CIVIL LAW REVIEW (ATTY. RUBEN BALANE)

ARTICLES 774/776

Union Bank v. Santibanez

452 SCRA 228 | Abu

FACTS:On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibaez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.

Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement.

Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document.

In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.

ISSUE:

W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending. W/N the agreement between Edmund and Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte estate) was void considering that it had not been approved by the probate court. W/N there can be a valid partition among the heirs before the will is probated.

HELD:

Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.

In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the provision which reads as follows:

(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.

The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.

The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs.

Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty.

ARTICLE 77

Uson v. Del Rosario

92:530| Andres

FACTS:

This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land in Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four illegit children. Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment. Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that Uson and her husband, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of which Uson was given a parcel of land and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death. CFI found for Uson. Defendants appealed.

ISSUE:

1. W/N Uson has a right over the lands from the moment of death of her husband.

2. W/N the illegit children of deceased and his common-law wife have successional rights.

HELD:

1. Yes. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, was merely a common-law wife with whom she had four illegitimate children with the deceased. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Art 777 NCC).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death". From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.

The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.2. No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation only if no vested rights are impaired. Hence, since the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband, the new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

Borja v. Borja

46 SCRA 577 | Ang

FACTS: Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who died, Josefa Tangco, with the CFI of Rizal. He was appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son Jose became the sole administrator. Francisco had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed special administatrix. Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana opposed the approval of the compromise agreement. She argues that it was no valid, because the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE: W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been probated.

HELD: YES, the compromise agreement is valid.

The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full payment for her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa.

There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco deBorjaamong the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco deBorjaand Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of suchcausanteor predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.

Bonilla v. Barcena

71 SCRA 491 | Angliongto

FACTS:

On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the CFI of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. In the hearing for the motion to dismiss, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.

ISSUE:

W/N the CFI erred in dismissing the complaint.

HELD:

While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.

The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done for under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.

ARTICLE 783

Vitug v. CA

183 SCRA 755 | JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWERFACTS:Romarico Vitug and Nenita Alonte were co-administrators of Dolores Vitugs (deceased) estate. Rowena Corona was the executrix. Romarico, the deceaseds husband, filed a motion with the probate court asking for authority to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover alleged advances to the estate, which he claimed as personal funds. The advances were used to pay estate taxes.

Corona opposed the motion on ground that the advances came from a savings account which formed part of the conjugal partnership properties and is part of the estate. Thus, there was no ground for reimbursement. Romarico claims that the funds are his exclusive property, having been acquired through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank.

The agreement stated that after the death of either one of the spouses, the savings account shall belong to and be the sole property of the survivor, and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor.

The lower court upheld the validity of the agreement and granted the motion to sell. CA reversed stating that the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which did not comply with the formalities of a valid will. Assuming that it was a donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation (donation between spouses).ISSUE:W/N the survivorship agreement was valid.HELD:YES. The conveyance is not mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death. The bequest or devise must pertain to the testator.

In this case, the savings account involved was in the nature of conjugal funds. Since it was not shown that the funds belonged exclusively to one party, it is presumed to be conjugal.

It is also not a donation inter vivos because it was to take effect after the death of one party. It is also not a donation between spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouses own properties to the other.

It was an error to include the savings account in the inventory of the deceaseds assets because it is the separate property of Romarico.

Thus, Romarico had the right to claim reimbursement.

A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death.

Survivorship agreements are permitted by the NCC. However, its operation or effect must not be violative of the law (i.e. used as a cloak to hide an inofficious donation or to transfer property in fraud of creditors or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir).

