policy analysis ... analyzing what
DESCRIPTION
Policy outcomes often fall short of policy intentions. Despite globalization and regionalization, in many cases national problems, policies, and politics emerge and traverse through varying modes of locally evolved governance mechanisms characterized by a range of clearly discernible formal and informal institutions.TRANSCRIPT
PolicyAnalysisandInstitutionsofGovernance:Analyzing….what?
December2015PositionPaper
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AcknowledgementsThispaperhasbenefitedfromcriticalandencouragingcommentsfromtheparticipantsandorganizersatthefollowingeventswherethekeypointsofthepaperhavebeenpresented:
• ExpertGroupMeetingon“InnovatingPublicServiceDeliverytoImplementthePost-2015DevelopmentAgenda”,organizedbyUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,Medellin,Colombia,22-26July,2015.
• ExpertGroupMeetingon“Governance,PublicAdministrationandInformation&CommunicationTechnologiesforPost2015Development”,organizedbyUnitedNationsDepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairs,Geneva,3-5July,2013.
• WageningenInternationalWorkshop“ScrutinizingSuccessandFailureinDevelopment:InstitutionalChange,CapacityDevelopment,andTheoriesofChange”,heldinWageningen(theNetherlands)onDecember6-7,2007.
• TheMaxwellSchoolofGovernment,SyracuseUniversity,NewYork,October14,2007• TheGraduateSchoolofArchitecture,Planning,andPreservation,ColumbiaUniversity,NewYork,October18,2007
• TheESRCGenomicsPolicyandResearchForumworkshop,“NewGovernanceToolsforNewTechnologies?”,heldatUniversityofEdinburgh,ScotlandonJune8,2005
• TheInstituteforEnvironmentalStudies“ScaleWorkshop”,heldatVrijeUniversity,Amsterdam,onJanuary24,2005
ThispaperhasalsobenefitedfromnumerousdiscussionsovertheyearswithSaurabhArora,AnthonyArundel,TommasoCiarli,SeemaHafeez,RichardNelson,AstaOlesen,MariaSavona,andSmitaSrinivas.
AuthorSaeedParto
AboutAPPRO-EuropeAPPRO-EuropewasfoundedinMarch2015tocarryoutappliedresearch,trainingandmentoring,monitoringandevaluations,knowledgedissemination,andpolicyadvocacytoinforminternationaldevelopment.APPRO-Europe(ASBL)isregisteredinBelgiumandFrance.APPRO-Europe’smissionistofacilitatecriticaldialogueondevelopmentaideffectivenessandpolicymaking.Thismissionhastwocomponents.Thefirstcomponentistomeasuredevelopmentprogressagainststrategicdevelopmentobjectivestoinformpolicy.Thesecondcomponentistotrainandmentorcivilsocietyorganizationsinevidence-basedadvocacyandgovernmentsinevidence-basedpolicymaking.APPRO-Europeoperatesthroughfundsprovidedbynationalandinternationaldevelopmentaidorganizations.Withtheexceptionofevaluationreports,allresearchfindingsaredisseminatedaspublications,downloadablefreeofchargefromAPPRO-Europe’swebsiteat:www.appro-europe.netContact:[email protected]:Collagebasedonphotographsfrom:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_topologyTheauthortakesfullresponsibilityforallomissionsanderrorsinthispaper.©2015.APPRO-Europe(ASBL).Thispublicationmaybestoredinaretrievalsystemortransmittedonlyfornon-commercialpurposesandwithwrittencredittotheauthorandAPPRO-Europewithalinktowww.appro-europe.net.Anyotheruseofthispublicationrequirespriorwrittenpermissionwhichmaybeobtainedbywritingto:[email protected].
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AbstractPolicyoutcomesoftenfallshortofpolicyintentions.Despiteglobalizationandregionalization,inmanycasesnationalproblems,policies,andpoliticsemergeandtraversethroughvaryingmodesoflocallyevolvedgovernancemechanismscharacterizedbyarangeofclearlydiscernibleformalandinformalinstitutions.Effortstooperationalizesupra-nationalorglobalpoliciesorvisionssuchastheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalscontinuetobesimultaneouslysupportedandcurtailedatthelocal/nationalscalebytheinstitutionsthroughwhichgovernanceisexercisedindifferentcontexts.Drawingonnumerousstudiesonthediscrepancybetweenpolicyoutcomesandpolicyobjectives,thispaperarticulatesaframeworkforconductinggovernance-oriented,institutionallyinformedpolicyanalysisinpoliticallyandsocio-economicallyheterogeneousenvironments.Keywords:Governance,PolicyAnalysis,InstitutionalAnalysis
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TableofContents
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 4
PolicyAnalysis ........................................................................................................................ 5
Governance ............................................................................................................................ 9
Institutions ........................................................................................................................... 14
InstitutionsandGovernance................................................................................................. 19
InstitutionalPolicyAnalysis:AFramework ........................................................................... 22
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 24
References............................................................................................................................ 28
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Introduction
Thepolicyprocessisalmostalwayscharacterizedbydiscrepancies,andsometimesquitesignificant
discrepancies,betweenpolicyoutcomesandpolicyobjectives.Thediscrepanciesareespecially
pronouncedwhenthesamepolicyintentionsaretriedoutinheterogeneousandhighlydiversified
contextsasrepresentedbythe191countriesthatsigneduptotheUnitedNationsMillennium
DevelopmentGoals(MDGs)inSeptember2000,forexample.Thesignatoriesmadeformal
commitmentstocombatpoverty,hunger,disease,illiteracy,environmentaldegradation,and
discriminationagainstwomen.IncludedamongthesignatoriestoMDGsarewealthyindustrialized
countrieswithverylargeeconomiesandstableanddemocraticmodesofgovernanceandpoororless
developedcountrieswithlessthandemocraticgovernments.Everyoneofthesignatorieshasadistinct
history,culture,institutionallandscape,andeconomicpositioning.Thisdiversityisamajorsourceof
conflictingperspectivesandcompetingagendasoftheactorsformallycommittedtomeetingMDGs.The
governanceoftheeffortsbythesigneestoMDGshasthusfarbeenfirmlybasedonabeliefinminimal
top-downgoverningand/orcoercion,relianceonlessformalnetworks,and“self-organization”.
TounderstandwhyendeavorssimilartoMDGshavehistoricallycomeupshortinfullymeetingtheir
goalsandobjectives,itisnecessarytoreviewandreassesssomeoftheunderlyingassumptionsabout
theroleofgovernments,networks,andinstitutionssystematicallycountedontocarrythroughpolicy
objectives.1Thereisrenewedurgencyandasignificantdegreeofripenessforaninstitutionalisttakeon
policyanalysis,giventhelessthansatisfactoryoutcomesofpoliciesintendedtomeetuniversalgoalson
eliminatingpoverty,protectingtheenvironment,orensuringequalrightsforwomen.Thepremiseof
thispaperisthatthereassessmentofsuchpoliciesandgoalswoulddowelltodrawandbuildonthe
pioneeringworksofSabatier(togetherwithMazmanianinthelate1970sandthe1980s),Sabatierand
Jenkins-Smith(inthe1990s),Ostrom(late1980s,1990s,and2000s),andKingdon(1980s).
Oftheseauthors,Ostrom’sexpansivebodyofworkstandsoutasincreasinglyfocusedonissuesof
governanceanditsinstitutionsinpolicyprocesses.Themainargumentinthispaperwillrunparallelto
Ostrom’sapproach,whichholdsthatonecannotdomeaningfulpolicyanalysiswithoutaddressing
1Thispaperusesthesigningbythe191countriesoftheMDGsasanillustrativecaseexample.Theframeofanalysisproposedinthispapercanbeappliedequallytopoliciesatdifferentscalesofgovernanceandindifferentcontexts,however.
