pil 1 digests

7/28/2019 Pil 1 Digests

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Tuesday, July 28, 2009Gonzales vs. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230Facts:

Respondent executive secretary authorized importation of 67,000 tons of

foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Ramon A. Gonzales, a

rice planter and president of ilo-ilo palay and corn planters asso., filed and

averring that in making or attempting to make importation of foreign rice

are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction because RA 2207,

explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by Rice and Corn

Administration or any government agency.

Issue:

Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts.

Held:

The power of judicial review is vested with the supreme court in

consonace to section 2 art. VIII of the constitution. the alleged

consummation of the contracts with vietnam and burma does not render

this case academic. RA 2207, enjoins our government not from entering

contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under

conditions prescribed in said act.

A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not

compel our government to default in the performance of such obligations

as it mat have contracted with the sellers of rice in question because aside

from the fact that said obligations may be complied without importing the

said commodity into the phils., the proposed importation may still belegalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned law.


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Gonzales vs Hechanovaon October 29, 2011

Constitutional LawTreaty vs Executive AgreementsStatutes Can

Repeal Executive Agreements

Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive

agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without

complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the Natl

Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals. Hence,

Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of rice from abroad

to the detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo

Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements.Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of

jurisdiction, because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn

by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements

entered into by Macapagal.

HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to

enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in theperformance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise

of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have

acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an

executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act

prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a

statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not

applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists

that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can begiven as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous

legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of

powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in

our constitutional set up.


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As regards the question whether an executive or an international

agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the

Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by

providing that the SC may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review,

revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as

the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of

inferior courts in All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any

treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question. In

other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not

only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs

counter to an act of Congress.


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Gonzales vs. Hechanova

9 SCRA 230

FACTS: Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources.Thereupon, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter, andpresident of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed thepetition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make saidimportation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents are actingwithout jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because Republic Act No.2207, explicitly, prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice andCorn Administration or any other government agency.

ISSUE: Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our

courts.HELD: The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled in theaffirmative by providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that theSupreme Court may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise,reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law orthe rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferiorcourts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,law, ordinance, or executive order, or regulation is in question. In otherwords, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not onlywhen it conflicts with the fundamental law, but also, when it runs counter to

an act of Congress.The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnamand Burma does not render this case academic. Republic Act No. 2207enjoins our government not from entering into contracts for the purchase ofrice, but from entering rice, except under the conditions prescribed in said

Act.

A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would notcompel our Government to default in the performance of such obligationsas it may have contracted with the sellers of rice in question because aside

from the fact that said obligations may be complied without importing thesaid commodity into the Philippines, the proposed importation may still belegalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws.
http://xyckriz.blogspot.com/2010/11/gonzales-vs-hechanova.htmlhttp://xyckriz.blogspot.com/2010/11/gonzales-vs-hechanova.html


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Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandezon November 22, 2010

Constitutional LawTreaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the

Exercise of Police Power

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take

advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in

the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen

enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954

when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act

the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the

retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Acton the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP

which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund

servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business

here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he

should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or

generally accepted principles.

HELD:Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted

principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised

generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the

law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it

merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like

circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities

enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by

legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specifiedclass, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable

grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such

class and those who do not.


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For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would

be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it

represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could

not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.

Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls

in the Pasay city market.


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Ichong vs Hernandez Case Digest

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alienresidents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. byRepublic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME

HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, andMARCELINOSARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents.

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

FACTS: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate theRetail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business.The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons,not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships,

or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizensof the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retailtrade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliensactually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowedto continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited inaccordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement incase of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the

Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) anexception there from in favor of citizens and juridical entities of theUnited States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses for violation

of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures andlabor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) aprohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actuallyengaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches ofretail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged inthe retail business to present for registration with the properauthorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving,among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets andliabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and

(7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retailbusiness who die, to continue such business for a period of sixmonths for purposes of liquidation.

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alienresident,s corporations and partnerships adversely affected by theprovisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a


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judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin theSecretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him,particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing itsprovisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act,contending that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of thelaws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process oflaw.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 denies equal protection of lawsand due process?

HELD: The Court cited the following reason in upholding theconstitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 1180 which does not violatethe equal protection of laws and due process.

We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actualthreat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominanceand control of the retail business and free citizens and country fromdominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within thescope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which itprotects its own personality and insures its security and future.

