pike-discrimination against african american soldiers in wwii

7/30/2019 Pike-discrimination Against African American Soldiers in Wwii

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DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AFRICAN AMERICAN

SOLDIERS IN WORLD WAR II: RACIAL POLICIES

AND THE MARCH TO DESEGREGATION

Brett Pike

HIS 4936

Professor Benowitz

April 11, 2011


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DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AFRICAN AMERICAN

SOLDIERS IN WORLD WAR II: RACIAL POLICIES

AND THE MARCH TO DESEGREGATION

Introduction: Racial Sentiments in Pre-war America

During World War II the African American population pushed for equality and

integration of the United States military, which, at the time, remained in accordance with the

culture and customs of the white majority by keeping the two races segregated. The term

"separate but equal" made famous by the United States Supreme Court casePlessy v. Ferguson

remained instantiated as the law of the land in reference to racial policy. This concept of keeping

both races segregated had permeated across the United States and was the prominent view of

most white citizens during this period. Segregation was seenfrom a white point-of-viewas a

way for both races to live within the society without racial conflict and tension. Separation of

blacks and whites stretched across all societal institutions, including the United States Military.

The idiomatic phrase "separate but equal" really was, as historians Sherie Mershon and

Steven Sclossman point out, a "policy of separate and unequal treatment of blacks."1

African

Americans did not receive the same rights and freedoms that their white counterparts did.

Moreover, they were discriminated against, physically abused, and were seen as less than

American; and even worse, less than human. Despite all of the injustices against them, they still

served and remained loyal to their country. They sought both equality and victory during World

War II; the question is, could they accomplish both simultaneously?

1 Quoted by Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman,Foxholes & Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed

Forces. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), P. 8.


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After the First World War, military policies and general notions regarding race relations

within the military became more defined and eventually led to new policies based upon the

experiences from the war. Reports of testimonies were collected by the War Department and the

Army War College after the conflict ended. These testimonies came mainly from white officers

who commanded two black regiments, the 92d Division and the 93d Division. Historian Ulysses

Lee writes that the general consensus of these testimonials was that the "Negro combat troops in

World War I failed to come up to Army standards."2

Such testimonials included that of Maj.

Gen. Robert L. Bollard, the commander of the 92d Division, who wrote, "If you need combat

soldiers, and especially if you need them in a hurry, don't put your time upon Negroes."

3

Such

opinions were the epitome of reports from white officers. The majority of these testimonies, as

Sherie Mershon and Steven Sclossman put it, "slighted the accomplishments of black divisions

and emphasized their failures, which the white witnesses consistently blamed on alleged intrinsic

deficiencies of black troops in general and black officers in particular."4

Earlier reports during the war were much more positive on the contributions and actions

of African Americans. Testimonials reflected the sentiments of Guion Griffis Johnson, who

wrote that "In France the Negro fared rather well. It seemed to be the opinion of the French that

he deserved the common lot of all soldiers."5

From unbiased testimonies, which were not fueled

by racist social constructs, it seemed that blacks performed well in the roles that they were

placed into. However, those roles were minimal ones, mostly labor and non-combat positions.

2 Quoted by Ulysses Lee, United States Army In World War II: Special Studies: The Employment of Negro Troops .

(Washington: United States Government Printing office 1966), p.203 Quoted in Ibid., p.15.4Quoted by Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman,Foxholes & Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed

Forces. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p.18.5 For an informative read on the roles and participation of African Americans in every major American war leading

up to World War II see Guion Griffis Johnson, "The impact of War Upon the Negro" The Journal of Negro

Education 10, no.3 (Jul 1941): p. 606.


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Roughly 90 percent of African Americans who served in World War I were placed into labor

units.6

Furthermore, testimonies from black soldiers were not taken, but in the reports from

various letters and outside reports they tried to explain these failures that many white solders

were reporting by blaming the deficiencies on a lack of proper training, equipment, and

experience.

These contradicting reports created a murky view amongst the public of how blacks

performed in the war, but when it came time to evaluate these reports and make policy off of

those testimonies, the military clearly sided with their white officers. The interpretation of these

reports by the Army War College and Department of War reflects how racism affected their

thought process and caused them to ignore environmental factors, such as the lack of training,

poor equipment, and racial tension with white officers. Instead they blamed the failures of the

92d and 93d Division on what they thought was an intrinsic inferiority.7

Historian Krewasky A

Salter wrote that "The aspersions cast on all African-American Soldiers because [of]one

regiment's failure during five days of combat during World War I reinforced general post-

reconstruction attitudes that African-American soldiers were a poor investment."8

In 1922, the military began planning on how to effectively employ the black population

in case of war. Using the reports from World War I officers, the military tried to formulate a plan

that best suited the use of African American manpower without upsetting the balance of social

customs in the United States. With those reports "it was generally considered that they[African

6 Bernard C. Natly, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military . (New York: The Free

Press, 1989), p.108.7 Alan M. Osur.Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II: The Problems of Race Relations.

(Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1976), p.58 Quoted by Kreasky A. Salter, Combat Multipliers: African-American Soldiers in Four Wars. (Kansas: Combat

Studies Institute Press, 2003), p.79.


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Americans] would be more useful as service than as combat troops."9

The new plan tried to

define the role of African Americans within the military and how to make them more effective. It

specifically focused on the organization and size of black units, and the use of black officers.

With a 1922 and later a 1937 plan, the military put a cap on the amount of black troops that

could be inducted into the military. The amount of black troops was to be proportional to the

population of the society or roughly ten percent, although during the interwar period, the total

number of African-Americans in the military was less than two percent. The plans also

established that blacks would require more training and supervision.10

The reports by the AWC caused a change in military policy that would directly affect

how blacks were implemented during World War II. Although they did have some positives

effects such as the utilization of soldiers in multiple capacities, the recognition that blacks should

be used in combat, albeit in a limited role, and that black officer candidates should attend the

same training as whites, it still showed how America viewed blacks and their roles within the

military. As historians Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman put it, "The fate of the black

regiments in the years between the two world wars exemplified the low regard and the racial

prism through which the Army viewed black soldiers."11

The policies that were created still

reflected the social views of American society. They saw blacks as inferior and in order for the

military to remain efficient and effective; it must continue its policy of segregation. As blacks

were treated in civilian life, they were also treated in military life.

9 Quoted by Ulysses Lee, United States Army in World War II: Special Studiest: The Employment of Negro Troops .

(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), p.3010 Ibid. p.3911Quoted by Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman,Foxholes & Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed

Forces. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p.8.


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The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 and America's

Entrance into World War II

The Selective Training and Service Act became law on September 16, 1940. It

established the protocol for the drafting and training of eligible males into the United States

Armed Forces. With the escalation of war in Europe, President Franklin Roosevelt and the War

Department felt the need to build up a military force. The Act used the 1937 Mobilization Act,

specifically in utilizing black soldiers, as the foundation of how to organize and deploy troops.

There was one major change in 1940, an amendment created by Senator Robert Wagner and

Representative Hamilton Fish. The amendment called for the abolishment of "discrimination

against any person on account of race or color."12

It also stated that blacks would be allowed in

every branch of the military, black reserve officers would be eligible for combat duty, and that

training of black pilots would be allowed. Groups like the NAACP (National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People) and various black civil-rights advocates like Charles H.

Houston, Judge William Hastie and Robert L. Vann, contributed enormous efforts in getting this

bill proposed and passed. While the law did not call for the integration of the Armed Forces, it

appeared to be a step in the right direction.

Although the amendment seemed like an advancement for African Americans, in reality

it amounted to, as George Q. Flynn puts it mere window dressing."13

It was political theatre in

order to calm the pressures from the black community, who were pushing for more equality in

the military. When it first passed, many African American leaders viewed it as a landmark

achievement for the black community because of the addition of the antidiscrimination

12U.S. Statues at Large, 1940, Vol. 54, p.885.13 George Q. Flynn, "Selective Service and American Blacks During World War II" The Journal of Negro History

69, no. 1 (1984): p.15.


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provisions.14

But a third clause within the bill still gave the final authority to the War Department

to decide who would and who would not be inducted into the military. The black community

voiced their opinions in opposition to this third clause because, if employed, it would give the

War Department final judgment on who could join the military, and it would not give blacks

rectification if they were rejected, which would make the first two clauses useless.15

Evidence of

the Act being more about politics and less about rights can be found all the way at the top with

President Roosevelt. Shortly after the passing of this bill, and one week prior to the presidential

elections, Roosevelt appointed the first black General, Benjamin O. Davis, Sr. a move that would

certainly gain him votes amongst the black population.

The military may have claimed that they no longer based policy on discriminations

against blacks, but in the coming years all facts would diametrically oppose that statement. The

War Department used various methods and excuses to omit the volunteers and the conscripted

African Americans from serving. While the 1937 and 1940 Mobilization plans called for a

"balanced force"16

of ten percent of blacks, those numbers were never reached. A day before the

attack on Pearl Harbor, and months after the passing of the Selective Service Act, African

Americans made up less than six percent of the Army.17

By the end of the war they came close

but still never reached 10 percent. In 1945 there were 653,563 or 9.68 percent blacks enlisted in

the military.18

14

Phillip McGuire, Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters From Black Soldiers in World War II. (Kentucky: TheUniversity Press of Kentucky, 1983), p. xxvi.15 Ibid. p.xxvi.16 Quoted by Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman,Foxholes & Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed

Forces. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p.27.

