performance improvement through collaboration improvement through collaboration robert c. morrison...

COG Official Use Only

Excellence through Collaboration

Performance Improvement Through Collaboration

Robert C. Morrison President and CEO

Workshop on Good Practices in Heavy Water Reactor Operation – Buenos Aires – November 2013

2

COG Mission and Vision

• To improve the performance of CANDU stations worldwide through member collaboration.

Mission

• CANDU Excellence Through Collaboration Vision

3

The Company

• Is a Federally Incorporated Not-for-Profit Corporation

•President is accountable to a Board of Directors

•Board is accountable to the Shareholders

COG:

• Voting Non Voting

• OPG, Canada NPCIL, India

• AECL, Canada KHNP, Korea

• Bruce Power, Canada TQNPC, China

• NB Power, Canada NASA, Argentina

• SNN, Romania PAEC, Pakistan

Members are:

• AMEC NSS; Kinectrics; B&W; CAMECO; CPUS; GE Hitachi; Candu Energy; Aecon

There are also Supplier Participants:

4

CANDU Reactors in the World

COG Members Operational

Units

Installed

CANDU

Capacity

(Mw(e))

Laid-up Units Units under Construction

or Refurbishment

8 4772

0 675 In Progress

1 680

10 6980 2

20* 4360* 1* 6 Const.*

4 2867

2 1411 2 Const.

2 1400

1 648

1 137

TOTAL 49 23930 4 8

*2 CANDUs – the other units are indigenous PHWRs

5

Supplier Participant Program

COG provides access to the Information Exchange Program to some key CANDU Suppliers

They use it to stay familiar with the issues in the Industry and to take Industry OPEX back into the design of the equipment they supply

Current Members of the COG Supplier Participant Program are:

Aecon Nuclear

AMEC Nuclear Safety Solutions

Babcock and Wilcox

Cameco

Candu Energy

CPUS (Canadian Power Utility

Services)

GE Hitachi

Kinectrics

6

The Business

Approximately a $75M annual business that is designed to bring value to the Industry by:

Leveraging investments by identifying common needs and initiating Joint Projects

Solving Industry problems by either linking Members to solution sources or facilitating solutions

Looking across the Industry to identify opportunities for collaboration and avoidance of duplicated effort

Managing CANDU operationally focused R&D investment – so that each Member gets leveraged investment and benefit

Providing OPEX – Events, Pattern Analysis, Alerts, Good Practices

Linking Members to a warehouse of Information

7

COG Organization

Information Exchange

Nuclear Safety & Environmental Affairs

Research & Development

– OPEX

– CANTEACH

– EPRI Interface

– Communications

– Workshops and Conferences

– Supplier Participants

– Knowledge Management

– Nuclear Safety

– Environmental Affairs

– Risk Informed Regulation

– Regulatory Issues Support and Information Exchange

– Fuel Channels

– Safety & Licensing

– Health, Safety & Environment

– Chemistry, Materials & Components

– Industry Standard Tool Set

Business Services

President & CEO Robert Morrison

– CANPAC

– CIQB

– Fuel Channel Life Management

– Joint Projects

Strategic Planning & Transition Office Services Information Technology

Joint Projects & Services

8

Fukushima

Fukushima

COG is continuing to support Canadian and international member collaboration

Severe Accident Joint Project well underway with OPG, Bruce Power, SNN, and NB Power

Pakistan, NA-SA, China and Korea will be taking part

Scope Includes:

Shutdown and Low Power Events, Multi-Unit Events

Containment Integrity, In-Vessel Retention, Inst & Equip Survivability

Habitability, Update of TBD and SAMG

9

CANDU FLEET PERFORMANCE

10

International CANDU Fleet Performance Trend Information

11

17 CANDU Reactors in Upper Quartile

12

Performance Trends for Indian Reactors

13

Trend on Reactor Trips

14

CANDU Performance 2012

15

INFORMATION EXCHANGE

16

“CANDU Excellence Through Collaboration” COG Operating Model

Member Value*

CANDU OWNERS GROUP INC.“To improve the performance of CANDU stations

worldwide through member collaboration”

Leadership Solutions

(Training, Knowledge Management &

Regulatory Affairs)

Lessons Learned Collaborative

Improvement

Joint Project Collaborative

Technical Solutions

Collaborative R&D Solutions

Services

(Information Exchange, CANPAC,

CIQB)

Member Operating

Experience

Non-Member Operating

Experience (incl. INPO/

WANO/NRC/EPRI/NEI/IAEA)

Stretch Objectives to

Operate CANDU Reactors

at Extended Life

Major Events

Requiring Consistent

Response

Station Problems

Requiring Technical or

R&D Solutions

Peer Group Issues &

Opportunities

Improved Station

Performance

Industry Teams

Regulatory Issues

Sharing Information and Collaborative Effort

*Member Value:

