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    P M B H?Explaining Non-Compliance Dynamics in the EU

    Tj A. Bz, T Hfm d D P

    No. 24 | February 2011

    Working Paper

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    2 | KFGWorking Paper No. 24| February 2011

    KFG Working Paper Series

    Edited by the Kolleg-Forschergruppe T Tfv P f E

    Th KFG W P S v dm h h f h Kolleg-Forschergruppe m hm

    v d . I m h dm xh h d d x

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    A KFG W P v h KFG .fm. dd v m

    [email protected].

    Ch f h : Tj A. Bz, T Hfm, D P

    Ed d d: F Ah, C Bh

    Bz, Tj A./Hfm, T/P, D 2011: P M B H? Ex N-Cm Dm

    h EU, KFG W P S, N. 24, F 2011, Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) Th Tfmv P f

    E F Uv B.

    ISSN 1868-6834 (P)

    ISSN 1868-7601 (I)

    Th h fdd h Gm Rh Fd (DFG).

    F Uv B

    K-Fh

    Th Tfmv P f E:

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    Gm

    Ph: +49 (0)30- 838 57033

    Fx: +49 (0)30- 838 57096

    [email protected]

    .fm.

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    Policy Matters But How? | 3

    Policy Matters But How?

    Explaining Non-Compliance Dynamics in the EU

    Tj A. Bz, Tb Hf d D Pk

    Abstract

    Th E U fm d hh zd. Nvh, h

    , -m d fm m v

    EU fm d v m. S f h m f m -

    x, h , , d m. I - md x

    d f hh -m d h q vd. Y, h h

    v f h m v h v xd. Th h

    d, , - v hh d m f x

    -m. Bd qv , h h m f h fq

    h hh EU vd, h f -m v m d v h d

    f h fm d.

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    4 | KFGWorking Paper No. 24| February 2011

    T Ars

    Tj A. Bz Pf f P S d hd h h f E

    I h O Sh I f P S, F Uv B.

    H h q f Gv, h

    f Ez h d f d d h d

    d f h E U. S O 2008, h d h Rh

    C Th Tfmv P f E h h Thm R.

    C: @zd.f-.d

    Tb Hf v f vm h C f Wm

    & M d h h PhD P S F Uv

    B. H h d h m f

    d . Bf j h f Wm

    & M f, h f h Nh C f Gz d

    Gv d h Whhd C f I

    A.

    C: [email protected]

    D Pk L f P S h Uv C D.

    H h f v d h -, d

    , h d d f m,

    Ez, mv E U , EU d-m

    , md h f m d

    z.

    C: d.@d.

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    Policy Matters But How? | 5

    Cnts

    1. Id 6

    2. N-Cm d P-V 7

    3. P-Ex 12

    4. R- Ex 18

    5. C 27

    L 29

    Adx: Oz f P d C 33

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    6 | KFGWorking Paper No. 24| February 2011

    1. Id

    N-m h , v hh zd m m,

    mm, d fm m v v.1 Th fm

    d f h E U (EU) m zd m m (h E

    Cmm) h d d v v f EU L. Th E Cmm

    fm d f dd f d -m d m

    d h h v . Shd m f, h Cmm h djd

    f h h E C f J (ECJ), hh d . F

    h h f hh -m, h Cmm d h ECJ h

    d h fm , hh h ECJ (f. Bz 2001). D

    h v, -m d d mm .2

    I dd, h fm f m v m v h f h EU

    m d d h h m v fm . S h d , x h m v f mm -m.

    Th f h -m h f m - x (.. K

    1998; Hvd 2000; f vv f. Mh 1996; Ch 2001). I , -

    md x d f hh -m d h f hh hh m

    m vd (Bz . 2010). Y, h h v f h

    vd v xd. W h h d h m f -

    d x. Thf, h f - v3, hh h f

    hh m f h fq f -m d v m d h f h

    fm d. I dd, h h - v, h hh E m,

    hh mx f , h d f E , h

    fq f m v.

    Th d h f . F, m h v f -m

    d (2). Sq, dv - hh d qv hm

    (3). V h fq f m d m dm

    m d x d h h f h d.

    F xm, h -m fm v, m- m

    d h m f f h fm d d d m v

    d m m- d m- . Sm, m v v

    m dv . I d hm d

    . T vm h d, d v m -d h. Nx -d

    hh, d - hh d hm h qv mhd (4).

    1 Cf. A . 2000; A/Sd 2000; D 1997; G . 1998; Gd . 2000; Hf/Sh

    1997; Hd 1993; J 2000; Kh 2000; Kh . 2000; Smm 2000; Smh 2000; S S/

    B 1997; Z 2001; Z/J 2005 m h.

    2 Cf. D 1997; F . 2004; F . 2005; H 2007; Hvd 2000; M 2001; M

    2003; S 2006; T 2003 m h.

    3 F m m fv f h h d v f. Lm/U1998; K . 2005; S 2007; S/Rhd 2005; S/Kd 2008; T

    2007; Hvd 2000; Hvd . 2008.