ARTICLE 804

Suroza v. Honrado

110 SCRA 388 | Atcheco

FACTS:

Spouses Mauro Suroza and Marcelina Salvador, who were childless, reared a boy named Agapito. Agapito and his wife Nenita de Vera had a daughter named Lilia. Nenita became Agapitos guardian when he became disabled. A certain Arsenia de la Cruz also wanted to be his guardian in another proceeding but it was dismissed. Arsenia then delivered a child named Marilyn Sy to Marcelina who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito. Marilyn used the surname Suroza although not legally adopted by Agapito. When Marcelina (who was an illiterate) was 73 years old, she supposedly executed a notarial will which was in English and thumbmarked by her. In the will, she allegedly bequeathed all her properties to Marilyn. She also named as executrix her laundrywoman, Marina Paje. Paje filed a petition for probate of Marcelinas will. Judge Honrado appointed Paje as administratrix and issued orders allowing the latter to withdraw money from the savings account of Marcelina and Marilyn, and instructing the sheriff to eject the occupants of testatrixs house, among whom was Nenita. She and the other occupants filed a motion to set aside the order ejecting them, alleging that Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, and that Marilyn was not the decedents granddaughter. Despite this, Judge Honrado issued an order probating Marcelinas will.

Nenita filed an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter-petition for administration and preliminary injunction, and an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition for letters of administration, which were dismissed by Judge Honrado. Instead of appealing, Nenita filed a case to annul the probate proceedings but Judge Honrado dismissed it. The judge then closed the testamentary proceeding after noting that the executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been paid.

Ten months later, Nenita filed a complaint before the SC, charging Judge Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina. She reiterated her contention that the testatrix was illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the will and that she did not know English, the language in which the will was written. She further alleged that Judge Honrado did not take into account the consequences of the preterition of testatrixs son, Agapito. Judge Honrado in his comment did not deal specifically with the allegations but merely pointed to the fact that Nenita did not appeal from the decree of probate and that in a motion, she asked for a thirty day period within which to vacate the house of the testatrix. Nenita subsequently filed in the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition against Judge Honrado wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings in the probate case be declared void. The CA dismissed the petition because Nenitas remedy was an appeal and her failure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari. Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado filed a MTD the administrative case for having allegedly become moot and academic.

ISSUE:

W/N disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a will, which on its face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as admitted by the notary himself.

HELD:

YES. Respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language understood and known to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix and translated into Filipino language. That could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.

The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the testator instead of testatrix. Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive. Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by the deputy clerk of court, respondent judge could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness. In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.

Noble v. Abaja

450 SCRA 265 | Bautista

FACTS:

The case is about the probate of the will of Alipio Abada (Not respondent Abaja). Petitioner Belinda Noble is the administratrix of the estate of Abada. Respondent Alipio Abaja filed a petition for the probate of Abadas will. Petitioner Noble moved for dismissal of the petition for probate.

Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada knew the Spanish language. She alleges that such defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the will.

ISSUE:

Should it be expressly stated in the will that it (the will) was in a language known by the testator?

HELD:

No. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will.[25] This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. In this case, Alipio testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in the Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language.

ARTICLES 805-806

Matias v. Salud

L-10751, 23 June 1958 | JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWERFACTS:The CFI denied probate of the will of Gabina Raquel. It must be noted that Gabina Raquel was suffering from herpes zoster that afflicted the right arm and shoulder of the testatrix, which made writing difficult and a painful act. Thus, upon the insistence of the attorney, Gabina attempted to sign, but since it was so painful she just managed to thumbmarked the foot of the document and the left margin at each page. The parties opposing the probate of the will contended that the will was void due to the irregularities in the execution thereof.

One of the points raised by the oppositors was that the finger mark can not be regarded as the decedents valid signature as it does not show distinct identifying ridgelines. And since the finger mark was an invalid signature, there must appear in the attestation clause that another person wrote the testators name at his request.

ISSUE:W/N the will was valid.

HELD:

YES. As to the clarity of the ridge impressions, it is so dependent on aleatory requirements as to require dexterity that can be expected of very few persons; testators should not be required to possess the skill of trained officers.

And as to the validity of the thumbprints as signature, the SC held that it has been held in a long line of cases that a thumbprint is always a valid and sufficient signature for the purpose of complying with the requirement of the article.