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issuesofpoweringovernancearrangementsandwithoutaccountingfortheroleofinstitutionsthrough
whichgovernanceisexercisedatdifferentscales,fromglobaltonationalandlocal.Tomakethis
argument,thispaperstartswithprovidingabriefoverviewofpolicyanalysistoestablishthelinkages
betweenpolicymaking,governance,andtheinstitutionsofgovernance.
Governanceisdiscussedretrospectivelyandprospectively,withparticularattentiontothecurrent
discourseon“goodgovernance”.Alinkisthenestablishedbetweengovernanceandinstitutions,
followedbyaseparatesectiononinstitutionstooutlinehowinstitutionalistpolicyanalysismaybe
conductedinagovernancecontext.Duetospacelimitationsthecasestudiesonwhichthispaperis
basedarenotbedescribedindetailandserveonlyasreferencepoints.2
Thispaperarguesthatonlythroughadetailedcomparisonofthefullrangeofinstitutions(fromthevery
informalandintangibletotheveryformalandtangible)incomparablepolicyarenascanonegetafull
senseofwhythesamepolicyimplementedindifferentarenas(andatdifferentscalesofgovernance)
producesdifferentpolicyoutcomes.Takingstockofthefullrangeofinstitutionsasproposedinthis
papercanalsorevealtheentrypointsforpolicyimplementerstoinitiateprocessesthatcanfacilitate
institutionalchangeasintendedbypolicy.
PolicyAnalysis
Policyistheoutcomeofaseriesofdecisionsonwhatconstitutesaproblem,whatthepossiblesolutions
are,andhowthepreferredsolutionsmaybeimplemented(Adgeretal.2002),giventheresource
constraintsofthecommunity,thephysicalandmaterialconditions,andthemodeofgovernance
(Ostrom1999).3Initsmostcompleteform,policymakingrequiresissuedefinitionandtheidentification
oftheissuecontext,optionsorsolutions,assessmentofoptions,selectionofthemostsuitable
option(s),monitoringandassessmentofimplementation,learningforfuturepolicymakingendeavors,
andhopefullyattainingincreasedefficiency,effectivenessandlegitimacy.
2Fordetailsofthecasestudies,see“GovernanceandPolicyAnalysis:WhatofInstitutions?”Availablefrom:http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:e0ac3f43-2d3e-426d-be64-845eaa4cf818/datastreams/ASSET1/content
3SeeHajer,M.(2003a:181)foraconciseoverviewofvariousdefinitionsforpolicyanalysis.
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Thatsaid,itisdifficulttocomeupwithaprecisedefinitionofpolicyanalysisbecauseofits“garbage
can”characteristics,complexity,andunpredictability.4Varyingemphaseshavebeenplacedonthe
differentelementsinprocessofpolicymakingdependingonthepractitionersandthecontext(Taitand
Lyall2004).Theseelementsincludeconstraintsattheorganizationscale(MarchandOlsen1979,1984),
interactioncharacteristicsofactors,oractants,toborrowfromBrunoLatour,indecisionmaking
domainsandnetworks(Burt1992,Coleman1990),andtheeffectivenessofpolicyimplementationat
multiplescalesofgovernance(MazmanianandSabatier1981,1983).Thesevariouselementsofthe
policyprocessmayberepresentedasFigure1.
Figure1:ElementsofthePolicyProcess
AdaptedfromOstrom(1999)
Attemptstoaccountforinstitutionsinthebroadestdefinitionofterm,capturingtheveryinformaland
intangiblesuchasvaluesystemsandcustomsandtheveryformalandtangiblesuchasrulesand
regulations,inpolicyanalysishavebeenlimitedwiththenotableexceptionofElinorOstrom’sworkin
the1990sand2000s.Itwillbeillustratedlaterinthispaperthatthisshortcomingispartlyduetothe
difficultyindoinginstitutionalanalysiswithoutasharedconceptualizationoftheterm“institution”.This
4SeeKingdon,J.(1984).
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difficultyhasbeencompoundedoverthelasttwoorsodecadesbywhathascometobeknownas“the
movefromgovernmenttogovernance”(Jessop1999,PierreandPeters2000)anda“hollowingout”of
thenationalstateasfarasitsclassicfunctionsandtheincreasinglysignificantroleplayedbynon-state
actorsindeliveringstatefunctions.(SeeGovernance,below).
Fromagovernanceperspective,Hajer(2003a:181-8)offersthreedefiningelementsforthepolitical
contextofpolicyanalysis:polity,knowledge,andintervention.Interpretedasastablepoliticalorder,
polityorthepoliticalsettingofpolicymakinghaschangedconsiderablysincetheSecondWorldWar.
Whereasbeforethecriticalpolicyanalyststroveto“speaktruthtopower”concentratedinthe
governmentofthenationstate,therearenownumerousothercontendersforpowerwhonotonly
wanttospeaktheirversionoftruthtopower,butalsowanttheirshareofpower.Theseinclude
transnationalormultinationalcorporationsandnetworks,non-governmentandcivilsociety
organizations,andthemediawhich,whileusedextensivelyandstrategicallybyallcontenders,are
themselvessometimescontendersforpowerthroughagendasettinginthepolicyprocess.
Thenewlandscapeofgovernanceasithasevolvedsincethe1970sismarkedbyadeparturefrom
territoriallydefinedspacesofthepost-warnationstatesandtheemergenceofanetworked(Castells
1996)orembeddedsociety(GranovetterandSwedberg2001)thattranscendsthenationstate.
Governanceinthisnewlandscapeisincreasinglyhavingtorelyonformalandinformal,supra-andsub-
nationalformsandstructures(Jessop1999,Hajer2003a).Undergovernance,policymakingisnolonger
afunctionfulfilledbyexpertsortechnocratswhosesoleroleistodevisepolicysolutionstoservevarious
identifiedneeds:thereisnowrecognitionandspaceforaplethoraofactorsandfactorsthatcollectively
governpolicyanditsmaking.
AaronWildavsky(1979),whocoinedthephrase“speakingtruthtopower”asthekeyroleforpolicy
analystsinthepolicyprocess,describespolicyanalysisintermsofdialogue,equitablebalancingof
prioritiesbetweentheempoweredandthedisempoweredamidtensionsrelatingtoresourcesand
otherconstraints,trustandmistrust,andideologiesanddogmas.Wildavsky’sapproachisechoedinthe
worksofmorerecentpolicyprocessscholars(Ostrom1999,SabatieradJenkins-Smith1993,1999,and
Kingdon1984)andpractitioners(Reich1988)whounderlinetheimportanceofcontextandthemoral
responsibilityofpolicymakersandpolicyanalysts,andthustheinstitutionallandscapeinthepolicy
process.Intheseworkssystemicattentionisbeingdrawntothegovernanceorpowerrelationalaspects
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ofpolicymaking,suggestingpolicyanalysisasbeingconcernedwithatleastthreesetsofdynamicsas
follows:
• ProblemIdentification:Establishingthemannerinwhichtheproblemforwhichpolicyisrequiredis
definedrevealsthemainfactorsandactors,ortheproblem-policy-politicsmixaccordingtoKingdon
(1984).
• PolicyDevelopment:Establishingtheinclusiveness,orexclusiveness,oftheprocesstofindsolutions
forthepolicyproblemindicatesthepolicy-makingstyle,thearena(Ostrom1999),orthe“coalitions”
(SabatierandJenkins-Smith1993,1999),andthereforethemodeofgovernance(Kooiman1993,
1999,2003)forpolicymaking.
• PolicyImplementation:Establishinghowwellthepolicyobjectivesarebeingmetinpracticethrough
ongoingmonitoring,periodicevaluations,andcontinuouslearningindicatesthedegreetowhich
policyisviewedbyitsimplementersasasystemicandcircular,asopposedtolinear,process.
