person and polis: max scheler's personalism as political theory

title:

PersonandPolis:MaxScheler'sPersonalismAsPoliticalTheorySUNYSeriesinPoliticalTheory.ContemporaryIssues

author: Schneck,StephenFrederick.publisher: StateUniversityofNewYorkPress

isbn10|asin: 088706339Xprintisbn13: 9780887063398ebookisbn13: 9780585057606

language: English

subject

Scheler,Max,--1874-1928--Contributionsinpoliticalscience,Politicalscience--Philosophy,Politicalpsychology,Personalism.

publicationdate: 1987

lcc: JC263.S252S361987ebddc: 320/.01

subject:

Scheler,Max,--1874-1928--Contributionsinpoliticalscience,Politicalscience--Philosophy,Politicalpsychology,Personalism.

Pagei

PersonandPolis

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PoliticalTheory:ContemporaryIssuesJohnG.Gunnell,Editor

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PersonandPolis:MaxScheler'sPersonalismasPoliticalTheory

StephenFrederickSchneck

StateUniversityofNewYorkPressAlbany

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PublishedbyStateUniversityofNewYorkPress,Albany

©1987StateUniversityofNewYork

Allrightsreserved

PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica

Nopartofthisbookmaybeusedorreproducedinanymannerwhatsoeverwithoutwrittenpermissionexceptinthecaseofbriefquotationsembodiedincriticalarticlesandreviews.

Forinformation,addressStateUniversityofNewYorkPress,StateUniversityPlaza,Albany,N.Y.,12246

LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData

Schneck,StephenFrederick,1953-Personandpolis.

(SUNYseriesinpoliticaltheory.Contemporaryissues)Bibliography:p.Includesindex.1.Scheler,Max,18741928Contributionsinpoliticalscience.2.PoliticalsciencePhilosophy.3.Politicalpsychology.4.Personalism.I.Title.II.Series.JC263.S252S36 1987 302'.01 86-23014ISBN0-88706-340-3ISBN0-88706-339-X(pbk.)

10987654321

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Contents

AcknowledgementsandDedication ix

Introduction 1

ChapterOne:PhenomenologyandOntology 13

HistoricalandIntellectualBackgroundofScheler'sThought

Lebensphilosophie

Nietzsche

Bergson

Dilthey

Eucken

Phenomenology

Husserl'sIdealism

Scheler'sRealism

RevivalofMetaphysics

ChapterTwo:Person,Other,Community 45

ActandPerson

GenesisofthePerson

Ontongenesis

Morphogenesis

PersonandOther,SocialityandIntersubjectivity

World

Nature

History

ChapterThree:PersonalismasPoliticalTheory 75

BeyondaSchelerianPoliticalTheory

ModelsandLeaders:ExtendingthePurviewofPolitics

Power:MoralityandPolitics

PersonalistSocialism,PersonalistDemocracy

Pagevi

ChapterFour:PersonalismandModernPolitics 95

BourgeoisLiberalism

Formalism

Individualism

Motivation

Rationalism

Personalism,LiberalismandPoliticalLegitimacy

BourgeoisMarxism

DialecticalMaterialism

ClassandSpeciesSubjectivity

CritiqueofIdeology

PersonalismandMarxism

Conclusion:AnEvaluationofPersonalismasPoliticalTheory

131

TheProblemofTransformation

TheProblemofValuePerception

Notes 141

Bibliography 165

PrimaryWorks

SecondarvLiterature

NameIndex 179

SubjectIndex 183

Pagevii

"Thesupremedespair,"wroteKierkegaard,"isnottofeeldesperate."

Onecannolongertellwhatmanis,andaswewatchhimtodayundergoingsuchastonishingtransformations,somethinkthereisnosuchthingashumannature.Forsomepeoplethisideabecomestranslatedinto"everythingispossibleforman,"andinthattheyfindsomehope;forothers,"everythingispermissibletoman,"andwiththattheyabandonallrestraint;forothers,finally,"everythingispermissibleagainstman,"andwiththatwehavearrivedatBuchenwald.Allthegamesthatmightdivertusfromourdisarrayhavelosttheirsavor,orhavebeenindulgedintosatiety....ThereligiouslunacywhichworshipstheGodofphilosophersandbankerswouldindeedjustifyusinproclaimingthatGodisdead,ifindeedthatidolwerehe.Couldweonlyhavealittlerespitefromthewars,tocarryonwithourtechnicalmiracles,then,gluttedwithcomfort,weshouldthenbeabletodeclarethathappinesswasdead.Anotherfourteenthcentury,asitwere,crumblingawaybeforeoureyes:thetimefor"asecondRenaissance"isathand.EmmanuelMounierPersonalism

Pageix

AcknowledgementsandDedicationMaxSchelerinsightfullyrevealedthatthepersonasanindividualemergesonlywithinacircleofotherpersonsinsociality.Thisisakeeninsight.Althoughthelimitationsofthefollowingstudyareentirelymine,whatifanycredititdeservesmustbesharedamongmany.TheOfficeofAdvancedStudiesoftheUniversityofNotreDameandtheDeutscherAkademischerAustauschdienstprovidedthevitalfinancialsupportnecessaryforcompletingthisstudy'sresearchattheSchelerArchiveoftheBayerischeStaatsbibliothekinMunich.ProfessorManfredFringsofDePaulUniversity,editorofScheler'sNachlass,kindlyofferedpermissiontoexamineportionsofthearchiveandonmorethanoneoccasionhasclarifiedkeypointsofScheler'sthought.SpecialthanksareduethethreeanonymousreviewerswhosecarefulreadingofthisstudyfortheStateUniversityofNewYorkPressprovedsovaluableforitsfinalform.

Morepersonally,IamdeeplyindebtedandgratefultoFredR.Dallmayr,DeeProfessorofGovernmentoftheUniversityofNotreDame.ThisworkplainlyowesmuchofitsinspirationtoProfessorDallmayr'sownpenetratingstudiesofthecharacterofthepoliticalsubjectandpoliticalintersubjectivity.Ithankmywife,Patricia.Sharingmyfailuresandrejoicingineachmodesttriumph,shehasfullybornetheburdenswhichaccompaniedthecompletionofthisresearch.Finally,IthankmyparentswhosehandsIeverseebehindmyown.

In1955,withthebirthofmybrother,myfatherwasforcedtoforegothecompletionofhisowneducationinordertosupportus.Thisbookisdedicatedtohiminthankfulnessforthatsacrifice.

S.F.S.

IntroductionDrawingupontheworksofContinentalphilosophyandsocialtheoryfromthepresentcentury,agrowingnumberofpoliticaltheoristsarerejectingthestillpredominantunderstandingsofpoliticsaseitherbeingtheinterplayofautonomousagentsortheresultofaconfluenceofvariouscontingentfactors.Analmostclassicalsenseofpoliticsas"praxis"isachievingincreasingacceptance.Thepracticalcharacterofpoliticsisemergingasthesharedtouchstone,thepointofconsensusamongtheseotherwisediversethinkers.Praxisisthemeetinggroundofthewaythingsareandthewaythingscouldbe,thejunctionofbeingandbecoming,inescapablystructuredbyboth,whichissomehowcloselyidentifiedwithbeinghuman.Itisdefinedasan"actingwithintheworld."

1Avoidingtheillusionofstandingapartfromtheworldofeverydayexistence,andavoidingthedelusionofbeingutterlysubmergedintheworldofeverydayexistence,praxisisacting,withacceptanceandawareness,aspartofthecontextofsuchexistence.

AttemptingtosketchanoutlineofapoliticaltheorybasedonMaxScheler'sunderstandingofthe"person,"thefollowingresearch,itishoped,mayaddtoorsharpencertainaspectsofthecontemporaryturntowardpraxis.Schelerstandsinthevanguardofthosephilosophersandsocialthinkerswhosecombinedinfluencehasledpoliticaltheoristsinthedirectionofgreatersensitivityfortheemminently"practical"characterofpolitics.Foravarietyofreasons,however,enormouslyinsightfulandsuggestiveelementsofhisthinkinghavelaindormantsincehis1928deathinWeimarGermany.Yet,itisthecontentionofthisstudythatthePerson,asunderstoodinScheler's

personalism,suggestsanewgroundonwhichtounderstandthepoliticalsubjectandthepoliticalcommunitysoastooutlineapoliticsandpoliticaltheorywhichtransformtheego-basedpolitics

ofmodernliberalismandMarxism.Thisispersonalismaspoliticaltheory.

Inthemostbasicsense,personalismaspoliticaltheoryfindsthebe-allandend-allofpoliticstobethe''person."Yet,itisnotthelegacyofDescarteswhichhereiscelebrated.Personalismisnotamererestatementofthecogito,anabsolutizationofthesubject.Itsstressisnotontheindividualego,notonthethinkingorwillingsubject.Scheler'spersonisatranscendentalunityofactswithintheworld.Beyondunderstandingintermsofsimply"subject,"intheCartesianorevenHusserliansense,thepersonisinseparablefromthecontextoftheworldandothers.

2Allthisisreminiscentofcurrentinterpretationsofmanyoftheoldesttraditionsofpoliticalthought.Aristotlereferstomanasapoliticalanimal,asazoonpolitikon.IntheNicomacheanEthicsandthePolitics,hepresentspoliticsasapracticalaffairofpersonswithinthepolis,personswhotherebyshareacommonperceptionandacommonsphereofexperience.Personsarefullpersonsonlyinlightofthissharedperspectiveandinlightoftheirembeddednessinthepractical,politicalworld.Thepracticeofpoliticsenablesthedevelopment,the"becoming,"ofthepersonandthepolisitself.Beyondtheembraceofthispracticalrealm,thepersonisanimpossibility.Beyondthepolis,asAristotlestates,therecouldexistonlybeastsorgods.Althoughtprofoundlydifferentinotherregards,thepersonalismofMaxScheler,aspoliticaltheory,revealsasimilarsensitivityforpoliticsaspraxis.Neithergodnorbeast,thepersonisseenneitherasstandingabovethecontextofeverydayexistencenoraswhollyidentifiedwiththiscontext.Thepersonismanifestlyapracticalbeingofthepracticalworld.

Ifpersonalismaspoliticaltheory,however,isreminiscentofpolitics

aspraxisintheclassicalsense,itismorethanmerelyareinterpretationoftheancienttheories.TheclassicalconceptionisvastlyandqualitativelyalteredinScheler'spersonalisminatleasttwoverybasicregards.First,althoughthepersonisneverconsideredintermsoftheindividualego,theconceptneverthelessincorporatescertainemphasesonthepersonasdevelopedintheJudeo-ChristianandWesternhumanisttraditions.Second,thepersoninScheler'sthoughtmustbeperceivedasessentiallyandexistentiallyahistoricalbeing.Whilesomewhatevidencedinclassicalthought,theconsiderationgiventhesepointsinScheler'sphilosophyissuchthathisunderstandingofthepersonissubstantiallydifferent.InthefirstisrevealedwhatSchelerwouldrefertoastheinherentdignityoftheperson.Inthesecond,theperson'sindividualandsocialdevelop-

mentinhistoryislentaradicallydeeperexistentialcontextthanthepoliticalanimalofAristotle,whilebeingatthesametimelessthanthefullpoliticalagentAristotleportrayed.Moredeeplyincarnatewithinthecontextoftheexistentialandhistoricalworldthantheancientsbelieved,inScheler'sestimationthepersonisalsopossessedofadignityderivedfromextra-politicalsources.

Wheretheancients'understandingisradicallyantitheticaltomodernparadigmofpolitics,personalismaspoliticaltheoryonlyintensifiestheantitheses.Inthepersonalistandtheclassicalconception,politicsandpersonsarereciprocally"grounded."Morethansymbioticallyinterrelated,personandpolityattaintheirrespectivefullrealitiesonlyasaspectsofaprocessofbecominginwhichbothpartake.Atrulypoliticallifeisthusacommunionofpersons,andpersonsemergeonlywithinthepracticesanddiscoursesofpoliticallife.Inlosingsight,therefore,ofeitherthepersonorthetrulypoliticallife,whatpassesforeitherisneither.ThisispreciselythechargewhichSchelerraisesagainstpoliticalthoughtofthemodernera;moreimplicitly,thisisalsothechargeinherentinthenatureofclassicalpoliticalthoughtandthecontemporaryturntowardpraxis.IfAristotleiscorrect,thelossofpolityandpersonleavesonlybeastsand"gods."

ThedominantvarietiesofmodernpoliticaltheorydolittletodisconfirmtheimplicationsdrawnfromAristotle.Politicsandpersonsinmodernpoliticaltheories,asiffollowingthedivisionbetweenthethinkingsubjectandtheextendedworldelaboratedduringthetransitiontomodernthought,aredeniedgroundsforthefundamentallinkagewhichisvitalintheunderstandingoftheancients,inSchelerianphilosophy,andintheturntowardpraxis.Asaresult,modernpoliticalthoughtpreponderantlypresentsbothpoliticsandpersonseitherinisolationfromthecontextofexistenceorincompletesubmergencewithinthiscontext.Thepoliticaltheoriesoftherationalists,voluntaristsandromanticistspicturethepoliticalactor

andhisactionsasendowedwithalmostgodlikefreedomfromcontingentconstraintsonreason,orwill,orhistory.Whethertheactorinsuchvisionsispossessedofareasoningabletotranscendthelimitsofthebodyanditssituationintimeandplaceorofawillsimilarlyaccoutered,itisagreedherethatmanissomehow,insomepart,greaterthanhistory,greaterthannatureandgreaterthanthedemandsofthehereandnow.Inlikefashion,naturalism,historicismandnihilismareconstruedinpoliticaltheorieswherethe"praxis"senseofpoliticsislostinamorassofdifferingcontingenciesandcausalities,where

thepoliticalactorandhisactionsareundifferentiatedfromtherhythmsofthesurroundingworldnatural,historicalorontological.Naturalism,thus,reducestheactorandhisactionstotheinteractionsofhormonesorenzymes,ecosystemstimuliorgenetics.Historicismfindstheactorandhisactionstobeparticularmanifestationsresultantfromtheexperiencesofindividualpsychologicaldevelopment,orgroupstandingsandtraditions,ormoreindistinctfeaturesofsocialandindividualhistory.Nihilism,theultimatereduction,effectivelyerasesthesignificanceofbothactorandactionbyequatingbothwithnothingness.Itseems,therefore,asinterpretedinpoliticaltheories,thegeneralcurrentsinmodernconceptionsofhumanactivityhavebeenaseriesofrejectionsofthepracticalcharacterofpolitics;theireffecthasbeenablindingtotherealityofpoliticsasanactingwithintheworld.

Morecurrently,thecuttingedgeofresearchintheinvestigationandappraisalofthesphereofhumanactivityliesinwhatisvariouslycalled"post-structuralism,""deconstruction,"and,generally,"anti-humanism.''Scheler'sdeepandpervasiveconcernwiththeperson,withlifeandspirit,wouldsurelyfindasuspiciousreceptionamongsuchwriters.Chargedwiththeall-importanttaskofchartingaresponsiblecoursebetweentheScyllaofsubjectivityandtheCharybdisofobjectivity,thequaintSchelerianconcernwithcomprehendingtheproblematicwhichismaninthecontemporaryagemaybelostuponsuchwriterswhoseever-narrowerandmoremundanevisionsofontologyleavescantroomfor"man'splaceinthecosmos."Scheler,however,isdeservingofgenuineattention.Tobesure,hetakeshisfirstandfinalbearingsfromwhatishumanandpersonal,andheadmitsthata"conclusionastothetrueattributesoftheultimatesourceofallthingscanonlybedrawnbystartingfromthepictureoftheessenceofman."