· Safety ↑· Cost ↓· Leveraged Investment

· Production ↑· Regulatory Certainty

· Equipment Reliability ↑· Human Performance ↑· Refurbishment Success ↑

Strong Member

Support

Industry-wide Proactive Initiatives

Supplier

Performance

Screening &

IdentificationPrioritize Alternatives

Optimal

Solutions

· Input from other Industry

Groups

· Knowledge & Experience

· Critical Capabilities

· Ownership for Improvement

· Best Practices

· Industry-Wide Perspective

· Industry “Catalyst” for

Collaborative Action

FOUNDATION OF VALUE DRIVEN PEOPLE

· Thought leadership

· Consultative Support

· Project Management

· Group Facilitation

· Training

· Centre of Excellence

· Leveraged Purchaser

Added Value Integrated Solutions

Value Added Solutions for

all COG Members

17

COG Information Exchange

By the Numbers

One stop shopping for relevant OPEX across the CANDU fleet and the nuclear industry

80...COG Facilitated peer groups, technical committees and task teams coordinate our approach to issues our members say matter most

50,000...entries in the fully searchable OPEX database, including select INPO and WANO reports

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Plant Managers and Support

Functions Forum

Operations Managers PG

Health & Safety PG

Outage Managers PG

Work Control Managers PG

Maintenance Managers PG

Fuel Handling PG

Radiation Protection Managers PG

Supply Chain Managers PG

Training Managers PG

Fire Protection PG

Chief Nuclear Engineers Forum

Engineering Managers PG

• Piping NDE PG

• Equipment Reliability PG

• Pressure Boundary PG

• Procurement Eng/Supply PG

• Environmental Qualification TT

• Plant Computer TT

• Electrical Safety TT

• ISI TT

• Design Basis TT

Nuclear Safety PG

• Safe Operating Envelope TT

• NOP/ROP TT

• Risk and Reliability TT

• BEAU Methodology TT

• SAMG Implementation TT

• CANDU Safety Issues TT

• Safety Analysis Improvement TT

Fukushima CANDU Industry Integration

Team (CIIT)

Reg. Affairs VPs Forum

Regulatory Affairs Managers PG

• Integrated Safety Review TT

• New License & LCH Approach TT

• Performance Indicators TT

• OP&P’s TT

• Hours of Work TT

Nuclear Environmental Affairs PG

• Environmental Management Systems TT

COG-IAEA Interaction Framework

Improvement Team

R&D/Technology Forum

Fuel Channels TC - R&D - Projects

• PT Crack Initiation WG

• Deformation WG

• Corrosion & Deuterium Ingress WG

Health, Safety & Environment TC

Chemistry, Materials & Components TC

• SG Non-Destructive Examination WG

• SG Material Integrity WG

• Concrete WG

• Steels WG

• Chemistry WG

Safety & Licensing TC

• Physics WG

• Containment & Severe Accident WG

• Thermalhydraulics WG

• Fuel Normal Operating Conditions WG

• Fuel and Fuel Channels WG

Industry Standard Toolset SC

• Physics Codes User Groups

• Containment and Severe Accident Codes User Groups

• Thermalhydraulics Codes User Groups

• Fuel and Fuel Channels Codes User Groups

Plant Refurbishment

Forum

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Information Exchange

Meetings & Workshops at COG

Meeting Title Meeting Date Meeting Facilitator and Contact Info

NSCR - Knowledge Management Meeting May 22-24, 2013 John Sowagi [email protected]

NPDS Meeting June 2-21,2013 John Sowagi [email protected]

COG Work Control Managers Peer Team Meeting June 4-6, 2013 Ken Keown [email protected]

Engineering Managers Peer Group Meeting June 11, 2013 Patrick Chan [email protected]

Ice Plug Workshop July 9-10, 2013 Aki Tanaka [email protected]

Radiation Protection Conference Aug 19-21, 2013 Kerry Clemen [email protected]

NPDS Meeting September 8-27, 2013 John Sowagi [email protected]

Pressure Boundary Peer Group Meeting September 10-11, 2013 Patrick Chan [email protected]

Engineering Managers Peer Group Meeting September 16, 2013 Patrick Chan [email protected]

Liquid Zone Workshop September 25-26, 2013 Ken Keown [email protected]

Equipment Reliability Peer Group / CBM Meeting October 2-3, 2013 Patrick Chan [email protected]

Training Manager Peer Group Meeting October 21-22, 2013 Kerry Clemen [email protected]

The Operating License Meeting - Knowledge

Management October 23-24, 2013 John Sowagi [email protected]

Fuel Handling Peer Group Meeting November 4-6, 2013 Kerry Clemen [email protected]

S-99 - Knowledge Management Meeting November 20-21, 2013 John Sowagi [email protected]

Nuclear Valve Conf/Workshop December 2-4, 2013 Kerry Clemen [email protected]

Regulatory Issue Mgmt Meeting December 4-5, 2013 John Sowagi [email protected]