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    Policy Matters But How? | 7

    Th v h h Dv d x E , h m f mm

    mmm d h f fm m m. L,

    mx f Dv hd hd h hh h f -m. F, -

    d m fm m mm. Th d h -, -, d -

    x f -m m, md. I m f -

    v, hh EU- d f -m

    (f. Bz . 2010). E m d mx h . Hh m h

    Dv d h E aquis communautaire hh mx Dv q m

    , dmv, , d v h Dv h m d d

    x d Dv h mx. Th, h h hm

    f d m h d mm f mx d

    EU .

    2. N-C d P-V

    Wh h E U h v xdd v m, h mm

    d fm f E m h h f h mm . Th

    E Cmm h h h mm f

    E (d A 226 ECT). Th fm d f v . Th

    , d fm (m, , .) d Fm L, fm d d

    d. Th fm fm d h h E Cmm Rd

    O. Shd -m v m d, h E Cmm f h E C f J (ECJ). Th h djd h, hh d h d

    jdm. If h mm f m, h Cmm d (A.

    228 ECT), hh m d ECJ jdm d (f. Bz 2001).

    Wh m h fq f -m d 1978 d 19994,

    h mm h f E m m h

    h. Od -m (DV1)5 dm dd .6 Wh

    h h m f Rd O , h

    hf f h h hd fm (f. Gh 1). Hv, h (..

    ) , mm v v v f h f v .

    Ifm m v hh f vm .7

    4 F m fm h d, f. Bz . 2007.

    5 F m fm h d, f. Bz . 2007. I h f h , hh f -

    x f -m, dh f dd v DV1 d

    DV2/. Th dd v (DV1) m h fq hh -m . I d

    Rd O, .. h f hh h Cmm h -m d. Th

    d dd v (DV2) m h f -m. I fh dh

    h d f -m v m (DV2) d h m f f h fm d

    fm (DV2).

    6 Th v v h h (f. Bz . 2007).

    7 Th m hd f h j d hm . Hv, h dd

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    8 | KFGWorking Paper No. 24| February 2011

    Graph 1: DV1 Annual Reasoned Opinions per Legal Act (in %) by Policy, 1978-998

    If h f -m (DV2) d f h , v d

    . Wh E h h m fd ,

    h -m h h m d d v. Wh

    -m fmd m h h f

    d d , fm d h h d d f h

    f h f vd.

    h h h Mh T 1993. Mv, j d hm h

    q mmzd d md j A 226 fm d. Thf,

    ddd xd h fm .

    8 dm = Adm, = A, m = Cm, = Em d , d = Ed- d h, m = S , = E, v = Evm, = Fh, m = S m,

    x = Tx, = T d E, d = Td.

    0

    5

    10

    15

    ReasonedOpinionsperLegalAct(in%)

    tra fis tax com agr adm eco edu ten emp sem env ent

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    Policy Matters But How? | 9

    Graph 2: DV2a Average Duraon of Non-compliance (in Days) by Policy, 1978-99

    A h v h d f -m (DV2) d h

    dvd fm h (DV2), h h h

    h v h f h fm d. I h

    h h d m f fm ( f h m f h

    ), d h mdd d h (f. Gh 3). M f h h

    m d d h . Th mh h h h

    h v , h d h h . A, vm, d

    m f m fm . B , d, m d

    , d d h, d m f v f fm h d. Ov,

    m h - -m m h f h fm

    d (Gh 3).

    0

    2,0

    00

    4,0

    00

    6,0

    00

    8,0

    00

    DurationofInfringementsProceedingsinDays

    ent agr edu ten eco tra com env sem emp tax adm fis

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    10 | KFGWorking Paper No. 24| February 2011

    Graph 3: DV2b Non-Compliance across Stages for Selected Policy Sectors, 1978-999

    I d q hh h - v d h h vd,

    z h f v h h v f dd v, .. DV1

    d DV2/. F, h f -m d h OLS

    (Md 1, T 1). I d , h q hh h m f

    h dvd fm h d h f fm d

    dd h h h fd . I d vd

    , dd md (Md 2, T 1) d Cx hzd md (Md

    3, T 1).

    Fm h md T 1 m v h h v h h f -m. Th h, x, d d hv d

    v hv m Rd O d v ( %) h h f

    (f. Md 1, T 1). Wh h m f f h fm

    d, hv h f m fm h, h

    h hh (f. Md 2, T 1). D-, h

    h , hh fm h f . A, d v m h E

    9 A h m h 2 f h fm f h EU f-

    m d xdd fm h h h f . I f, fm hm d , d d h, d d h md h fh (ECJ

    Rf, A 228) h 1978-99.

    0

    10

    20

    30

    PercentageofInfringements

    1 2 3 4Stages: 1 Reasoned Opinions, 2 ECJ Referrals, 3 Rulings, 4 Referrals, Art. 228

    agr emp ent env

    fis sem tax ten

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    Policy Matters But How? | 11

    h hv h h f vv, .. dd f

    m h h h (f. Md 3, T 1).