3Perhapsinsodoinghesteerstoocloselytothemaelstromofsubjectivity.However,thereisnoneofNarcissus'vanityinScheler'sapproach;heseekstorevealmaninthefullrangeofhisexistenceandpromise.Terminghisphilosophythe"openhand,"aveiledallusionperhapstoNietzsche'sclosedone,Schelerpainstakinglyendeavorstoclarifyandcontinuallyreclarifytheimageofmaninhistotality.4Attheveryleast,Scheler'sisaquietremindertothosechargedwiththeall-importanttaskofourtimesthatthereremaintwowhirlpoolssubjectivismandobjectivism.Heholdsoutthepossibilityofamodeofinquiryandconcernregardingmanandman'sconditionwhichcouldbemorethana

systemofcloakedandfurtivemanipulation.Inaneraheldhostagetotheall-too-humanthreatofanendtomanandhistory,Schelergentlyshakesusfromanybemusedfascinationwithnotionsthatourresponsibilitiesaresomehowotherthanourresponsibilities.

Thesesentimentsunderscorethepurposeofthisstudy,apurposewhichaspirestomorethanSchelerianscholarship.Thesubtitleofthestudy,"MaxScheler'sPersonalismasPoliticalTheory,"capturestheprimaryfocusofitsresearch,butitdoesnotwellconveytheinterpretivequalityofthework.ThestudyisnotareviewoftheideologicalpositionstakenbySchelerinhisfewpoliticalessays,norarepresentationofhispoliticalphilosophy,suchasitis.Rather,itisanattempttotakehis"personalism"asabasisforacontemporarytheoryofpoliticsonewhichstandsatsomedistancefrommodernliberalism,conservativismandMarxism,bothintheirbourgeoisandEnlightenmentvarieties.

Thispersonalism,moreover,doesnoteasilyfindaplacewiththephilosophieswhichthehistoryofphilosophyhaslumpedundertherubricofthatlabel.Itisverymuchunlikethepersonalismofmedievalscholasticismand,despiteintriguingaffinities,unliketheexistentialistpersonalismofMounier,Marcel,Camusandthelike.Scheler'spersonalismhasitsrootsinthatsame,richadmixtureoflifephilosophyandphenomenologywhichgaverisetoMartinHeidegger'searlyphilosophy.ItisaphilosophicalanthropologyfoundedonScheler'sownrealistphenomenology,sociologyofknowledgeandnon-formalethics.Inthisstudy,theattempthasbeenmadetointerpretScheler'sconceptofPersonaconceptakintoHeidegger'sDaseinandNietzsche's"willtopower"asthecornerstoneforafreshunderstandingofpoliticalsubjectandobject,thepolisandthetheoryandpracticeofpolitics.Itsconclusionpositsthepossibilityofa"post-modern"politicswhichturnsontheinestimablevalueandnon-objectifiabledignityofthehumanperson.

AlthoughthestudyfindsinpersonalismaspoliticaltheoryatsomeoddswithspecificpoliticalpositionstakenbyMaxScheler,itnonethelessadherestightlytohisphilosophyinspiritandmethod.Scheler'sthinkingcomesatacrucialturningpointinWesternintellectualhistoryanditsimpact,asaresult,hasbeenfar-reaching.AmongsocialandpoliticaltheoristshisinfluenceextendstowritersasdiverseasDietrichvonHildebrand,MauriceMerleau-Ponty,KarolWojtyla,JürgenHabermasandErnstBlock.MartinHeideggeracclaimedhimasoneoftheforemostphilosophersoftheage,amost

potentphilosophicalforce,andanintellectofthefirstmagnitude.

5HannahArendt,EricVoegelin,Hans-GeorgGadamer,CarlFriedrich,HerbertMarcuseandAlfredSchutzalltestifytothelastingvalueScheler'sthoughthasofferedtheirownworkandtotheprofoundimpacthewieldeduponthatmarvelousgenerationofthinkerswhichgerminatedbetweenthewarsinGermanuniversities.Inanindirectmanner,thisstudyjoinsanemergingrenaissanceofinterestinScheler'swork,arenaissanceevidentfromtherebirthofpoliticaltheoryinPoland,totheturntolanguageandphilosophicalanthropologyamongcriticaltheorists,totherenewedinterestofsocialscientistsinphenomenologyandthesociologyofknowledge.

Yet,theintentofthisresearchisnotsomuchtoreintroducepoliticaltheorytotheinsightsofMaxScheler'sthoughtasitistosuggestthefundamentalsofanewpoliticaltheory.Indeed,insodoing,certainlimitationstoScheler'spersonalismbecomeevident.Troublingambiguitiesareuncoveredwhichraisevexingdifficultiesforpersonalismas"political"theory.Thestudyconcludesbyaddressingtheseambiguities,reconsideringtroublingaspectsofScheler'spersonalismandbrieflyoutlininggroundsforpossibleresolution.Still,thecoreofthispersonalisttheorytheinestimablevalue,intersubjectivecharacterandnon-objectifiabilityofthehumanpersonremainsregardedasaworthyandevenrequisitestartingpointforanewpoliticsandpoliticalvision.

PerhapsScheleroughtnotbeapproached,therefore,asacuriousspecimeninabottle.Thatis,heoughtnotbelabelledphenomenologist,orLebensphilosoph,orproto-existentialist,orphilosophicalanthropologist,andlockedintotheappropriateshelfinthecabinetofthehistoryofideas.Rather,thebestofScheler'sfarseeingthoughtoughttobetaken-up,criticallyconsideredand

therebyreanimatedinthediscourseofpresentdaypoliticaltheory.This,atleast,istheauthor'shope.Yet,itseemsthatMartinHeideggerwasmorepropheticthananywouldhavebelievedwhen,inamemoriallecturewithindaysofScheler'suntimelydeathin1928,hespoke:"MaxSchelerisdead.Webowourheadsbeforehisdestiny.Yetagain,awayofphilosophyfallsintodarkness."6ThepresienceofHeidegger'seulogyisincontestableinretrospect.Sadly,althoughmanywouldconcurwithHeidegger'sremarkswhichdesignatedScheleras"themostpotentphilosophicalpowerinpresentdayGermanynay,inpresentdayEuropeeveninallofcontemporaryphilosophy,"hisworksfellintothedarknessoftheensuingyears.7Jewishonhismother'sside,theelectionandcapturingofpowerby

theNationalSocialistssawScheler'sworksplacedundercensorandsawscholarshiponSchelerresearchprohibited.Scheler'slibrary,correspondence,andmanyofhisunpublishedmanuscriptsweredestroyedbytheBritishaerialbombardmentofColognein1944.

8Althoughtheworldmoretheneverconfirmedhissuspicionsregardingthefailureofmodernsocietiesandpolitics,Scheler'sownpenetratinginsightsintothesemattershavebeenonlyslowlyrediscovered.9

Inpart,too,perhapstheslowrediscoveryofScheler'sthoughtreflectsthehistoricaltenorofhisworks.Pre-eminentlyaphilosopherandintellectualofengagement,heisembroiledintheturbulenceoftheWeimaryears.BornnearMunichin1874,hismotherwasJewishandcloselyrelatedwiththemostprominentMunichJewishfamiliesoftheperiod.10Hisfather,aProtestantfromanagriculturalbackgroundwhohadpreviouslymanagedaHungarianestatebelongingtoBavarianroyalty,hadbythetimetheyoungSchelerknewhimexperiencedseverefinancialsetbacksandwaslivingouthisdaysinacloudofresigneddespondency.Scheler,asaresult,wasapparentlyraisedasaJewbyhisdotingmotherintheMunichhomeofherbrother.Somewhatundisciplinedinschool,duringhisGymnasiumyearsSchelerattendedvariousspecialinstitutionswhichhadreputationsforworkingwiththespoiledandlazy.

HisuniversityeducationwasbegunatMunichwiththestudyofpsychologyandphilosophy.Withinthefirstyearofhisstudiesheswitchedtothefieldofmedicine.Ostensiblytocontinuehismedicalstudies,SchelertransferredtoBerlinin1895,thoughitnowseemsapparentthatromanticinterestsplayedalargepartinthisdecision.Curiously,(andfortunatelyforphilosophyandpoliticaltheory)itwasnotthepursuitofmedicalknowledge,butphilosophyandsociology

thatbecamethefocusofhisstudiesatthistime.AlthoughBerlinduringthisperiodwasgraduallybecomingmorethanaPrussiancapitalandwasbeginningtoacquirethecosmopolitanambienceofanimportantinternationalmetropolis,itwasatthesametimeincreasinglyacquiringthemoregloomyaspectsofmodernity.ThestarkcontrastbetweentheBerlinof1900andScheler'sMunichmustcertainlyhavemadeastrongimpressiononhisappraisalofhisera,formal"Prussianisms"coupledwiththebrightestanddarkestoftheindustrialrevolutionversusGemütlichkeitandtradition.Attheuniversity,theairwasladenwiththeintoxicationofintellectualferment,althoughsuchfermentseemstohaveonlypartlypermeatedtheinstituteofphilosophy.WhilethelecturesofDiltheyandSimmelappeartohavemadealifelongimpressionontheyoungScheler,

WilhelmSternandothershavereportedthatthedriestoflogicalanalysisandMachian-stylepositivismdominatedthephilosophicalatmosphereofBerlinatthisperiod.

11Itislittlesurprising,therefore,whenafterthreeyearsinBerlinSchelertransferredtothesmalluniversitytownofJena,whereunderthelifephilosopher,RudolfEucken,hecompletedhisstudies.ThestudyofphilosophyinJenaatthisperiodwasvaguelydividedandinter-mixedwithEucken'sspirituallifephilosophyononehandandOttoLiebman's"backtoKant"Kantianismontheother.Additionally,RudolfSteinerandhismysticismwerealsosomesmallpartoftheJenaintellectualatmosphere,aswerethelegaciesofGoetheandHegel.Eucken'sinfluenceonthedevelopmentofScheler'sthoughtisunmistakeable,althoughSchelerhesitatedbutafewyearsbeforebreakingwithmanyofthetranscendentalaspectsofhisteacher'sthought.

Scheler'sdoctoralthesisunderEucken,BeiträgezurFestellungderBeziehungenzwischendenlogischenundethischenPrinzipien,primarilycontendsthatalthoughlogicandethicsarecorrelativeandparallelindirection,theyarenonethelessnotinterdependent,butmutuallyindependent.12WhilethispositionislaterrejectedbyScheler,hisunderstandingofthe"extra-rational"intuitionofvalueswhichisfundamentalinhissubsequentlydevelopedethicaltheoryisembryonicallyevidentineventhisearlywork.FollowingcompletionofhisdoctoralthesisatJena,SchelerstudiedforayearatHeidelberg,workingonhisHabilitationschriftandgainingacloseacquaintancewithMaxWeber'sculturalstudies.EvidencingWeber'sinfluence,Scheler'sfirstpublishedwork,"ArbeitundEthik,"alsodemonstratesthedirectioninwhichhisthoughtwastravelingi.e.,towardunderstandingcognitionandrationalevaluationamidstacontextof

concretehumanpractices.13AlthoughlessborneoutinhisHabilitationschrift,thepublishingofwhichallowedSchelertoreturntoJenain1899asateacherunderEucken,evenwiththisworkitisevidentthatSchelerisgraduallydistancinghimselffrommoreKantianelementsincorporatedinEucken'sownphilosophy.14EntitledDietranszendentaleunddiepsychologischeMethode,theworkdemonstratesthegrowingrejectionofpsychologismcommonamonganumberofphilosophersofthisperiod,butitalsorevealsamodestretrenchmentfromEucken'sconceptofman'stranscendentalfreedomfromanymeasureofpsychicdetermination.Theimportantyear1899alsomarksashort-livedconversiontoCatholicismandasubsequentmarriageinMunichtotheolder,divorcedwomanwithwhomhehadbeenromanticallyinvolvedinhisearliermovetoBerlin.

Scheler'sturninthedirectionofunderstandingmanwithinthecontextofman'spracticeswasgreatlyintensifiedin1901withhismeetingEdmundHusserlataKantSocietygatheringhostedbyHansVaihingerinHalle.Herebeginshisphenomenology.AlthoughthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenSchelerandHusserlwillbeconsideredinsubstantialdetailinlaterpages,thephenomenologicalsenseof"intentionality"andthegeneralfocus"onthethingsthemselves"obviouslyaugmentedandsupplementedScheler'sgrowinginclinations.Infact,SchelerclaimstohavemovedtowardphenomenologyindependentlyofandpriortohisacquaintancewithHusserl'sphenomenology.

15Regardless,itwaswiththerecommendationofHusserlin1907thatSchelerwasofferedandacceptedapositioninphilosophyattheuniversityinMunich.HerehejoinedacircleofyoungscholarsundertheauspicesofTheodorLipps,includingAlexanderPfänder,MoritzGeigerandTheodorConrad,whowereattemptingto"do"philosophyalongthelinesofHusserl'searlyworks.DietrichvonHildebrand,whowithHedwigConrad-MartiusandHerbertLeyendeckershuttledbetweenHusserlinGöttingenandtheMunichcircle,notesofthisperiodthatSchelermovedlikeanenchanteramongthegroup,entrancingtheyoungerscholarsandolderstudentswithhisextemporaneousbrillianceandspellbindinglectureswhileantagonizinghissuperiorswithhislackofdisciplineandundiplomaticuniversitybehavior.16Scheler'scareeratMunichwasendedabruptlywhenvariousscandalsinhisprivatelifepromptedthestaidandreligiousuniversitytorevokehistenureonthegroundsofimmorality.17

Followinghisdismissal,SchelerwentfirsttoHusserl'scircleatGöttingenandthenbackagaintoBerlin.Theyearsinassociationwith

thephenomenologicalcircleatGöttingenandtheliteraryandpoliticalcommunitiesinBerlinwereamongthemostproductiveandcreativeofhislife.IncludingvonHildebrand,AdolfReinach,RomanIngarden,AlexandreKoyre,RudolfClemensandEdithStein,itwasinconjunctionwithhisassociationwiththeyoungGöttingenphenomenologistsofthisperiodthatthemajorthemesofhisphilosophyandmuchofhissocialandpoliticaltheorybegantotakeshape.EvenaftermovingtoBerlin,takingapositionwithanintellectualjournal,hecontinuedtoreturnperiodicallytotheGöttingengroup.Atthesametime,Scheler'slifeinBerlinbroughthimincontactwiththerisingpoliticalintelligentsiaoftheperiod,establishingacquaintancewithWaltherRathenau,WernerSombartandanumberofcenterandleft-liberalfigures.InlargeparthisexperiencesinBerlinbeforetheoutbreakoftheFirstWorldWarsetthestageforhis

sociologicalandanthropologicalphilosophyduringtheWeimaryears.

Scheler'sproductivityduringtheseyearsatBerlinandGöttingenwasunflagging.Coupledwithhisfree-lanceworkwithvariousjournalsandhisnowoftenoverlookedco-editorshipoftheJahrbuchfürPhänomenologieundphänomenologischeForschungthesheeroutputisstaggering.Threeparticularworksareespeciallyworthyofconsideration:Ressentiment,TheNatureofSympathy,andFormalisminEthicsandNon-FormalEthicsofValues;theyrepresentthegreatrangeofScheler'sinterests.

18Thefirst,Ressentiment,standsatthethresholdofhismorephenomenologicalsubsequentworks.StillundertheinfluenceofDilthey,Euckenandthelifephilosophies,SchelerseemstocombinesuchanalyseswithWernerSombart'sand,tosomeextent,FriedrichNietzsche'spathologicalinvestigationsofthephenomenaofmodernity.Althoughphenomenology(andthephenomenologicalmethod)pervadesthework,itremainsverymuchinthebackgroundorisutilizedasaposteriorijustificationforotherinsights.TheNatureofSympathy,thesecondmajorworkofthisperiod,marksahighpointinScheler'sphenomenology.Here,inthoroughandrigorousfashion,Schelerconsidersthephenomenonofsympathy,reviewsvariousinterpretationsofthephenomenon,andconcludesthatsympathyitselfisinsufficientgroundsforethicsand(implicitly)politics.Intheprocess,itisrevealedthatsympathyrestsontologicallyandepistemologicallyuponsomethingdeeper,whichheterms"love."Perhapshismostwidelyknownwork,FormalisminEthicsandNon-FormalEthicsofValues,representsScheler'seffortsphenomenologicallytoexplorevaluesandtheirorder.Onthebasisofthisexploration,Schelerisabletodemonstratethedeficienciesofallformal(i.e.,Kantian)ethicsandrevealthepossibilityofanethicsbasedonobjective,perceivedvalues.