17 Karin L. Stanford,If We Must Die: African American Voices on War and Peace. (Maryland: Rowman &

Littlefield Publishers, 2008), p. 143.18 Kreasky A. Salter, Combat Multipliers: African-American Soldiers in Four Wars. (Kansas: Combat Studies

Institute Press, 2003), p.87


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The War Department and various other agencies under their control deliberately

sabotaged the acceptance of blacks into the military. They did this in varying ways: first, the use

of a literacy test, which specifically targeted the lack of education amongst blacks; second, they

lacked segregated training and housing facilities that were available to accommodate the

increase in black draftees and volunteers; and finally, according to historian Phillip McGuire, in

some parts of the country they purposely "sent secret orders to its[First Army Headquarters] draft

boards requesting that no blacks be inducted in the first draft."19

The actions taken by the War

Department proves that they consciously premeditated a plan to omit and discriminate against

blacks and their pursuit to serve their country.

By basing their beliefs off of the reports by the AWC, which reflected negatively on the

black soldier during World War I, the War Department tried to limit the use of African

Americans as much as possible in the newest crisis. As Beth Bailey and David Farber put it,

"The goal of the Army, or of any other branch of the armed forces, was not racial upliftit was

mounting a successful fighting force as quickly and efficiently as possible. And coming into

World War II, using black troops clearly presented problems."20

The War Department believed

that the best chance of success in World War II involved minimizing the employment of black

troops. They did everything they could do in their power to either navigate around the law or

simply break it.

In order to understand the discrimination that took place and to understand the opinions

of leaders during this time, it is important to expand upon the methods they used to keep blacks

from joining the Armed forces. First, let us examine the use of literacy tests to eliminate many

19 Quoted by Phillip McGuire, Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters From Black Soldiers in World War II. (Kentucky:

The University Press of Kentucky, 1983), p. xxvii.20Quoted by Beth Bailey and David Farber, "The 'Double-V' Campaign in World War II Hawaii: African Americans,

Racial Ideology, and Federal Power"Journal of Social History 26, no.4 (1993): p.822.


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candidates from joining. The Army used both the Army General Classification Test (AGCT)

and the Mechanical Aptitude test to measure the intelligence and aptitude of incoming recruits

and help evaluate where to place individuals within the military. The test separated the recruits

into different "grade" levels according to their ability to "pick up soldiering" and "learn easily the

facts, skills, and techniques necessary for carrying out Army duties."21

As a result of theses tests

49.2 percent of black recruits were place in the lowest grade level, grade V, compared to only 8.5

percent of whites.22

The vast majority of African Americans that took the test were placed into

the lower grade levels and considered to be mostly illiterate. The result of such low scores came

from the poor environment that many blacks were raised in. They did not have access to much

education and it gave the War Department a reason to restrict black inductees. Although, blacks

and whites who came from similar economic and social backgrounds, scored comparatively, it

did not stop the discrimination and the reinforcement of old ideals that the black soldier was

inferior.23

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson wrote in his diary that "the Army had adopted rigid

requirements for literacy mainly to keep down the number of colored troops."24

Not only did

Stimson knowingly discriminate against blacks because of their test scores, he purposely

recruited illiterate whites in order to increase the number of white recruits25

. As George Q. Flynn

writes, it was clear that blacks "had been passed over despite the letter of the law but in

21 Ulysses Lee, United States Army in World War II: Special Studies: The Employment of Negro Troops .

(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), p.24122 Beth Bailey and David Farber, "The 'Double-V' Campaign in World War II Hawaii: African Americans, Racial

Ideology, and Federal Power"Journal of Social History 26, no.4 (1993): p.822-823.23 Ulysses Lee, United States Army in World War II: Special Studies: The Employment of Negro Troops .

(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), p.24324 Quoted in Phillip McGuire, Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters From Black Soldiers in World War II. (Kentucky:

The University Press of Kentucky, 1983), p. xxviii25 Ibid. p. xxvii


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sympathy with the spirit of the times."26

In the following table from Ulysses Lee's United States

Army in World War II: Special Studies: The Employment of Negro Troops, the percentages of

white and black recruits scores are illustrated. 83.9 percent of the black recruits scored in the

lower two grades. Only 0.4 scored in Grade I compared to 6.6 percent of white recruits.

