmyra«U«abl« »b^ UkmiAm ir«qM«twi tltet X ba provMad attk » cafiy af nilt^ ttw taatlwary lalHwn lajr tlia Jlaar^ tiafarw tit* Saard fraaaaiJUiip «i<« a«»»aJMtod* Z &• llMaa mHimata for tte porpaa* af *—^r**n Mrf ravia«ljtM|ttw MMa aa tkat if aagr nppOaMHrlavr ar ajqOjoMitaiT atataawita «araJarttaMa X mX(fiA imm tlM fiarthm awiWiilty af inaaaiillnii «lMa tetlMit «lw aai4 Witmi !#% haw tka ttiil a^vaatef* ««r i^ SallMirta immaf «ha faata aa IdMjf aadatad at ttat Uim, Tfaa OudMaa tT «ha 8aar4atetMl Uat ^r »*«|WN»ta aam af aaiali a natani «Mt tlMgr atMnXd Iw da«l|r tlM *ar DapartMiift smI mmialwid tiiat X Mint diiwai ar^pllaaticn a«i

a, Aaiwllncljrp X N<|iaa«t tkat aa aaea •• pmatlaaUa I ba riiiaiiiMiiwMk a aanr of "7 taaitlawy kaf«r* iita Oma*. X ra^paat alaa ttei !•iitntaXjr X ba fwmtdkt* « aa!? «f Uw taaUiMRQr takan %a data 1^ ibaBaard Mii Um* iwnaftar X ba fwniabad «itii a aa;tr «r «te — ifmiiir «rttw taattoawy fraK dagr ta a«gr «• it itt Ujcan. X alaa rmtmaUt aaaaaa to•U af tlM ««ldl*«« twm tlaa «a «1m. fte »ma* uyptmu t« Immv ««mgapartara far tiM parini «r taiw imtt Um tnMUNRPtbiii« af tiw UatliMwtmi X lfalla«« 44>i9r«via tt iqr rM«aaata aauXd iwaaaat m aindalatmitiva4af«l««ltjr.

J. Ill aviar ta aspaMto Mttara, I r»paat that tbaaa oafdaa ba gk'mm«• WHmMMT OanaraX T. I* OVaaK, 2096 HaHitiima Kidimiig, i^ »iU fav««MI•aas «a aa afcawwir X hapiMi ta ba.

/•/ latar C. _„ _

Itakjar OtnamX, n. 8.

HH /<iv->^'

SamU)

TO I

f« «•

TIM fit^Wt •<

Uk tMl.

tt. a.

•f UM

% •« UM

I* «*• lyM Ml

«ftV %• #r *> 1* ia

«r t^HN

Milk*

JA u i^^d

Um

it A, HUB,

Copjr for, TJAO, r« and Ind. SPJOJ 19W8535 WJH, Jr. 7753517 Aug UU, •Utin« that no h*r« «an b« turn in fun»l«hln«**»J G«i Short a oopy of the ttatijKtn/ alrwkdy takan, andday to d«7 atanographlc transcript.

ow';,

.•i

I

'C

~ te«M« I9H. la «M;«ii

«« to iNwcitirtim • Mir v^'

»# am. iMv«7wi««r o.lu imw m). ««•< i^

•f ttw I'liiipiiin «r tMftlaaar fltnaty ixnqwtwi far iwm It ^» li—nt «Mlttwt X to fto«l»to« vitfa MplM «r tJta iSttwra ijwiupgtii •• audi «ton Itogr

f. A* «feMW «i:u to • ita»t» BMHWit «r taitjjwny fMr at te«ai Mt tiaa is af tto •••••• X »»§»<% Idtot atftltB •» ilda

4« Xa meim to anvailto afttton X trngtrntit Vm% «to aapi— afto toUtoawi to ar mwniaiiX, Irifaiiav ttaaaval f. I.

8096 iMKiiaiMi laiKtag, iriia «1U fasrann! ttoa to aa.

-^ix

'I'\


AOPO-M aca Short, 1telt«r C.

(31 Au«44)

WO, ACD, Wuhinctoa 25, 0. C, 1 S«piMb«r 1944.

IMMETMATK ACTION

Xtt Ind. A(Z/«b/2U6(St 21 S«p 4A)

TOi PTMidmi, Ar^r PmtI Harbor Board, BXd« 36, PrMldlo ot auiFruMiaoo, 8ms Fraaolaoo, Call/.

For raaark.

By order ot tha Saoratary of Warty

J. A. ULID,Ua^r Oanaral,

Tha Adjutant OaiMraX*

A'JPO-!>* 201 Shor't, Walter C. 2ncl Ind. 00 4ih

Army Pearl Harbor Board, 20 September 1^44.

To: Tlio Adjutant General, U.S. Arny, Washlui'tun, D.C./

1. Tha analyaes reX'erret^ to are not na vft the offlclslrecord of the Bonr''! and will not, \.e until verified and accepted Inwhole or In part. At present ihn-j nrely go work 3)»oeta being cora-

plled by- officers loaned to aaalst tho Bonrd.

^ ie;, Fni'thor, there la but one conpl'^to copy of the nnalysle

sheets referred to and the Hoard will neod tlila copy for otudy untilIt completes Its report, wiioreupon th«t cojiy nay or iwy not becotae

a permanent part of tho record. Kor can that copy, of whlcVi there

are between four and five hundrnl ahoots, bo spared by tho Hoard to

have coplea thereof made.

3. lience disapproval of General Short's request now, or In

the future, is recommended.

I''or tho Iloard:

• ^«?,\9^ /

«;.^-*'

cyiu^^

Lt. Oon. , U. S. A.Free 1 dent.

'7,-

&:v'


(»» kk)

25 3«P 445yno9M« of 7a«tliiDnjr tokm toafor* th«i^fMBT i'<MU>l liRriwr ^ar4. AtS'om 303. iit»r%, mxt^r C.

(31 Mtf 44)

(wo ini1nr»Ar.in^ m htniiot •« 7«t ]r««i>h«<l thi» 9fflo««

1 1^«I.cy. Itr. :a. Aii< 44* «/2 Inci»«

VHt Hm A4)«««at o«MW»l. AttmHmi otnmr*» •ftt&«)i« •mhi leflO,liM&tl«l« BOlUttllf.

MM It affpiftyt tmm wmmmA iwd«nmm»t tmm «te ftmA fM^r !(«m« %#9« AAJ««Mii OMMfDl, to«*i S» M{»tMiWv 1944, «tw« th« h^miiiwm oftMtijwa;' r««{«wtt«A l^r swmimI ShM>Hi Im the Wde MwnaMoRtlca (ki>« mttt

la •Ml' w*r ff»R«tt*«tt« iiw offistni cie%i«« «f «hi» hokini mid ««, l« «i^•f<M«, tlM ii9iunt •lc%«a t« MM m* at tlMi pim»ma% tls* apAf* «Ji»««]W^)«ni, ill la f»it—iitiM that §«n«nil $)i«rt %• A#yl««4 tl>«« tfe*

1 SmA. «M«f, Mlltenr jrtt««i4M*BtTl«i*».

^'^

rii-iitw'..',s "T--355rif'"


• "'ONFIDENTIALMM 0EPART>4EKT GEKERAL STAFF

DISPOSITION FORM

PMSOmriL Division, 0-1

il«: VMiJf 301 Short. Wnlt«r C.

tVIJCCT: (>«n«ral Offlear.

I

l»*t*: 1 Oeto'bar 1944.

Tt

reR

e/i »Ai 148., a -I

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITl'EE 3877

IK* %

ihrnm

mz» Bp.bdJ!Z-lX »• 78978

DXSXRIBUTXOIIi0-1 «OQS, Bit 28925 A

^ s^ 44, Am^ aa Short* w*u«r c,, Q^P^>^?'

^

\

/«^^^^, _^, „^_ ,^, '•t

\ ,^jkJNTIAJ^ I ocs

n<ac

vhc

CjCSA ica snort, «.0.

(2 Oct uijOctobdr 3, 194^

M«SK)RANDIIM PUH OW^RAL OROSfJiT:

--4.\.»&UJ i. ", copy af a ietter tlst-Jd oeptea-b«r 2v, IVi/., aiflnad by ilajor Gtangral WaXtur C. Short.^-^^r^^, «,ong with a roply to r,..ri«rai ij'Fi^' •hlch hia

! by the ixjcratary of Aar.

,..1

.< > /.

"!nc.

'.8 Uiat ttiosn b«".. /Our i^oard.

JOij»:?H T. UcOiAHNwyLieutsiuuit, Wii.,.!-.. i t!

D»pt> oaff

COPY Ymrr G!

--UENTIAt.

« U'

3141 Southmatcm BoulaTkrd,Oallju 5r Taxaa,

S«ptmb«r 29, 19U.

Honorcbl* Henry L. 'Itljuion,

S«or«tar7 of W«r,Wasblogton, D.C.

Dmt Mr. S»oi>t*ryi

Tha tefltlaonjr vhioh wu takan befor« th« ao-oallad RobtirtB

Coaalnloo and that ourrvntljr b«lng takan in tb« bearing now pending

b«fox*e th« kntj Pearl Harbor Board waa reoentl;' laade aTailable to ae.

Upon exaBlaing tbeae reoord« to vbloh noae of the exhibits have been

attaehed» I fail to find a dlaoloeore of eertaln vital inforaatlon

whlob high HaahLagton officials appear to have had prior tc Deoember

7, 19^1, of the iaaioeooe of an attaok by the JapMineae. Suoh taforoation

wee not aade a'*ailable to ae in the exercise of xgr oooDaand in the

Hanaiian lalande. Am I underetarai that the Ar«y Pearl Harbor Board

is now about to couplete ita hearings and ainoe thla iaportant

factual data ia not inoraded in the teatiaony of the Board thus far

fumiabed to aa, I faal ooapelled to oall thla aatter to ytmr attention.

Troa atateaenta in the reoorda of these two heairinga, it is

to be noted that a knowledge of pertinent facts whioh are not later

dlaoloaed la the reoord la inferred. Thla important factual inforaa-

tion ia eaaentlal to a full apprmiaal of the aituatlcm. I apeolfioally

refer to the following inatanoeat On pagea 318 and 319 of the teatlaooy

takaa before the Hoberta CcMnnlaalon the qxieationa aaked by Juatloe

Roberta Indicate that aa chainaan of the ooamiasion he waa in poa-

8«aal<m of facta of t^e utaoat iaportanoe to this oase whioh pointed

to a definite warning of an attaok against Pearl Harbor which ap-

parently waa known to offiolala in Washington from certain interoepted

Japaseae code aeaaagea. So far aa I haTe been able to learn theae

facta are not a part of the reoord of theae hearings.

Again in the teatiaony of Adairal lCl«ael before the krmy

Paarl Harbor Board (¥olr3BKl^,P*g« 1811) it ia clearly indicated

that oartain vital inforaaticm waa in the hands of the War and Havy

Dapartaenta ra^rding the iasdnaace of an attaok, which inforaation

aata certainly uot tranaaltted to ae. The information upon whioh he

baaad thla atataaent ia likawiae not a pairt of the reoord of the

baarifiga. Without a doubt he would not hare aade auoh a atateaant

if he did not have evidence to aupport it.

It ia alao reapeotfully pointed out that General Marahall

had •«• inpcrtant Infomation on whloM ]» .9eii^ >i the tlaa he J^

o-im^^,.^wr/^,,..,,,,F_,VH,,i '"I*

I I

cown-'f-i^

Mtit m Vtf MOmA UUgnm (ntwfi to «t ?•!. Tt, p««» 309, «fFMkTl BurtMr 3a«rd tcvtlaoo^) «H««r imf cf D>o»Eb>r 7, I9U, uhldlittfortiaMit«Ij did m4 rM«h m wtil mipwi kev« «ftM> %hm attMk.TlM lAferMtim tqMs irtii«h Ckratna MunriMll Hurt Imt* r»li«l laMMdiag this •••«« lltevlM do«« not aiqmtr la lAw Mwirt birfer*th« B<Mrd ttan* f«r fomlclMd m.

TlM fMt« Up<« Htlah tlMlM MtiOM «ad t>t lWt# «•>«k»Md sl««rX7 fo to tlM vary mmom «f tho parvMBt laqtilxy.Z b«li«v«, tbMofoM, TOO will rMdily agrM tluit • fÔl adooaploto dl«elo*ur« of all tb« lafermtioa vlileb wui la th« h«ad«of ffAahioitoa ofrioUl* prior to OMMitbor 7, 19U. wltb nfMd toth* iMlnono* of aa attaok, abould ba obtaiaad and oada a Mttar ofraoard la tha prooaadlaga of tba auraot inTaatlfatlM aa thaj avaaf tlM iitMoat iaportanoa la apfwalalac tiila avtlxw •I'taatlau.

