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euro POLIS

Journal of Political Analysis and Theory

ISSN: 1582-4969

Edited and published by the Centre for Political Analysis

Correspondence address: Mosoiu Traian Str., no. 71, Room IV/2 400132, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

euro POLIS Journal of Political Analysis and Theory Babes-Bolyai University Department of Political Science Centre for Political Analysis

Director: Vasile Boari, Babeș – Bolyai University Managing Editor: George Jiglău, Babeș - Bolyai University

Editorial Board: Ronald King, San Diego State University Vasile Boari, Babes – Bolyai University Paul Michelson, Huntington University, Indiana Anton Carpinski, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Iasi Eric Remacle, Free University Bruxelles Natalia Vlas, Babes – Bolyai University Sergiu Gherghina, Goethe University, Frankfurt Gabriela Borz, University of Birmingham Dan Capostagno, Sonoma State University, California Radu Murea, Babes – Bolyai University Cosmin Marian, Babes – Bolyai University Flore Pop, Babes – Bolyai University Advisory Board: Nicolae Balota, Nice, France Aurelian Craiutiu, Indiana University Mihaela Miroiu, SNSPA, Bucharest Alina Mungiu Pippidi, President of the Romanian Academic Society Eliezer Palmor, Ambassador Israel Cristian Parvulescu, SNSPA, Bucharest Silviu Rogobete, West University, Timisoara Oleg Serebrian, Free International University, Chisinau Levente Salat, Babes – Bolyai University Michael Shafir, Babes – Bolyai University Vladimir Tismaneanu, University of Maryland

Table of Contents Articles

Florin N. Feșnic

The Demand-Side of Euroskepticism in Eastern and Western Europe: Romania and France

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Daniela Angi

Participation and Norms of Good Citizenship: A discussion on Romania and youth

91

Florin N. Feșnic

Political Consequences of Romania’s

Modernization: How the Romanian party system evolved from the 1990’s to the present

113

Daniela Cervinschi

The Impact of the Entrepreneur Condition on Social Mobility and Social Change Romanian Self-Employed Migrants in the Italian Construction Sector

125

Ovidiu Oltean

Romanian Migrants’ Political Transnationalism, Alternative Voting Methods and Their Effect on the Electoral Process

157

articles

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THE DEMAND-SIDE OF EUROSKEPTICISM IN EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE: Romania and France* Florin N. Fesnic Babeş-Bolyai University [email protected] Abstract Euroskepticism is on the rise in both Eastern and Western Europe. In this paper I use survey data1 from an Eastern country (Romania) and a Western country (France) and highlight important similarities between the determinants of Euroskepticism, on the one hand, and its electoral consequences, on the other. The analysis shows that Euroskepticism, albeit correlated with authoritarianism, has an independent and significant effect on support for extreme right parties (PRM and the National Front, respectively). These results suggest that, even though the PRM is now practically extinct, the potential for the rise of a new Euroskeptic party in Romania is significant. Keywords: Euroskepticism, authoritarianism, left, right, extreme right, Romania, France Up until recently, Euroskepticism (generally understood as a set of negative attitudes towards, even rejection of furthering European integration and EU governance) was a relatively minor issue on the political agenda of both individual European countries and the EU. However, several developments have given this issue prominence and salience. On the one hand, the role of European citizens in the policy decision-making process is more important than in the past, as shown by the results of recent national and European elections, as well as the results of several EU-related referenda. On the other hand, political entrepreneurs have seized this opportunity, so that Euroskepticism is now well represented by a number of important parties all across Europe. In this context, Romania’s accession to the EU raises some interesting questions, ones that are equally relevant for scholars, policy-makers and the general public. When we look at the demand-side or voter perspective,

* This research was supported by the CNCS-UEFISCDI grant PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0669. 1 The dataset for Romania was provided by the project “Romanian Presidential Election Panel Study 2010,” director Mircea Comşa, financed by CNCSIS (grant CNCSIS-UEFISCU PNII-IDEI 2174/2008) and the Soros Foundation. The source of the dataset for France was the study “Panel Electoral Français (2007) CEVIPOF-Ministère de l'Intérieur”.


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one important issue is whether the determinants of Euroskepticism in Romania resemble those from the West. For instance, if better educated people in Western Europe are more sympathetic vis-à-vis the EU, compared to their less educated counterparts, do we see the same effect of education in Romania? Then, from a supply-side or party perspective, an equally significant question is whether Romanian political parties can make electoral gains from embracing a Euroskeptic agenda and, if so, whether there are ideological affinities between the ideological profile of parties and the prospects for success of such attempts. For the time being, Euroskepticism has little, if any, presence in Romania, at least at the political level, but things may rapidly change, especially given the current economic conditions, the migrant crisis and the recent terrorist attacks, all of which offer good opportunities for nationalist parties and politicians to blame the country’s problems on external factors such as the European Union. To address these issues, this paper will compare the impact of socioeconomic, demographic and attitudinal variables on Euroskepticism in Romania to the impact of these variables on Euroskepticism in a Western European country, France. There are substantial differences between the two countries in terms of economic, social and political development, in addition to their institutional experience with the EU. France was one of the six founding members of the European Economic Community, the EU’s ancestor, more than half a century ago, while Romania has joined the EU less than a decade ago (in 2007). Last, but certainly not least, the French public is among the most Euroskeptic among all 28 member states, as illustrated by their rejection of the new European constitution in the 2005 referendum and the significant electoral gains made in recent years by the strongly Euroskeptic National Front, while various polls have consistently showed the Romanian public as one of the most Europhile. In spite of all these differences, the analysis will show important similarities between the two countries, not just in terms of the determinants of Euroskepticism but, perhaps most significantly, in terms of the impact of Euroskepticism on party competition. Various studies have indicated that, in Western Europe, extreme right-wing parties appear as the natural vehicle for Euroskepticism. The analysis in this chapter will confirm this finding in the case of France, where the extreme rightist National Front (and its former leader, Jean Marie Le Pen), appear to be the sole beneficiaries of Euroskepticism. Most interestingly, this finding is mirrored in the case of Romania, where another extreme right party, the PRM

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(Greater Romania Party) and its leader, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, emerged as the natural choice for Romanian Euroskeptics, even though the party did not embrace a Euroskeptic position. Certainly, the PRM has become rather irrelevant politically in recent years, even before the death of Vadim Tudor. However, given the ideological profile of the PRM –a nostalgic of the previous regime–, this can actually offer an opening for genuine Euroskeptic parties. Determinants of Euroskepticism: previous research Studies conducted in older members of the EU from Western Europe as well as newer EU members from Central and Eastern Europe have identified a series of socioeconomic, demographic and attitudinal variables with an impact on Euroskepticism (Hix 2005: 147-74, Markowski and Tucker 2010: 540, McLaren 2004). Not surprisingly, these variables are the same that play a central role in explanatory accounts of partisanship. The literature on voting describes the linkage between the socioeconomic and demographic profile of voters and their partisan preferences as being mediated by their attitudes and policy positions - the so-called “funnel of causality” (Campbell et al. 1960, 24-37). In a similar vein, Figure 1 presents a modified version of the classical model of voting behavior, adding Euroskepticism as a determinant of party preference. Figure 1. A theoretical model of Euroskepticism and its partisan consequences

As it is the case with voting, attitudes toward the European construction and the EU are shaped by a mix of normative concerns (cosmopolitanism and libertarianism versus nationalism and authoritarianism) and utilitarian


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considerations – or, to put it differently, by both politics and economics (Cichowski 2000, 1245; Hix 2005, 166-73; Tverdova and Anderson 2004, 190). That is to say, citizens with a more cosmopolitan-libertarian worldview and those who think that they will get social and economic benefits from European integration will support it, while the more nationalist-authoritarian respondents and those who do not expect to get material benefits from integration will oppose it (Gabel 1998, 335-8; Hooghe and Marks 2005, 421-6; Tverdova and Anderson 2004, 186-92). In turn, the political and economic positions of citizens are affected by their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (that is, the former are a consequence of the latter). Consequently, we expect those who are better educated, younger, wealthier, or residing in large cities to be more favorable toward the EU compared to those who are less educated, older, poorer, or residing in rural areas, either because the members of the first groups are more cosmopolitan, or expect to perform better economically in a more integrated EU, or both (Hix 2005, 157-66; Markowski and Tucker 2010, 540; Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky 2002, 558-64). Additionally, gender and religiosity are variables whose potential impact on Euroskepticism is perhaps less intuitive. Previous research indicates that women tend to be less supportive of the EU compared to men (Hix 2005, 163), a result that is likely to reflect gender differences in terms of position in the workforce and economic interests (Hix 2005, 162). Finally, both religiosity (Markowski and Tucker 2010, 540) and religious affiliation (Hix 2005, 163-5) are related to EU support. Nelsen and Guth (2003) found that in the 1980s and 1990s, support for EU among devout Catholic and Orthodox Christians was higher compared to their less devout counterparts; however, for Protestants, the pattern of support was reversed: devoutness was negatively correlated with support for EU. When we analyze Euroskepticism as an independent, rather than dependent variable (that is, when we move our focus from individual-level determinants of Euroskepticism to its consequences for party competition), one party family emerges as the clear beneficiary of Euskepticism: the extreme right. The extreme nationalism and authoritarianism that is the core ingredient of both the ideology of extreme right parties and the worldview of their constituents seems to have an affinity with Euroskepticism (Grunberg and Schweisguth 2003; McLaren 2002). However, rather than seeing Euroskepticism as a mere component of the nationalist-authoritarian position of the extreme right, as Grunberg and Schweisguth do, I conceptualize Euroskepticism as a separate variable, though largely


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influenced by nationalism and authoritarianism. One additional important caveat is that, in order to reap maximum electoral benefits from Euroskepticism, an extreme right party should endorse at least a centrist position on economic issues in order not to alienate the economic losers of European integration. Subsequent empirical analyses will confirm that both economic leftism and nationalist-authoritarian attitudes have a significant impact on Euroskepticism. In turn, in addition to the economic and political positions of citizens, their level of Euroskepticism is an important predictor of support for extreme right-wing parties: the more Euroskeptic the respondents, the more sympathetic they are toward those parties and the higher the chances that they will vote for such parties and candidates. Before moving on to the actual analysis, what follows is a brief description of the datasets employed, the methods used and the operationalization of variables. Datasets, methods, and operationalization of variables The sources for the data used in this paper are two surveys conducted in France and Romania. The first survey was the second wave of the French Political Barometer, sponsored by the Ministry of the Interior and Regional Planning and implemented by IFOP (Institut français d'opinion publique) in September 2006. The sample was representative for the adult eligible population of France (N = 5,647). The second was a post-election survey, conducted in Romania during the weeks immediately after the last European elections (June 2009). The survey was sponsored by the Soros Foundation and implemented by Gallup Romania, and the sample was representative for Romania’s adult eligible population (N = 1,200). To analyze the impact of socioeconomic and demographic variables on economic and political attitudes, as well as Euroskepticism, I will use multivariate linear regression. In subsequent analyses I will add Euroskepticism to all the aforementioned variables and use all of them as predictors of vote intention in a multivariate regression model. Multivariate linear regression is a statistical technique that enables the researcher to assess the impact of each independent or explanatory variable on the dependent variable (the variable to be explained), while holding the effect of the other independent variables constant. For example, in a multivariate regression where we have the respondents’ education measured as “low,” “medium” and “high” and their age (measured in


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years) as predictors of the likelihood that the respondent will vote for party X (say, on a 0-10 scale), the coefficient for education will tell us the amount by which this likelihood changes, on average, when education increases by one “unit” (from “low” to “average” or from “average” to “high”). The operationalization of “gender” and “age” is straightforward. The first variable is dichotomous (male/female), while the second is continuous (measured in years). I recoded “education” in four categories, “elementary”, “vocational”, “high school” and “higher education”. “Residence” was recoded in three categories, “rural”, “town” (under 100,000), and “city” (over 100,000). The respondents’ religiosity was measured using their answer to a question about Church attendance (four categories, from “never or almost never” to “very frequently”). The measurement of the respondents’ wealth was less clear-cut. In the Romanian survey, I used the answer to questions about ownership of various items (car, mobile phone, computer, washing machine, bank account), in addition to having Internet access and air conditioning in the household. Each answer was coded “0” for “no” and “1” for “yes”; these scores provided a cumulative index with a range from zero (respondents who had none of the seven items) to seven (respondents who had all of them). A similar approach to the measurement of wealth was previously used by scholars studying the post-Communist region (White, Rose and McAllister 1997, 60), while a slightly modified form of it was used in older studies conducted in France (Evans and Mayer 2005, 44). Unfortunately, the 2006 survey did not include questions that would have measured the respondents’ wealth directly. Therefore, I had to use an indirect measure, a question about how easily the respondent’s financial situation enables him or her to manage everyday life; the answers (four categories, from “very difficultly” to “very easily”) were used as a proxy (indirect measure) for wealth. With the partial exception of wealth, the measurement of socioeconomic and demographic variables was simple. Things are less straightforward with regard to attitudinal variables, where we do not have such a simple meter for measuring authoritarianism or Euroskepticism as it is the case with, say, education or age. One possible solution to this problem is to use a statistical method called factor analysis. Without getting into technical details, the idea behind factor analysis is that we start with the notion that there is an unobserved latent variable (for instance, authoritarianism), and we use a number of observable and measurable variables for which we


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have theoretical reasons to believe that they are related to our latent variables (say, in the case of authoritarianism, support for the death penalty or hostility toward foreign people or religions). We can then start from the set of observable variables to compute an overall score (factor) that represents an empirical measure of the unobserved latent variable. Table 1 presents the questions used in factor analysis to compute economic (left-right), libertarian-authoritarian, and Euroskeptic scores for each French and Romanian respondent. Table 1. Questions used in factor analysis to compute left-right, libertarian-authoritarian and Euroskeptic scores for French and Romanian respondents

Factor France Romania Economic (left-right)

Favors the CPE2; More freedom to businesses; Positive views about profit

People get their fair share; Government should not intervene to reduce income inequalities; Against government ownership of main utilities

Authoritarianism Favors the death penalty; Negative views on immigrants; Negative views on Islam

Democracy is not the best political regime; A military regime would be good for Romania; A democratic regime is not good for Romania

Euroskepticism Voted “no” in the referendum on the new European Constitution; Negative views on the EU; France should not open up

Romania’s membership in the EU is a bad thing; Not proud to be a citizen of the EU; Never felt European

Finally, for party preference I used questions about the respondents’ likelihood to vote for the leaders of each of the major parties (left, center and right) in France and Romania, respectively, as well as the likelihood of voting for the leaders of the two extreme right parties, Jean-Marie Le Pen

2 The CPE, or First Employment Contract (contrat première embauche) was a measure promoted by the conservative government of Dominique de Villepin and passed by the French parliament in April 2006. The law, favored by business and opposed by labor unions, enabled employers to fire young employees easier than it was the case prior to the passing of the law (Le Monde 2006).


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(National Front) and Corneliu Vadim Tudor (Greater Romania Party). In France, the question had four categories, from “very unlikely” to “very likely”, while in Romania the question was asked on a 1-10 scale. In both countries, the institutional peculiarity of a directly elected and relatively powerful president provides an important reason for preferring vote intention in presidential rather than parliamentary elections in order to capture the partisan preferences of respondents. Additionally, unlike the rest of the parties in either country, neither of the two extreme right parties that constitute the main focus of this chapter, the National Front and the Greater Romania Party, have experienced a succession at the top, being headed by the same leader from the very beginning of their inception. Thus, in both cases, the party identifies with its leader to a much greater extent than mainstream parties. The determinants and political consequences of Euroskepticism: empirical analysis In the first step of the analysis, Euroskepticism is the dependent variable (i.e., the variable to be explained). To this end, I use regression analysis to assess the impact of each of the socioeconomic, demographic and attitudinal variables depicted in Figure 1. The next step is to evaluate the influence of Euroskepticism on party competition. At this stage, party preference becomes the dependent variable, and Euroskepticism is added to the list of independent variables from the previous analysis. By doing so, multiple linear regression controls the effect of all the other variables and the coefficient for Euroskepticism is an accurate estimate of the impact of this variable on partisanship.


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Table 2. Determinants of Euroskepticism: France and Romania compared

Left-right Authoritarianism Euroskepticism

France Romania France Romania France Romania

Education + − − −

Age + − + − −

Male + + − −

Urbanization + − − −

Wealth + − − −

Religiosity + + −

Left-right − −

Authoritarianism + +

For each independent variable, the sign in Table 2 represents its substantive impact on the dependent variable in the column where the sign appears. For instance, the “+” sign for the influence of education on left-right position in France tells us that better educated respondents in that country are more right-wing than less educated respondents (recall that throughout this chapter I reserve the labels “left” and “right” exclusively for economic policies positions). I chose p < 0.1 as the threshold for deciding whether a variable is significant or not. Intuitively, that means looking at the statistical significance for each independent variable that was reported by the statistical package performing the analysis. When the statistical significance was less than 0.1, it indicated that the chance that the impact estimated in the analysis is “true” (that is, we will find the same impact in the whole population) is greater than 90 percent, and therefore we can be quite confident in the results. For the variables where the statistical significance was greater than 0.1, there was less certainty about the results, and consequently I reported no effect (for instance, the lack of a sign for the impact of education on the left-right position of respondents in Romania indicates that the estimated impact of this variable was negligible). The results in Table 2 point out substantial differences between the impact of socioeconomic and demographic variables on the left-right position of respondents and their level of authoritarianism in the two countries. In France, better education, older age, being male, living in a large city, having a better material situation and attending Church often are all attributes that make a significant contribution to a more right-wing position on economic policies. In Romania, only two variables have a significant effect on left-right position, and this impact is the opposite of what we observe in France


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– namely, that older people and the inhabitants of large cities are more left-wing. Unlike their Western counterparts, most of the elderly in Romania live in rather poor socioeconomic conditions, and so their support for leftist economic policies is not surprising. More unexpected, though, is the leftism of residents of cities, possibly an effect of the economic crisis, which may have hit harder in urban areas. If we look at the determinants of authoritarianism, we see that in both countries education has a dampening effect. Once again, the impact of age in France is the opposite of what we see in Romania, with old people more authoritarian in the former and less authoritarian in the latter (yet another surprising, and quite unsettling, result). Additionally, urbanization has a significant effect in France, where residents of large cities are less authoritarian than residents of rural areas. In Romania, women, the better off, and the non-religious are more tolerant compared to men, the worse off, and the very religious. The predictive model of Euroskepticism in France is the mirror image of the model of left-right position: all the variables that make the respondents more right-wing also make them less Euroskeptic. For Romania, only two non-attitudinal variables have a significant effect: males and the better off respondents are less Euroskeptic than females and the worse off. Finally, the two attitudinal variables have similar effects in both countries: a right-wing position on economic issues is negatively correlated with Euroskepticism, while authoritarianism is positively correlated with it. These last results are consistent with the explanatory account of Euroskepticism that considers the role of economic interests (a right-wing economic position) and normative considerations (a libertarian-cosmopolitan worldview). In the final stage of this analysis I look at the impact of Euroskepticism on partisanship. To this end, Table 3 presents the analysis of vote intention (more specifically, likelihood to vote) for the major candidates representing the left, center, right and extreme right in recent presidential elections3 in the two countries.

