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V.B Justification of the War ( II Vols.)In ternal Documents (9 Vols.)1. The Roosevelt Administration

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V.B. loJ USTIFICATION OF THE WAR- lliTERHAL CO::UTMEiiTS -

The Roosevelt Administration, 1940- 1945

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JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR - - INTERNAL COJolMITMENTSTHE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION, 1940 - 1945

Foreword

This portion of the study consists of a collection ofU. S. Government documents which set forth th e rationale ofU. S. policy toward Vietnam. The collection represents th einternal commitment of th e U. S, as expressed in classifieddocuments circulated at the highest levels in the gover nment . The documents are organized chronologically withineach Presidential a Q ~ i n i s t r a t i o n This volume covers theRoosevelt years , 1940-1945 .

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JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR - - INTERNAL CO!1MITMENTS

The Roosevelt Administration , 1940 - 1945Contents and

Chronological List of Documents

1 . U. S. views on Japan ' s demands concerning French Indochina aregiven to th e French Embassy . Memorandum by Mr . Dunn (Poll t icalAdviser) to Under Secretary Helles, 6 August 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2 . Welles instructs Ambassador Grew to convey to the Japanese thatthe U. S. was "seriously perturbed" over Japanese demands concerning Indochina . Welles 293 to Tokyo, 6 August 1940 . . . . . . . . . 3

3 . Mr . Cecil Gr ay , Assistant to the Secretary of State, reports onSecretary Hull ' s view of the Japanese occupation of Indochina .The occupation was seen as a threat to trade routes of II supremeimportance to th e United States . " Secretary Hull also remarksto Sumner vTel les that "th e J apanese are seeking to dominatemilitarilY'practically one- half the world . . . I and will continue"unless something happens to stop her . I Two metloranda by Mr .Cecil Gray, 24 and 25 July 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

4. President Roosevelt proposes to th e Japanese Ambassador toneutralize Indochina , creating in effect an Asian "Switzerland ."Memorandum by Sumner Welles of conversation between Rooseveltand th e Japanese Ambassador , 24 July 1941 . . . . . . . . . . 85 . U. S. publicly declares that the agreement between France andJ apan regarding Indochina was unjustified . State D e p a r t m e n ~ press release, 2 August 1941. . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . 116. u.s. proposes to Japan that the tvl0 countries endeavor to concl ude a m u l ~ i l a t e r a l non - aggression pact ~ o n g Britain, China,Japan, Netherlands, Russia, Thailand, and th e United Stateswhich would respect th e terr i torial integrity of Indochina.Cordell Hull to ~ b a s s a d o r Nomura (Japan), 26 NoveDber 1941 . . 137. President Roosevelt expresses to Emperor Hirohito that continu-ance of the Japanese troop movements into Indochina is "unthink able ." }.lessage from Roosevelt to Hirohito, 6 December 1941. . . . 14

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8 . u.s. assures France that she will be restored to ful l independence "in a l l th e greatness and vastness" which she possessedbefore the war in Europe and in her colonies overseas . Lettevf rom r1r. f.1urphy to General Giraud, 2 November 1942 . (OtherU.S. pol icy statements for 1942 are quoted 1n Document No . 11,page iv, fo110\


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g . The French offer a renewed expression of concern over theapparent intent to use Chinese troops in Indochina and alast minute warning of dire consequences to th e Alliedcause i f the Chinese ....' ~ r e used. Letter from M. Hoppenotto Berle, 13 December 1943 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. 22

1 0 . President Roosevelt conversation with Narshal Stalin on thepossibili ty of a trusteeship fo r Indochina which he had dis cussed with Chiang Kai - shek . Extract fram Tehran Conference,28 November 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

11 . Secretary Hull conveys British interest in U.S. policy onFrench Indochina to Roosevelt with summaries of stated U. S.and British positions . The U. S. had continuously promisedto restore to France i ts independence and sovereignty over i tsterr i torial possessions . The British, on the other hand ,avoided guarantees of "French Empire Tt integrity but alluded tothe "greatness of France" and the lack of British designs onFrench territory, 14 January 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

12. Roosevelt reiterates his opinion to the British that Indochinashould no t go back to France and that he was supported byStalin and Chiang Kai- shek in this view . Memorandum byRoosevelt to Secretary of State, 24 January 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3013 . Stettinius seeks approval from Roosevelt to assume that Frencharmed forces or French nationals would be used in the l ibera

t ion of Indochina without prejudicing the question of ultimatestatus . Memorandum by Stettinius to Roosevelt , 17 February1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3114. Views of President Roosevelt "'ith respect to setting up at rusteeship for Indochina and expressions of these views tothe British are' summarized . l-1emorandum by l>1r . Grew , 'Far EastAffairs, 10 July 1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3215 . Cordell Hull seeks a decision from Roosevelt on the Frenchr ole in the Far East military operations . The British hadrequested of Hull affirmative answers on th e attachment ofa French l1ission to f.iountbatten and the establishment of aCorps in India . l.{emorandum by Hull to Roosevelt , 26 August1944 ... .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3416 . Roosevelt defers decision on French role in the Far East unti lafter th e Second Quebec Conference, 11-16 September 1944.

t.lemorandum by Roosevelt to Hull, 28 August 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

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17 . Hull follo.,s -up with a new request to Roosevelt for decisionwith the information that the British were going ahead withbringing a French Mission into South East Asia Command (SEAC)and other activities to get them installed . Memorandum byHull to Roosevelt, 10 October 1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3518. Secretary Hull requests Roosevelt's decision on renderingsupport to resistahce groups , both French and native, inJndochina. Memorandum by Hull to Roosevelt , 13 October 1944 . . . 3619 . Roosevelt decides that the U. S. "should do nothing in regardto resistance groups or in any other way in relation to Indo-china." Memorandum by Roosevelt to Hull, 16 October 1944 . . . . . . 3720 . Anthony Eden ' s views on th e question of trusteeship for Indochina . Memorandum by H. F. Mathews, Office of European Af-

fa.irs, 2 November 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.721. Stettinius summarizes recent developments in relation toIndochina for President Roosevelt . Among the points coveredwas that th e O. S. S. representative in SEAC reported thatBritish, French , and Dutch strategy appeared to be to winback control' of Southeast Asia with US. r esources but "fore-closing th e Americans from any voice in policy matters ."Memorandum by Hull to Roosevelt, 2 November 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3822 . Roosevelt appears adamant in a four point reply to Secretaryof State; i t was to be made clear that the U. S. had made no

f inal decisions on, and expectej to be consulted by th eBritish, Dutch and French with regard to any future of Southeast Asia . Memorandum by Roosevelt to Stettinius , 3 November1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

23 . France expresses strong interest in participating in recoveryof Indochina . Caffrey 316 to Hull, 4 November 1944... . . . . . . . . . 4024. British aide-memoire covers proposals fo r th e use of Frenchforces in pre -operational activit ies in I ndochina . Halifaxl etter to Stettin i us , 23 November 1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.25 . Stettinius informs Roosevelt of British impatience over lackof U. S. r eply to aide-memoire; the British were concernedthat the U. S. had not determined an Indochina policy andcoul d hardly keep th e French out in light of their increas ing strength . t-1emorandum by Stettinius to Roosevelt ,27 December 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

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Stettinius notes Roosevelt ' s refusal to get "mixed up in anymilitary effort" in Indochina -- with the rejoinder thataction at this time was premature . Extract from Stettiniusdiary, 1 Ja'1uary 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Stett in ius informs Halifax that Roosevelt did not agree withsending French agep.ts to Indochina. Memorandum of Conversat i on, Stettinius -Halifax , 2 January 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Secretary of Har Stimson replies to state Department querywhether U.S. actions in Indochina were consistent with Roose vel t 's instructions . stimson le t ter to Stettinius, 2 January1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Harriman reviews Soviet attitudes ("hosti l i ty to colonialexploitation and domination of native peoples by foreignimperialism") and assesses intentions in Russian relations("not to consent cheerfully to any further establishment ofHe stern military and naval power in that area") regardingFrench colonialism and the future of Indochina . Harriman(Noscow) 118 to Stettinius , 13 January 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Patrick J . Hurley reports on Indochina situation ; GeneralWedemeyer has maintained a "non- ccmmit t a l policy vis - a.-visIndochina . 11 Hurley 177 to Stettinius, 6 February 1945 . . . . . . . . .Roosevelt discusses Indochina trusteeship with Stalin atYalta . Extract of Roosevelt-Stalin Yalta Conversations ,8 February 1945 . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Hurley forwards a "note" from the French Provisional Government concerning de Gaulle ' s position on Indochina . Hurleydespatch 111 to Stettinius , 31 January 1945 (State Department14 February 1945) ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Caffrey reports Generai de Gaulle's distress over the lackof U. S. support to French resistance in Indochina . ' '\'Thatare you driving at? . .We do no t want to become Communist . .I hope that you do no t push us into i t . 11 Caffr ey 1196 toStett inius, 13 March 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Stettinius seeks Roosevelt ' s approval o a proposed s tate ment to the effect that the U. S. "Will do al l i t can tosupport resist:ance groups . " Memorand'JlIl by Stettinius forRoosevelt , 16 March 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Roosevelt declines to issue the statement proposed byStettinius (on U. S. support of resistance groups) as '' ' ' inadvisable . '' MemorandU!ll by Leahy to Hull, 17 ~ 1 a r c h 1945. . . . .