Furthermore, the validity of thumbprints should not be limited in cases of illness or infirmity. A thumbprint is considered as a valid and sufficient signature in complying with the requirements of the article.

Garcia v. Lacuesta

90:489 | Castillo

FACTS:

This case involves the will of Antero Mercado, which among other defects was signed by the testator through a cross mark (an X). The will was signed by Atty. Javier who wrote the name of Mercado as testator and the latter allegedly wrote a cross mark after his name. The CFI allowed the will but the CA disallowed it because its attestation clause was defective for failing to certify 1) that the will was signed by Atty. Javier at the express direction of the testator, 2) that the testator wrote a cross at the end of his name after Atty. Javier signed for him, and 3) that the 3 witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.

ISSUE:

Whether the will should be allowed despite the defect of the attestation clause since the testator had placed a cross mark himself as his signature.

HELD:

The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Mercado directed Javier to write the testators name under his express direction. Petitioners argument that such recital is unnecessary because the testator signed the will himself using a cross mark which should be considered the same as a thumb-mark (which has been held sufficient in past cases) is not acceptable. A cross mark is not the same as a thumb mark, because the cross mark does not have the same trustworthiness of a thumb mark.

Barut v. Cabacungan

21:461 | Casuela

FACTS:

Barut applied for the probate of the will of deceased, Maria Salomon. The testatrix stated in the will that being unable to read or write, the will was read to her by Ciriaco Concepcion and Timotea Inoselda and that she had instructed Severo Agayan to sign her name to it as testatrix. The probate was contested by a number of the relatives of the deceased on various grounds.

The probate court found that the will was not entitled to probate because the handwriting of the person who it is alleged signed the name of the testatrix to the will for and on her behalf looked more like the handwriting of one of the other witnesses to the will than to the person whose handwriting it was alleged to be (i.e. The probate court denied probate because the signature seemed to not have been by Severo Agayan but by another witness).

ISSUE:

Was the dissimilarity in handwriting sufficient to deny probate of the will?

HELD:

No. The SC found that the mere dissimilarity in writing is sufficient to overcome the uncontradicted testimony of all the witnesses that the signature of the testatrix was written by Severo Agayan. It is also immaterial who writes the name of the testatrix provided it is written at her request and in her presence and in the presence of all the witnesses to the execution of the will.

Based on Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that with respect to the validity of the will, it is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. The important thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction in the presence of 3 witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her presence and in the presence of each other. It may be wise that the one who signs the testators name signs also his own; but that is not essential to the validity of the will.

The court also held that the 3 cases cited by the lower court was not applicable. In those cases, the person who signed the will for the testator wrote his own name instead of the testators, so that the testators name nowhere appeared in the will, and were thus wills not duly executed.

Nera v. Rimando

18:450 | Cukingnan

FACTS:

The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of the instrument propounded as a will in the court below, is whether one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.

HELD:

Citing Jaboneta v. Gustilo, the court held that The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.

But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so.

The question is whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will signed the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the purpose for which this particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in the execution of a will.

Icasiano v. Icasiano

11 SCRA 422 | Dela Cuesta

FACTS:

Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, and for his appointment as executor thereof. Natividad and Enrique Icasiano, a daughter and son of the testatrix, filed their opposition thereto. During the course of the trial, on 19 March 1959, Celso, started to present his evidence. But later, on 1 June 1959, he then filed an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent had left a will executed in duplicate and with all the legal requirements, and that he was submitting the duplicate to the court, which he found only on 26 May 1959. Natividad and Enrique filed their opposition, but the will and its duplicate was admitted to probate by the trial court. Hence, this appeal by the oppositors.

Oppositors-appellants (Natividad and Enrique) in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine, nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original, and further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby proponents- appellees stand to profit from properties held by them as attorneys- in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.

ISSUE:

Was the trial court correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to probate given the allegations of forgery of the testators signature, or that the will was executed under circumstances constituting fraud and undue influence and pressure?