TheoutbreakofthefirstworldwarbroughtScheler'sthoughtstoawiderpopularaudience,initiallyasastrongapologistfortheGermanwareffort.Rejectedforactivemilitaryserviceduetohisageandeyesight,heworkedasareservewithanartilleryunitandlatertookapositionasapropagandistwiththediplomaticcorpswithwhichheservedinGenevaandTheHague.DerGeniusderKriegundderDeutscheKrieg,amilitaristicandchauvanisticpasticheofanti-bourgeois,anti-Englishandanti-"West"ruminations,representswhatisclearlythelowestpointofScheler'sintellectuallife.19Inpublishingthework,Scheler,moreover,alienatedapacifistcircleofacquaintancesinBerlin,includingMartinBuberandMaxBrod.It

cannotbesaid,unfortunately,thatthisworkiswithoutsomelooselinkagestohisearlierworks.InpassagessimilartomanyofNietzsche's,helaudsthevitalityandauthenticityofthewarriorasagainstthemanipulationsandrancorousvindictivenessoftheshopkeeper.ThewarispraisedasapurifyingstruggletoridEuropeofbourgeois,especiallyEnglish,pleonexie.By1915,asevidencedinKriegundAufbau,aturningpointwasreachedinScheler'sconsiderationofthewar.

20NolongerdoesheportraythestruggleassomesortofdialecticalprocessthroughwhichtheGermanspiritwouldemergevictoriousoverthebourgeoisdecadenceofBritainorsuffocatingorthodoxyofRussia.Rather,hefindsthewartobeatragicresultofthemoralandspiritualbankruptcyofWesternman.Theonlyglimmerofhopetobefoundinthehorrorofthiswar,maybeintheopportunityrevealedforthereconstructionofWesternculture.ForSchelerthisopportunitywasthechanceforarenewedEuropeanunity,mirroringtheunityofpre-reformationandpre-bourgeoisEuropeunderthesolidarityofChristianity.

AlthoughsuchthinkingpervadesScheler'swork,atthistimeitseemslikelytohavebeeninfluencedbyhisrapprochementwithhissubsequentre-conversiontoCatholicismattheBenedictineabbeyofBeuronin1916.Thisbeginsthe"Catholic"periodofhisthought,whichsawhisreturntoacademia,acceptingthedirectorshipoftheInstitutefortheSocialSciencesandaprofessorshipinsociologyandphilosophyatColognein1918.HisworksofthisperiodendorsemuchofCatholicdogmaandtheologyalbeitmoreAugustinianthanThomisticandappealforChristianunityasthebasisforatransformationoftheEuropeanspirit.Politically,suchthemesweremanifestedinhisendorsementoftheyouthmovementsandinhis

theoreticalforaysintointriguingconceptssuchasChristiansocialismanddemocracy.Hismajortheologicalwork,OntheEternalinMan,appearsroughlyatthemiddleofthisperiod.21Althoughthemajorportionoftheworkelaboratestheconceptofthepersonintheologicaltermsi.e.,man'spersonandGod'sperson,italsotreatsthesociologicalquestionofreligion,andcontainskeyessaysintothenatureofphilosophyandintothepossibilityofEuropeanspiritualrebirth.Histhinkingofthisperiod,however,soonchafedunderthestricturesofCatholicteachings.Ledbyhismostpenetratingeffortstocomprehendthecharacterofpersonswithinthecontextofthesocialandmaterialworld,hegrewmoreandmorecriticalofwhatheperceivedastheCatholicdoctrineofthesufficiencyandefficacyofman'ssoulorspirit.Formallybreakingwiththereligionin1923,

friendsandacquaintancesreporttheprofoundagonizingandemotionalturmoilprecedingScheler'scarefullyconsidereddecision.

22

AsinBerlin,Scheler'stenureinColognesawhimengagedinthegeneralintellectuallifeofthecityanditsuniversity.HeestablishedcloserelationshipstherewiththetheologiansPaulTillichandRomanoGuardini,andwiththeliterateurErnstRobertCurtius.Scheler'scircleattheuniversityincludedthephenomenologistandmetaphysician,PeterWust,andacademicssuchasvonWeiseandDriesch.Inthecafesandnightclubs,chain-smokingcigaretteaftercigarettedespitehisphysician'sorderstothecontrary,hefrequentedthecompanyofartistsandliterati,fromOttoDixwhopaintedhiswell-knownportraittoRainerMariaRilkeandRomainRolland.23Histhoughtbegantobranchmoresystematicallyintocultural,political,sociologicalandanthropologicalquestions.Searchingfortheontologicalandmetaphysicalfoundationsofmanhestrainedagainsttheconfinesofmereepistemologyand,hence,againstbordersofatleastHusserlianphenomenology.Theyear1925sawthepublicationofDieWissenformenunddieGesellschaft,whichincorporatedananalysisoftherealandidealstructuresofsocietyinhistorywithapowerfulrevelationoftheexistentialgroundsforcognitionandreason.24Thethrustofhisinquiryintothesetopicsculminatedinhisuncompletedphilosophicalanthropology.Awareofhisdeclininghealth,thephilosophicalanthropologyofhislastyearswashisefforttodrawtogetherthewholeofhisintellectualendeavorsundertherubricofwhathetermedonoccation"meta-anthropology."Sharplyawareofacontinuingerosionofthegroundsofmetaphysicsandphilosophyinthecurrentsofintellectualinquiry,andoftheerosionoftheprivilegedplaceofthehumansubject,Scheler'sworkwasintendedtooutlinetheindisputablegrounduponwhichmencouldalwaysanduniversally

relythecertitudeofman'sownrealitywithintherealityoftheworld.Hence,althoughhimselfchangingthetitleofhislastpublishedworkfromDieSonderstellungdesMenschenimKosmos(The"Special"PlaceofManintheCosmos)toDieStellungdesMenschenimKosmos(ThePlaceofManintheCosmos),heholdsoutthepossibilityofameta-anthropologyforthemetaphysicswhichheperceivedassonecessaryforourtimes.25

In1928,shortlyafterbeingcalledtoanewchairattheuniversityinFrankfurt,Schelerdiedofheartdiseaseattheageof54.Hewasinterredwithouthisbrain,whichwassavedforscientificstudyofhumangenius.

ChapterOnePhenomenologyandOntology

HistoricalAndIntellectualBackgroundOfScheler'sThought

Inaccordancewithhiscontentionthatideasaremerefancieswithouttheirembodimentwithinrealforcesinlifeandhistory,MaxScheler'sthoughtneedstobeseenfromtheperspectiveofitssituationinitstime.

26FortheheightofScheler'slifeandwork,thissituationinWeimarGermany:aheady,intoxicatingmelangeofculturalandintellectualrenaissance,restorationandradicalness.FromthevantageofthehistoryofideasthescantdecadeandahalfbetweentheconclusionofthehostilitiesoftheFirstWorldWarandthefirststepstowardthesecondisaperiodofincrediblecreativeactivity.Itrepresentsboththehighpointofthe"turntowardman,"anunderstandingwhichitselfbeginsinasimilarepochofintellectualtumultsomefourcenturiespreviously,andaturningpointawayfromatleasttheexcessesofthissameman-centeredunderstanding.Weimarthusmarksawatershedformankind'sunderstandingofitself,thecosmosandman'splacewithinit.Whereasinthatearlierepochanunderstandingofrealityintermsofdivineprovidenceisgraduallytransformedintoadifferentvisionwhichsawthehumansubjectasitsfoundation,sotoobeginningwithWeimaraturningpointisreachedforthissamevision,whichwouldseemtobeunleashinganewunderstanding.ForeshadowedinHegelandtheabsolutespirit,inMarx'smaterialdialectic,inNietzsche'soverman,inpragmatismandhistoricism,itisinWeimarGermanymostclearlyevidentthattheman-centeredunderstandingreachesitscriticalmassandatwhichpointsomenewperceptionbeginstoevergeinitsownright.Thehumansubject,as

Godinthepreviousepoch,isgraduallyshakenfromitsprivilegedroleastheultimateandindubitablefoundationforknowing,doingandbeing.

Theresultantconfusiononlyservestounderscorethepervasiveexperienceof"alienation"and"homelessness"whichcharacterizes

notonlyWeimarGermany,butwhichhasbecomethecentral,evenunifying,experienceofthe''post-modern"period.Shakenfromhisprivilegedplace,wherenowisman,whatishispurpose,who,indeed,ishe?Capturingsowellthiscontemporaryproblematicinhisoft-quotedremark,Schelerexclaimsthat"wearethefirstageinwhichmanhasbecomeutterlyandunconditionally'problematic'tohimself,inwhichhenolongerknowswhoheis,butatthesametimeknowsthathedoesnotknow."

27

SketchingtheplaceofMaxSchelerandhisthoughtinthisjumbleofoldandnew,certitudeanduncertainty,isnoeasytask.Overthespanofhislife,histhinkingmustbeseenasagrowingandreflectiveexercise,notasastatic,dogmaticsystem.Histhinkinginregardtoanumberoffundamentalpointsundergoessubtlechangesofemphasisandoutrightreversal.28Intheturbulentintellectualstormsoftheera,however,onecannotsimplyperceiveScheler'sphilosophyandsocialtheoryaskitesbuffetedtoandfrointheprevailingbreezesassomehavesuggested.29Ratherheepitomizeshistimeandbetraysanuncannyknackforbeingeveratthelocusofgreatestuncertainty,atthefrictiousborderbetweentheoldandnewvisionsofreality.Alwaysatthecenterofthemaelstrom,Schelerandhisthoughtdefyassignationwithineithertheoldortheasyetshroudedandunchartednewunderstanding.Stumblingonoccasion,hewalkstheperilousridgebetweenNietzsche'scelebrated"lastmen"andbeingthe"firstmanofgenius,theAdamofthenewParadise"asOrtegayGassetdesignateshim.30

AmongthemanyinfluencesinScheler'sintellectualdevelopment,threeroughlygroupedcurrentsappeartobemostdominant:Lebensphilosophie(philosophyoflife),phenomenologyandtheso-

called"revivalofmetaphysics."Tosomeextenttheprogressionofhisthoughtmightbedividedifonlyconceptuallyalongtheselinesintoperiodswherevariouscombinationsoftheseelementsmarktheprevailingcharacterofhiswork.TheperiodpriortohistransfertoMunich,hisearlyperiod,canbeseenaspredominantlyconcernedwiththeagendaofthelifephilosophies,andtoalesserextentwithEucken'smetaphysics.Hismiddleperiod,followinghisexposuretophenomenologyandhisacquaintancewiththeMunichcircle,couldbesimilarlyseenasonedominatedbyphenomenologyandtheuseofthephenomenologicalmethod.Astheworksofthisperiodindicates,however,thereremainsavitalconcernwiththecertainmetaphysicalquestionsevenatthepeakofhisinterestinphenomenology.Finally,inthesociologyofknowledgeandphilosophicalanthropologyofhis

lastperiod,Schelersomehowincorporatesallthreeelementsratheruniquelyandevenlyinhisthinking:lifephilosophy,phenomenologyandmetaphysics.Allthreeelementsareattheminimumnascentlypresentineachperiodofhisintellectualdevelopment.Eveninregardtophenomenology,thereisevidencesupportingScheler'sclaimthathewasreachingoutinthedirectionofphenomenologypriortohismeetingwithHusserl.

31Obviouslyaswell,thesethreeintellectualcurrentscanhardlybeconceivedas"schools"ordistilledintocanonicalcoresofpreceptsandtenets.Moreproperly,lifephilosophy,phenomenologyandtherivivalofmetaphysicsappearasadhocconstellationsofthinkersgroupedaroundcommonconcerns.Furthermore,therearenounbridgeablefaultlinesbetweenthesedifferentmovements,eveninthemindsoftheirrespectiveadherents.Ambiguousbordersadmitvariouspersonalitiestobeidentifiedwithtwoorallofthemovements.Scheler,thus,isfarfromaloneinacknowledginganambiguousstandingwithineachofthecurrents.

Lebensphilosophie

Thephilosophyoflifeisperhapsthemostnebulousandleastfocusedofthemovements.Underitselasticcanopy,writersasdiverseasFriedrichNietzsche,HenriBergson,WilhelmDiltheyandRudolfEuckencanbegroupedeachofwhomareprofoundlyinfluentialinthedevelopmentandbackgroundofScheler'sthought.32Broadly,lifephilosophy,asillustratedintheworksofthesethinkers,affirmsthefundamentalroleof"livedexperience"incontrasttotheformalismofpurereasonandthepassivityofrationalknowing.Itemphasizesthelife-basedconceptsofgrowth,development,evolutionanddynamism.Realityispicturedinwhatcanonlybecalledan"organic"manner,undergoingadevelopmentalprocess.Tosomeextentthisreflectsan

oftenunacknowledgedHegelianinfluence;or,asHans-GeorgGadamerremarksinspecificreferencetoDiltheyandNietzsche,itrevealsthatthelifephilosopherscame''toseeHegel'sconceptofmind[Geist]asagenuinelivinghistoricalconcept."33Initsmorevitalisticversions,asinBergson'scelebratedelanvital,roomisgrantedinrealityforapowerful,oftenimpulse-like,lifeprinciplewhichinagrowingprocessstrugglestoovercomeorvivifynon-life.Rejectingthemind-bodydualismofDescartesaswellasKant'snoumena-phenomenadichotomy,lifephilosophystrivestowardachievingareconciliationofallsuchdivisionsintheunityandrealityoftheprocessoflife.34Schelerbeingcloselyfamiliarwiththe

worksandthoughtofeachofthementionedfigures,aconsiderationoftheirthoughtdrawsoutthelegacyoflifephilosophyinhisownwork.

Nietzsche

CalledbyErnstTroeltsch"theCatholicNietzsche"(aboutthetimeofhisconversion),ScheleradmitstohavingstudiedNietzsche'saphoristicworksasearlyashisGymnasiumdays.

35FromhisdoctoraldissertationwherehebrieflywrestleswithNietzsche'scritiqueoftherationalsubject,tothe"ManinHistory"essaywritteninthelastyearofhislifewhereinheexploresNietzsche'sinsightintotheideologyoftheEuropeanideaoftruthwhichisseenasneedingtobeovercomebytheunderstandingoftruthas"willtopower,"SchelerdrawsonNietzscheforthethemes,directionsandpointsofdepartureforhisownworks.36Ressentiment,themajorworkofthetransitionfromhisearlytomiddleperiod,isaprimeexampleoftheutilizationSchelermakesofNietzscheananalysisforhisownends.37HereSchelertakestheNietzscheanconceptionofresentment,thebitterself-poisoningbutrepressedhatredofthelessermanforthegreaterwhichNietzscheseesastherottenfoundationforallWesternandespeciallyChristianmorality,andherevisesNietzsche'sargumenttoconvincinglyillustratethatresentment-basedmoralitydoesnotemergewithChristianityandtheWest,butwiththeappearanceofmodernityandthebourgeois,andultimatelytriumphswiththeriseofmasssociety.Inthemoreapparentstreamofthelifephilosophies,heconcurswithNietzschethatitisinresentmentthatthegeneralthrustofmodernthoughtfindsitsemotionalroots,arguingthat"asecretressentimentunderlieseverywayofthinkingwhichattributescreativepowertomerenegationandcriticism.''38

AlthoughSchelerdiscussesNietzsche'screativityandinsightwithpraisethroughouthisworks,inthefinalanalysisheremainsatsomedistancefromcentralelementsofNietzsche'sthought.Intherejectionofmodernity,SchelercontendsthatNietzscheyetremainscovertlydependentonthemethodologyandmetaphysicsofmodernity.AsSchelerunderstandshim,thefailureofNietzscheliesinhisreductionofthepersonandthesphereofthepersontothestatusofobjectsorepiphenomenaofthenaturalworld.Insodoing,itisimpliedthattheperverseone-sidednessofmodernity'sstressonthetranscendentalsubjectistransformedintoitsmirrorimagei.e.,transformedintoaperverseone-sidednesswhichstressestheobjec-

tivismoftheempiricalsubject.