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36 . Admiral Leahy authorizes the War Department to give GeneralWedemeyer approval to send whatever assistance Ilcan bespared without interfering with th e war effort ll to th e Frenchresis tance forces in Indochina . Hemorand1.Dl1 of Conversation ,Assistant S e c r ~ t a r y Dunn, 19 f.iarch 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ . 69

37 . u.s. assistance thrQugh 14th Air Force to French resistancein Indochina is approved provided such assistance does no tinterfere with planned operations . Paraphrase of Hedemeyerto Chennault message , 19 March 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7138 . Stettinius relates U.S . policy to th e French Ambassador onfurnishing assistance to resistance groups in Indochina .Stettinius to Bonnet, 4 April 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

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75 1G .9V8l'nIE VlDVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIOnS (DU llN) to THE .. .\ UNDER S E C H E ' I ' A H Y ~ O F - S 1 ' A T E (HELLE$)1\'lash1ngtcn, August 6, 1940,

STRICTLY CONFIDSNTIAI,Acting upon your instruct ions , I cal led on theFrench AI ,lbassador this morning and gave htm the oralr eply \'lhich you have for mulated to the Ambassador'saide-me'mo:tre of August 6th, on the subject of t he demands

made 15y--he-Japanese Government upon the FrenchGovernhwnt \lith regard to authorization to send t roopsacross Indochin::t, to use the loc al a ir f ie lds jn Indochina, to stat ion forces a t the a i r f ie lds for thepurpose of assuring the i r securi ty , and to send p l a n e s ~ munitions, and a l l necessary materlal through Indochinadest!.ned to the J apanese ArillY.I to l d the French Ambassador that Ire have beendoing and are doing e v e r y t h ~ _ n ~ possible Nithin t he fraruowork of our esteol lehed policies to keep the s i tua t ion1n the Far East stabi l ized; that \Ie h a v ~ been p!'ot;ressive-. ly taking various steps, the effec t of ...!hieh has beento exert economic pressure on Japan; that our Fleet1s nO\>I bas ed on 1 2 i ~ I and tha t the course \:hich we havebe en follo"ding J as indicated above , gives a clearindicat ion of our in tent ions and act ivi t ies fo r thefu t ure . I also ratsed "11th t he French Ambas$ador theqttest ion whether i t would be pract icable for the Frenchto delay discussions ",i th the Jap anese \'lith ' e ~ ; p e cto Indochina f or a period . I further'more to ld theAmbassador that the Bri t i sh A!i1'::>assador had been in fo rmed of this matte r by you in a most str5_ctlyconfid ent ia l manner and that i f the Bri t i sh bad anyobservations or COlTlments to make ,'w would t ransmitthem irrulled12 te ly to the French Ambas sador .c ount de Saint -Quenti n stated that he fe l t tha tth i s reply to the French request for as sistance andsupport 1n her nezot ia t ions ,': l th Japan "/Quld very

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STRICTLY CONf'rDENTIA[,probably not be considered by his Government as sufficientprospect for to enable them to \>1ithstond thepressing dem ands made by the Japcll1 ese Government for tr.eestablisr.ri1ent of certain r i ghts in Indochina in addit ionto the econori1tc demands accO ln9anyJ.ng the foriiler . Hesaid that he did not think it would be practicable forthe French Government to delay t h ~ neeot iat ions becauset he Japanese had themselves stated at the time ofmaking the demands that i f the French Government didnot acquiesce in the grant ins of these r ights , theJapanese Government had every intention of taking thenecessary action to acquire them. He \-lent on to sayt hat in his opinion the phrase "w i thin the frameworkof our established policies " , \'/hen associated \'lith theapparent r eluctance of the American Government toconsider the use of military force in the Far East atthis part icular t ime , to mean that the Uni ted Stateswould not use military or naval fo rce in support ofany position which might be taken to resis t theJ apanese attempted a g ; 2 ; r ~ s s i o n on I ndochina , Th e Ambassadorasked me to convey to you thus his construction of youroral r eply conveyed to him through me this morning andhis fe ar that the French Government \'!Quld, under theindicated pressure of the J apanese Government, befo rced to accede to th e demands set forth in h isatde-memo ll'e.

J AI1ES CLEHENT DUNN

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751G.94/14a : Telegram THE ACTl!I"G SE:CR2TARY OF S'EA'llE TO

Il{ JAP.1N (GilEI-I) 1LPa1'8phrasy

'r'flE Arm ASSADOR

\la.shll1gton J I,ugust 6.1 19401 p.m.293. Ne',J's ngencies have car:-.ied r e p ~ r t . s tha t !;apan hasmade 5 e c ~ e t d e n ~ a r . d s on France :,:,egarcling F : . ' 2 : ~ c h Indochina. As reported t h e s ~ delTIa!lds inc ludu l ' ig : l t onpar t of 1 f e l ,: by the n)veraTiient of t he Onlte.i s t a t es regarding the r : : : p t ~ d d .zvelopments .

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In n te!CphOM cOll'l""ersution this atterD-OOU with ::.hs-"!!'i r::;t Secretary, : thtJ Chinese E"lbassy on 11. lo ntine matter , ~ I l " . Tsul repe,ltec1 sub,.. i : " ! l I y the same question nsl:ed by ~ , I r . Liu. :'t1y reply \\'115 th(): . as gi \'eu to Mr. Lin. Afl('r some he;;it:ltion and speaking in

C::il1, :e: )f1'. Tsui l:uic1 th::tt the Emunssy W.IS n'lT much concel"llcd.....::- 11I.:-s(' reports. lI e said that the. Centr"l Go n:ornment felt\ ..:' ... Luug Yun (Chail"lllnn of l ' l l l l lHUI ProYillce) ... might be


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~ j R f . I G X p.f.T ,ATrO.xS, 19 1 1, VOI,U).fF. rvsettJerueat in the P ac ific. The United Stntes Go.cfmncnt, Mr. Hullsaid, could on ly b2 driven to the conclusion tl' ut OUf discuss ions lo ra. f riendly sdtlemcnt had been "iped out by the I ndochinn dc,elop_ment, Th e Seen:.tr.ry snid that if wc waited until h I) came home to tellA m ~ s s ! l d o l ' ),Iornu ra the foregoing, then it would come too late as aw:lrnillg to J ap:m, 'Ye Jnust let them SCQ the serio1l3nes5 of the stepthey l1t'1\'e td;:e:l and let them know that such cO!lstitutes an unfri clldl ract because it helps H itlel' to conquel' Bri tain. T he Secretary said tha"i f ....e did not tell the AmbassadOl' all this , he would not si t down withAcltniral NOlntl\'n. ,yhen he came b!!.ck to Washington. I t ,,"ouM be af:trce to do so ,

There followed quite a bit or discussion about counter meilStil'e3 onth e part of thc Un ited State3, with Well es explaining what theBritish propos.ed to do, what our Army and Navy boards fa.vol'cd,"hat the PresHicnt favored, ct cetera, and, as I understood It, theSecretlu'S lelL the decision 011 these qu estions to tho judgment ofthose on the ground. _Secreto ry Hull then cnme buck to the subject of :MI'. 'Yelles' forthcomillg talk with Admiral Nomura, and he said that Ml'. Well"smight begi n the cOlln'l's:l.tion by spea.king to Admiral Nomura COIl-cel'ning a readjustment of the United Stales position vi s-avis J a.pansome\\'hnt as follo',s : T here is a. profound belief evcl'Y\\'hcr,:::, il l,-jew of mnny reports fr om many sources, that the J apnne3c movcmel:tinto Indochina has two probnble purposes, or at least two possibilitiesthis Go\"erlilllent cannot ignore : (1) if this GO" erlilllent is to be s.lfc ,

it is bound to nsstune that this nct con st itutes definite notice of thelaunching of a policy of force and conquest on the part of the Ja p:\I\e5CGo\'Crnment j (2) this Go,emment, in the interest of its own s:tf(tyand in the light of nIl J apancse utterances and nets, must assumcth nt by its actions and prcparat ions J apan may bc taking oncmore vital and next to the final step in occupying all the South S ,;o;\area. Such n st:ltement to the ,Ambassador ,,;ould lay the ba sis forour own futurc acts and would lct the J apancse understand fully ourposi t ion .It was agreed between the Secretary and ~ I r . Welles that there ":;L5no use to pur3uc our discussions for a friendly sett.lement withJ npaues2 unle':;3 the J apanese policies arc to coincide \\'ith their pre"fessions . 'We could get any kind of an agreement f rom the 13ri .l:=]:and other go\'ernments looki ng to the safeguarding: of J npanesc l ' ~ i ' timnte il,tere3ts so that thero is no re.\l basis for J apanese c b i nof being thrcntened 01' in danger.

I t was agreed between the Secretary and Mr. Welles that st.we thing must bo said to the 'pr ess along the lines of the foregoing p:n,l '

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EFFORTS FOR ACREEMENT WI'L'H JJJ!lu.'f

graphs." would for the purpose of m:lld.r.g a. record ! 1 . b ~ u t the real sigmficftllce or the J apnncse movement nnd li kewIse to ncqufuntthe public with th e fnct that we Imew wh:l.t wus going on. ~ 1 1 ' . Wellesthen read to the Secreta ry n. draft of n. statement prepared by th eFar Eastern Di-xision. Th e Secretal'Y made specific comment nsfollows : make clear tha fact thnt the occupation of Indochina byJapan pOESib ly means one imthcr important. step to seizing controlof the South Sen. are:l, including trade routes of supreme importanceto the United States controlling snch products as I'tlbbr:r, tin and othercommodities. This was or vital concel"lt to the United State;;. The~ c r c t a r y said that. if we did not bring out this point om people willnot understand the significance of this movement into I ndochina.The Sec retary mentioned anothcr point to be stI"2::sed: there is notheory on ' I"hi ch Indochina. could be fl ooded with nt'med forces, ni t'craft, ct cctern , for the