    Table 1: Policy Sectors and Infringements

    Md: (1) (2) (3)

    DV1 DV2 DV2

    Adm 0.0112

    0.0555

    0.3487**

    0.1492

    -0.5730***

    0.1537

    Cm -0.0031

    0.0425

    0.2150

    0.1821

    -0.3835***

    0.1405

    Em & F

    A

    0.0278

    0.0729

    0.5151**

    0.2312

    -0.2014

    0.1997

    Ed & Rh 0.8580***0.1369

    0.3444***0.0772

    -0.5411***0.0662

    E 6.8655***

    0.7353

    -0.2459***

    0.0553

    0.1051**

    0.0471

    Evm 3.6017***

    0.4348

    0.4077***

    0.0528

    -0.3579***

    0.0479

    Fh -0.0689*

    0.0375

    0.8810***

    0.1806

    -0.8927***

    0.1183

    S M 1.1717***

    0.1127

    0.1771***

    0.0542

    -0.4808***

    0.0452

    Tax -0.0582**

    0.0234

    0.4575***

    0.0787

    -0.5485***

    0.0618T & E 0.4165***

    0.1239

    0.2055***

    0.0757

    -0.0890

    0.0683

    Td -0.1581***

    0.0199

    0.2819

    0.2455

    -0.2524

    0.1815

    C 0.1676***

    0.0195

    C P 1 0.6532***

    0.0366

    C P 2 1.1998***

    0.0384

    C P 3 2.2336***0.0545

    Tm Dmm

    Ov 273 5,462 4,591

    Adjd R-qd 0.74

    Tm R 2,974,371

    R h -d - d (H/Wh) dd . *** = 0.01, ** = < 0.05, * = < 0.1.

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    12 | KFGWorking Paper No. 24| February 2011

    3. P-E

    I d x h d m fd d h fm m d,

    h , d h f h m d d m d h

    fm h, h hd dv -d hh h f -m

    (DV1) d (DV2), v. Th md mh d h I R

    (IR) f h x m d mm , hh -d d

    hd d v. Hv, h x. A h m h

    hhh d v d -v (Mj 1993), dv d

    dv (Wdh-H 1980), d m-/v d m-/

    v (Z 1997).

    Mj h h f fm d d-m

    v h E v, m d m h

    m h mm f E h dm v. Rv m

    -m h h -v h fm m hh ,

    hh h mm h mh h (Mj 1993). Wdh-

    H (1980) f m h d h x hh h d .

    S d m h -dv h h dv h

    mm f h dm v. U dv , dv

    f d (W 1980). Sm fm dv

    , h h hv f hm. Th f h dd, m,

    d (hf) fm v m (O 1965) v

    h mm d h fm f dv E , h

    -m. Thd, fm mh hv d v h

    fm h , .. dd m d d . Th hd h m f

    h f mm . P , hh h EU h mhv v

    m (d ), xd m h hh d m fm h

    hh h EU v m . Th d h , h m

    mm mh h h m h h mm d

    fm f mhv d f h .10

    Table 2: Policy-specic Hypotheses Part 1

    Rv Rdbv Scope

    If h f

    v, x m

    -m h -v

    .

    If h f

    dv, x

    m -m h -

    dv .

    If h f

    h d v ,

    x m -m

    h h m

    .

    10 Smh m h h f z ( h hf), hh dd S-/Kd 2008 h x hh dv h h , hh dd

    mmd fm dm (11).

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    Policy Matters But How? | 13

    F, Z h v h f -m v, m-

    v v, m-m dm, h v/m- h

    h m fd (Z 1997; Bz . 2003). Th d h v

    m-m d q mm dv d h

    f , fm f h h f f m f.

    B , v d j m h m f d f m E,

    x q f d (Shf 1999; W 2005). Th

    d mm f v d m hh , h m

    f mm -m. Hv, Z m d h. I f,

    h hhz h f d mm h

    hd d d h h f h d mm h h hd

    (Z 1997). M , h h E fm v

    v -m () f mm vm , .. h

    dm h h mz d h h h

    m , d () h m h d fm h h

    h . E Z, h f

    vm , f vm m hd m m h

    v m d f mm (f. Bz . 2003). I h x, vm

    m f d v (d h hh, h h m f v

    ), hh h mm f f h h hv

    (-) (A/Rh 1995; Hvd 2000; T 2002; L 2007). T h, d

    h f dd -d hh, h f hh . Th

    hh mmzd T 3.

    Table 3: Policy-specic Hypotheses Part 2

    Pv I

    If h f h v

    h, x m -m

    h v .

    Wh d v f vm , h -

    m m f v

    m m d.

    Wh d v f vm m, h -

    m m f v

    m m d.

    Th -m m f v

    m h m h

    d h fm f EU h f

    .

    A f h q z f h d. Th xm d,

    hh h v d, f, v E h v

    d dv m d m m f m d f m , v.

    Th h v d hv fd z hh h fd hz (Shf 1996, 1997; Z 1997, 2002). Y, v h v f dvd , h

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    14 | KFGWorking Paper No. 24| February 2011

    z f v m d. Sd h mhd h

    mh m d d h h d md Shf m v.

    W m h z h h EU m hv h , d

    m-v h d h m m vd hv h

    dm h dm h f . O z d m

    vd m h .

    Table 4: Policy Sectors and their Characteriscs

    C: Rv Rdbv Scope Pv

    Adm

    A X

    Cm X X

    Em & F A X

    Ed & Rh X X

    S A X X X X

    E X X X

    Evm X X X X

    Fh X

    S M X X

    Tax X

    T & E X X X

    Td X X

    W d h h hv dm m- h, h

    h h m m-m , h. Th f h EU h

    m- (A. 136 ECT) m mv v d d

    hh d f. I m v, environmental policy dd m

    f d d d dd h vm (A. 174-176 ECT).