39BothNietzscheandmodernthought,moreover,arecriticizedforremaininglockedintoanindividualismwhichperceivestheperson,whetherassubjectorobject,solelyasego.ForScheler,thistooisone-sided.Mimickingtheterminologyofotherlifephilosophers,itiscontendedthattheindividualisnotaprimal,isolated,unitoflife;theindividualisaborigineequallyafacetormanifestationofitscommunity,speciesandtheprocessoflifeasawhole.Despitethesefundamentalreservations,SchelerfindsinNietzsche,inconceptsliketheoverman,thetransvaluationofvalues,theanalysisofresentmentandsoforth,theturningpointinthoughtfromwhichheinterpretshisownphilosophical"mission."Inregardparticularlytotheconceptoflifeanditsstatusinreality(whichtransformedintopersonalismandphilosophicalanthropologybecomesthecentralfocusofhisownthinking)Scheleracknowledgeshisfar-reachingindebtednesstoNietzsche'svision.InwordswithwhichSchelermightaswellbedescribinghisownposition,SchelersaysofNietzscheinanearlyessay...

"Life"thisbecomesforNietzsche,inboththeleastandthegreatestforms,somewhatlikeadaringundertaking,ametaphysical"adventure,"abravethrustintothepossibilityofbeingwhichwill,insuccess,firstformitselfintoabeing[diesicherstimGelingenzueinemSeingestalten(wird)]bywhichallpossible"knowing"[Wissen]isperceived.Lifethisistheplacestandingbeforeexistence,withinwhichexistenceandnonexistenceareascertained.Makinguseoftheinexpressible,heloveswithancientfriends,withHeraclitus,theimageoftheflame,theflickeringofwhichdecidestheformwhichisofferedtothewatcher.LikeHeraclitus,Nietzsche'slastwordisalso''becoming,"andtrulylifeisabecominglifeorbetter,lifeiswhollybecoming.40

Bergson

HenriBergsonplaysasimilar,iflesspervasiveroleinthebackgroundoflifephilosophywithinScheler'sthought.Inmanyways,ascontemporaries,itseemsthatthemanyaffinitiesbetweentheirrespectivephilosophiesreflectmorecommonalityofinterestsratherthananythinglike"causal"influence.Yet,clearly,ScheleriscloselyacquaintedandimpressedwiththeworkofBergson.41KeyaspectsofBergson'sthoughtappearinvariousdegressofreinter-

pretationintheworksofScheler.Amongthese,Bergson'sinvestigationsintomatterandspirit,hisso-calledélanvital,hiscritiqueofreasonandsubsequentelaborationoftheconceptofintuition,areperhapstheforemostintheiraffinitywiththemesinScheler'swritings.

GenerallycriticalofBergson'sconceptsandneverfullyacceptinghisanalyses,SchelerreactsmostsharplytoBergson'scritiqueofreasonandtohisturntowardmysticalintuition.ThisisindicativeofScheler'soverallambiguousrelationshipwithmuchofLebensphilosophie.Bergsoncontendsthathumanreasonisanthropologicallydirectedtowardtheexteriorworldofthings.Itdevelopedinthespeciesasafunctionbywhichmanwasabletogainmasteryoverobjectsintheworldinorderthathemightsecurehiscontinuedexistence.Unlikeinstincts,whichestablishastaticpatternofreactiontostimuli,reasonlendsanorganismameasureofflexibilityinrespondingtothedemandsandopportunitiesoftheexteriorworld.Basedonthecharacterofthisevolutionarydevelopment,Bergsoncontendsthatreasonisinherentlydirectedoutwardtowardtheworldasanassemblageofobjectswhichmustbemasteredinorderforreasoninglifetosucceedinliving.Reasonseekstoinformtheactionofanorganismbydrawingknowledgefromwhatisperceivedintheexteriorworld,asopposedtoinstinctwhichinformstheactionofanorganismbyrelayingtheknowledgewhichinheresinlifeitself.Reasonisanactiveacquiringeffort,notapassivetransmissionofknowledge.Becausereasoniseverlookingoutward,however,itisunabletoinanywaytranscendorbecomeindependentofitsintentionalrelationshiptoobjects.Instinct,ontheotherhand,beingmerelyaconduitofgeneticknowledge,islikewiseunabletotranscendandreflectuponitself.Thus,Bergsoncontendsthatthereexistsathirdfunction,"intuition,"whichtranscendstheintentionalityandexteriorityofreasonandtheinteriorityandimmediacyofinstinct.

Intuitionsomehowinformshumanactionswithimmediatecriticalinsightintothefullnessofexperiencedreality,joiningexteriorusefulnesswithinteriorpurpose.

42

ForScheler,curiously,Bergson'serrorisperceivedasbeingoneofnaturalisticreduction,ononehand,andoneofsupernaturalrealism,ontheother.LikeBergson,aswillbeexploredinanothersection,Schelertooseesanintimacybetweenknowingandliving.Hecontends,however,thatBergsonisunabletoshakethepositivistconceptionofmechanicalcausationwhichissharedbytheBritishevolutioniststowhomBergsonwasindebted;and,hemistakenlyfocuses

toonarrowlyonthephenomenonoflife.Bergsonappearstobeclaimingthatreasonisutterlyandsolelyreducibletotheprocessoflifeandlife'smaterialdemands.ThisisanaturalisticreductionisminScheler'sappraisal,promptinghimtowriteofBergson,that"the'intelligence'ofmanisonlyadevelopmentfrommanbeing'homofaber'tohim."

43Thisisanabsolutizingofthelifeconcept,afailuretoseetherichvarietyoffactorsinwhichreason,intelligenceandlogicemerge.History,theobjectsofreason,natureandthevaluesofthesubjectallplayafundamentalpartintheprocessofreasonanditsdevelopment.SchelerobjectstoBergson'sreductionofrealitytothemetaphysicalmonismwhichistermed"life."Moreover,cognition,aSchelerianthemetobeexaminedsubsequently,isitselfnotuniformbutcomprisedofthreeessentialmodesonlyoneofwhich,[Herrschaftswissen]theknowingwhichaimsatdomination,iscontainedinBergson'snotionof"intelligence.''Finally,SchelerrejectsthemysticalovertoneswhichpervadeBergson'sworks.Forcedtoresorttoamystical"intuition"toovercometheinstrumentalrationalityofreason,Bergson,inScheler'sestimation,succumbstoasupernationalrealismwhichcannotbeverifiedeitherphenomenologicallyorempirically.Indeed,inasmuchasintuitionisanoutgrowthitselfoftheprocessoflife,itis"notonlymysticism,butquitequestionablepsychologisticmysticism,inaddition."44WhatknowledgemightbegiveninBergson'sintuitionwouldbeincapableofrisingaboveitsoriginsinthepsychologicallifeprocessesofthehumanorganism.Bergson,Schelercontends,errsbytakinglifeasanimprobableunityofbothsupernaturalandempiricalcharacter,andbyseekingtocomprehendthetotalityofmanfromtheperspectiveofthesinglefactor"life."Hearguesthatallisnotcontained,explainedorunderstoodintermsoflife;thevaluesoflifeareneitherthebasisforallothers,northemostsublime.

Dilthey

WilhelmDiltheymoredirectlyshapesthebackgroundofScheler'sthinking.StudyingunderhimatBerlin,SchelerincorporateskeyDiltheyanconceptsratherdirectlyintohisownphilosophy,sociologyandpoliticaltheory.Ofsuchconcepts,threeareespeciallyrelevantforpresentconcerns:theconceptionofexperiences[Erlebnisse]anditsrelationshiptoknowledgeandaction,theunderstandingofhistoryandcultureinworld-views,andtheconceptionofresistanceasthemostprimalexperienceofreality.Lessovertly,Scheler'sappraisalof

thecharacterofthenaturalsciences,theculturalsciencesandphilosophyalsowouldappeartoowemuchtotheoveralltenorofDilthey'sinvestigationsinthesameareas.HeisforthrightinhisacknowledgmentofthegeniusofDilthey,andoftheprofoundinfluenceexercisedbyDilthey'sresearchonhisownthought.Noting,timeandagain,thestrongsimilaritybetweenhisownWesensanschauung(insightintoessence)andDilthey'srenownedWeltanschauung(insightintoaworld),Scheleratonepointrefersto"thepioneeringgeniusofWilhelmDiltheyandhisschool"asattemptingtorevealbymeansofa"phenomenologicaldoctrineofworld-views,"phenomenologicallyclarified"structuresoflivedexperiencerelativetoaparticularepoch"whichwouldserveasthegenuinebasisfortheculturalsciences.

45

ThegistofDilthey'sthoughtcanbeinferredfromthesharedconcernboththinkersevidenceinregardtotheculturalsciences.Heseesmanasalivingbeingwhichonthebasisofthepossessionofspirit[Geist]isnolongerabletoexistprereflectivelywithintheunityofnature.Man's"nature"is,therefore,theworldofhiscultureandhistory.Bymeansofthisbifurcationbetweenthenaturalworldandhis"nature,"mantwistsandturnstheobjectsofthenaturalworldtowardtheserviceofhisneedsanddesires,bothbiologicalandcultural.AccordingtoDiltheythisdivisionistheoriginal,essentialdifferencebetweenthenaturalandtheculturalsciences.LikeBergson,herejectsthemonocular,naturalsciencevisionofreality,whererealityisperceivedonlyintermsofobjectstobeexplainedandutilized.UnlikeBergson,however,Diltheydoesnothimselfproposeacountermonocularvisionwhichreinterpretsrealityassimplyorganiclife.ForDilthey,whilemanisadmittedlypartofnaturallife,heremainssomehowalientonaturallife.Mandoesnotliveprereflectivelyin

nature,butinsomemannerhedoessoliveincultureandhistory.Wheremanmustgainknowledgeofnaturebyhypotheticalexplanation(the"knowing"ofthenaturalsciencesnecessarybecausemanisnotwhollyimmersedinnature),manunderstandshistoryandculturethroughreflectionuponhisownpersonalexperiences,whichisthe'knowing'oftheculturalsciences.Replacingthesinglevisionofthenaturalsciences,therefore,Diltheyarguesthatbothexplanationandunderstandingarenecessaryinordertocomprehendtheobjectsofphysicalrealityandtheobjectsofhistoricalreality.46

Thealienationbetweenmanandnatureisalsotheoriginofman'sexperienceofreality.Realitybecomesrealformanwhenheexperiencestheresistancetheworldraisesagainsthisspirit.Itisatthis

primallevelthattherealityoftheworldisaffirmed.Notdirectlyintuited,aswasthecaseinBergson,forDiltheytheawarenessofthe"reality"ofrealityariseswhenconsciousnesscomparesitintensionswiththeactualperformanceachievedinacts.Fromthisexperienceofresistance,trueegologicalself-consciousnessandcognitionaremadepossible.ThisunderstandingiscloselyparalleledinDilthey'spresentationofthegenesisofanyparticularweltanschauunginhistory.Thebasicexperienceofapeopleinhistoryleadstoarelativeindividuationoftheirrespectiveframeworkforapprehendingtheworld;i.e.,leadstotheiruniqueweltanschauung.Therelativityofsuchworld-views,theirindividuation,isnotapriori,butratherreflectstheshareduniversalstructurescommontoallpeoplesinalltimes.Inasmuchasmanis"naturally"ahistoricalbeing,therefore,thetaskofthehumansciencesistobringsuchstructurestotransparency.

47Hence,thepointofDilthey'steachingsontheideaofweltanschauungisnottopropoundtherelativityofbeingandknowing,buttofoundascienceonthetheoryofweltanschauungbywhichthestructuresofhistorycanberevealedinorderthatmoreresponsiblyinformedandmorerationallybasedactionsmightbemadepossible.

AlthoughScheleracknowledgesthesignificanceandinfluencewhichtheseandsimilarthemesinDilthey'sthoughtexerciseonhisownworks,onlylittleofthisisaccepteduncriticallyorwithoutqualification.Inparticular,SchelerisquiteapprehensiveofwhatheperceivestobeKantianlegacies,inDilthey'sproject.Forexample,thequestionofknowledgeandexistence,astreatedbyDilthey,isseentoraiseadilemmaconcerningthestatusofrealityinregardtothehumansubject.Asnoted,ostensiblybeingisdirectlyandessentiallyperceivedforDiltheyviatheprimalexperienceofresistanceaposition

whichwouldappeartorejecttheKantianpremiseofrealitybeingunknowableinitsessence.Schelerargues,however,thatDilthey'sunderstandingof"experience"isnotinfactapenetrationtothingsinthemselves.ThekeytohisargumentishisclaimthatDiltheyportraystheprimalexperienceofrealitythroughresistanceasappearingimmediatelyintheconsciousmind,pre-egologicalornot.Thus,foreshadowingtheerrorSchelerfindsinHusserl'sphenomenology,hecontendsthat,inalmostKant-likefashion,Diltheyfailstopiercethroughtotheontologicallevelofrealityandremainsattheleveloftheconstitutionofthephenomenaofrealityinconsciousness.Elaboratingsomewhatfurtheronthisthemeinalateessay,heclaimsthat"Diltheydoesnotnoticethattheexperienceofrealityisaboveallanecstaticone[pre-consciousandpriortothe

subject-objectdistinctionbywhichcomparisonisgrounded],andnotanecstatic'knowledgeof'butanecstatic'havingof'reality."

48LikeDilthey,Schelertakestheexperienceofresistanceasthebedrockofhisphilosophy,butwhereDilthey'sconceptiswhatwouldnowbetermed"phenomenological,"hisisontological.

ThisontologicalconcerninhisthinkingmakesmoreunderstandablethevariousreinterpretationswhichmanyofDilthey'sconceptsundergoinScheler'sthought.Dilthey'sremainingatthelevelofsubjectiveconsciousnesspermitshimonlytoconsidertheobjectivecharacterofhistory,cultureandthesphereofthepersoningeneral.49Deeplyconcerned,asheis,withcommunityandintersubjectivity,Schelerrecoilsfromwhatappearstobearequisiteobjectificationofotherpersoninthisapproach.Schelerstressesstronglytheabilitytoparticipatedirectlyinthesubjectiveintentionsandexperiencesofothers.Hisownconceptionofweltanschauung,stemmingfromthis,revealsanattempttojointogetherthematerialandspiritualfactorsandtheobjectiveandsubjectivestructuresofhistoryintoaunifiedinquiry.50Itcanfurtherbeassumedthathisownunderstandingoftheculturalscienceswouldbesimilarlypatterned.