(Not raised by the appellants in the case but discussed by the Court and in Sirs book) Is the failure of one of the witnesses to sign a page of the will fatal to its validity?

HELD:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that both the will and its duplicate are valid in all respects.

On the allegations of forgery, fraud and undue influence:

The Court is satisfied that all the requisites for the validity of a will have been complied with. The opinion of a handwriting expert trying to prove forgery of the testatrix's signature failed to convince the Court, not only because it is directly contradicted by another expert but principally because of the paucity of the standards used by him (only three other signatures), considering the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signature, and the effect of writing fatigue.

Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned signatures does not appear reliable, considering that standard and challenged writings were affixed to different kinds of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole, the testimony of the oppositor's expert is insufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental witnesses as to the wills execution, which were presented by Celso during the trial.

Nor is there adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The testamentary disposition that the heirs should not inquire into other property and that they should respect the distribution made in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part, do not suffice to prove fraud or undue influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which, as shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate being diverted into the hands of non- heirs and speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated on another occasion. It is also well to note that fraud and undue influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence against the validity of the will.

On the failure of a witness to sign a page in the original, but signed all pages in the duplicate:

The records show that the original of the will consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page 3 thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.

Witness Atty. Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign page 3 of the original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page 3 was signed in his presence.

The failure Atty. Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time. Therefore, Atty. Natividads failure to sign page 3 of the original through mere inadvertence does not affect the wills validity.

Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.

This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to mark the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.

The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the duplicate is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate of the original because it lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma: if the original is defective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate, and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.

Cagro v. Cagro

92:1032 | DinaFACTS:

Vicente Cagro died on Feb. 14, 1949 in Samar. Since the decedent allegedly made a will prior to his death, the will was probated before the CFI of Samar. However, the oppositors-appellant objected the probate proceeding alleging that the will is fatally defective because its attestation clause is not signed by the attesting witnesses. It is undisputed that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.

ISSUE:

W/N the will may be probated even if the signatures of the witnesses do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, and instead, they were placed on the left-hand margin of the page containing the same.

HELD:

No. The position taken by the oppositor-appellant is correct. The attestation clause is 'a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will' required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.

The petitioner-appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.

Bautista Angelo, J. dissenting:

I dissent. In my opinion the will in question has substantially complied with the formalities of the law and, therefore, should be admitted to probate. It appears that the will was signed by the testator and was attested by three instrumental witnesses, not only at the bottom, but also on the left-hand margin. The witnesses testified not only that the will was signed by the testator in their presence and in the presence of each other but also that when they did so, the attestation clause was already written thereon. Their testimony has not been contradicted. The only objection set up by the oppositors to the validity of the will is the fact that the signatures of the instrumental witnesses do not appear immediately after the attestation clause.

This objection is too technical to be entertained. In the case of Abangan vs. Abangan, (40 Phil. 476), this court said that when the testamentary dispositions "are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses (as the instant case),their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless." In such a case, the court said, the requirement of the signatures on the left hand margin was not necessary because the purpose of the law which is to avoid the substitution of any of the sheets of the will, thereby changing the testator's dispositions has already been accomplished. We may say the same thing in connection with the will under consideration because while the three instrumental witnesses did not sign immediately by the majority that it may have been only added on a subsequent occasion and not at the uncontradicted testimony of said witnesses to the effect that such attestation clause was already written in the will when the same was signed.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

I concur in Mr. Justice Bautista's dissenting opinion and may add that the majority decision erroneously sets down as a fact that the attestation clause was not signed when the witnesses signatures appear on the left margin and the real and only question is whether such signatures are legally sufficient. The law on wills does not provide that the attesting witness should sign the clause at the bottom. In the absence of such provision, there is no reason why the signatures on the margin are not acceptable

Cruz v. Villasor

54 SCRA 752 | Dizon

FACTS:

The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of Valente Z. Cruzs last will and testament. His surviving spouse, Agapita Cruz, opposed the allowance of the will alleging it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute without the testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law. Agapita appealed the allowance of the will by certiorari.