Aa tba parfaetlag of tba raoord la tbla lavaatlfatioo laof oouraa of graat laportaaoa to aa paraotMtlljr, Z orfa tbat aoatapa ba laft vmturaad to aaka a aai^tlata iavaatigatioo of tba aaaa,ao tbat all of tha avldaaoa oonaaralag tbla aattar la In tba raaacdof tba h*ari04(a of tba Board. It la tharafora vargmtlj raqiaaatadtbat tha Board dalay tba oonplatlon of ita prooaadlaga tmtU tnobtlaw aa this oao ba aeaoiqpllahad. |n tbla eonoaotlon I raqnaat alaotbat ^f eouaaal ba givaa aooaaa to all War Iâpartamst raoogpda abiahwould ba partlnant to tbla aattar.

1^trtbarera , If a tberoacb iBTaatlfatloa af tba War Dârtawtraoorda ^ tba Board and bf agr oaoaaal do aot dlaoloaa tba faataand arldaaoa upon irtilob tba atataaaata aad aetlona abova rafarradto wara aada, I raquaat tbat aa approprlata aall ba aada opoa aafothar aooroa wbidli all^t bava aaeb partiJUMit lafcanatloo^ partlaalarlartba Kmry ^partaant, and tbat tfaajr ba raqulrad to fomiab aad aakaall aaoh arldaaoa avallabla to tba Board aad to ^f ooanaal.

Tba War D^wrtaMnt baa dmalad aer raqoaat to bava arapraaantatlva at tba Board proeaadlafa aad to oroaaâzaalaa wltaaaaaaand tharafora unlaaa mr raqoaat barala la graatad tbara la aaaTallabla to aa by abiob I aajr ba aaa\irad tbat all tba partlaantarldaaoa will ba aada avmllabla to tba Board Aad to aa.

Slaoaraljr, >

Waltar C. Short,Major Oaaaral, O.S. kemj, ^tlrad.

tT•^*^°''*^

">-^"-^:S^Ô.u....u.AL ,0^

Urnim 9mmr»X «ai«r 6. Short* VU iwtdrwi*

'0«iur 0«fMnr«l ahsrti

hm4m of tl^ Amgr rwurl NMtMMfp B«*rC

ttd* 3<»*rd 1MM a|»p<.>int«<i hj isQr »nlnr t4» m^martitliti m^ r«p*rt

te •• th« fMsta «il*Ur/: t« t*« »Xtuttk mmI* ^tpon <*• Territory of Itowftli

cm 7 BM<nfe«r 1%I« «Bd to baIm tMsh raeMRMMili^itmii «« it "foy dMM

ppojMir, tou wiy th«r»foi^ r»a* MNWirw! ««t th« S<»rd i w ej^lorinc

all acKutMM of wid«no« b«ari^^ open tJh« 9(ibj««t,.

; am UinMlirstfT Q«n«r«l Gmmmt to ^relt ^'vnay iitjIitATr CetMiMil

tA «xaHln« lt« «Mhiblt« la %h« prmmmam of « tM«t>«r of tht !k>&rd. %0

aof>i** of ih«M otilblt*, NsMmiwr, wi^ h« M»iK«

1 tis iCao dlPWJtln/; tli*t «^{>W!rj»ri««Mi isamin,^* r«3.«i.tii*.« t«

adlltiiry wwurlty h« i5l*«n to ;«j«ir c»ii»««»l ftef Ws« ir!l'o»TiBti:,n «nd guid-

an** of an asnoognwd*

Sln««r«l / "!r»,

Sm»ntAry-ot «»r.

illE Alv GENJblEAL

l"»

79716 O—46—pt. 19 30


^

MUwotNM *«M ruKL nuaa w(nm

IWM

ftmi

/

fall—1 tmnit^M

I, Bm tt»tn af Mr Trwtrty» %• «•*• «r*0«»7 fdr •iiiiiif 111 arMMTt* ratf artglwa vT mII MftlMta will Iw

fU* liiMrt^iiiit V^wHM 1-t*, ta«l ««»«•.

I. Mdll« BlHMHlk nr«M MMria«s««i, «Mi mnpfkmm wt mm 4mi.Xtt

%«MMMrtf«« l*«.. » «•»*•« ^r t—ira Origin mm'

—lit, «*il IW jXlllitel.l «ft«l «iM AmTC «« MOO —•r* MTrtii. lUw •Hmht %mw {*) MiiiM «1U )m akUMl %• «Im»

••kr* llnitiwr»ww is HMHtftafWR. %• )m mwliirii mmk «fcUlM4 Iqr

•WMT «• •mhhwI SImm^ (ttr«««^ hi* •(MMwl , aMnw l ar««m>

mm/^

s^;r,;M:j",'?fg',; bsai-::

I

CONnOLNTIAL

JUtUmAnwm JtRMT PEAKL HARBOR »OAKPRaott /.fix, itmi%i<m9 ^îUiag

Bttiîlln? 36, Pr««idlo «f &«o ^r«noi«oo>«li ' rsnel •<- ;i , nllfomi*

I ert«lo«« h«r^w1th c ^py of »«i«or«n<J'U(« i H«v«' t.<xl'>y «#<nt toIfajor H. R, Po«««ll, G.s.c., «too !• setlnK cm b' hulf of BrlgadlorCl«n«r«JL J. S. Br«cdaB« eomssl for Coloeî^l %iiMa.

I «rot» thi» j.«t*.'«r .ft'rr eo'};ii<J»«rmbli» tho»j«i|ht jmd foasutt. wtloK »itlk 0«e*r&l traa#T, îH tfer>r« »ouid b« s »lifitin''t. '*fsH'>rr<»(»»-

mmk% IbtoItM lit glvin* '-»««*»r-.l fr<sft<J<« " copv of Jujor Cl««ii«#t»»»

•MMnr«D<t«M of 10 Jii.v 19^^ to )iT, Aabwrg. ThU ike«ors»<1u« la

r»f*Tr»d to, 'a you 'Ha note, In n"" «"Oornrv^ ;" r*" tn« ^ctlfc8*<;r«t.nr tt v^r to th« Jw<f* AcToct* J«n»r«i ^«t#<l l" /«ly \î.L»

Ib spit* of tlii» fact. It iw.» f*lt th'it ^mfirml »T*r''»» *•" ccimsel,il%» » rt<s,ht tC' th« or'rr r. fvrrlng thp "yaf-n c».-* to th« '?o<ir<1. In.t-n* ^TF-nt Q^rfrsl 'j-s.'-.on '-sAlovs up th«* presfr.t. r':ca»««t by "^'.•o»»t—

1b^ Itojor -liu*^n'» B.««or*n<au«, I rhftll, uel»iB; inftruct' -J tc th«eotttnrr by tb« boarc, d««llBe to rIt* It to hi* oc t4i4« grmxa<^ th^tit oor.t^ i©« -oc}ri->rti«l infor«»tlon to which b» Ir not '^ntlti^d.

^li.LI'-» J. irJ^HV , JR.' OlOTVftl, J ,.' .;.!.

lael-C^ of iftOMo tollBj PomU widi iael*

v'^^

HIADCO I'T V IfUfl P'-APL HkPWih BO; I'D

/ -•jjt' ab r 19^X

S«bJ»-eti ^r-'.wr Crf tln« P«i»rl Hfirber H«Mir^. MtA

R*f«rri,'Mj *ti>itt«-r of ;."Oi " ' 'h- <>rtor«t

tyw.n, Jr., to i^orr*!

i. l*urfcu«r!t to s'owr aral r«CiU«»t for tr' nsalsrsioo to ;<rlgi»<1l«r

G»«n«r'il J. . Br«f(i!on, »hu you <!t«»t« h«:' b«»«R appo nt»«<*. roun.-«fl for

th« «boT«-nijBiKi offlc«r, th^Tw 1;- at»,«eh«<:i heri-to co >y of cotsfld«n-

tlal or<ier bj- tto* •^•cr«' t?-.r>- of ' «r d«t#d 6 Jniy 194.-'. cre»vtt)-.|r th«

Pfmrl H«rbor s^otrrf, copy of iurpli-B^nt 1 ord»r of Ui«- -••erf t' ry of

»i»r df\t«»d .' July 19iAi ''nd copy of c«mflrt«ntl»l «Mi«orikn'iu» of th*

, atlng »>cv t .ry of tr d t»»d 1. Jul- 19ii rf-ferrlnK th*- »»tt«r of

th» tnT»rtlg-itlor. of CoJ.ori»»l Th''0<ior« symau, Jr. und any other*

»ho Bl^ht he Involved In Ha»»iSttn oef«n»^ proj»ct«» to th« P#r>rl

Harbor Boarrf.

Colonel, J.A.C.i..

Offirer In Ch< rg«

In«lInel Ij foof or

rttd H Jul iAInci > I :.yail or' nf ;'/*

die' ' July AAInol 3i Couf -.«.»o of AetSng S/*

.1W i> Jul U

,.r


x"^


I CONFiDfcNTlAL

..u-b,f«atJ *Q!e^m$*>-».»

4.,' V .Sii ho las M). „•.-:«», S-.-y'«S.

th» }»fewiM »bt«fc T»la%»fl i« Ww Huetl SfejFUwr in«»»*»r «f «« r9^t% »f

¥%»i, s»i». 8w*rr ^' **«»*u, cmtH?, USA,

Col. Ch«uri«« *. w«ift. oir>'»«, Jm:>.

bX SUM].,

i2 JuJj^V

of Wft^-

MJ«%*»* &8toi(«'f

AC of S, 5^.1, Col. Oaoawta. Jt

a 8|»ti«tlo» «r, 08, thi 8I»st>.

Off »r »•« «•«, «« 1506, »smitlo»» *J,«4 «/<*

Col. BttTt**, *» 10&&. '»!»alti->'.» 3'. w. %.,r.

Ui!««Ji ©rne«f'» aoi tii*.AO 0/ 8, OPD. WW*. a» 3»«e .

m. Amy Air »arc»», Sm ttiim?

CONFfDENi


I CONFIDENTIAL I

'.J? W, l-M*.

»StnXT9 Co*

bw«sf »Stb tk« "Wilvltlet s? t&« l*««yl Rtsptso? Wsispi S« itM tstt-*"!**^

COMFtDENTIALj4v

UUMlFiUlbNiiAi.

HEAOgyilRTKR:; ARK PIAFIL H*BBOR BOARD

RoMi i7U, Munltloon Balldlng

A .•ptHirtr«r 19U

itaie»iA8 oji ''05 c-'im-L j. a. &Em, o.:.«-., or , no.->B ^ce3o, p«nu««B

Harbor «»o»r.' to M«v«i!.

)ro« iM» fttrnlah*^ 1th • c«M»i»l«t»' lint of «>li th« t>«riK»nfl Includlufim4 •«««r»TNur\7liic th« *mgr P*«ri H»rt>or Be*r-j o« lt» trip to ^>*««il,tikm n'-ame ct •ach 'p«rton r »! trr --it follovai

Lt. :..;.. ..»orc» wriiB«»Tt, 0153^4, OiUItoJ. i;«B. H(»r,ry D. !to r.fll, 0.1^769, USAfckj. 0«a. ?«l1* :

'- fr»«)t, 0.>71, OtiA

Col. Ch rl»^B , 0X7774, JfAOrf

Coi. Hurry *. lo^UBta, OJ'05'i.X), ACLt. Colo«"l -itmrlm* E. Il«i««m, Jr., 0,>571fe4, AC

*.j. nohr-Tt 0. Hurt, 010«)01>4, *0C'

lot Lt. W'jiKS L. Shjmhy, Jr., 05«3iXi, ACrut. ;.t«|A«« K. Motit^oiE ry, 5.)R46«'71

•r, U.«yd i«. N«rlcir.«

Ih-, f*rl M. Pan ellr, tt. >» ^J»CoTi»or

Ifr. L«<m a. &ol<ila«Hr, V»-ylot C. »re<»*

tsILLJAM «. HyGMFii, JH.CoV«!«l J.A.G.ri.

(^fle«r In CWmt*

WAIt DKi'AHIMKMHEADQUAKTEHS AKMY FKAHl. HAKUOK BOAHI)

~- \ ,13 3«pt.emb«r "i^U*

Colonol .Villiaci J. Hiirhos, JAnDRoom Uyiii, K'linltions f^-i iHin'-.

Waahjnrton, D. C.

Dear Colonel Hurhas:

ThroQ copies of all volume :i ftf t; . „. .....crlpt covts: ;; .j- .-.:m

Francisco hearlnna to Include nunibar 23, which was the last t«3t1r.<xiy

taken ther*e, were <1uly transrtttei to you by rorlst«r;«'i innll pri^r tc chit

departure <'ro«a that place. This wa;; in accor'iance with p,v monorandum

dated 2it Adjust 19iih, « copy of rrtdch waa fum-'shed yon an'! Wa^or ^'urk-

hart.

iHir 3ChodUj.fc» '~f op r ''

'

.tM IJ':"I • ' ,n(.-«Jti;j i Vtj riw ana

it has been scr.owhat di•

•• Boarrf keep the rec<-!Hi

"road". }{0W0vor, thev <1o n^-'t v»«nt the r«ar ecUcl^-n there to run oxxt of

copy. Therefore, It has boon deciie'i not to wait urttll the record Is

read and corrections are made on all copies (as per plan aet forth In

prevlouB meworandvar) but tf> send vo-.j two cr.p1 en ^^f eaOi vol'une as soon

as available an'i before correcti -ns ar" mado. These two will he those

marked Secretary of War and Recorder. If y.u arfi still tran3»rl?.t.inp the

lattar to i~.irv-r-.-.i r,r:. on on hehnir of nenoral ';hort, it »h<nil>1 Im exiVlaJned

to hiir th.': t minor c^- ns way later have to be made. Ho fur

as Rurkha; - ' - -'-'' " '' •"'- ''•' -"=-''- *'- r rr«f~t.i ,,n - »-

be made h;

any flar^ni* error wn'iCh j«i.. s!.