Thecontemporarypolicyanalystmustthusstrivetoanswertwokeyquestions:
1. Onthebasisofwhattypeofinformationcanbetterpolicydecisionsbemade?And,
2. Whatandwhostructurethepolicydiscourse?
Answeringthefirstquestionrequiresadiscussionontheadequacyandappropriateuseofthecurrently
in-usemonitoringindicators.Whileafulldiscussionofindicatorsisbeyondthescopeandpurposeof
thispaper,itwillbearguedthatinformingpolicytomeetitsobjectivesrequiresasetofinclusiveand
practicableinstitutionalindicatorstosupplementthecurrentlyin-useindicatorsonefficiency,
effectiveness,andimpact.
Answeringthesecondquestionrequiresin-depthunderstandingofthe“modeofgovernance”orthe
mannerinwhichacommunityofinterdependentactorsmakesdecisionstoorganizeitself–oris
organized–basedontheavailableresources(materialandphysicalconditions),therulesinuse
(attributesofthecommunity),anddistributionofpoweramongdecisionmakers(systemofgovernance)
asindicatedinFigure1.Theremainderofthispaperfocusesonansweringthesecondquestion.
Intheknowledge-based,networksocietythecombinedpressuresofsimultaneousglobalizationand
individualizationprocessesalongwithadominantroleofmediahavesignificantlyerodedthebasisfor
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trustinandthelegitimacyofgovernment,makingthejobofproblemidentification,solutionfinding,
andmaintainingauthoritylessdependentontechnicalexpertiseandmoredependentontheabilityto
engagemultiplestakeholders(Reich1988,TaitandLyall2004).Policymakingunderthesenew
conditionshasbecome“amatterofdefininganagreeduponpackageofactionstobetakenbyavariety
ofstakeholders,oftensupportedby‘softlaw’suchascovenantsoragreementsthatareperhapsbacked
upbyregulatoryframeworks”(Hajer2003a:187).InHajer’s(2003a,2003b)andReich’s(1988)view,
theseconditionsdemanddeliberationinpolicyanalysis,andanappreciationforpoliticalactionsbased
onmutualinteraction,toensurelegitimacyandimprovecollectivequalityoflifeforallconcerned.
Legitimatepoliticalactionsandthenatureoftheagreedupon“rulesofthegame”inpolicymakingare
productsofthemodeofgovernance,discussedinthenextsection.
Governance
Duringthelastthreeorsodecades,theclassicfunctionsofthepost-industrialstateshavemoved
upwardstosupra-nationalbodies,downwardstoregionalorlocalstates,andoutwardstorelatively
autonomouscross-nationalalliancesamonglocalmetropolitanorregionalstateswithcomplementary
interests(Jessop1999,PierreandPeters2000,Hajer2003a).Theoutcomeofthesedevelopmentshas
beenaweakeningofthestate’sauthoritythroughthediffusionofresponsibilitiesaccompaniedwith
newformsofcivicorganizationinawidergovernancecontext.Theweakeningofthestatehasrendered
theclassical-modernist(nationalandformal)institutionsofgovernmentinadequateorlesscapableof
providingtherulesofthegameforinterdependentactorsfacewithcomplexandmulti-facetedsocietal
issuesinrapidlychangingenvironments.
ThenewapproachtopolicyanalysisincorporateswhatHajer(2003a)hascalled“thegameof‘scale
jumping’,ortheartofputtingeachinterventionattheappropriatelevel”(pages176-9),whichmay
includeformal,informal,government,andnon-governmentstakeholdersandtheinstitutionsincluding
rulesandvaluesthroughwhichthesestakeholdersorganizethemselvesorareorganized.Anoperational
considerationforthemodernpolicyanalystshouldbetodeterminewhichstakeholdersareinvolvedin
thepolicyprocessandthroughwhatstructuresorinstitutionstheirinteractionsaregoverned.
Ifgovernmentisaboutthearbitrationofhowscarcesocietalresourcesareallocated,governanceis
aboutthecontestationsaroundhowresourcesareactuallyallocated.Kooiman(2003:4)distinguishes
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between“governing”as“thetotalityofinteractions,inwhichpublicandprivateactorsparticipate,
aimedatsolvingsocietalproblemsorcreatingsocietalopportunities”andgovernanceas“thetotalityof
theoreticalconceptionsofgoverning”.Thusgoverningmaybedefinedastheprocessthroughwhichthe
contestationsandinteractionsamongthecompetingactorsaresettled.Whilegovernancedenotesa
significantdegreeofself-organizingneutrality,governingdenotesintention,preference,andagenda(s).
However,thecommonlyacceptedinterpretationofgovernanceisinfactwhatKooimanhasdefinedas
governing.5
Undertheumbrellaofgovernancetherehavebeennumerousdiscussionssincetheearly1980samong
policymakersandsocialscientistsalikeoncollaboration,inclusion,cooperation,andcoordinationon
theaccountofincreasedinterdependenciesamongactorsinmarkets,networks,andhierarchies.The
discussionsonthechangingmodeofgovernancemaybegroupedintotwomaincamps.First,thereare
thosewhoviewtheemphasisoncollaboration,cooperation,private-publicpartnerships,andsoforthas
aproductofanideologicalshifttowardneo-liberalismandamoveawayfromtheconceptionofthe
stateastheproviderofwelfareandtheconvenerresponsibleforsocialcohesion.Second,thereisthe
viewthatthedispersionandinformalizationofformalstatefunctionssignifyamovetowardamode
of"co-governance"whereinactorsincivilsocietyareabletoengagemoreinmattersofpublicpolicy
thantheydidduringtheperiodimmediatelyfollowingtheSecondWorldWaranduntiltheearly1980s.
Thefirstcampviewsthemovefromgovernmenttogovernanceasanindicationofthestateabdicating
itscentralroleandresponsibilitieswhilethesecondcampseesthismoveasofferingapotentialfor
moreinclusiveanddemocraticparticipationandcivilengagementinmattersofpolicyandsocial
development.
TheproponentsofthefirstcampareanumberofmainlyBritishscholarswhosincethelate1980shave
pointedtoamovefromformalgovernmenttothelessformalgovernance(Jessop1997,1999,2001,
Macleod1996,1999,Jones1997a,1997b,1999).ThoughatfirstspecifictoBritainunderThatcherism,
thisconceptionofgovernancehasbeengeneralizedbyothersincludingAmin(1999),AminandThrift
(1994),Cox(2001,2002),EdenandHampson(1997),GoodwinandPainter(1997),Hajer(1995,2003a,
2003b),Kooiman(1993,1999,2003),Scott,A.J.(1998),Storper(1997),Swyngedouw(2000),
Swyngedouwetal.(2002),andahostofotherstocapturethesignificantchangesthathavebeentaking
placeinthesocio-politicalandeconomiclandscapeofthepost-Fordistera.Jessop(1999)andPierreand
5SeealsoKooiman(2003)forafulldiscussionofthedifferencesbetweenthetwoterms.
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Peters(2000)refertoa“hollowingout”ofthenationalstatethroughthedelegationofstatefunctions
tonon-stateorquasi-stateentities.Jessop(1999)alsomakesclearthatthedelegationofgovernment
functionstoquasi-ornon-governmentalbodiesdoesnotequateasurrenderofpoliticalpowerbythe
statetonon-stateactors.
IncontrasttothefirstcampandfocusingonaEuropeanscale,theproponentsofthesecondcamp,
exemplifiedbyHajer(2003b),interprettheshiftfromgovernmenttogovernanceasamovefromliberal
democracyto“expansivedemocracy”characterizedby“increasedparticipation,eitherbymeansof
small-scaledirectdemocracyorthroughstronglinkagesbetweencitizensandbroad-scale[formal]
institutions,bypushingdemocracybeyondtraditionalpoliticalspheres,andbyrelatingdecision-making
tothepersonswhoareaffected”(p.3).Hajer(2003a,2003b)andKooiman(1993,2003)pointoutthat
classical-modernistinstitutionscharacterizedandmaintainedbycodified,well-establishedpatternsof
behavior,arenolongersufficientforgoverningeffectivelyinthechangedcontextofgovernance.The
formalinstitutionsofgovernanceareincreasinglyhavingtocompetewith“open-ended,oftenunusual,
adhocarrangementsthatdemonstrateremarkableproblem-solvingcapacityandopenupopportunities
forlearningandchangeinexactlythosecircumstanceswhereclassical-modernistinstitutionshavefailed
todeliver”(Hajer2003b:3).