Engineering Managers Peer Group Meeting December 9, 2013 Patrick Chan [email protected]

FAC Workshop December 12, 2013 Aki Tanaka [email protected]

The Operating License Meeting - Knowledge

Management October 24, 2014 John Sowagi [email protected]

20

The Information Exchange Process

21

Information Exchange Process

A weekly OPEX screening meeting is held at COG

Includes OPEX experts from CANDU Member organizations, selected technical resources and WANO participation (PWR and BWR info)

Participants agree on significance, further distribution and follow-up

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Information Exchange OPEX Weekly Screening Results

In 2012:

1,045 events were reviewed and analyzed from CANDU stations Nuclear Industry, and others

43% of these select events were deemed Actionable by the COG Member sites

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MAJOR EVENTS

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Major Events for CANDU/PHWR 2012 and 2013

Event Impacts and Causes Industry Significance

COG Member Follow-up as an

“Actionable Item”

Turbine Lube Oil Purification

System Fire

On January 1, 2013, while

Pickering Unit 1 was in an

outage, a turbine lube oil

purification system skid fire

occurred.

A station emergency was

declared for the fire, and the

turbine hall was evacuated.

Emergency response team

members responded to the

fire, which was declared

extinguished 20 minutes

after it was reported.

One of the three

heating elements in the

heater for the

purification system

remained energized

when its associated

switch was in the “off”

position

The fire caused

extensive damage to

the turbine lube oil

purification skid and

overhead cable trays,

as well as ancillary

damage to a nearby

hydrogen system panel

Damage to the

overhead cable trays

led to 45 additional

days of outage work for

replacement

INPO IER

Level 3 (1 is

highest)

COG Action

WANO

Noteworthy

Awaiting

feedback

INPO IER Level 3

events may be

reviewed at Peer

Review

25

Turbine Lube Oil Fire Photos

Lube Oil Purification Skid

Cable Tray Fire Damage

26





Loss of One Phase of Off-Site Power

Causes Loss of Maintenance Cooling

(Rev 1)

The maintenance cooling system

(MCS) pump at Bruce A Unit 1

tripped on electrical protection.

Operators attempted to restore

maintenance cooling using the

alternate MCS pump, but it failed

to start. After several attempts,

neither MCS pump could run for

more than several minutes before

tripping on electrical protection,

and a loss of maintenance cooling

was declared. At this point, the

time to reach 90 degrees Celsius

was more than seven hours.

The direct cause of the

loss of maintenance

cooling was an

ungrounded open

phase condition on a

230-kV drop line to the

in-service system

service transformer

The high-voltage

ground fault alarm

credited to monitor for

open phase or

imbalance conditions

on the in-service TSS

did not alarm and

indicate a fault.

There was an

insufficient review of

previous operating

experience

INPO IER

Level 3

COG Notable

WANO

Noteworthy

2 of 5 members

27




“Actionable Item” Rupture of Calandria Over Pressure

Relief Devices Due to a Moderator

Cover Gas Explosion IAEA IRS 8216

(OPEX #49946

Tarapur Unit 4 – On June 9, 2011, just

after completion of maintenance work

involving replacement of Self Powered

Neutron Detectors in Vertical Flux Control

Unit, an explosion took place in the cover

gas space leading to simultaneous

rupture of all the OPRDs. The reactor was

in Guaranteed Shutdown State at that

time. A combination of factors like an

increase in conductivity of the moderator,

a stoppage of the re-combiner units and

non-sampling of cover gas, led to build up

of deuterium in the cover gas space.

Maintenance activities on Vertical Flux

Units allowed air ingress into the cover

gas and provided oxygen for an

explosion. Following the incident,

inspections and functional tests were

carried out to ensure healthiness of Safety

System Components (SCC) especially

critical components located inside the

calandria. No abnormality was found in

any of the SSCs

Addition of gadolinium

nitrate to moderator

increases the moderator

conductivity and

enhances the rate of

radiolytic decomposition

of moderator even during

reactor shutdown due to

the presence of a

radiation field.

This can lead to an

increase in deuterium

concentration in the

cover gas space

COG Notable 2 of 5 members

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“Actionable Item” Report on Feeder Pipe Crack of

Channel S-11

2011-10-05 (OPEX #49461)

KANUPP - During a planned outage, Channel S-11 was isolated with freeze plugs to investigate why it had been indicating a higher temperature than surrounding channels. The Grayloc seal flange was opened and a bolt was found in the orifice. The system was then normalized with core cooling through the standby cooling system. After three hours the B/R MPCa high alarm for a D2O leak near south reactor face floor was received. A D2O stream was coming out from S-11 feeder pipe near the point at which ice plug was formed. After the leak was controlled, about 1200 Kg D2O was collected in drums

The crack in the

feeder pipe

developed due to

expansion of trapped

water in between the

two ice plugs made

side by side, due to

lack of knowledge

and thus wrong

judgment of the

personnel executing

the job

COG Notable Actioned by COG

(event was prior to

collation of member

responses)