    F, h research policym mv h mv f E d, d

    v m m- m, d d h (A. 163

    ECT).

    A f h f , h d h f agriculture,

    environment, social aairs, d single market. Th m dv ..

    fm h q h vm d fm d-d

    h d f . Fh d x, , v v f .

    F, h Mj d f h EU (Mj 1997), m

    hv d dm h. Ex administraon, agriculture d

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    Policy Matters But How? | 15

    sheries policies. Wh h fm d m f f h dvd , agricultural

    policies hv h dv d dv d m d d m m

    dd d hv. Th m hd fsheries, hh v, hv,

    m dv m f m h d. I

    m v, social aairs, enterprise, environmental policy d transport and energy policies v

    m h dv m, d h .

    Empirical Findings

    Hv dd h - h h -m d z f

    v, m m h dvd hh. I m

    h d d d h hh. T h - hh,

    j d d h h h f . Th m hh

    v m Rd O dd fm v -v, dv

    -dv, . . A h f Z v hh m f

    - d mm - v, d d h h f h .

    Th f f Md 2 d 3 f T 5 h v v v , .. f h

    h v f h -m h v d

    -m h v . F, h hd f Z v hh,

    hv dh -m h d h h d h

    h h d . Th f h Md

    1 f T 5, h v d fm .

    T 5 h h h v f mh h fq f -m

    (f. Md 5, T 5), h h Mj Wdh-H d m m

    h m h q f m (f. Md 1 d 5, T 5). Wh f h

    mm - v, h m vd f Z m h v mh

    dd f d f mm h v . Th v

    m- d m f fm E

    (f. Md 2 d 3.T 5). A, h f h v hh

    d (f. Md 3, T 5). Wh h m f v d h

    h h f d h m f fm, v d. Th

    v d h v dmm d h vm

    d h m d h -m m f v

    . Th f h h v v hh.

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    16 | KFGWorking Paper No. 24| February 2011

    Table 5: Policy-specic Explanaons of the Occurrence of Non-compliance11

    Md: 1 2 3 4 5

    Policy:

    Rv 1.49881.1350

    0.01950.6936

    Rdv 2.1744

    1.4292

    0.7559

    0.7116

    S 0.8490

    0.4823

    0.9354**

    0.4244

    Pv -0.4298

    1.4391

    1.5845***

    0.2078

    1.2873***

    0.1619

    0.5909

    0.9366

    0.2608

    1.0586

    Phase:

    A -0.2455

    0.6163

    0.0072

    0.6274

    Power:

    GDP 0.0001

    0.0001

    0.0001

    0.0001

    Sh S. Idx 0.0341

    0.0203

    0.0341

    0.0204

    Capacity:

    GDP -0.0037

    0.0093

    -0.0037

    0.0093

    E -0.4888***

    0.0543

    -0.1696*

    0.0791

    C 0.7973

    0.6483

    0.4884

    0.4500

    Interacon Eects:

    SSI * E 0.0127

    0.0094

    0.0127

    0.0095

    P. * E -0.6385***

    0.1813

    P. * C 0.6177

    1.2140

    P. * A -0.6650

    0.9823

    -0.9176

    0.9624

    C -1.0556

    1.0696

    -0.5695

    0.6143

    -0.4209

    0.6143

    0.5204

    0.6068

    -0.5652

    0.4818

    Tm Dmm

    Ov 252

    P Y

    464

    Nv

    v. Pv

    C Y

    464

    Nv

    v. Pv

    C Y

    564

    T

    v.

    522

    T

    v.

    Adj. R-qd 0.33 0.44 0.47 0.00 0.12

    R h -d - d (H/Wh) dd h mm (Md 2 d 3)d (Md 1, 4, d 5). *** = 0.01, ** = < 0.05, * = < 0.1.

    11 Th z f h d v xd Adx.

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    Policy Matters But How? | 17

    Table 6: Policy-specic Explanaons for the Persistence of Non-compliance

    Md: (1) (2) (3) (4)

    Policy:

    Pv 0.2969***

    0.0770

    0.2368***

    0.0756

    -0.2709***

    0.0552

    -0.2486***

    0.0739

    Power:

    GDP 0.0001*

    0.0000

    0.0001*

    0.0000

    -0.0000

    0.0001

    -0.0000

    0.0001

    Sh S. Idx 0.0033

    0.0110

    0.0038

    0.0107

    -0.0177**

    0.0082

    -0.0179**

    0.0085

    Capacity:

    GDP 0.0000

    0.0000

    0.0000

    0.0000

    -0.0000

    0.0000

    -0.0000

    0.0000

    E -0.2317***0.0248

    -0.2119***0.0404

    0.0585***0.0196

    0.05050.0359

    C 0.4530**

    0.1973

    0.4831*

    0.2685

    -0.3524

    0.2184

    -0.3306

    0.2479

    Interacon Eects:

    SSI * E -0.0017

    0.0060

    -0.0016

    0.0058

    -0.0017

    0.0052

    -0.0018

    0.0051

    Pv * E -0.0808

    0.0769

    0.0307

    0.0836

    P. * C -0.1583

    0.7477

    -0.1028

    0.3447

    C 1 0.6701***0.2211

    0.6576***0.2226

    C 2 1.2113***

    0.2242

    1.1989***

    0.2253

    C 3 2.2244***

    0.2410

    2.2120***

    0.2406

    Tm Dmm

    Ov 5,181 5,181 4,377 4,377

    R-qd 0.0216 0.0217

    Tm R 2,905,849 2,905,849

    R h -d - d (H/Wh) dd h mm (Md 2 d 3)d (Md 1, 4, d 5). *** = 0.01, ** = < 0.05, * = < 0.1.