Eucken

Scheler'sprofessoratJena,RudolfEucken,hasbeenlargelyoverlookedandhissignificanceunderestimatedbycontemporaryappraisalsoflatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturyphilosophy.Withoutquestion,however,fewthinkersenjoyedthepopularacclaimintheirdaywhichwasaccordedEucken.HavingnotonlyawidefollowinginGermany,butinEnglish-speakingandScandanaviancountriesaswell,in1908hereceivetheNobelPrizeinliteratureasrecognitionforhisphilosophy.Himselfastudentoftheneo-

AristotelianAdolfTrendelenburg(whotermshisAristotelianphilosophyan"organicworld-view"),Euckenacceptswithallthelifephilosophersthatrealityofspiritandtherealityoflife.Hepresentsthetwoasorganicstagesinaprocessofdevelopment,wherelifeisabletoattainastateofbeing-with-itselfwhichis"spirit,"andthesphereofspirit.Histermforthisbroadconceptofspiritis"spirituallife."Allspirit,notonlythought,canbeseenasanorganoflife,whichistheperspectiveofnaturalism.However,naturalismfailstoperceivethetranscendentqualityofspiritandtheprimacyofspiritoverlife.Despiteitscharacter,spirituallifecannotescapeitsrootsinthelifeprocess.Philosophyandalltheorizingde-

penduponabasisintheactionsandexperiencesofhumanlife.Aswithotherlifephilosophies,Euckendemandsthatliving,doingandexperiencingcomepriortoandgroundalloperationsofmind.Hence,thoughhepositsarealmofpurebeingtowhichpuretruthcorresponds,hecontendsthatsuchpurebeingisonlygraduallyuncoveredinhistory.Man'slivedactionsdrivethisuncoveringprocess,andpuretruthremainsonlytheultimateendtobeachievedinthetotalrevelationofbeing.Actions,insimilarfashion,arethemovementofrealitytowardthefullactualizationofspiritinthisend.Theself-consciousmanifestationoflife,manis,itwouldseem,thedisclosinganddiscerningagentthroughwhichliferevealsthetruthofpurebeingandbywhichspirituallifeachievestotalactualization.CallingtomindtheidealismofHegelandFichte,Euckentermsthisphilosophy"activism."AsSchelerstates,heendeavorstogroundthe"idealismofspirituallife"onJohannFichte'sact-idealism.

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Notasystematicphilosopher,Eucken'snotionsdonotfitcomfortablywithineventheindistinctboundariesoflifephilosophy.LikeDilthey,EuckentooinsertscertaincriticalaspectsintohisphilosophywhicharederivedfromKantianorneo-Kantiansources:aso-called"noologicalmethod"andtranscendental,individualsubjectivity.Utilizingthenoologicalmethodinhisownhabilitationthesis,SchelerdescribesEucken'sapproachasanattempttounitethemethodsoftranscendentalphilosophyandtranscendentalpsychology,methodswhichinKantaresomewhatdichotomousandcontradictory.52Thepurposeofthenoologicalmethodistwo-fold.First,itendeavorstoendowtheprocessesofthemindwiththecapacitytoperformtranscendentalinquiry.Insodoing,second,itmakespossiblealinkagebetweenthedevelopingworldofaction(whichSchelercallstheArbeitsweltatthispoint)andtheworldofobjectsof

transcendentalinquirytherealmofpurebeing.Againstpsychologism,ononehand,whichreducesspiritualactivitytomentalprocesses,andagainstpuretranscendentalism,ontheotherhand,whichwouldinsulatespiritualactivityfromthedevelopmentoflifeandhistory,Euckenstrugglestobridgelifeandspirit,phenomenaandnoumena.Theembodimentofthisbridgebeingthehumanperson,however,Euckenisrequired,morethanotherlifephilosophers,topositatranscendentalcharacterwithinthehumansubject.Regardlessofhisorigininlifeandthedevelopingworld,manmustinEucken'sviewpossessacapacitytotranscendboth.

TheinfluenceofEucken'sthinkingonhis,variesoverthespanofScheler'sintellectualwork.InScheler'searlyperiod,Eucken'slife

philosophyformsthemediumthroughwhichhisconcernswithethics,religion,emotionsandculturearejoined.Yet,aboutthetimeofhismeetingwithHusserlin1901SchelerturnssharplyawayfromthenotionofthetranscendentalsubjectandEucken'snoologicalmethod.Adoptingphenomenology'sturntowardtheconstitutionofthingsinconsciousness(Husserl's"intentionality")augmentshisgrowingcriticismoftheproximityofEucken'sunderstandingtoKant'sregardingman'sabilitytotranscendthecontentsofconsciousness.Reminiscentofhisteacher,however,towardtheendofhislifeSchelerelaborateshisowncosmologyofspiritandlifewherebothengagedialecticallyintheperson,endinginthespiritualizingoflifeandthevivifyingofspirit.Althoughgreatlyreworked,otherEuckenianthemesalsoreappear,includingtheconceptsofactandpersonuponwhichSchelerfoundsthelargerstructureofhiswholephilosophy.Scheler'sdevelopmentoftheseconcepts,however,whichareonlysketchilytreatedbyEucken,oughttobereckonedamongthemoreoriginalandimportanttheoreticalenterprisesofthepresentcentury.

Phenomenology:Husserl'sIdealismAndScheler'sRealism

Thephenomenologicalmovementisonlymarginallylessfragmentedthanthelifephilosophies.Yetthereremainsaunitytothemovementwhichgoesbeyondsharingtopicsofconcernorconfrontingcommondilemmas.Wellillustratedintherallyingcryoftheearlyphenomenologicalmovement,"tothethingsthemselves,"phenomenologyattemptstobreakfreefromthetraditionalconceptualconstructsandideologicalmodesofanalysisthroughwhichrealityistypicallyapproached.Whatissought,istherevelationofthingsthemselvesastheyappearoriginallytoman,beforeanyjudgmentofhypothesis.Rationalist,empiricist,positivistandevenpragmatistphilosophiesconsiderphenomenaonlyinlightofcertaincriteriabywhichtheyarescreenedforvalidityandacceptability.Theyapproach

phenomena,inotherwords,withcertainpre-conditionsinhand.Phenomenologystrivestoovercomesuchpre-conditions,strivestoacceptthe"givenness"ofthingswithanaiveopenness,allowingthethingsspeakforthemselves.AsHusserl,Schelerandtheotherco-editorsoftheJahrbuchfürPhilosophieundphänomenologischeForschungexplainin1913:

Itisnotasystemthattheeditorsshare.Whatunitesthemisthecommonconvictionthatitisonlybyreturntoprimary

sourcesofdirectionintuitionandtoinsightsintoessentialstructuresderivedfromthemthatweshallbeabletoputtousethegreattraditionsofphilosophywiththeirconceptsandproblems;onlythusshallwebeinapositiontoclarifysuchconceptsintuitively,torestatetheproblemsonanintuitivebasis,andthereforeeventuallysolvethematleastinprinciple.

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Thestatement"returntoprimarysourcesofdirectintuitionandtoinsightsintoessentialsturcturesderivedfromthem"revealsasecondaimofphenomenology.Notonlydoesphenomenologyinradicallyempiricalfashionseektoreturntothethingsthemselves,i.e.,toprimarysourcesofdirectinsight,butitalsoseekstoperceivetheessentialstructuresderived.Inotherwords,phenomenologygoesbeyonddetailedandunprejudiceddescriptionofthingsastheyare"given;"itattemptstoderivetheessenceofwhatissogiven.Thisderivationisaccomplishedbywayofwhatissometimestermed"thephenomenologicalreduction."Variouslyunderstoodbyphenomenologiststhemselves,allgenerallyconcurthatthereductiondistinguishestheessenceofphenomenafromtheirexistenceinsomemannersuspendingtheexistentialsothattheessentialstandsforthoris"intuited.''SuchintuitingisnotarecoursetothesemimysticalunderstandingofintuitionasispresentedinBergson'slifephilosophy.Rather,intuitionforphenomenologyreferstoaself-evidentialinsightintothecharacterofsomethinggiven.Whilephenomenologistswoulddenyanyinnateknowledgeorcategoriesofthemind,theycontendthatmindhasthecapacitytorecognizeor"intuit"ageneraloruniversalnotionsuchasequalitynotbymeansofmanipulativeanalysis,butthroughperceivingtheessenceofequalitydirectlyinexperience.Finally,presumedinthediscussionofphenomenaasgiven,isthephenomenologicalnotionof"intentionality."Againattractingvariousspecificformulations,theconceptdemonstratesthe

uniquepositionwhichphenomenology,especiallyScheler'sphenomenology,holdsintheforegroundoftheWeimarwatershedregardingtheplaceofthehumansubjectinreality.Astypicallyinterpreted,agivenphenomenonispresenttothe"subject"onlyasan"object"inanintentionalrelationship.Usingthewordssubjectandobjectverylooselyinthiscontext,bothareconsideredpossibleonlywithintheframeworkof"intentionality."Tospeakofeithersubjectorobjectimplicitlybegstheacknowledgementoftheirconnectedness.Subjectivity,thus,doesnotescapefromexperienceandexperienceisinexplicableapartfromsubjectivity.Not

independentthingsinthemselves,subjectandobjecthavenoeffectivestatusapartfromtheirintentionalrelationship.Neitherispriororposteriortotheother:bothareco-originalaspectsofintentionality.

Husserl'sPhenomenology

AconsiderationofEdmundHusserl,founderofthemovement,lendsdetailtomuchoftheforegoingoverviewandhighlightsareasofcontrastagainstwhichScheler'sownphenomenologycanbeadvantageouslycompared.ThebackgroundofHusserl'sdevelopmentofphenomenologybeginswithhisturnfromanearlytraininginmathematicsitselftowardinquiringintotheepistemologicalandpsychologicalrootsofmathematicsandlogicfirstfromthestanceofaradicalpsychologism.ArisingoutofBritishempiricismandwidelypopularamongGermanacademicsbeforetheturnofthecentury,psychologismnotonlyundercutethicsEucken'sconcernbutequallycalledtoquestionthefoundationsofevenmathematicsandandlogic.ArguedbyphilosopherslikeTheodorLipps,thepsychologisticexplanationofmathematicsandlogiccontendsthatevenfundamentalconceptssuchasnumber,identity,equalityandsoforth,havenoobjectiverealityandarebutreflectionsofcertainpsychologicalprocessesandpsychicexperiences.Husserlgraduallycametorejectthesecontentions,ashadGottlobFregeandaswouldtheearlyBertrandRussell.Husserl'srejection,however,greatlydiffersfromFrege's,Russell'sandmostoftheothersinvolvedinthisgeneralreactiontopsychologism,forwheretheothersinasenseturnedtowardsomethingapproximatingmetaphysicalrealism(numbers,forexample,beingobjectivelyrealandknowable)hedoesnotentirelymakeaparallelmove.Hishesitationisnotsomuchowingtodoubtsconcerningtherealityofmathematicsandlogic,ratheritiscenteredonthemannerinwhichsuchthingsareknowable.Hetakes,asitwere,amiddlecoursebetweenpsychologismandthesevariousmetaphysicalrealisms,affirmingthatprinciplesoflogicand

mathematicsarediscoveredinexperience,butonlywithinthecontextofaveryspecialtypeofexperienceaphenomenologicallyclarifiedexperiencewhereinallconcernswiththeparticularitiesoftheexperiencedgivenaredisregarded.Likethepsychologists,Husserlfocusesonindividualpsychicexperience,onconsciousness.Unlikethemhedisregards(atthistime)alllinkstoarealityoutsideorexteriortotheseexperiences;or,better,hefocusesononlywhatisgiventoconsciousness.Inlikefashionhismoveignoresanybridgebetweenconsciousnessandanyobjectivelyrealmetaphysics.

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AtthispointisrevealedtheunderlyingtrustofHusserl'sphenomenology,forexperiencingbecomesbeingconsciousnessofsome"thing".Justasthe"known"andthe"knower"arenotindependentandsufficientinthemselves,representingonlyterminalendsofa"knowing,''sosome"thing"isthatwhichoneis"consciousof"andconsciousnessisalwaysconsciousnessofsomething.ThisisthebasicsenseofHusserl'sintentionality.Inasense,Husserlborrowsfromthethesisoftheempiricitsts,wherebyallexperienceisreducedtopuredataandwherealltheorizingandconceptualmanipulationofsuchrawdatais(supposedly)eliminated.Yet,phenomenologyacquiresevengreatercomprehensivenessinitsrejectionofaprioritheorizing,forHusserlstarklycriticizestheempiricistpositonbecauseitisnotsufficientlyradical.Empiricismerrsinitshastetoovercomepre-judgementbyfailingtoseeitsownimplicitpre-judgementbywhichallexperiencesofuniversalsarerejectedoutofhand.Husserlseeksthepureandprimaryexperience,regardlessofwhetheritscharacterisparticularoruniversal.Moreover,asallexperiencingisa"beingconsciousofsomething,"heisledtoconcludethatintentionalityisthesufficientcriterionofrealityandtruth.Inmakingthismoveheavoidsthesubject-objectdualityofmetaphysicalrealismandavoidstherelativityinherentinpsychologism'sreductionofmindtothedeterminationsofpsychologicalexperiences.Heovercomestheproblemofcorrespondencebetweenideasinmenteandobjectsinreality(whichsobedeviledtheidealists)bysuspendingjudgmentonboththesubjectandobjectapartfromtheirinterdependencyinintentionality.Withthis,intentionalitybecomesnotanattributeofsubject,butconsciousnessitself,notareflectionofreality,butwhatmustpassforrealityitself.Insimplestwords,withoutrecoursetoanexistenceofsubsistentsubjecttherecanbenosubjectivismwithoutrecoursetoanexistentorsubsistentobject,therecanbenoobjectivism.

TidyasHusserl'stheoryisinresponsetomanyofmodernity'sepistemologicalpuzzles,itmightyetbewonderedhowhisinterpretationofintentionalitysolvestheinitialproblemsoftheuniversalandcertaincharacteroflogicalormathematicalprinciples?Or,lookingbeyondhisnarroworiginalquery,howisitpossibleforanythingtobeknownwithuniversalcertitudewhenitappearsthatanydegreeofuniversalityhasbeenlostintheshatteringofknowingintoaseeminglyendlessnumberofintentionalrelationships?Possiblyfromsimilarconcerns,Husserl'sphenomenologydevelopsthroughaseriesofinsightswhichareinsomewayaresponsetothesequestions.IntheearlyHusserl,theHusserlwhohadsodeeplyimpressed

Schelerintheir1901encounter,theresponsehingedonthederivationofintentionality.Husserlhadadoptedthenotionfromhisteacher,FranzBrentano,forwhomintentionalityreferencedthesphereofmeanings.Reflectingthissense,Husserlverythoroughlyandcarefullydemonstratesthatlogicoperatesinregardtowhatismeantorwhatisintended.Itsconcernisnotwiththestreamofrealpsychicactswhichthesubjectisperforming,butwithmeantorintendedobjectsofconsciousness.

55Inasmuchasintentionalityreferstosuchintendedobjectsofconsciousness,eachactofintention,eachactofmeaning,pointstowardanidealunityofmeaning.Theendlessnumberofintentionalrelationshipsare,then,individuallyuniqueandrelativeinthemselves,buttheypointinthedirectionofcertainunitiesorgeneralities,someofwhich(includinglogicalprinciples)areuniversalincharacter.56ForHusserlatthisjuncture,theprocessbywhichtheseunitiesarediscernedisameansofabstractioncalled"ideation"[Wesensschau].Ideationisaspecial"intuitive"apprehensionofagiventhinginconsciousnessthatreachesbehindthegiven'sparticularitiestowarditsessence.Itmustbeclear,however,thatconceptssuchasideation,essence,idealanduniversaldonotevidenceanysortofmetaphysicalrealismintheunderstandingoftheearlyHusserl.EssencesanduniversalsarenotPlatonicformsinthesenseofbeinghigherormoreperfectthanparticulars,orinthesenseofbeingeternalandunchanging.Moreover,theirstatusvis-a-visanyrealitybeyondintentionality,asdiscussedabove,isdismissedasirresolvablebyHusserl.Hispositionismuchlessambitious,muchmoremundane.Essences,universalsandidealsareonlyconditionsforthepossibilityofobjective,generalknowledge.Hence,duringtheseyears,theuniversalityoflogicandthecertitudepossibleforanyknowledgeingeneralisadeterminationbasedintheideationprocesswhereinspecialintuitiveinsightsaregivenintheappearanceofathingin

consciousness.