TheoptimismoftheperspectiveongovernancesharedbyHajerandKooimanisremarkableinits
contrasttotheviewoftheBritisheconomicgeographersandpoliticalscientistswhosemainobservation
aboutthemovetogovernanceishowanti-democraticithasbeen,atleastintheUK.6Whetherthe
influenceofthenationalstatehasshrunkremainsamatterofdebateamongeconomicgeographers,
sociologistsandpoliticalscientists.Whatisclearinthisdebateisthatgovernanceisviewedbyallas
highlyscale-andcontext-specific.
Inthepolicymakingdiscourse,governanceisoftendescribedastheexerciseofauthorityandcontrolby
amultiplicityofpublicandprivateinterests.Thisviewofgovernanceisprevalentinmostofficial
definitionsoftheterm.Forexample,acursorylookatthemoreformaldefinitionsofgovernanceyields
aseriesofkeywordsandphrases(Table1)thatpointtogovernanceashowactorsorganizethemselves.
6SeeMacLeod(1996,1999)andJones(1997a,1997b,1999)forspecificexamplesandcasestudies.
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Table1:KeyWordsandPhrasesinDefinitionsof“Governance”• Leadership;ExerciseofAuthorityandControl,Power,Coordination• Managing;DecisionMaking• Influence;Behaviour;Conduct• Interdependence;Transaction;Interaction• Social,Ecological,andPoliticalSystems• Social,Political,andEconomicActors• Society;Hierarchy;Private,Public,andCivicOrganizations• Traditions;Rules;FormalandInformalInstitutions• Structures;Culture;Processes• Conflicts;Negotiation;DisputeResolution;Coercion;Influencing;Constituting;• Knowledge;Devices;Policies• Networks,Associations,andAlliances• Issuestackledthroughgovernanceinclude:Stability
Source:Multiple(2012)
ThekeywordsinTable1aretakenfromofficialstatementsbytheEuropeanCommission,government
ministriesandagencies,foreigndevelopmentagencies,academicinstitutions,internationalcorporations
andagencies,andworksbynumerousscholarsincludingStoker(1998),Kooiman(1993,1999,2003),
WeimerandVining(1999),DiMaggioandPowell(1983),HollingsworthandBoyer(1997),andahostof
others.Aswillbeillustratedbelow,clarityanddefinitionalagreementfortheterms“governance”and
“institution”remainfarfromresolved.
Toillustrate,theEuropeanCommissionusestheterm“GoodGovernance”torefertoamodeof
governingwhoseintentionsareconsistentwiththecommongoodoftheMemberStatesandthe
EuropeanCommunityasawhole.TheCommission’svisionisbasedonthefivepoliticalprinciplesof
openness,participation,accountability,effectiveness,andcoherence.Furthermore,theseprinciplesare
tobemaintainedthroughthe“institutions”oftheEuropeanUnion’sgovernancesystem(Table2).
Table2:EuropeanCommission’sPrinciplesof“GoodGovernance”Openness:TheInstitutionsshouldworkinamoreopenmanner…Participation:…ImprovedparticipationislikelytocreatemoreconfidenceintheendresultandintheInstitutionsthatdeliverpolicies.….Accountability:…EachoftheEUInstitutionsmustexplainandtakeresponsibilityforwhatitdoesinEurope.…Effectiveness:Policiesmustbeeffectiveandtimely,deliveringwhatisneededonthebasisofclearobjectives,anevaluationoffutureimpactand,whereavailable,ofpastexperience.…Coherence:…CoherencerequirespoliticalleadershipandastrongresponsibilityonthepartoftheInstitutionstoensureaconsistentapproachwithinacomplexsystem.
Source:CEC(2001:10),emphasisadded.
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WhatismoststrikingintheCommission’sdefinitionofgoodgovernanceistheemphasisontheroleof
institutionsasentitiesthatarelargelyviewedasbeing“upthere”and,atleastcurrently,insufficiently
withinthereachofordinarycitizens.Assuch,thisviewofgovernanceseemsconcernedprimarilywith
minimizingbureaucratizationandhierarchyoftheorganizationswithkeyrolesintheEUsystemof
governance.ThustheintentoftheWhitePaperonEuropeanGovernance(CEC2001)istomakethese
formalorganizations–withkeyinstitutionalfunctionsandwhosesizeandnumbersareincreasing–
moreaccessible,accountable,andrelevanttothegeneralpopulaceandtoretainahigherdegreeof
relevancy,credibility,andlegitimacyintheaverageperson’smind.TheWhitePaper’snecessarybut
exclusivefocusonwhatareatbestformalinstitutionsoverlookstheimportantroleplayedbyother,less
formalortangible,institutionsinEuropeangovernance,particularlyinpolicyformationand
implementation.Tofullyappreciatetheroleofinstitutions,theymustbeviewedasmorethanlarge
bureaucraticorganizations.
Thereareotherdefinitionsofgood,ordemocratic,governancethatpointimplicitlytotheimportanceof
informalinstitutions.Table3highlightsthekeywordsinsomeofsuchdefinitionsofgoodgovernance.
Table3:KeyWordsandPhrasesinDefinitionsofGoodGovernance
• ServingtheCommonGood• Monitoringofauthority• Democraticallyelected,Representative,andParticipatorygovernments• Accountability;Responsiveness;Transparency;Efficiency• RuleofLawandEqualJusticeunderthelaw• GovernmentCapacitytomanageresourcesandimplementsoundpolicies• GovernmentAbilitytomaintainsocialpeace,lawandorder,economicgrowth,andaminimumlevelof
socialsecurity• GovernmentAbilitytoreformstructuresandprocesses• GovernmentAbilitytoimplementpolicyeffectively• RespectofCitizensandthestatefortheinstitutionsthatgoverneconomicandsocialinteractions• Interactionbetweenacademicsandpolicymakers• Learning;ProblemReformulation• ActorsincludebutarenotlimitedtothePrivateSector,CivilSociety,andthestate
Source:Multiple(2012)
AnillustrativeexampleisprovidedbyUNDP,whichdefinesgovernanceas:
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…theexerciseofeconomic,politicalandadministrativeauthoritytomanageacountry'saffairsatall
levels.Itcomprisesthemechanisms,processesandinstitutionsthroughwhichcitizensandgroups
articulatetheirinterests,exercisetheirlegalrights,meettheirobligationsandmediatetheirdifferences.7
Otherinternationalorganizations,e.g.,theWorldBank,UnitedStatesAgencyforInternational
Development(USAID),offersimilardefinitionsofgovernanceemphasizingtheroleofhigherformal
authorityforthecommongood(Table3).
Ifwesimplifythenotionofgovernancetomean‘thewayhumancommunities(i.e.,organizations,
polities,andcross-polityregions)organizethemselves’,itfollowsthatanalysesofmodesofgovernance
needtoincludeadiversityofactorswhohavetorelatetooneanotherduetointerdependency,and
whoallcontendforordefendapieceoftheproverbialpie,action,orpower.Wemayconclude,
therefore,thattherehasbeengovernanceaslongastherehasbeenhumansociety,characterized
aboveallbyinterdependency–itistheformthatchangesovertimeandduetovaryingresource
constraintsandopportunitiesandthestructuresthatwedeviseadaptivelytogovernourselves.The
intricateconstellationoftheformalandinformalstructuresthatweusetogovernourselvesisoften
referredtoas“theinstitutions”.But,thisbegsthequestion:whatpreciselyaretheseinstitutionsand
wherearetheymanifest?Thenextsectionoffersaperspectiveforansweringthisfundamental
question.