    W h - hh f h f -m (DV2). H, f

    h v m hh v v v d h

    -d d -d v.12 F h, h m d d f

    Md 2 d 3 f T 1, d hm h dmm v h dh v

    d v d h h v d vm m d

    vm .

    12 W d h f h h v (f. T 5) h d d f -m, dd d . Thf, d h v

    v v hh T 6.

    Nm f S (DV2) D (DV2)

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    T 6 v h -m fm v d h m f

    f h EU fm d d d. F h , hv, m m d

    hh mm hv v d/ m dm v . N f h

    hhzd vm , vm m, d

    .

    Ov, h vd f -m mxd. Hv, h mh m d

    h z f h v h h f . Th m

    h f h hh fm h v f h dvd d h

    v. Ov, h m h m hm,

    f v h d dm h hmv. Wh m vm

    hv v h, h d . Sm hv d ,

    h hv . Sm h f v mm

    , h v . I d h m, h x f h dvd h m h .

    4. R-S E

    Wh m v , m xm d f d

    , h v v v dv v -dv. F m

    hd hh h v m- v h

    h dv. S h h h mj m f h dvm

    d f hh, d. W d

    h h h f h h fd md h

    (DV1).

    A h , d d dd v, .. h m (DV2) d h m

    f f h fm d (DV2) f dvd f -m

    d. Wh h d f h v , h f

    mhd h, hh d h m. I , h m h

    hv h v -m d v (Bz . d v) h v

    f h dd v f (DV2) h v q, ..-m. M , h m m . Sv,

    hh -, -, d - f h h d f fm

    d d m fm h f h EU fm d. Hv,

    h q hh v v h dd v f dd h f

    , hh f dd m v. Bh m f h q m

    d -m d d m f (d ) hh h

    v h dm h d m f . H, x d, h f

    -m h m h x ddd. Hv, h dvm f

    m hq f d d md h d vv d dd md

    h d x (Bhm . 2006; Kh 2007; Bhm/M 2008).

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    F xv h dd v, -, m q

    d h d fm h zd 3. W d md d hh

    dvd hv md h , m, f h EU mm

    d d h (dd v) f h f h h d. A

    fm f dd v f h m h 10,000 E f

    v h d 1978-99 d h f h , f h 1993 d fm

    118 EU Dv h m f h . Th 1993 v m f h

    1978-99 -m d. I h v m (f. Gh 4, v h): I,

    Bm, G, P, d F h fm h f m d,

    h Dm, h Nhd, Lxm, d h UK fd v f f h 1993 EU

    Dv.13 Thf, hd d f - f -

    m fm h m f h v f fm h E U.

    Graph 4: Infringements on 1993 Direcves versus Average Annual Infringements14

    13 Th d h h f m d f Dv, h d . Sm f h d,

    , f h m Dv v m. F , h Cmm h d f-

    m d f fm C Dv 93/37/EEC h d f d

    f h d f F v m 1993. Thf, Bm, F, d

    G x m fm h I (44 ), hh d h

    m f m f fd . Hv, hd d h f h 118 EU Dv

    d 1993 hv v fd mm d Dv C D -

    v 93/13/EEC f m m h fd m h EU mm.

    14 Th h h h h m f h 118 EU Dv h m f 1993 h h fh EU 12 mm fd 1993 d 1999. Th h h h d h v

    m f fm f E EU 12 mm h 1986-1999.

    0

    10

    20

    3

    0

    40

    50

    ReasonedOpin

    ions

    DN NL LU UK IR ES DEFR PRGRBE IT

    Infringements on 1993 Directives

    DN NL LU GB IR ES DE FR PR GR BE IT

    Average Annual Infringements

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    L d fm - d f mm -v (Gh 5),

    h h v h h hh 1993 EU Dv fm h h vd

    fd . D , f h m f Dv h m f

    h 1993 h h m f Dv h mm

    f . Wh h 46 Dv h d h d 36 h

    d h h E m, Dv dd m. Th v

    mm f m h f v h , , d x Dv.

    C, m mm m h m Dv m f h m.