3 The 2007 French presidential election and the 2009 Romanian presidential election.


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Table 3. Socioeconomic, demographic, attitudinal variables and their impact on partisan preferences: France and Romania compared

Left Center Right Extreme right

FR1 RO2 FR3 RO4 FR5 RO6 FR7 RO8

Education − + −

Age − + + + − −

Male − +

Urbanization + −

Wealth − + + −

Religiosity − + − + −

Left-right − + +

Authoritarianism − − + +

Euroskepticism − − − − − − +

1Dependent variable: likelihood to vote for Ségolène Royal (Socialist) 2Dependent variable: likelihood to vote for Mircea Geoană (Social Democratic Party) 3Dependent variable: likelihood to vote for François Bayrou (Democratic Movement) 4Dependent variable: likelihood to vote for Crin Antonescu (Liberal Party) 5Dependent variable: likelihood to vote for Nicolas Sarkozy (Union for a Popular Movement) 6Dependent variable: likelihood to vote for Traian Băsescu (Liberal-Democratic Party) 7Dependent variable: likelihood to vote for Jean-Marie Le Pen (National Front) 8Dependent variable: likelihood to vote for Corneliu Vadim Tudor (Greater Romania Party) Whether we compare the model of support for the left, center and right candidates in the same country, or even moderate candidates from the same ideological family in the two countries, we notice substantial differences. For instance, the model of support for the Socialist candidate Ségolène Royal is not only different from the model of support for the conservative candidate Nicolas Sarkozy, but differs quite substantially even from the model of support for the Social Democratic candidate Mircea Geoană. In spite of all these inter-and intra-country differences, there is one variable that has a consistent effect across the predictive models of support for all moderate candidates, distinguishing them from the models of support for the two extreme right-wing candidates. The predictor in question is Euroskepticism, the very variable that constitutes the focus of this chapter. After controlling for the effect of the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of respondents, as well as their left-right position and level of authoritarianism, Euroskepticism has a negative effect on support for all mainstream candidates, while having a positive effect on support for Le Pen and no effect on support for Tudor.


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Conclusion This chapter offered a comparative analysis of the determinants of Euroskepticism and its consequences for party competition in France, a Western European country and old member of the EU and Romania, a post-Communist country and recent member of the EU. In the first part of the analysis (Table 2), Euroskepticism was the dependent variable. Even though the predictive models of left-right position and authoritarianism in the two countries are very different, the predictive models of Euroskepticism are not. These results are consistent with Marks et al.’s (2006) comparative analysis of party competition and European integration. On the one hand, they describe party competition as following a different logic in the two halves of Europe: in Western Europe, the main axis of party competition is left-libertarian versus right-authoritarian, while in Eastern Europe the main axis of party competition is left-authoritarian versus right-libertarian, which explains why the models for left-right and authoritarian-libertarian positions (Table 2) and the subsequent models of partisan preferences (Table 3) in Romania are so different than the models for France. Yet on the other hand, Marks et al. argue that in spite of all these differences, the process of preference formation for European integration (i.e., Euroskepticism) follows a similar logic in Western and Eastern Europe. This latter result explains why the partisan impact of Euroskepticism in Romania resembles so well the effect it has in France, lowering the support for all mainstream candidates, but not the support for the extreme right candidate. Even though the results indicate that, as of 2009, the impact of Euroskepticism on support for Tudor was less than its impact on support for Le Pen (no effect in the first case, a positive effect in the second), they also indicate a promising avenue for the emergence of a new extreme right-wing party. The analysis showed that all mainstream parties in Romania lose electorally from an increase in Euroskepticism. That being the case, an extreme right party becomes the natural or default choice for Romanian Euroskeptics. It is also important to mention that the PRM did not, throughout its electoral history, embrace a hardline Euroskeptic position. When an extreme right-wing party does that, such a strategic move can only improve its electoral prospects. Another important caveat is that throughout this chapter I used the label “extreme right” for Greater Romania Party and its late leader only because this is the conventional label used in the literature for such party. However, on economic policies the


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PRM was rather leftist, thus placing it in an ideal position to benefit from Euroskepticism, combining economic leftism with political authoritarianism. If one were a political strategist, the consequence would be clear: taking into account the current economic, social and political conditions, in Romania and throughout Europe, it seems that the first thing a new extreme “right”-wing party should do in order to make substantial electoral gains is to fully embrace an Euroskeptic position. References Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E.

Stokes. 1960. The American Voter (unabridged edition). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Cichowski, Rachel A. 2000. “Western Dreams, Eastern Realities: Support for the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe”. Comparative Political Studies 33(10): 1243-1278. doi: 10.1177/0010414000033010001.

Evans, Jocelyn, and Nonna Mayer. 2005. “Electorates, New Cleavages and Social Structures”, in Developments in French Politics 3, edited by Alistair Cole, Patrick le Galès, and Jonah Levy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 35-53.

Gabel, Mark. 1998. “Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories”. Journal of Politics 60(2): 333-354.

Grunberg, Gérard, and Étienne Schweisguth. 2003. “La tripartition de l’espace politique”, in Le vote de tous le refus: Les élections présidentielle et législatives de 2002, edited by Pascal Perrineau and Colette Ysmal. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 341-362.

Hix, Simon. 2005. The Political System of the European Union, 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2005. “Calculation, Community, and Cues: Public Opinion on European Integration”. European Union Politics 6(4): 421-445.

Le Monde & Reuters. 2006. “Jacques Chirac promulgue la loi sur le CPE, mais repousse son application”. Le Monde [March 31, 2006] Available at: http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2006/03/31/jacques-chirac-promulgue-la-loi-sur-le-cpe-mais-repousse-son-application_756840_3224.html [Accessed December 10, 2015].

Markowski, Radosław, and Joshua Tucker. 2010. “Euroskepticism and the Emergence of Political Parties in Poland”. Party Politics 16(4): 523-548.


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Marks, G., Hooghe, L., Nelson, M., Edwards, E. 2006. Party Competition and European Integration in East and West: Different Structure, Same Causality. Comparative Political Studies, 39(2): 155-175.

McLaren, Lauren M. 2002. “Public support for the European Union: cost/benefit analysis or perceived cultural threat?” Journal of Politics 64(2): 551-566.

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Tucker, Joshua A., Alexander C. Pacek, and Adam J. Berinsky. 2002. “Transitional Winners and Losers: Attitudes Toward EU Membership in Post-Communist Countries”. American Journal of Political Science 46(3): 557-571.

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PARTICIPATION AND NORMS OF GOOD CITIZENSHIP: A discussion on Romania and youth

Daniela Angi Babeș-Bolyai University

[email protected]

Abstract Norms of citizenship describe how individuals understand their connection to community and to the broader political context. They are part of the attitudinal drives for participation and activism. Likewise, the attachment to various images of good citizenship may be linked to individuals’ life experiences and reinforced by the actual practice of citizenship. This paper provides an exploratory research of norms of citizenship in Romania, asking whether age influences the way people understand good citizenship. Age is found to be a much weaker predictor than the actual habits of participation and the attitudinal backgrounds of individuals. The commitment to different images of good citizenship is best predicted by attitudinal factors, specifically the perceived efficacy of unconventional/conventional forms of participation. Key words: citizenship, norms of good citizenship, youth, participation, Romania

Recent political developments from Romania provided a number of occasions when groups consisting mostly of young people got mobilized and became vocal towards different aspects of politics or reacted collectively to specific political decisions. Most recent such events have been the so-called “ctrl-alt-delete” protests1 from November 2015, a label alluding to protesters’ demands for the renewal of political leadership and of the general manner in which politics is practiced. A few years back (2013), the controversy around the exploitation of Rosia Montana gold resources spurred protests in several major cities of Romania, with young people in the front lines of events; earlier, in 2012, other waves of protest reflected widespread discontent towards a range of perceived dysfunctionalities (Burean & Badescu 2014).

1 http://www.euronews.com/nocomment/2015/11/05/romania-ctrl-alt-del-protest/


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Periodic participation in protests provides a partial picture of citizens’ politically motivated involvement, specifically, the contentious side of it. At the same time, it does reaffirm the interest around the activism of youth and the way young people think of themselves as citizens. To the extent that participation is rooted in people’s orientations towards their role as citizens, the discussion can be carried in terms of norms of citizenship, understood as “a shared set of expectations about the citizen’s role in politics” (Dalton 2008, 78). Citizenship is important. It represents a “fundamental identity that helps situate the individual in society” (Conover et al. 1991, 805). As such, citizenship encapsulates two important relationships: that ‘between the individual and the other members of his/her society’ and that ‘between the individual and his/her institutions of government’ (Denters et al 2007, 90). Citizenship involves dynamism, both in how people understand its meanings and in how they practice it. These meanings and practices are fluid and responsive to changes in the political context and may adjust during individuals’ lifespan. The relevance of examining youth’s understanding of citizenship may be approached by acknowledging that: (1) young people’s understandings of what is expected from them as members of the society is likely to reflect on the future outlook of civic and participatory practices at societal level; (2) youth in post-communist contexts are exposed to complex and at times conflicting discourses about the meanings and practices of citizenship (participatory visions encouraged by democratic institutions and school socialization merged with mixed standpoints of families mostly socialized in non-democratic circumstances). This paper discusses the effect of age on people’s orientations towards community and civic involvement. The first sections approach participation, activism and the importance of focusing on youth as a particularly relevant group of citizens, as well as recent theoretical and empirical work on norms of citizenship. The second part of the paper turns the attention towards Romania. It first reviews recent empirical work on Romanian youth. Subsequently, it uses survey data to advance an exploratory examination of activism, participation, norms of citizenship and their relationship with age.


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Participation, engagement and youth Civic and political engagement cover numerous forms of participation in public life, which may be ‘highly political, entirely nonpolitical and anything in between’ (Fiorina 2002, 515, quoted by Jenkins et al. 2003, 1). Often, there is a blurred demarcation between participation that is openly political in nature and forms of involvement with prevailing civic components. For example, political participation has been defined as “…activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action - either directly by affecting the making of or the implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those selections” (Verba, Scholzman & Brady 1995, 38). This broad definition may include a diverse range of activities that place citizens in multiple civic roles, beyond that of a mere voter. Furthermore, the literature accommodates a frequent, albeit challenged demarcation between conventional and unconventional forms of participation (Uslaner 2004; Van Deth 2001). Conventional participation includes “contacting politicians and government officials, party membership and work for political parties and all activities directly related to the electoral process such as voting or campaigning”, whereas unconventional participation accommodates “boycotting, signing petitions, attending (un)lawful demonstrations, occupying buildings, political violence” (Barnes & Kaase 1979, as referred to in Linssen et al 2011, 4-5). The reason why this separation of participation forms is sometimes questioned is the increasing occurrence of demonstrations and other forms of contention that suggest such activities are no longer out of the ordinary and ought, therefore, to be included in the repertoire of conventional participation (Dalton 2008; Stolle & Hooghe 2011). Surely, not all forms of participation have the overt purpose to impact political decisions; not everything that citizens do or are expected to do is straightforwardly political. Many forms of participation are more visibly oriented towards community and less towards the political system. Yet together, these participatory activities contribute to the integration of individuals in the society and make the everyday substance of citizenship. Benefits of civic engagement assumed to extrapolate from the individual to community and society are higher levels of trust, more tolerance and a stronger sense of political efficacy, to name just a few (Theiss-Morse & Hibbing 2005). A dense associational life and broad membership signal the development of a vibrant civil society; sustained electoral participation and


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additional forms of political engagement are often used as evidence of a functional democracy in which people feel motivated to participate and the institutional arrangement enjoys legitimacy. For this reason, momentous shrinkages of participation levels, whether in turnout for elections or in other forms of civic involvement are sometimes interpreted as detrimental for a healthy democratic environment. Within this general framework, part of the discussion specifically concerns the youth, its activism (or indifference), as well as the alleged descending trends in youth participation (Dalton 2008; Stoker 2006). Regarding youth, dominant paths of research focus on three broad categories of participation: “involvement in institutional policies (election campaigns and membership); protest activities (demonstrations and new social movements); and civic engagement (associational life, community participation, voluntary work)” Kovacheva (2005, 24). The effect of age on participation is commonly approached in two types of explanations: those that focus on lifecycle and those that emphasize the generational effects on participation (Quintelier 2007). Life cycle centered explanations acknowledge that “the nature of responsibilities and experiences varies over an individual’s lifetime” (O’Neill 2007, 2). In this vein, it seems natural to expect that young people possess less resources and less practical experience in the realm of civic and political participation, which may hinder an dynamic engagement. Generational change is also important in terms of prevailing orientations and behaviors that mark different cohorts. Some explanations place the focus on the prevalence, among the young generations, of post materialist values that emphasize concern for quality of life and environmental issues (Inglehart 1997). These value orientations are expected to motivate new, less conventional forms of participation, “more issue-specific, ad hoc and campaign-like political action” (EACEA 2014, 4), or “community actions, political consumerism, new social movements” (Quintelier 2007, 3). Expected differences at the level of behavior are paralleled by attitudinal ones. Dalton (2005, 146) argues that “the young are now more likely to display lower levels of political trust and greater cynicism towards politicians and political institutions.” Recent assessments of youth participation in Europe argue that “young people are critical, rather than apathetic” (EACEA 2013, 162), in other words dissatisfied with the existing political offer, and not reluctant to participation and involvement as such. Still in the context of Europe,


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survey data collected by Eurobarometer (2012) show that young people are more attracted to “new forms of political participation” and do not always choose to get involved in the forms of participation they themselves assess to be most effective (EACEA 2014). Thus, “despite their low electoral participation, a relatively large proportion of young respondents stated that voting is an effective way of influencing decision-making” (EACEA 2014, 18). Further accounts distinguish between patterns of participation of youth from consolidated and new democracies respectively. Along these lines, Kovacheva (2000) argues that participation of youth from post-communist societies could be approached by considering the multiple influences that shape their civic and political involvement. These influences include values and practices inherited from the communist past, still apparent at societal level; Western models of participation and involvement to which youth get increasingly exposed; youth’s position within the changing social and economic contexts of these societies, which is likely to impact on their resources and choices of participation. Participation and norms of citizenship Norms of citizenship are part of the values-laden foundations that ground engagement and participation. According to Dalton (2008, 83), norms of citizenship ‘indicate what the individual feels is expected of the good citizen.’ Citizenship norms stipulate the grounds for how individuals regard relations with other members of society and with the institutions of government (Denters et al 2007). Moreover, norms of citizenship “provide reasons why citizens behave in specific ways” (van Deth 2007, 403), thus being strongly connected to participation. On the one hand, commitment to specific citizenship norms may be approached in terms of attitudes conducive to specific patterns of civic and political participation (Zukin et al 2006). On the other hand, they may be approached as an outcome of political socialization generated by a multitude of socialization agents, among which family and school/education play notable roles (Pasek et al 2008, Verba et al 1995, Verba et al 2005). Along these lines, schools’ contribution in fostering civic education and education for democratic citizenship may be considered as particularly relevant (Fesnic 2015, Pantea 2014).


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Studies that approach the construction of citizenship norms cover contextual factors as well as individual-level attributes. Coffe and van der Lippe (2010) examined good citizenship norms in four post-communist countries from Central Eastern Europe, arguing that country-specific prevailing understandings of citizenship reflect different national experiences during the communist period. They compared the prevalence of “duty-citizenship” and “engaged citizenship” in Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovenia. Their explanatory analysis using the two citizenship components as dependent variables suggests a great deal of variability in how images of good citizenship are built, in each country, by attributes like social and institutional trust. Zmerli (2010) and Van Deth (2007) find four prevailing dimensions of citizenship located in the theorization of democratic citizenship: participation, autonomy, social order/law obeying, and social citizenship/solidarity. Each of these dimensions accommodates beliefs, values and behaviors that define individuals’ place in their communities. Denters et al (2007) found differences in how citizens from Eastern and Western Europe envision citizenship. With citizenship norms grouped in three broad categories, ‘solidarity’, ‘critical and deliberative principles’ and ‘law-abidingness’, the authors show that citizens from Eastern European countries prioritized law-abidingness over deliberative principles, whereas their Western counterparts were more inclined to attach deliberative meanings to good citizenship. In the aforementioned research, Romanian respondents were found to score very high on the ‘law-abidingness’ component, registering the highest values for this dimension among the 13 countries in the study. Trust is an important resource that brings people together, facilitates co-operation and collective action. Of particular relevance is social (generalized) trust, placed in unknown people, a type of trust “not limited to a comparative narrow circle” (Zmerli & Newton 2013, 69). The link between civic engagement and trust is underlined by the approaches of social capital, with the important observation that the directionality of the relationship is an open question (Uslaner & Brown 2003; Sonderskov 2011). Both scenarios are highly plausible: more trusting people get involved publicly or, in contrast, involvement and membership foster social trust of active individuals (Stolle 1998). Zmerli (2010) finds social trust to be a strong predictor of norms of social citizenship, autonomy and participation, thus supporting the argument that trustful individuals are more likely to endorse visions of citizenship that emphasize activities oriented towards or


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involving common action and purposes. The diagram below summarizes the previous discussion on the construction and likely impact of citizenship norms. Figure1. Norms of citizenship: a theoretical synthesis.