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Major Non-CANDU/PHWR Events 2012 and 2013



“Actionable Item” Lessons Learned from Long-Term

Flood

WANO MER ATL 12-157 (OPEX

#50251)

Fort Calhoun (FCS) – Personnel learned many lessons as they prepared for and dealt with flood mitigation, due to snow melt and historic amounts of rain which increased runoff in the Missouri River basin. This necessitated water releases from dams upstream of the FCS that were more than double previous releases. On June 6, 2011, while the station was in a refuelling outage, the Missouri River level at FCS approached 1,004 feet, at which point FCS declared a Notification of an Unusual Event (NOUE). Maximum water level at FCS peaked at 1,006 feet 10 inches on June 25. FCS exited the NOUE on August 29. FCS is designed for a flood level of 1,014 feet. The river level is typically below 1,000 feet.

Ensure that an adequate

site elevation survey is

available

Review flood response

plans to ensure sufficient

off-site power is

maintained

Ensure plans take into

account safety-related

electrical and plant

service systems

COG Notable

WANO

Noteworthy

1 of 5 members

30





Reactor Scram and Loss of Offsite

Power at Wolf Creek WANO EAR ATL 12-001 Wolf Creek experienced a catastrophic failure of a turbine generator output breaker that locked out the 345-kV switchyard East Bus and main generator, resulting in a scram and generator trip. Transfer from the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) to the Start-up Transformer (SUT) occurred as designed. The SUT protective relaying unexpectedly tripped on phase differential, resulting in the loss of the switchyard West Bus and a loss of off-site power (LOOP). Both Emergency Diesel Generators started and loaded, supplying power to both Emergency Buses. A natural circulation cool down was initiated because the Reactor Coolant Pumps were unavailable. Off-site power was subsequently restored to the non-vital buses using back feed through the UAT 98 hours later. Initial troubleshooting did not identify the cause of the 13 January SUT trip, and the Start-up Transformer tripped again on 13 February 2012 during an attempt to start a Reactor Coolant Pump. The response to the failure was complicated by a water hammer, degraded equipment and difficulties in restoring fire water

• An unusual event was declared as a result of a LOOP for more than 15 minutes

• The cause of the generator output breaker failure could not be definitively determined based on the extent of damage

• The output breaker was less than three years old. The suspected cause was particulate foreign material from the manufacturing process

COG Notable

WANO Noteworthy

3 of 5 members

31


Event Impacts and Causes

Industry Significance


“Actionable Item” Station Blackout and Loss of

Shutdown Cooling Event Resulting

from Inadequate Risk Assessment,

WANO SER 2012-3 (OPEX #50234)

Kori-1 was in a refuelling outage with reactor coolant system temperature at 36.9 deg C. During testing of generator protection relays, the main transformer circuit breaker tripped open, leading to a loss of offsite power. The emergency diesel generator failed to start as designed, due to the failure of the start-up air supply solenoid valves. As a result, power was lost to the operating residual heat removal pump. Power was restored within 12 minutes. The licensee did not report the station blackout event and subsequent loss of shutdown cooling to the regulatory body in a timely manner, reporting one month after the event occurred. Outage work activities required to be performed in a particular sequence during an outage should have a clearly identifiable link or easily identified relationship between the activities.

• Failure to declare an emergency alert or inform the regulator in a timely manner.

• Inadequate rigour in risk assessment and outage schedule management was identified.

COG Notable

WANO SER and

Noteworthy

4 of 5 members

32





Performance Issues with Seismic

Instrumentation and Associated

Systems for Operating Reactors, NRC

IN 2012-25 (OPEX #51125) NRC –

Performance Issues with Seismic Instrumentation and Associated Systems for Operating Reactors – Recent occurrences where seismic instrumentation and associated monitoring and alarm systems did not provide reliable indications or alarms, preventing plant operators from promptly determining if the ground motion levels exceeded the Operating Basis Earthquake levels. Plant operators rely upon the proper calibration and functioning of seismic instrumentation and the associated seismic alarm system to enable them to make timely decisions about whether a plant may continue to operate and whether it fully conforms with the licensing basis during and following an earthquake. In addition, the examples in this IN illustrate the importance of licensees understanding the design, operation and performance of their seismic instrumentation

• By evaluating the performance of seismic instrumentation and associated alarm systems and considering the appropriate actions, licensees can assure more accurate earthquake ground motion recording and better information for plant operators during any seismic activity at their plant sites.