    Graph 5: Reasoned Opinion per 1993 EU Direcve (in %) by Average Member State

    H x h m f h 118 Dv fd ? Wh m h h

    vd d fm h h md h? A, h d m mm f

    m f h Dv h h d ? T h q, h

    d m, mx, d m d dv v hh, m fm

    mm d Ez h, h mm h, fm h, d

    v h z h f v h x f

    (d).15

    F, h dvd h f , z h f h

    f E h h fd . A f h m m -

    m h, v f v, h q v

    , hh h mh (D . 1996; M 1992) d (Ch/

    15 Cf. S 2007; Hvd . 2008; d S/Kd 2008.

    0

    10

    20

    30

    40

    ReasonedOpinionsperlegalact(in%),averageMS

    com ten sem env agr ent emp tax

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    Policy Matters But How? | 21

    Ch 1993). R h m d x dd, , , m

    v h, v d d q (mj) vm f , dmv,

    , v (Bz 2005; H . 2001). H h

    hm d -m hd v . A E m x E

    , , h, f d m hh.

    Table 7: Mist Hypotheses

    E M D M

    Th hh h m x d

    E m, h m fm.

    Th hh h m E d

    x dm m, h m

    fm.

    T h m hh, z h M 2003, Kd 2006, d

    Hvd/Rmj 2007 hh h m f x E , hh h Dv

    d , h v m h h h Dv fd . Nh h

    hh h dd v dh h mm h E m

    h m f . Th h f dm m. N E

    m h x mm h h. W z h

    dm m h h m f m h mm (d )

    d mm E Dv. Th m hd h z h

    h h m f d m, h h m h E

    Dv d x dm m. Thf, x h h m m,

    m m h mm f EU .16

    Sd, mm d fm h x h h mx f E

    Dv hd h h f fd . Th mm h -m

    m h fm v (Ch/Ch 1991, 1995). Ev f m h

    E , h vd fm d f h v d h m

    . O f -m mx m. U f v

    -m mm m h hv

    f h h m d h hd d. Hh mx f m d

    qm. Cmx Dv q m , dmv, , d

    v h , h f h f -m. Th, h

    mm h x h m mx d h f vd.

    Th fm h m h v m f -m

    xd (D 1998; D . 1996). Cmd mv m, hh

    Dv hd v m f h -v f h d

    16 F d z f dm m h x f d f dv h

    Nhd (f. M 2003). Kd (2006) d dm m. Hv, h h

    h h , h h m f d f mm x d-

    f h E Dv h dm v h h f h D-

    v mh d .

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    mm. Th, - m d -m f h fm.

    A, hh m h m f mm h mm

    d h E (H 1980; F 1980; Wdh-H 1980), hh

    h h h m vd.

    Table 8: Complexity and Precision Hypotheses

    M A C Enforcement Approach to Precision

    Th hh h mx f E m, h

    m h fd .

    Th hh h f E m, h

    m h fd .

    H d z h mx d h f E Dv? Uf, h

    f mh d. W h d d f h mm f

    mx: Th m f Dv , h m f x h, d

    h m f d.17 A h f h v hhzd v d

    mx d hf h f -m d h mm h.

    P . W z h d: h m f x

    Dv h d h Dv h m f d. Bd h fm h,

    x h hh f -m.

    I h m v, dq m, hh m h hvd,

    m f v -m (Ch/Ch 1991, 1995). EU mm d

    m , mm, d f Dv. If mm d v

    m, -m m vd (f. M 2003; S/Rhd 2005; Kd

    2006; Hvd . 2008). Dm mh m () qd mm

    d f d h . Th d m. N d m

    f h f -m h mh m mm v EU

    Dv, h mh m h . Th mm d mm

    E (d h dd), h hh h h h h h

    h Cmm d h h Cmm h hm, .. fm

    d.18

    17 Sm d h m f d h h f x d f h mx f E-

    . I, h h h f Dv d d h m f

    d h hh mx, xv x hh d h h f

    , m d m hd (f. S/Kd 2008).

    18 M f h v d h f E Dv h d f

    m v, h dd v f. Wh d dmd f

    -m h , (M 2003, Hvd . 2008, S/Kd 2008, d hz h m Dv (d h dd) d hh h

    Cmm d mm v E .

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    Table 9: Time Hypotheses

    T Tb R- Id

    Th m m mm d

    E m, h fm.

    Th mm

    E m, h m h h

    Cmm fm d/h

    fm dd.

    T m h f m vd d m , z h f h m f d

    h f E Dv d h dd -m,

    h hd, d h m f d h dd d h d f h d

    m, h h hd.

    Empirical Findings

    N, , h md, hh - v

    hv h h EU Dv d 1993 fd mm

    , d md. Th f h mm -Dv. Th dd

    v f m hh fm d f 1993 d

    1999. Th dd v f h d m h mm

    f Dv.

    Table 10: Mist, Complexity, Time, and Infringements

    Md: (1) (2) (3) (4)

    P C P C

    Mist:

    Pv EU A -0.1785***

    0.0633

    -0.1381

    0.0872

    -0.1133**

    0.0498

    -0.0902

    0.0748

    N Im -0.0281

    0.0216

    -0.0292

    0.0235

    0.0123

    0.0132

    0.0132

    0.0130

    Complexity/ Precision:

    A Cd 0.0037

    0.0160

    0.0175

    0.0191

    0.0408***

    0.0129

    0.0575***

    0.0155

    A Chd 0.0336

    0.0260

    0.0278

    0.0312

    0.0374**

    0.0181

    0.0489**

    0.0204

    Wd 0.0000

    0.0000

    0.0000

    0.0000

    0.0000

    0.0000

    0.0000

    0.0000

    Time:

    Dd 0.0004*

    0.0002

    0.0003

    0.0003

    0.0003*

    0.0002

    0.0004

    0.0002

    Id 0.0009***

    0.0001

    0.0008***

    0.0001

    C -1.1322***

    0.1206

    -1.8720***

    0.1613

    -0.9282***

    0.1031

    -1.7657***

    0.1514

    P Dmm

    Ov 1079 1079 1320 1320

    Pd R-qd 0.1824 0.1072 0.0216 0.0189

    R h -d - d (H/Wh) dd . *** = 0.01, ** = < 0.05, * = < 0.1.