When the discussion on participation and citizenship is focused on generational changes or specific patterns of youth participation, the matter becomes more intricate. Reacting to positions that lament over the seemingly declining participation of younger generations, Dalton (2008) recommends a shift in the research from highlighting the difference between past and current patterns of civic and political behavior to searching for the current meanings associated to citizenship by the young generations. Previous research on Romanian youth Tufis (2014, 304) notes that in Romania „participation of any kind is at rather low levels” and relates this fact to citizens’ low levels of trust and tolerance, the general lack of a „culture of participation”, as well as to the insufficient/ineffective access points to the political system. The way in which the political system is assessed by citizens, from the point of view of its accessibility, can be meaningful in terms of perceived political efficacy. This has been defined as “the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile performing one’s civic duties. It is the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change” (Campbell, Gurin & Miller 1954, 187).


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As far as young people are concerned, recent survey data show that Romanian university students are more participatory than the general population, while being, at the same time, less engaged than young people from other countries (Burean & Bădescu 2014). A study on Romanian youth 15-29 years old shows a prevailing trend towards disillusionment regarding the political sphere, consistent with self-declared low interest in politics and rejection of conventional types of political participation in favor of more contentious forms of involvement (Sandu et al 2014). The same study arrives at conclusions consistent with the political socialization literature, which postulates meaningful associations between young people’s political opinions, those of their parents and the frequency of discussions on political issues in the family context. Recent inquiries show that, in terms of volunteering, Romanians perform rather modestly: 9, 5% in 1999, 8% in 2002, 5, 8% in 2007, and 12, 8% in 2008 (GHK 2010). Data from the 2008 European Values Survey showed that for the age group 18-30, the percentage of volunteers was 14, 6%, with most volunteering performed in environment and animal rights associations, organizations focused on education, art and music and in religious organizations (GHK 2010, 5). A 2007 survey found that about 80% of the Romanian volunteers were of ages 19 to 35, with high levels of education or still enrolled as students.2 Rigman (2010, 163) observes that volunteers differ from the general population in several important ways related to interest for public matters, ‘their sense of empowerment and the levels of interpersonal trust.’ However, the author notes the difficulty – common to many assessments of the relationship between engagement and values/orientations – to separate the self-selection bias from an actual impact of volunteering on civic skills. Studies that specifically address young Romanians’ understandings of citizenship are rather scarce. Comsa (2010) analyzes the virtues of citizenship among adolescents (survey on students from grades 8 to 12), revealing a social and a political dimension of citizenship norms. Placed in relation with varying degrees of involvement, the analysis generated a typology consisting of four categories of citizenship norms: the “uninvolved citizen” (endorsed by 39% of the young respondents), the “social citizen” (25%), the “political citizen” (16%) and the “good citizen” (high involvement, of either social or political nature: 20%). The study by

2 Survey conducted by Pro Vobis National Volunteer Center (Volunteering in Romania – the State of the Field). For a detailed description, see Rigman, 2010;


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IMAS/Militia Spirituala (2011), on a different age group (18-29) found that the prevailing meanings associated by respondents to good citizenship (survey, open-ended questions) are: obeying the laws, respecting the others and being honest and fair. On pre-established items that describe citizenship norms, the analysis revealed three dimensions: a political dimension, a community-oriented pillar and a component centered on the observance of social norms. An exploratory analysis of citizenship norms in the Romanian context The data used in this paper have been collected in 2012 from a survey of 1100 respondents, representative for the Romanian adult population.3 The items covered - among other topics - issues related to forms of civic and political participation, membership in associations and volunteering, attitudes towards protest and citizens’ assessment of means available for influencing public decisions. This survey data is particularly useful because it includes a set of questions about people’s understandings of good citizenship, a topic examined with relative scarcity in the Romanian context. The operationalization of good citizenship followed, to a large extent, the approach consecrated by the Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy survey. Each of the eleven items could receive a score from 0 to 10. A ‘0’ score means that the respective item is given no importance at all in a definition of good citizenship. A ‘10’ score means that the item is valued as a very important element of good citizenship. About half of respondents scored as ‘very important’ paying one’s taxes and observing all laws and regulations. Over 40% considered voting in elections as very important, as well as forming one’s own opinion. Among the items that received fewest high scores we find the empathetic (altruistic) orientation, the involvement in voluntary organizations and writing petitions to public authorities. Figure 2 clarifies the prioritization of citizenship norms by showing the mean scores for each item.

3 Data collected in 2012 in a research by Centrul de Resurse pentru Participare Publica (CeRe) and Centrul pentru Studiul Democratiei, Babes Bolyai University (CSD).


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Figure2. Perceived importance of actions that describe ‘good citizenship’

The age group 18-35 displays statistically significant differences from the rest of respondents along three of the items above described. They are more inclined to value being active in NGOs and organizing campaigns to support certain causes than the rest of the respondents. At the same time, they value to a less extent - within the imagery of good citizenship - the importance of observing laws and regulations. Factor analysis performed on the eleven items included in the measurement of good citizenship revealed two distinct components, shown in Table 1. The two factors extracted (Eigen value >1) explain, together, 59.4% from the variation of the variables. Table1. Two components of good citizenship How important is in your opinion...? Component

1 2

Being solidary with people worse off than yourself ,392 ,553

Voting in elections ,145 ,733

Paying all your taxes ,028 ,886

Forming your own opinion, independently of others

,277 ,612

Always respecting laws and regulations ,109 ,838

Being active in voluntary organizations ,753 ,194 Thinking of others more than to yourself ,642 ,230


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Accepting criticism of your opinions ,492 ,303 Writing petitions to authorities to speed problem solving

,840 ,075

Organizing campaigns, actions to support a cause ,873 ,092 Protesting against unjust facts in your community ,812 ,132 Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization KMO value: 0.862

The first component brings together six items that describe a proactive understanding of citizenship. The items that best correlate with the vision of proactive citizenship are organization of campaigns in support of a cause, petitioning and protesting against unjust occurrences in one’s community. Activity in NGOs also records a high score, with smaller values for items about accepting criticism and about thinking of others. For this factor, the value of Cronbach Alpha is 0,860. The second factor includes items related to somewhat diverse aspects of citizenship: a duty-based envisioning of citizenship (voting, paying taxes and always respecting the law); the issue of autonomy (opinion forming) and solidarity with those in a less advantaged position. The factor correlates most strongly with paying one’s taxes and adherence to law abidingness. Though it may seem that the five items in this factor pertain to disparate pictures of citizenship, they may be in fact accommodated into a unitary vision of a citizen aware of her duties, concerned about the others, while keen on building one’s own opinion. The test of internal consistency (Cronbach Alpha for items subsumed by the duty-based vision of citizenship is 0.796) confirms the ability of these items to speak for one latent substratum of citizenship). This factor will further be labelled as ‘traditional citizenship.’ Consistent with the argument that young people are more likely to be attracted to less conventional forms of participation, we expect to find the same predispositions at the level of conceptualizations of good citizenship. Therefore, the expectation is that younger people would lean towards the proactive version of citizenship, whereas older people would value to a greater extent the second vision on citizenship. In a first step, bivariate analysis confirms these expectations, showing moderate, yet statistically significant, relationships between age and the two sets of civic norms, in the expected direction. (Age x Proactive citizenship: - ,121**; Age x


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Traditional citizenship: ,114**; Pearson coefficients, correlations significant at 0.01 level). A multivariate analysis is later performed, to see whether age retains its effect when additional relevant predictors are taken into consideration. The descriptive analysis reveals additional interesting facts. For example, respondents have been asked about how much they would like to live in a society in which the emphasis is placed on: (1) hard work; (2) people’s mutual responsibility to one another; (3) respect for rules; (4) people’s freedom to do whatever they want to; (5) citizens’ political involvement; (6) the possibility to accomplish something in life; (7) a justice system people can rely on; (8) rewards granted according to merits. By and large, respondents are inclined to prefer a society where merits are recognized, the justice system is reliable, people have a real possibility to accomplish something in life and working hard is the norm. However, the second least valued feature of an “ideal” society is citizens’ involvement in politics.4 This comparatively modest valorization of citizens’ political involvement bears no association with respondents’ age. Further results are revealed by the type of activities in which respondents reported they engaged in the past year, broke down by age group. Table2. Forms of participation by age group

18-35 36-50 51-65 >65 all In the past 12 months, did you…

Contact an MP 0,6 4,7 3,4 0,9 2,4 Contact an NGO 5,9 8,4 2,3 2,3 4,5 Contact a public clerk 19,1 25,6 23,7 17,2 21,5 Get involved in a political party

5 9,8 4,9 2,8 5,5

Get involved in a trade union

2,8 12,6 5,7 0,9 5,3

Work in an NGO 5 6 2,6 1,4 3,7 Wear electoral symbols/badges

5 10,2 2,6 2,8 4,8

Sign petitions 7,8 14,4 6,6 2,8 7,7

4 On the basis of mean scores for the items included in the operationalization of the ‘good society’ (0 = “I wouldn’t like that at all”… 10 = “I would like that very much”).


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18-35 36-50 51-65 >65 all In the past 12 months, did you…

Attend public demonstration

6,9 14 5,4 3,3 7,1

Attend a strike 3,8 7,9 5,4 1,4 4,6 Boycott certain products

8,8 11,6 4,9 0,5 6,5

Intentionally buy certain products

7,8 11,6 3,7 1,4 6

Donate money 37,8 51,2 44 44,2 43,6 Contact media/appear in media

4,4 5,1 2,3 2,3 3,5

Contact courts 8,4 13,5 8,9 5,6 9 Take part in spontaneous protests

5,9 10,7 4,6 2,3 5,7

Take part in public meetings

8,1 11,6 4,6 4,2 6,9

Abstain from voting 10,6 7,9 7,7 4,2 7.9 Do any other activities 3,1 1,9 0,6 0,9 1,6

Note: Values in cells are percentages of those saying “yes”; in bold, highest values for each form of participation, by age group

For specific types of participation, the category 18-35 surpasses the subsequent age groups solely in terms of abstaining from voting in elections or referenda. Perhaps most revealing is that the age group most active in almost all types of participation is that of respondents aged 36-50. The explanation lies, conceivably, in the agglomeration, within this age group of people with more resources, active on the labor market yet still with enough time and appetence for civic or public involvement. When emphasis is placed on the scope, rather than on type of participation, one can look at number of affiliations and organizations for which respondents volunteer, and the number of activities in which people say they engaged in the preceding year. Each of these measures show a negative and statistically significant correlation with age, although of modest intensities, suggesting that younger people are somewhat more participatory, volunteer more and are members of more organizations than older individuals (Age x Membership scope: -0,082**; Age x Activism


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scope: -0,084**; Age x Volunteering scope: -0,063**; Pearson coefficients, correlations significant at 0.01 level). The mixed impressions about solid differences between younger and older population is suggested also by responses related to perceived efficacy of means to influence public decisions, by age category (Table 3). Respondents have been asked about the weight attached to actions generally believed to grant citizens the power to influence decisions in a society (on a 0 to 10 scale, where 10 means “very effective”). These actions are: being active in a political party; working or volunteering for an NGO; voting in elections; personally contacting politicians; contacting media; boycotting products; attending public demonstrations and attending spontaneous protests. Table3. Perceived effectiveness of civic and political actions by age groups How effective do you

think is

Age groups

18-35 36-50 51-65 65+ All

Being active in a political party

5.12 5.32 5.16 5.54 5,26

Volunteering for an NGO 5.22 5.00 4.59 4.84 4,91

Voting in elections 7.43 7.33 7.85 7.94 7,64

Contacting politicians 4.41 4.08 4.38 5.08 4,46

Drawing attention to mass media

5.19 5.41 5.00 5.09 5,16

Boycotting products 4.14 4.11 4.00 3.94 4.05

Taking part in public demonstrations

4.68 4.93 4.81 4.92 4.82

Taking part in spontaneous protests

4.64 4.67 4.50 4.77 4.62

Note: Values in cells are mean scores. In bold, highest values for each action by age group; in italics, highest value within each age group (the action perceived as most effective by a specific age category)

The distribution of mean scores is fairly similar, with respondents 18-35 showing less than impressive differences from the remaining age


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categories. Voting is the activity perceived as most effective across all age categories. There is, however, one aspect along which 18-35 respondents significantly differ from respondents ages 36+: the perceived effectiveness of working or being active in an NGO as a way of influencing public decisions. The commitment to the two types of citizenship above discussed (proactive citizenship and traditional citizenship) has been further examined through multivariate analysis. The independent variables assumed as relevant predictors have been grouped in three thematic sets: (1) Socio-demographic attributes: respondents’ age; gender; education; income; marital status (recoded as dichotomous, with married respondents and those living in cohabitation placed within the same category); (2) Values and beliefs: perceived efficacy of conventional forms of participation (includes perceived efficacy of: being active in a political party, volunteering for an NGO, voting, contacting politicians; contacting mass media); perceived efficacy of non-conventional forms of participation (includes perceived efficacy of: boycotting, attending public demonstrations, attending spontaneous protests); social trust; (3) Amplitude of participation: scope of membership (number of affiliations declared by respondents); scope of participation (number of actions performed during the past year; see Table 2 for details); scope of volunteering (number of organizations for which respondents said they volunteered in the past year). Table4. Explanatory models for Proactive citizenship Independent Variables Model 1

(Beta) Model 2 (Beta )

Model 3 (Beta )

Socio-demographics Age -.089* -.053 -.048 Gender .042 .006 -.003 Education .094* .059 .038 Income .003 -.032 -.037 Marital status .026 -.032 -.048 Values and beliefs Perceived efficacy of conventional participation

.185***

.190***

Perceived efficacy of unconventional participation

.353***

.329***

Social trust .019 .012


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Engagement and participation Membership scope -.017 Participation scope .104**

Volunteering scope .062 R Sq. .024 .266 .280

Note: statistically significant coefficients in bold. *: p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001 Table5. Explanatory models for traditional citizenship

Independent Variables Model 1 (Beta)

Model 2 (Beta)

Model 3 (Beta)

Socio-demographics Age .110** .078* .072*

Gender -.028 -.003 .003 Education .069 .019 .028 Income .008 -.006 -.005 Marital status .037 .042 .035 Values and beliefs Efficacy of conventional participation .469*** .460***

Efficacy of unconventional participation

-.201*** -.183***

Social trust .005 .019 Engagement and participation Membership scope .070 Participation scope -.043 Volunteering scope -.157**

R Sq. .017 .135 .151 Note: statistically significant coefficients in bold. *: p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001 The tables above show that socio-demographic attributes alone have a modest explanatory power for both types of citizenship commitment. However, as expected based on the existing research, age has a negative (albeit weak) effect on proactive citizenship, suggesting that it is rather the young who are more prone to hold norms of an active engaged citizenship. Education also has a weak and positive effect on proactive citizenship


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norms and no influence on traditional citizenship. Older respondents are more likely to be committed to traditional norms of citizenship. The predictive power for both types of citizenship norms improves when models are supplemented with predictors related to values and beliefs. Regarding the norms of proactive citizenship, perceived efficacy of unconventional forms of participation is shown to have the strongest positive impact. Age is no longer a significant predictor of proactive citizenship, once additional factors are taken into consideration, and the same goes for the entire set of socio-demographic variables. Traditional citizenship is best predicted by perceived efficacy of conventional forms of action, with age holding a moderate and positive effect. Social trust has no significant impact on either type of citizenship norms. The third model adds information about respondents’ actual engagement and participation. The data suggests that having participated in more forms of action increases the likelihood of being committed to norms of proactive citizenship. However, all other things equal, the strongest predictor of norms of proactive citizenship is the perceived efficacy of unconventional forms of participation. Interestingly, the scope of volunteering is found to have a negative impact on holding traditional citizenship norms. While the effect of age is still positive and statistically significant, it is the conviction that conventional forms of participation are effective for influencing decisions that most strongly drives the commitment to traditional norms of citizenship. Conclusions The concern around citizens’ activism in general and on that of youth in particular is rooted in the largely accepted conviction that an active citizenry is beneficial for a functioning democracy. Citizens’ involvement may generate numerous benefits at community and societal levels, by fostering civic skills and sustaining an active citizenship; in turn, an active citizenry may encourage a healthy democratic environment, responsive to institutional performance and prepared to react to its possible faults (Putnam 1995, Skocpol and Fiorina 2004). Civic actions are important in the overall participatory climate of a democracy. As Jenkins et al (2003, 2) argue, “work in the civic world provides training in skills critical for helping an individual navigate in the political world.”