Tn accordance with the foref"1nr r'imarks there t •« boinj' trar,:!!Tii tt-id

to you via aarli'wt available tranap'^r^ ''^ .-. t.«. ,:•.:.,;,.:; <u,c). f v ^smes

2U - 27 inclusive, and euhsequeni —*^''

copij Toted.

:n.tntinr th.»t ovar/thinr !.! '

64 ////

SNM

I

n SniiMrtbMi 1»M

MbiuvooM rou > i&Asi?« •nr.HiO. joai m. v<m.

••%^Mt I fmmrl H«i%*r b*«hi rnMcwAiac*.

1. I «t«««««»4 th* TmupI dki^r »!««<> «l%li 6«iwnkl m^HiiWMiy

«M« M»mtiic MkS H* %•!« M tlHkt >«iMii tlMi •••ft ImmI Mi« 11* r«p*r« 1%immXA vnT prvlM^lily 1m> r«f»rr«A %• • ia th* wnial <M«r«« f»r i^laioa.t» M»« vvwit I |Mb»t*« cmt that tiw tta* •Xmhii% wm «Mh tlMt •lUMtr I

•r ' in HT offlM ««ii*i« %• >««i> to fMdM^riM Ma«*lf «dtli tiMi

tMitlMBir ! •f««r tlm* M «a*M <l«X«r i^w^K MB' •« thl« Mi. •ralMiVMrMr •««i4i>^ iw «<««lMi« this pMwter* t« W UWimml. mt U •«!•• VimKmutI Mavb»v »««r« t»«esrA4 ncly*

y, I weuUk UV* 7«><i. t)iMrMf*r*, t* litfoni %Im S«Hira af tH» «%«««%• iMvr* U«l«tt«'l »i««^« fwRiUikri** MaMilf with %h9 t««tlMar •• «•

fe« (t%i« t« «*!•% iM «Im)» tb* tta* MUM*.

,V,i,fy,m.t

,<->

SSSSSa^: :^<SSSBS^?î

ûAî^d 'Airôat* a»a«rai for «ca«i&ffipali»js« SliB Seeftteury wtil i»i«o penteiMdly

SIM irei>or« hue bem «a««iiiri«^ ^ i:b» jUfttQ' lt««rd jMrtX?*. «• SSCaOSf (uol

partly Bc fop SlCBsBr, Mft this olm§itla«AUto will 1>« nrtrl^t^vA for •«eari^

>|^ Sqi>r0prie.t« sllitary aa^ri $i«g.

. ^

WAS iaBP.4R2KSST

Bttr«»tt of Pu^te Relmtleft*

FBXSS smscHT9l. - SSS 6706

Brt. 3426 end 4860

OctoXier 86, 1944

infatuatm ion trs phsssi

The fell owing It the text of k queetion and the renly made Tsy the

Secretary ef H«r «t hie preee conference on Octoher 36. 1944i

Oeji jrou dteeloee whatever yov. oaa abaut the nature of the Aray'e Pearl

Harbor reijertt Doee It fecoaniend ooort-aartial action agRinet S«aej»l Short

or any ether Army offlooret Doee It «lter> in any v«y the Army's expreeead

T>laa te hold a trial after the war Is over of General Shortt Is there any

ohanee any part of the ret>ort or a eufflasary thereof will reach the puhlic

prior to election day, er prior to the end of the var, ci- everT Vhen will

It he aade aTailahle to Cen«re>it

SMCBMUCfx

Hare you ever read the etatute under whiob my dutiee are oeabinedT

pimss:

1 read that and couldn't find it called for a report te Congreee on

that thins

.

SSdtSTAKY's

Then, why do you ask the queetion? I an going tc follow thie statute;

•The Secretary ef Var and the Secretary cf the l?avy are severally

directed to -nroeeed forthwith with an Investigation into the facts surround-

ing the catastroT<he desorlhed in Section I aT>cve and to conaaonce such Tiro-

ceedlngs agalnet such •nersono as the facts may ^Justify."

fh«t le the duty of the law tmSer which 1 ate acting. 1 do not care to

comment on any future action en the Jearl Snr"bor rewsrt of the hoard which

was aTOOintad tc atslet me, except to »ay that 1 shall give this retsort the

eonsiderRtlcn necessary In order to carry out the eerioue fluty ^ which I wmi

charged hy this act ef Congress. The riresont etatus of the report is as

iiven in the press release last Monday immediately after the report wae baade

'* '^'ffil

'''^'iT**""'^ '^ '*'>T:!''-'^^.''t.'.'r^^-'^'''^ «r'^»-- T. -''*".,*:*.'- V-^'^V

.'J'-.\'-

'.-.^i•".-- '';v'^;>..,/:.'-»if?X-"*Ai*:5;'<I.-'-i.-;V-^^'^^^^ r." ''' .'Xi.-

|5


Smvicts or Supply^"^ orrics or th« juoof aovocatb mummAL

i>

. ix/Wu.

%» Mil «JM vlalMi dr Oiii^mi M Mpwuiti i» Mis i-avtXnUo*, X law*

M lavMHAflkttMU X* •«•» %• MM1I4M M «• «Mi m4»

1«r ovter tffttMl /tUr If XM4« • BcMMl of «lawi

r«UUiW «• «lw AttMk M«« Ir f!» MMi f«r«M tipw «!» Twrti%««y

•C 11.-111. f Ml T »—iwr l«a Hi «• awk* »U<MM M 1%

ltd* tarn fmMl tu^mr »ma* trn* mtmlm^U a« mUmIv* ••

tor—tlgittWH. Xt «M ImmM ti—riii ta »hwU, •• fnmiam,

1% kM —awi • ItWtei Mf lA trtlMMMM ui fMwlwrt

MMLMto* X hM« M<Mi itMi MfMHi awt iwiwil—H 0«m fwrta at liw -

4n^, •« ^r iiMMMMi. MM *1M «Mii4Mi tte f^pwrt aatf tt« »—«K Mi

ta* fl«m M fttU/ 1*» kHMfl« af liU viMt.

iMvlJv ft inlrtif MtM M to •!»«, if Mr* M«lM to «• to toitttotoi

Mto •«»• ftftor MA4^tot ftU tot MMftiwttuM, I M «XMr toft*

i»» — mU M jMftttoft Mi fHiFMa ft 1U tot to

^ ft rtilMiH «f V yrnMt ninl«itiM« to fto M to^r aavr to

9, ^mmmmmm^ Mto toft pMU totoMft** IV

:.ii, '-i-i - t. -J

' _,..! , ^^ -' %)>\ iS? '- ,

j^'

ttm tmm fmaA. lurhar hw4* aMtkNgk i%

•mMM la Vm iUU iw4 to «lw fcr S^prtaMt !» M4 •«

•«rM Vl«il MHM hM aV« tkU ST til* »M«i*l WMltWlM*.

U in i MMi , I as «# tlw (wiiidLMt ttet ld« «rMMrfl •( |ii«»iirt mm •#

MSh • M«MM M It* itmwt. hla r«U«f Dnm * Ci—mwl vtetat*. Thla mc

«M« W JmMMT U* Ifa. «< i* i^Mir i« • MTlMM M««Xt fMT MT

•#flMV H&Ml * 1H« MMTi ttf —>;» MrriM, *U Mil 111 1 1M MI MU«M OiiOTWiX mmr% «• W. S» ar |«MkPM«« m tite avidMM m«

MMMM, 1% la twrriataait mUmufWtiMNnMRr*, X M Mtl«fl«4 «)»« |)t«f<«r vfe^vo mv* tolcM to

Mrr— MMh 1<»<** of •Ittkar pmrnrnmi. or ar«MltMU«ai *• mm•to*» is raiM aitliMr la tha lur SapartaMst «r la tte ftali a% Wm Um•r tka IHaurl larâr <14aft*t*r. 1^ aaawiaaiâ la ttet Mater <fcU «)M .

atrawati iaaaa Urn a»t4«aaa aM iraawriad tfoaa a»t aanraat tlw laaUtoUaa

«r Mr fwtlair pTMMdlawa awilaat mt afflcar la ilw Anr*

la anaariaaai «l«k «>m> oplaloa of «te liatfca MtawMtta aa—wl,

I tmm daaKad toa% ar w<n> liWM«t0k«l«« almiU to fwHUwr aaallMai

«a«U all to* faato to* aMa a« aiaar »m {tMslkla ta^ uaUi toa toaV-

taaar af wnry altoaaa la jiaaaMtalaa af aatoylal faata aaa to atoalaai,

•mi I tmm «l««a tto m»—»tarr dlraatloaa to aiiiajîah tola rvanlt.

9mm «t %to toatlaay aar to aaait telaira* atora aitoaaaaa ajra

/

-(.'>


-J-

V

\

rtmUr* X * abMJLvWljr «a.wu- tJMt It MmU )m htji^kl/

INrajtiftLalid to tlw awao—«f>U. }ar»MMnt«loft of %)im wur aad Um iwjrwtgr

•r AmmtImb Htm to wU* yulOi* »t %tM ipviNNMit ti«« Mm r^*rt irf

Um 4nv r«M-l tferbor »muM wr tto rMttM (W »ia«b It la toa«4.

/ r«irtl»«iwNr«, to i»ttU«fc imnAsf p>xhAMm «f «Im Itoant'B t*vwX mr*m»*4 aauXd iM«*a«i!j^;i/ «lato>r« iha r»«to aad ito aea«i«ialoiw,

wDlatk «i»«K! Ukwwia* to tk^kijmt toa ]wliUa totora^.

/'iC

79716 O—46—pt. 19 31

i,iimim»au,3>mi&''"

.

I W'AR DEPARTMENT |

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S»Cr;H^

Haw {29 Aug ^;-

iiilt of Gen , B

-••','t Shafter, f. H.

Ttumher vm 8869^

To Rioharason fros SOBsei»v»ll aiijn«6 mrahaii.

Ordera are being re^xjested

i Spain.'':

/V

• t you fiav© the diapsrtaieiit

,.^«i^ltxing to the oonatruotic-3t«-tlon«, the y«' wwerv® gaaoii.

•rcrif p«J«ta.lBlng to bott?. alan tl- ,;>^

•'0 th« nohl OQtmc-llt '- 'i«f oonU'actRfor work cr fflBtSfiaio • ove pwjjecta,

r«vl8ved &i»(l a chroaoioj^Joftx -^naiyaitt sKide ther^^it'

«•- thAt It v:'*!! tT. " rrf' " '.f '> •'•'7^' t^'t» officers nbov!*.

',3 p&rt.i

Ai«o that local priori fcJ'^a ssk^ -^- *•

M3t®<l socowilag to th«lr occ-

^,ii?(<?9«t»<! that £h© aiialywlfi .

i., o;raft varalxtg stations; (B) '^

•jct Tor t.{i>:;

GM-0UT-9S69R 44)

NfflA*

COfY NO.

THt MAKINO or AN KXACT COPY Of THI« MCSSAOt l» rC«B)DDEN

18 1*^


;,l*^-.-«l!:; !V AN CXA

In -ICOPY NO. \S

'

....^.?

5' 1

mm^.

AM

m

TSSrisiSm'l

X^^ISZ^l^'Ml»«

^Wt%

t.

M% (CM. t«1, ap* •< It Mr. MM*. W$ f«tt«C, |i}* 1R»

***tiffi^S**2iiL'"**^"

i«f Hi*

•I

0.

6.

Ml

,^^

..^nnpniKMrN

^

^imm'^1

t&dkutuJiihiiH KUi CUJjUNEL \,jXLxm J. HUUii:;^, JH., J.A.U.D. , Hooa 271i»

Uunitioiis Muiifiing, (ixt«ii9ion 77>3t>

Th« o«crot«ry of hmt air«ct« that th« coabinatlon of th» outer

•*!• in .vuun iJ>-St>U, b* «;iv«n to Colonvl £aM«r(l P. UocliUng, sSxttcutlr*

Uffic* «1 ..33iBt*nt Jtiief of ot«If , G-4» upon tn« I'oxiowing understanding

t

h« inner safe will reakaln trttere it la, without «ec«BS

.h« co«biB*tion to the outer eafe will be dlscloeedto no oture ttian twu ut'txamr*.