ThatHusserlhimselfwasunsatisfiedwiththecomprehensivenessofhispositionatthispoint,whichisdemonstratedbyhissubsequentmodifications,leavesopenthedoortoquestionthesatisfactionhisearlytheorylendstothequestionofepistemologicalcertitude.How,forexample,arehisuniversalsoressencesexperiencedinorgiventoconsciousness?Wherepreciselydoescertitudelieinhisprocessofideationintheessences,intheprocessitselforinsomethingentirelydifferent?SpurredbysimilarquestionsHusserlbeginsagradualshiftinhisphenomenology.AlthoughnotacknowledgedbyHusserlhimselfuntilverylateinhislife,theterm"tran-

scendentalphenomenology"hasbecomewidelyacceptedasadescriptionforthisturninhisthought.FourthemesdrawnfromHusserl'sthinkingfollowinghischangeservetoillustrateitsconceptualdirection:thetranscendental-phenomenologicalreduction,noesis-noemaintentionality,thephenomenologicalegoandphenomenologicalidealism.SomewouldalsoincludeHusserl'sconceptofthelife-worldinthisturn.Yet,itseemslikelythatHusserlborrowedthetermfromScheler.Moreover,thenotionofthelife-worldisnoteasilycongruentwiththegeneraltrendofHusserl'sturnhere.

Thetranscendental-phenomenologicalreductiontoagreatextentmodifiesHusserl'searlierunderstandingofideationasaspecialintuitiveprocessofabstraction.Hefindstheideationnotion,whichisnowdiscussedaseideticreduction,tobeinsufficientfortheachievementofcertitudebecauseitremainsatthelevelofwhatistermedthe"naturalstandpoint."

57Fromtheperspectiveofthenaturalstandpoint,whichcomprisesthesolestanceofhisearlierphenomenology,Husserlcontendsthattheworldispresenttooneassimplythere,naively,immediatelyandintuitivelyexperiencedasamenagerieofrealities.Viaeideticreductionotherstandpointscanbeobtainedfromthenaturalstandpoint,fromtheperspectiveofwhichgeneralessencescanbegraspedamidstthevarietyofparticularrealities.Logicandmathematics,forexample,aregroundedonstandpointswhich,thoughdifferentiatedfromthenaturalworld,donotrejectthenaturalstandpointbutareannexedtoit.HerethecentralmotivatingproblematicbehindHusserl'senterpriseisuncovered,forfromthenaturalstandpointnothingisfinallyrevealedbutthenaturalworld.And,whileamodestphenomenologyisvalidandworthwhilefortheintuitingofessencesatthisnaturallevel,suchaphenomenology

cannotbetheprocessbywhichabsoluteepistemologicalcertitudeisobtainable.Husserlwouldseemtobearguingthatfromthenaturalstandpointphenomenologyisitselfnotradicalenoughinitssearchforpurephenomena(thethingsthemselves)becauseittacitlyandunreflectivelyacceptstherealityoftheworld.Pureconsciousness,directedtowardpurephenomena,mustbesought.Thephenomenologicalreductionisthemethodbywhichthisistobeachieved.58

StartingpointforthisreductioniswhatHusserltermsthe"phenomenologicalepoche,"throughwhichbeliefintheexistenceandrealityofthenaturalworldissuspended.VaguelyresemblingDescartes'universaldoubt,theepochesubstantiallydiffersfromCartesiandoubtinthatitsaimisnotthediscoveryofalocusforsureandcertainbeing(viz.,IthinkthatIam,Godis,etc.)butaimsinstead

atlocatinganarenawhereknowingandbeingareabsolutelycorrelatedsothatepistemologicalcertitudemightbeobtained.Indeed,soradicalisHusserl'sepoche,thateventhebedrockoftheCartesianreality,thesubstantivecogito,issuspendedinitsexistence.Instrivingtoreduceallexistentialitytopurephenomena,Husserlisengagedinwhathehimselfreferstoas"purephenomenology."Yet,behindtheepoche,andinfactrevealedasaresidueofitsveryoperation,remainsarealitywhichisimpervioustoalleffortstosuspenditsexistenceandwhichismadetransparenttoitselfbytheseoperations.Phenomenadonotsubsistinthemselves,clearly,theyareconstitutedinconsciousness.Demonstratedagain,therefore,isHusserl'spurpose,forheseekstoestablishwhatis"given"withthecertitudeofnecessity.Whatwasbutgroundlesslyafactfromthenaturalstandpointbecomesconstitutedinconsciousnessandrenderedcertain.TheconstitutionofphenomenawithinthecertitudeofconsciousnessformsthebasisuponwhichHusserlisabletoconsiderphenomenologytherigorousscienceofessencesuponwhichallothersciencesmustdepend.

ThisconceptionofconsciousnessanditsphenomenaisasignificantreinterpretationofHusserl'searlierpresentationofintentionality.Notareversalofhisposition,orevenamodification;insteadHusserlheresharpenstheearliernotionsothatitisconstruedinaveryspecificfashion.Unliketheambiguoussenseofintentionalityassimply"consciousnessofsomething,"Husserlnowverynarrowlyredefinesintentionalityastheunityofcogitating(designatedasnoesis)directedtowardthatwhichiscogitated(designatedasnoema).Deeperreachingthanthepreviousunderstanding,thenoesis-noemaintentionalityispresentedasthesufficientgroundforknowingandbeing.Thus,itistherealityof"consciousnessofphenomena,"thenoesis-noemarelationship,whichformsthefieldinwhichallquestionsofbeingandknowingcanberesolved.

59And,astheabsolutecorrelationofbeingandknowing,ofpurephenomenawithinpureconsciousness,itisinthenoesis-noemarelationshipthatcertitudeisachieved.

Asbefore,however,Husserlisleftwithafurtherdilemma.Ifcertitudeisobtainedonlyinthefleetingpluralitiesofthenoesis-noemarelationships,isitthentobeassumedthattheontologicalstatusofthis"certitude"isequallytransitoryandrelative?Inotherwords,withoutameasureof"subsistence"ofeither"knower"or"known''whichisconstantandtranscendentaltoeachparticularintentionality,itwouldseemthatcertitudeitselfisnotconstant,enduringorsub-

sistent.WrestlingwiththisdilemmaHusserlmovesindirectionswhichcontinuetoprovokecontroversyamongphenomenologistsandwhichdrewsharpcriticismfromScheler.Heturnstowardatranscendental,phenomenologicalegoaconceptwhichrequireshimtoacceptphenomenologicalor,better,"transcendental"idealism.DoingsoreturnsHusserl'sphilosophymuchnearertothesubject-objectdualityofmodernityfromwhichhehadoriginallylaboredhardtodistancehimself.But,italsoallowshimtopostulateaunityandconsistencyinintentionalityonthebasisofthephenomenologicalegobywhichtruthcanlayclaimtoastatuswhichismorethananephemeralorhaphazardcongruenceofknowingandbeing.

Husserl'sacceptanceofthephenomenologicalegoandidealismisaninescapableconclusionoftheusageofthephenomenologicalepoche.Revealedinthethoroughgoingsuspensionofexistence,whichnegateseventheexistenceoftheself,isaresidueofthenoesis-noemaintentionality.Itisanenduringconsistencyorunitywhichlinksintentionwithintention.Focusingonthisresiduerevealsatranscendentalunitybehindintentionalitythephenomenologicalego.Everlogical,Husserl'sidealismfollowsfromthis.For,sincebeingexistsonlywithintheconstitutiverelationshipofnoesisandnoema,nothingcanbesaidtoexistexceptasisgiveninintentionality.Assuchtheontologicalstatusofallbeingisimpressedwiththecharacterofnoesisandtheunseenunityofthetranscendentego.Simplyput,thephenomenaintendedinconsciousnessnolongeraretobemerely"taken"asreality,thesephenomenaconstitutedundertheauspicesofthephenomenologicalegoarerealityitself.Theworld,life,historyandotherpersonshaverealityonlyasphenomenologicalobjectsconstitutedinconsciousnessunderthephenomenologicalego.

Scheler'sPhenomenology

ForallpracticalpurposesScheler'sphenomenologybeginswithhis

1901introductiontoHusserl,theimpactofwhichledSchelertowithdrawanessayonlogicfromthepresses.Asheexplainsit,Husserl'selucidationofphenomenologicalintuitionrevealedthepovertyoftheKantianismfromwhichthatessayhadproceeded.

60Yet,asbothEdmundHusserlandhearequicktoclaim,SchelercannotbesaidtobeastudentofHusserl.61Indeed,inacceptingphenomenology,Schelerwasalreadysteepedinthelifephilosophiesandwascommittedtoanasyetundefinedmetaphysicalposition.Fromtheveryfirst,then,heincludesinhisphenomenologyelements

whichareatsomevariancefromHusserl'sinterpretation.

62Nonetheless,althoughSchelercomestounderstandphenomenologyinasignificantlydifferentsensethanHusserl,itbecomesandremainsthesupportingmethodologicalorientationofhisphilosophy,andhissocialandpoliticaltheory.Hefindsinphenomenologyamannerofapproaching"reality"whichneitherstandstranscendentlybeyondtheobjectofinquirynorstandsreducedtothesphereofitsobject,asdoespsychologism.Concernedasheiswithman,whofunctionsasthelinchpinbetweenthetranscendentalandpsychologicalforEucken,littlewonderthatSchelerrejoicesinphenomenologyasthemodeofinquirymostbefittingthestudyofman,hisworldandhisproperplace.ThegreatestdebtwhichcontemporaryphenomenologistsowetoMaxSchelerrestsinthisinsight.ItisSchelerwhobearstheprimaryresponsibilityanddeservesthegreatestcreditforturningtheconcernsofthephenomenololgicalmovementbeyond"thingsthemselves"totheworldofpersons.

SomethingbeyondapsychologicaldifferenceintheattitudesandpurposesofHusserlandSchelerisdisclosedinthis.Husserlepitomizestheprofessionalscholar.Proceedingmeticulouslyandmethodicallyinthe"doing"ofhisphenomenology,helaboriouslyclarifieshissuppositions,gathersevidenceandlogicalargumentassupportforhisspeculationandleadshimselfandhisreadertoaself-evidentperceptionofeachmodestintuition,mortaringeachasabrickintotheimposingstructureofhisphilosophy.Endeavoringtoclearahardfoundationofcertitudeforthewholesweepofman'ssciences,theappropriatenessofhistermingphenomenology"philosophyasrigorousscience"cannotbequestioned.63Matchinghisends,Husserl'sphenomenologyapproachestheprecisionofformulae,with

strictandverifiablesequencesofmentaloperationswhichcomplementhisconcernwithlogic.ForScheler,incontrast,athinkermoreaccustomedtosmoke-filledcabaretsortheconversationofaLatinquarterLokalthanbook-linedstudies,phenomenologyislessformalandmethod-likeandmuchmoreanattitudeorstanceorawayoflookingattheworld.Hewrites.

[P]henomenologyisneitherthenameofanewsciencenorasubstitutefortheword"philosophy;"itisthenameofanattitudeofspiritual[geistliche]seeinginwhichonecansee[erschauen]orexperience[er-leben]somethingwhichotherwiseremainshidden,namelyarealmoffactsofaparticularkind.Isay"attitude,"not"method."Amethodisagoal-directedprocedureofthinkingaboutfacts,forexample,inductionor

deduction.Inphenomenology,however,itisamatter,first,ofnewfactsthemselves,beforetheyhavebeenfixedbylogic,andsecond,ofaprocedureofseeing.

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Phenomenologyissubtlyrecast,then,inScheler'sthinking,notatfirstbyanyobvious,fundamentaldisagreementwithHusserl'sposition,65butcertainlybyasignificantdifferenceofemphasisasisdemonstratedintheintensitywhichSchelerbringstohiseffortstopiercethroughall"thinking"aboutexperienceinordertoobtaintheoriginal"givenness"ofthingsinexperience.Highlydistrustfulofanypre-conditionstoexperiencing,especiallyanyformaloridealapriori,SchelerfromthefirstappearsmorestridentthanHusserlingoingbacktothethingsthemselvesastheyappearinexperience.Hewritesthata"philosophybasedonphenomenologymustbecharacterized,firstofall,byanintenselyvitalandmostimmediatecontactwiththeworlditself."Inthissense,hecontinues,phenomenologicalphilosophyisradicallydistinguishedfromanyapproachtophilosophy"whichtakesconceptsorformulas,orevenscienceitself,asthebasisofitsprocedure,andthenseekstoreachthe'presuppositions'ofsciencebyreductionortobringitsresultsintoaconsistentsystem."66Theory,critique,ideaandmethodmustnotprecedetheprimalexperienceof"things.''AswithHusserl,Schelerisunrelentinginhiscriticismofempiricismforitsfailuretorecognizetheunseenmetaphysicsimplicitintherejectionofuniversalsoutofhand,butSchelerisequallydubiousofphilosophieswhichproffer"critique"asasolutiontothedilemmaofmetaphysics.Forhim,phenomenologymustnotinanyfashiondelimittherichnessofexperience.Utlilizingthetermsinaveryqualifiedmanner,SchelerfollowsEugenFinkindiscussingthiscompleteopennessas"themostradicalempiricismandpositivism,"andwritesfurtherthat:

[A]widegulfseparatestheradicalempiricismofphenomenologyfrom

anyandeverykindofrationalism,insofarasphenomenology,byvirtueofitsprincipleofcognition,rejectsthenotionofgivingprioritytotheproblemsofcriteriawhenitdealswithanyquestion.Aphilosophywhichdoesgivecriteriapriorityisrightlycalled"criticism."Incontrast,thephenomenologistisconvincedthatadeepandlivingfamiliaritywiththecontentandmeaningofthefactsinquestionmustprecedeallquestionsofcriteriaconcerningaparticulardomain,nomatterwhethertheseconcernthedistinctionbetweengenuineandfalsescience,trueandfalsereligion,genuineandworthlessart,orevenquestionslike"whatisthe

criterionfortherealityofanintendedobject[einesGemeinten]orforthetruthofjudgement?"Hewhoisalwaysinclinedtoaskforacriterionfirstofallacriterionforwhetherthispictureisanauthenticworkofart,say,orwhetheranyextantreligionistrue,is...amanwhostandsoutside,whohasnotdirectcontactwithanyworkofart,anyreligion,anyscientificdomain.Hewhohasnotexpendedlaboronsomedomainoffactsistheonewhatstartsoffbyaskingforcriteria(Stumpf).

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Contendingthatepistemologicalconcerns,evenamostbasicepistemologicaldistinctionsuchasthetruth-falsityantinomy,arenotresolvablepriortoexperience,hearguesforaphenomenologywhichseekstheoriginaryexperienceofthingspriortotheirmanipulationinrationalreflection,evenpriortotheepistemologicalcategorizationoftruthandfalsity.Nor,canany"criteria"fortheappearanceof"things"inthephenomenologicalattitudebeaskedfor;doingsoisnottounderstandphenomenology,becauseitbegsthequestionofsomemeasureofvalidityprecedingtheexperienceofthese"thingsthemselves."

DifferencesbetweenSchelerandHusserlbegintostandoutinsomereliefatthispoint,differenceswhichhintthateveninregardtotheirearlythought(pre-Ideas)theremightbeunseendisjuncturesattherootsoftheirphenomenologies.Husserl'sconcernwithclearinganepistemologicalfoundationforcertitudeseemstoapproachtheerrorwhichSchelerfindsinplacingcriteriabeforeexperience.Moreimportantly,Scheler'sclaimthatphenomenologymustbeintenselyvitalandinimmediateengagementwiththeworldwouldappeartoaccordlittlewithHusserl'sfocusuponphenomenaastheyarepresentedwithintheintentionalityofconsciousness.Mostcrucialinaddressingthesedifferencesisthequestionofthecelebrated"thingthemselves"inthecontextofScheler'sthought.Clearlynotfollowing

himintothequasi-idealismofHusserl'slaterthought,whatpreciselyisScheler'sstancerelativetothestatusofparticularsanduniversals,subjectandobject?