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FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1941 , ,VOL,IDre IV - ,bass!ldor 'When I didn't see him here to go oyer the whole situution.Then we sent H nmilto!\ ngnin to see his two associates fo r the purposeof keeping (dh"e. the whole sitlmtion th::lt we had under discussion.Then fin ally, before they go t to n fncesn ...ing stage, after it was npparent that they \\C1'O prep!lring tlle Indochina moye, this 'W.\5 followedup by n fin al step of slimming up io1' the record the p)'os and consnnd llutklng :'. fiord nppeal to the Japs before it was too hte. Thatis tlle record we made. I think it ought 0. 11 to be kept in mind. I t isa fact tlmt , in justice to the Administration, thQ Goycrnment andtIle Stato Department, ns the Chine50-.Tnpan':!sa difiicli ltics d(l".elopcd," 0 not only oxprcs2ed opposition and condemnation nt appropriatet imes, but \YO grndllaJ1y took steps of ret aliation. I need no t mention all the steps. iYhen t question of oil became most seriouslyconsidered 10l' the first time, th ore was not a long period beh,eenthnt point and the point when J apan and tho Netherlands proceededwith their trade negotiations, which involved oil rllld rnis':!d the wholeoil question. No,,", in those circumstances, not ,vith the idea ofnpilea:;;illg J apan oUl'seh"es, bu t merely to deal pmclically with aninternational situation that had become acute, so far as oil was concerned, in connection with tl1050 negotiations, and which was clearlyto remain acute untit th oso negoti at ions were concluded, ,",0 restedour position before tho:::c negotiations had ended. The a p " - n c 5 ~ GOl'erumcnt through its Ambassador came to us with It proposn l for0. peaceful settlement cO"'cl'ing the en tiro Pacific :'Irea, including thequ estion of oil and everything else, and I In:.vo had, as you know,. SCTentecn confcrenees with him. 1'hel'e is a strong so-culled ~ n c ~ group in J apan back of him (the Ambl\ssadOl). Naturally, it wouldhaTe been utterly impractical for us to h:wc fonowed a purely appeasement policy whcn e,ery considct'.,tion would prevent us from putt in.;on embargoes rmd penalties and retaliation during tlleso l1cgot iation?My judgment is thnt the State Department and the Government shoul'lnot say too much on this J apnnesa question. The first thing \yc kno'.Vie will run into a storm. I t is so delicate and there are so manyangles to it. I am sure J apan is going' on unless something h a p p c n ~ to stop her. This is a world movement. The J apanese nre seekingto dominate militarily practically one-half the ,,0rId and apply th l'barbarous methods that they nre applying to China and that Hitleris applyi ng in Europe, and if ther han tfif'ir way, they will e:'\l',yout what they nre saying of their right to be supreme in tlw.t half oftho world, by wl1ich they menn military s u p r e m ! l . ~ y with method:; 0:nrbitrul'Y, selfish domination nnd the Hi tler method of piracy an.!nn ..ul control of the :ieas and commerce. At any rate, I just v.-ant yot!to keep that in mind. C[ECIL) W. G[n.d

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..H E : : ' ! O R \ H t ~ J j : . l 3Y TfiE AC1'IIU S S C R ~ T L ' R OF S ~ l . T LffiAS: rn:G'O!.Jl . i J'uly 24 ,

At th e request of t he JepUI!2Se A m b a s s ~ e o r the Presidentr ec.::ived the .o\J.;;oessador tal ' aa 0! f - th2-r'eCOld conf erence in Oval.Room a t th e i:hite I ~ o u s e E-t .:'ive o ' clock t:1:'5 afte!:no:::.n. At thePresident s r equest , Ae.::lir a l Ste.rk and I Here present

. . The President t:len "ent on to say teat t ~ l ! S neil It!O'[C by .Tapen

_ in 1 1 1 d o c ~ i n c : : e a ~ e d an e x c e e d : i . n ~ l : , - seric.us proi)lcu fo r t ile United.Sta tes . Ee saie. tha t , as I had a ~ ~ d to the " . . r r . ~ . ? _ s s a c l o r yester:!ay ,inscfar as assuring i tsc :Lf t r a t i t could o"utain ?ooclst.uffs and rm.,materials from Inc'..ochina , J ape.n, of ccurs e, haC. it :-eaci..ed an aGreement uith t he United Sta"::es a l ong t c . ~ tcr:.'s 0:: t:,e d i s c u : : . . ~ i o : 1 s ":>e tuecn Secretary Hull and t!1e Atic::.ssad.c.r , ,,ould h:lve beer.. affore.ed f ar

~ a t e r assurance s 0': o".Jteining such sl!.ppl ier; t1t:m any other n a t : ! . o n ~ Narc then thet , the P:-es:cient se id, ";he cost of military occu!,at10n1s t r e n e n d o ~ . l s end. tr:e cccuna tion i t se l f i s not cO!1duc t.i.ve to th e. .production b: , civil ians in occupied c O t : r ~ t r ! e s of fooe: ~ u p ? : i a:1d ra"'"materia l s of t he chan.c tc!' requ:i.red by J e,p:m . I!o.d J ap?,n underb,l\:en toobtain the suppli es sh e requ1:-ed. from In eoci:1na in a peace:'ul '\Fa!',she not only wou l d have obtained I v:rger q u a n ~ i t i e 6 of such supplies,but l-lould have .obtained thel.l :lith cO::Iplete security and ",itl:out thedra ining expense at a lnilitary occupation . Furthermore , from theoil i tary stand:point , the President s.!!id, s1ll'cly th e Japanese Government could not have in r ea l i ty th e slich t es t belie f that China, GreatBr i tain, the Netherlands t:le Un i t ed s t ates :--:.ad an!' te r r i tor ia ldes igns on I r.dochif'..e nor uere in the 6l ightest p;:ovidinz anyr eal tr-.reats of agG ression ac;air.s:' J apan . This Govern::1ent, n s e ~ u e n t 1 . y , could only eS5U!'.:e tl:a t the occupati.oll oZ Indochina ues being Lmdertakenby Je.pan f or th e of furth e:- offense and t hi s cl 'catcd e. sf tuation1-7hich necessarily t ll.lSt eive t:le U:1ited S t a ~ e s the z::ost s eriQus d.isqu1te .

The President said tb t he had been f o ~ l o " i n z in co!':,plete detail-the convel'sations vhich had been prosres3inG oc tVE:en e c r e ~ a r : , ' :au lland tn'O: Anbassador a!ld t:...a.t he ..:as confic.ent that the Ari'0assaGor woulda g ~ e e that the policies no t u n d e r ~ a ~ c n :n Indochin& by t te c n e sv e r ~ e : \ t vera t e l y o p p o ~ e C i . to the p r i n c i p ~ e s and t1-.e le t te r

of the p o ~ e d a : , e ! l ~ ilhich ,110.6.. been u n ' : ' ~ r d i s c ~ s s i o u . - - ~ - -.1.;.s printec!. i n ~ e : ' 1 P 1 P.e:e.t:.-:ns 0: ' gnited S t e ~ c r p ~1:2.31-.191;.1, yol. I I , pp . 527 -530 .

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Declassified per E.xecutivc Ordcr 13526. Section 3.3NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

711. 94/2177 Con 't . 1At t his pOint the hlbassador took out of his pocket ti:O sheet s ofnotes t:hich he hod pr"epared 2:1d asked the President s permission tor efer to thew. in order to mEI.ke a statement of his Government ' sposi t ion .In th is exposition thc i.xnoassp.do r covered exactly the Same groundvhich he had coverc.d in his conversat ion "lith me h .st night .The only pOints of diffE:rcnce tIere th?t at the outset of theconversation} the i.mbassador VG:r'J cle"rly and Emphatically steted

t hat the move by Japan into Indochina tolaS someth ing i c h hepersonal ly deplored and l i t h Hhich he personally " 1 ~ S not in agreemsot o ' .The President then s2.id th2t had a propo s('l to wake to theIJnbassador "'hich had occurred to him just before the ' J r b ~ s s a d o r had comein and \o!hich he h.d no t had time to ta lk ov;;;:r Hith me before makinghis proposal to the I ~ b a s s " dThe President said t h ~ t it might be too late for him to IT'2kc tPJsproposal but he fe l t that no mattGr ho',; la t e the hour might be , hes t i l l wished to s e ~ z e every possible opportunity of pr(;v(;nting the

c reation of a situ8.tion bnt\olc:en Japan 2nd the United St

He s tc-ted th?t t r i s 'Duld ir:1? ly th ct none of the w ~ r s concernedlolOuld undertake my :nilitary a:ct of aggr(;ssion aga:\nst Indochina andwould r cr.t3.in in co ntrol of the tErr i tory ~ n d would not, be confr ontedwith attempts to dislodge them on the par t of de Gaullist or FreeFrench agents or forces .

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711 .9L/2177 Con ' t .1\ If t h ~ s steps r e r t.?kcn J thG P l ' e s i d ( seid , .J


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PRESS RELEf,SE ISSUED BY THE DEPfaTH!'!,IT OF ST;TE ON AUGUST 2,19411The : .ctine S c c r c t ~ r y of Stl'lteJ Hr. Surrner "1el les , issu ed thef ollowing s t . tc...'1l;:nt on u g u s t 2 in reply to inquiries from thepress concerning the a f ~ T < : C : r . t c n t enterE.d in to betHeen the French 2ndJ2.pancse Gov(.mrr.:nts rcg"rding French I ndochina :

liThe FrEnch Qovcrnme:ont at Vichy h"'5 g1 ven r (:peatc.d.?ssnrt'.ncc s to th e C O V i , . l n n ~ n of the Unittd St?tes t r r t i twould not coopcr?te Hi th th e I.xis pOHers b c ~ r o n d theobligations i mposed on it by the a r ~ i s t i c e and that itt.>ould defend the terr i tory under i t s c6ntrol E'g2inst enyaggressi ve action on the part of thi. rd powers .UThis Government hM no .. received infor:n"tion of thet erms of the agrcerr.e.l1t bet'!veen the French ar.d Jq:lancse G o v ~ r n m e n t s covering the so-calle:d 'c oll'.l'fl.on defEnse! of Frtnch Indochtna.In effe:ct, this agreement vir tual ly turns over to J a p a ~ an

~ o r t . ~ n t . part of the French :E)npire ."Effort has beEn made to just i fy this agreement on theground th.?:t Jcp.1nese l assistance 1 i s needed because of somemenac,; to the t er r i to r ia l in tegr i ty of French I ndochina by othe l'pm';ers o The Qovernmant of Ule United Stat es i s unable toaccE:';?t this e x p l ~ n a t i : m _ As I s t c tcd on July 24, there i s no ques_t ion of al1y threat to French I n d o c h i n ~ , unless i t l i es in

the expansionist aims of the J apanese G o v e r n m 6 ' " ~ t ~ liThe turning over of bases for mill tal'Y op Gr.o:tions andof t e r r i t o r i ~ l rights under pretExt of c o ~ ~ o n defense' toa pOl-Ier ..Ihose t er r i to r ia l aspirations C!re ~ p p a r c n t hereprese.l1ts a 5i tuat ion Hhich has a direct bee ling upon thevi tal problem of /Jnerican security . Fo r reasons tl1ich arc

beyond the scope of any Y.no,,:n .;!greemcnt, Fre.nce hoES no .,decided to permit for(;ign troops to cntc.r m integral :n:r tof i ts E ~ i r e , to occupy bases therein , and to pre?are operat ion s ..... . thin French t e r r i ory ..:!lich may be di rect


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Dcclass ilit"d per ExecUlive Order 13526, Sec tion 3.3NNO Project Number: NNO 633 16. By: NWD Date: 20 11

The French Govcrnoent at Vichy has rcpeatedly dccl&reddetermination to l 'esist a l l encroachments upon the

sovereignty or i ts te:-ri to:-ies . nOllever, th e ~ e n andI talian forces availed the::tselves 0:" certain facil!.ties inSyria to carryon opel'ations clirected against t he British ,th e F!'euch GO 'leTn""!ent , a l tcoug:h this 113S a plain encroach ment en terl 'itory under French control , did not reSist .Bl.!t uhen t:1e 3 r i t i s ~ unae!"toolt defense operations in theterritory of Syrie , th e French Govermtcnt did r esis t .