ISSUE:

W/N the will was executed in accordance with law (particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the NCC, the first requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public.).

HELD:

NO. Of the three instrumental witnesses to the will, one of them (Atty. Teves) is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma; Castro v. Castro); to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity. Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement (Balinon v. De Leon). That function would defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. It would place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted.

Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public may, in addition, act as a witness to the executive of the document he has notarized. There are others holding that his signing merely as notary in a will nonetheless makes him a witness thereon. But these authorities do not serve the purpose of the law in this jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue herein because the notaries public and witnesses referred to in these cases merely acted as instrumental, subscribing attesting witnesses, and not as acknowledging witnesses. Here, the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805-06. Probate of will set aside.

Javellana v. Ledesma

97:258 | EnriquezFACTS:The Court of First Instance of Iloilo admitted to probate the documents in the Visayan dialectas the testament and codicil duly executed by the deceased Da. Apolinaria Ledesma Vda. de Javellana, on March 30, 1950, and May 29, 1952, respectively, with Ramon Tabiana, Gloria Montinola de Tabiana and Vicente Yap as witnesses. The contestant, Matea Ledesma, sister and nearest surviving relative of said deceased, appealed from the decision, insisting that the said exhibits were not executed in conformity with law. Ledesma is questioning the validity of the codicil contending that the fact that the notary did not sign the instrument in the presence of the testator and the witness made the codicil was not executed in conformity with the lawISSUE: W/N the codicil was validly executed.

HELD:

The instrumental witnesses (who happen to be the same ones who attested the will of 1950) asserted that after the codicil had been signed by the testatrix and the witnesses at the San Pablo Hospital, the same was signed and sealed by notary public Gimotea on the same occasion. On the other hand, Gimotea affirmed that he did not do so, but brought the codicil to his office, and signed and sealed it there. The variance does not necessarily imply conscious perversion of truth on the part of the witnesses, but appears rather due to a well-established phenomenon, the tendency of the mind, in recalling past events, to substitute the usual and habitual for what differs slightly from it.

Whether or not the notary signed the certification of acknowledgment in the presence of the testatrix and the witnesses, does not affect the validity of the codicil. The new Civil Code does not require that the signing of the testator, witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single act. A comparison of Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code reveals that while testator and witnesses sign in the presence of each other, all that is thereafter required is that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" (Art. 806); i.e., that the latter should avow to the certifying officer the authenticity of their signatures and the voluntariness of their actions in executing the testamentary disposition. This was done in this case. The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate execution out of the presence of the testatrix and her witnesses cannot be said to violate the rule that testaments should be completed without interruption. It is noteworthy that Article 806 of the new Civil Code does not contain words requiring that the testator and the witnesses should acknowledge the testament on the same day or occasion that it was executed.

Ortega v. Valmonte

478 SCRA 247 | Escosia

FACTS:

Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983but acknowledged only on 9 August 1983. The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia, Placidos sister. According to the notary public who notarized the testators will, after the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time to prepare. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The formal execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty.

Petitioners argument:

1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind.

2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.

ISSUE:

1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the will.

2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or trickery.

HELD:

1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their location. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for fraud, he would not have made.

The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.

Omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. The variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and instrumental witnesses.

Guerrero v. Bihis

521 SCRA 394 | Estorninos

FACTS:

Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died. Guerrero filed for probate in the RTC QC. Respondent Bihis opposed her elder sister's petition on the following grounds: the will was not executed and attested as required by law; its attestation clause and acknowledgment did not comply with the requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner and her children procured the will through undue and improper pressure and influence. Petitioner Guerrero was appointes special administratrix. Respondent opposed petitioner's appointment but subsequently withdrew her opposition. The trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's residence at No. 40 Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City.

ISSUE: Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code?