Initiatingaconsiderationofthesematters,Schelerremarksin1922that"phenomenologygroundsanewtypeofapriorismwhichnotonlyembraces[umfasst)thepurelyformalpropositionsoflogicandaxiologyintheirvarioussub-disciplines(ethics,aesthetics,etc.),butwhichalsoleadstoreal[materiale]ontologies".68Thus,heacknowledgesthepeculiarapriori"reality"ofHusserlianconcernssuchaslogicalpropositions,butextendsphenomenologicalapriorismtoa

muchwiderfield.TherangeofScheler'sphenomenologyisuniquelyrevealedinthis.Distinguishedfrommereempiricism,ononehand,bytheacceptanceofaprioriessences;ontheotherhand,heclaimsbythisacceptancethatphenomenologyisabletoaccommodatethevalidityoftheidealistaprioriofPlatoandtheformalaprioriofKantwhilesurpassingbothinthebreadthofitsencompassingreach.Yet,asSchelerassertsin1913,agulfremainsbetweenphenomenologyandthesetheories,forinphenomenology"theaprioridoesnotbecomeaconstituentpartofexperiencethroughan'activityofformation'orsynthesisandthelike,muchlesstheactsofa'self'ora'transcendental'consciousness."

69PerhapscovertlyaddressedtoHusserl,thesecommentsbySchelerarestrongargumentthatphenomenologycannotdistanceitselffromtheworldinthesenseofPlato'seidosorKant'snoumena.

Scheler'sconvictioninthisregardisillustratedinhisextensionoftheapriorismofphenomenologyto"realontologies."WiththisthemostbasicanddivisivedifferencebetweenSchelerandHusserlisbroughttolight,forSchelerfromthebeginningsofhisthoughtis,andremainsathoroughgoingrealist.ThepathHusserltakesinphenomenology,fromtherealistcornertowardtheidealist,isdirectionallyobverseScheler's.Comingtophenomenologyfromidealismandneo-Kantiantranscendantalism,Schelerturnsincreasinglytowardrealism.Specifically,itseemsheisunsatisfiedwiththeconceptionofthehumansubjectandtheexistentialworldwhichtheidealistpositionrequires.FallingmorethanhistoricallybetweenHusserl'sconcernwithepistemologicalcertitudeandHeidegger'sconcernwithbeingitself,Scheler'spervasiveconcerniswiththeontologicalstatusofmanasbothsubstantive(naturalandhistorical)andmetaphysicalreality.Forhim,phenomenologyhasitsmajorpurposeinthe

uncoveringofrealontologyasitpertainstomanintheworld.WhereforHusserl,phenomenologybeginswithanambivalencetowardthepossibilityofsubsistentrealitybeyondtheintentionalityofconsciousnessandconcludeswithatranscendentalidealismwhere"reality"isconstitutedintherelationofnoesisandnoema,forSchelerphenomenologyeveraffirmstheineluctablerealityoftheworldanduniquerealityofpersonsactingwithintheworld.TheapriorismwhichSchelerperceivesthroughphenomenology,is,therefore,onewhichisrealandobjective.

Hispurposeinphenomenologyisdisclosedinthis.EdmundHusserlwishestoenabletheacquisitionofcertitudewhileavoidingthePlatonismofobjectivemetaphysicsandthereductionof

psychologism,whichleadshimtoovercomethesubject-objectdichotomybyappealingtoanidealismexpressedinintentionality.Scheler,ratherdifferently,turnstophenomenologyinordertoclarifyanduncovertheobjectivelyrealgroundofhumanbeing,andisledfinallytopositanontologicallyrealjunctionwheresubjectandobjectmergeandwhereuniversalsandparticularsconverge.Husserl'sstrugglewithuniversalsandparticularscentersonestablishingthepossibilityofdrawingtheuniversalfromtheparticular.Fundamentallydifferent,Scheler'sproblemisbringingtheuniversalandtheparticulartogetherandidentifyingtherealgroundoftheirlinkage.Tobemorefullyexploredlater,thisontologicallyreallinkageorjunctionistheconceptofthe"person"uponwhichhis"personalismaspoliticaltheory"isbased.He,forthesereasons,refusestocircumscribehisphenomenologywithinaframeworkofmethod-likeprocedurespreciselybecausesuchprocedureswouldveilthegivennessofhislookedfordeeperreality.ParodyingHusserl'slaterphenomenologyasillustration,itcouldbesaidthatSchelerrejectsHusserl'smovetocutawayfromagroundinginthenaturalstandpointforfearoffloatingawayfromtheontologicalgroundhesodesperatelyseeks.

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Consequentfromtheinclusionofanontology,Scheler'sphenomenology,whileonthesurfaceremainingremarkablysimilarinappearancetoHusserl's,variessignificantlyfromtheotherthinker'satdeeperlevels.Althoughspecificelements,suchasScheler'sphenomenologicalreduction,hisconceptionofintentionalityandhispersonalism,arebetterconsideredinamorethoroughtreatmentofScheler'smetaphysicalposition,fourgeneralremarksrelevanttoScheler'sphenomenologywhichagainillustratethedivergencefromHusserlmightbeusefullyreviewedinconcludingthissection.First,

Scheler'sphenomenologydemandsanimmersionintheworld.Hisstressonphenomenologyasanattitudeofopennesstothewholeofexperienceverymuchrequiresthat,whateverdegreeofsubjectivityheallows,itbeplacedwithinthecontextofcontingentreality.Thefocalpointofthissubjectivity,Scheler'snotionofthe"person,"ismuchmoreintimatelyjoinedwiththeworldthananypurelytranscendentalegowouldpermit.Hence,Husserl'segologyiscriticizedbySchelerforitsisolationfromtherealfactorsoftheworld.Second,Scheler'sphenomenologyrejectsthereductionismofpsychologismandnaturalismwhileatthesametimeforegoingthecategorizationandformalizationinherentofrationalismandidealism.Asthewell-quotedMauriceMerleau-Pontywouldlater

note,andasSchelertherealistadmits,thereissomethingtonaturalism,somethingtopsychologism,butneithernaturalismnorpsychologismaresufficientinthemselves,phenomenologymustbereceptive,therefore,tothetotalityofexperience.Heacknowledges,forexample,theapriorianduniversal"facts"ofessencesaswellasthefactsoftheworldofmatterandhistory.Whatcategories,hierarchiesanduniversalsaregiven,arediscerneddirectlyfromthevantageofthephenomenologicalattitudeasobjectiveandsubsistentrealitiesinthemselves.Third,thecognitionwhichoccursinphenomenologyis,atitscore,anuncritical,passivereceptionofwhatappearsinthephenomenologicalattitude.Absolutelynothingcanbe"known"whichisnotfirstnaivelyandpositivelyacceptedinexperience.Schelercontendsthatthinking"aboutsomething,"canhardlyprecedeaprimalacceptanceofthegiven''thing"inexperience.Fourth,Scheler'sphenomenologydoesnotinanymannersuccumbtothephenomenalismtowardwhichHusserl'sthinkingapproachesinitslaterperiod.Giveninthephenomenologicalattitudearenot"pictures"ofrealitybutrealityitself,revealedinaclarityachievedviaareductionthathasstrippedawaythesymbolsandtheorieswithwhichthesubjecthaspreviouslyveiledit.Aswillbeseen,forSchelertherealitysoexperiencedisaffirmedintheresistancesuchgivensraisevis-a-vistheactionsofthemind.

RevivalOfMetaphysics,Anti-EpistemologyAndPhenomenology

TurningtoconsiderScheler'smetaphysicalandepistemologicalthinking,itmightbeusefultobrieflyconsiderthethirdelementinthebackgroundofhisphilosophy,theso-called"revivalofmetaphysics."Overlappingwiththelifephilosophiesonsomepoints,suchasinthephilosophiesofEuckenandHansDriesche,andwithphenomenologyatotherpoints,asintheworksofEdithSteinandPeterWust,therevivalofmetaphysicshasitsrootsinareactiontomaterialistand

historicismrelativism,ononehand,andinareactionagainsttheidealistsandneo-Kantians,ontheother.Comprisedofanebulousgroupingofidiosyncraticscholarswithlittleornoorganization,the"movement"findsitsunifyingthemeintheassertionofapositive,non-formalmetaphysicswhichisdisclosedinaprocessofinduction,basedonthedirectandimmediateexperienceofreality.Universals,essencesandsofortharepresentedasobjectivelyrealandsubstantivefactswhicharegraduallydiscerned,dialecticallyorteleologically,intheperformanceofactsandintheaccumulation

ofexperience.PullingtogetherasmatteringofthesewritersinhisownsurveyofthestateofGermanphilosophyduringtheWeimaryears,Schelerwritesofthoseassociatedwiththemovementthat"allareepistemologicalrealists,"andthatonthebasisofthisrealism,themovementlookstoconstruct"ametaphysicswhichrestsuponthefoundationofexperientialscience

71[Erfahrungswissenschaft)."

Thenotionof"experientialscience"isnotable,forasSchelerdescribesit,therevivalofmetaphysics,whileverymuchanti-empiricist,isnotengagedinrejectingeithertheproperinquiryortheempiricalvalidityofthenaturalsciences.Rather,themovementasawholeseekstodemonstratethattheconfrontational"either-or"dilemmaofchoosingbetweenthesensibleworldofthenaturalsciencesortheinvisibleworldofphilosophyisanunfoundedandinadmissableimageofreality.Anydifferencebetweenmindandmatterisnottobeidentifiedwiththeidealist-realistdichotomy.Scienceandphilosophyarenotmutuallycontradictoryinthepursuitoftheircommongoalintruth.Withsomehesitationandqualification,Schelerincludesportionsofhisownworkundertheaegisofthemovementandhearguesthattherevivalofmetaphysicssupportsandwelcomestheprocessesofthenaturalscienceswhichrevealanddiscoverreality.Inconjunctionwiththemovement,however,Scheleralsosuggeststhatnaturalscienceerrsinperceivingitsspecialpursuitasthesolelegitimatemodeofinquiryorwhenitfailstorecognizeitsdependenceonametaphysicalposition.ThelatternotioniscrucialforScheler,fortotheextentthatthesciencestacitlyaccedetotheempiricistpositionthatconceptionsofbeingandknowledgearederivedentirelyfromsenseperceptions,themorethesciencesundercutscience'sownmetaphysicalfoundation.Similarly,inregard

tothehistoricalandsocialsciences,hecautionsagainsttheabsolutizingoftheobjectsoftheirstudyjustasherejectsthenaturalsciences'absolutizingofthenaturalworld.Heisstridentparticularlyinhiscriticismofthosethinkerswhoareunableordisinclinedtoperceivethatallsuchabsolutizingonlyservestoraiseempiricalfactsorhistoryoreconomicstoametaphysicalposition.Metaphysicsisinescapableinsomefashion.

Mandoesnothaveanychoiceastowhetherornotheformsordoesnotformametaphysicalideaorametaphysicalsense[Gefühl],i.e.,anideauponwhichmanhimselfandtheworldaregrounded,uponwhich,asthatreality[Seiende]thatisonlythroughitself(Ensperse),allotherrealitydepends.Consciouslyorunconsciously,acquiredorinherited,manhassuch

anideaandsuchasensenecessarily....Thesphereofabsolutebeing[Sein],aspresenttothinkingconsciousness,belongstotheessenceofmanandestablishesinconjunctionwithselfconsciousness,worldconsciousness,languageandconscience,oneindivisiblestructure.

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Therevivalofmetaphysics,however,intendsmorethanmerelyrephrasingtheepistemologicaltruismthatsomesortofmetaphysicalconceptionisfundamentaltoallcognition,forinanothersensethemovement,asSchelernotes,isdiametricallyopposednotonlytotheoftenunseenreductionistmetaphysicalrealismofnaturalismandhistoricism,butequallyisopposedtotheformal,transcendental"metaphysics"oftheneo-Kantians.ArguingfromKant'sthesisoftheimpossibilityofknowledgeofessences,theneo-Kantiansclaimthatnon-formal(i.e.,objective)metaphysicalknowledgeisunattainable.Radicallyfollowedtoitsextremeconclusionthisargumentwouldpermitno"positive,"certainanduniversalknowledgeofreality.Certaintyanduniversalitywouldbeobtainableonlyinthecriticalprocessesofpurereasonreasondivorcedfromthecontentsofexperience.Towhatextentsuchsublimeconceptsareattainable,anunresolvablequeryformostneo-Kantianthinkers,theymustthereforebeformalandtranscendentalincharacter,entirelyremovedand''other"thantheempiricalworld.

Agreeingwiththerevivalmovement,Schelerconsiderstheneo-Kantianpositionasuntenable.However,Schelerthephenomenologicalrealistisalsointerjectedintothisconclusion.Allknowledge,heclaims,evenknowledgeofuniversals,musthaveitsultimateorradicalsourceintheself-givennessofthingsinreality;itmustbegininpositiveexperience.Asheputsit...

Thereisnocognitionwithoutpriorrecognition;thereisnorecognition

withoutthepriorexistenceandself-givennessofthethingsrecognized.

Unquestionably,theprimarynexusbetweenScheler'smetaphysicsandhistheoryofcognitionisgiveninthispassage.Knowingisportrayedtobeagenuinelypositivereceptionofreality,andnotmerelytreatedascritical,analyticorsynthetic.Allknowing,however,followssomedeeperprimalawarenessoftheuniqueandinherentbeingofsome"thing"i.e.,itsSelbstdasein.Incordoning-offtheir"knowing"fromthisfundamentalawarenessofreality,Schelerholdsthatiftheneo-Kantiansactuallywereinfactcapableoffollowingtheirmethodologythisknowingwouldbeextremelylimitedand

suspect.Henotespointedlythat"realityis'transintelligible'foreverypossibleknowingmind.Onlythewhatofthebeing,notthebeingofthewhatisintelligible."

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Yet,inwhatsenseisthisrealityofathing"self-given"?OnthisquestionwouldseemtohingetheauthenticityoftheabovenexusbetweenmetaphysicsandthetheoryofcognitioninScheler'sthought.Thedirectiontakeninthisregardhasalreadybeententativelyoutlined,forheassertsthatthedeepestawarenessofrealityisself-givenintheprimalexperienceof"resistance."AdaptingtheconceptofresistancefromlifephilosopherssuchasDilthey,75itbecomesthebedrockofthemetaphysicalrealismwhichitselfundergirdsthegeneralthesisofhisphilosophy."Bedrock"ispeculiarlyappropriate,furthermore,becauseinturningtowardthisconcept,heismakingananti-epistemological,ontologicalmove.Runningathwartmanyofthemajorphilosophicaltrendsofhisdaycriticalrealism,transcendentalidealismand,perhapsmostpointedly,HusserlianphenomenologySchelerassertsthatthisprimal"giveness"ofrealityisnotpresentatthelevelofthought,ortruth,orcognitioninanystrictsense.''Itisimportant,"Schelerasserts,"toexpresstheseproblems,whicharesocrucialtometaphysics,inapurelyontologicalformandnotconfusethemwithproblemsofcognition."76Itisnotanepistemologicalquestion.Rather,theprimalgivennessofrealityispresentedinresistanceand,hence,isanontologicalgivenness.Reality,Schelerclaims,ispresented"inourinstinctive[triebhaft]andconativeconductvis-a-vistheworld,or,morebroadly,inourdynamic-practicalbehavior."77Moreprecisely,headdselsewhere,realityisgivenin"anexperience[Erfahrung]ofthenon-spiritual,instinctiveprinciplewithinus:anexperienceoftheunified,alwaysspecialized,life-driveinsideus."78Thismostbasicexperienceisthe

experienceofresistance.