"Under these c i r c l l n : n c e s thiEi o v e r n ~ : . e o t is impelledto question i,net:1cr t h ~ Fr ench Goverru:tent a t V i c l . ~ T in factpropose::; t o llk'1int ain i t s declc.red. policy to pre's'(:!'"Ve fort he ~ r e n c h peopl e t:le t err i tories both a t home and abroadwaicil have l one; been un4e r French sovereiGnt:r .

"This G o v e r ~ m e n t r,lindful of i t s tl 'aci.:!.tional friend ship for Frence , has d e e p l ~ r s ~ ' ! : ! p a t i 1 i z e d ',.;ith t he desire oft he French pCClple to maintain their t e r r i ~ o r i e s and top reserve t!:eiU i n ~ a c t . In i t s r e2ations ~ i t h the Fre!lch. o v e ; ' ~ l l m e n t a t Vichy end lolith the l cc al French authori t iesin French t er r i tor ies , the Un:'ted ste.tcs ',Till be g o v e ~ n eby the manifes t effectiveness ",ith "Thich 'thOSe authorit i esn d e ~ v o r to protect these terr i tor ies fro m do:o. i nation a!1dcontrol by those poucrs "lhieh are s eekin g to ex tend their

rule by for ce an d. conques t , or by th e threat t here9f . 11

12---


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711. 94/250},DOCUHBJT HiJ\IDFD BY THE 5ECRE'I'JRY OF 5T/T TO THE JLP;,NESEJ,}!B!.SSiJlQ;l (!:O ;.rvll.!,.) Oll tlOvr:1BER 26 , 1941J.

t I ~ c t l y C0nfidcntial ,Tentet iWJ end Hi thoutCommitmcnto "!f,SHIN'GTON, November 26, 19410OUtline of Pr oposed Basis For l ~ g r c c m B c t H e ~ n The United Sto?tesfind J apan

SECTION IIST!2S TO BE Ti,KFN BY THE GOVrnNlmlT OF THE UNITED STiTES HID BY THEGOVE.!lllHENT OF Ji.Pi.H.

The Govermr,c.rlt of the United St.!ltcs and the Government of Ja.panpropose to take steps as folloHs:1 . Th e Government of th e United Sto?tcs and the Government ofJ2p.m \-Till e n d e ~ v o r to c 0nc lude a multilatera l non-aggressi::m pactrunong the British EIr.?ire, China, J . ! l P ~ , the Nether1 a..'1cls , the SoVietUnion, Thailc>.nd ?r.d the United StEltcs.2. Both GovcrP.mc:nts will endc?vor to conclude among the ; .ere rican,Brit ish, Chinese, Japclnese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an

g r ~ c m c n t Hhcrettl1dcr each of the Governments w:?uld pledge i t se l ft o r espect ~ ~ e te r r i tor ia l in tegrity of French I ndochina and , in th eevent that there should d e v c l o ~ 1 a threat t o the t e r r i toria l integr i tyof Indochina , to entGr in to i mmGdiate o n ~ u a t i o n torith a vi et,.; t ot aking such measures as mCly be deemed necessary and advisC'.ble to meetthe thrcat in question. Such agreement Hou ld l'lrovidG- Al so th?t c.l!chof t he GovcrnmE:nts pa rty to th e agreement ',,;oll l d not seck or accC?tpreferential t r c ~ t : 1 e n i n i t s trade or economic r cl.:.ltions tdthIndochin? and H'.;u l d use i t s influence to obtain for ee;ch of thesignatories equcllity of t reatment i n tr


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740. 0011 Pacific ~ ' ! a r / 8 5 6 PRESIDE!n' ROOSEVELT TO E l P ~ ~ O a IfIRORITO OF JAPAill

jjiP.SHU:GTOp] December 6 , 1941

l>1ore than a yea!' ago Your Hajesty fs Government concluded anagrecnent vith the Vichy Government by 't.,hich five 01' six thou.sandJ apanese tro::>ps "i


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I t i s c lear that a cont:tnuance of s uch a s i tuation i s un th inkab l e .None of th e :pzop;'es ~ T h o m I have sp01:en of above can s i t t i 1 e

indefinitely or perrr.::mently on a keg of dyn


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Dccl:lss ilicd I>cr Executive Order 13526. Section 3,3NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 I

740.0011 European Hal' 1939/291f61Confident ia l F i le

to General n ~ n . ! ' i G ~ r c l l t d

,

November 2, 1942The General :

Re ferr ing to the declara t ion made on severa loccasions by President Rooseve l t ; .::md the obliga t ions a l r e . : l d ~ r unc1erta y. t}n by the ....merican Govern-ment as Nell as by t r.e Bri ~ , - s h Goverl1';ll'Emt} I amable to assure you th21; the r lSs ',:;ol"ation of Franceto ful l i ndependence, in a l l the greatness and"vastness ' ! h i c h it possessed before the Hal" inEurope as veI l as overseas , i s one of th e val" a i msof the Uni t ed Nations.

I t i s thoroughly understood t h a ~ Frenchsovereignty wil l be re - establ ished as soon as pos-s ib le throgghout a l l the t e r r i to ry , metropolitanand c010nia 1 1 ove r "'hich flet" the ? r e n f l ag in 1939 .I}.'h e Gov el'nment of the Un i ted States considers 'the French nation as an al ly and will t rea t i t as such.11ay I add further t hat 1n case of militaryoperat ions in French t err i to ry (whether in Hetl"opo litanFrance or in the COlonie s ) in a l l in s tances "ThereFrench col l abora t ion nay be found, the Americ anauthor i t ies \'[i11 not in t e r vene in any way in thoseaffai rs t,!hich are sole ly t' l i th in khe province of tl2national administration or "hich have to do \'1ith theexercise of French sovereignty .

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CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSED ENTRY OF CHINESETROOPS INTO INDOCHINA TO CO)IBAT JAPANESEFORCES IN THAT COLONY'HO.OOlll'::.clfic Wlu/3531'l 'M. lVasMngton Delegation of tlte French Committee oj Nat-ionalLiberation to tllC Dcpartment of State 2

l Translatlon]' VAsflL",-c'rox, October 20,1943,

h b ~ ~ o I ' . A x l ) u : : : , [ According to cert:lin information which hos come to the knowledge

of tho Committee of National Liberatioll, Allied plnns of operntionin the Far East y;ould, in tim nenr f u t u n ~ , include the start of opera4tions against the fTontiers of Indo-Chinn, operations entl'usted toChinese ttoops.

'I'he ' Yashington Delegation of the Committee hns already hadoccn sion to call the Department of Stntc's attention to the absoluteimportnnco to the Allied came of associating the competent Frenchauthorities with the detailing of Allied war plnns in the Far East,especinlly when their execution im'olves French I ndo-China. Thenforementioned authorities possess, in this field, documenta.tion anelexperience which Cl m be or tho greatest use to the Allied High Command. The role whieh France has traditionally played in the FarEast, the important in terests which s11e has there, the dispositionsalready taken by the .:\Jgiers Committee to p,.rticipnte when the timecomes in the struggle for the liberation of Indo-China, are all, as m:\nymore, reasons for an effecti,-e French participalioll in In te r-AlliedColmcils whcro the general strategy of the United Nations in the FarEtlst is determined.

As concerns the project of 1\ Chinese offensh-e tlgainst Indo-China,the Algiers Committe

"-


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PROPOSED CA:\ll'AlGN IN L,OOCED?'AA Chinese attack ngaillsl; Tonkin would h n n ~ the immed iate eITect

of causing the whole Indo-Chineso populat ion to rise against theAllies.For the A n n a r u i ~ s the. Chinese, who n n ~ so froquent ly in the pastinvaded and ravaged their frontier regions, represent the bcrcdit:nyenemy. Far from greeting th\!!l1 as liborators, the locnl populationwo uld impede their ndnmco by every means in their power. Moreoyer, the population and the French troops, WIlO would take the side

of th e Allies if it ""01"0 French, Amcricrm and British forces whichwere comillg to theil' hdp, might vcry well react against :m uttackby the Chinese, whoso true intentiolls could ensily ba confused byenemy p rop:lgnnd,,-, Tho position which Chincse attack nppnrentlywill cnuso cil-ilian and militnry French Indo-Chinese to take will inthe futuro be difficult to modify and the consequences of such n mistnker un the risk of weighing hC:lxily upon tho de,clopment of thecnmp:lign,

T he French Committee of national Libcl':ltion belieYes, therefore,that it is of the highest import,mce to set asidn a. project ,,-hich, fa rfrom sel'ving Allied interests, I 'UllS the risk of causing the g l ' ~ a t e s t hnrm. The CommiUcc, likewise, equnlly bclic"es that , ns concernsmili tnry opcmtions w h o ~ 3 thc:ltl'o would bl) ] 'ronch territory, it isimpcra ti,-c to usk tho Allies that no deci-;ion should be taken withoutour prc\'ious agreement.140.0011 W a r / p ~ 3 1 Memorandum, of 00lWeJ'sation, by the ...bristant Secl'c(clJ'Y of State(Be rle)

[WA SlllXOTOX,] October 21, 1943,M. Hoppenot cnme in to sec me at his request. He lmllclecl mo theattached memorandum,' which st.ates th at th e French National Com .miltee understands that Chinese operations will presently open against

the J apanese within the frontiers or Indcx:hin a. This ga\'e great concern to the Committee or National L iberation, I f Chinese troopsat tacked there, plainly them wou ld not. 00 nny support from theFrench, since the Chinese had nlways claimed interest there, flUel itWllS not unlikely that the French troops would defend ngainst (\Chinese aUack,

I asked whether this matter had already been brought to the nttention of the CLie is of Stall. M. H oppenot said it ho.d, through General Sup r a,

18

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FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1 D ' ~ 3 , CHIN"ABcthou:l.I"t. I thanked him for the iniormntioa and said that thematter prescnted was lll"imarily for mi litary consiclerntioIl.A[OOLF) A. B[U:LE)} Jr:.