Tfje ao«jr to tlie outer sife wlli not be allowedto regain opon urdeas an officer is in attendance.

i(«« occupants of tne room, entrance to wfaich is

obtained tiu-ou^-.n the outer saie, will vacate theroom for sucii perloa of ti«« as iaeutanaiit Colonel!i«iu-y C. Clausen, JAia), aay require to enable hi«to complete the present work assigned to hia bjthe SocraS-ary of 'War.

^«^^ii«i M«c(.lxii<4 wi-ii aclmowledge the above oyu,pj..ropr*ii»t« iiuloraeaent hareon.

I i f ^' < i «--•£ •*-

?KAHVKY K. BUNDYSpecial Assistant t^. the Secretary ef AU^

/

v'-'bii^!?^^;!!'


Section F

CM>f«) aUIML «iL.«

l&tniUh JSAaU* JS>9twU

Kftbriiiir:?

\\

l^; 1^

Xi^

.H.

'J..

^*-

'v4

s,

t

u UU NOT DETACH TH

' «4UTam

ft

cgwt

PVVVK OF THE AOMINLSTUATIV/E ASSISTANT

Date

W Adj. luMierui.Adj.

Under Sw:. of War.

A sat, Si*c. of War.

A88t. K«!t

Asst. Chi'

rhief of Stair.

« hicf of En^rH.

Dir. Personnel.

Chief, Air Corps.

Chief of Fiuancw.

t^. M. (»«m!rRl.

Judife Advocate Gen.

Public Relations.

Chief Signal C^rps.

I»n>c. & ' ' • I>iv.

For

N«>cc8J»ary a«

, f'trect reply.

i^ N**ce8»ary «

t.UTl} of S>»:

for »igna-

fur signa-N0cei»«ary actuin and preparation of •<^

ture of AdnJ"'"»rativ« Afi.sistant.

K«?nmrk8anar.%. ,.metul»t!on.

.VTj»morandum for ?^f'^. nf War or Adminiatrativ© A»»t.

Investlgatioi.

Notation and ftlinK

Not«d by Bee. of War oV Admin!utrative A8«t. and

n^turned for ftling:.

Previous pap«ii«.

Mark "PerHonal aitcmtion of Adminsstiauve^lfet."

' <>r»-Rct!on

By diret tiod Hecr«t;

XV. %

.af<


•it'V,'\,'\r.ni

WD 2C1 Short, mlUr C.

Hanor«lxU Carl Higrdsn,

Itolt«l SUtM 8«Mt«.

DMkr S«mitar HK/teni

Thia «11X aeknovladi^ r«e«lpt of jrow latter ^ f9bnmrr U»1943, r«|a«atl&« iofaraatlan a« to tha praaant ratira«aat atatiia

of ciaoarsl Short and Aiteiral flwal, and an«loai»jC ooiqr of a

Icttar froa ona af /oar eawatltaawU, Mra. r. H. OalU af Taoaon,

ArUoaa, in vhloh aha protaata tha ratlraaant of thaaa t«o offlaara.

Ttia oflfMtltlaM aurroMndiag tha aaaa af Majar Oaoaral WtltmC. Shca^, Cnlt«d Stataa krmy, ara of vary aonfldaotlal aatwrai

and, IB viaw of tha rapart ot Juatioa Kabarta eoEtaanOnc thia

mttar, 1 faal confidant that you ain appraciata tha aaeaaaitgr

for aweh prooadura. A* aooo aa a daoiaion haa baas raaehad kgr

tha Dapartaani, full imbllaltr of tha aatlon to ba takan will

ba aada.

Slnea tha aaaa «f Adairal KImmI coMaa uadar tha ^turladl*-

tied of U>» lavy m^wrtaant, it la mtgsmXii that /ou addraaa tha

gaeratari' of ttta Mavy ootmmmit^ that afflaar.

simmntXr r^um.

Saaratary af wur.'iMc'

'" '^Cnii<?s5 .f»l«l«ss -Scttoic

•i*«**TlO»«i

%j«^«!A-*.!^jJ^^

•wsumAi \

Q0


Mofima/Sk^

MmOMrS mo.

MdrwnMid t«} !« for ap^gmftfUAm nvOy*

it !•

VMi nuanwrtty tor • •U4(M MUff hueemm m

Ji» A« atucOp

,-/

,>\

i««uM!eHIK^

ocTs-tan

UUi 8-1943

QbilMd MkIm ln«t«.

9mr f«B»tar Brvetet

Id ^4r«ttr ir«yljr te ymr li*t«r tf U HjtwaiT XftMta^rlnt A««Mr «»* e«attt«« tf lltdltAUaiw will hmt th**«il*l of u»Jor CtaMnl ff«lt«r S. Short (B«%ii»^} for •lto(«<•IttMiBiM «ewBitt*A ea or ateuJb ? 2>»Q«d)*r XMt* }"o« ftr«UflM<t «M»t th» iwjTMr ii«rt«4 «f th» atKlittw of lUlU-tUm mte4i«d im Artisl* wt War S9 vtli Mptni 7 9M«A>«r,ISM* te« tlMt In ^* wMuttaM (}«R*na ttwrt liai mamAti• vftivwr of tte •te^tc of tlflAtttiioo*. Swirttl «>»or«*cMtloe i» aJMouUsc & w«i r«r it alnilKr to %tuki of ftMrAimlnX SutbMid S. XIibwX «hs cacMutvd a «iiliiw •»<«h« WKfA Otatut* of Uxd.t*«loBa. rubllc •ttB««HM«N«attitla oCrMt «»• Ma4a« ia th« prM« ea 8 O«tob»r 1949.

In munmr to yvur ••ooa4 iaqvAry a* ta «h«th«rSbort «M pUoad aa th« r«tir*d liat follaviae ti»

<M t*mA BM^r. ywit mt* «dvU«d th&t Ocaanl Aiiort, «p<mkU Mm appXlsfttiea* «»• r«ftira4 fro* Mtir* awnrlQ* SSfa^rttwy XMI, "altlieut eoatemtioa of any affatta* orprajnila* to any ftitara dlaaiplio&ry aotiaa*>

glne*raXf yvvra,

(Qpl.) HENRY L SnWSON

•••ratary of War.

;» iJtk-kt '* W<**

{original [>^''» cheo fwm\'

o! • ' ' '" '^ STAFTj

Copy for The ...djutftnt Oen«ml

i™&«3CJ&.»«w^T!««Wia((««iS*«»*5!lSj^',SSf

i*ar .vap*rti«nt JuWlwr l'J>43>

Toi TtM Adjutant Jonoml '^TiHU P-mmxml Dlvj.ai(m, O-l, ^arl)ep»rtni«»i» •••v.r-aj staff;.

i. inclo««tl IS draft ai r*>il^ for u« aigimtup* oi" U.«S«cr«tAr^' of *«r, to l«tt«r of S«nutor C. .«j*yl«nd lirooka.

iJ. The rwtum of thi» flJa wm» dml»^mb«r lv'4.1.

KQfron C, Craaer,Major Ciftneral,

fiin Judj;* Advociitf General.

2 Xncla.Incl. 1 - KM Tranam. uh«»t

'•j-20-43 11/% incla.

Incl, 2 - LTft. itr. Son.UnoaH.ai.

UaltiMt :itikum j<Hi«t«.

'Cmiur .mimtar Brooks

t

Jn (uritmr rmpXji to >i»ur i«t.t«i' of 11 J«pt«i»ter IMJiaiîriai mm%timr Ui« «t.«tuw al IiMit«Uaiw wiU bmr thmtri«l of Stejor ucmnaX >««lWr u. ahori (>4»Ur*d) for alidadafr«nMM coM&iwa an or aoout 7 Utam^r Isfd,!, /ou art•dvlMd Ut»t Uio two-ôur ptrloa of %im «tA%uU of Ili&it»-viOMi iMbtMiXmJ, in »rU«il* of «*!• 3^ mUl •*ttkf 7 Di»«mti«r

ly43, tut Uuit ia Um mmet%Xm» wiamnU. .MMsrb kM •aMcuUKl« Maivor oi tiio utaVuio uf llitit«i.tion«. uN«iMi>r»l ^M^rt**•oUon 1a axocuUrt*; m waivor li «l(«iX«jr %ti Umt of HmutMJmijraX ihutbmtd K* < jLjw>1 wImi ajwoutad • miivwr oavvtrinî

Vw «Mk«kl atatuto of linliaUorui* Ktbtio aanottmMRNHit t*UiiM •(i»a% waa ahmJo in U» prwaa «m 3 ..otobar },-«4?«

m ansMsr %• /aur aaaoiMt iwiairy a« %» aHathar ommrmXSJao'^t «M >aao«d on tlM rwilrvd liat foilaaing tha att*ok« iaarl fiartoor, you am adviaad Umt Ckanaral ihort, uponMLa 0MI ajiplioation, mm* rvtiniu froia aetiva a«r/io« ZU¥• nukfj l^tUt '*mtt)Ov% oonctonatlfln of aajr offwruM or>>r»judlaa to m^ fjlum dlaolj^^narT aalian".

ainomrmTty jroura.

.'^âarwtAXsr of war.

«*«-• t, -jitw^ 5r-> -^ ij^ jv i'"a jfiaT«?a:-s»>».ssC':-iS'<->4;.x. -• . •. i->., . «sK«»«ijK«5w-


!I

!**^ 'i^CiKHcb ^Ictit* .Sb^rtctit

wmmt-- - r,. .^.

^/(/f ^

^

25 li<»'w»ibar 1%3/

8fJ^

BaBor»bl« Sthrla C. .MbfiMa,

Unitvd Stat«a 8«n«t«.

Dmut Sanaitor JohfUKmi

Bio«i|»t la kekaawlAdlgad o( irwir l«tt«r of 33|o'««iid>«r X943 la whldi jroa «aal^ fna * l»tt«r r*^ottivad tor you ?r«» fr«4 W./miil^^n, Colorado ;^?rliiv>»

Colonwto, ?^l*t4T« to asV "if^iitutt of Uari*•*!<»•bkrrlng posalbla fatur* oou7t»HMrti«I of OMwrsXShort and Admiral UmwI..

In « pr«M •nnounosBwnt, 3 Oototer 1943, **•S«cr«t«K7 of War •t«fc*4 U\at CMnezil^lJteet ha'i «nMet«<ian liwtrMRvnt waiving a« a dkfWM* th« ct«tut« ofllMltaUarw abmOii to b« trl«4 \^ aoiirtHnarU*! »ato*»qamt tc 7 Dao«n*bcr 1443. 4 alailar anmranowMNSt wlttrefsrcnc* to Adnira^JivMl mus aad* t{r tJa* Sooxwiwyof tto Havy.

Tory KLfitoeroly yotaro.

g

»?yr«r! C.

1^

Krron C. Ci

Major Q«Q«ral,Aulc* iUlvooato aansral.

«. ff «.

79716 0—46—pt. 19- -32

I«

-s^

Ito7 IB, I9Wi

IbUM of ftipr—

n

totlT—,

DMT Mr. tensflaltfi

I >»»• yoar l«tUr of May 10, 19U», nK^aMUnt to ta* «<tna«dM to th« flu- ORptrtMnt poUogr «lth rafaraop* to tho trial ofU«ut«nA(>t 3*i»r«l laltor C, Short for allogod offonMO gpomint out of

Xtm Jmpmmm «tt«ok oa HmuI Hiutor. lou point cut thut Urn aUtut*of ll«it*tio»», M «K%ma(kt4 by CongiSMMi, »lli taiplro Jam ?, ISW*.

th» mur OopartMBit (too* not t«k« tt» »!•» Ih»t a«nMf«l Short

auat bo Lriod bofor* Juno 7 wwt. 3e»Bi tij«i ajjo loooral tJvort aocMutotf

a waiTar of tha atatuta of HadtaUona ahloh ofmr^t— to antond It u.jtll

t** and of ti» war ami elx wxitha tharaaftar and tbua jwrnlta Ma trial

imtpootiva of tha data aat by tha act of Concrasa rafarrwJ to by you(Aot of Daootribar 20, 19i»3, PvtolU La* 206, 78th Coograaa). I undarataad

a 8ljd.Ur waiTar waa exacutad by Asteinil tUawl. Ifcdar thaaa drcuw-atanoaa, I <k> aot faal that tha trial of thia oaaa in tiaa of war i«

naoaaaaiy. Sveb a trial would of wKiwaalty ba vary Imngikqr, w>uld jjlva

publioitor to hi#il7 oonfidwjUal aattam am! iwuld roquira Uw attaodanoa

of amaj Ijiportant Arwy at>d !la^ offLeara *teo at prasaot ara an«acad tn

aotlva oparaUona a«airwt tha amny all ovar tha world. Kor thaaa

raaaona, I faal that It would not only ba acainat tha publlo InUraat bot

it would alao ba highly datriwmtal to tha auooaaaful oonduet of tha oar

to brine thia caaa to trial during tim pariod of acUva oparaUona.