TABLE 1-DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY GENERAL CLASSIFICATION TEST SCORES

MARCH 1941-DECEMBER 1942

AGCT GradeWhite Negro Total

No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent

Total 4,129,259 100.0 440,162 100.0 4,569,421 100.0

273,626 6.6 1,580 0.4 275,206 6.0I 1,154,700 28.0 14,891 3.4 1,169,591 25.6

II 1,327,164 32.1 54,302 12.3 1,381,466 30.2

V 1,021,818 24.8 152,725 34.7 1,174,543 25.7

351,951 8.5 216,664 49.2 568,615 12.5

ercentage -- 90.4 -- 9.6 -- 100.0

Source: Ulysses Lee, United States Army in World War II: Special Studies: The Employment of NegroTroops. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), p.244

Along with poor education scores that restricted the induction of African Americans,

health issues also gave the government validity for denying blacks the chance to serve. The

second factor that limited black draftees was venereal disease. The disease was widespread

among the black population who came from a lower economic background and was unable to

acquire adequate medical attention. Thus, venereal disease was used as a vehicle to discriminate

against blacks before and during the war.27

While both races had a fair amount of diseases,

discrimination was still dominant on only one race, the African Americans. Men who failed their

26 George Q. Flynn, "Selective Service and American Blacks During World War II" The Journal of Negro History

69, no. 1 (1984): p.20.27 Ulysses Lee, United States Army in World War II: Special Studies: The Employment of Negro Troops .

(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), p.275


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physical tests could be eligible for limited "nonstrenuous duty".28

In the beginning years of the

war whites who had similar physical deficiencies were drafted for limited service at a rate of 20

percent, compared to blacks who were not drafted at all. By the end of the war there were 34,352

whites drafted for limited service and only 1,747 blacks.29

The numbers show there was

discrimination against blacks, as the War Department was willing to accept physically unfit

whites and not physically unfit blacks. While they did accept some African Americans who were

unfit for regular service, they came nowhere close to the quota of ten percent that the Selective

Training and Service Act called for. Once again they broke the law to continue racist

discriminatory policies.

The third method the War Department used was not building enough facilities to

properly accommodate the two segregated armies. The drafting process was designed to draft

men by a number system and not by a race system, which initially disrupted the quota structure

and threw off the proportionality balance of the determined 10 percent. Soon more black men

were being drafted than there were available training and housing facilities. This caused a

backlog of African Americans who then dangled at the mercy of the Selective Service. Many left

their jobs to enter the Army but then were told there was no room for them.30

Because of this

bottleneck situation, the War Department ordered various draft boards to only draft whites.31

This led to conscription by race and not on the basis of equality, which was the supposition of

the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. The War Department again maneuvered around

28 Quoted by Ulysses Lee, United States Army in World War II: Special Studies: The Employment of Negro Troops .

(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), p.275.29 Ibid.

Quoted in Phillip McGuire, Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters From Black Soldiers in World War II. (Kentucky:

The University Press of Kentucky, 1983), p. xxvii30 George Q. Flynn, "Selective Service and American Blacks During World War II" The Journal of Negro History

69, no. 1 (1984): p.19.31 McGuire, Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters From Black Soldiers in World War II. (Kentucky: The University

Press of Kentucky, 1983), p. xxvii


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the law, even though their actions contravene the anti-discriminatory clauses in the Selective

Service Act.32

To avoid criticism on the overt overreach of power and the deliberate obfuscation of the

anti-discrimination policy, the War Department used the lack of available facilities as an excuse.

But if mobilization plans were made in 1940, which involved a segregated army, would it not

seem prudent to build enough facilities to house both armies once it appeared the nation was

edging towards war? In my opinion, if the War Department truly believed in having 10 percent

of African Americans serving, than they would have built a sufficient amount of facilities to train

them in. While the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 began with much promise of

equality for blacks, it appeared that racial customs and attitudes continued to dictate policy,

whether it was legal or not. I agree with Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman that it is evident

that "the obstacles that black draftees encountered as they entered the Army in 1940 and 1941

continually reminded blacks of the strength of institutionalized racial discrimination and of the

apparent inability or unwillingness of the federal officials to combat it."33

The Rise of Black Activism and the Black Press:

Due to the evident violation of the two anti-discriminatory clauses in the Selective

Training and Service Act, black activism and protest began to surge. This backlash occurred

across the entire American black population, from government officials to the common black

citizen on the home front. Civil-rights organizations such as the NAACP and National Urban

League began to gain members at an incredible rate. Also, black newspapers like thePittsburgh

Courierand The Crisis extended their influence and increased their circulation during World

32 Quoted by Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman,Foxholes & Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed

Forces. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p.45.33 Ibid.