COG Notable 1 of 5 members

33


Event Impacts and Causes

Industry Significance



Increase in Loss of Decay Heat

Removal (DHR) Events,

WANO WER ATL 12-0586 (OPEX

#50744) This report addresses increased losses of Decay Heat Removal (DHR) in reactor vessel shutdown cooling (SDC) and spent fuel pool cooling (SFPC) during outages. Eleven losses occurred in the first half of 2012 compared to 10 in the previous year. In addition, 8 losses of SDC occurred in 2011, increasing from 5 in 2010. The major causes of these events are human error and design vulnerabilities. Industry representatives from stations experiencing a loss of DHR in the last 12 months met to determine if there are gaps in industry guidance that, if corrected, could reverse the adverse trend in loss of DHR events

• The number of losses of SDC and SFPC increased during the past year.

• This report describes industry insights and recommended actions from that review, as well as additional insights from detailed analyses of the events.

COG Notable

34

Notable OPEX Q3 2013

Post-Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident Lessons Learned (R1). WANO SOER 2013-2. Implementation of recommendations is expected and will form part of the 2014 WANO evaluations

Discovery of Non-Compliant Environmental Qualification Connectors 2 Units SD. Event will be discussed later in the presentation.

High Pressure ECCS Unavailability due to Gas Isolation Valves Failure to Open. Test results exceptions need to be thoroughly investigated

Boiler Safety Relief Valves Fail To Operate During Test. The PM did not include the pressure switches which drifted and failed to protect the design basis

35

Notable OPEX Q3 2013

Offsite Notification due to Electrical Fault in Switchyard Resulting in Personnel Injuries. Personnel were inadequate trained and failed to wear the proper PPE for the task.

Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture WANO report. The reports identifies the traits and behaviours required for a positive Safety Culture.

Guidelines for the Excellence in Fire Protection Program Implementation, WANO report. Guide is to be used to assess the health of the program, improve ownership and accountability and ensure readiness of personnel and equipment to respond to fires

36

EXAMPLE OF COST SAVINGS

37

Information Sharing Means

Cost Savings

Pt. Lepreau GS OE

On Oct.10, 2011 at Qinshan Unit 1 during a normal fuelling sequence when the closure plug was being reinstalled into channel it was observed that the jaws of the closure plug could not be released and the reactor was forced into an unplanned outage (6 days)

It was confirmed that the internal mechanical transmission system of the latch ram failed and that 6 shoulder screws of the ram worm were broken off

38

Sketch Picture of Bolts Connection


Cost Savings

39

Broken Bolts Remained in Internal Gear (marked in red)


Cost Savings

40

Point Lepreau Fuel Handling completed an applicability review of this OE:

notifications and subsequent work orders were raised

the six bolts were changed out in each of the four rams


Cost Savings

41

Point Lepreau as Found Condition


Cost Savings

42

Information Sharing Means Cost Savings

Lepreau likely avoided a possible issue which could have delayed start up or possibly caused an unplanned outage when fuelling resumed

Cost of an outage to complete this repair app. $ 4 - 6 million.

Actual cost of repair $6000

43

PREVENTING REPEAT EVENTS

IMPACT OF SHARING IN PEER GROUPS

44

Information Sharing Means Preventing Repeat Events

COG monitors what follow-up actions are taken

encourages all Members to take action on the most important events

Follow-up is reviewed and shared

promotes best and most effective actions

A quarterly ‘Top-Ten’ OPEX for Executives

to help them check that the important issues are being adequately addressed in their organizations

Key events reviewed at Peer Team meetings

and lessons learned and root cause reviews are routinely shared.

45

Impacts of Sharing in the Peer Forums Example 1: Human Performance

The Human Performance PEER Group

Focused on Human performance precursors

Developed a list of HP precursors which if monitored can be used to prevent HP events

HP precursors were developed from indicators sites are already monitoring

Prepared a Guide to identify the precursors and included an implementation recommendation

Results

Guide used to reduce HP events . Issued 2013.

46

Impacts of Sharing in the PEER Groups Example 2: EQ Maintenance

47

Impact of Sharing in the PEER Forums Example 2: EQ Maintenance

Field surveillance by the System Engineer revealed EQ was not being maintained

In the photo the 2 red dots need to line up – they were offset

Extended condition review discovered other non-conformance issues

Resulted in a 2 Unit Shutdown

48

Impacts of Sharing in the Peer Forums Example 2: EQ Maintenance

Effective Workshops and PEER teams generate networks/contacts that share info and provide support

The as found EQ issue site was quickly communicated to PEERs

Other Stations did immediate surveillances to determine if they had the problem

The contacts were working on the issue before any official OPEX was issued

Feedback was received that several hundred items had been checked and no issues were discovered at the other sites

49

Impact of Sharing in the PEER Groups Example 2: EQ Maintenance

EQ PEER Group is preparing a EQ field book -95% complete

Booklet used to train new EQ Engineers and provide a guide during field surveillance

Booklet will be of value to Maintenance planning and Execution as it has descriptions and photos on what good looks like

50

Example 3 – Post Fukushima Peer Group Discussion – 7 Members

3. Modifications

Member 1 Member 2 Member 3 Member 4 Member 5 Member 6 Member

7 3.1. Are you installing an external water line to the calandria?