Slnooraly youra,

(i>fd.) HKitar L. znm «

t*cratary ef *"*•

COPT

3*

^«'

•NV

fm immj^tm km uas&os mfmnn, anrjsi cwssr m wum,

I. Till—m>il iMiwprtMl ia d»«fl «»f • !•%«« pMMMd f«r «lw

to* f\mm\ Blwwrli «m» m« NR^djtikff prmmmMm. mt «^m* oiTflMni

«ttols • vum wmMm*

1. 4»toa«lMi to lml%wf to tlMl paMUMM^ ^41^im o»n«r«» I»«l«r to tot QaiMf Mnwtoty <tf

pMWMNll,^ (MP <{IMMKlHMFIlAl4yL let lAfHMMNMDft tott |WM« tMrtur «KtoUn« prnMrn^ to MnmllJWto^ «ito Hit Wmmm «f

to* iwdpil if tte UniMr to«Mtoqr*« ni#3^ to to to mmmA tto wfflirtMof tto mm Dnnar%Mi'i»«

Mftjer Cto»Ml«

V* * '

t TlW^Wa .? '^

IML. 2. o toiitii« sUyk a«^u^ ^ togr liii« 1^ ;p»«%


»nl«»iMi t» —

t

iai tlM Urn Uidt f«r fMi ii l ty frmMMl—lAW «r i«nMM &M«iV»A la %iM fttlHMll «i

M|r Af ft l«i«%«r «ft«^ Jiir !•• ^M4« f)r«ft %!>•

rimm m «ld«

I fiMi* A>*'>V4l^

'^

Hur,h*»a, W.. , -cTfl-ftftb

f!^7jrS-':-e- ?^."*JSK"-^

'TiZnileb ^(aie« J&en<t(«

«eJor "eneiAl Uyron C. Craaior,

TVi« Judffe Ail»ocatn Uoneral,Headquartera Anny Service forceo,WMhint'tori, D. C.

My flo«r Oeneral traii.or:

1 MB 111 r'fceipt cii' your 1''

meaning; of "iruuiii>st i:i.f)ediinent,''

atnluttj of iiroitatiiins of timtrial '^/Ists.

'•BCrlt.itix &

I r." 11 nfi;. think

to u ear. '

j ruducf)

the -i.il. -

ttiii i ' ' • ..

hoi'; ' "^.it

we .. .

."•*,

at;.ti!*«: is oBBv:

seen !'it t,o t*Jie a waiver frfxn ar.yot,

h/ivo asauced on ti.eir p&rt, at l»T,-\«t

theory f!,&t tr:«r« c«iia be only oneF.-.".ri Ki»U>r. I thiii>> tills is A nri-,1,

ttat I hoi>« an Invest' ^'hHoii rou^Ht to trls,! at t^.- ««• i

i-lty. Sursly irieio cor

ifts corwr.l • t,nd nt i'««rl

rt

.

* *ie

...•if.iêned at! this) HTB ^lity^tent with:« t<: ôme-re with our

â « iiiatler of is* I

r:riat. iiiv- -•* • "•

\ 9 true.

ft.iStir.i'i-3 that'-r t':?>ri thf? finuy.

>avor to in-

HF,' \

- 1 m r^a

1 iMtUM iMTMitt mw •* mmmmaam ptywii tomt

MM MMlfMH tl%l»llll—l %• tVUl. «&«%«.

I f«^, Ml UPlilll is tl» MMMVMliM^ WltA >

f«aiiir i»i4 «iM« m» MA9%«Mt •* • •%•%• •f ^<—»^»^.^ ^ ,

i» %iM Cf «W tlwU «i«iW» %• t^^MfltU* «M «• «lw rtiiBM «f Mll»ttvy «1«MM*« «iuM»A ia tt« tMHP •fftyl «r w«iiM !• teiflUwIaa to

tto M«««v iw to V toUflf «wl «M HtwiHM !• •Xam^ tolM_«

•f ^ Tuiml %MVt ainiMiMl Mrt to iImmA th» ctMwto iM* •

NMWM to %tU«** IM «IU wBmm to* I« Umi

i% u 4tfn«ai ^t » to %Ai««* «»• • «M»towHuiiA«li • twmA tt «!*• «lMiii«toip ««a* amtoU his ylM

•f tiM atototo t lIMtotiMMi, li»«MPt«r, m I «mmW« to fwf««toff*r» "Mil Mt&m Ir «wMml aiMl wnU m»|m% Mm to totot

iw «Mito«% rtmrtat m •ftt«w mA • i»11— ««to«r A»hA«» cf

1 ImI.8ir •#

ita,/. *»., •>«f*/tirf

II samm» wmBm,

•imMmim wt U«I«*h«m

Mr fOTi*« taH«c «MiBk Ir >««MR t mm wmifm%

!• a&Utwr |M%IM« thai W iiWtMiil ttt iiiipitiiH

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AH :cjs

December 9, 1943.

Honorable Harold D. Smith.Director, Bureau of the Budget

Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Smith : In compliance with your request of December 8, I haveexamined the resolution (H. J. Res. 199) which is before you in enrolled form,

to extend the time limit for immunity.The Joint Resolution would extend the statute of limitations affecting the

possible prosecution of any person connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe

or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, for the period

of six months.The debates in the Senate and House of Representatives on this resolution

indicate that it was the view of the sponsors of the legislation in Congress that

as a matter of precaution in order to avoid any question as to the binding effect

of any waivers of the statute of limitations that have been obtained so far, andin order to extend the right of the Government to prosecute any persons whohave not waived the statute of limitations' it was desirable that that statute of

limitations in respect to such cases be extended by congressional action.

I found no objection to the approval of the Joint Resolution.

Sincerely yours,[S] F. BiDDLE,Attorney General.

Delivered by Asst. Sol. Gen's Office 12-10-43.

AH :NAT :merDecember 13, 1943.

Honorable Harold D Smith,Director, Bureau of the Budget,

Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Smith : In compliance with your request of December 8, I haveexamined the resolution (H. J. Res. 199), which is before you in enrolled form,

to extend the time limit for immunity.The Joint Resolution would extend the statute of limitations affecting the

possible prosecution of any person connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe,

or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, for a periodof six months.The debates in the Senate and House of Representatives on this resolution

indicate that it was the view of the sponsors of the legislation in Congress thatas a matter of precaution in order to avoid any question as to the binding effect

of any waivers of the statute of limitations that have been obtained so far, and in

order to extend the right of the Government to prosecute any persons who havenot waived the statute of limitations, it was desirable that the statute oflimitations in respect to such cases be extended by congressional action.

I am inclined to the view that the resolution is not likely to have the effect its

sponsors apparently have in mind. If present waivers of the statute of limita-

tions are binding, the legislation would be superfluous. If the waivers are noteffective, the statute of limitations expired on the day on which the bill wasfinally passed by the Congress and the resolution cannot now revive the rightof the Government in institute prosecutions.

In view of the fact, however, that the resolution is at best innocuous, I find

no objection to its approval.Sincerely yours.

Attorney Oeneral.

HBC :gmJune 9, 1944.

Honorable Harold D. Smith,Director, Bureau of the Budget,

Washington, D. C.

My dear Mb. Smith : In compliance with your request of June 8, 1944, I haveexamined Senate Joint Resolution 133, to extend the statute of limitations incertain cases.

The Joint Resolution extends any statute of liiuitations that operates to pre-

vent the court martial and prosecution of any person involved in any matter in

connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, or involved in any other possible

or apparent dereliction of duty, crime or oftense against the United States, for

a further period of six months. As you know, Public Law 208, Seventy Eighth

Congress (Act of December 20, 1942; 57 Stat. 605). extended these statutes for

a period of six months from December 7, 1943.

Se<-tion 2 of the bill directs the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the

Navy to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the

catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts

may justify.

I call your attention to my letter dated December 13, 1^3, commenting on HouseJoint Resolution 199, Seventy Eighth Congress, which became the Act of De-cember 20, 1943.

I find no objection to the approval of the present resolution.

Sincerely yours,

> » >

Attorney Oeneral.

Delivered by messenger 6-9-44.

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Telephone Coveesation Between General Cramer and Hugh Cox, AssistantSolicitor General, 8 June 1944

Cox: * * * to proceed forthwith with an investigation—is cast in such

a form that it does give the services some leeway as to the nature of the investiga-

tion, etc., and that although the words in the concluding clause doesn't have the

language about discretion in it, it probably doesn't require any—the institution of

proceedings any particular time, and for that reason the Attorney General told

Judge Rosenm"an that considering the possibility of criticism that the Presidentmight be subjected to if he did veto it, it was his personal view that the Presidentought to think pretty carefully before he did decide to veto it. Now we are not

going to put all that in a report. I think we'll just send to the Budget probablya noncommital report stating that we don't have any objection or we don't takeany position one way or another on the thing. But I thought you ought to be in-

formed as to what the Attorney General had said to Judge Rosenman.Cramer: Yes, I'm certainly very glad to know that. Well now, he doesn't

think that the bill in its present form—if the President approves it, will that putus up against the proposition that we have to go ahead ?

Cox: Oh I think you would be under a duty probably to have some kind ofan investigation.Cramer: We're going to have an investigation anyway, there's no question

about that.

Cox: I don't think that otherwise, and I agree with the Attorney Generalabout that, it imposes any immediate duty on you at all. If you ever finish theinvestigation and got full possession of all the facts, then the question wouldarise as to when you had to commence proceedings and I think you could con-strue that section so that the word "forthwith" doesn't apply to commence suchproceedings, so you wouM have some latitude there anyway.Cramer: Well that's just the question—I don't know--Cox: The legislative history I think creates some doubt about it because they

did take out the words "in their discretion".Cramer: Yes, well the investigation as far as that's concerned, we'll start that

any time, just as soon as we find out what's going to happen to this bill and wherewe are at. We didn't take it because at first there was going to be a two-partyinvestigation and then General Short's wife was sick (I guess you heard metell that), so that's the reason we haven't taken any.Cox: Well that seemed—we look at section 2, that's the only immediate obliga-

tion that's imposed on you. Now I think that's improper, that is I don't thinkCongress has got the right to tell you to go ahead forthwith with an investigationbut they've done it and it's a question I suppose for the President of weighingan impropriety against the criticism that might come from vetoing the thing.Cramer: You see they say after investigating the facts surrounding the catas-

trophe described in section 1 above and to commence such proceedings againstsuch persons as the facts may justify. But doesn't that imply that they mean todo it within the six months period since they've extended the statute?Cox: I wouldn't construe it that way I think, General. I think—suppose your

investigation for one reason or another isn't finished within the six months—thesection shows you're not supposed to start proceedings until you've got all thefacts. You may not be able to get the facts in six months; these people arescattered all over the world I suppose.Cramer: Yes, they are everywhere; there's a question whether we can get

them in that length of time. But I do feel this to a certain extent, if the Presi-dent approves the bill, he does or at least implies that he is concurringwith Congress in that directive, that binds the S°cr"*^ary of War and Secretary ofNavy to go ahead, don't you think there's the possibility of that?

Cox: Well" again I think it's—I draw a distinction between the investigationand the proceedings. I think he certainly binds himself and them to go aheadwith the investigation, which you are going to do anyway. Now on the proceed-ings I think there—I don't think he binds himself to starting proceedings withinthe six months period. I think it depends on what happens in your investiga-tion—how the thing goes and what the situation is when the investigation is

completed. I think it's pretty clear from the record of the history of the debatesthat I'm looking at that you can make a strong argument that Congress didn'tintend you to start proceedings at any time if it was the judgment of the servicesthat those proceedings would interfere with the war.Cramer: Well that's probably true when you go through tiie records of the

debates—I had those in front of me yesterday.

Cox: The Senate Debate and the House Debate both have got a lot of state-ments of that kind. It's not free from doubt but I think it's tenable, strongposition.

Cramer: Well many people—the last I haven't talked to since I talkedto you, but they were very keen about a veto on it. I doutft myself whether thePresident would veto it.

Cox: Well I got the impression from what the Attorney General said—heard

—

Judge Rosenman say—that the Judge would be very reluctant to have himveto it.

Cramer: Yes. So maybe we can get him to put in .something in the messageexplaining the situation that by that he is not binding himself—

—

Cox: To start any proceedings if the proceedings are going to interfere withthe war. I think it's quite possible that the people at the White House mightapprove that.

Cramer: Well all right. That's a good suggestion, I'll see what I can do aboutit. And thank you very much. Goodbye.

Telephone Conversation Between Giner.vl McNarney and General Cbamfr.15 June 1944

Cramer: Good morning, General. I wanted to talk with you a bit about tlii.s

Sbort-Kimmel business. I suppose you saw where the President signed the bill

yesterday and made a statement to—in a general way about he understood thatit was not to interfere with the war effort, which approves our going ahead withsome sort of an investigation. Now I'm just wondering what the best procedureis. I've been talking with Admiral Gatch about it and we're both of aboutthe idea that it ought to go up at least to the level of the two Secretaries to agreeto do something in concurrence with each other and probably it would be awise idea to put it up to the President and have sort of a joint commission ofsom.e kind—what do you think of that?McNarney: Well I think that whatever we do should be joint—certainly if we

are going to have an investigation it should be a joint investigation ^with boththe Army and Navy on—now if the President would like to add some civilianI would have no objection to that.Cramer: Well of courseMcNarney: We've already had one commission but I'm sure you and Gatch

ought to get together and submit a recommendation to the two Secretaries as to

what you think the—what type of a thing it should be.