Non:: But it is not only for militnry consideration. This br ings ussquarely lip to tha problem of whelhcl', in the Far Eastl wo arc reestablishing the w{'stern co!oni;t l empires 01 ' whether 've are lettingthe East liberate itself if it call do so. I fael that the matter shouldbo discussed on a high leyel with tho President for his decision. Ido not know that"\)e need to settle matters ,dth the French Commit.teo in Algic.s. I i the Chinese can do nnything against the Japanesein French I ndochina to the general I'.ch'antage. of tll!! war, I hayodifficulty in seeing WIlY we should stop them.A[Dorx] A. B[ F.f:U:], JR.14.0.0011 l':tcl!lc"\):tr/S:; :aMemorandum by the Ass-islant SeCI'eta;'!,' of State (Berle) to the

U'llder S e C l ' e t ~ M J of State (S tettini!ls )[W .aSll1XGfO.:o.',] October 22, H143.

Mr. Sn:tTIxJus : I n connedion wi th the application of the Fr.mchCommittee of nntionnl Liberation for membership all the P ncific 'WarCounci l, it is of interest that the l'l1presentnti\"e of the Committeeyestcrd:lY presented us with n reque.5t thnt we do not permit theChineso to take pnrt in oporntions aga inst tho Jnpnnese troops whichare presently occupying Indo-China. The Committee ohscn-ed t l if British nnd Americ!l.l\ troops accomplished tlle reconquest thiswould be quito ul l r ight; but the. French} nnd pnl'ticulnrly thQse inIndoChina, considered the Chinese :1.5 their hereditary enemies(crbfeinde) j if thcy took part in the liberation of I ndoChinn, prob.nbly they ould claim ne\"\' te1'1"itory.

ThoFrench would push this view in the Pacific Wttr Con neil, T hiswould probably be supported by the British and the Dutch_ Th iswould present liS, for all practical purposes, with the task of reconqu ering In doChina almost singlehanded (since the British interest5topS with Burma) for the sole purpose (,f returning I ndo-China toFrance. France is unlikely to be able to maint:tin herself in controlof, or protec t, th r. t pro\'ince for a good ,,,hile; so that 1'.'0 should have{.he added job of policing and protecting it ngainst the Chinese as well8S the J apaneso in the interest of the French Colonial Empire.I t strikes me thnt this fact should be called to the attention of thePl'esident and also of thE:'. Joint Chiefs of St aff." I think wo should On October :-Ofr. S [ ( ' U l D l u ~ fC[llI('ti to :-Ofr. r:f'I'Ie; " I :lgrcf! "'Ith yoU tbo t them:l.tter ot F rench l l ) r l . ~ e l l t : l t l o n the Pucific W:l r Ct'IJlJciI l\ lld al!\Q their

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PRQPQSI;I) C . \ ~ I l ' . \ l G N lS INJ)ocnrNAI1nswer tllG French COlllmittee tklt their l'cprcscntntion will recei\'cconsiderJ.tio;', but thr.t milit:lty factors must pr;dominate in th etlecision.

Franldy, I doubt. if we could defc-nd before the Congress 0. veryconsiderable cxpcalliturc of Americall liYes fol' the sale purpose ofkeeping Inclo-Chiult il l French, as n g ~ i H s L Chinese 01 ' Indo-Chinese,hands. , . . .

A(DOLF) A. B[J;RI,E] , In .NO.0011 "llelGc W:a/::531ilIe-l",orandmn by tlle Assistant Chief 0/ tlu; Division 01 Fa)' Eastem

Affairs (Vincent) to the Assistant Secreta1'Y 0/ State (B erle )3[WASUIXCTOX,] N"oYember 2,104:3.

"MR. BYRLE: ' Ye ha.e rcad with keen intCl'e3t your memorandum ofconver3ation with l.Ir. I-Ioppenot and his aidc-m611IOirc, an d concnr inthe opi nion expressed inyout nole.

T hero is at the bottom of pnge 1 of the aidc-m6moil'c the {ollowillgstatemen t which we feel shou ld not pass without comment: "Pourl'Anllamile, les Chinois, qui Ollt si In::quemmellt d:tlls le p:tsse envnhiet ravage leurs regions fronticrcs, l'.::pr&catent l'ennemi hCreditairc."This statement is grossly mislcading, if not actually false. In 1879th eAnnamitc5 sought militnl'Y :dd II'om China to clri.e ou t the French.I t wns China's we:llmess, noL Allnamito dislike or fear of Chinn, thatpermitted the French to reJIlain. l :ecul'l"cnt waves of Annam ite II:\.tionalism have looked to Chinese nntionali5m {or inspiration and guidance, particnlarly silice 1920. To day there is undcrstood to be insouthern China a group of Allnamites which advocates independcncefo r Indochina and seeks Chinese support. I t is our belief that theAnnamitcs, by and large) ha.e fo r the Chinese n feeling of friendlinesso.nd cultural affinity.

The Chinese Gon.'rnllle.nt's attitude rcglll"dlng the post-war statusof Indochill:l. has been cautious . Officials of the GO\'ernment hal'cdisclaimed territori!'.l ambitions bu t they 11a.o at times intimated thatChino. would clesire an al'l1lngcment which I1ssured :1.CCC;";; to the seafrom Yunnan Proyince through Tonkin to Haiphong. Independencefo r I ndocllina is included il l the Chinese GOYernmcn t's general ad vocacy of selfgo\elnment for eastern pwp1cs.rpquest that tl e Chluese be asked not to conduct m 1 1 l t n r ~ opcratlons withinIndo-China should be reCen-ed both to the Presid(!!lt ::md to the Jowt Chlersor 5tafl." Initialed by the Cliler of the Division of t.af Eastern .\lrair3 (B:1UanUne) .

20

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Th e pO.:.t-w llr status of li"rcuch I ndochi na is a l l lu t tCl' of sp ec ulation:return to Fl ';lnce j in ternational con trol; and eyen British cont rol. I tis our belief that t.he Annamitc3 are f undamentally capable of scM-gO'iermnent and th at it should be the objccti\-e of any post-wal' administmtion to tra i.n AUMmitcs to resume the l p o l l j b i l i t i of selfgovernment. This object ive might be achicycd by 0. continuation ofFrench administration for n definitely limited p ::::l'iod or by interna-tional administmtion . There would seem to be no r c-asonable b:lsis fOl'B ritish :'ldministl'ation. In ully cyen t) the Chi nese Go\'cl'lllUentsh ottldbe consu lted nnd its view s given full considel'ntion in r egard to plansf or the fu tu1'O of Indochina .

HO.OOl l l 'Kcln" W ' l I r / = : ~ 3 1 Mem orandum by th e Arting Secretary 0/ State to Pl'esidcnt Roosevelt'lVASlllNCTOX, Xo\'ember 8, HH3.

M. Henri H opp:mot, th e D elcg:lte of tho F rench Committee ofNntiona l Liool'nt ioil) has lef t with the State Dep:utment!l. communication, a copy of which in t l':1l1s1ation is attached hereto ,1 g iving' th ereasons "ohy, in the opinion of tho Committee, it would be a mistake toentl'U'it to Chinese b.oolls th e l:mnching of militul'Y operations ugnillstIn do-Chinrl.. Th e main r eason ad,anced is that th e Chinese are th eheredita ry enemies of the A.nnamites and that nn nttack by theChines2 would therefore be rcsiste d by the local population as well asby French troops_ I t is Olll ' belief th at thi s presentation of th e caseinvolves allegations not in o.ccord with the hets, nnd that the .\nnamite:;, by nnd large, h aye fo r the Chinese a feelin g of fr iendliness andculturnl affinity. .

Th e problem to whieh these representations rohtes seems primarilyto be a. military problem for t.he Joint Chiefs of Staff. " 'e under-stand that it has alrcady been brought to the attention of tho.t bodvby General Bethotl:u't, Chief of the Fl'ench lI,Iilitul'Y Mission.

EOWAP.n R. Sn.."TI'l""lUS, In.1 '0.0 011 Plldllc Wllr/3.:i6,.'1Iem.orandU?1t by PresMent-Ro()se'l:eZt to tlte A.ct;"g Secretary 0/ State

WASW XGTOX, November 9, 1943 .In regard' to the usc of Chineso troops ngainst Annnm, I agree with

the S t:tte Department thnt the French pl'osenta.tion of the ca.se is notsufficient ly yulid to' take !l.Ily uction.' d ille, p. 832.

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PROPOSED CA.'II'AlGX IN l X D O C H L . ~ A The whoJIJ O1:'ttler should ba left to the di.;.:cret.ion of the Joint Chiefs

of SLat! and to th::! Commanding Officers in the area. This i s ~ s s e n t i a l l y amilitnry problem. F[r-AXlu.m] D. R[OOSEYrJ,T]T


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FOR EIGN RELATIONS, 1943, CHlNAI am convinced that nothing could morc seriously hinder their coop-erc.tion Wjill the Allies than fOl' tho 1iberntion of L"c1ochina to appearto be entrusted, even proyisioll:'tlly, to Chine3s format.ions which, inth o prescnl; C!lSC, would appenr to them not only as the nd"ance guardof the l c r ~ d i t n l " y enemy of Annmn :mc1 Tonkin, but as tho directdesccndnills of the bnnds of piL'ales llnd Jolly Rogers who hnyo solong caus!.Id th o lhl"t'at of th ei t exnctions to weigh upon those regions.Just as American or Englisll troops would be welcomed as 1.l1ies nne1liberntors, so "\YQ nm the risk of seeing French and nnth'es reactstrongly against th e usc of thcsc ChinC3c clements. I do not belic.et.hat n more s ~ I ' i o u s political and psychological fault could be com-mitted and I take the liberty to beg you to call this point again to theVC l'Y scrious attention of the competent : t u t h o r i t i e s.Pleaiic nccept [etc.] HE NT:I H OI'.L'E:-;"O"l'

On Janu:Lry 5, 1!).J-l, ) {I". Berlc wrote )L HOPllt!not til:Lt lhe contents of bl3letter bad been tr:LnsmiUed to ul1prol11'lnte U l 1 t h o r l t i e ~ or tllC Governmeot.