HELD:

No. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. 6 This formal requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will. 7 In other words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate. cDICaSThe Notarial law provides: SECTION 240.Territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.

The compulsory language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the Notarial Law was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo were all completely void.

Lee v. Tambago

544 SCRA 393 | ForteaFACTS:

Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses. In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.

The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965. Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962. Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation which supposedly contained his purported signature. Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed of donation were "in any way entirely and diametrically opposed from one another in all angle[s]."

Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective voters affidavits.

Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA).

ISSUE:

Was the will spurious?

HELD:

Yes, thus Tambago violated the Notarial Law and the ethics of legal profession.The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.

A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The will in question was attested by only two witnesses. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.

A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testators old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.

As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization. These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded.

ARTICLE 808

Garcia v. Vasquez

32 SCRA 489 | Grapilon

FACTS:

This is a petition for appeal from the CFI of Manila admitting to probate the will of Gliceria Avelino del Rosario (Gliceria) executed in 1960. Likewise, this is also an appeal to remove the current administrator, Consuelo Gonzales-Precilla( Consuelo) as special administratrix of the estate on the ground of Consuelo possesses interest adverse to the estate and to order the RD of Manila to annotate on the registered lands a notice of Lis Pendens.

When Gliceria died she had no descendants, ascendants, bros or sisses and 90 yrs old. After which, her niece, Consuelo petitioned the court to be the administratrix of the properties. The court approved this because Consuelo has been was already managing the properties of the deceased during her lifetime. What the respondents allege is that in the last years of the deceased, Consuelo sought the transfer of certain parcels of land valued at 300k for a sale price of 30k to her husband Alfonso through fraud and intimidation. In addition, the oppositors presented evidence that Consuelo asked the court to issue new Certificates of Titles to certain parcels of land for the purpose of preparing the inventory to be used in the probate. Also shown was that NEW TCTs were issued by the RD for certain lands of the deceased after Consuelo asked for the old TCTs.

At the end of the probate proceedings, the court ruled that Counsuelo should be made the administrator, and that the will was duly executed because of these reasons: NO EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PRESENTED to establish that the deceased was not of sound mind, that eventough the allegations state that the deceased prepared another will in 1956 (12pages), the latter is not prevented from executing another will in 1960 (1page), and that inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses prove their truthfulness.

ISSUE:

Was the will in 1960 (1 page) duly/properly executed?

HELD:

NO. Provision of Article 808 mandatory. Therefore, For all intents and purposes of the rules on probate, the testatrix was like a blind testator, and the due execution of her will would have required observance of Article 808. The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) , is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. Likewise, the 1970 will was done in Tagalog which the deceased is not well versed but in Spanish. This creates doubt as to the due execution of the will and as well as the typographical errors contain therein which show the haste in preparing the 1 page will as compared to the 12 page will created in 1956 written in Spanish. ALSO, as to the blindness, there was proof given by the testimony of the doctor that the deceased could not read at near distances because of cataracts. (Testatrixs vision was mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print.) Since there is no proof that it was read to the deceased twice, the will was NOT duly executed.

ALSO, Consuelo should be removed as administrator because she is not expected to sue her own husband to reconvey the lands to the estate alleged to have been transferred by the deceased to her own husband.

The notice of lis pendens is also not proper where the issue is not an action in rem, affecting real property or the title thereto.

Alvarado v. Gaviola

226 SCRA 347 | JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWERFACTS:On 5 November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled Huling Habilin wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son, petitioner Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before the RTC of Laguna.

According to Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he was present when the said notarial will was executed, together with three instrumental witnesses and the notary public, where the testator did not read the will himself, suffering as he did from glaucoma.

Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and read the same aloud before the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public, the latter four following the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them.

Thereafter, a codicil entitled Kasulatan ng Pagbabago ng Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testators eye operation.

Said codicil was likewise not read by Brigido Alvarado and was read in the same manner as with the previously executed will.