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War II. Black leaders targeted many social and political issues such as lynching and employment

discrimination, but the center of their protests focused on the racial policies of the military.34

Shortly after the passing of the Selective Training and Service Act, several black leaders

met with President Roosevelt to discuss the furthering of anti-discriminatory policy in the

military. With help from Eleanor Roosevelt, who persuaded her husband to have the meeting,

black civil-rights leaders Philip Randolph, Walter White, and Arnold Hill proposed several new

policies to further eliminate discrimination against black soldiers. The meeting seemed to be

cordial and as Doris Kearns Goodwin writes, "the president promised to confer with Cabinet

officers and other government officials about the problem and then to talk with the civil-rights

leaders again."35

After a week the White House had not yet released a press statement on the

meeting or contacted the civil-rights leaders. Once again, Eleanor had to intervene and force

action. A statement was finally released which did not satisfy the black leaders as only a few of

their minor proposals were accepted. Furthermore, Roosevelt then went on to support policy

which continued the establishment of segregation.36

This created a sudden vehement outburst by

the black press and was the start of the escalation of black protest and activism against military

racial discrimination.

The backlash that the press statement caused forced Roosevelt's hand and he made

concessions in order to keep face and not upset the black vote. He promoted Benjamin Davis to

be the first black Brigadier general and he also appointed Judge William Hastie, the dean of

Howard Law School, to be the assistant director of the War Department. Roosevelt may have

34 Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman,Foxholes & Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces.

(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p.9635 Quoted by Doris Kearns Goodwin,No Ordinary Time. (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1994), p. 169.36 Andrew E. Kersten, "African Americans and World War II." OAH Magazine of History 16, no.3 (Spring 2002):

p.16.


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kept the dam from breaking, but it would not hold the flood of black activism for long. Angered

but also invigorated, the black press and advocacy groups started on a passionate mission to

expose the cases of racial discrimination in the military, in order to push for the improvement of

conditions for black soldiers.37

In February 1942, the black press and civil-rights advocacy groups adopted the "Double

V" campaign. It was the symbol of the movement towards equality and expressed what the black

community was trying to achieve with its protests. It first solidified that African Americans were

committed to the war effort and were loyal to their country. The first "V" is victory for the

United States against her fascist enemies, while as the second "V", is victory against the fascism

and discrimination in America. The campaign pointed out the hypocrisy and irony in the United

States, which was fighting for democracy and freedom; yet America itself did not have that same

freedom for its entire people, and was even fighting for freedom with an un-free military. A

black soldier named Clarence E. Adams, serving in the 429th QM Gasoline Supply Company,

wrote a letter to theAfro-American Newspaperexpressing his opinion on the matter after a white

officer found a book written by a black author in his possession and demanded he get rid of it.

He wrote: "Yes we are Negro soldiers, giving our sweat blood, and lives for what is known as an

IDEALISTIC DEMOCRACY, and here in the midst of a world crisis we are told not to read

books as that one by men of our own race. If this sort of thing happen[sic] now, what will happen

when the war is over? I am sure that it will be much worse for the Negro, of which we aren't

going to stand for."38


(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p.94.38 Quoted In McGuire, Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters From Black Soldiers in World War II. (Kentucky: The

University Press of Kentucky, 1983), p.90-91.


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By accentuating these hypocrisies and printing letters like the one above, the black press

and advocacy groups hoped to force the government to take action in eliminating the

discriminatory policies that were in place, specifically the integration of the Armed Forces. As a

result of shining a spotlight on cases of discrimination they were often able to either force change

or shame officials into changing policy. Newspapers and advocacy groups did this with great

efficiency and found much success by publicizing the discrimination. During the summer of

1942, the Bureau of Public Relations analyzed various trends in black press newspapers and

through one of their analyses they found twenty-six articles covering discrimination of black

soldiers in one single issue in thePittsburgh Courier.

39

The newspapers found much success in changing policy and examples of such changes

can be found in numerous places. Shortly after the bombing of Pearl Harbor and America's

entrance into war, the NAACP pushed for equality for blacks in the Navy. Up to that point,

blacks could only join the Navy as messman, a job that was no more than a glorified servant. No

other positions were available for African Americans. With the backing of the black press and

the recent uproar against President Roosevelt after his debacle of a meeting with the black civil-

rights leaders, the NAACP was able to force change. Mr. Roosevelt conceded to the pressures

and granted equal opportunity in all positions in the Navy for blacks.40

They were also able to

achieve the same for the Air Corps, which had no black pilots. The creation of the Tuskegee

airmen, the first African American pilots was the result. Another example can be found in the

mutiny at Port Chicago in San Francisco. In July of 1944, several Navy ships exploded due to

hazardous working conditions, killing 320 people, 200 of which were black. Because of those


(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 383.40 Doris Kearns Goodwin,No Ordinary Time. (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1994), p. 328-329.