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    24 | KFGWorking Paper No. 24| February 2011

    T 10 h h h m m f h f - hh.

    Th vd h, h Dv d x E , h m

    f mm mmm d h f (P Md 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, d 11 f

    T 10) v ( d Md 6 d 10 f T 10) fm m m. Hv,

    h d m hh h f dm m d d. Th

    mh m d d h h h z f dm m v h

    m f m v d. I f, f f h dm m

    hh v m dd fh d h m

    d f vm m d (Md 9-12 f T 10) (f. Bz . 2010),

    d m h h m f dm v h h m d

    -m dd.

    Table 10: Mist, Complexity, Time, and Infringements (connued)

    Md: (5) (6) (7) (8)

    P C P C

    Mist:

    Pv EU A -0.1797***

    (0.0641)

    -0.1454*

    (0.0803)

    -0.2266**

    (0.0923)

    -0.1690

    (0.1099)

    N Im -0.0086

    (0.0181)

    -0.0087

    (0.0171)

    -0.0021

    (0.0177)

    -0.0005

    (0.0158)

    Complexity/ Precision:

    A Cd 0.0075(0.0160)

    0.0267(0.0168)

    0.0103(0.0192)

    0.0263(0.0189)

    A Chd 0.0353

    (0.0271)

    0.0270

    (0.0292)

    0.0344

    (0.0289)

    0.0184

    (0.0312)

    Wd 0.0000

    (0.0000)

    0.0000

    (0.0000)

    0.0000*

    (0.0000)

    0.0000*

    (0.0000)

    Time:

    Dd 0.0004*

    (0.0002)

    0.0004

    (0.0002)

    0.0004*

    (0.0003)

    0.0003

    (0.0003)

    Id 0.0009***

    (0.0001)

    0.0007***

    (0.0001)

    0.0009***

    (0.0001)

    0.0007***

    (0.0001)

    Power:

    GDP 0.0001

    (0.0002)

    0.0002

    (0.0002)

    0.0001

    (0.0002)

    0.0001

    (0.0002)

    SSI 0.0655*

    (0.0369)

    0.0975*

    (0.0512)

    0.0699*

    (0.0383)

    0.1026**

    (0.0508)

    Capacity:

    GDP -0.0000

    (0.0000)

    -0.0000

    (0.0000)

    -0.0000

    (0.0000)

    -0.0000

    (0.0000)

    E -0.4601***

    (0.1151)

    -0.7648***

    (0.1860)

    -0.4976***

    (0.1235)

    -0.7782***

    (0.1827)

    C 0.8333

    (0.5483)

    0.8824

    (0.6143)

    0.8947

    (0.5508)

    0.9352

    (0.6091)

    Interacon Eects:

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    Policy Matters But How? | 25

    SSI * E 0.0387

    (0.0246)

    0.0819**

    (0.0390)

    0.0416

    (0.0263)

    0.0828**

    (0.0384)

    C -1.4996***

    (0.1581)

    -2.5399***

    (0.2273)

    -0.9823*

    (0.5868)

    -2.0174***

    (0.4810)

    P Dmm no no Ov 1079 1079 1067 1079

    Pd R-qd 0.2230 0.1436 0.2405 0.1585

    A hf f h md md T 10 (3, 4, 7, 8, 11, d 12), d f h

    m mx m, .. m mx EU Dv m fd .

    Th fm hh d , h h f Dv

    (h Md 7 d 8 h x T 10) d h

    h m f d d -m h d md. F, d h f Dv h h h

    Cmm m fm d h v . Th f h

    m d f - . A , f m , h d

    h m m h h xd h m h m h mm v h

    f , mm, d f dm. C

    f h m f h mm h d m hh, x

    dd h h m m .

    I Md 5-12 f T 10, f mm d v. I h,

    h hd, h d d E v m hh d h f

    h v. Th , h f h m f Dv d d h m

    mm h Dv . O h h hd,

    h m -d v d , hh x

    h f -m mm h h d (Bz . 2010)

    d d h h f fm. Th h h h d

    fm 1993 EU Dv f h v f fm EU

    1978 d 1999.