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SECRE'TEHRAN CONFERENCE

Extract fro m l'13morandum of Conversationbe t Tt1een PreSident: Roosevelt and Narshal Stal in ,Novembor 28, 1943, 3 p.m . l11ARSHAL STALIN expatiated a t l ength on the Frenchruling clas ses ane! he said, in his opinion, theyshould not be entit led to share in any of the benefi tsof the peace, in vie\


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" .SECRET

THE ~ P . E S I D E N T saia he "ras 10C'J}.; in agreemen t\-11 th r ~ l a r s h a l StEilin and remarked t h ~ t after 100 yearao f Fr-ench r u l ~ in Indo -China } the l:r..habttants t'1ere>Iorse o ff than they had been before . He said tha tChiang Kai S h e ! ~ had told him China had no designson Indo - China but the people of Indo-Chtna \'rerc notyet ready for lndependence) to \,l!1ich he had r ep li.=d that when the United States acquired the Phl1tppines}the inhabitants v!ere not ready for Indep3ndence\'lhlch 'dould be granted \'11 thou t qua l i f ica t ion uponthe end of the "Iar against Japan . He added tha the had discussed "Iith Chiang j(ai Shek the possi -b i l i ty of a system of t rus t eeship for Indo-China\orhich \"Tould have the tael( of preparing the peoplefor inc1ependnnce "ri thin a defini te period of time,perhap s 20 to 30 years .vi el'1 .NARSHAL STALIN compJ.etely agreed \'lith th is

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mscu ssIO!\'S REGARDI:->G THE FUTURE STAT US OF Fr.:ENCH INDO.CHINA AND FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN 11'S LIBERA1'ION FR m,IJAPANESE OCCUPATIOXJl!emoranaUln by the Secretary oj Slate to PI'csident R oose1;elt :o

V ~ \ S U T X C T O N , J anuary 14, 104:4.Last week in a conversation:1 which I had with the British Ambassador he stated that, ac cording to information f rom his ForeignOffice, you h:t.d s p o l ~ e n rather defin itely during your recent trip of

your views concerning the future of French Indo-Chin:l.. Accordingto Lord H alifax' information you had expressed th e opinion thatIndo-China should be taken away hOlon the French and administeredby nn internationnl trusteeship.:: H e wondered whether tlus represented your fi nn1 conclusions Jtud attached importance to tim matterin view of the fact that reports of your alleged conversations wouldundoubtedly get back to the Frencl1. I informed the Ambassador thatI did not know whether YOll had come to nny fin nl conclusions on thesubject and added that, in my judgment, you and ~ { r . Churchill wouldfind it desirable to talk this matter over fully, deliberately , andhnps finally at some future stage.

COPY ot memorandum obtained trom the Frnnkl!n D. Roosel'el t Llbrnry, HydePark. N.Y . Fo r extract ot mewornndum ot this con,ersntion, dated Jn nu:lry 3, 1044,see Foreif)/t Relati ons , The Contilrellces at Cairo nnd Tehr.:!n, 1913. p. SG4.A memorandum ot Jul y 21, 1!J.t3, olltnlned trom the Franklin D. Roosel'eltLibrary at Hyde Pa rk, N.Y .. r l'Cords a sta tement by President o o ~ e , in theth lrtytblrd meeting ot tbe Pacific Wa r Council that Indochi na should be plncednnder a trusteeship until It was rendy tor Independence.

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-: FOnEIGN RELATIOXS, 19-1.4 , VOLUME II IAs of possible interest to you I am enclosing two brief memoranda

citing the more important public stntements or commitments by ourseh'es and the British wit.h regard to tho futuro of French territoryaf ter the 'Tar. C[ORDBLL] H[m.L]

[Enclosure 1]J A - U J \ R Y 7, 194.4.

UXlTD Sf.\u:$ P OSl1'lOX 1rrra R ESPECT TO F P . E ~ C r t TEnnITORY ...b-rEP.T I I E W

During: the past three years there ha"e been n. number of publicpronouncements, as 'Wcll as lUlpublished statements, by the Pr esident,the Secrct..'\ry of State, and other high ranking otftcials of this Govemmcnt regllrding the future of French territory aftor thc war, Tilemo st important of these pronouncements and statements are sct for t.hbelow.

1. In a str.temcnt issued on August 2, 1941, concerning the agreoment entcred into between the French :\I1c1 Ja panese Governmen ts regarding French I ndochi.na, the Secretary of State said: 23

"This Governmcnt, mindful of its traditional fricndship for France,has deeply sympathized \'t'i th the desi re of the French people to maintain their territories nnd to presel've them intact. I n Its relationswith the French Go't'ernmcnt at Vichy and w'ith the local French authorities in French territories, the United Stutes will be gO"crned bythe man ifest efi'ccti,eness with which those authorities endeavor toprotect these territories from domination and control by tho::c powerswhich arc seeking to extend their rule by force and conquest., Ot bythe threat thereof.') (Department of State Press Release No. 374)

2. In a. letter to Marsh"l PiStain in Deccmber) 1941,21 PresidentRoosevelt stated that so long as "French so\ereign control remains inreality purely F revch" the American Govenlment has no desire to seeexisting F rench sO\'ereignty O\'cr Ft'cnch NoTth Aft,jca or any of theFrench colonie3 ICpass to the control of any other nation".3. A State Department press release of March 2, 1942 u (No, 85)relative to the sitllation in N"ew Caledonia, included the follo,vingwords:

"The policy of the Government of the Uni ted States as regardsFrance nnd French territory has been based up on the maintenance of, For C{)mplete teJ:t or s t a t e m ~ n see Dep.1rtruo!ut or State Burtetill , .1ugust 2,19-11. p. 8T,"ltor tE:.;:t letter of Deceulb!:!r 27 , 19-11, se!:! F o r c i ! l ' ~ RelatiOIl.! , IlHl, 'fol. n,, p, 2M. Department of Stnte Bul letfll, :"!I:trcb T, 1942, p. 203.

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the i n t e ~ l " i t y of France and of the French empire and of the eventualrestoratIon of the complete independence of aU French territories."The above stn.telT'entwas qualified by the following words;"In its ro1ations with the local French authorities in French territories the United Stntes has been and "ill continue to be gm-erncd bythe manifest cffecth-ene3S "ith which those authorities ende!n-or toprotect their territories from domination and control by the commonenemy ." .4. In a note of April 13, 1942,:G o the French A m ~ : l . d o at 'Yashington, relati"e to the establishing of an American consular establishment at Brnzzaville, the Acting Secretary oi State said;"The Go,-crnmcnt of tho United States recognizcs the sO"creignjurisdiction of the people of France o.er the territory of France and

0\"01' French pos5cs;;ions mor5cas. The Govcrnment of the UnitedSt.ates fernmtly hopcs that it may see the reestablishment of the independence of Frnnce and of the integrit.y of French territory."5 .At his press conference on ~ r a y 21, H)42, in reply to an inquiryas to wh ether the United Statcs considered itself bound to the restoration of the whole French Empire after the ~ a r , the Secretary of

Statesaid that. Lhi.squcstion hadllot nri2en.6. In an unpublished Ictter of Xoycmbcr 2,10,12, to Geucml Giraud,the President's Pcrsonal Rcprcsentati \'e, illr. ;:\Iurphy, wrote:"It is thoroughly understood that F rench soycreigllty will be reestablished 35 soon as p05sible tlll1)ughout all the territory, metropolitan and colonial, over which flew theFrench flag in HI3!)."7. The landing of Americ:m forces in North Africa on XO"embcr S,194:2/r wns the occasion for a. number of aSSllrances to tho Frenchpeople regarding American moti"esr .... .]nong them were the

: f o l l o " i nIn his mess:"tge to Marshal P6tnin za the President said ;"I ri.eed not tell you that the ultimate and gre!lter aim is the liberation of France and its empire fr om the A:tis yoke."The President's messttgeZ'.l to .A.dmiml Esteva, Resident Geneml atTunis, concluded ~ i t h these words:"I know that I may cOllnt on your understanding of .Americanf riendship for France and American determinntion to liberate theFrench empire from the domination of its oppressors." Porei111 R e l a l i o ' I . ~ 1 ! H : ? , l"ol. n, p. 561-II Fo r correspondence concerning the landings oC NOl"ewbcr S, 194 2, see ibid.,PP. 4..."'1>-432. Dep."l.rtment oC State Blilletill , N O l " e m ~ r 14, 1\)-12, pp. 904, 00:;;. I bid., p. DOS.

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FOR EIGX RELATJOXS. Hl44, YOLm,fE II I

I n his broadcast to the French peopJe on November 8 the President said : ."'Ve assne you that onc\) the menace of Germany and Italy isremoved from you, we shall quit your tOl'l'itory at once."8. T he preamble of the unpublished Clark-Darlan Agreement ofNovember 22, 1912,31 contains the loUo\"jng 'Words:"It has been ngreed by all French clements conceI'lled and UnitedStates military nuthorities that F rench forces will aid and supportthe forces of th!) United States and their nIlies to expe1 from the soilof Africa the common enemy, to libl!ratc France and restorcintegrnUythe French Empire."

[Enclosure 21JASUARr 7, 1944 .

BRlTISl i P OSl1'10X " '11'H RESPECT TO Fl'.l::xCH TmRITOI:Y Arn:r:THEWAI: .