Institutions
Whiletheinterestininstitutionsofgovernancebyeconomistsandpoliticalscientistssomewhatfadedin
themid-20thCentury,itremainedcontinuouslypresentinSociologyandisreflectedinworksbyCooley,
Durkheim,SpencerandSumneraroundtheturnofthe19thCentury,toWeber(1924),Parsons(1990),
Hughes(1939),Davis(1949),DiMaggioandPowell(1983),Jessop(2001),andScott,W.R.(2001)among
numerousothers.Mostofthesewritershavebeeninfluencedby,orfoughtagainst,theideasput
forwardbyKarlMarxwhoiscreditedwithsignificantcontributionstothethreedisciplinesofSociology,
PoliticalScienceandEconomics.Thediversityofconceptualizationsofinstitutionsoriginatingfromthese
threedisciplineshasgeneratedaliteratureoninstitutionsthatisrichandextensiveyetintimidatingly
difficulttooperationalizeforanalyticalpurposes.
7 TakenfromadefinitionofgovernancebyUNDP,availableat:http://magnet.undp.org/policy/default.htm.
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Toillustrate,acloseexaminationofsomeofthekeydefinitionsofinstitutionsrevealsthatinstitutions
areviewedasinformalandintangible(e.g.,norms,habits,andcustoms),semi-formal(e.g.,mental
constructsandmodels,rulesofthegame,conventions),andformal(e.g.,family,prescriptions,
proscriptions,corporations,tradeunions,thestate)phenomena(Table4).Surprisingly,few
institutionalistsappearalertedtothisdiversityofmeaningsandtheneedformanageable
conceptualizationofinstitutions.Mucheffortisdedicatedtofindthemostperfect,singulardefinitionof
institutionsinstead.8
Table4:WhatareInstitutions?1. Habitsofagrouporthecustomsofapeople(Hamilton1932)2. Settledhabitsofthoughtcommontothegeneralityofmen(Veblen1919)3. Convenienttermforthemoreimportantamongthewidelyprevalent,highlystandardizedsocialhabits
(Mitchell1950)4. Howthegameisplayed(NelsonandSampat2001)5. Normsthatregulaterelationsamongindividuals(Parsons1990)6. Conventions,rulesofaction,embeddedinsocialstructure,locallyspecific(Krätke1999)7. Setsofrulesofthegameorcodesofconductdefiningsocialpractices(Young1994)8. Mentalconstructs(Neale1987)9. Rulesofthegame(North1990)10. MentalModels(North1994)11. Collectiveactionexercisedbydifferenttypesoforganization(family,corporation,tradeunion,state)in
controlofindividualaction(Commons1924)12. Formalorganizations,patternsofbehaviour,negativenormsandconstraints(CoriatandDosi1998)13. Asetofsociallyprescribedpatternsofcorrelatedbehaviour(Bush1986)14. Prescribedorproscribedpatternsofcorrelatedbehaviour(Tool1993)15. Constitutionalrulesystemsforsociety,collectivechoicerulesgoverningdifferentkindsoforganization,
operationalrulesoforganizations(Ostrom1999)Source:Parto(2005a)
Thefirststeptowardreconceptualizinginstitutionsistotakestockofhowinstitutionshavebeen
definedbythosewhohaveseeninstitutionsascrucialtounderstandinghumanbehaviour.Table4is
onesuchattempt.Table4illustratesthedifficultyofdefininginstitutionsandconductinginstitutional
analysissincethereisnoonedefinitionheretocapturethemultiplicityofmeaningsortheextentto
whichinstitutionscollectivelyorganizehumaninteractioninmultipledimensions.Tomakecoherent
senseofthesedefinitionswemayattempttoveryroughlygroupthembasedonthetypeofinstitutions
towhichtheyreferasfollows:8See,forexample,Hodgson(2006),whereduringaninterviewwitharguableoneofthegiantsofinstitutionalisminEconomics(DouglasNorth),noattemptismadetoreconceptualizethenotionofinstitutionstocapturetheirimportanceandplaceininteractionsatdifferentlevelsofinter-relation,scalesofgovernance,orspheresofhumanactivity.
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• Definitions1,2,3,4and5suggestrelativepermanencyandpointtoinformalinstitutions(norms,
habitsandcustoms,howthegameisplayed)
• Definitions6,7,8,9and10alludetosemi-formalinstitutions(rulesofthegame,conventions,
mentalconstructs,mentalmodels)andinformalinstitutions(rulesofaction,codesofconduct,
socialpractices)
• Definition11referstomainlyformalinstitutions(family,corporation,tradeunions,thestate)
• Definition12referstoformalorganizationsandinformalstructures(patternsofbehaviourand
norms)
• Definitions13and14refertomoreformalinstitutions(prescriptions,proscriptions)
• Definition15referstoformalinstitutions(constitutionalrulesystems,collectivechoicerules,
operationalrules)
Thegroupingofdefinitionsintheabovemannerrevealsthreeimportantdistinguishingfeaturesof
institutions.First,somedefinitionsunderlinetheterritorialscaleofgovernance(Krätke1999,Ostrom
1999,Young1994,2002).Second,anumberofthesedefinitionsrefertoinstitutionsasbeingmanifestin
individualbehaviourinsocietyatlarge(Hamilton1932,Parsons1990,Krätke1999,Veblen1919),
individualbehaviorwithinorganizations(Commons1924,MarchandOlsen1984,CoriatandDosi1998),
interactionsamongorganizations(Ostrom1999),andinteractionsamongnations(Young1994,2002).
Finally,onecandetectvaryingemphasesonthesocial,economic,andpoliticalaspectsofinstitutions.
Whatshouldcomethroughthisgroupingofthedefinitionsofinstitutionsisthatinstitutionscanbe
moreorlessformal/tangiblephenomenathatstructureinteractionsamongindividualsatdifferent
levels,interactionsamonggroupsofindividualsatdifferentterritorialscales,andinteractionsof
individualsandgroupsindifferentspheres(toparaphraseMaxWeber)ofhumanactivity.Viewedinthis
multi-dimensional/multi-layeredfashion,thetaskofunpackingthecomplexitythatthediverse
definitionsofinstitutionsattempttocapturebecomesmoremanageable.Asummaryoftheworking
definitionsforlevels,scales,andspheresisprovidedinTable5.
“Levelofinter-relation”isborrowedfromSociologyandreferstointer-relationsattheindividual,
organizational,andsocietallevels.“Scaleofgovernance”isborrowedfromSociology,PoliticalScience,
andAdministrativeStudiesandcapturestheterritorialdimensionofgovernance.“Sphere”isanotion
borrowedfromstudiesofSystemsDynamicsandSociology(MaxWeberinparticular)andisusedto
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bringinterconnectednessofeconomic,social,andpoliticalarenasintoperspectivesofgovernanceat
differentscales.Thenotionofsphereisparticularlyusefulindealingwithcomplexandmulti-faceted
policyissueswhichrequireconcertedeffortstointegrateandaddresssocial,economic,andpolitical
concernssimultaneouslyandatmultiplescalesofgovernance.
Table5:Levels,Scales,andSystems
Levelsofinter-relation
Individual:Amongindividualsatlargebasedoninterpersonalinterdependencewheremanyactorsareinvolved.Organizational:Withinorganizationstosecureinternalcohesionandamongorganizationstomaximizeadaptabilityofindividualorganizationssoastomakecompatiblerespectiveoperationalunitiesandindependencewithdefactomaterialandsocialinterdependenceonotherorganizations.Societal:Amongoperationallyautonomous(or“closed”)functionalsystemseachwithitsownautopoieticcodes,programmes,institutionallogicsandinterestsinself-reproduction(adaptedfromJessop1997).