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The focus of this paper was on norms of citizenship and participation, with particular emphasis on the impact of age on the commitment to different images of the good citizen. By and large, the ways in which people think of themselves as good citizens is important from the point of view of the relationship between values and attitudes on the one hand and manifest civic and political behaviors on the other hand. Young people’s imagery on good citizenship is all the more relevant as it may offer a glimpse into the future outlook of civic and political involvement. On data collected from Romanian respondents, age was found to be negatively associated with the scope of participation, membership and volunteering, suggesting that as people grow older, they are slightly less inclined to be engaged in multiple forms of civic and political participation. At the same time, the youngest group of the population (18-35) is, for the most part, exceeded by the successive age category (36-50) in terms of percentage of those who recently took part in specific forms of participation. The notable exception, where the younger respondents proved to be more active is that of abstaining from voting. This finding is in line with life-cycle approaches that expect participation to be linked to having more resources and more experience in the realm of public affairs. Young people are similar to the general population in that they perceive voting in elections as the most effective means to influence public decisions. The youngest of the respondents (18-35) do differ in that they value to a higher extent being active in NGOs, as an effective means to influence public decisions. Regarding citizenship norms, the analysis of data revealed two distinct components, labelled as proactive and traditional citizenship respectively. As anticipated, on the basis of previous relevant studies, it is rather the young who are more attached to the norms of proactive citizenship (most strongly related to organizing campaigns and causes to support a cause, writing petitions and protesting against unjust facts in the local communities). This finding is consistent with approaches that emphasize the generational effects, translated in a shift of preferences towards unconventional forms of participation, some of which may be of contentious kind. However, as further analyses suggest, age is a much weaker predictor than the actual habits of participation and the attitudinal backgrounds of individuals. In fact, in the suggested models, the commitment to both types of citizenship is best predicted by attitudinal factors, specifically the perceived efficacy of unconventional/conventional forms of participation. From the point of view of social learning, the


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analyses in this paper underline the importance of political socialization. What people learn to be effective in influencing the public decisions may meaningfully shape their ideas about citizenship and, accordingly, about what is expected from them as members of communities and of society. References Barnes, S. H. & Kaase, M. (1979). Political action: mass participation in five

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POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ROMANIA’S MODERNIZATIONS: how the Romanian party system evolved from the 1990’s to the present* Florin N. Fesnic Babeş-Bolyai University [email protected] Abstract This paper offers a structural account of the evolution of the major partisan alignments in Romania1. I argue that in the 1990’s there were three major blocs: left, right and “extreme right” (welfare chauvinist), and these were largely the outcome of two processes, modernization from above during Communism and the subsequent transition to democracy and a market economy. Unlike in the case of the other two blocs, the success of the extreme right (PRM) was short-lived; one major consequence of generational replacement is that its natural constituency, the nostalgics of the old regime, is slowly disappearing. The result is that we are moving away from party competition between three major blocs to competition between just two blocs, left and right. Keywords: modernization, transition, values, partisanship, voting, Romania There are quite a few variables that can play an important role in shaping a country’s party system. Romania is no exception. Without being exhaustive, we can consider the impact of institutions (especially the electoral system), political factors (such as the performance in office, which may partly explain the disappearance of the PNŢ-cd), and external influence (e.g., the EU). In this paper I will focus on the role of structural determinants which, I argue, also play an important role. More specifically, I consider that the Romanian party system of the last 25 years is the joint product of modernization (social and economic) before 1989 and of the political, economic and social processes started by its transition to a post-Communist regime.

* This research was supported by the CNCS-UEFISCDI grant PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0669. 1 The paper is an updated version of a section of my doctoral dissertation (Fesnic 2008); a previous version of the paper was presented at the 61st Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, IL (Fesnic 2003).


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In the 1990’s, political life in post-Communist Romania was dominated by three major blocs: left, right, and “extreme right” (welfare chauvinist2). The core constituency of each of these blocs was, in one way or another, a product of modernization. The left is representing mostly rural Romania, one that has yet to modernize. The right is a product of successful modernization – an urban, young, well-educated, dynamic constituency. The extreme right constituency, the voters of Greater Romania Party (PRM), emerged after the transition from the prior regime as the side effect of a kind of ‘defective modernity,’ the outcome of the process of rapid urbanization and industrialization imposed from above during Communism. As this last group of voters grows older and new generations, socialized under very different conditions from previous generations, come of age, the PRM has suffered a kind of natural death (even before the disappearance of the leader of the party). This evolution and its consequences for party competition will be illustrated in the final part of the paper, where I present a comparison of voting patterns in the 2000 and the 2014 presidential elections. The structural roots of Romanian partisan constituencies In the second half of the twentieth century, Romania has experienced substantial economic and social transformations. After 1989, these changes were consequential for party competition. One important side effect of the process of socioeconomic transition was the marginalization of blue-collar industrial workers, which became the main supporters of the extreme right (PRM). Moore (1966) described Communism as a process of rapid, forced modernization imposed from above. Romania was no exception – as a matter of fact, Romanian Communism is an extreme illustration of this process. Developmental policies in Romania, as in the Soviet Union, had a manifest urban bias. They were a conscious attempt to overcome social and especially economic underdevelopment (Mungiu 2002, 9-16). Urban areas and the working class were the beneficiaries of these policies; rural areas and the peasants were the losers. In the Soviet Union, “the regime’s policy was ultimately based on the impoverishment of the peasant as the means for securing those forced savings in consumption which provided

2 One of the early proponents of the concept of “welfare chauvinism” (mixing support for leftist, redistributionist economic policies with nationalism, xenophobia and authoritarianism) was Herbert Kitschelt (1995).


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the capital for industrial expansion” (Inkeles and Bauer 1959, 71). Similarly, in Romania the development of urban areas was paramount and rural areas were ignored. Agriculture was constantly sacrificed in favor of industry (Masson 1985, 258-62). The share of urban population in Romania increased from just 23.4 percent in 1948 to 54.1 percent in 1992 (INSSE 2006). Such policies were not universal across the Communist region. They would have been redundant in Czechoslovakia, one of the most urbanized and industrialized areas of Europe (especially the Czech part). Therefore, if we want to assess their impact, it is more appropriate to compare the social well-being of Romanians with that of the inhabitants of another post-Communist country with a similar level of development. Table 1 presents some indicators of social development for Romania and its southern neighbor Bulgaria: Table 1. Social development in Romania and Bulgaria (2001)

GDP per capita in 2001 (in US$)*

Population using adequate sanitation

facilities (%)**

Population using improved water sources (%)**

Physicians per 100,000 people**

Romania 1,825 53 58 184

Bulgaria 1,803 100 100 345

Sources: *United Nations Statistics Division,

**United Nations Development Programme

2001, 169. Clearly, Romania has a long way to go before catching up not just with the post-industrial West, but even with some of its neighbors. Moreover, this lagging behind is primarily a reflection of extremely poor social conditions in rural Romania, in a country where 45 percent of the population continue to live in villages (UNDP 2003, 100), and urban-rural disparities are comparable to those found in many Third World countries. In one analysis of social underdevelopment in the Third World, Handelman noticed the gap between urban centers, where “at the close of past century, 72 percent of the population had access to proper home sanitation – and rural areas, where that figure fell to 20 percent” (Handelman 2006, 8). That means a 52 percent gap between urban and rural. Although I do not have disaggregated figures for Romania, I believe that a similar measure is the


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proportion of the population without access to running water. In 2003, the numbers were 12.3 percent for urban and 84.3 percent for rural – a 72 percent gap (UNDP 2003, 108). If urban industrial workers were the main beneficiaries of forced modernization in Romania, they became the main victims of the transition to post-socialism. A core feature of the former regime was “the ‘social contract’ between the regime and society, of which industrial workers were among the main beneficiaries” (Crowley 1994, 592). In addition to free health care and education, subsidized housing and a host of other benefits, workers “put a premium on increased material rewards and job security” (Bahry 1993, 515). After the fall of Communism, governments were both unable and unwilling to pursue such policies, which had become untenable. Since urban workers benefited from those policies far more than rural inhabitants working in agriculture, they also felt more heavily the impact of these changes. In the 1990’s, “the meaning of ‘social injustice’ seem[ed] to have shifted from absolute to relative deprivation” (Bahry 1993, 537). The theory of relative deprivation (Davies 1962; Gurr 1970), tells us that it is not necessarily those who are objectively worst off (in this case, rural inhabitants employed in agriculture), who would become politically the most radical segment of the electorate. Rather, the most likely candidates for such radicalization are urban industrial workers, for whom there is a large gap between what they believed they were entitled to and what they actually received after the transition (Figure 1):


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Figure 1. Relative deprivation and revolutions

Source: Hague and Harrop 2004, 138. The concept of relative deprivation, used to explain a wide range of phenomena, is equally useful for explaining support for extreme right-wing parties. Apter, for instance, argued that

In both [less economically developed countries] and advanced industrial countries, the productive system and the world economy are changing in ways that generates polarization, marginalization, functional displacement, dispossession, and with them a growing predisposition to violence [...] There is a growing discrepancy between the declining industrial labor force and its absorption into an expanding service industry. Reemployment of the displaced worker becomes more and more difficult [...] Such problems have [...] political consequences [...] There have been marked increases in primordialism, racism, and discrimination (1987, 35-37).

Apter’s account offers us reasons to expect a radicalization of blue-collar industrial workers in countries affected by a radical restructuring of industry, as it was the case with Romania in the 1990’s (Figure 2):


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Figure 2. The evolution of the Romanian workforce, 1992-2000

Data source: UNDP 2001, 107. The restructuring of the Romanian economy and the changes in governmental economic and social policies after 1989 had some remarkable consequences. As the data in Figure 2 indicate, during the decade following the transition there was a substantial decline of the workforce employed in industry, paralleled by an increase of the workforce employed in agriculture. Moreover, “starting from the mid-nineties, [...] the domestic migration flows have for the first time in more than a century and a half of official Romanian statistics reversed themselves and started to go mostly from the urban areas, affected by industrial restructuring towards the rural areas, turned into last resort shelter for the huddled masses of dislocated workers” (UNDP 2007, 88). The 1992 census data indicate that, in that year, 45.7 percent of Romanians lived in villages; by 2002, the share of rural population rose to 47.3 percent (INSSE 2006). Obviously, we would expect such developments to have an impact on electoral politics. I argue that political life in post-Communist Romania was, until recently, dominated by three major blocs: left, right, and “extreme right” (welfare chauvinists), and the constituencies of each of these blocs are/were, in one way or another, a product of modernization. The left is representing mostly rural Romania, one that has yet to


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modernize. The right is a product of successful modernization – an urban, young, well-educated, dynamic constituency. The extreme right constituency, the voters of Greater Romania Party (PRM), emerged after the transition from the prior regime as the side effect of a kind of ‘defective modernity,’ the process of rapid urbanization and industrialization imposed from above during Communism. Gradually, new generations of voters come of age. They were socialized under very different conditions from previous generations and they also have different objective economic and social interests than the urban industrial workers of the old regime. The end result is that the natural constituency of the PRM is shrinking. Political consequences of Romania’s modernizations: contrasting party competition in the 1990’s and 2000’s The first part of this paper described the social and economic transformations which occurred in Romania after the transition. This was consequential for Romanian politics (for both partisan constituencies and the party system), leading to the emergence of three major blocs (left, right and extreme right) in the 1990’s. In the 2000’s, this was followed by the slow, but rather unavoidable disappearance of the extreme right and the consequent move from a three-blocs to a two-blocs system. In the second part of the paper I will use survey (exit poll) data to support these assertions. The data reveals that each of the major constituencies (formerly three, now two) has/had indeed a very distinctive profile. To this end, I use data from a poll and a survey conducted by IMAS in 2000 (during the first round and a few days before the second round of that year’s presidential election), and from an exit poll conducted by Antena 3/Sociopol during the second round of the 2014 presidential election. The dependent variable is “vote”; the independent variable is the respondents’ level of education. I consider education as useful in two ways, as a determinant of values and as a proxy for social class.


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Figure 3. Education and vote, first round of the 2000 presidential election

Data source: IMAS exit poll, November 26, 2000 Note: the original data had four categories for education (“eighth grade or less”, “vocational” (şcoala profesională), “high school” and “college”). For the sake of consistency with the data for 2014, where there were only three categories (“low”, “medium” and “high” education), I computed here (and in Figure 4) the percentages for “medium” education as the unweighted average of the second and the third original categories. The percentages for the “liberal” category represent the sum of the votes for Stolojan and Isărescu. Figure 3 shows that each of the three aforementioned blocs had indeed a very distinctive constituency. The leftist candidate, Ion Iliescu, draws a disproportionate level of support from the least educated group, a mirror image of the pattern of support for the “liberal” candidates (Theodor Stolojan and Mugur Isărescu). Education is negatively correlated with support for the left and positively correlated with support for the moderate right (“liberals”). Finally, in the case of the extreme right candidate, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, we observe a third pattern of support, very different from either of the other two: the leader of the PRM draws most support from voters with average education.


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Figure 4. Education and vote, second round of the 2000 presidential election

Data source: IMAS pre-election poll, December 6-7, 2000 Note: the original data had four categories for education (“eighth grade or less”; “vocational” (şcoala profesională); “high school”; “college”). In the figure above, the percentages for “medium” education represent the unweighted average for the second and the third original categories. Figure 4, based on the results of a second survey, conducted between the first and the second round of the 2000 presidential election, confirm the distinctive profile of the extreme right constituency (the electorate of Tudor). They also show how the presence of Tudor in this second round, much like the presence of his French counterpart, Jean-Marie Le Pen, in the second round of the French presidential election less than two years later (in May 2002), has led to an unusual alliance between the left and the moderate right electorates. In Romania, as the following results indicate (Figure 5), this alliance was circumstantial and short-lived; as the extreme right gradually became a negligible force, electoral competition returned to the pattern of competition characteristic for the 1990’s, left versus right.


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Figure 5. Education and vote, second round of the 2000 presidential election

Data source: Antena 3/Sociopol exit poll, November 16, 2014. As it becomes immediately apparent from Figure 5, based on the results of an exit poll conducted during the runoff presidential election of 2014, the left and right electorates continue to be clearly distinguishable. Adrian Năstase’s description of the two constituencies as “two Romanias” (cele două Românii)3 continues to be as accurate as it was a decade ago. Conclusion The good news is that, unlike in the 1990’s, Romania does not currently have an extremist/anti-system party. The bad news is that, as the events of the summer of 2012 illustrate, this does not make liberal democracy in

3 „Rezultatul votului […] arată că, în prezent, există două Românii. În primul rând, este vorba de o Românie urbană, în creştere, cu o solidă componentă liberală […], care aşteaptă de la stat mai degraba şanse decât sprijin; aceasta este Romania care l-a votat pe Traian Băsescu. Dar mai există şi o Românie rurală, cu oameni în vârstă şi oameni săraci, care are încă nevoie de ajutor nu doar pentru dezvoltare, ci şi pentru supravieţuire; aceşti oameni au avut încredere în mine” (Năstase 2004).


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Romania foolproof. On that occasion (and others), it was not only the left, but also significant parts of the (liberal?) right, which showed a lack of genuine commitment to the guiding principles and institutions of liberal democracy. Even though we have also occasionally witnessed exemplary mobilisation from segments of civil society toward defending democracy (the last presidential election offers an example in this respect), it is not clear yet whether, and to what extent, this will have a long-lasting impact, bringing positive change in “the other Romania” and the party(ies) representing it (particularly the PSD, but also the PNL). Politically, for the time being, the “non-modern” half of Romania appears just about as strong as the “modern” half. References Antena 3. 2014. “Antena 3 alegeri 16 noiembrie 2014 (Antena 3/Sociopol

exit poll)”. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dizsWITIf0M>. Apter, David E. 1987. Rethinking Development. Modernization, Dependency,

and Postmodern Politics. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Bahry, Donna. 1993. “Society Transformed? Rethinking the Social Roots of

Perestroika.” Slavic Review 52(3): 512-554. Crowley, Stephen. 1994. “Barriers to Collective Action. Steelworkers and

Mutual Dependence in the Former Soviet Union”. World Politics 46 (4): 589-615.

Davies, James C. 1962. “Toward A Theory of Revolution.” American Sociological Review 27(1): 5-19.

Fesnic, Florin N. 2003. “Modernization, Transition, and Voting in Romania”. Presented at the 61st Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Fesnic, Florin N. 2008. “Welfare Chauvinism East and West: Romania and France”. PhD dissertation, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/304626606>.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hague, Rod, and Martin Harrop. 2004. Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, 6th ed. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Handelman, Howard. 2006. The Challenge of Third World Development, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

IMAS. 2000. “Sondaj la ieşirea de la urne - Alegeri Parlamentare şi Prezidenţiale - 26 noiembrie 2000”.


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<http://domino.kappa.ro/imas/home.nsf/Intrebari/62B7F52554281906C22569A3007D35D5?OpenDocument>.

IMAS. 2000. “Alegerea Preşedintelui României - sondaj pre-electoral (6-7 decembrie 2000)”. <http://domino.kappa.ro/imas/home.nsf/Intrebari/DA8D23BADD50A951C22568F1007840DC?OpenDocument>.

Inkeles, Alex, and Raymond Bauer. 1959. The Soviet Citizen. Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1995. The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Masson, Danielle. 1985. “Roumanie: La ‘Société Socialiste Multilatéralement Développe’ et sa Paysannerie.” In C.N.R.S., Paysans et Nations d’Europe Centrale et Balkanique. Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose.

Moore, Barrington. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorships and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. 2002. Secera şi buldozerul. Scorniceşti şi Nucşoara: mecanisme de aservire a ţăranului român. Iaşi: Polirom.

Năstase, Adrian. 2004. “Cele două Românii”. Revista 22 15(51), <http://www.revista22.ro/cele-doua-romanii-1362.html>.

United Nations Development Programme. 2001. National Human Development Report: Romania 2001. Bucharest: UNDP.

United Nations Development Programme. 2007. National Human Development Report: Romania 2007. Bucharest: UNDP.