Cramer: I see. Now so far as having a joint investigation is concerned thatwould have to be directed by the President I suppose anyway even if it were onlyArmy and Navy.McNumey: Oh no, it wouldn't have to be directed by the President because

we have a direc-tive to go ahead and do it haven't we"/Cramer: We have a directive to go ahead and do it, yes.McNarney: The Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy could agree

to that if its restricted to Army and Navy people.Cramer: But of course the—it says severally^I don't know what they mean

by that act severally but the Act of (Congress says that the Secretary of Warand Navy shall severally be directed to proceed, whicli means separately I

presume.McNarney: Well I think we'd still have to do it separately.Cramer: The only question about it would be this—if we agreed on a joint

commission some way as to what authority it w<mld have to subpoena witnessesand all that sort of thing. I mean if we just voluntarily agreed to appoint ajoint committee.McNaniey: Well you'll have to give them enough authority to call witnesses

before them and swear them I supp<)se.

Cramer: WelTmy offhand thought on that is that they'd have to have a specialact of Congress authorizing like y(m people did on the Roberts Commission.McNarney: They would, huh? I'm not enough of a lawyer to know all those

things but I think the best thing to do is for you and Gatch to get together andmake us a recommendation as to what we ought to do.

Cramer: All right, fine.

McNarney: I'm not enough of a lawyer to be able to determine it but I dothink thai whatever we do should be joint.

Cranwr: Yes, well I think that's true. And they are sort of holding off—I toldthem we'd hold off so they wouldn't give any more public statements over thereunless we made them together.McNarnep: Yes. Well I'll tell you I'll call Horn and tell him that I think

that it should be joint and that I've asketl you to get in touch with Gatch tosubmit some sort of a recommendation.Cramer: All right, that will be fine. Goodbye.McNarneji: Goodbye.

JAG :rl(l

Department of the Navy,Office of the Judse Advocate General,

Washington 25, D. C, 15 June 19U-Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.At 10: 45 this mornirg I had a talk with General Cramer and General Weir in

General Cramer's office on the Joint Resolution extending the Statute of Limita-tions as approved by the President on June 13. I pointed out that this JointResolution directs the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretax-y of War severallyhold an investigation into the Pearl Harbor catastrophy and expressed the opinionthat this requires us to proceed separately. General Weir opined that if theSecretaries acted severally upon a renort it would satisfy the law in this respect.Both General Cramer and General Weir thought strongly that it would be pref-erable for the President to appoint a Joint Commission to handle the whole matterat once. I also agree that this would be preferable procedure providing that it

complies to the Statute.I told General Cramer that I contemplated recommending to the Secretary of

the Navy that he immediately convene a Court of Inquiry which wou'd'be giventhe Roberts Commission Report and Admiral Hart's Report and would be au-thorized to summons any witnesses in the Naval service on shore duty withinthe United States ; that in my opinion summonsing vi<^nesses outside of theUnited States would interfere with the prosecution of the war and would becounter to the President's expressed understanding in the statement he made ofhis reason of approving the Joint Resolution. General Cramer and General Weirthought it would be preferable to leave such a matter up to the discretion of theBoard and tell them not to summons any witness which would interfere with ourwar effort.

If a Commission is appointed by the President we all agreed that there shouldbe a General and an Admiral on it to deal with the strategic considerations. Wethought that Mr. Hackworth of the State Department, or at least someone highup in the State Department shouM be on the Conn ission to cover the diplo-n)atic phases and that there should be two other members so that the Commis-sion would be predominatelv civilian. It occurs to me that perhaps a retiredJu'lae and a Senator would be advisable.We agreed that we should present our views to the Secretary of War and

Secretary of the Navy and that they probably would wish to take this up withthe President.

T. L. Gatch,Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

79716 O—46—pt. 19 38

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Coograsa ulraetad aa follo«»t

*Tli« Sacra tit rx of War and ttio

£>acretary of th« Rayy *ra aavaralXjrciiractaa to procaea fort4»Kj,tij 1than InvaatltatloQ into Ui« facts aur*rounding tba cataatro|iha aaacrlbad in•actiun 1, abovaf na^ to cotaaanca pro*caau|.n£a againat auch paraona aa thafa6ta aay Juatlfy,*

Wtion Congrass pacaad Uils leglalatioQ, it iomv thatAoatlraJL Hart had bmmx ati^agao for soma tlaa in mxtmlaixm amaywlttMasaa «lth a via« toward parpatuatlng thalr tactlaonjr. Hatrartnalaaa, Con«(ras» uiractau tJtiat I procaau with an Inrastlfatlonof ttia xacta.

XnaasRtch aa Congraaa is not aatlsfiau with the procaaoratakan by AOalraX Hart anu wlshas furthar InTaatlgatloa by mm,it la my a«ty to ordar * for«*i Court of Inquiry.

*h«n thia Court of Inquiry haa complatac Ita wor* and •

**

raport«^ Ita fiivainga to ma, anu ghouls the facta bo Juatify,thoaa conaiaara^ uarallct in thair uuty at Paarl Harbor orconnactaa i»ith that cataatropha, will be procaadau agalnataa uiractau by Congratts.

iU,u^i' '" 't^^.*^f—


TAMOAMQ ruMM MD

Office M^ctnorandum united states govfjinment

JUN I '.- iy44DATB!

TO : General John Weir USA

moM : Cornelius H.builufiice JALi,Ut;N

•UBJB..T: A.immeL-Short court mui-tial.

1. xn my humble juugment - th« soon«r thismatter getj. over on the uoorstep ol" No. IbOOPennsylvania Avenue the better. After all, iAr.

i\ is the only wan v.tio can deciae whether thesetwo olTicerti shou ,u be court uiartiaiieu - or ^tney shouia. Neither your w-ecretary nor mine canueciae tnis matter.

i^ aumirai Gatch recommenus a court lorKimuiei to the Secretary oT the Navy he will haveto lay this matter bel'ore the FreBiuent lor a

uecision. *'e botn kmov. that thf? Presiuent woula,in ail probability, Jubt put the matter in his

llies ("unaer consiuoration") eert.iinly untilalter tht^ Kiections.

ijhoulu the President ueciae that moreinveiitiejation be neeued, he coulu set up a composltiBoar^or Court oi enquiry as he saw fdit

Vvhen jir.Koj rei tal has int true tea us howto proceeu anu what to uo I'll sound oil.

*''egara»^

Snnrial Afv'-ir.^nnt

#40tCAt1

17m 1944

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Bsafsstfully

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a. a Ma. n 0. tturt

MaJ. Oaa. Myroa C. Cramar^-^

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9t,S,A.M 'ioMUrykWHCT OF TMiWNAVY

HCtnntM Of TMC JUOOB AOVOCATB OCNKIiAt

MBMOMAMDUM


V.JI. A. «

CMU^ARTMCNT OF THE NAVYorrtcx or tmk juooc aovocatv. oKNKnAU

MKMOPIANOUM


Department of the Navy,Office of the Judge Advocate General,

Washington 25, D. C, 30 Decetnber 1943.

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

H. J. Res. 199 has been approved by the President. This Resolution purports

to extend the statute of limitations for trials by court martial for six months.Statements were made at the time of the passage of the Resolution that it wouldmake mandatory the trial of Admiral Kimmel within the additional six monthsperiod. I foresee that such contentions will again be advanced.

It has been my view that the agreement Admiral Kimmel made not to plead

the statute of limitations in bar of trial was not strictlv necessary, but that his so

agreeing made assurance doubly sure. Our statute of limitations reads:

"Article 61. No person shall be tried by court martial * for anyoffense * * * which appears to have been committed more than two years

before * * * unless by reason of having absented himself, or of some other

manifest impediment he shall not have been amenable to justice within that

period."It is my view that where the circumstances are such that the convening of a

court martial and the summoning of the necessary witnesses would interfere

with out prosecution of the war, as determined by the President or the Secretary

of the Navy, there is clearly such a "manifest impediment" as is contemplated

by the statute. There is an argument to the contrary, includ'ng two very ancient

Attorney General's opinions where the circumstances were different, but I submitthat the words of the statute mean exactly what they say.

In any event we are amply justified in ignoring H. J. Res. 199. The attached

copy of a letter from the Attorney General to the Director of the Budget sets out

the reasons.I submit this memorandum that you may be prepared for developments.

Respectfully,T. L. Gatch,

Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

Memorandum for General Cramer.

1. A statute of limitations can not be extended after it has run (Falter v. U. S.,

23 Fed. 2nd 420, 425; Moore v. State, 43 N J. Law 203), the reason being that

the prosecution being dead, the accused has a vested right to repose. Thus in

civil cases it can not be extended once it has run.

2. The above distinction is recognized in the Federal statute of limitations,

18 U. S. C. 582, which prescribed a new statute of limitations and provided in

.so many words that it should not apply to offenses already barred but wouldapply to cases wherein "the existing statute of limitations had not yet fully run".

3. General Short's offenses were all barred under Article of War 39 on De-cember 7, 1943. and the act of December 20, 1&43, was powerless to revive the

(lead prosecution.4 It is unthinkable that General Short would break his word not to assert the

statute of limitations. If he did so, he would alienate any vestige of chance of

acquittal by public opinion. But a.ssuniing he did assert the bar of the statute.

it is b'^lieved the agreement would stand up on the following grounds

:

a. There was ample consideration on both sides.

b. The statute of limitations does not deprive the court of jurisdiction; it is

a mere defense which must be asserted {Johnson v. V. S., 13 Fed. Cases 867,

No. 7418). If pleaded, the court must sustain the plea before the prosecution

is barred. It is unbelievable that where an accused has lulled the Governmentinto security until the statute has run he would be allowed to reap the benefit

of his own fraud.c. The agreement might constitute a "manifest impediment" to trial within

the meaning of Article of War 39. 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 265 discusses a manifestphysical impediment but there is no rea^n why the impediment need be a physi-

cal one. Fraud on the part of the accused might very reasonably constitute amanifest impediment.

d. The accused's fraud would make him a fugitive from justice which tradi-

tionally stops the running of the .statute. See 18 U. S. C. 583.


o. The real danger of the present legislation is that someone might construeit to be different from an ordinary statute of limitations and to deprive the courtsof jurisdiction to try the offenders at any other time than the period as extended.This is a very real danger.

Wm. J. Hughes, Jr.,

Lieutenant Colonel, J. A. O. D.,Assistant Chief, Military Justice Division.


EXHIBIT NO. 171

Table of Contents

1. Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal dated8 September 1945.

2. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Forrestal to Rear Admiral Kimmel dated28 August 1945.

3. Dispatch #180328 December 1941 from CincPac for Action to PacFlt.4. Letter from R'?ar Admiral Kimmel to Secretary of the Navy Knox dated

26 January 1942 with endorsement dated 27 January 1942.

5. Press and radio release from the Navy Department flated 14 April 19^.6. Memorandum from T. L. Gatch, Judge Advocate General of the Navy, to

Admiral King dated 13 April 1944.

7. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Rear Admiral Kimmel dated10 September 1943.

8. Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to Secretary of the Navy Knox dated7 September 1943 vpith enclosure.

9. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Rear Admiral Kimmel v?ith

enclosure.

10. Memorandum from T?*^ar Admiral Jacobs to Secretary of the Navy Knoxdated 17 August 1943.

11. Memorandum from L. E. Bratton, Acting Judge Advocate Genei'al of theNavy, to Rear Admiral Jacobs dated 4 August 1943.

12. Navy Department Communique No. 47 dated 28 February 1942.

13. Memorandum of Secretary of War, H. L. Stimson.14. Memorandum of 26 February 1942.

15. Navy Communication #191909 February 1942 from Coml2 for Action to

SecNav.16. First Endorsement from BuNav to Rear Admiral Kimmel dated 17 February

1942.

17. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Rear Admiral Kimmel dated 16February 1942.

18. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Rear Admiral Kimmel.19. Memorandum from Edwin Dickinson, Special Assistant to the Attorney

General, to Captain Gatch, Assistant Judge Advocate General, Navy Depart-ment, dated 14 February 1942.

20. Memorandum from the Attorney General Francis Biddle to the Secretaryof War, dated February 14, 1942.

21. Alternative suggestions of language referred to in the Attorney General'smemorandum to the Secretary of War, dated 14 February 1942.

22. Covering title sheet addressed to Assistant Solicitor General, Department ofJustice.

23. Memorandum from Captain Gatch, Ass't. JAG, Navy Department, to Ass't

Solicitor General, Department of Justice, dated 14 February 1942, withletter from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Rear Admiral Kimmel attached.