Prime lfinister Churchill hns more than once expressed the desireto see France, including Alsace-Lorraine, restored, and both Mr.Churchill and Mr. Eden S! h[we repeatedly denied any territorial ambitions on the part of Great Britain with respect to the FrenchEmpi re.1. On June 10, 1941, the Pr ime Minister assured the House ofCommons" that

'''We ha.'e no territorial designs in Syria or any\,hcre else in Frenchterritory'1 jand subscquctttly, on November 10, 1942, he said :

"For ourselvcs we ha"e no ,,-ish but to see France free ::md strolig,with her empire gathered rOlmd her and t\"ith AlsnceLormine restored. ' Ve CO'lct no French tl:!'lTitorv . ' Ya ha,'e no acquisith-e designs or ambitions in North Afric.1. 01' "any other part of the world."These commitments, 110'We"e1', nre not interpl'ated by the BdtishGovernment as including nny guat'antee of particular frontiers or oftho integl'ity of the French E mpire. The Bri tish F oreign Secretary, in n letter to the Amoricltn Ambassador on NO\'ember 16, 1942 ,3$stated:"You 'Will seo that we have taken cnra to M-oid guaranteeing theintegrit,f of the French Empire nnd hnve conccntrated upon ns.:;crt

in,g, our mtention to restore 'the independence nnd ~ l ' e a t n e s s of France'ana denying any desire to anne:! French territory' ... Depa:rtn.ent of State Bulletll l, XOl'emher 14, 11H2 , p. snl. Fo rei!/Il Relatfolll. 1'J42, 'O\. II, p. 43.1. A...ntbODf Eden, Britisb Seeret:l. ry or St:l.te to r F oreign Atrnlrs. Parliamclltcr!l Dcf,cte8. Bouse ot COOlmOIl9. 5t b series, l'ol. 312. col. 157.. For entire tu t of speeeb, see the London Timel. NO'fewber 11. 1&12, p. S. K ot printed

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' . . FRAl.'\"CEl\[l1eh earlier, in cOllllection with his 110te of *\'ugust 7, .10 10, to

General de G:1.ulle, Mr. Churchill, in an unpublished let tel ' of thesame date, h!l.d s!l.icl:leI think Ii. necess:1.l"Y to pu t Oil record that the e.s:pres.sion


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FOREIGX .RELATIOX5, 1944, Vor.tnIE II I

Memorandum by the Under SCCl'etal'Y 01 State (S tett inius ) toPresident Roosevelt

--[WASHlXG TON, ] February 17 , WH .

lJ'he Civil Afl'airs Div ision of the 'Vnl' Depar tment has indicatedits desire to proceed at once ,rith ci\'il nffairs plnnning for I ndo.Chin o. and before doing 50 has requested political guidance f rom theState Department.A number of important dec isions depend upon whether Frenchtroops nre to be used in the military operat ions to regain control ofIndoChina, nnd whether French nationals a.re to be used in ci"aac1ministratio!l and plnnning. T ~ ' e is nm ple evidence that theFrench hope to be consulted and to play n. part in dl'i\'ing: the , p n " nose f rom that area.Subject to your approval, the State Depnrtment will proceed onthe assumption that French armed forces will be employed to atleast some extent in the military operations, nnd that in the adll1inistrat ion of I ndoChina it will be desirable to employ French n n t i O l \ n l ~ who ha"e all intimate knowledge of the country and its problems. Wewould assume fu rther that the use of French forces or civilians wouldbe without prejudice to the question of the ultimate status of FI'CllchIndoChina and would be related solely to problems directly con-nected with and flowinl! from possible militn.ry operations.

EDWARD R. SU'ITIXlUS) JR .

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851G . Ol/7-1044

FE

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Er . Gr-ew

s C I i : ' T

July 10 , 1944

Subject: Vie;-:s of the l 're s ident '.'/ithliespec t to IndochinaOn i.iareh 27, 1 9 L ~ 3 f ' res ldent 1\oosevelt, Seeret :::. ry ofSt s.. te hu l l , th e rti.::;ht Sonoroble Anthony Lden 1 13ri t ishAc.loassodor Lord Halifax, I : ~ r S tre.n,::; of the Brl t ishForeisn Office, .i'I,mbas s ador ':)'lnant , Under Secre ta ry ' ,elles,and 1: r . Earry hopkins held a ..;enersl conference a t the",hite I ~ o u s e In the course of the discussion thei res ider . t su..:; ...ested th::lt t l 'usteeshlp be se t up fo r Indo

c hina . 1:1' . !..den indic :: ted tha t he WES favorably impressedwi t l: th is i ' ) r O ~ o s a lOn Janusl 'y 3, 1944 Secretary of State Hull and theBri t i sh m b a . s ~ 8 d o r L1rd l lal i fax held a conversat ion att he r , . e p . ; r t ~ n e n t in vhich the br i t i sh Ar.!ba ssedor r e r . 1 r l ~ e d t hs t infol'ffi:?ltion h ;.ld co;.).e to him fro r1 his F o r s i ~ n Office

t h ~ t i:1 a con vers a tion wi th the u r k s l.c:yptians l!nd pel' -hSLls o t h ~ l ' ~ C::uri r.,J t i s recent tri,!) to the Ne::r :"ast , the?resiclent spoke rather dof Ini te ly about what purportedt o be his vie w3 to the e f fec t tl:!'.t Indochina should be.tal-;sn a ' fro, :! the f'rench enG. put under an i n t r n e t i o n ~ l r u s t e e etc . 'ibe . ~ . m b . s s a c } o r s a Id th .:::. t of course heh ad heard the J . ~ r e s i d e n t :nake i'smarks l ike th i s durLngt h ~ p.:st year or mOl'e but t11:... t tho c;.uestion of whethert he Yl'esident ' s ut t5N .nces represent fi ' 1:1 conclusions

becomes

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S E C " E l'beCO:lles import::.nt in vie .... 01' the .fact the.t it viou:d soonget bacl< to the f.i"ench , etc . i: r . hu l l s cicl th::.t i.e knerlno more about the .mE ttel; thB.n the ! . . b : l s s d o l ' F..nd ho.donly he :.:. rd the i d e n t ma}


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Memorandum 011 the Secretar!/ 01 State to President R oosevelt,[WASlIL'\GTO!',] August 2G , 19!-!.

Th ere is attached herewith a copy of an aidememoirc co e f ~ w i ~ h the e p a r t m e n ~ of State this morning by Lord Halifax in .....hich thelatter raises certain questions with regard to the French role in m11i.tnry operations in t.he Fnr East, with particular refcloence to FrenchIndo -China.. The Ambassador stated that the qnestion is of considerable urge ncyowing to Mr. Eden's desire to gi\e an ans,yer on tw o definite pointsbefore the latter leaves London on Tuesday, August 29 . T he twospecific questions on which 7\lr. Eden desires to give an : l f f i n : n ~ \ t i y e answer are:

(1) T he Il.ttnc11ment to the South East .Asia Command H eadqunr ters of n French ~ I i l i t a r y ~ l i s s i o n under Genel'al Blaizot, ancl

Not prLDted. but tor substance, see Secretary HuU's memorandUIll orOc tober 10, p. 77!\o


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(2) The establishment in India of n. "Corps U ~ e r d'Intervention"which apparently h!l.s already been established ntAlgiers.Although these suggestions nrc ostensibly militalY in character,

they hr.we wide political implications and for this reason they arebeing referred to you for decision. I f more time is needed for decision we can so infol'm Lord Halif:u:. O[ORD=] H [ = ]S:IlG.014/S -!!S4'

Memorandum, by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State' VASmXGTOX, August 28, 194-!.

In regard to your memorandum of August 26th on the subject ofquestions raised by Lord Huliia): in reference to French Indo-China,I suggest tltis matter be defetTed until after my meetiug with thePrime Minister in Quebec.H

The same thing applic:; to the ..d..ide-.1/bnoire covering the FrenchCommittee's pl"Oposals.u It should be r.::membcred that in relationto (IV) participation in the planning of political wad:tre in the FarEast invoh'es one of the principal partncr.i i.e, China.F[RAxliLIx] D. TI[OOSE' 'ELT]8 ~ l G . O O / 8 - 2 G i 4

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to Pres-ident RooseveltS H L " " C : T O ~ ' October 10, 1044.

FRENCH PARTICU"A 'rIOX IX LIDEflAUOX OF IXDOCUlXAOn August 20, 194-1 I sent you a mefnorandum with II. copy of a

British aide-mbnoire dn.ted August 25 stating that the French hadrequested British uppro\'ul of ; (a) Sending a French :UIilitary "J1is.sion under General Bhizot tobe attached to SEACi3 he:t.dquariersj(b) ~ e n c l i n g to Inclia a light interven.tion force for later use inl.ndochUla jto) S e n c l i n ~ , Jatar on, n. French e::s:peditionary force to participatein the liberatIOn of Indochina ;(d) Participation by the French in planning the \,ar againstJapan ;(e) Participation by the F r ~ n c h in planning politicnl wc.rfare inthe Far East.

"'Documentation on the Secoud Quebec Conference, September 11-lG, 1914,is scheduloo to r publicn tlon In a s U : J s e q u ~ l : t volume ot FCJrci!}lt ReiiJtir>Jr.S ... Fo r substance ot French proposals, s e ~ 5ecn!tnry Hull's memorandum otOctober 10. infra.. Sooth East .\Sln CowmnacL

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FOREIG:-.'" RELATIOXSJ 1944, . VOLIDJE II IThe Br itish requested American concurrenca on tIta lhst two pointsby August 20, You informed me orally that you plannccl to discussthe French iJroposn.ls with the British Prime ~ [ u . i s t e r nt Quebec;o.ccorclingly no reply has been made to the British aide-mcm-oi)'e ,

The Consul at Cotombo has reported that on OctoUcl" 4: it WItS lcnrnedfrom al l unimpeachnblo sOllrce tho.t tho Brit ish plnll to bring a. FrenchMission uncleI' Geneml maizot to SEAC hcadquarters in the immediate futurej that full collaborat ion is to bo given the Fnmch ?I[issionwhich will participate officially in acth'itics of the SEAC; that asAmerican agreement has not been obtained, tho ~ . I i s s i o n will be ostensibly unofficial and will 00 housed nt fin:;t in a hotcl; that as soon as theconcurrence of the Allies is forthcoming it is planned to mo \e the-Mission into permanent qUllrters; and that French parachutists arecont inuing to be trained by the British in groups of foul' Ol' five forclandestine activities in I ndochina.As you will recail, the British proposcd in their aide-mcmoil'e thatall deta ils of Frenc h political war Care robting to I ndochina shouldbe a matter fol' arrangement betwecn SEAC and the French ':Uilitary].1iSSiOll, although, according to the latest information in the Depart_ment, IndochilUt is in the China theater and not in tho SEAC theater.Will you inform me whether the repol"Led sending of thi s s . 5 i o l 1 is in accordnnce with any understanding which may hM'e been reachcdwith MI". Chu rchil l on the French requests together with an indication of whethe t' you desi re the Dcpartment to take :Hly action1