The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the bigcenters of population, therefore, becomes a potential source ofdanger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here inthis country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods amongnationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups thatdominate the distribution of goods and commodities in thecommunities and big centers of population. They owe no allegianceor loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in timesof crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his personand his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien mayeven become the potential enemy of the State.

The law does not violate the equal protection clause of theConstitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinctionbetween alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated.

Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids aclassification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of theclass falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a


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higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similarclasses than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadlyspeaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliensconstitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise ofpolice power.

DUE PROCESS

The due process of law clause is not violated because the law isprospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliensalready engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects theirprivilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out itsobjectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact itseems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any

case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, withwhose power and discretion the Judicial department of theGovernment may not interfere.

The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not beunreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selectedshall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to beattained.

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in theabsence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adoptwhatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promotepublic welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to itspurpose. The courts are without authority either to declare suchpolicy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If thelaws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a properlegislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, therequirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determinationto that effect renders a court functus officio. . . .

To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of thepublic, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally,as distinguished from those of a particular class, require suchinterference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessaryfor the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressiveupon individuals. The real question at issue, therefore, is not that


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posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts andcircumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens fromthe retail trade unreasonable?; Arbitrary capricious, taking intoaccount the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which thealiens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated theanswer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessaryto bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free nationaleconomy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarilyunreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am.Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is theappropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the meansadopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test,disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actuallynecessary, must be considered not to have infringed the

constitutional limitation of reasonableness.


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Ichong vs Hernandez

FACTS:

The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail

Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of thePhil. from having a stranglehold upon the peoples economic life. a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships,or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, fromengaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 areallowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited inaccordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of

juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until theexpiration of term.

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this

Act. provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retailbusiness for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic controlweights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,commerce and industry. provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actuallyengaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retailbusiness

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents,

corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare

it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:

1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and

deprives them of their liberty and property without due process

2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title

3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations

4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of

their retail business thru hereditary succession

ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of thelaws.

HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the

aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive

and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully


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justify the legislative classification adopted.

RATIO:

The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among

residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, underlike circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and

liabilities enforced.

The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one

class are treated alike.

The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for

reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.

Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by

alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the

legislatures target in the enactment of the Act.

The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the

alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit

of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and

makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and

the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.

While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the

needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the

State.

The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the

people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use ofpernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic

control on the nations economy endangering the national security in times

of crisis and emergency.


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Kuroda v. Jalandoni Digest

Kuroda vs. JalandoniG.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949Ponente: Moran, C.J.

Facts:1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese

Army and commanding general of the Japanese forces during theoccupation (WWII) in the country. He was tried before the PhilippineMilitary Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities committed againstmilitary and civilians. The military commission was establish underExecutive Order 68.

2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and

hence the military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him onthe following grounds:- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (WarCrimes)

3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in thecase hence the 2 US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the militarytribunal jurisdiction is valid

HELD:

1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda.EO 68 was enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3,

Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of nationalpolicy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles ofinternational law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention,and other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including theprinciple that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing,

waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws andcustoms of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are whollybased on the generally accepted principles of international law. They wereaccepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)
http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/12/kuroda-v-jalandoni-digest.htmlhttp://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/12/kuroda-v-jalandoni-digest.htmlhttp://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/12/kuroda-v-jalandoni-digest.html


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2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is aparty of interest because its country and people have greatly aggrieved bythe crimes which petitioner was being charged of.

3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and

rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules ofcourt but the provision of this special law.


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Kuroda vs Jalandonion November 9, 2011

Political LawGenerality Accepted Principles of International Law

Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the

Philippines during the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before

the Military Commission due to the atrocities that were done against non

combatant civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant

to EO No. 68 which established the National War Crimes Office and

prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war

criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the

same is not provided for in the Constitution. He further underscores thefact that the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on

Rules and Regulations Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose

against him any criminal charges because it has no laws to base on,

national or international.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?

HELD: EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take

cognizance of the case at bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to the constitutionalprovision that states the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of

national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of

international law as part of the law of the nation. The Hague Convention

and other similar conventions whose principles are generally accepted are

hence considered as part of the law of the land.


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Kuroda vs Jalandoni 83 Phil 171

Facts

Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial

Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the

Philippines was charged before the Philippine Military Commission for war

crimes. As he was the commanding general during such period of war, he

was tried for failure to discharge his duties and permitting the brutal

atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against

noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation

of of the laws and customs of war.

Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid

court because the law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is

unconstitutional. He further contends that using as basis the Hague

Conventions Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war

crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a

signatory of such rules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that

the United States is not a party of interest in the case and that the two US

prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issue1.Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional

2.Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case

Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the

National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules on the trial of accused

war criminals, is constitutional as it is aligned with Sec 3,Article 2 of theConstitution which states that The Philippines renounces war as an

instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles

of international law as part of the law of the nation. The generally

accepted principles of international law includes those formed during the

Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other international


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jurisprudence established by United Nations. These include the principle

that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning,

preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes

and offenses in violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held

accountable. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines abides by

these principles and therefore has a right to try persons that commit such

crimes and most especially when it is committed againsts its citizens. It

abides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the

mere incorporation of such principles in the constitution.

The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people

have been equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which

the petitioner is charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the

Military Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules as to

parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but by the

very provisions of this special law.


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CO KIM CHAM v EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH

FACTS:

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the proceedingsin a civil case which were initiated during the Japanese military

occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General

MacArthur that all laws, regulations and processes of any other

government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth

are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines

free of enemy occupation and control had the effect of invalidating

and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of

the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the

lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue

judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of

the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such

authority.

During the Japanese occupation, no substantial change was effected

in the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts thatfunctioned during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the

laws they administered and enforced.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts

and proceedings of the courts during a de facto government are good

and valid.

2. Whether it was the intention of the Gen McArthur to annul and void

thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts

established in the Philippines during the Japanese military

occupation.
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3. Whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the

same court existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese

military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those

proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines werereoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and

the Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the

Islands.

HELD:

1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and

proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of

a de facto government are good and valid. The doctrine upon this

subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International

Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): The right of one belligerent to occupy and

govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is

one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to

conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political

institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government

for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military

occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government

are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived

directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the

world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of

courts in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a

conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue

in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they aresuspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He,

nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at

his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones.


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According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact

that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again

into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, does not,

except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by aninvader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence

to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of

a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that

they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various

acts done during the same time by private persons under the

sanction of municipal law, remain good.

That not only judicial but also legislative acts of defacto governments, which are not of a political complexion, are and

remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent

occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General

Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares null and

void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments

established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it

would not have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogatethem if they were invalid ab initio.

2. NO. The phrase processes of any other government is broad and

may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative

or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of

the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the

Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration

the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-knownprinciples of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings,

which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments

during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before

and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the


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power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not,

and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas

MacArthur, in using the phrase processes of any other government

in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of saidprinciples of international law.

3. YES. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial

administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military

occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take

the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the

ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country

which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. AnExecutive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states

that in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated

but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the

ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation.

This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on

the present occasion. And Taylor in this connection says: From a

theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armedwith the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of

government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point

of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of

the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws

and institution so far as military necessity will permit. Undoubtedly,

this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and

business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as

belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government

established by the occupant of transient character.

If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior

to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the


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Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive

Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands

to reason that the same courts, which had become reestablished and

conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupationand liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy,

may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts,

without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them

to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in

speaking of said principles a state or other governmental entity, upon

the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its

right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political

resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables

elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon removal of the

external force, and subject to the same exception in case of

absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content.


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Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh

Posted on December 4, 2008 by danabatnag

Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh

Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the

Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the

Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon

refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by

General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings

and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law,

lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial

proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the

Philippine government under the Japanese).The court resolved three issues:

1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese

occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;

2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which

he declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any o ther government in

the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without

legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control

invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;

3.And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation,

those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.

Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a

de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission

and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be

considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving

their authority from the laws of war.

Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless

suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected evenduring war, for the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the

bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration

of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for

MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.

The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase
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processes of any other government and whether or not he intended it to annul

all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese

military occupation.

IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial

proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the

occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs

intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international

law.

A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be

construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction

remains.

Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular

construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or thecourt ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of

the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.

Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog

the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should

not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase

processes of any other governments.

In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are

continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from

him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued

as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.

It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established

continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT

CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the

new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.

Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the

Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of

Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon themhave continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue

exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration

of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and

conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.

DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance


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of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the

proceedings in civil case no. 3012.

Summary of ratio:

1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil

laws continue even during occupation unless repealed.

2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be

applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the

law of nations.

3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending

before it.

***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets

possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains

itself against the will of the rightful government)through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade

and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a

government of paramount force)

through insurrection (established as an independent government by the

inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)


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