No Yes No No. Not currently planned.

Not currently planned.

Yes

3.1.1. Vault? Yes Yes Yes. Yes Under consideration.

Under consideration.

Yes

3.1.2. Ends shields?

Yes Yes No. No Would be part of 3.1.1 Vault.

Would be part of 3.1.1 Vault.

Yes

3.1.3. Steam generators?

Yes Yes Already present through ECCS.

Yes Yes. Yes. Yes

3.1.4. PHT system?

Yes No Already present through ECCS.

Yes Yes. Yes. Yes

3.1.5. Spent Fuel Bay?

No.but a emergency plan to make up water to SFB has been issued.

Yes Yes. Yes Yes. Yes. Yes

3.1.6. Scheduled in-service dates for each?

31-Dec-11 I/S Plant Operation after refurbishment

Expected in-service date is December 2013.

31 December 2014 for 3.1.1 & 3.1.2 above. 31 December 2012 for 3.1.3, 3.1.4 & 3.1.5 above.

31 December 2015 for 3.1.1 & 3.1.2 above. 31 December 2012 for 3.1.3, 3.1.4 & 3.1.5 above.

2013

51

Example 3 – Post Fukushima Peer Group Discussion – 6 Canadian Stations

3. Modifications 3.1. Are you

installing an external

water line to the

calandria?

Yes Yes Yes – Moderator Yes – Moderator Yes –

Moderator

Complete

3.1.1. Vault? Makeup line to

shield tanks under

consideration.

Makeup line to shield

tanks under

consideration.

No Yes Yes Complete

3.1.2. Endshields? Would be part of

3.1.1 Vault.

Would be part of 3.1.1

Vault.

No Yes Yes Complete

3.1.3. Steam

generators?

Yes. Yes.. Yes Yes Yes Yes

3.1.4. PHT

system?

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

3.1.5. Spent Fuel

Bay?

Yes. In Service. Yes. In Service. Capability exists,

will add specific

provision

Yes Yes High

volumetric

flow rate fire

water supply

system already

installed

Member 1 Member 2 Member 3 Member 4 Member 5 Member 6

52

CANDU HISTORY LESSONS

53

CANDU History Lessons

1

NRX Reactor

Accident (1952)

Ref#1 Jimmy Carter

Ref#2 AECL 7760 Clean Up

Ref#3 IAEA TECDOC 1335

Ref#4 INPO 06-002

Ref#5 INPO 06-002

Ref#6 Lewis Report

Ref#7 CNSC R8

Ref#8 INPO SOER 91-1

2

Darlington Loss

of Primary Heat

Sink (1993)

Ref#1 Root Cause Investigation

Ref#2 NRC IN 90 25 Vogtle


Ref#4 SOER 88-3Rev1

Ref#5 NEA 2006 International Experience

Ref#6 NUMARC 91-06

Ref#7 IAEA 75-INSAG-4

Ref#8 UK H&S Executive Safety Culture

Ref#9 INPO Principles for Enhancing

Professionalism of Nuclear Personnel

Ref#10 WANO SOER 2010-1

3

Fire Protection Ref#1 NEA Core Damage Frequency

Fire

Ref#2 Windscale Fire

Ref#3 Chernobyl Accident

Ref#4 Browns Ferry Fire 1975

Ref#5 Vandellos Fire 1989

Ref#6 Chernobyl Unit 2 Fire

Ref#7 Norora Fire 1993

Ref#8 Salem Unit 2 Fire 1991

Ref#9 Fermi 2 Fire 1993

Ref#10 DC Cook Fire 2008

Ref#11 Pickering Unit 2 TG Fire SER

91-0086

Ref#12 CSA N293-07 Amended 2008

Ref#13 Bruce Unit 3 Cable Fire 1979

Ref#14 Point Lepreau Carpentry Shop

Fire 1985

Ref#15 Pickering Trailer Fire 2004

Ref#16 Pickering Unit 4 RB Fire 1988

Ref#17 Pickering Unit 5 CER Fire 1994

Ref#18 NPD Chem Lab Fire 1986

Ref#19 Oak Ridges Welding Fatality

1997

Ref#20 Darlington Oxygen Fire 1999

Ref#21 Oxygen Fire at CRL 2006

https://cog.cogonline.org/OPEX/CANDU History Lessons References/CHL-001_Ref01.doc



https://cog.cogonline.org/OPEX/CANDU History Lessons References/CHL-001_Ref02.pdf





























































































https://cog.cogonline.org/OPEX/CANDU History Lessons References/CHL-003_Ref02.mht





























https://cog.cogonline.org/OPEX/CANDU History Lessons References/CHL-003_Ref08.htm














































