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THE IMPACT OF THE ENTREPRENEUR CONDITION ON SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE ROMANIAN SELF-EMPLOYED MIGRANTS IN THE ITALIAN CONSTRUCTION SECTOR Daniela Cervinschi Babeș-Bolyai University [email protected] Abstract The article focuses on migrant entrepreneurs’ agency and explores the determinants of self-employment, on one side, and the relationship between the “entrepreneur condition”, the social mobility process and the capacity of transferring developmental values in the communities of origin, on the other side. The study is based on qualitative empirical research involving self-employed migrants from Romania, working in the construction sector in the Veneto Region, in the North-Eastern part of Italy. A number of 24 interviews and participatory observation were conducted with Romanians settled in different provinces and cities of the Veneto Region analyzing their professional paths, the motivating factors for self-employment, the process of social status attainment within the Italian society, the way they perceive themselves within the Romanian community in the host and home country, and finally what kind of resources, values and cultures they have transferred into their communities (in both their host and home countries). Key words: migrant entrepreneurship, social mobility, construction sector, self-employment, entrepreneur condition Introduction On the one hand, in political discourse immigrants are considered to be a burden on the social systems of the countries of destination, and a threat to their security and values, on the other hand in the civil society and academic discourses the migrants contribute to the countries’ economy both as unskilled workers in 3D jobs, but also as entrepreneurs and highly qualified labour force. The migrant entrepreneur is especially valuable as it creates a job for itself and for others; thanks to the human, social and transnational capital it holds, it can facilitate the development of various types of business connecting the countries of origin to the countries of destination, it provides products, services, cultural symbols needed by the migrant communities. Entrepreneurship is a way to climb the social ladder,


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entrepreneurs become a model for other migrants, encourage and mobilize social and economic development in the countries of origin. Migrant entrepreneurship has become a field of study in the sociology of migration itself (Pecaud 2010). It uses the explanatory power of a multidisciplinary conceptual framework in areas such as Economics, Social Economics, Management, Sociology, Political Science, and Public Policy. There is an extensive literature examining the factors that led to migrants starting their own businesses (Waldinger, Aldrich and Ward 1990, Light 1979, Bonacich 1973, Volery 2007, Oliviera 2007, Kloosterman and Rath 2001, Verheul et al 2010, Chrysostome and Arcand 2009, Matricano and Sorrentio 2014), but studies that focus on the impact/outcomes of migrant entrepreneurship on the individual, gender, family, household, social status values, on the country of destination and origin (see Wahlebeck 2004 2007 2007a 2008, Rindova et al 1990, Al-Dajani and Marlow 2013, Nowicka 2013, Newland and Tanaka 2010, Nkongolo - Bakenda and Chrysostome 2013) are less numerous. Typically, studies take into account only part of the phenomenon, or focus on the explanation of the determinants for a group of migrants, several groups of migrants or between groups of migrants and natives, or on the results of the phenomenon, but they are rarely assessed together. Thus, the article aims to contribute to the theory of migrant entrepreneurship by analyzing both the factors, outcomes (social mobility and development) of this phenomenon on the migrant at micro (individual) and meso (migrant communities in the country of destination and origin) level, and their business development strategies. Migration of Romanians to Italy has been studied extensively and from different perspectives, but mostly considered in the connection between the migration experience and its effect on the upgrading / changing individual values, social position, structure and family relations and the household (Sandu 2010, Anghel 2009, 2011, 2013, Horvath and Anghel 2009, Vlase 2013, Ban 2009, Cingolani 2007, Perrotta 2007). Some studies have understood migration from a transnational perspective and conducted ethnographic research in both regions in Romania and Italy. However, there is no research to thoroughly investigate the case of Romanian entrepreneurs in Italy, only a few studies reached this topic tangentially (Ban 2009, Cingolani 2007, Anghel 2013). Therefore, the article also aims to cover this gap in the Romanian literature, exploring the case of Romanian entrepreneurs in the construction sector in Italy, Veneto Region. The research aproach is ethnographic, and the semi-structured interview and the participating observation were used as research tools.


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Theoretical Background The paper analyzes the entrepreneurship of Romanian migrants in Italy, using several theoretical concepts which are summarized in the table below:

In the literature on migrants economy there is a number of definitions explaining what migrant or ethnic business means, and the reasons it differs from the general business. Usually, ethnic is used to encompass ethnic and religious minorities as well, not only the migrants, but sometimes are used interchangeably. Waldinger (1990) defines this phenomenon as a set of connections and regular patterns of interactions among people sharing the common national background or migration experience (p.33). Mezies et al (2003) uses the term minority entrepreneurs and defines it: as business owners or self-employed individuals who can be identified with a particular ethnic (geographically or religiously based) group (p.128) Various names are used for this phenomenon such as: ethnic business and entrepreneurship, migrant entrepreneurship, minority entrepreneurship etc. However, for the purpose of this research, we shall use the term migrant entrepreneurship. There are several main approaches developed by the sociological school explaining migrant entrepreneurship. The


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blocked social mobility - which explains that lack of social mobility due to poverty, lack of employment, discrimination and limited knowledge about the host culture may influence the choice of an independent activity by the ethnic group. This theory sees entrepreneurship not as a sign of success, but as an alternative to the lack of employment (Volery 2007, Light 1979). Cultural theories – the orthodox approach considers that certain groups of immigrants choose to start a business or the company is successful due to cultural values that came from the country of origin. This model is taken from Max Weber’s ideas. The reactive approach suggests that cultural traits promoting ethnic entrepreneurship are formed as an adaptation to reduced opportunities offered by the host country (Light 1984). Bonacich (1973) argues that minorities (ethnic minorities and migrants) play the role of middleman minorities between the producer and consumer, employer and employee, landlord and tenant, elites and masses (p.583). They are sojournes who are interested in obtaining quick profit from their small business, and then invest the profit to in their countries of origin. The interactive model of Waldinger (1990) argues that migrant entrepreneurship can be explained better by understanding the both group characteristics and the opportunity structures. Mixed embeddedness is an interactionist approach that focuses on three main components – social capital, markets and state regulations regarding market access (Kloosterman et al 1999, Rath 2000, 2002). For the purpose of the article, Bonding and Bridging Social Capital concepts shall be used from the social capital theories. Bonding Capital - refers to the dense network of a homogeneous group of people. Increased research has argued that immigrants have access to dense networks of people of the same ethnicity and similar socioeconomic status. This is useful for ethnic entrepreneurs as it provides solidarity and trust facilitating cooperation and reduces the risks (Kanas et al 2009, 187-188). Bridging social capital - refers to contacts with natives and other nations, and these contacts are useful as they connect immigrants to natives and other nationalities. Natives have access to better and more specialised information, so that the connection with the natives can facilitate the entry of immigrants on the overall market of business and jobs. (Kanas et al 2009, 188) Gap Min and Bozorgmehr (2000) argue that various types of capital held by individuals give rise to different types of businesses. Ethnic resources in the form of loans from family or ethnic group members, cheap or unpaid labour - these resources are important in the setting up of small, family business. Class resources - high education, access to financial capital are


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more important than ethnic resources in setting up large companies that require more complicated managerial skills and a fairly large capital (p.710). Opportunity entrepreneurs are considered to be those who start a business as they noticed a certain market opportunity and try to exploit it (Reynolds et al. 2012). Necessity entrepreneurs decide to start a business because they have no other choice (Chrysostome and Arcand 2009). In the scientific literature there are two approaches to measure the socioeconomic status; the first approach indexes the position of a particular individual in a hierarchy of power by objective relative indicators such as income, wealth, education, occupation prestige. A second approach of subjective social status has a more qualitative view and captures the subject’s perception on the positioning into the society. In general, it includes the individual’s personal assessment on the social status taking into account (human capital - occupational prestige, income) the social capital - access to information, and cultural capital. In other words, the subjective social status reflects the way in which the person is positioned by its own assessment, differing from the others (Diemer et el, 2013 p.104). For the purposes of this article, the second approach shall be used. The concept of entrepreneurship as empowerment is developed by Rindova et al (2009) and argues that some individuals choose to be entrepreneurs not only to aim material gain, but also to overcome one’s authority, to be free of certain constraints. These constraints can be intellectual, psychological, economic, social, institutional, and cultural. Schiller and Caglar (2013) recommend than rather analysing the ethnic group within the boundaries of a state, it is better using the multiple embeddedness concept. The concept of multiple embeddedness emphasizes the process by which migrants create, in their business practices, the network of social relationships in multiple social spaces. Social spaces are networks of power that can be located locally or extended transnationally, and connect individuals to economic, political, social and cultural institutions (p.499). Romanian migrants in Italy: from undocumented migrant to European citizen and self-employed in Italy. Horvath and Anghel (2009) identified 5 stages of Romanian migration such as:

a) 1990-1993- after the end of the Communist regime, many Romanians began to migrate to Western Europe.

b) 1994-1996- EU countries imposed strict policies on access. During


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this period more Romanians migrated to Israel, Turkey and Hungary

c) 1997-2001- increase of Romanians’ migration to Western Europe, migration was of circular type and the intention to settle in those countries was small. New migration countries are Italy, Spain, Ireland, UK.

d) 2002-2007- increase of the number of Romanians who emigrated because the risks and cost of migration became smaller. Since 2002, Romanian citizens have the right to travel without visas in the EU (in most EU countries).

e) Romania’s accession to the EU – the Romanians’ intention to settle, long-term residencies, increased migration in Italy and Spain (p. 388-389)

2007 was considered as peak year of departure - 458 thousand people emigrated. The countries of destination where most Romanians emigrated are Italy, Spain, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary and other countries (NIS 2003).

Source: National Institute of Statistics, Romania 2012 In accordance with NIS Romania, the data provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) show that the period in which most Romanian migrants were recorded in Italy was 2007-2008.


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Source: Italian National Institute of Statistics-ISTAT, 2003-2014, authors’ compilation As the data show, with the liberalization of the visa regime in 2002 and Romania’s EU accession in 2007, an ongoing and growing migration to Italy began, but this is due to family reunification as well, their formal registration as residents and the trend to settle in Italy. Romanians who migrated after 2007 have had a previous migration experience in Italy or other countries (Mara, 2012). In 2014 there were 1,081,400 Romanian migrants in Italy. The regions with the highest number of Romanians are Lazio, Lombardy, Piedmont, Veneto and Tuscany. They are industrialized regions with a wider range of jobs for Romanian migrants.


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Source: Italian National Institute of Statistics-ISTAT 2014, authors’ compilation Romanians’ evolution from irregular migrants to European citizens is clearly surprised by Anghel (2011, 2013). The author showed that prior to the liberalization of visa regime there were some migration strategies of Romanians such as: Invitations received from Germany followed by the departure and irregular settlement in Italy. Temporary employment contracts, such as those for agricultural labour in Western Europe, followed by overstaying their right to stay. Buying visa from certain companies involved in such informal activities. Illegal crossing the border by migrant groups or by individuals (Anghel 2013, 115). And after the liberalization of the visa regime, Romanians found other ingenious solutions to overcome regulations and continue their work (Culic, 2002). The author gives several examples of such practices taken from an ethnographic study such as: in order not to exceed the 3-month period and not lose their job, Romanians used to find Romanian replacement, usually a relative. E.g. the job was divided among 4 people, each person stood 90 days of legal residence in the EU and then rotated, in this way the job was preserved and risks were significantly mitigated. A scheme organized by the transport companies was the following: they lent money as proof of financial resources covering


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the living abroad during the visit which had to be shown at the border police. And after crossing the border, the carriers recovered their money plus a percentage. A strategy to obtain a residence permit in an EU country was to enrol in study programs - universities, faculties. This practice involved some costs for tuition and so on. Migrants enrolled for study to get that license until they managed to find a job ( Culic 2002, 160). Only few migrants have access to leadership positions, public offices, high level or intermediate positions in Italy (most migrants are present in hospitals as nurses). But the most important alternative to higher occupational status is independent economic activities (self-employment). According to Eurostat Labour Force Survey (2013), Italy (23.3%) is on the 2nd place at EU level regarding the proportion of self-employed in the employed population. Thus, this method chosen by migrants is actually a feature of the Italian economy. Self-employment for migrants is and remains a way to reach higer social positons (Ambrosini, 2013, 188). According to IDOS (2014) in Italy the number of Italian companies is decreasing, while those started by migrants is increasing. From late 2011 to late 2013 companies with migrant owners increased by + 9.5%, and in 2014 by 4.1%. This phenomenon is thought to be beneficial for the Italian productive economic system, but also for the economies of countries of origin (p. 2). The rapid development of migrant entrepreneurship took place especially after the Turco-Napolitano law from 1998 and Bersani Law. (Ambrosini 2013, 188). According Infocamera, Padova Chamber of Commerce and Trade Register data, in 20131 the migrants who started most companies in Italy were from Morocco, China and Romania. Thus, Romania ranks third on independent economic activities opened in Italy, but if we look at the proportion of self-employment in the total resident population in 2013, we notice that only 6% of Romanians started companies in Italy, as resulting from the table below. Ambrosini (2013) explains that the large number of companies opened by migrants during the economic crisis is due to the phenomenon of false companies as well. Individuals are forced / encouraged by the employer to start an individual company and so they avoid paying taxes on salaries, as the author says these cases are common in construction, but also in other 1 Data were requested by the author from the Chamber of Commerce of Padua, Italy, which itself prepared the centralizations based on data received from Infocamera and the Trade Register. Data were received in September 2014 and are the latest.


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areas. Then there is the phenomenon of starting a business as backup plan to the difficulty of finding a job. The 11 foreign EU and non-EU national groups and the proportion of self-employment out of the total foreign EU and non-EU resident population in Italy, 2013

Source: Foreign resident population- Italian National Institute of Statistics-ISTAT 2013, foreign entrepreneurs – Infocamera, The Register of Enterprises and Chamber of Commerce Padua, 2013, author’s compilation. Some immigrants needed the extension of residence permits, and the opening of a company gave them the opportunity to have a legal status in the country. The Italian market also experiences the ecological succession, the entry of migrants in commercial activities abandoned by the Italians (as they were not profitable and it was hard work), street trade, bakeries and so on. As indicated by the chart below, most companies were started by Romanians in the 2006-2007 when 10,655 new companies were created. But not all are real companies, as argued by Ambrosini (2013). Economic activities with the most companies opened by migrants are trade - Moroccan entrepreneurs prevail, construction - Romanian companies prevail, and manufacturing where Chinese prevails. In recent years, companies can no longer provide services unless they possess the DURC (Documento Unico di Regolarita Contributiva), which keeps track of whether the company has paid all taxes required by the state and which is required upon contracting (Ales and Faiola, 2013). Another two areas where Romanians started companies are trade and hotels and restaurants.


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In these areas, Romanian entrepreneurs operate on an ethnic market, using features of Romanian culture, products and services, symbols at the request of the numerous Romanian community in Italy.

Source: Infocamera, The Register of Enterprises and Chamber of Commerce Padua, 2013, author’s compilation Table: The foreign entrepreneurship by economic sector and country of origin in Italy, 2013

Source: Infocamera, The Register of Enterprises and Chamber of Commerce Padua, 2013, author’s compilation.


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Romanians have chosen to start businesses with a single owner, only 7% are associates. The regions with most Romanian entrepreneurs are Lombardy, Lazio, Piedmont, Tuscany and Veneto.

Source: Infocamera, The Register of Enterprises and Chamber of Commerce Padua, 2013, author’s compilation. Most entrepreneurs belong to the age group 30-49 years, for both men and women. The distribution by gender and economic sector shows that women are concentrated in economic areas such as: trade, information and communication, hotels and restaurants. Men are concentrated in areas such as: construction, manufacturing. The construction sector as a niche market


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of immigrants has been studied mainly in America, and Waldinger (1995, 577) considers that the construction sector represents a quintessential ethnic niche. The author explains why the construction industry has become one where the most migrant workers and entrepreneurs are concentrated. The connections between entrepreneurs and co-ethnics are information flow vehicles, the distribution of jobs and contracts and obtaining financial capital, and skills are learned on the construction site; the migrant does not need to have them obtained in the country of origin. On the construction sites, communication takes place in the native language of migrants as well.