(Territorial)ScalesofGovernance
Local(subnational),national,international(betweennationallyconstituted,functionallydifferentiatedinstitutionalorders),transnational(passingthroughnationalboundaries),andglobal(coveringtheglobeasawhole).
Spheres Societymaybedefinedintermsofitssocial,economic,political,andecologicalspheresorsystems.Asubsystemcontainspartsofallsystems.
Source:Parto(2005a)
Likeallcategorizations,thetermslevels,scales,andsystems(orspheres)areconstructedandemployed
tocometotermswiththecomplexityofthisfundamentalquestion:howdoweaccountforinstitutions
inanalysesofpolicyaimedateffectingsocietalchange?Answeringthisquestionhasimportant
implicationsforfurtherresearchandpolicy.Inresearch,carefulcategorizationofinstitutionsbasedon
levels,scales,andsystemsenablesustoinvestigatethesameproblemorresearchquestionindifferent
contexts,expectdifferentfindingsduetocontext-specificinstitutionallandscapes,andidentifythe
factorsandactorsmostrelevanttochangemakingeffortsinagivencontext.Inpolicymakingand
implementation,anin-depthandmulti-dimensionalappreciationofthecollectiveroleofinstitutionsis
likelytominimizethepossibilityofsettingunrealisticpolicyobjectivesandincreaseourunderstanding
ofwhyinsomecontextssomepoliciessucceedmorethanothersinmeetingtheirobjectives.
Theseresearchandpolicyimplicationsareparticularlyrelevanttopolicymakingatregional,e.g.,
EuropeanUnion,orglobalscalesofgovernanceonsuchissuesasclimatechange,forexample.The
categorizationsinTable5provideausefulbasisforoperationalizationofamulti-dimensionalnotionof
“institutions”.Applyingthelevels-scales-systemsperspectivetoinstitutionsyieldsaloosebutnecessary
typologyofinstitutionsasdepictedinFigure2.
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Figure2.ATypologyofInstitutions
BehaviouralInstitutions:Institutionsasstandardized(recognizable)socialhabits–manifestindeeplyingrainedmodesofbehaviourinindividualsandgroupsasreflectionsofsocialnormsCognitiveInstitutions:Institutionsasmentalmodelsandconstructsordefinitions,basedonvaluesandembeddedinculture–(tobe)aspiredtobyindividualsandgroupsAssociativeInstitutions:Institutionsasmechanismsfacilitatingprescribedorprivilegedinteractionamongdifferentprivateandpublicinterests–manifestinactivitiesofgroupsofindividualsRegulativeInstitutions:Institutionsasprescriptionsandproscriptions–manifestastheimmediateboundariesofactionbyindividualsandgroupsConstitutiveInstitutions:Institutionsasprescriptionsandproscriptionssettingtheboundsofsocialrelations–manifestastheultimateboundariesofactionbyindividualsandgroups
Source:Parto(2008)
Asimportantasthisdisaggregationandarrangementofinstitutionsareinidentifyingthem,more
importantistherangeoftangibility/formalityandscopethatitdepicts,particularlywhenweview
institutionsasphenomenathatbindtogetherandstabilizeinter-relationsatdifferentlevels,governance
atdifferentscales,andsystemsindifferentconfigurations.9
Institutionalanalysistoinformpolicyinamodeofgovernancecommittedtofundamentalsocietal
change,e.g.,toaddressclimatechange,shouldbeginwiththespecificationofthecontextinwhichthe9 SeeParto(2005a)foramoreelaboratediscussionofinstitutionsatdifferentlevels,scales,andsystems.
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institutionsaretobestudied.Further,itrequiresdifferentiatingbetweentangibleandintangible
institutionssincedifferentlevelsofformalityandscopeofinstitutionsrequiredifferentmethods,or
mixesofmethods,ofanalysisandpolicyapproach.Thenextsectionsketchesouthowthetypologyin
Figure2maybeappliedtostudygovernanceforsustainabledevelopmenttowardmeetingMDGsatthe
EuropeanUnionscaleofgovernance.
InstitutionsandGovernance
WithoutadoubtthepoliticalwillattheEUscaleofgovernanceisbeginningtoshowsignsof
institutionalizationattheformalpolicylevel,atleastinsofarastheenvironmentalaspectofsustainable
developmentisconcerned.10However,theinformationavailablethroughconventionalsocial,economic,
andenvironmentalindicatorssuggeststhatinpracticetheEuropeanCommunityasawholeisless
sustainablenowthantwoorthreedecadesago.Thismismatchbetweenpolicyobjectivesandpolicy
outcomesisinpartaproductoftheinterplaybetweenthepolicyprocess,themodeofgovernance,and
theinstitutionsthroughwhichgovernanceforsustainabledevelopment/environmentalprotectionis
exercised.Insufficientattentiontoinstitutions,particularlythelesstangibleandinformalinstitutions,
hasledtosettingunrealisticorambitiouspolicyobjectives.
Toillustrate,themostwidelyusedschematicofsustainabledevelopmentshowsthesocial,economic,
andenvironmentalspheresasthreeoverlappingcircles(systems).11Sustainabledevelopmentis
depictedasoccurringintheareawherethethreecirclesoverlap.Anotherpopularapproachis“pillar-
based”which,accordingtoGibsonetal.(2005:9),
…distinguishesbetweeneconomicandsocialneeds,inparttoemphasizethatmaterialgainsarenotsufficientmeasuresorpreserversofhumanwell-being.Similarlytheadditionofparticularattentiontoculturalandpoliticalcomponents,mostcommonininternationaldevelopmentapplications,ismeanttostresstheimportanceofthesefactorsinbuildingchangethatmaybeviableoverthelonghaul.
Policyformationonsustainabledevelopmentislikelytorelyoninformationprovidedthroughcurrently
in-usesocial,economic,andenvironmentalindicators.Aninstitutionalistapproachtopolicymakingfor
10TheformalizationofEUpolicyonsustainabledevelopment,therenewedfocusonaddressingclimatechangewiththeCOP21conferencein2015,andthesteadyincreaseintheamountofavailablefundingforresearchintosustainability-relatedareasthroughsuccessiveEuropeanFrameworkProgrammesarebutsomeindicationsofthisinstitutionalizationprocess.
11ForacomprehensivereviewofdefinitionsforsustainabledevelopmentseeGibson(2001).Foranofficialexample,seeUNDP,Availableat:http://magnet.undp.org/policy/default.htm,accessedDecember12,2004.
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sustainabledevelopmentwoulddeviseacomplementarysetofinstitutionalindicatorstohelpexplain
theunderlyingcausesforpoorperformanceinmeetingsustainabledevelopmentpolicyobjectivesinthe
social,economic,andenvironmentalarenas.OnewaytoconceptualizethisistocombineWeber’s
notionofspheresandthetypologyofinstitutionsinFigure2.TheresultispresentedinFigure3,whose
mainpurposeistocapturetheroleandplaceofinstitutionsinvariousspheresofhumanactivity.
Figure3.InstitutionsandGovernanceforSustainableDevelopment
Source:Parto(2005b)
Toillustrate,howdowechangeunsustainablebehaviour,suchasnotrecycling,over-consuming,or
usingresourceswithoutrecognizingscarcityoradverseecologicalimpact?Somehowweneedto
capturewhysomepeoplerecyclewhileothersdonot,andwhysomecountriesorregionsaremore
sustainableincertainrespectsthanothers.ThecentralfeatureofFigure3isthatinstitutionsarepresent
asstructuringphenomenaatdifferentlevelsofinter-relationandscalesofgovernance,bindingtogether
themainspheresofsustainabledevelopment.Thedegreeofformalityandthescopeofinstitutions
increaseaswemovefrom“Behavioural”upwardsto“Constitutive”institutions.Ithastobenotedthat
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thistypologyisveryfluidandthereisconstantinterplayandtransformationbetweenthedifferenttypes
ofinstitution.