When the notarial will was submitted to the court for probate, Cesar Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that the will was not executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or mentally incapacitated due to senility and old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear or threats; that it was procured by undue pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary; and that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.

ISSUE:

W/N notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be admitted to probate despite allegations of defects in the execution and attestation thereof as testator was allegedly blind at the time of execution and the double-reading requirement under Art. 808 of the NCC was not complied with. HELD:YES. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testators will.

Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father was not totally blind (of counting fingers at 3 feet) when the will and codicil were executed, but he can be so considered for purposes of Art. 808.

That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.

However, in the case at bar, there was substantial compliance where the purpose of the law has been satisfied: that of making the provisions known to the testator who is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) and enabling him to object if they do not accord with his wishes.

Rino read the testators will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public.

Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions.

Only then did the signing and acknowledgment take place.

There is no evidence that the contents of the will and the codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator.

With four persons, mostly known to the testator, following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents.

The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will to himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes.

Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testators will.

ARTICLE 809

Caneda v. CA

222 SCRA 781 | JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWERFACTS:

On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a last will and testament at his residence before 3 witnesses.

He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad.

In the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to several people all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator.

4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the probate of his last will and testament, but numerous postponements pushed back the initial hearing of the probate court regarding the will.

On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court.

Thereafter one of the legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought his appointment as special administrator of the testators estate.

Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition for intestate proceedings. They also opposed the probate of the testators will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate.

Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by William Cabrera as special administrator and gave an order that the testate proceedings for the probate of the will had to be heard and resolved first.

In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the allowance of the testators will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already in poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Also the genuineness of the signature of the testator is in doubt.

On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary public testified that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that the testator was in good health and was not unduly influenced in any way in the execution of his will.

Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero.

CA affirmed the probate courts decision stating that it substantially complies with Article 805. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:W/N the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally defective or can be cured under the art. 809.HELD:No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law.

Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to 809. The will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the attesting witnesses. The attestation clause need not be written in a language known to the testator or even to the attesting witnesses.

It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed.

The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof.

It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will failed to specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses witnessed the testator sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. And the Court agrees.

The attestation clause does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.

The phrase, and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the space provided for his signature and on the left hand margin, obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words as his last will and testament.

Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. That the absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be probated.

Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The defect in this case is not only with respect to the form or the language of the attestation clause. The defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself which is clearly lacking in this case.

Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the intestate proceedings shall be revived.

Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it does not pertain to the form or language of the will. This is because there is not substantial compliance with Article 805.

Azuela v. CA

487 SCRA 119 | JalipaARTICLE 810

Roxas v. De Jesus

134 SCRA 245 | Lantion

FACTS:

Bibiane Roxas died. Her brother, Simeon Roxas, filed a spec. pro. for partition of the estate of the deceased and also delivered the holographic will of the deceased. Simeon stated that he found a notebook belonging to deceased, which contained a letter-will entirely written and signed in deceaseds handwriting. The will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my will which I want to be respected although it is not written by a lawyer. Roxas relatives corroborated the fact that the same is a holographic will of deceased, identifying her handwriting and signature. Respondent opposed probate on the ground that it such does not comply with Article 810 of the CC because the date contained in a holographic will must signify the year, month, and day.

ISSUE:

W/N the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.

HELD:

Valid date.

This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions of the law wills consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. If a Will has been executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Will should be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282).

If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the testator. InAbangan v. Abanga40 Phil. 476, we ruled that: The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. ...

In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case.

We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained.

As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

Labrador v. CA

184 SCRA 170 | JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWERFACTS:Melecio died leaving behind a parcel of land to his heirs. However, during probate proceedings, Jesus and Gaudencio filed an opposition on the ground that the will has been extinguished by implication of law alleging that before Melecios death, the land was sold to them evidenced by TCT No. 21178. Jesus eventually sold it to Navat.

Trial court admitted the will to probate and declared the TCT null and void. However, the CA on appeal denied probate on the ground that it was undated.