24. Letter from Secretary of War Stimson to Secretary of the Navy Knoxdated 14 February 1942.

25. Memorandum from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Admiral Jacobs dated7 February 1942 with attached memorandum for the Secretary on Stimson'smemo by Admiral H. R. Stark, dated 31 January 1942.

26. Notes by H. L. Stimson after meeting at the White House January 28, 1942.

27. Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to Secretary of the Navy Knox dated28 January 1942 with endorsement of the same date.

28. Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to Secretary of the Navy Knox dated 26January 1942 with endorsement dated 27 January 1942.


280 Brnnxville Road, BronxviUe 8, N. Y., 8 September 1945.

From : Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Retired)To

:

The Secretary of the Navy.Subject : General Court Martial in my case.

1. In view of the agitation for a Congressional Investigation before Congressreconvened and the action of the Senate in ordering a joint CongressionalInvestigation of Pearl Harbor, I wish to defer my reply to your letter of 28August 1945 until that investigation is completed.

(S) H. E. KiMMEX.


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iiattt etMQ^A* i8iEsa cmm i8 ip: 1941 m^n

fItfVt ^«0M 14| S€«IAy| ftUNAff eiNtATi CIHaANT ROUTtNf

AMIRAL HUSBAIO C KtllCL RAUUB lOM HIS FLAG ?HtS DATE AND VICE

AWMfUL tlU^IMI S fYE USIt ASSUMES TCMPOflARy COUMANB OF THE ttS

IC n.€ET IH ADSITfON TO ms fUUWT OUTlEf

sisTKiaeri^

•tfiMy«....««6tfi ttAMc ANY mn,^ restrictco

W» 10/tn 36t aft 15, Flu/^

79716 O—46—pt. 19 34

r

fcI»?'EL, Husband S.

Rear /icbtlral, USI(2207-, -Rn)

January 2C, IJâ

lô.i)i Rear A.dialral Uushand E. Kiiin«l, t.<.3>N>

Tot fho Secretary ol h;- NaTy

Subjectt =\«que«t for f<«tire"»nt i;i!der the Provisionsof Section 1445 êTisod r;-.,atutoa.

1. After forty one years ana eifht months senrlceIn the 'filled States .iary, I icrob^ request that I be placedupon the retired list In accordance nith the provisions -ofSection 1443 Rerlsed 5âtut s.

2. I hold myself i/i readlaoss to perTorsR an> jutyto which I may be assl-ned«

Hl.SBAND B. KIvîX

Ist Kndorsf^Drtt

January 27, 1942

Pro.1t Cor.;jaad,int, r.-relfth Naval le-riot oâ.i Wava\ Oj) ratingBase, San i'ra.'iciacc, wOlTornia

Tot The recrr^jxry oC thte Nf.ty

Subjects lioquost for f<e-iro::.ont unut:.- t,ric i'rovisijiui of:ec'.ior) 1442 evised ::tatuti)s

1. "orwardad.

.'. ... ;i^ N3LAi)E

vtrfsn^mm^^


IMMEDIATE RElt.Mfi*

PRESS AND RADIO APRIL 14, 1944

PEARL HARBGR WrrliESSES UNAVAILABLE DI3E TO WAR ASSXCaJMENTS

^cretary of the Navy Frank Knox has received a memorand\im fromAdmiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N., Commander in CMef of the United StatesFleet, in which Admiral King officially Informed &e Secretary that certain .

officers of the Navy now serving on battle fronts in various parts of theworld, could not be -withdrawn from their military duties in order toparticipate as members or witnesses in court martial proceedings In

connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl HarMr on December 7, 1941.

In his consideration of the case of Rear Admiral Husband Klmmel, '

'U4^N. (Retired), and of the procuring df members and witnesses for acourt martial, the Secretary had requested Admiral King to advise him as to

Vae availability of certain officers should a court martial be convened.

Admiral King, answering the Secretary, said: "About half the officers

listed are on duty at sea in command of forces engaged with the enemy andIn accordance with planned operaticais. Others at sea are performingduties on the staffs of those commanders."

At his press conference oii Ajxrll 11, 1944, Secretary Knox wasquestioned In connection with Congress' extension of the time for trial of

mose involved in the Pearl Harbor catastrophe to June 7, 1944, and'^eSecretary said he would obtain the opinion of his legal advisers.

"I have discussed this matter with Rear Admiral G&teh, the JudgeAdvocate General of the Navy" said Secretary Knox, "and I have beenadvised by him that, inasmuch as Admiral Kimmel irns long since signedan agreement not to interpose the statute of limitations as a bar to his trial,

there is now no necessity to construe any acts of Congress on this subject/

The Secretary further explained that Admiral Thomas C Hart, U.S.Nt,(Retired), is now in Hawaii pursuing his investigation into matters relating

Ao the attack upcao Pearl Harbor by the Japanese on December 7, 1941.

1 would cejrtainly feel derelict in my duty if I took from the Fleet and' :ers whomSecretary.

the fi^iting fronts .the officers whom Admiral King has placed in thosepositions," conduced the

•foil e &0^ \ '***

\


Dbpabtmbnt op the Navy

office of the judob advocate obneiial

washington, d. c.

13 April 1944

MHPWWM 198 imiwt rag /

than has %•«& a gnrnt d*«l of acitMloa In tha pr«aa raoaatl/

BC tba Faarl Baitor aattar. with aapaoial rafaraaea to tha dalagr

i> tha trial of AdBlral KImuI,

Partlaolar attantloa ia dlraotad ta tha atataaaata of Saerataxjr

Xaoz at hla praai ooafaraaca on April 11, la «faloh tha Saoratary ia

aajj^peaaA ta hava aaid that ha woald rafar tha mat tar ta tha Attonugr

Oaaaral for a la^al opinion aa ha (tha Saoratair) "vaa confotaad*.

It ia otttalttad that inaaaooh aa Adalral XlnMl haa tlpiad a

TiKlld valvar of hia rl|^t to plaad tha atatuta of llnltatlona la har of

trial, thara la aow no aaad to 'iatarprat* any Aeta of Oeacraaa vqpea thia

aohjaot . aqpaeially tha ona a]rtaadla« tha tlaa within whloh trial aaat

taka placa.

Iran thon^ tha Hav^'a oaaa wara coqplata ia avary raapast. aa

aetlon caa now ba takan for raaaoaa 70a taatm alraadjr fivaa, naaaljr tha

aoa-aTailability of offloara on dntr at aaa.

I hava draftad a aa«f*«tad praaa ralaaaa which, I haliava will do

MMh toward aattllac thla aattar - for tha daratioa of tha war at laaat.

^4"^

1.

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i I

2a> BRONXVluLE ROADBRONXVlLLt, '?>i£»i XOHK

September 7tb, 1943,

From:

Toi

Reference(a)

Enoloaure' A

Re«r Achoiral Husband E. Kiwnel, U.S.N., Ret.,280 Bronxville Road,Bro«urTill8, New Toric.

The HoncarabXs Frank Knox,S^fcretary of th* Navy,Navy Departcent,f»aafeJLngtcm, D. C,

Latter froB Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, to Henp AdmiralHusbartd E. KlJtnmel, U.S.N., Ret., proposln,^ a Valver of t:«Statute of Limitations.

Agreentent not to ploitd the Statute of Liraltatlons in bar oftrial by General Co\irt Martial.

Receipt is acknowledged of your undated letter. Reference (a),

d«liver:»d to me by hand Aufust 27th, 19A3, concerning a Generil CovrtMartlMl in my case. In which letter you atate thst the two year statute pf'itipitatlons controlling Naval Courts Uartinl will have run on wy caae c«rt

December 7th, I9A3, and you propose that I should now ajjree not to plead^the statute of limitations in bar of trial and you enclose a proposed fora

l»f waiver.

lou state in Referenco (a) thatInterest and safety would now permit proceeiTurther believe that ao long as the war con'ippractlcablt* to have a muDber of iaportantOtnift on account of their war duties. Forfeel that it would be in the best interestsl^ow agree not to plead tlie statute of linitgive me your assurance that the trial willable date.

you think that the publicdin,' with my trial, but that yo^i

tlnues it ».ill be manifestlyVitnessea appear before thethis reason, amon^^ othsTS, ycru

of all concorr.ud if I shouldatioas in bar of trial auid yoube h^Xd at the earliest practic-

al^

1*1- X^

3

September 7th, 19A3.

From: Rear Aciairal Kiisbiutd E. Kinsel, U.S.N. , Ret.Tot The Secretary of f.w Navy

-2-

It is «y personal desire to be brought to trial by GeneralCoiart Mart ill in open coujrt at the earliest pr«cticable date; Delay in

the matter- Is opposed to ay personal interests, since the pessage of tiaeand the cirouostances and casualties of war and of the period followingmay m&ke it difficult, perhaps ispossible, to assemble and produce theevidence and the witnesses reqviired. I have at all times been anxious tosubordinate, jBsy otm interests to the nati<x)al welfare, which appears tortf^uirs tnat ajr trial be delayed. I an therefore forwnrdin^ to you here-with a waiver, Bnolosure A, executed by ae which I hope will be satis-factory to you.

Respectfully,

# «.

*< iAn-AAA.^ '^ ' '

,

vt^'j^ ,AA>^

End. (1)

A - to Utter dated SAstenbei .._, _.,,, :>om.

R«ar AdrainU. Hv ?. Kiirircl, O.S*!l., Mrt.,.:> the SeoretsTj^ o; ine Navy.

I. HUSBAND E. KDC^L, Rear A^ral, Onit«<i Stat«8 S»vy,R^tlrsa, hereto-/ agrea on my hi<ai<»r as an oCf«^r «asd a gentlMian tiwit t^will nol ple:id, nor jwrait R»y attoiTiey or otlier person on my b^^&If toplead^ the atntute of limitations in bar of my triid by General Courtfertajsl. iK open court for any alles«<3i offenses with which I ttmy bechargeji relating to the period on or before Dember 7th, 194i» i^ould aytrialib§ hell during- the present uar or within six (6) Buxiths thereafter.

P I tnke tills action voluntarily, believing it to be in the

public interest.

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SatoJ««tt

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RMur ifdbdral aasbanS B. ri—i\.

QGII In jrbor

boXMOMt Fon of «f«>winnt« mtot.

1. Tb» report of th» a^-oalXad Roberts Cmmi »!<» allsssdowrtaia darellotiona of duty en your part. Xeurtiraaant was appro-rwi, and It ims statad tharaia ___^.^"win ba no bar to yoiir raquaatlng a ganaxtd eou^fPHHBHIHPP to thaMaYjr Oapartaant's ordarlnii you for trial should 8o ^tarmlBed."

t trial upon ttaaaa ehargaaintaraat and aafaty

On Fabruary 28, 19yU I atatad to tha praaswould not ba bald until aueh tiaa aavould permit.

2. Tha two year statute of llaitatlons eoatrolllng navalcourts martial will have r\m in your case on Oaeaabar 7, 19^, subjaotto tba exception therein relating to eases is which there exist* a"manifest impediment" to the trial of the accused. Therefore, if ordersfor your trial are not issued prior to tha date stated, you could pleadthe statute of limitations in bar of trial, and its application to yourcase would have to be determined in the manner provided by law.^

3. I think that the pcU^o interest and safety would nowpermit proceeding with your trial, but I further beliere that so loneaa the war continues it will bsvampractieahle to have a number ofimportant witnesses appear before the court on account of their imrduties. For this reason among others I feel that it would be to thabeat interests of all concerned if you shcnild now agree not to pleadthe statute of limitations in bar of trial upon ay assurance that thetrial will be had at the earliest peracticable dateawptretion t>f the two^yess {jwlud.

4. If you agree with the foregoing yoxir prompt return ofenclosure is requested.

Di

hMMqr agXM on mgr honor u a& amo«r and a twntlwwn tlmt Z «U1 not \

Vilf*d tb* statoU of UUdtaUomi la Ixur of a^ trial fey gwwna eoort }

MTUal for aagr an«t«l off«»»•• I My Imira otMnittwI on or btfora 1

iDioaaibar 7, 19iU» ahouXd mj trial tw hald darlag tte praaant aar or ^vitlda aix Bontha tbrnraaftar, and that I alXl aot panait ai^ attorm^

or otlwr iMcraon on agr balialf to aaka auoh plaa.

I nka %}dB agraaMnt foluoatarily, in raeoifBiUon of tha

fact iUbat during tha praaant aar and for tlHMilMaad pariod tharaaftar

it will b« iaqpiraeti(Mibla to obtain tha attendanca hafora a ganaral

court aortial of aitaaaaaa «ho would ba ij^xurtant tor w^ dafanaa,

aa wall aa witnaaaaa raquirad by tha proaaoution.

^-'--tJcA-

Hri. '^P'\y<AjL^

In rrptj.' atlrfp^w not (hr Binnt-r of thi»

I<U»T, but liunwu vi N'ftval IVn»»^r.nrl,

ti:t\y Depart Hit Dt. \Vjshm::tyn. D. C.

Refer to Nc.

CCKFIDQJTIAL.

Navy Department

BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

WASHINGTON, D. C.

^y^

17 Aiacust 1943.

Moaarandom for

Tha Secretary of Mam Navy.