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unsafe conditions fifty black sailors refused to go back to work on the ships. Those men were not

given fair trials, but because the black press investigated and covered the events, they were able

to get reduced sentences for the men protesting. They also shined a light on the hazardous

working conditions that black sailors had to deal with and were able to create awareness and

push for change.41

The black press soon found themselves under attack by the white community and the

United States Government for pushing what the latter groups believed to be a radical agenda that

was counter-productive to the American war effort. Patrick Washburn notes that once the

movement gained popularity "government officials became nervous" and "they viewed the

Double V campaign as possibly disloyal and quickly blamed the black press for black

discontent."42

Racial tension and violent outbreaks were attributed to the supposed inflammatory

material being printed in black newspapers. In response, the black press defended themselves

and their "Double V" campaign as a conservative movement; that while they pushed for black

rights, they "always placed the war abroad as the struggle which had to be won first."43

They

argued that both ideas, equality for blacks and victory against the axis powers, were not mutually

exclusive and that their mission was to channel black resentment and frustration in order to uplift

morale and increase support towards the war effort. The black press believed that to make civil


(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 83-84, 98-99.42Quoted by Patrick S. Washburn,A Question of Sedition: The Federal Government's Investigation of the Black

Press During World War II. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p.101.43 Quoted by Lee Finkle, "The Conservative Aims of Militant Rhetoric: Black Protest during World War II." The

Journal of American History 60, no.3 (Dec. 1973), p. 693.


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and social strides in American society a "total commitment to participate fully in the war effort

was the path toward eventual equality."44

As the war progressed and the black advocacy groups and press achieved more equality

in the Armed forces, the protests against discrimination became more moderate. These groups

understood the need to build relationships, with not only the white community, but also the

Roosevelt administration, for the advancement of continued reform after the war. The black

press continued to ameliorate the conditions and policies of the United States Military

throughout the war and also built a foundation of communication for change towards a more

equal America. Advocates like Hasite, Randolph, and White, various civil rights groups such as

NAACP, and the black press exerted the most influence upon policy.45

The black press vigorously pushed for equality in the Armed Forces for African

Americans and because of their commitment and influence they were able to cause massive

change in policy and attain more rights for black citizens. Their mission became the nascent

black civil-rights movement that would later explode in the 1960's and the accomplishments they

achieved should be recognized as an amazing feat against the overwhelming racist sentiments in

that epoch. Their voices were the motivating factor for the common black citizen to join the

military and to serve their country. It gave people hope that they could achieve true freedom and

without them it may have been hard to persuade the black masses to join the fight. Looking back

at the events one would be hard pressed to believe that blacks would have gained any rights

during World War II if it was not for the black press and advocacy groups. They surely would

44 Quoted by Lee Finkle, "The Conservative Aims of Militant Rhetoric: Black Protest during World War II." The

Journal of American History 60, no.3 (Dec. 1973), p. 70345 Quoted by Phillip McGuire, Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters From Black Soldiers in World War II. (Kentucky:

The University Press of Kentucky, 1983), p.xxxv.


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have been doomed to the misfortune of being characterized as the same poor soldiers, which was

the notion that reigned supreme after World War I.

Black Morale and Opinions Toward the War

Black morale and opinions of the war were affected by various factors during World War

II. These factors ranged from discriminatory policies against blacks, including segregated

facilities and units; to the roles of blacks within the military and questions over whether they

would gain civil-rights after the war. The importance of black morale was crucial to the success

of black troops during the war. Moreover, it was imperative to achieving the goals of gaining

civil rights during and after the war. Black morale varied depending on how various

discriminatory factors affected individuals and the group as a whole, but for the majority it was

low.

Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the founder ofThe Journal of Negro Education,

Charles (Chas) H. Thompson wrote about the initial opinion of blacks towards the war. He

wrote:

Being Americans, Negroes enter the present war as do other Americanswith the conviction that they

must fight to give democracy another chance. For those who have thought at all about the issues at stake

realize that the Negro's future in this country is inextricably bound up with the future of democracy. They

realize that despite the unenviable status of the Negro at the present time his position could be worse under

fascism or Nazism, foreign or domestic. Accordingly, Negroes once more take up arms in defense of anideal which to them seems to be their main hope as well as that of America itself. 46

In general it appeared that the black community recognized the situation in front of them and was

willingly committed to support the war for the greater victory of America. In a speech eight

46 Quoted by Chas H. Thompson, "Editorial Comment: Negro Morale and World War II." The Journal of Negro

Education 11, no. 1 (Jan. 1942) p. 3.


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months later, Thompson commented on the fear of whites that blacks were using the war as a

way to move their social agenda forward. He stated: "I would like to make some observations

growing out of the honest, although misguided and unwarranted, concern of the majority of our

fellow white Americans who feel that negroes are taking unfair advantage of the emergency to

the race problem; and because of their protest are alienating the affections of Negroes from the

war effort and creating disunity thereby."47

He believed that the discriminatory policies and

objections from the white community would result in the plummeting morale of African

Americans. His fears would become reality in the next several years.

Mary A. Morton, another contributor to The Journal of Negro Education,believed that

"five major factors operate in the development of the morale of a democratic nation at war."