Source: Infocamera, The Register of Enterprises and Chamber of Commerce Padua, 2013, author’s compilation


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Source: Infocamera, The Register of Enterprises and Chamber of Commerce Padua, 2013, author’s compilation In general, migrants tend to settle in low-skilled jobs and often these jobs are in construction, but there are some migrants who manage to cross the status of the artisan and unskilled labourer then to entrepreneur (Rath 2002, 357). Waldinger suggests that immigrants form ethnic niches through networks, and the process consists in establishing the first immigrant pioneers, others would follow their example to form over time an ethnic concentration in that area (Rath 2002, 360). Ambrosini (2012) concluded that Italy has a dual market, on the one hand there is a limited market of large companies that is controlled and adjusted, also characterized by the strong presence of trade unions, and on the other hand a large peripheral market that is not adjusted, with undeclared work and fake self-employment and agencies. Subcontracting strategy is often used in construction, not only in Italy, as a construction project requires the performance of the various parts by certain professionals (architects,


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painters, specialists in flooring, roofing, electrical and hydraulic systems and so on); companies often subcontract to other companies the performance of such work. Subcontracting is a strategic method used to reduce labour costs (Fellini et al 2007, 288). Methodology and profile of the Romanian self-employed in Italy The methodological approach is part of ethnography (Bloomaert et al 1995, Johannes 2001) and the semi-structured interview and participating observation were used as research tools. Discussions were held with over 50 people (representatives of Romanian organizations, priests, representatives of Italian companies, spouses, relatives and employees or collaborators) of which interviews were conducted with a number of 24 Romanians who are self-employed in the construction sector. The qualitative sample is achieved through the snowball method. The main steps in identifying Romanian entrepreneurs were first to find informants that could put me in contact with Romanian entrepreneurs. First, I used the representatives of Romanian organizations, churches and the Chamber of Commerce of Padua. The Chamber of Commerce provided me with the names and physical addresses of entrepreneurs and their data were then searched on the Internet to find their phone number, e-mail address or a Facebook profile. Furthermore, I sought their contacts on various specialized websites such as http://www.paginegialle.it/ The field research took place in Italy, in the North-East part, Veneto region in September 2014-January 2015. The interviews lasted from 1 hour to 3 hours. The interviews took place at the residence of the Romanians, but also in various other venues. The identification process of the Romanians was quite hard, because, on the one hand they did not trust me as a PhD student, and on the other hand had a busy schedule and I could not schedule the appointments. Romanians entrepreneurs from the qualitative sample were aged between 28 (the youngest) and 50 years old (the oldest), all are men. 5 of the Romanians hold or are waiting for the Italian citizenship. 16 of them are married and the family comprises 1 to 3 children. The spouses and children are in Italy. 9 are not married, but will get soon, or are divorced. 4 families are mixed, the wife is from the Republic of Moldova. Most come from rural areas in Moldova such as: Bacau, Barlad, Focsani, Botosani, Galati, Neamt, Romania, Dorohoi, Vatra Dornei, Muntenia - Giurgiu, Bucharest and Transylvania-Dej and Satu-Mare. The survey participants are of the Veneto Region, and some cases are from Friuli Venezia Giulia and Emilia Romagna. 17 of the beneficiaries are


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Orthodox, and 3 people are catholic and 4 are Pentecostal. Only a few persons stated they go to church, 3 of the respondents are parish councillors. Most participants have completed vocational school or high school, and 4 respondents have higher education. Participants are part of the generation of those who left in the 90s (10 of them) and those who left after 2000 (14). They spent in Italy a period of 24 to 9 years. The companies’ field of activity ranges from companies that execute various construction to companies that provide some type of work, such as: roofing, industrial floors, facade restoration, interior finishing, electrical and hydraulic installations. The companies started by Romanians are small, are variations in legal form - natural person and craftsman, but there are some limited liability companies as well. Determinants: I had a pretty good salary {...} but I wanted to have something of mine The data show that there are a number of factors that determined Romanians to open their economic activities, relating both to human and social capital they hold, but also to structural factors of the market - very easy access to self-employment. Surprisingly, the number of Romanians in our sample having said they had opened a company in the desire for independence is greater than the number of those who opened it because the employer had proposed this as they had no formal job. Subject A: I always liked to be independent, I had a Romanian friend who was a plumber at home and he knew the job well. During that period, our factory had to leave about 30 workers at home. Meanwhile I wanted to go independent, yet I had to learn the craft. I really wanted no to work in the factory and become a plumber. Subject P: We set up the business not for the money, I had a pretty good salary ... more than I had before. There was my thing to do something of my own. Not because of the money. I had two Romanians to whom I got long and who were on their own and I asked them if it pays off, but anyway I trusted in my professional status. But the difference between the push and pull factors is very small, i.e. a Romanian entrepreneur chooses entrepreneurship both due to the dissatisfaction on work / salary ratio, lack of a formal contract of employment preventing him to contract a loan or access other services, the


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companies they work for went bankrupt, but also because he wants to be independent, be able to implement his ideas, to have a more flexible schedule, to have higher earnings. These reasons can coexist together, so there is no exact demarcation between the two. But most of those who started a company in the desire for independence are those who have had previous business experience in Romania or in the family, and those who held leadership positions in Romania and in the construction sites in Italy. Most often, the pattern of a Romanian to starting a business in Italy is as following: 1. He worked as an irregular unskilled labourer on the construction site (most often learning the profession). 2. Followed by the period when, with the help of the company owner, approaches were made to obtain a residence permit (but not always completed by the legal employment of the migrant). 3. His specialization in a particular field, masonry, floors, roofs, electrical installations or in several areas. 4. He was appreciated by the employer and shall be assigned responsibility as site manager or team manager. He has increasing access to the company’s revenues and realizes that he can obtain this income. 5. A period when still working for the current owner he tries to find customers, asks the advice of other Romanians or Italians with businesses in construction and then starts the company. Often it happens that former employers work with Romanians who started the company. There are different cases of this route, which I hereby present: The case of S family - The Romanian worked for a period of 4 years in an Italian construction company and learned the craft then was fired. Thus, it was decided to work without papers for various individuals in painting, gardening, interior finishing, roofing. But increasingly more customers requested invoices and then he noted that he would lose important works because he had no legal forms. So he decided to start a business. The case of G – he worked at an Italian company and befriended with the owner who helped him to obtain a residence permit. It ended being a team leader to coordinate 30 workers. But the Italian owner could not afford running the company anymore on the market because of the debts and thus encouraged G to start a business. All pieces of advice and information required were provided by the owner. Today they’re working together and


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are good friends. The case of C – he worked at a construction company, but was never paid on time, had no legal papers. Because he did not have an employment contract he could not access certain services, such as bank loan. The case of Ci - he worked in a company mounting exhibition pavilions, which preferred working with persons self-employed, so forced by circumstances, he started a company to be able to execute works. His case is particularly interesting as the company is opened in Romania, but he uses it to get lower prices on the Italian market. The case of P: he worked in a construction company to an Iraqi, and once the business went increasingly worse, he decided to resign. He found another company which agreed to work with him only if he would become self-employed. Bonding social capital is very important in the early stage of preparation for starting a company - Romanians ask the advice of other Romanians who started a business on income taxes, management, but the information received is almost always incomplete and often they cannot rely on it. In the advanced stage of company preparation, the Romanian seeks the specialised advice of accountants or authorized agencies. Bridging social capital matters more in the customer identification phase - Romanians keep in touch with other Italian craftsmen, with former employers or companies for which they used to work at the former employer. Moreover, the majority of Romanian entrepreneurs said they did not advertise the company and most of the works were obtained (passa parola) from one client to another. But there are some interesting cases that have managed to get works through Facebook or websites advertising. The case of Io: he managed to initiate a collaboration with a Romanian whom he met on FB; the Romanian has a company in Romania (concrete plant for industrial floors). The shop’s customers become Io’s customers for floor execution. It has 205 contacts on the FB page. He posts pictures of works and other important information for customers on FB. But the case of P and Pa who placed ads in local newspapers was unsuccessful. The case of I – he owns a site which helped him obtain customers, as he claims. I.: I found job thorough Internet and now I found works on the Internet. I found 5


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people on the Internet and I go to another 5 from man to man, for me it triples. I’ve had about 20 customers so far, almost all individuals. I reached through work, passa parola and Internet. I got 50% of the work through Internet, then old acquaintances with whom I worked in the past. The initial investment was covered by Romanians’ personal savings, which were small, and the need for equipment and tools appeared along the way. The majority of Romanian entrepreneurs work as subcontractors of other Italian companies and individuals. There are 4 cases of entrepreneurs who have their own works and participate in public tenders. As for the number of employees, it varies depending on the work, most of them do not have employees at the present, they work with other companies on construction site. But those who have employed have very few employees, 2-5 employees with papers, the rest are without papers. The employees are Romanians, but other nationalities as well, and Italian workers on the construction site, but Italians are still more employed in strategic positions of leadership, architects, managers. Subject V: I had work contracts for employees and collaborators, Romanians, Moldovans, Moroccans and Italians. They found me, Moroccans come on the site and asked if I can provide them with work. I had a Nigerian employee, he used to come at the traffic light and asked me money, and I told him I had no money that day, but would you go work for me? Yes, I’ll go ... Jump in the car and come to work. And when the customers saw me, the architect asked me “Where on Earth did you find this one?”, I say: Let him work, instead of giving him 2 euro at the traffic lights which won’t be enough anyway. The Romanian entrepreneurs choose to hire Romanians as they work more, don’t raise many conditions and agree to work undeclared. But they emphasized that they respect their employees and have chosen them from among those with who have worked in the past, which were already in Italy. Only one case hired Romanians who weren’t already settled down in Italy. N: Me and my employees are best friends, they earn according to how much they work. Sometimes we work on Saturdays or Sundays and during night time. They have a fixed salary per day. For e.g. last month an employee was entitled to 2,000 euro and another to 1,800 euro. Well, there’s the third who is no longer employed, but I continue to work with him as such. Usually if I am to take someone to work I must know him in advance or someone has to recommend him. I have never put ads


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on the Internet or something like this .. All were Romanians. The Romanians to whom I discussed suggested that undeclared employment takes place, of course, with the consent of the employee, and is used widely in construction and by small Italian companies. This practice is seen as the norm to stay on the market. In the construction sector, small companies cannot provide a constant flow of work and therefore cannot afford to employ under indefinite employment contracts. They work for short periods of time depending on the work flow. Strategies: we took more care of the company than the family- the company is our baby as well Only a few Romanian entrepreneurs in the sample were able to gradually develop, participate in public tenders, have no losses and start other businesses in Italy. But most of those with whom I spoke were pessimistic about the future of business in the construction industry in Italy. Access is very simple (Romanians can easily start a business), but high taxes on income and wages, and losses due to the non payment by the Italian companies of the works performed by Romanian companies make the survival of small Romanian companies much more difficult. Discussions about the economic crisis and its impact on trade were very frequent in interviews. The best time for businesses in construction was before 2008, when there were more customers (both individuals and legal entities) and when big companies paid work in less period of time and there were no cases of failure to pay for the works. Discussions about the crisis have focused on the following topics:

1. The crisis was beneficial for some Romanian entrepreneurs because it brought in a process of natural selection, the companies doing high quality work stayed on the market. This is the case of Romanians dealing with the repair or roofing.

2. More and more individuals are more reluctant when thinking about

finishing or renovating their homes, and large companies no longer pay on time the works performed by Romanian entrepreneurs or do not pay at all. Some Romanians said they had lost between 10,000 and 320,000 euro. Romanian companies issued invoices, but they


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were not collected due to unpaid work by contractors, but taxes had to be paid to the state for those invoices.

3. The crisis is not a real phenomenon, crisis discourse is used by big

companies with the intention of not paying small firms

4. The crisis has primarily affected big companies that have contracted loans from banks, had losses and were unable to keep functioning, and small businesses have been affected as well not being paid for the works they performed.

If before 2008 the customers of Romanians entrepreneurs were mostly other companies, now they work more with individuals, because there is no risk of non payment which is made in a shorter time, and there is also the possibility that the works provided are not invoiced. Currently, in order to function, companies must submit the DURC certifying that all taxes are paid to the state, but this document is not always required by individuals but more by the contracting companies. In recent years, the construction sector has experienced greater regulation to restrict undeclared work and failure to pay taxes to the state. Subject G: Once this was America... I lived the period when I was dirty from head to toe, but I had pockets full of money. Subject V: Before I used to take the bag with 40,000 euro and go pay my employees in a restaurant, gave them envelopes, they all signed the payroll and done. At that time the bank gave me permission to withdraw 20,000 euro, it was manageable. Now I can’t do this anymore, the Italian state tells you that you cannot withdraw more than 999 euro. Fines for non-compliance are high. A method used by the Italian State to regulate the works done for individuals but also to encourage small entrepreneurs in construction was piano casa by which an individual was exempted from taxes for a certain period if it proved he renovated the roofs. Subject P: When you want to restore a roof you receive a 65% deduction from the state from taxes, well you have to meet certain conditions for individuals. It was a successful measure as many persons repaired their roofs.


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Very few entrepreneurs work with the banks, only a few contracted bank loans to purchase machinery or tools, or use various prepaid services. While they would be stronger as a company, Romanians to whom I spoke do not want to become partners with other Romanians, because they feel that the business may fail. They say that the Romanian wants to be chief, they are very proud and not always honest when it comes to sharing money. The sample included several stranded cases of joint ventures. The strategies adopted by the Romanian entrepreneurs both to survive in the market and to grow are the following: 1. Continued investment in machinery and tools 2. Quality work 3. Training courses and training for various tasks on the construction site 4. Learning to use new technologies and new materials 5. The practice of hiring workers without legal papers 6. Avoiding works as subcontractors (for other companies) and focusing

on individuals 7. Those who nevertheless work with companies have a network of

companies that often calls them for carrying out the works 8. Less work, but from trusted companies 9. Work in various provinces, cities not only in the area where they live. 10. Starting companies in Romania used to carry out works in Italy

(invoices on Romanian company data are seldom because not all Italian companies accept this, and setting up a company in Romania to work with in Italy or in other EU countries has some strict rules). Moreover, some companies are hiring using the companies in Romania. Taxes on income and wages are lower in Romania, thus Romanian companies can compete on the market with a better price; this phenomenon is not seen favourably by other Italian entrepreneurs.


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11. Closing the indebted companies and starting others on the names of spouses or other relatives, partners.

Subject Vi: Now I’ve closed my own, my wife started a business and I am her employee. To be honest, I closed it because I didn’t manage to pay taxes, because my works haven’t been paid for. If one cannot pay its taxes manage, they do not issue the DURC, and without it one cannot do anything, no work. I worked thoroughly with my “dita” (small company) until 2010, after that not so much and now I’ve closed it this year. Results: it is the pride that what comes out of your hands is appreciated by someone else {...} I am happy that my opinions are respected even by the heads of major companies The experience of entrepreneurship is considered to be positive and to have some effect on the personal life, family relations, community relations, a way of thinking. Some Romanians who were forced by the employer or by other circumstances to start a business said they would not return to employee work. Only two cases said they would be given an opportunity they would choose to be employed because of high stress and fewer social benefits at their disposal. Although for many it has been easier (more time for family, maybe a better salary) in the period when they were hired, they said that entrepreneurship gave them a lot of confidence in their own strength, the desire of autonomy has been satisfied, the desire to feel free to make decisions, the responsibility to provide employment for others, the recognition from the large Italian companies, the recognition and respect from the Romanian and Italian community, the access to relationships with influential people, large gains in short periods of time. Although self-employment involves a lot of stress, some said they had come to like that kind of stress. Subject V: When I was hired I was living in another world, the boss said “Go” and I went. I went just like a horse pulls the cart and I had no other worries .. Comparing with nowadays - I have many worries, concerns, anxiety, obligations, many requests, but cannot stop. I’m full of will, just like someone who falls in love. It may be 10 other beautiful women, he only wants that one ... Often, the job was learned and perfected while working as employees other


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knowledge and skills have been developed during entrepreneurship: a better knowledge of the laws, communication and negotiation skills with clients (companies and individuals). Some of them enrolled in various training classes or wanted to complete studies begun in the country. They learned to make preventives, invoices, understand tax systems, read a drawing, use the computer for business and other tools they hadn’t used before. They learned new technologies and materials. They learned basic accounting and management issues. They have a better understanding of human behaviour due to entrepreneurial activity. They have a network of influential or very rich people. Entrepreneurship made them be more creative in seeking solutions both for the company, but also for everyday life. It made them respect more one another, demand more from themselves and from others, the responsibility of working with people, more trust and confidence in their own strengths. Subject G: Having a business on your own, you see the world differently, you don’t stay on the site from morning to evening, you stay there and think only to work. As self-employed you meet all kind of people, all sort of problems, you’re experiencing a total, continuous change. And I now have much more influence on my destiny, on the things surrounding me. I have important connections with important people. Before setting up the business, some felt they belong to the middle class or lower on the social ladder against the Italians. After setting the business, the situation changed for some of the Romanians, they feel they’ve advanced, but for others the social ladder position remained unchanged. Romanians positioned above the Italians take into account the family happiness, economic comfort, knowledge and skills they possess, the lack of debts to the bank. Romanians positioned below to Italians on the social ladder take income into a greater account. Before starting the business, Romanians felt at the same level with Romanians in Italy - the middle class, but after starting the business they felt higher on the social ladder and considered: courage, education and skills, attitude and revenues. Compared to Romanians in Romania, Romanian entrepreneurs in Italy feel


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higher on the social ladder and took into account the mentality and income, skills and knowledge. But not all were able to position themselves, especially those who no longer see their family plans related to Romania and those who do not visit often the country. Romanian entrepreneurs are seen as an example to others, they are always asked for advice when a Romanian wants to start a company. Some of them are well known in native cities, villages of Romania. Three categories of transnational entrepreneurs distinguish among the Romanians with the construction business: those who have started construction companies in Romania and occasionally work there, those who have started a company in different field then construction in Romania and plan to return home, and those who have opened businesses in Romania to work with them in Italy, but in this case certain provisions must be complies with, and sometimes these practices are at the limit of legality. Some wanted to start these companies due to the more favourable tax environment in Romania which allows them to work at lower prices in Italy, but others prepare large business in Romania as is the case of Vi. Together with an Italian and a Romanian, he develops the project of two small hydropower plants in Romania, without possessing the knowledge in this field, it works with specialists and experts. He learned about the business opportunity from the Chamber of Commerce of Italy which presented its own citizens the business opportunities in Romania. The project is at an advanced stage. His company could provide employment for 20 people in that commune. Subject Vi: I’m sure I will have enormous trouble, I’m sure they’ll come up with, “never mind it will work’’, they’ll come up very often. But I cannot wait to start work in Romania. In fact in Romania everybody saw us like milch cows. Vi reckons that Romania doesn’t make efforts to attract Romanian entrepreneurs from Italy in particular, because they have the resources, not just financial, but also relational. Romania is seen as a country that can provide business opportunities and loose fiscal environment, but they do not feel that Romania would encourage them to invest their money in the country (the case of Vi). It is interesting that entrepreneurship in Italy has made Romanian better


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understand their rights and obligations, better understand the markets, not only in Italy but also in Romania, be inventive and creative. Even those who have no business in Romania, want to start one. There is also the category of those individuals who have tried, but failed, or started, but could not stay on the market. Because they deem that for the company to be successful you have to be physically present in Romania, they cannot trust anyone else. Other obstacles would be bureaucracy, mindset of people from Romania and corruption preventing access to the construction market. Romanian entrepreneurs who have active companies in Romania say they are very careful at aspects regarding the customer relationship, quality of work and the payment of taxes to the state. Moreover, they greatly appreciate the modest attitude of the Italian entrepreneur, which they adopt as well, both in the relationship with employees and customers in Italy and those in Romania. Conclusion and discussion The article analysed and explored the world of the Romanian self-employed in the construction sector in Italy by placing the analysis in a three-dimensional theoretical framework of determinants, strategies and results and by putting an emphasis not only the individual but also on the community level. The main contribution to the field of migrant entrepreneurship is the integrated approach of the phenomenon which proved to be very useful in analysing the Romanian migrants in Italy. The conclusions of the paper are centralized in the model bellow.


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Acknowledgements This work was possible due to the financial support of the Sectorial Operational Program for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/132400 with the title „Young successful researchers – professional development in an international and interdisciplinary environment”.