54


4 Foreign Material

Exclusion

Ref#1 WANO FME Guidelines 2009

Ref#2 EPRI FME Guidelines 2005

Ref#3 INPO FME Examples TR4-36

Ref#4 INPO CEO Letter 2006

Ref#5 Fermi 1 Core Melt 1966

Ref#6 Bruce Unit 2 Lead Blanket 1991

Ref#7 Bruce Unit 2 Repeat Lead Blanket

1992

Ref#8 Bruce Unit 3 Feeder Chain 1980

Ref#9 KANUPP Grayloc Blockage 1991

Ref#10 Kaiga Washer in Feeder 2000

Ref#11 IAEA Trends in Fuel Performance

Ref#12 CANDU Fuel Performance 1996

Ref#13 Bruce B Debris Fretting Failures

Ref#14 Cernavoda Unit 2 Fuel Failures

Ref#15 Bruce A Fuel Failures

Ref#16 Pickering Unit 1 Fuel Fretting

Ref#17 PL Pump Failure 1995

Ref#18 Pickering Unit 6 Generator Failure

Ref#19 Pickering Unit 6 Boiler Damage

Ref#20 Gentilly 2 Moderator HX

Ref#21 Atucha Mod HX

Ref#22 Wolsung Unit 1 Turbine Trip

Ref#23 Pickering MCC

Ref#24 Pickering Unit 5 ABFP Damage

Ref#25 Darlington Standby Generator

Ref#26 Embalse Gad Tank

Ref#27 Gentilly 2 Condenser

Ref#28 Darlington SG FME Plug

5 Pickering Unit 2 Small

Loss of Coolant Accident

Ref#1 SER 94-009

Ref#2 NEA Report

Ref#3 INPO 06-003

Ref#4 Root Cause Report

Ref#5 SER 75-0087

Ref#6 SER 77-0063

Ref#7 SER 77-0146

Ref#8 NK21 SER 79-079

Ref#9 NK21 SER 79-090

Ref#10 NK21 SER 79-089

Ref#11 NK29 SER B95-037

Ref#12 Extract from COG JP Report

Ref#13 WANO-EAR-TYO-95-003

Ref#14 EAR-TYO-09-001

Ref#15 CSA N286_2_00

Ref#16 INPO_90-009

Ref#17 ACAD_98_004

Ref#18 INPO_05_002

Ref#19 INPO_SOER_94_1

Ref#20 COG_JP_95_001






































































































































































































https://cog.cogonline.org/OPEX/CANDU History Lessons References/CHL-005_Ref12.docx
























































https://cog.cogonline.org/Publications/Publications/JPSPublications/AECL,HQ,NBPN,OPG/COG-JP-95-001-D1.pdf






55


6 Darlington Unit 3 Steam

Bleed Valve Fails Open

Ref#1 WANO ENR ATL 01-021

Ref#2 Event Investigation Ops

Ref#3 Event Investigation Eng

Ref#4 PRV Failure Investigation

Report

Ref#5 Wolsong 1 Event

Ref#6 Rasmussen Paper

Ref#7 INPO 06-003

Ref#8 WANO GP ATL 08-003

Ref#9 WANO Simulator Guidelines

Ref#10 NK29 SER B95 037

Ref#11 IAEA TECDOC 1169

7 Bruce Unit 1 Radiation

Overexposure Recovery of

Damaged Fuel Bundle from

Channel P13

Ref#1 Bruce Overexposure

Investigation Report (1979)

Ref#2 Pickering Overexposure

Event Presentation

Ref#3 AA Rod Over Exposure

Dosimetry Report

Ref#4 WANO SOER 2001-1


























































https://cog.cogonline.org/OPEX/CANDU History Lessons References/CHL-007_Ref02.ppt






















56

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

57

RECENT CHANGES IN SHARING OF CANDU EVENTS

58

Recent Changes in Sharing of CANDU Events

Introduction

Recent Changes in Sharing of CANDU Events

Discussion of Background / Reasons

Potential Impact on COG OPEX Products

Options to Increase Sharing of CANDU Event / Equipment Failure Information

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

674 736

10541191

10681258 1247

1153 11671061

866

389

68112

304

627

517

555798

885 932

863

948

62265

59

53

83

46

13

108 4356

2544

34Ev

en

ts

Year

OPEX Events Reviewed

Misc. Events Reviewed

Industry Events Reviewed

CANDU Events Reviewed

59

OPEX Events 2011 to Q1 2013

60

Missed Opportunities

As an Industry, constant effort is required

to ensure that the right information

gets to the right people

at the right time

to solve operational issues

61


Are we as an industry sharing all that we can to ensure and strengthen our nuclear safety and performance?