IfwearetoexploretherelationshipbetweengovernancemodesandmeetingMDGswithaviewto
identifythepolicymakingstylesandinstitutionsthatcanbestfostermovingtowardsustainable
developmentattheglobalscale,weneedrathermorethanthecurrentlyin-usesocial,economic,
environmental,and(formal)institutionalindicatorsortheircomposites.
Forexample,theWorldBank’sWorldwideGovernanceIndicatorsdefinesgovernanceas“thetraditions
andinstitutionsbywhichauthorityinacountryisexercised”andoffersixcompositeindicatorsto
“measure”governancein199countriesatfourtimeperiodsbetween1996and2002.Theindicators
are:VoiceandAccountability,PoliticalStabilityandLackofViolence,GovernmentEffectiveness,
RegulatoryQuality,RuleofLaw,andControlofCorruption.Todeveloptheseindicatorstheauthorsuse
25separatedatasourcesfrom18differentorganizations,includingtheWorldBank,Gallup
International,theEconomistIntelligenceUnit,IMD,DRI/McGraw-Hill,ColumbiaUniversity,Freedom
House,Afrobarometer,Latinobarometro,theWorldEconomicForum,andReportersWithoutBorders.12
Theindicatorsareintendedtoserveasbenchmarksforpolicymakers,donoragencies,civilsocietyand
developmentexperts.
Withoutadoubtthereisvaluetosuchbenchmarks.However,nomatterhowinclusiveorcarefully
developedcompositeindicatorsorindicesare,theyareoutput-basedandonlyrevealstaticallythestate
ofaffairsatgivenpointsintimeandafterconsiderabletimelapse.Manyoftheelementsthatmakeup
theseindicatorsareprocessvariableswithhighprobabilityofchangeintheshortterm.Theseindicators
onlytellus‘how’thingsareorwereatagivenpointintime,leavingustospeculateasto‘why’things
haveturnedoutthewaytheyhave.
Governanceforanything,inthiscasetomeetMDGs,requiresconsciousandconscientiouseffortto
steerdevelopmentbyinterventionthroughgovernmentalandnon-governmentalactionalong
preconceivedtrajectoriesbased,toalargeextent,onlearningbydoingintheinstitutionalcontext.
Kaufmannetal.’s(2015)indicatorswouldbeoffarmorevaluetopolicymakersifaccompaniedwith
12ForadditionaldetailsontheWorldBanksGovernanceIndicators,see:http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
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context-specificnarrativestoexplainwhytherehasbeenadeteriorationorimprovementinthemode
ofgovernanceandwhatoptionsthereareforfurtherimprovementthroughpolicyinterventiontoeffect
institutionalchange.
InstitutionalPolicyAnalysis:AFramework
Inlightofthediscussionintheprecedingsections,wecanrevisitthenotionsofgovernanceand
institutionstomakethefollowingstatementsasworkingdefinitionsandguidepostsforconducting
institutionalpolicyanalysis:
• Themodeofgovernanceisthemannerinwhichacommunityofinterdependentactorsorganizes
itselfatthelowestscaleandisorganizedfromthehighestscale
• Governanceisintimatelyrelatedtoamultiplicityofinstitutions,asdepictedinFigure2,through
whichitisexercised
• Governanceforeffectingsocietalchangehastopayparticularattentiontoformalandinformaland
tangibleandintangibleinstitutionsandtheirfunctionsinfacilitatingandcurtailingchange
• Toaccountfortheroleofinstitutionsweneedto:
• Identifytheproblems,events,actors,andotherfactorsthatcollectivelyactascatalystsfor
processesthatprecedetheemergenceofinstitutionsintheircurrentforms(Ostrom1999,
Kingdon1984,andSabatierandJenkins-Smith1993,1999)
• Establishthecontrollabilityofthesecatalystsandusetheinformationinselectingpolicy
measuresthatutilizethecatalysts
• Setinmotioninstitutionalizationprocessesthatneutralizeundesirable/unsustainable
institutionsandreinforcedesirable/sustainableinstitutionsalreadypresent,and
• Identifywhatcomplementarycatalystsmaybeinitiatedthroughpolicyorotherintervention
tosteerchange.
Institutionalchangethroughpolicyinterventionismorelikelytooccurifintroducedthroughweaker
entrypointsonthebehavioural-constitutivecontinuumdepictedinFigure2.Amajorpolicyimplication
ofthisperspectiveoninstitutionsofgovernanceisthatmanagingsocietalchangerequiresGovernment
interventionthroughpolicymeasuresasamaincatalystofinstitutingchange.Sincegovernment
interventiondoesnotoccurinavacuumandisoftenshapedbyotherinstitutions,weareledtoask:
howdoweidentifytheinstitutionsandtheircatalystsintheirentiretyinagivenareaofstudy?Or,more
specifically,whatmethodologycanbeemployedforthispurpose?
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Themethodologicalapproachneedstobe“postdisciplinary”(Sayer2001),“eclectic”(Swedberg1990),
“Lamarchian”(NelsonandWinter1982),and“adhoc”(Hodgson1988)sincethestudyofinstitutionsof
governancespansatleastthreedisciplinesandoveraCentury’sworthofthoughtanddebate.Weneed
todrawonasmanydisciplines,metaphors,andfieldsofstudyasnecessarytoprovideanarrativethat
captureswhatnoonedisciplinecan.Themethodologywillthusneedtoincludethefollowing
components:
• Historicalreviewofsecondarydatatodocumenttheevolutionofthearena13orsubsystemunder
study,e.g.,howtheTransportationortheEnergysubsystemsandtheircontextsdeveloped,and
why.Thisrequiresmappingdifferenttypesofinstitutions,theirinter-relations,andevolutionover
time.
• Re-interpretationofworkalreadycarriedoutoncultural,social,andhumancapitaltogather
contextualdetailsandidentifyinformalinstitutions.
• Interviewswithkeyinformantstosupplementreadilyavailabledatafromsecondarysources.The
interviewsalsoservetovalidatefindingsandintuitionsderivedfromsecondarydatareviewsand
mappingexercises.
• Re-interviewstoverifythefindingswiththekeyinformants.
• Aboveall,theinstitutionalistapproachrequiresasignificanttimecommitmentinanembedded
fashiontocapturethelesstangibleinstitutions.
Thesuggestedmethodologycanbeusedtoidentifythevariables(decisions,situations,andother
factors)thatmayhaveplayedkeyrolesineffectingatransitionfromone“stable”statetoanotherinthe
subsystemunderstudy.Byweightingandrankingtheidentifiedvariableswecanidentifythemost
importantvariablesofthesubsystem,trackchangesinthepropertiesofthesevariablesovertime,and
assessthemforcontrollability.Thenextstepistomakeeducatedguessesaboutthemixofvariables
likelytofacilitateatransitionfromthecurrentstateofaffairstoamoredesirablestablestate,e.g.,from
unsustainabletosustainableeconomicdevelopment.
13Arenasreferto“thesocialspacewhereindividualsinteract,exchangegoodsandservices,solveproblems,dominateoneanother,orfight”(Ostrom1999:42).SabatierandJenkins-Smith(1993,1999)provideasimilardescriptionfortheirnotionofsubsystemswhileKingdon(1984)uses“policystreams”.
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Theinstitutionalistperspectivedoesnotrelegatetheroleofinstitutionstoaboxlocatedamongthe
differentcomponentsofthepolicyprocess,ortreatinstitutionsasacollective“filter”thatshapesthe
patternsofinteractions.Instead,institutionsareviewedasthebindingagentinhumaninteractionsand
manifestatalllevelsofinter-relation,scalesofgovernance,andthroughdifferentspheresofhuman
activityinagivensituation.Viewedinthismanner,Figure2canbeusedtoinventoryandcategorizethe
fullrangeofinstitutionsinagivenpolicyarena.Thefinalstepinthisproposedapproachistodevelop
andplayoutpolicyscenarioswhilemakingallowancesthatsomeofthehistoricalcausalitiesmaynot
holdduetochangedconditions.Cautionhastobetakentodealwiththepotentialconsequencesof
policyexperimentationfailures.