C[ORDF.LL) lI[ul.!.). 8:l1GAS/lG-lOH

e m o r a n d l m ~ O!/ the Secretary of State to President Roose1Jelt,[W ASmXGTOX ,] October 13, 1041,

A letter has bcen ,.received fr om Ge neral Donovan, Directol' of theOffice of Strategic Services, asking the views of the State Dep:utmenton the following contemplated operat ions ;

"T he staff of the T e n t ~ r Commander for the CBI H theater hasunder consideration opem.tionnt plans invoh'ing the fUl'lIishing ofsupplies and equipment to resistance groups. I t is contemplated thattheso operations will be undel' Ame rican command although there wiBbe collaboration with tho French.1I

I n amplificat ion of tho foregoing, it was explained omUy that theproposed assistance would be to res istance groups within Illdochina;that the propos::!d collaboration wou td he with t h ~ French i l i t n r y Mission at Chungking ; th:tt sllch co1inoomtion would not pr event

.. China, BUrllI!!, I ndI a . ,

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assistance to aU resisb:mce groups whether French or nath-e, bu t thatwithout. such collaboration, it would not be possible effectively toassist resistance groups among the French military forces in In do- chinn, and that this would result in retarding resistanco efforts.Subject to your approval, the Department. will reply to GeneralDono...-an that it has no objection to fUl"lIishing supplies and equipment to resistance groups, both French and nati\"c, acttl:t1ly withinI ndochina, nol ' to American collaboration with tho French MilitaryMission at Chungking or other French officers or officials in furtherance of the contemplated operations or any other military operationsin Indochi na for the defeat of J apan.

C[ORDEU.] H[t1u,]a:HG.00 / Io-16-H

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the SccretarlJ of StateWASiliNGTOX, October 16 , 11).14.

In regard to this Indoch.ina matter, it is my judgment on this datethat we should do nothing in regard to resistance groups or in anyother way in relation to Indochina. You might bring it up to meIt little1nter when things nre a, little clca reI".

8 ~ l G . O l / 1 1 - : ! ~ IMemorandum by t!te

F[R':'\NKLtN] D. R [OOSE\'ELT]

Deputy Directo1' of the OfJlce of EuropeanAffairs (Matthcws} U['V . A S r u N G T O ~ ,] Noyember 2, 1044

. According to .:\.mbass.'ldor n a n t ' ~ 16 recollection, Indochina wasdeal t with only briefly at the "11ite House con.ersation on :'\Inrch 27,1943 and in other conHrsations with Mr. Eden.iT In the ~ r l 1 r c h 27conversation the question of trusteeship was discussed at some length,Mr. Eden ach-ocating the advantages of national rather than international administration. There w:ts eonsidemble inconclusi ...e discussion as to the degree to 'which governments other than the onehaving sOl'el'cignty or administrative responsibility for (l. particula rarea might properly intervene in mntters involving the administl'llt!Ollof the aI'C:l. or its relations with other areas. Mr. Eden emphasized

.. Addressed to tbe Deputy Director of the Office of Far :::3.stero. Atrulrs(Ballantine) and to tbe Chief of the Dl"!slon of Southwest P3. c\fl.c .lflalrs.(llotrat) ... American AIUbn.sslldor In the United Kingdom.4: For corresponden('c reg;lJ;ding the visit of :\[r. Eden to Washingt on, ll!lrcb 12-30,1 !).J3, see F o r e l ! J I . ~ Relationa, 1043, \'01. IU, pp.l 11'.

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FOREIGN RELATIO::-lS, 19-14, VOLUME II Itbe belief that the goal lor small colonial' areas should be economic,socinl, and political ndl'nncement and an autonomous status ratherthan independence, which would subject. them to both economic andmilitary danf,"Cl"s .The ArobaS3ador does not recall that the question of restoring Indochina in full so,-ereignly in France was discussed at the time bu texpressed the opinion that the French will be highly sensitiyo about ther estoration of al l parts of their colollinl empire to the ~ t a t ! l s quo anteand that tho British Govemment will firmly support the French position in view of its desire for the closest possible relations with France.H. FREEMAN ~ L \ " l ' r H E w s 'i400.00lt P .W./1l- 2",4

Memorandllm by the U'TIder Secretary 01 State (Stetth,;u.s ) toP res"dent Roose velt[ W ASUlNGTOX ,] N o v e m b ~ r 2, 104'1.

I NoocmxAIn order that you may be kept fully infol'lned on de"'elopmcnts in

n lation to Indochina, there has been prepared the memorandum nta c h e d hereto.

E D W ~ \ R D R. Sn:1.TINlOS, JR .(Anu(U": ]

[\VASHIXGTOX!] Xonlmber 2, ] 944,.RE CEN"r DEVl::Wr:m:xTS IX R ELATION TO I NDOCHINA,The following arc recent developments in rel:\tion to I ndochina.:

- C O l o m b o ~ ! has reported that:The British staff at headquarters of SEAC has protested to the"British Chiefs of Staff in London against the inclusion of Indochinathe theatre under the new United States Army Commanding Gen

-era.l in China! urging that I ndochintl. be included in the SE_\"C thcntre.The French Military 1lission, which is large! has arrived in Ceylonan d has received .American approval and is now recognized openly :tndofficially, .Apparently, General B1aizot has not ye t arrj'-ed. Baroll

d e Langlnde who parachuted into I ndochina some weeks 'ago with8. letter of introduction from de Gaulle is also in Ceylon_ He spent.t wenty-four hours with French Army officers in Indochiull, and stated,.upon his return that a basis for n French resistance movement exis ts

.. Seat ot tlle American Consul:lte In Cerlon.

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FR.-L'\CEthere, but reportccUy declined to say more wltil Blu.izot's arril'fLI.Blaizot, :l. Lieuten::.nt General, was formc.rly Chicf of Staff in Indochina.. H eisa "colonial" general..Altho.ugh SEAC was advised specifically that only military, andnot politic..'\l, quest ions might be discuS5Cd with the French s s i o npolitica1 quest ions are ill fact under discllssion.The British SOE which is acti,-ely eng'l.lged in undcrco.er operations in Indochina has rece ntly recei'"eel orders from the ForeignOffice that they should have nothing to do with any Annamile or othernati\"e organizations in Indochina, but are to devote their efIOlts tothe French.The OWl repre5entative at Kew Delhi has receh"ed indication thatthe British wish OWl acti"ities directed at the nnti"e populations illThailand and I udochina be eliminated so as not to stir 'up native l 'esistance to the Japanese and so incite the J apane.se to send more troopsinto those ar\!as. Colombo st:'Lte3 that it is apparent SOE desiresseverely to restrict OSS operations in the SEAC theatre and to giveSOE preeminence or) failing that , to establish combined SOE-OSSoperations.British propag'


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FOREIGX RELATJQXS, HIH, YQLIDIE II I740.0011 P.W./ l1-lHMemorandum by President Roosevelt to tlle Under Secretary oj State (Stetlinills )

""\VASHlliGTOX, November 3, 19!-!.I h:we YOUl'S of Noyembcl" second, enclosing memonllldwn ou reocen t developmcn"ts in relation to IndoChinn. I wish you would make

it clear lhat :1. ' Ve must 110t gh'e AmcricnIl nppro\nl. to nny French militarymission, os it appears we have dona in tho first sentence of the firstpnrngmph.2. Referring to the third pnragt'aph, it must be made cleal' to alI

our people in the Far Enst that they can make no decisions on politicalquestions wit.h the Ft'ench mission or anyone else.3. " fe have made no final decisions on the fu ture of IndoChina .Th is should be made clear.4. I n the final par;.lgl'tlph it is stated the British and Dutch haveanh'cd at an agreement in regard to the future of Soulhenst Asia.

and are about to bring the Fl'ench into the picturc. I t should be mndl)clear t.o aU our people that the Uni ted States expects to be consultedwith regard to any future of Southeast Asia. I have no objection toth is being made clear to the British, the Dutch or tho French.F[RANKLlN] D. R[oosE\"ELT]8:110.01/11--'11-1; Telc;rnm

The Arnoa8sador in France (OalJery) to the Secretary oj S t a ~ 8 PARIS, November 4, 19!-


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Genentl BlaizoL lms been instructed to l:eporL to Lord Louisl\IountbnUcn.s,Ad \'er ting to F rance's primary j n t e r ~ s L in Indochina, Chaul'elmnde the point. that the French GOYCrrullcnt is interested noL only in

n. Fr ench force in I n d ~ a but also would be interested in French lmitsto be incl uded in forces v,hich might strike from the P hilippines to ward Indochina if sllch pl ans were on foot.

CAFFRY

140.0011 P.W./11-:!H.4The British Ambassador (Halifa:c) to the U'TIdel' Secretary of State

(S tettinius)A S m X G T O ~ , November 23,1944.

11Y D EAR ED: I senel you h e l ' ~ w i t h an Aide-illemoire concerningproposals for the use of the F rcnch in pre-operat.ional llct.iyit.ies inIndo-China.

This is a matter ,yhich MOlmlbnttcn and all of us ho,yc .cry muchat hear t. Unti l we h:l.ye the nIl-clear from your side he C.-tlUlOt effectively carry out sabotage etc. activities which he is sa tisfied shouldcontribute '-cry considerably to his task.You will sec that. the maLtCi' is l\l'gent nnd 1 would be grateful ifyou could Ict usha ' -e a ,-ery early reply.V. sin[ccrely,] H.. .LTh A X[.!nne:s:l

Th e British E1nbassy to the Department 0/8tate- ~ I i : l ( o . . E

1. In August last H is Majesty's Go,-el'llment invited the concurfelice of the United States Go\ei.'nment in the following proposals:(1) The cstablislunent of a French militnry mission with the SouthEast. Asia Command. This " auld facilitate tho work of the SecretOperations E xecuth'e and of the Office of Strategic SCl'yices andwould sen 'c as the Ilucleus of the operational headquartel's ,.hich maybe required bter. The function of the mission would be primarilyto deal with matter.;; concerning French I ndo China and it would notparticipate in questions of general stmtegy. I t 'would, t.herefore,be much Oi l the same