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ROMANIAN MIGRANTS’ POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM, ALTERNATIVE VOTING METHODS AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE ELECTORAL PROCESS Ovidiu Oltean Babeş-Bolyai University [email protected] Abstract The present paper continues this debate, discussing possible solutions and reforms that would improve external and out of country voting (OCV), and enhance and enable political participation and representation of the Romanian diaspora. Departing from the perspective of political transnationalism it reinforces the argument of extended citizenship rights for migrants, and analyzes the possibility of introduction of electronic or postal vote and the impact of such changes on the electoral process, drawing comparisons with states that already use similar voting systems. Keywords: internet voting, online voting, Estonia, diaspora.

Presidential elections and voting problems in the diaspora

The two rounds of presidential elections held in the autumn of 2014 will remain in the memory of many of us for their dramatic turning point and unexpected result. The discriminatory treatment and arrogant tone of the Romanian authorities and their lack of reaction to voters’ denied access to polling stations outside of country created much discontent at home and abroad. The Romanian electorate and civil society mobilized and sanctioned in return the government's mishandling and deliberate actions to influence the elections' outcome. Tens of thousands have taken it into the streets of the country’s largest cities to show solidarity with their co-nationals abroad who could not cast their votes for the election of a new president (Balkaninsight.com 2014), and created a big wave of support around the candidate running against the prime minister Victor Ponta. This contributed to his victory, marking a tipping point in the history of Romania’s democratic elections. For the first time someone belonging to a national ethnic minority in a considerably


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conservative East European country has been elected as head of state. This represents not only a change of political tradition but also a change of thinking and representation of politics.

The power establishment seemed to be defeated by someone coming out of the margins of the political system, long time member of an ethnic German political formation, with the significant contribution and support of a large, marginalized part of the Romanian population, represented by labor migrants living in other states of the European Union. Their demands for political representation also resurfaced voices of civic activists, scholars, journalists and members of the political opposition demanding urgent reforms of the electoral legislation and easing of voting access abroad.

Infused by the Romanian authorities’ power abuses they reinitiated discussions on topics that have been long time overlooked, such as the introduction of electronic or postal vote and the possibility of voting by Internet, the assembling of an up to date national electoral register that would include all Romanians abroad, and a more transparent financing process for electoral campaigns and candidates. They stressed the need for alternative and technologically enhanced methods of ballot casting that would make participation at the polls less restrictive and more open, and not the least, the need for a better representation of the diaspora.

After series of failed legislative attempts in the past to introduce an alternative voting system that had almost no echo outside the parliament, the nexus between the introduction of remote electronic voting and extended voting rights for Romanians abroad has stirred much necessary debates and research endeavors, as well as legislative projects aiming to modify certain aspects of the electoral legislation. The association recently founded and baptized as M10, grouped around Monica Macovei, former presidential candidate and member of the European Parliament, proposed the special parliamentary commission working on the review of electoral laws a project for the introduction of remote electronic voting that would allow any Romanian citizen to vote from home in any type of elections (Hotnews.ro 2015a). The votes would be cast on similar devices as those used in e-banking and enable voting on internet in a


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secured environment. The Center for Study of Democracy, a think tank in Cluj, proposed the Romanian presidential administration a much broader document containing a set of recommendations that would improve the electoral process and assure a more transparent financing of electoral campaigns. The experts working for this organization recommended the completion of the National Electronic Electoral Register and the modernization of voting techniques (CSD 2015, 36-8), and criticized the opaque provisions stipulated in the draft of the electoral law under which electoral candidates could be reimbursed from public funds for their expenses for running for office (Hotnews.ro 2015b). This well documented report influenced the sending of the legislative project back to the electoral commission and the change of several problematic articles. Other legislative projects for the electronic and postal voting have been initiated by members of the center-right parties in the opposition, the National Liberal Party (PNL) and Popular Movement Party (PMP).

The present paper continues this debate, discussing possible solutions and reforms that would improve external and out of country voting (OCV), and enhance and enable political participation and representation of the Romanian diaspora. Departing from the perspective of political transnationalism it reinforces the argument of extended citizenship rights for migrants, and analyzes the possibility of introduction of electronic or postal vote and the impact of such changes on the electoral process, drawing comparisons with states that already use similar voting systems.

New and old concepts

External voting is understood in the terms of an electoral procedure which enables some or all electors of a country who are temporarily abroad to exercise their voting rights from outside the national territory (Braun and Gratschew 2007, 8). Expressions such as out-of-country voting, absent or absentee voting are sometimes used with the same meaning, and they are equally validated by the literature (Ibid.). In spite of having a long history behind, supposedly being used the first time in the Roman Empire (Ellis 2007, 41), external


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voting is in fact a new procedure and has been embraced by the majority of the world states that qualify as democracies and constantly hold free elections (Braun and Gratschew 2007, 3).

Electronic voting or e-voting is usually mentioned and analyzed in relation to external voting and refers to any procedure or method by which votes are cast through electronic means (IDEA and IFE 2007, 247). Electronic voting can imply remote voting or votes cast in polling stations. Examples include casting votes through Internet, by using Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) or Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machines (DREs), or their predecessors used at the beginning of the 20th century, the Mechanical-Counting Machines with Lever-Pull or Machine readable ballots (Burean et al. 2009).

Postal vote is also related to external voting and represents the simple procedure by which an elector completes his or her ballot paper and returns it by post to central authorities in charge of organizing elections (IDEA and IFE 2007, 250).

The concept of diaspora, which seems to be more problematic and contested, is not understood strictly in terms of a historical national community living outside the borders of the state, or as a population that was violently displaced or expelled to another country or territory in a territorial dispute (Burean 2011, 85). And it is only partially understood in the more recent conceptualization as a population which belongs to a recent emigration process and intends to settle indefinitely in a destination country (Sheffer 2005 [2003], 19-20). It is rather defined in a very broad sense and it covers the entirety of migrant populations bearing the formal status of citizenship of a certain state, with various types of linkages and attachment to their country and home society, without making differentiation in terms of formal integration, migration history, ethnicity or political views.

The Romanian diaspora, a political force worth being taken into consideration


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Although Romania has one of the most permissive legislations when it comes to out-of-country voting, and made considerable efforts in the last decade and a half to double the number of polling stations opened abroad for national elections (Burean 2011, 95), there have been serious problems in providing access to polling stations to a larger than ever number of Romanians willing to cast their vote outside of country in the last elections (The Economist.com 2014). The images of large groups of Romanians, mostly migrants residing in western European countries, waiting in line for hours to vote in front of Romanian embassies and consulates abroad, broadcasted by the main international media outlets and extensively distributed on social media platforms have attracted attention and criticism from inside and outside the country. A very large diaspora, such as the Romanian one, with almost 4 million people, has been restricted to vote due to the authorities’ lack of capacity and efficiency in organizing elections abroad, or due to an ideologically selective denial of allowing them to exercise their votes (Telegraph.co.uk 2014).

Long time ignored or valorized only for the high amount of remittances sent home Romanian migrants became more visible as in the last two presidential elections as they were capable of influencing the result in a substantial manner and turn the tables in favor of one of the candidates. Enabled by social media and mostly a positive coverage in the Romanian press they strongly made their voices heard as tens of thousands could not enter the polling stations opened abroad and cast their ballots during the elections for president held in the last months of 2014. This engendered a massive mobilization movement against the government coalition and their candidate for presidency, Victor Ponta, and contributed to the election of his opponent, the former mayor of Sibiu, Klaus Iohannis.

In a country that has experienced in the last two decades and a half a pervasive migration process, more than 15% of the active population is engaged in a form of migratory movement making Romanians one of the largest migrant populations moving inside the European Union (OECD and UNDESA 2013). From ethnic migration to irregular migration Romanians developed various practices of


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mobility and transnationalism overcoming the economic deprivation they faced in the country, accumulating migration experience and economic resources (Horváth and Anghel 2009). After their status regularization that came with the accession of Romania to the EU they became empowered to demand recognition as fully enfranchised citizens, both in their receiving states as well as in their origin country.

The formal change of status became visible in the increase of participation rate in the national elections held at home. If in the legislative elections of 2004 and 2008 the Romanians abroad participated in a small proportion with 5% or less from their real numbers going to the polls, their numbers almost doubled in the presidential impeachment referendum from May 2007, with 72,156 persons voting in 178 sections opened in embassies and consulates (Căjvăneanu 2009, 102-3). The interest for national elections in the diaspora continued to increase as the second round of the presidential elections of 2009 registered a participation twice as large than 2007, with 147,754 Romanians expressing their options at the polls, voting in a striking majority for the incumbent president, Traian Băsescu, and turning the outcome of a critical election (Burean 2011, 91; Mateescu 2010).

Constantly criticized for their low turnout at the polls and apathy for national politics (Căjvăneanu 2009, 120-1) or courted for votes and support every time elections approached (Angi et al. 2009, 34-5), migrants have constituted into a political force able to influence decisively the result of elections from outside the country (Burean 2011). Even more, they remained salient trough out time in their options for right, center-right parties, perceived to be pro reformist and more liberal than the political forces coalesced around the Social-Democrat Party (PSD) (Ibid.). This way, migrants acted not only as an important resource of financial remittances but also a potential resource for development and change, supporting liberal policies and contributing to the democratization process.

The Romanian state should reinforce and support the linkages that they maintain with their home country not only because they are a resource from where obligations (such as financial remittances and


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taxes) could be extracted (Burean 2011, 86), or through which it could foster cooperation and promote national interests in foreign countries, but also because they are part of the community of citizens. In this case the state has to assure its legitimacy and their representation, irrespective of their territorial residence or other forms of state affiliations. As they represent a large share of the active population of Romania, which becomes more mobile than ever, migrants embody also a valuable human capital and financial resources that could be successfully invested their home country. They could contribute in creating employment opportunities in the local economy of their communities of origin, in developing social and cultural projects, or in transferring scientific and technological know-how, as well as democratic and participative values (Waldinger 2014).

Transnationalization of citizenship

Migrants are not territorially unbounded nomads moving and living in empty lands or in a void of state authority and power (Bauböck 2007; 2002). As they move across borders and territories they carry with them to a certain extent the franchise of the polities of which they resorted, combining external and internal statuses and affiliations (Idem 2003, 703). As political participation and representation rights are not negotiable and once granted they are irreversible and cannot be retracted in any democratic state (Idem 2007), the transnational ties and spaces resulting from the overlapping political communities and institutional arrangements which migrants belong to should not cancel out or limit such rights and actions but rather extend and enlarge them (Idem 2002, 14-15).

A major role in creating and supporting such venues of political transnationalism or transnational citizenship (Idem 2007) belongs to the states and their political leadership. Instead of disconnecting citizenship from membership in bounded political communities (Idem 2002, 24), states should approach them from the perspective and logic of positive rights that need to be put into place in the stronger sense of entitlements and public services that grant citizens


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the opportunity and possibility to exercise such rights, and make the entire electoral process much more open, accessible and fair (Idem 2007, 2407). Organizing registration, printing ballots, making electronic voting machines available, and opening a sufficient number of polling stations abroad should become standard democratic procedures for all democratic states in a world of increased mobility and global spanning economic and social processes.

The transnationalism literature has for a long time maintained the assumption that only poor or peripheral states engage in diaspora politics and extend citizenship rights (Gamlen 2006, 3). State-led policies and measures of encouraging transnational political participation and institutionalizing migrant political practices at home (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, 761) have been analyzed from the perspective of world-system theory and neoliberal politics, and explained as an economic process between states who offer such opportunities and rights in exchange of control over migrants financial resources and capital (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Goldring 2002). Political theory analyzing transnational political processes tends to break this line of argumentation (Bauböck 2003). Although there is evidence that states who seek diaspora engagement policies and construct models of transnational citizenship tend to cluster in the southern hemisphere and are mostly emergent economies, it is also true that they are not all poor and that such practices are much more diverse and used by many of the established democracies and richer states (Gamlen 2006, 20).

There are three categories of states identified by practices of diaspora engagement: exploitation states which extract obligations without extending rights; generous states, which extend rights without extracting obligations; and engaged states which offer rights in exchange for obligations (Ibid., 21) And there is a clear tendency of most of the states of the world to transnationalize citizenship, using both ethnic and civic models, with a stretch on all geographical regions of the globe (Ibid., 23).

Although states have different reasons and motivations in extending citizenship, from a normative standpoint there should be no


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conditionality between the amount of remittances and investment in the home country and enfranchisement. Citizenship rights cannot be monetized and negotiated by financial means, and should not be determined by the formal incorporation and economic success one has in his or her host country, or by the amount of money a person sends back home, as citizenship makes no differentiation in terms of income and is not a tradeable asset. In the same vein citizenship and the exercise of fundamental rights should not be territorially confined, although this principle bears serious limitations as it depends on bilateral agreements and states compliance to international norms, as not all states share the same political principles and recognize the same citizenship rights.

This line of reasoning does not endeavor to bring arguments and build a foundation for post-national citizenship rights nor is an attempt to perpetuate methodological nationalism within transnational migration studies or confine diaspora studies by conceptualizing it inside the realm of common ancestry and national politics (Glick Schiller 2007, 18). It rather aims to show how the transformations in the positioning of states in global fields of power and capital affect the way migrants maintain transnational connections (Ibid., 6), and how states can reinsert themselves in such webs of power and transnational political processes and extend the franchise and political representation of migrants.

External voting and migrant political participation

In the sense of entitlement to vote from outside the country, two thirds of 115 countries and territories allow all their citizens access to external voting, while one third partially restrict it, accounting for more than half of the world democracies, if in this case democracy is defined by the minimal conditions of holding multiparty elections and granting universal suffrage (Braun and Gratschew 2007, 3). However, this measure is not sufficient to enable and encourage transnational political participation. Some countries have adopted provisions for allowing external voting but have not yet implemented them (Ibid.), while others implemented them in a


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manner that makes registration and ballot casting difficult, costly and arduous (Fierro, Morales, and Gratschew 2007, 19-20). Certain polities encourage participation from abroad and allow contestation while others restrict participation and keep contestation to a minimum, considering that because of the physical distance migrants have from their origin country they should influence domestic politics only to a limited extent (Green 2007, 90).

In order to cast an external vote migrants are usually required the same conditions for electoral registration and voting that apply in the home country, and the entitlement to vote is generally linked to citizenship, age, and residency (Ibid.). Some states require their citizens living abroad minimal conditions to register and cast their votes, while others impose supplementary conditions. For example Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Norway, Poland, South Africa and the United States all give their citizens living abroad the right to register and vote without any condition to the amount of time one has spent outside the country (Ibid., 93). On the other hand, states like Germany, New Zealand or the United Kingdom impose limits on their external voters (Ibid.). Most of the states allowing external voting organize polling stations in consular offices and embassies, and demand their external electors a preliminary application to register before voting, in order to keep the electoral register up to date (Ibid.). Countries such as Iraq, Namibia, Norway and Sweden allow their citizens abroad to vote in national elections without previous registration (Ibid., 100). In the case of Romania, citizens voting out of country are automatically registered in a national electoral data base and do not have to make any other application in their host country, but have to fill a form when entering the polls in which they state that they did not cast more than one vote in the current elections.

Several countries that do not have general entitlements for their citizens to vote from abroad have granted special provisions for citizens who hold specific positions and occupations, such as working in the diplomacy, in the military, or as public officials (Ibid., 94-5). Countries like Lesotho and India grant such provisions to diplomats, public officials and their employees working in


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diplomatic missions, while the Republic Ireland provides it to diplomats and armed forces (Ibid.). Other countries such as Senegal, constrained by the reduced resources to organize elections, condition the voting from abroad to the registration of a minimum number of 500 electors in each state where they have diplomatic missions (Vengroff 2007, 105).

Although voting rights should not be deliberately restricted to any person that holds a citizenship status of a democratic polity, provisions of voting from abroad are often conditioned by the resources states dispose of to organize elections simultaneously inside and outside their territory. The procedures of external voting require supplementary costs and administrative creativity from authorities, who have to assure similar access to registration and polling to all citizens entitled to vote, with a fair degree of security and privacy (Thompson 2007, 113). External voting is also conditioned by the time and resources that migrants have and mobilize in turning out at the polls in their host countries, and by their access to information and interest in the domestic politics of their origin country.

There is actually widespread evidence that not all migrants take part in transnational political activities (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008), and that their turnout in the national elections of their origin country is usually very low (Burean 2011). Most of the states who offer OCV provisions require their citizens the presence at the polling stations and very rarely they put in place alternative voting systems that would simplify and facilitate ballot casting or remote voting. Electronic remote voting or postal voting represent accessible alternative voting methods that could be used in enhancing and encouraging participation from abroad and possible solutions for reducing election organization costs. There are however many who question their virtues and raise concerns on their security and their contribution in reducing costs and increasing access to voting, even though many established democracies use them at a national level, and large, populated democracies such as India depend on them for assuring equal voting access to its citizens and organizing elections by democratic standards.


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Alternative voting methods around the world

Despite their long history and contestation there is little agreement and scarce research on the viability and security of electronic voting, and few references to postal voting and its effect on political participation. Criticized by governments, political parties, scholars and journalists for their lack of transparence and security vulnerabilities (especially the electronic vote has received a good deal of criticism), as it happened in Estonia (The Guardian.com 2014), France (Libération.fr 2014), or Ireland (Tribune.com.pk 2015), they became much demanded by the civic society and the out of country electorate in the case of countries with a large active migrant populations such as India, Mexico, Romania or Poland.