Policyanalysisalongtheabovelinesmayappearadauntingtask.However,mostofthedatarequired
forthistypeofanalysisarealreadybeingcollectedandthemethodologyproposedherecanberefined
continuallybasedontheavailabilityofdatafromthesesecondarysources.Amajordifferencebetween
theproposedmethodologyandconventionalsurveyworkistheemphasisoftheformeronqualitative
analysisofqualitativedatawhilerecognizingthevalueofquantitativeanalysis.Animportantpointto
emphasizeisthattoapplytheproposedmethodologyusefullyandconcretely,thearena/subsystem
needstobemanageableinsizeandclearlydelineatedforitsboundaries.Thatis,weneedtofocuson
specificissuessuch,e.g.,wastemanagement,energyconsumptionandprovision,ortransportation
ratherthanlargeall-encompassingquestionssuchas“sustainabledevelopment”or“goodgovernance”
–yet,withoutlosingsightofthelargerpictureandbyfullyaccountingformulti-dimensional
interdependenciesandinterconnectedness.
Conclusion
Ifpolicy-makingisvalueladen(Tait1992,SabatierandJenkins-Smith1993,1999,TaitandLyall2004)
andthatduetointensifiedinterdependenciesandinterconnectedness,thereisgreaterneedforpolicy
integrationanddeliberativepolicyanalysis(Hajer2003a,TaitandLyall2004),whitherpolicyanalysisfor
meetingglobalormulti-nationalgoalssuchasMDGs?Theanswertothisquestionisfarfromdecided.
TaitandLyall(2004:17)suggestthatfromapoliticalperspectivelackofintegrationinsomecasescould
beviewedaspragmatic,useful,andperhapsevenessentialsincefullclarificationmayclarifythingsthat
arebestleftasambiguous.InstitutionalpolicyanalysisasimpliedbyTaitandLyall(2004)recognizesthat
linkingideasofgovernanceandintegrationmaybeusefulorproblematic,dependingonhoweachterm
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isused,“bywhom,andinwhatpolicycontext”.Inotherwords,legitimacyofpolicypositionsinsome
arenascannotbetreatedasagiven.
WorkontheEUpolicymakingprocessbyLyallandTait(2005)indifferentarenassuggeststhat
integrationisdesirableinsomearenassuchasenvironmentalpolicy,butperhapsnototherssuchas
tradeingeneticallymodifiedorganisms(GMOs)wheretheprivilegeof“speakingtruthtopower”needs
tobefullyexercisedbecauseofthewidedivergenceofopinionsontheissue.Asimilarargumentmaybe
madeinrelationtoothertechnologiessuchasnuclearpowergenerationandwastetoenergy
incineration.LyallandTait(2004)distinguishbetweenhorizontalandverticalpolicyintegrationbut
perceptivelymaintainthatthedesirabilityofeithertypeisdependentonthearenainwhichthepolicyis
formedorassessed.
MeetingpolicyobjectivesforMDGsarguablyrequireseffectivecommunicationandlineofcommand
acrossandthroughdifferentscalesofgovernance,withthehighestscaledefiningtherulesofthegame.
However,inmorecomplexarenaswithconsiderablymoresignificantsocietalrisks,e.g.,tradeinGMOs
ortherelianceonnuclearpowerasa“sustainable”energysource,itmaybejustaswellthatthereis
fundamentaldisagreementpreventingintegration(andunanimity)atthenational,EUorthe
internationalscalesofgovernance.
Jordan’s(2000)indepthreviewofenvironmentalpolicydevelopmentfroma“departmental
perspective”intheperiod1970-2000offersarangeofformalinstitutionalexplanationsastowhythe
UnitedKingdomhascontinuouslyunderperformedinenvironmentalprotectionwhencomparedtothe
Netherlands.ImplicitinJordan’saccountaretheproblems,policiesand,perhapsmostimportantlyfrom
agovernanceperspective,thepoliticsofenvironmentalpolicy-makingandperformanceintheUK.
ApplyingthetypologyofinstitutionsassuggestedinthispapertoJordan’smeticulousaccountof
departmentalevolutioncoulddeciphernotonlythepolicystreamsalaKingdon(1984)butalsoalarge
numberofinstitutionsthroughwhichgovernanceoftheenvironmentalarenahasbeenexercised.Akey
contributionofsuchanapplicationwillbetheidentificationofthelessformal/tangibleinstitutions,and
arguablythosetypicallyleftoutofmoststudiesofgovernanceoranalysesofpoliciesthroughthelensof
publicadministrationstudies.
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ElsewhereJordanandothers(Jordanet.al2003,SchoutandJordan2003)comeclosertounderlining
theimportanceofthelessformalinstitutionsin(EU)governanceinrelationtoenvironmentalpolicy.In
theirlistof“complicatingfactors”SchoutandJordan(2003:20)includeintra-Commissionrelations,the
needtoexertsimultaneoushorizontalandverticalpressure,theneedtocombineadministrative
capacitiesofMemberStatesintoacoordinatedEuropeannetwork,thedifficultiesingainingan
overviewofthecapacitiesatMemberStatelevel,andthesensitiveproblemofhowbesttoidentify
weaknessesatthenationallevel.
SchoutandJordan(2003)warnagainsttheexpectationthatEuropeanUnionnetworksself-organizeina
constructivemannerintheirresponsestocoordinationchallengesandrecommendthattheEuropean
Commissionshouldtaketheleadinproposingalternativeactionsthroughpolicyandregulatory
measures.IfindeedthisisthecourseofactiontobefollowedonsuchCommunitychallengesaswaste
management,transportation,energyconsumptionandprovision,immigration,andpoverty–tocitebut
afewexamples–thenitisofutmostimportancethatpolicymakersatallscalesofgovernancewithin
theEuropeanUnionareawareofandsensitivetotheroleofallmannerofinstitutionsinthepolicy
process.
Thislineofreasoningcanbeusefullyappliedtothecommitmentby191countriestoimplement
programmestomeetMDGs.Deliberativepolicymaking,whilepath-dependentatthenationalscaleand
difficulttoadoptwhereitisnotalreadypracticed,hasahigherprobabilityofsuccessatasupra-national
scalesuchasthatrepresentedbytheUnitedNations.FortheUNtoincreaseitschancesofsuccessin
effortstomainstreamMDGs,ithastorecognize,asasupra-nationalbody,theimportantroleofformal
andinformalinstitutionsthatprovidethestructuresthroughwhichgovernanceisexercisedatdifferent
scalesofjurisdiction,indifferentspheres,andatdifferentlevelsofinteraction(Figures2and3).
Onlythroughadetailedcomparisonofthefullrangeofinstitutionsindifferentcontextsandatdifferent
scalesarewelikelytogetasenseofwhycontexts,subjectedtocomparablepolicies,generatedifferent
outcomes.Applyingthemethodologyarticulatedintheprecedingparagraphsrequiresgoingbeyond
lookingatinstitutionsfromadepartmentalorpublicadministrationperspective.Usingthetypologyof
institutionstotakestockofthestructuresthroughwhichgovernanceisexercisedislikelytorevealsome
ofthemainopportunitiesforandimpedimentstoeffectingchangeinagivenpolicyarena.Inthefinal
analysis,thecentralquestionforthepolicymakerandthepolicyanalystisnothow“good”apolicyora
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modeofgovernanceisintheabstractbuthowcloselythepolicyresonateswith,andiscapableof
changing,thepre-existingconditionsandtheinstitutionsthroughwhichapolicy-targetedsubsystemis
governed.
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