The attached noBorandum brings up the question of the trialof Rear Admiral Kianel, based on the findings of the Roberts Board.

In order to be snre that he be brou^t to trial, if such is

desired, it is necessary that Specifications and charges be preferredprior to 7 Decenber, 1943*

If sudi charges are preferred, I am of the opinion thatAAniral Klatel will demand ijaoedlate trial.

I do not think it is in the national interest to pendtlhis case

to coae to trial at present*

I have discussed this case with Adndral King, and he agrees with

ne that the final decision in the case mast be made by the President.

RANDALL JACOBS. ^^^

IMf iUOO^ AOVOCATt Ol NUtAL OT tMl N*WAMb NKf IR lo NO.

JAG:n.) :rid

Dkpartmknt Of THi; Navy

OKKICE OK THK JDDUE ADVOCIATE GENKRAl.

wasihn<;ton, ». c.

A August 19^3

:..o.-.orajidu:i; I'or hear Adairal Randall Jacobs

Major GenerBl Viyroii C, Craner, Judge Advocnte Geiierax of the

.'.i"v> CK.e into riy office tliis aftarnoon and stated that ho had re-

ported to Genorti ' araliall that If ajiy action is froin^; to be takenrslntivc to the trial by general court martial of General Short a

.".eterr.ination s'rould be arrived at because tii.* Statute of Li^lit•^tions

sxjirss on Decenber 7, 194.3. General Marshall stated thnt the mattervould have to be taken up with Secretary Stir.son and then asked Gen-eral Cra. er to malce inquiry as to what action the Navy Department wastaicins "/itti respect to Admiral Kitmnel for the reason that it ?;ould beadvisable that the V.'ar Departjient and the Kavy Department be in ac-cord with tiie action that is to be taken.

General Craner was informed tliat Captain Gatch had been se-

lected as the relief of Admiral 7ioodson as Judge Advocate General andin view of the ixportance of the matter I would immediately take thematter up vdth htm. Likewise I advised Gener.il Craner th.Ht in viewof the fact tha^ the subject was one affecting personnel presumablyCaptain Gatch nould v/ant to take the matter up with Admiral Jacobs,the Chief of fiaval Personnel. Furthermore, I expressed the view toGenereil Cramer that the ultimate decision as to the action to be takenin the case of General Short and Admiral Kicoiel would be for the deci-sion of the President of the United States, that tJie respective Secre-taries would vevy likely be the ones to present the matter for the de-cision of the President and xiiat the respective Secretaries might ex-press their views as to the policy governinj, the action to be takenbut that the President would render tiie decision to the Secretaries whoin turn would then ttike such action as was determined upon.

. It so hapt,ened that upon the arrival of Captain Gatch you came

in to my office and the above subject matter was discussed. You re-quested that a memorandum be prepared with respect thereto and that

you in tiam would take the matter up with Admira,L Ernest J . King, Com-nander In Chief, United States fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations.


JAGtAJ:rld

This metnorandvLTi consequently is being forriarded for your Infonaationand such instructions in the pi-emipes ac are deterEined upon.

L. E. BrattonActing Judge Advocate General of the Navy

•^ .\


NAVY DEPARTMENTIMMEDIATE RELEASE FEBRUARY 28, 19U2

NAVY DEPARTlffiNT COMMUNIQIJE NO. hi

The Navy Department issued the following connrainique:

The Secretary of the Navy announced today the acceptance,

effective Iferch 1, 19ii2, of the application for retirement of Rear

Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U.S. Navy, "without condonation of any offense

or prejudice to any future disciplinary action."

The Secretary of the Navy announced at the same time that, '.

based upon the findings of the report of the Roberts Connnission, he

had directed the preparation of charges for the trial by court-martial

of Rear Admiral Kimmel, alleging dereliction of duty. Ttie Secretary

of the Navy made it clear, however, that the trial upon these charges

would not be held until such time as the public interest and safety

would permit*

•«*


incnoN rI NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVI, M4B m* NAVY DEPARTMENT

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79716 ()—46—i»t. 1» 35

C3P i

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First Endor«M—nt.rwbruary 17, 19i;2

1

Fromt TbB Chlaf of Uie iikontuM of Narication.

Rear ActBiral RuabAnd S. KijibmiI , U. v>. Ite'vy,

Twairth iaral Dlatrict.

S-.

^

TlAi

Subject

»

Tha CooEsandant.

Tranafar to the llatirad Liat aftar tortjr (^)yaara* sanrlee.

1, Plor**rcl«cl,

^

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.^Vf~ir»-y 1 A^ 1 J^"-

Tromi T»i« ..•crAturjr of tte« roTr

a'ib>cti ""rwnfer ti t'.# - tVr*d . i|t «rt«r forty (4C)y»«ir«' ••rrle*.

•fey«: c»"J ''] ~ .- rft-niMt for r«tlrMi«ttt, d*(*A^;r ^ry •'P, 194.'',

1. ypi»i* r^cn^nt to be tr«r»f*rrea to t; r, retlr»&lltt "ftsr t^e eoiv>latl'>n or forty l<^) "•ir*' ••rrlc* InRceordtni^ li- •. .!. rrTl»lftyit of ;. .:. C»<1«, Ht>e .14,

Saetloa TH ir, V I'lrnctlcn of the i'^nxldant, w^^^roved, Touvlll be tr».riri"«rrcd t? tK« r.tlreri M't fif pJTi'jtr'* of th«r.ltf* >tAta* ' »r, .- s :.f x- -»• ''

, 1 ;,', ^

'. .11' • ^-'".•iVrti of <^-'iT- T^c<iftt t-iT- r»tlr«a«nt tawLti»»ut condonntloR of any affenas or ; rejurtlce t: futuradiP'-'.nH'iftT 'ctlon.

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

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been wade by A- ..r^^ctir,:.

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fis to KTir--est iori a. (n; wor«:s "sauseoueat, c;)urt ir.<!rli.^,l pro-

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DrPARTMrNT OF THF NAVY0» » i< » <<t rut I urjf AlJVOCATh <>(NtHAI

M» MOHANDU'V"


N . .1 . \ . s

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYOFFICE OF THE JUDGt ADVOCATt OENERAl

MEMORANDUM

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1. lour request to be transferred to the retired listafter the conpletion of forty (40) years' service in accordancendth the provisions of U. J. Code, Vitle 3^, i^ection 3^1 is,

by direction of the ^'resident, approved. You Trf.ll be trarisferred,

to tiie retired list of officers of the United Jtates I.'avj as ofLarch 1, 1942,

^ C . ,• , i» • *•

2. This &9i£icwet i» «ippp«wring your request for --^tire-

Bien.tQrLll be no bar to your requesting a general court aertial,or to the Navy Departitent 's ordering you for trial should it be

so deteiuined^

Acknowledgment of receipt is requested.

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-u;;- r ac!-. that : y,'.s, rai flydisclosure cf the unity <. f cory-.'x.d at râ; a. .. , : Iht- Caribttar., ^rc srreother places up the coast.

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DISIBICI SIAf HEAOQUABIEICi

TWI'lFTll \AVAL DISTRICTtliaOL, Huabaad I. komal officf buhuinc civk cfniER

Rear Admirid, 031 SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA(2206-00-111}

Juuarjr 28, 1942

ProBi R««r Adairal Hiuband E< flwl, U.S.H.

Toi Th* S«er«tAry of th« laiy

Subject > 1^ Request for Retlraaent

Referenoei (A) ^jr Itr. to the Secretary of the lATy of 26

January 1942 requaatlng retlreaent under theproriaiona of Article 1443 Rerlaad Statutea

1. Reference (A) waa aubmitted after I had beenofficially informed by the Navy Departnent that General Short hadrequeated retirement«

2. I waa officially Inforawd today by the lavy Depart-ment that ny notification of General Short's requeat waa not Intendedto Influence aiy deciaion to auboit a almllar request*

S> I deaira my request for retirement to atand, aubjectonly to determination by the Department aa to what oourae of actionwill beat ••ty* the interests of the country and the good of theserrloea

li^iu^J £. jCiMi^^j^-iM.

/

HDSBAID E. EIiaC]|L

1st endorsement

January 28, 1942

From: CoHmandant, Twelfth Haral District and Naval -OperatingBas«, San Francisco, California

To: The Secretary of the Navy

Subjects Uy Request for Retirement

1* Porwardad.

^ill I C.tfe^*

GR£E»SLADI•/3-

T\\ IIFTII \A\\L DISTRICTKIiajEL, Husband B.Rear Admiral, USK «> A \ K(.\N ( l>f ( • (AIIKkMA(2207-OC-Kn)

January 26, 1942

f^om: Roar Admiral Husband E. Kiinnel, U.S.H.Tor Th« Secr«tar>' of the Itavy

Subjeotj Request for J?etir»«ent under the ProYlsionsof Section 1443 Revised Statutes.

1. After forty-one years and eight months servloein the United States Havy, I hereby request that I be placedupon the retired list in accordance with the provisions ofSection 1443 Revised Statutes.

2. I hold myself in readiness to perform any dutyto which I may be assigned.

HUSBAND E. KIM'EX )

^-t^<J2^

1st Endorsemeat

January 27, 1942

From: Comnandant, Twelfth Haval District and Naval OperatingBase, San Praaciseo, California

Tot The Secretary of the Navy

;'iN '9 4?*lMl*°*'' Request for Retirement under the Provision* ofSection 1443 Revised Statutes

1 . Forwarded.

f. W. GREEKSLABE

-/•/-

79716 O—46—pt. 19- -36


EXHIBlt NO. 172

WASHINGTON

Hoon 4D757!Ehe Pentagon

20 Mardi 1946

vmsBAsum k)e mr. hichabdsoh:

In rasponee to yotir oral reqaeat, you vill find Indosad!

(1) a talile, basod on Information soppliad "by tiM AmyMr 7orce8. containing tba following data on Amerlcazv-produced "basAumfor the pariod 1 Vabraary - 30 HoTember 1941: (a) trief desoripiima,(b) range %ri.th and %flthout boob load, (c) total deliveries,(d) dellrerlea to foreign ooTmtriea (showing whether pursuant to |cash contract or lend-lease), (•) irmy shipments to Bawaii, and I(f) Army shipments to the Philippines. It will be noted that (c) and(d) represent deliveries in this country while (e) ai^ (f ) repreewxtarrirals at destination. Vavy shipments to the Hawaiian andPhilippine areas are not shown. i

(2) a table, based on information supplied by the Army |Ordnance Department and the Army Service Torees, containing thefollowiz^ data on Army anti-aircraft weapons for the period 1 Tebruary7 December ISttt (a), produotiou, (b) transfers to foreign countries,(c) shipments to Hawaii, and (d) shipoents to the Pbilippines. Hsvyproduction, transfers and shipments, if any, az« not shown*

RASMOir DDKCOKBBLt. Colonel, OSC

Xaole. - 2


Dftartment or the Navy,Office of the Secretary,

Washington, 12 April J9Ji6.

1083A(JFB)R#160MemorandumTo : Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In response to your request dated 21 March 1946, for a table containing thedata outlined by you in respect of American produced bombers for the period1 February to 30 November 1941, there has been prepared and is forwardedherewith a set of tables entitled

:

LONG RANGE PATROL BOMBER AND SCOUT BOMBER ACCEPTANCES SHOWING DELIVEBIE8

TO THE NAVY AND TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES 1 FEBBUARY-30 NOVEMBER 1941

The term "acceptances" as used in the tables includes all deliveries of military

aircraft of the types described that were produced by the specified manufacturerin question. It will be noted that the foreign deliveries were not lend-lease

transfers, and*that of the total acceptances of 835 long range and scout bombers,there were delivered to the Navy 582, and to the foreign countries 253 ; and ofthose to the Navy, 218 were sent to the Hawaiian area and to carriers operatingin the Pacific as explained in the footnotes to the attached tables.

John Ford Baecher,Commander, USNR.

Ends. (Tables)1 Negative10 Positives

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lOeZk DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYB#164 orriCE of the secretary

WASHINGTON

6 May 1946

MBMORAKDUM

Tot Mr, S«th V. Elcbardson

In response to your oral request, and also that ofSen&tor Ferguson (Heeord of Proceedings, Pa^e 12,997) referred to

in Item #19 of yo\ir memorandua of 29 March 1946, there has "been

prepared and is forwarded you herewith, since Nayy activity in

sending shore based anti-aircraft guns to the Pacific Ocean areasvas 8x;compl i shed through the Marine Corps, tables shoving thetroop and weapon status, with increases and decreases as the easemay be, of the U. S. Marine Corps defense battalions and postand statica personnel at Oahu, Palmyra, Johnston, Midway, Wake»

Samoa, Guam, Carite, Olongapo aud Shanghai, on 1 February 1941

and 7 December 1941, together with a concluding summary.

^John Tord BaecherCommander, T7SIIR

I


U. S. Marine Corps troops and weapons status

OAHU

(Defense Battalions)


GUAM

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY

3 9999 06314 038 6