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    Table 10: Mist, Complexity, Time, and Infringements (connued)

    Md: (9) (10) (11) (12)

    P C P C

    Mist:Pv EU A -0.1820***

    (0.0648)

    -0.1461*

    (0.0774)

    -0.1178**

    (0.0513)

    -0.0949

    (0.0703)

    N Im -0.0166

    (0.0250)

    -0.0011

    (0.0226)

    0.0249

    (0.0264)

    0.0130

    (0.0202)

    Interacon Eects:

    N. Im *

    E

    0.0397

    (0.0312)

    0.0485

    (0.0328)

    0.0188

    (0.0291)

    0.0082

    (0.0292)

    N. Im *

    C

    -0.7432**

    (0.3118)

    -0.5385*

    (0.2789)

    -0.3792**

    (0.1751)

    -0.3693*

    (0.1909)

    Complexity/

    Precision:

    A Cd 0.0101

    (0.0162)

    0.0277

    (0.0170)

    0.0441***

    (0.0132)

    0.0596***

    (0.0147)

    A Chd 0.0412

    (0.0287)

    0.0266

    (0.0306)

    0.0415**

    (0.0194)

    0.0487**

    (0.0208)

    Wd 0.0000

    (0.0000)

    0.0000

    (0.0000)

    0.0000

    (0.0000)

    0.0000

    (0.0000)

    Time:

    Dd 0.0005*

    (0.0002)

    0.0004

    (0.0002)

    0.0003*

    (0.0002)

    0.0003

    (0.0002)

    Id 0.0009***

    (0.0001)

    0.0008***

    (0.0001)

    Power:

    GDP 0.0001

    (0.0002)

    0.0002

    (0.0002)

    0.0002

    (0.0002)

    0.0003

    (0.0002)

    SSI 0.0541

    (0.0380)

    0.0877*

    (0.0509)

    0.0605*

    (0.0325)

    0.1104**

    (0.0537)

    Capacity:

    GDP -0.0000*

    (0.0000)

    -0.0000*

    (0.0000)

    -0.0000*

    (0.0000)

    -0.0000*

    (0.0000)

    E -0.4684***

    (0.1221)

    -0.7916***

    (0.1850)

    -0.5801***

    (0.1047)

    -1.0017***

    (0.2050)

    C 1.0212*

    (0.5365)

    1.1583**

    (0.5841)

    0.9290**

    (0.4671)

    1.1121*

    (0.5830)

    Interacon Eects:

    SSI * E 0.0334

    (0.0252)

    0.0802**

    (0.0381)

    0.0494**

    (0.0225)

    0.1083**

    (0.0442)

    C -1.5731***

    (0.1652)

    -2.6130***

    (0.2242)

    -1.3380***

    (0.1393)

    -2.5249***

    (0.2318)

    Ov 1079 1079 1320 1320

    Pd R-qd 0.2332 0.1489 0.09452 0.07544

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    Ov, h m 10 d h d f dvd hh h h h

    -m m-dm hm h f d m ddd

    fm , , d v. Ev h hh h f

    mm d , Dv h, d dmm h md,

    d f hh fm h f h v. Th v m

    v h, hh -, -, d - v.

    5. C

    D IR , m h m f -d x f h

    d f -m. I v , d h h d d

    md x h f h vd v m dm (Bz . 2010).

    Y, m v h md xd f. Th dv h m h hh

    mv d -d h d - d - v. T h d,

    md h fq f -m d d. Th v h m

    m vd h h ( h fm h , j d hm

    , d vm d) d h m v q m m d m f h

    fm d h d ( h fm h h, dm, d

    x d). B, h x m d h h fq f

    v d h fm f -m m? I 3, dv

    hh d dv h h, h h dm mm,

    m, d . Th qv f h hh v h

    h d f d (.. v, dv, d dv),

    h d m- d m- v f h

    m v -m h v. Th m f h h h m

    d h m h d d h dd dm.

    F , m d v d v m v

    . I dd, v hv dv d-. W ddd m d

    h dd f (S 1970) d f - v h h h h

    f h d. T h d d d d mdf x Ez, mm,

    mm, d fm h, dv hh d E m, h

    mx d f m, m, d d 4 f h . T

    h hh, dd d, hh Dv h d f

    1993. Th d d m m d -m f dvd EU

    Dv, d Dv dvd, - h . Wh -

    hh, h h m mx f Dv hd hd h

    hh h f -m. A, h Dv d x E ,

    h m f mm mmm d h f fm m. L,

    , d h f Dv h h h h Cmm

    fm d h d mm .

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    Th dm h x f -, -, d -h

    f md. T hh h f mm d ,

    - v, d dmm md, fd f h f h

    v: C h hh ( ) m v EU h

    f h d. C h v m h h

    h m h h hv , mm, d f (f. Bz

    . 2010). A h m m, h h mm v mx d

    m- d m h d h fm

    hzd v . A, mm f EU m f

    h E m hh. Th, h v m v h, hh

    m dd v h v h d , , d

    .

    Bd h d h, h m h f f m h.

    F, d h d f h hh dvd 3 f h

    . Th h fm f E v h d m

    h z f d h v, dv, d, m-m,

    m-. A x d h mf d h v f h

    d d dvd E , , dv, d d h

    dm. Wh h f, d , v h m h 10,000 E

    f. Th d h f f h m d , mhd.

    H - hh f d dd v, .. h f -

    m v m d v h d f h fm d? A d , h

    q - md h m d d md h hd h

    vv d dd md h h d f h -dm m

    h h x f h m fm f E hd

    h h d h d m f h EU fm d vm -

    m m h h.

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    Policy Matters But How? | 29

    L

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    d h . I xm h f h EU -

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    f d x d h h :

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    Cm, Cd d Bd

    Cmv Rm d E Ex R