ISSUE:W/N the alleged holographic will is dated, as provided for in Article 810 of CC.

HELD:

YES. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator.

The intention to show March 17 1968 as the date of the execution is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. It states that this being in the month of March 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than Melecio Labrador, their father. This clearly shows that this is a unilateral act of Melecio who plainly knew that he was executing a will.

ARTICLE 811

Gan v. Yap

104:509 | Lugtu

FACTS:

Felicidad Yap died of a heart failure, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in Manila.

Fausto E. Gan, her nephew, initiated the proceedings in the Manila CFI with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased.

The will was not presented because Felicidads husband, Ildefonso, supposedly took it. What was presented were witness accounts of relatives who knew of her intention to make a will and allegedly saw it as well. According to the witnesses, Felicidad did not want her husband to know about it, but she had made known to her other relatives that she made a will.

Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.

After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Judge refused to probate the alleged will on account of the discrepancies arising from the facts. For one thing, it is strange that Felicidad made her will known to so many of her relatives when she wanted to keep it a secret and she would not have carried it in her purse in the hospital, knowing that her husband may have access to it. There was also no evidence presented that her niece was her confidant.

In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositors evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have executed such holographic will.

ISSUE:

1. May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesseswho have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?

2. W/N Felicidad could have executed the holographic will.HELD: 1. No. The will must be presented.

The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814. "A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed."

This is a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills under Act 190, which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required wills to be subscribed by the testator and three credible witnesses ineachand every page; such witnesses to attest to the number of sheets used and to the fact that the testator signed in their presence and that they signed in the presence of the testator and of each other. Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled when such will is submitted to the courts for allowance. For that purpose the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the three must testify, if available. From the testimony of such witnesses (and of other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion as to the genuineness and authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its due execution.

With regard to holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they are "entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself."In the probate of a holographic will" says the New Civil Code, "it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent's handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to."

The witnesses need not have seen the execution of the holographic will, but they must be familiar with the decedents handwriting. Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, thesemeans of opposition, andof assessing the evidenceare not available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity the testator's handwriting has disappeared.

The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate) of a lost or destroyed will by secondary evidence the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of the original document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills which could not then be validly made here. Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills? (NO)

Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the holographic will is that it may be lost or stolen an implied admission that such loss or theft renders it useless.

As it is universally admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the testator and by himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either its execution or its contents, the above article 692 could not have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state whether they know of the will, but whetherin the face of the document itselfthey think the testator wrote it. Obviously, this they can't do unlessthe will itselfis presented to the Court and to them.

This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero Juzgo, admittedly the basis of the Spanish Civil Code provisions on the matter.(According to the Fuero, the will itself must be compared with specimens of the testators handwriting.)

All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased in accordance with his holographic will, unless they are shown his handwriting and signature.

Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.

At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why, unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.

In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be checked and exposed, their whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the likelihood that they would be called by the testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or trusted friends of the testator they are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent scheme to distort his wishes. Last but not least, they can not receive anything on account of the will.

Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissibleonly one man could engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or passable imitation of the handwriting and signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and credible witnesses see and read the forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they would in all good faith affirm its genuineness and authenticity. The will having been lost the forger may have purposely destroyed it in an "accident" the oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the error, because the document itself is not at hand. And considering that the holographic will may consist of two or three pages, andonly oneof them need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be the most important ones, may go undetected.

If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable feature feasibility of forgery would be added to the several objections to this kind of wills listed by Castan, Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-known Spanish Commentators and teachers of Civil Law.

One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses would be testifyingto a factwhich they saw, namely the act of the testator of subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify asto their opinionof the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be tested in court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.

In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.

2. No. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.Rodelas v. Aranza

119 SCRA 16 | Nieves

FACTS:

Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.

Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of:

1. Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;

2. the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will, it was merely an instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by the decedent;

3. the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect because lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills

4. the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by law.

MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition.

The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will stating that in the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills.

And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more t