Many of the world countries mentioned above that practice the extension of the electoral franchise for their citizens residing abroad or with double citizenship have created simplified and technology enhanced methods of ballot casting and counting that would allow their citizens to choose the methods of exercising their voting rights in national elections. However, the process of technologically upgrading ballot casting and counting and extending out-of-country voting is advancing at a slower pace than the transnational flows of people in mobility and their demands of representation and enfranchisement. Some established democracies such as Austria, Finland, Germany, and Norway have introduced such technologies but stopped using them, while others, such as India made them legally binding and use them at a national level (TheAtlantic.com 2014), but restrict their use from voting from abroad (Thevotingnews.com 2015). Countries such as the United States have a long history in using electronic voting, where voting machines used for elections can be traced back to 1892 (Burean et al. 2009, 53-55), but did not extend the procedure and technology at a national level or outside the borders for their OCV electorate (Goldsmith and Ruthrauff 2013, 29-30). France and Estonia have introduced electronic voting and voting by internet and use them alternatively with paper ballot casting, but still need to perfect them and fear their vulnerabilities. Smaller and more fragile states like Republic of


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Moldova have recently endeavored to construct an electronic system of voting starting with a national electoral electronic register that has enabled the state electoral authority to better organize free and fair elections, while preparing to introduce a fully operation electronic voting infrastructure by 2018, despite the country’s population reduced connection to Internet (Hotnews.ro 2014). Romania has had only one use of electronic voting, rapidly put in place in 2003 for the military forces and staff serving in mission in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq and Kosovo, enabling them to vote in the referendum regarding the review of the Constitution (Stiripesurse.ro, 2015). Any other attempts or projects for the introduction of alternative voting systems have been dropped or impeded since then, even though this first trial has proved to be completely functional and viable.

Postal voting is currently used in many countries of the world and it is considered to be as old as the first postal service. Switzerland has already established a tradition with its frequent referenda in which it made possible that ballots could be filled at home, before the end of the week when most suffrages are held, and sent by mail to the electoral authorities (Braun 2007, 230). Postal vote functions usually as an alternative method of ballot casting, electors being able to choose the way in which they cast their vote. There are however exceptions in the case of some states of the US federation which became universal vote-by-mail states in their endeavor to cut election costs. Oregon and Washington use it for all types of elections and praise their virtues, although there is still much contestation on their safety and real contribution in reducing costs and making voting accessible (Governing.com 2011). Other consolidated democracies such as Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, and Sweden as well as younger democracies such as Bosnia and Herzegovina or Fiji use postal voting in alternative ballot casting formulas (IDEA and IFE 2007, 234-45). Poland has introduced the procedure of voting by mail for its external voters, and other countries restricting voting from abroad allow their diplomats and military forces to cast their ballots by mail in their missions abroad and send it to their home country. The United Kingdom has delivered a lot deal of criticisms in


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the last years towards postal vote after observing constant and continuous electoral fraud in the Birmingham constituency (Telegraph.co.uk 2015a), making the issue of alternative voting by mail even more puzzling.

Technical and normative assessments of electronic voting

From the different varieties of electronic voting the present undertaking looks mainly at remote electronic vote or voting by Internet, which is the only relevant one in enhancing participation and representation of the diaspora. There are countries which use electronic voting devices or electronic voting machines (EVMs) on an extended level, but require their citizens the presence in a polling station and ballot casting in a voting booth. Brazil, India, Philippines, South Korea, and the United States are successfully using various models of EVMs or machine readable ballots (Burean et al. 2009, 55-6) without having any electronic remote voting system implemented. While certain countries which used EVMs dropped them for reasons of security, such as The Netherlands, other countries such as Bhutan, Nepal or Namibia, inspired by their success in neighboring India borrowed and imported such machines for their own legislative elections (TheAtlantic.com 2014). Although there is much discussion today and various proposals for electronic voting are drafted in many countries around the world the dynamics of adopting this voting method remain nevertheless weak.

Before discussing the technical aspects of electronic voting or postal voting and weighting their benefits and challenges it should be emphasized that such voting methods are usually used alternatively and do not replace completely the paper ballot casted at the polls. Their purpose is to offer a wider range of possibilities to cast a vote and facilitate participation from distance, and offer an increased access to the polls to large democratic societies.

Electronic voting always implies and requires the use of technology and electronic devices or machines (Goldsmith and Ruthrauff 2013, 23), irrespective if casted in the supervised environment of the polling station or in the friendly milieu of the house. Electronic


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voting machines or devices usually enhance both the vote casting and the ballot counting. There are also electronic procedures when votes are cast on paper and counted by machines which can electronically read the ballots and digitalize them on a memory card (Burean et al. 2009, 60-1). However, not all technologically enhanced voting requires electronic registration and authentication (Goldsmith and Ruthrauff 2013, 59-60). Some of the processes offer the possibility of registering in an electronically automated way, while most of the time electoral registration is done by filling paper registration forms and making the proof of a valid ID card to a public authority or electoral observer.

The remote electronic voting is newer and different than most automated voting procedures used across the various states mentioned above. It requires without exception an Internet connection and it is supposed to facilitate remote voting for those not able and not willing to cast their ballots at polls. It requires also an electronically and digitally alphabetized population that trusts such voting methods and a strong political consensus for implementing them (Pârvu 2015). The trust and consensus should derive from the widespread acknowledgment and recognition that technology may offer benefits over traditional methods of voting and counting (Goldsmith and Ruthrauff 2013, 21).

The guide on implementing and overseeing electronic voting and counting methods and systems, assembled by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems in collaboration with the National Democratic Institute and published in 2013 identifies several benefits of this method, where the most important are the elimination of costs and logistics involved with paper ballots, the improvement of accessibility to voting, and easy conduct of complex elections (Ibid., 21-2).

Like all alternative voting systems electronic voting and voting by Internet bring many challenges and pose technical problems (Ibid.). The e-voting implementation guide identifies some of these challenges such as the fact that voting on electronic devices outside polling stations offers less transparency, it poses questionable security problmes of the voting and counting process, questionable


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ballot secrecy, and difficulties for the illiterate and poorly technologically alphabetized voters (Ibid.).

Although there are obvious positive contributions of the electronic voting and voting on Internet the concerns related to security and fraud seem to be prevail and resurface every time this method is brought into discussion. This is why it is important that before introducing the procedures of remote electronic voting, decision-makers should organize consultations with the civil society, academics and scholars, IT specialists and other stake holders, and not the least, with the electorate, and obtain a broad political consensus and support, and discuss its benefits and shortcomings (Pârvu 2015, 4).

The next step in implementing and using electronic voting requires a good coordination between electoral authorities, electoral commissions and bureaus from different constituencies and authorities in charge with supervising communication infrastructure, and IT companies designing and implementing the voting system, and those auditing the procedure (Ibid., 6).

Of course, as the illustrating case of Estonia shows, nothing can happen without a valid and functional electoral register which could be accessed and updated electronically, and ID cards which can be easily scanned and used by electors to register and to be identified online. This requires also a performant public administration and infrastructure and well trained public officials.

Estonia has been the first country in the world to use Internet voting at the national level and has progressed tremendously today in this direction, with 30% of ballots being cast online in previous elections (Springall et al. 2014, 1). Estonian citizens use bio metric ID cards and they can be offered special additional SIM cards which can be used for logging online to vote, pay taxes or access different public service available on Internet (Pârvu 2015, 6). With the help of a card reader similar to those used in e-banking they can authenticate and enter the voting application with a PIN number that is generated every time an operation takes places (Springall et al. 2014, 2).


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After registering online citizens can vote in advance of few days before the polling stations are opened. What is interesting is that the voter can change his mind several times and effectively cast multiple votes (Ibid., 3). However there is only one vote registered - the very last one that was computed in the program before the ending of the voting by internet period, while all the others have been revoked (Ibid.). A person who has sent his vote by Internet cannot vote again at a polling station (Pârvu 2015, 6). The same principle applies to all countries using remote electronic voting.

On-line voting requires downloading and installing an application that was specially designed and secured for the elections taking place. The application contains a scanning function that identifies the IP address of the user and scans his computer for viruses and malware. The voter runs the application and receives the list of candidates. For registering and centralizing votes cast online the Estonian system is again illustrative, where there are usually four servers used for supporting such a procedure (Springall et al. 2014, 3-4). The application mediates between them and the user. The Vote Forwarding Server has already sent the list of candidates to the voter and received his option with the identification and data of the person who cast the vote. The votes are then transferred to a Vote Storage Server with the help of a Log Server. The votes are then copied on a DVD and anonymized and transmitted to an off-line Counting Server where they are counted (Ibid.). The principle by which the electronic vote on Internet works is that of the double envelope (Pârvu 2015, 7). In the first step when the vote is cast it is directly sent in an envelope, with the name of the voter attached to it. It is then extracted from this envelope without the name of the voter and transferred anonymously in the second step to another envelope (Ibid.). It is then opened and counted with the other votes.

Following the same system used in Estonian elections, we can see that there are solutions for counterfeiting fraud, bearing limitations but still feasible. Voters can easily verify if their votes have been registered and correctly quantified with the help of a QR code generated after the vote has been cast, and scanned with an application installed on the mobile phone (Ibid., 8). Verifying the


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votes and casting procedure is very important and crucial to the success of electronic voting by Internet. A mishandling of the voting procedure or electoral fraud could be easily detected if 1% of electors verify their votes (Ibid.). Estonia also allows citizens to assist the procedure of opening and counting electronic votes, which is usually held in the Parliament building. Norway used a similar voting verification system with a paper card containing numeric keys which is offered by mail to every person registering to vote online (Ibid., 8). Every key corresponds to a party and they are generated individually, for every voter, who receives a message on his mobile phone with a code that should correspond with his voting options, after sending the vote online (Ibid.). Estonia on the other hand makes available to its citizens a web page containing numeric fragments of the source code that was used for creating the voting application, which can be used to verify different stages of electoral process (Ibid.). It has received criticism for not publishing the entire code online, but criticisms has been deemed unrealistic as publishing the entire code would have caused serious threats to the online voting system (Ibid.).

There are however founded criticisms of the online voting. Observing elections where electronic voting by Internet has been used, electoral design and IT specialists have found evidence that security measures are not always respected. When members of Expert Forum (EFOR), a think tank based in Bucharest and specialized on public policy and public governance reform, participated in observing legislative elections in Estonia in March 2015 they noticed operators using used memory sticks for transferring the votes from one server to another, the use of email platforms such as Gmail, the typing of codes directly from sheets of paper that were sometimes spread in front of the computer with observers around, the lack of standardized procedures for operators, observers allowed to film and photograph in the first place and forbidden in the following days (Ibid., 9). A group of observers composed by scholars from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and researchers and activists from Open Rights Group, UK, also related about serious flaws of the Internet voting procedures in


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Estonia after their visit in Tallinn during elections held in 2013. Anomalous situations that occurred were handled in ad hoc and sometimes discretionary manner, procedures were changed several times while observation was taking place, and sometimes voting security was seriously put to test when from the two operators required to perform backup and updates only one was present, overcharged with work and leaving the security of the system on the integrity of only one member (Springall et al. 2014, 4). There were also many security lapses that could lead to malware and alteration of voting process. Operators working for the electoral authority downloaded software and performed pre-election setup process over unsecured Internet connections, operations have been performed on personal, “unclean” computers, and votes have been transferred to the counting server on a USB sticks, making the entire process and system exposed to electronic frauds and attacks (Ibid., 5). Insufficient transparency has also been signaled. Apparently observers were also allowed to film and take photos in the first place and banned afterwards. Operators were said to have intervened on the process and avoid reporting on funny outputs registered on the servers (Ibid.). Besides the observed mishandling and flaws of the electronic voting procedure there are many other who remain in the space of the voters’ house. Voters can have problems in protecting their electronic signature and ID and avoid Trojans that would hack their connection and authentication and modify their voting options. They can also have problems in using the card reader or registering online and understanding the functioning of the voting mechanism.

Authorities and voices supporting remote electronic voting counterfeit the retractors of voting by Internet, by pointing to the fact that, in the first place, there is no ballot casting procedure completely insulated from fraud or mishandling. They argue that each citizen is responsible for his vote and should pay equal attention to potential threats and attempts of fraud. The right to vote should be protected no only by the state but also by citizens themselves, who should exercise it with maximum responsibility and integrity. Further on, electronic voting by Internet is seen as safer than paper ballot casting due to the possibility of easier tracking of digitized votes with the


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use of software and better security measures offered by the online environment. The comparison with the e-banking system is very common, and it aims giving the remote electronic ballot system more credibility. Voters have the option to revoke their actions and cast a vote again in a repeated manner until the end of e-voting period, if the first one was directed wrongly, hacked or if one of the candidates simply became undesirable. In the third place, they argue that remote electronic voting increases accessibility and offers every citizen the possibility to vote, reducing the restrictions of space and time. In the case of Estonia, which has 14% of all Estonians living in foreign countries, this has reconnected the diaspora with its home state, although only a small percentage of them voted from abroad (Maaten 2007, 228). The same argument applies to similar countries with a large diaspora. Even though not all of them vote the existence of an alternative in hand is intrinsically positive.

Some considerations about postal voting

Postal voting is already a widespread method around the world and it requires less elaboration and preparation than electronic voting or voting by Internet. Usually voters have to fill an application in order to register in an electoral register and receive the form that will become the ballot paper, the documentation accompanying the ballot, and the special envelopes which will be used to send the vote by mail to the electoral authorities (Vollan 2007, 212). This type of vote can be easily observed and secured as the processes previous to the vote casting are handled by public officials organizing elections and all the forms are issued and published in advance on a typified paper support. However, because of postal voting spreading over a longer period of time the voting process can become hard to observe and exposed to fraud (Ibid.). With all its limitations, postal vote remains in use in many democracies and very few of them gave up this alternative voting method.

Ways ahead for implementing alternative voting systems in Romania


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If Estonia is usually looked at as the ‘Holy Grail’ of electronic voting and its successes and failures are imagined by the other states as a possible blueprint for their own roadmap towards the implementation of a similar system, it should be taken into account that each state has its own economic, social and cultural characteristics and specific administrative weaknesses or political problems. Thus, the Estonian model could only be replicated to a limited extent (Pârvu 2015, 13). Even though remote electronic voting uses electronic devices and tokens it should not be taken and implemented simply as employing a gadget or a user-friendly software as there is no ideal model that can be applied to every country, as not every country works the same. Every state should adapt, design and implement the electronic voting system in accordance with its own needs, structural problems, and resources.

In the case of Romania remote electronic voting or postal voting seem indeed necessary from the perspective of the large diaspora and large numbers of migrants who have to be assured an easy access to voting in the elections of their home country, and be offered the possibility of casting their votes on Internet or by mail, without having to make endless lines and wait a day in front of embassies and consulates. But it raises serious problems in implementing such a system at a certain standard of security, safety and accountability from the perspective of logistic conditions and resources that Romania dispose of. For alternative voting to work it is crucial to have in the first place a performant administrative system and institutional infrastructure. For the electronic vote this should comprise a clear evidence of all its electors and the creation in advance of an electronic data base and registration procedure that would enable anyone entitled to vote to authenticate and send his vote online. Unfortunately Romania is still standing far from this achievement. The previous presidential and legislative elections have resurfaced the problems that authorities have in keeping a clear evidence of the number of citizens and persons having the right to vote. What should be a basic function of a state becomes simply too arduous for the Romanian administration. Postal voting does not require automatically an electronic register but requires an increased


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capacity of verifying the authenticity of ballots and keep track of multiple votes and fraud. As it was shown by the presidential elections of 2014 and 2009, or by the legislative elections of 2012 there have been many cases when the existence of electoral fraud was evident with votes cast on supplementary lists that overpassed the number of those inscribed in the permanent lists, and the public officials doing little to investigate and limit such practices. It was proved that they even encouraged maintaining on the register’s lists voters that have naturally disappeared and they were no longer going to vote, in order to use their ballots and cast them in their own benefit. In this context postal vote leaves an even wider space for mishandling and maneuvering votes.

Another constraint in introducing alternative voting systems is represented by the reduced technologic alphabetization and participative culture of Romanian electorate. If Estonia or other Scandinavian states have a high penetration of Internet networks and usage, and a better understanding of electoral procedures and registration formalities, Romania has a reduced Internet use among the population, in spite of the existent infrastructure and powerful broadband, and citizens that are far less knowledgeable about the democratic mechanisms and practices of which they dispose. Internet vote would be used and understood mostly by the young population and possibly avoided by the older electorate. This could contribute in widening the divisions and cleavages that have been created by previous elections between the young, urban and more liberal population and the more conservative electorate. Nevertheless, the remote electronic vote and the postal vote are not meant to replace the paper ballot but come in the help of those seriously constrained to express their options at polling stations. From this reason the supplementary costs the state should support for introducing an alternative system are justified, as it is evident that the state could not cover the entire Romanian population abroad with polling stations and registration infrastructure, in the situation when voting is usually done in the building of diplomatic missions or cultural centers and assisted by the Romanian staff working there. Internet


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voting or postal vote should be a tool that would offer equal chances to every citizen to take part in the democratic electoral process.

It seems feasible that the implementation of an electoral register, of voting application and security software could be realized and developed in partnership with one of the numerous IT companies and developed in one of the IT centers in Romania. A public-private cooperation that would benefit from the existent technologic and IT resources could produce satisfactory results with the condition that the Romanian state remains consequent in its intentions and does not stop or postpone the project, as it happened with the e-government portal that was long time advertised but which remains only partially functional. Producing at first a trial electronic voting application that would be used in a less important round of suffrage, such as a referendum, could be a possible start (Pârvu 2015, 13), but a failure of a pilot project could undermine the credibility of an ensuing undertaking of putting in place any kind of alternative voting system.

With all difficulties and drawbacks associated with the implementation of an alternative voting system such a reform should be brought more often into discussion, and policy makers, scholars and civil activists should start negotiations and build consensus on a future policy, weighting its advantages and limitations. Public consultations should follow and the electorate should be informed about each stage of the project and about the costs included. Even though the introduction of an alternative voting system based on remote electronic voting would take time and it will need continuous refinement after its incipient phase, such an undertaking should not be delayed anymore. The digitalization of democracy should not be avoided or treated like a useless and costly project that would devoid the electoral process of meaning and significance. The reduction of costs on the long term, the minimization of counting mistakes and flaws, and the increase of choices that would bring the ballot closer to the voter (Telegraph.co.uk 2015b) are sufficient arguments to initiate the implementation of a remote electronic voting system.


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