Those were; "The masses of citizens must desire victory, understand the issues of the conflict,

identify themselves with the war effort and its objectives, be given adequate direction in their

participation, and be afforded opportunities to participate."48

Morton argued that blacks failed to

fall into all categories for the development of morale; specifically, they were not being given

equal opportunities and sufficient direction or training in their participation. She comments on

these factors, particularly segregation, and comes to the conclusion that "to be isolated at home is

unfortunate enough. But to have Negro men in uniform referred to abroad as if they were

something from the less holy side of the family who had to be brought along, but who are not to

be taken seriously, and definitely not to be considered on a basis of equality, is a most stinging

blow to morale."49 Because of this discrimination, "Any lasting change in morale of colored

47 Quoted by Chas H. Thompson, "The Basis of Negro Morale in World War II." The Journal of Negro Education

11, no.4 (Oct. 1942), p.459.48 Quoted by Mary A. Morton, "The Federal Government and Negro Morale." The Journal of Negro Education 12,

no.3 (Summer 1943), p.452.49Quoted by Mary A. Morton, Ibid. p.455.


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Americans will come only with a fundamental change in social and economic structure of the

nation."50

Low morale amongst black troops was common because of discrimination and lack of

equal opportunities. They did not receive the same treatment from the government, their white

officers, and their fellow white soldiers. They faced racism and discrimination daily which

challenged their dedication and support for the war. Furthermore, they were given inferior

training, equipment, and housed in substandard facilities. High morale of black troops was rare

because of these conditions and sentiments could be found that it was a white man's war. For

some, fighting a war where they would be considered less than a white soldier was unacceptable.

Draft evasion became an alternative to fighting for black soldiers. For example, Wayman

Sullivan, a 22 year old black man evaded the draft after he faced discrimination while trying to

join the military. In aNew York Times article, dated May 20, 1942, it said that "Sullivan became

embittered when he tried unsuccessfully several years ago to join the Navy, and when, more

recently, he was refused enlistment in the Army because of a temporary physical disability, since

corrected."51

Other draft evaders, such as Winfred W. Lynn, evaded the draft as a protest against

segregated armies.52

By 1943, estimates of roughly 167 African American men were tried and

convicted for draft evasion.53

Due to racial discrimination and the lack of equality and fair treatment in the army,

Ulysses Lee comments that "morale and motivation crumbled to the point that neither the routine

50 Quoted by Mary A. Morton, "The Federal Government and Negro Morale." The Journal of Negro Education 12,

no.3 (Summer 1943)p.46351 "Draft Evader Jailed, Scorns Court's Aid: Judge Tries for Eight Weeks to Get Negro to Enlist," New York Times,

May 20, 1942.52Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters From Black Soldiers in World War II. (Kentucky: The University Press of

Kentucky, 1983), p.xxxvi.53 Karin L. Stanford,If We Must Die: African American Voices on War and Peace. (Maryland: Rowman &

Littlefield Publishers, 2008), p. 145.


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of training and employment, the expansion of physical facilities, nor the hortative of well

meaning had significant effect.54

Despite all of the Jim Crow laws that black soldiers had to

tolerate they remained steadfast and obstinate in their goals towards freedom; both home and

abroad. Black leaders and the black press allowed for such hardships and low morale to be

endured. With their leadership and guidance, it gave hope to the black soldier that what they

were doing was for the good of their country and their people. As Charles H. Thompson said:

"For only by establishing freedom for all peoples can we assure it for ourselves."55

Black Units, the Changing of White Attitudes, and the

Desegregation of the United States MilitaryWhile the vast majority of black soldiers and units did not see combat in World War II,

the ones that did experienced mixed results of success and failure. Like World War I, these

failures were attributed to an intrinsic paucity of ability and intelligence by their habitually racist

white superiors. The real problem was a lack of proper training and racial tension with their

white officers. Black units were never given equal opportunity to succeed and the result was

often failure in battle situations. According to historian Dale Wilson, units like the 92nd Division

failed because of unequal circumstances. He wrote: "Segregation policies were the root cause of

most problems in Negro units because they provided colored troops a constant, visible reminder

of their second-class status."56

It was these policies that lowered morale and negatively affected

combat troops, hindering effective training and fighting.


(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), p.347.55 Chas H. Thompson, "The Basis of Negro Morale in World War II." The Journal of Negro Education 11, no.4

(Oct. 1942), p.462.56 Quoted by Dale E. Wilson, "Recipe for Failure: Major General Edward M. Almond and Preparation of the U.S.

92nd Infantry Division for Combat in World War II." The Journal of Military History 56, no.3 (Jul. 1992), p. 486-

487.