Second-Quarter INPO RP Talking Points RPD 2013-02

“We have recent examples in which internal events were not known until the INPO points of contact conducted their quarterly discussions with the utility representatives. Plant issues, challenges, and near misses should be evaluated for operating experience…”

62


Example 1: Fuel Channel Closure Plug “stickiness” issues

recently suffered at Point Lepreau after refurbishment

it was uncovered that others had been through a similar issue but had not reported it

Result

Significant cost because of power de-ratings and potential for debris in Heat Transport

63


Example 2: Annulus Gas System Flow Issues

A system for monitoring the integrity of the Pressure Tube or Calandria Tube

Partial system flow issue due to incorrect field installation encountered after refurbishment at one station

Required regulator involvement to approve restart with lower than design flowrates

Experience has not been shared

Result

Lessons Learn for others will not be available for those next entering Refurb

64


Example 3: Calandria Tube to LISS Nozzle GAP Inspection

Information was not shared directly

but once learned in a COG Peer Group meeting it was entered by COG personnel into the formal OPEX process

Result

Calandria Tube integrity and safety issue

If it was not known possible fuel channel inspections/ models would be missed

65

Events like these are no longer being reported as they do not meet the WER criteria

Sample of CANDU Lower Threshold Events at Sig. 1 and 2

OPEX #

Title Event Description Consequence/Important Points

47068 Groove Wheel Wear and Washer Extrusion on the Fuel Handling Power Track

Intermediate rollers of a Fuel Handling power track, T12, have experienced groove wheel wear, extruded washers and thinning flanges. T12’s chain sag is the major cause for the trolley’s short coast.

Power track roller side load is the root cause of power track intermediate roller groove wheel wear and extruded washers. It is created primarily by sagged chain that has been allowed to accumulate and not being replaced on a timely basis.

45529 Fuelling Machine Control, 24 VDC Power Supply, 63597-PWS1 Does Not Have a Back-Up Supply

Fuelling Machine Control, 24 VDC power supply, 63597-PWS1 does not have a back-up supply. If this power supply were to fail, essentially all Fuelling Machine operations and panel indicators will be disabled.

Consequence of failure: All Auto and Manual controls of Fuel Handling System are lost. The age of the power supplies that are presently in service is approximately 35 years.

46393 Fuelling Machine (FM) Damaged Due to Use of the Snout Clamp Preloaded Mechanical Ring Force Gauge

Unit 1 West FM was damaged due to use of the snout clamp preloaded mechanical ring force gauge

The damaged FM was unavailable for three days to replace the lever arm assemblies and perform calibration.

44194 35230-NW HEAD 8B NOT FILLING HEAD-Functional Failure due to Vapour Lock of Fill Pump

Fuelling Machine Head H8B on the North-West quadrant could not be filled with D2O. It appears that air is being trapped at the suction side of the Fill Pump which results in the inability to fill the F/M Head and maintain the proper D2O level.

If spent fuel was on board the F/M Head, this could result in spent fuel being left in air and possible fuel failures. The fault appears to be a design deficiency, not a maintenance issue. Design change proposals have been issued, but not yet installed on all heads

44072 Recurrent Thermal Trip of Fueling Machine Catenary Motor

The south fuelling machine (F/M) catenary trolley refused to move due to abnormal friction with the electromechanical brake.

Recurrent catenary break issue which could ultimately lead to a station outage if such an event would occur with spent fuel on board.

43792 Modified CIGAR Closure Plug Failed Its Channel Leak Test

During a test installation of a shimmed CIGAR Modified Closure Plug (MCP) into channel S04 East End Fitting, the Fuelling Machine could not lower it's head D2O level prior to it's leak test operation.

This event resulted in requiring a repeat S04E shimmed MCP install test and approximately one day of additional critical path time.

42611 NorthEast (NE) Fuel Machine Head Level Indication Lost During Fuel Discharge - Head Flooded With Bay Water (downgraded)

When discharging irradiated fuel (I/F) to the Primary Irradiated Fuel Bay (PIFB), the ability to raise and therefore control head level was lost.

Overhaul of the valve actuators during the Unit 3-4 restart project using the latest actuator chrome sleeves would have prevented the hardened belleville washers from digging into the softer carbon steel guide .

Fuel Handling

66

INPO and WANO Event Reporting Differences

67

Considerations for Sharing

Why would we not share?

Do we forget our obligation to our industry peers?

Do we perceive it costs too much to take time to report our experience to others?

Is there an embarrassment factor?

A Competiveness factor ---commercial or IP factor?

Are we concerned about our relationships with our stakeholders, shareholders and Vendors?

Concerns with legal issues?

Are persons who approve the sharing not as familiar with the criteria as they should be?

Are the criteria not as tight or specific as they should be?

68

Recommendation to Reduce Missed Opportunities

Focus on reporting additional lower level events related to CANDU specific systems, equipment and issues

We do not want to go back to where we were with potentially excessive reporting

We are looking for CANDU specific equipment failures to share with other members

69

The Path Forward

Continue to share knowledge that has impact through the various networking forums

Encourage All utilities to look at their processes for eliminating those barriers for “timely” and “right information” and to “champion” sharing

Seek out and benchmark with those industries and utilities that are doing a good job at sharing

70

CANDU Excellence through Collaboration

performance improvement through collaboration improvement through collaboration robert c. morrison...

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