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Black troops also had their fair share of success in battle and served with distinction in

combat during the war. The 99th Pursuit Squadron of the Tuskegee airmen, had tremendous

success during the war. Doris Goodwin Kerns comments that "In the course of 1,578 missions

over North Africa, Italy and Germany, the 99th Pursuit Squadron would be credited with

shooting down 111 airborne craft and destroying 150 on the ground. Winners of a hundred

Distinguished Flying Crosses, the 99th was the only escort group that never lost a single bomber

to an enemy fighter."57

Another unit that had success in battle and demonstrated heroism in battle

was the 751st Tank Battalion. The battalion served in 183 days of action, fighting battles at

Arracourt, France; and the Battle of the Bulge, among other battles. As Ulysses Lee point out,

the unit fought bravely and achieved much success in battle and those "deeds were emulated by

members of the 761st who before the unit's career was over, had won eleven Silver Stars and

sixty-nine Bronze Stars, four of the latter with clusters, and nearly all for heroism under fire."58

Despite discrimination and the lack of equality in society, black troops continued to

serve their country with bravery and loyalty. The sacrifices they made for their country caused a

shifting of opinions and attitudes within the white population. While the majority of whites did

not hold this new opinion, and most whites still favored segregation in society, as historians

Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman put it, "a new, more liberal perspective on racial issues

gained enough strength within the white general public to become an important element in

national culture and political debate during the war years."59

Furthermore, with concern over

national unity and "the proposition that racial intolerance was undesirable because it...

57 Quoted by Doris Kearns Goodwin,No Ordinary Time. (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1994), p. 424.58 Quoted by Ulysses Lee, United States Army in World War II: Special Studies: The Employment of Negro Troops .

(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), p.663.59 Quoted by Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman,Foxholes & Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed

Forces. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 105.


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contradicted the goals for which the war was being fought,"60

it at the minimum challenged the

constructs of American society and led to political debate on the issue of racial inequality. This

debate would eventually lead to the desegregation of the Armed Forces and the eventual civil-

rights movement two decades later.

The United States Military would eventually be desegregated in 1948 by President Harry

Truman with the signing of executive Order 9381. With the executive order and the establishing

of the Fahy Committee, which had oversight of military desegregation, the process of integration

began. Full integration finally happened in the Korean War with a total of 139 integrated units

deployed. These integrated units were able to execute efficiency in combat and the age old

polemic that blacks were inferior soldiers crumbled underneath the weight of insurmountable

evidence that proved otherwise. The conclusion from Korea was that both African Americans

and whites were both capable soldiers.61

Notions that black troops were inferior finally

disappeared and it became self-evident that with equal training, opportunity, and treatment,

blacks could be effective soldiers.

Conclusion

World War II was a battle for democracy. For African Americans, they not only fought to

have democracy for the world, but also for themselves. At a time and place where blacks were

denied the essential civil-rights humans deserve to be granted, they were expected to participate

in a war where they were not seen as equal Americans. They endured hardship, discrimination,

racial violence, poverty, political and social attacks, yet they still invested their lives into the

60 Quoted bySherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman,Foxholes & Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed

Forces. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p.108.61 Mansel G. Blackford. On Board the USS Mason: The World War II Diary of James A. Dunn. (Columbus: Ohio

State University Press, 1996), p. xxiv.


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country that denied them equality. They sacrificed their blood and futures for a chance to gain

rights and to live in a society without segregation. Historian Phillip McGuire wrote that "to

them[African Americans] serving in the armed forces meant having to endure the anguish of an

American institution unwilling to make the democratic rhetoric of World War II a reality for its

black members. And yet numerous letters revealed that in their written complaints black soldiers

expressed loyalty to the United States and to the ideals for which it stood."62

But were African Americans able to achieve both their goals of equality and victory over

outside enemy forces? By using the Double V campaign, black leaders fought for both, and

achieved success in both. The black press and advocacy groups were able to keep black opinions

toward the war positive, which led to participation by the community. The United States

eventually won the war and the first "V" of the campaign was accomplished. The second "V"

ended with mixed results. While they did gain equality in the military and other social

institutions, they did not accomplish the totality of their goals, which was not only the

desegregation of the military, but of American society itself. The goal was to achieve true

equality in American society, but once the war ended, they found that they achieved little gains

outside of the military. While still a huge step forward for black civil-rights, it fell short of their

initial objective. Even though African Americans kept their allegiances in the face of hypocrisy

and discrimination they were not granted the rights they deserved. The advancements that were

made during the war became a strong symbol for the future and laid the foundation of race

relations, but it did not bring the equality that the black community had expected. Once again

blacks served their country and yet the country failed to serve them.

62 Quoted by Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters From Black Soldiers in World War II. (Kentucky: The University

Press of Kentucky, 1983) p. xxi.


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pike-discrimination against african american soldiers in wwii

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