Resistance,thus,istheenduringobstructionwhichtherealityofanybeingposestolife'smostbasicimpulses.Itisnotasensation,butanimmediateandutterlyundifferentiatedexperiencewherethesubstantialrealityofobjectivereality"resists"one'sintentionalactions.Indeed,itisthecentralexperienceincurredineveryaction,andonlyinthisresistanceis"practicalrealitygiven"andany"practicalobjectconstituted."79Moreover,inasmuchasresistanceoccursintherelationshipbetweenlifeandbeing,itsrootsreachbeneaththeboxofconsciousnesswithinwhichHusserlandtheneo-Kantiansimprison"reality."Byremainingattheir"epistemological"level,Schelerbelievesthatsuchthinkersareleftironicallyunabletoresolvetheveryquestionsofepistemology"Whatisitthatisknown?Whatisitwhichknows?

Whatisknowing?"Withoutrealbeingexistingbeyondconsciousness,oneislodgedpermanentlyinanendlesscircleofinquiryseekingaftertheconditionsofknowledge;oneremainsunabletounraveltheactualrelationshipsbetweenknowingandbeing.InobliquereferencetoHusserl,Schelernotesthat"onlyaverydefinitehistoricalstageofoverreflectivebourgeoiscivilizationcouldmakethefactofconsciousnessthestartingpointofalltheoreticalphilosophy,withoutcharacterizingmoreexactlythemodeofthebeingofconsciousness."

80Instead,theprimalexperienceofreality"istherepriortoallthinkingandperceiving,"anditisonthisveryrealbasisthatScheler'sownphilosophystands.81

Fromtheperspectiveofhisunderstandingoftheconceptofresistance,uniqueinsightisgainedintothespecialinterpretationwhichScheleraffordsostensiblyphenomenologicalnotionssuchasintentionalityandreduction.UnlikeEdmundHusserl,forexample,whocomestoperceiveintentionalityasacognitiveandconstitutiverelationshipinvolvingconsciousnessofsomethingwhereinbothareinextricablyboundtogetherandessentiallynon-existentapartfromtheintentionalrelationSchelerseesintentionalityaslesstotal,lessall-encompassing.LikeHusserl,heseestherelationshipasinvolvingactingspecificallyactingfororactingtowardsomething.Yet,Scheler'sactsarenotthenarrowlycognitiveactsofthephenomenologicalego.Instead,inhisphenomenology,actsarepre-cognitiveandevaluativeatroot,andarefundamentalpreconditionsforanysubsequentcognition.ThisdoesnotmerelyrecreateHusserl'sphenomenologicalegoandcognitive,constitutiveintentionalityinanewguisebasedupona"willing"subject.Scheler'sunderstandingisneithercognitivenorconstitutiveinthestrictsense.Isisnotcognitiveasamplynotedpreviouslybecauseknowingmustfollowthe

experienceoftherealitywhichisbecomingknown.Sincetheexperienceofresistancetoactsistheprimarymediumthroughwhichthisrealityisconveyed,thentheactsofintentionalityarepriortocognition.Itisnotstrictlyconstitutivebecausetheexperienceofresistanceimplicitlyrevealsthattheuniquerealityoftheexperiencedthingisdistinctinitselfandprecedestheactsofintentionality.Hence,notonly,asinHusserl'sversion,isthetranscendentalunityofacts(Husserl'sego,Scheler'sperson)greaterthanwhatisencompassedintheboundsofintentionality,buttheintendedthing(the"object")isalsogreaterthanwhatisgiveninintentionality.Constitutedinintentionalityisstrictlyandonlythegivennessorawarenessoftheexistentialrealityoftheactandthatwhichisactedupon.Eventhegivennessofthisreality,moreover,neverfullyexhauststhefullreality,existentialandessential,ofeithertheactoror

theobject.Theirbeing,thus,isnotessentiallyconstitutedintheintentionalrelationship.

Itcanbeseen,onceagain,thatthemetaphysicalrealisminScheler'sthoughtisendemictohisphilosophy.Intentionalityisnotconcernedprimarilywithknowingandcognition,butwithrevealingtheparticularrealityofwhatisgiven,layingonlyagroundworkatopofwhichcognitionmightlaterbeestablished.Intentionalitybecomesforhimthearenainwhichbyrevealingtheparticularmodelofbeingofagiventhingasanobject,thepersonobtainsanawarenessofhisownmodeofbeingasact.

82AlthoughbeingisconceivableonlyasobjectivebeinginHusserl'sintentionality,inScheler's,itoccursintwomodes:asobjectandasact.Itisthisinterpretationofreality,therefore,whichliesattheheartofthedifferencesbetweenthetwothinkers.Scheler'sowninterpretation,however,subtlyismodifiedinthedevelopmentofhisthought,andcanbeperceivedintworatherdifferentphases.Throughhismiddleperiod,roughlyfromtheMunichyearstothepointofhisfinalbreakwithCatholicism,intentionalityisportrayedwithastrongemphasisonthedeontologicalandvolitionalcharacterofacts.Hismarvelousworkonethicsofthisperiod,FormalisminEthicsandNon-FormalEthicsofValues,presentsintentionalityasjoinedtoapersonalunityofevaluativeacts.Thisunderstandingofintentionaliy,whichwillbetreatedindetailinalatersection,seesallpracticalactionasverymuchconstrainedandstructuredbytheperceptionofvalues,valueswhicharerealandobjectiveintheirownright.Givenbeforeanyotherrealityintheprimalexperienceofresistance,Schelerargues,isarealvalue.83Conationofthisrealvaluemustprecedeallotherrelationshipswithwhatisgiveninintentionality,includingknowledge,instrumentalutilityandsoforth.Inhislastperiod,thisinterpretationofintentionalityisradicallyrevised;heabandonsmuch

ofthephenomenological"approach"inordertofurtherconstructhismetaphysicsandphilosophicalanthropologyonthesecureunderstructureofthatwhichwaspreviouslyclarifiedinphenomenology.Here,totheextentitmaystillbespokenofas"intentionality,"theevaluativeaspectoftheconceptisrelegatedtolessprominentemphasisand,initsplace,thearenaofacts,resistanceandthegivennessofapowerfullifedrive[Gefühlsdrang]andapowerlessintentionofspiritcompriseamoredialecticalintentionality.84

ThephenomenologicalreductionisalsosubstantiallytiedtotheconceptofresistanceinScheler'sthought.RecallthatforHusserlandmanyphenomenologiststhereductioninvolvesthebracketingor

suspensionofthejudgementthatthatwhichisgiven"exists."Schelerwouldwishtounderscoretheword"judgement"inthisstatement(aboutaquarterofanySchelertextisitalicized).CreditingHusserlwithposingthis"basicproblemoftheoreticalphilosophyinaprofoundandoriginalway,"Schelerisstilldoubtfulofthefinalvalidityofthisunderstandingofthephenomenologicalreduction.Henotes:

The"elimination"or"suppression"ofthepositingofrealityalwaysimplicitinthenaturalworld-viewisbynomeanssatisfactory.Itisamatterherenotofsuppressingexistentialjudgment,butofstrippingawaythefactorofrealityitselfwhichfulfillsthemeaningofthepredicateintheexistentialjudgment.Or,itisaquestionofeliminatingtheactsfurnishingthisfactor.Merelytosuppressexistentialjudgmentischild'splay.Itisquiteanotherthingtosetasidethefactorofrealityitselfbyputtingoutofoperationthose(involuntary)functionswhichfurnishit.

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IfScheler'saim,however,istogofurtherthanthebracketingofbeliefofjudgementregardingexistence,ifhisaimisindeedto"setasidethefactorofrealityitself,"howisthistobeachieved?Here,Schelerreturnsoncemoretotheprimalexperienceofresistance.

Asnotedabove,thebasicconationofrealityisgivenintheexperienceofresistance.If,then,thefactorofrealityistobesetaside,theexperienceofresistancewhichfurnishesitmustbeputoutofoperation.ThisispreciselytheintentandprocessofScheler'sphenomenologicalreductionor"ideation."InthelastofhisworkswhichSchelersawpublishedbeforehisdeath,Man'sPlaceinNature,heexplainstheoperationofthisideationprocess.86Missinginhisportrayalisthemethod-likeprecisionwhichisobviousinHusserl,forheseestheideationprocessasanaturalhumanfunctionacquiredinmankind'sevolutionandanthropologicaldevelopment.Thespiritual

aspectofmanisablesomehowtodenyandrejecttheexistentialrealitywhichispresentedtohimasalivingcreature.AsSchelerelaborates,ideationisachievedbytruly"deactualizing"realityi.e.,bywithdrawingorrestrainingallintentionalactssothattheprimalexperienceofresistance,thatexperiencewhichfurnishesthegivennessofexistentialreality,doesnotoccur.Inthismanner,asinHusserl'searlynotionofideation,essenceisrevealedbehindtheexistential."Whatremainsafterthedeactualizingoftheworld,"heremarksinanotherlateessay,"isindeedthe'ideal'worldofessence."87

ChapterTwoPerson,Other,CommunityShortlybeforehisdeath,Schelerremarksthat"thequestions'Whatisman?,'and'Whatishisplaceinbeing?'haveinterestedme,morethananyotherphilosophicalquestionssincethefirstawakeningofmyphilosophicalconsciousness."

88Here,disclosed,istheprimaryconcernofScheler'sphilosophicalenterpriseunderstandingthehumanperson,hisplace,hisessenceandhisend.UnlikethebroaderontologicalconcernofMartinHeidegger,whosethoughtconveysmuchofthesameresonanceandsharesacommonphilosophicalheritageinthelifephilosophiesandphenomenology,Scheler'sconcernwithpersonbetraysaninterestnotsomuchinbeingitself,butinthespecialbeingofbeinghuman.

WithinthecurrentrenaissanceofSchelerscholarship,thisspecialdignitywhichSchelergrantsthehumanpersonisincreasinglyandsubtlymutedineffortstoincorporatehisthinkingintothevoguishantisubjectivismofpresent-dayContinentalthought.Suchefforts,thoughnotentirelybereftofmeritinasmuchashedoesmuchtobringthehumansubjectdownfromthepedastalofthepurecogito,failtoappreciatetheimplicitintentofScheler'sendeavor.Indeed,itisbutafewdecadessinceGabrielMarcelandotherearlyFrenchexistentialistsweresiftingtheworksofSchelerinsearchofsupportforathesisofsubjectivefreedom.But,Schelereludeseasyaccommodationwithineithertheontologist'sortheexistentialist'sperceptionsofthehumanperson.Thehumanpersonhashisplacewithinbeingandis,thus,lockedintheembraceofnatureandhistory.Yet,thepeculiarbeingofbeingahumanpersonisimportantly

differentfromthebeingoftheworldinwhichheisenmeshed.

This"specialness"associatedwiththehumanpersonisinterpretedvariouslyoverthedevelopmentofScheler'sthought.InhisearlyyearsatJena,heseesmanasbothaproductandparticipantinadivineprocessinwhichbydintofhisuniquenessmanisengagedin

thegradualrevelationofbeingtoitself.ThefirstworksofhisearlyyearsinassociationwithphenomenologyseeSchelercombiningaNietzscheanportrayalofthefailureofmodernmanwithhisownunderstandingofthehumanpersonasaunityofevaluative,spiritualacts.AttheheightofhisCatholicperiod,SchelerendorsestheChristianconceptionofman'sendlyinginsalvation.Thisisbound,further,withhispreviousnotionofpersonasaunityofacts.Withthis,sinceactsareintentionalandinseparablefromtheworld,analmostclassicalinterpretationofpersonaslinkbetweenthemundaneandthedivineisrefashioned.Finally,thissenseisgivenradicallynewmeaninginhislastperiodintheconceptoftheall-man[Allmensch].Aptlynamed,Scheler'sall-manattemptsatotalpictureofman,andispositedasamodel,oraleadingfigure[Vorbild],foranewage,the"eraofadjustment,"theseedsofwhichheseesabouthimintherevolutionsofart,literature,andphilosophyduringtheWeimaryears.ReminiscentofNietzsche'sovermanandperhapscertainthemesofAristotle,themodeloftheall-manistoserveastheguidingpatternnotonlyforthespiritoftheage,butforthetransformationofmanhimself.Amodelforthecompletionofthespecialbeingofbeinghuman,asSchelerwrites,theideaoftheall-man"istheideaofamanwhohasrealizedallhisessentialcapabilities."

89

Tobesure,thespecialdignitywhichhelendstheconceptsofmanandpersondonotstretchtoencompassavisionofmanwhichseeshimaswhollyplasticandutterlydevoidofessence.Nor,yet,doeshisunderstandingendowmanwithother-worldlyfacultiesbywhichmanentirelymightescapelivingintheworld.But,man'splaceinbeingissuchthatauthentic,practicalpolitics,isnotonlypossiblebutrequired.Aconsiderationofthispoliticalelement,however,mustawaitamorefulsomereviewoftheconceptofmaninScheler'sthought.Moreover,

becauseitisScheler'sunderstandingof"person"whichcomprisestheframeworkforsuchatheoryofpolitics,i.e.,personalismaspoliticaltheory,itistheelusivedynamicofthehumanpersontowardwhichattentionnowshifts.

ActandPerson

Schelerdefines"person"asa"concrete[also'ontic']unityofacts."90Atstakeinthisdefinitionisadistinctionbetweenthewayinwhichaperson"is"andthewayinwhich"things"are.Asintroducedabove,suchadistinctionstemsfromScheler'scontentionthatbeingisoftwomodes:being-as-objectandbeing-as-act.Theperson,

aunityofacts,properlybelongstothelattermode.Things,incontrast,belongtothemodeofbeing-as-object.Ofthetwo,being-as-object,perhapsnottooironically,ismorereadilygraspedandexplained.Scheleridentifiesitasthepredominantunderstandingofrealityinthepresentdayandhetracestheoriginsofthispredominancetotheemergenceofatypeofmanheterms"thebourgeois"andtothepenchantofthebourgeoisforappraising,ordering,classifyingandcounting.

91Atthesametime,Schelerfollowsthedeeperanthropologicalrootsoftheobjecttothespeciesacquisitionoftheabilitytodistinguishand,thus,tomanipulateobjectiveelementsintheenvironment.Unlikelowerformsoflifewhichsurvivesolelybyadaptingtothesurroundingworld,mancanalsoadaptandmanipulateobjectiveelementsoftheworldenvironmenttoprovideforhissurvivalandlivelihood.92Therefore,theoriginoftheobjectitselfandtheoriginofthepredominanceoftheobjectinmodernitybothariseinconjunctionwithatransformationofman,onebeinganthropologicalandtheotherhistorical.

ItmightbeobjectedthatthereislittlenewgroundtrodinScheler'sargument,that,forexample,Diltheymorethoroughlyandoriginallytreatsthehistoricaltransformation,orthatBergsonmoresensitivelydiscussestheanthropological.ItmightevenfurtherbearguedthatScheler,inregardtobothforms,isstilllocked,justasDiltheyandBergson,inconceivingtheobjectonlyasa"target"ofsomesortofthinkingsubject.Thisperception,whilevalidinasmallsense,clearlymissesthemarkinalargersense,fortheuniquenessofScheler'sthesisarisesfromitsnon-dependenceuponathinking(orwilling)ego.Heassertsthattheideaofobjectinthephilosophiesofmostmodernsfollowsfromthepositingofanegocogitowithevery

experienceoftheworld.

Thatis,thisegoisnotacorrelatethatisaddedtotheunityandidentityoftheobject."Object"heremeansonlyasomethingthatisidentifiedthroughtheego.Identityisnot(asitisforus)anessentialcharacteristicoftheobject....[I]dentityisoriginallyintheego,anditisfromtheegothattheidentityofanobjectisborrowed.93

Hence,Schelercontendsthatmodernthoughtcannotescapetheperceptionofobjectbeingaconstitutionofthethinkingsubjectbecauseitreliesonthethinkingegoasanindividuatedcognitiveagencyfromwhichallactionproceeds.TothisSchelerresponds,ononehand,thatthebeingofanobjectisinnosensewhollyaconstitu-

tionofthesubject.Ontheotherhand,hecontendsthatthethinkingegoisitselfonlyanobjectpresentbeforethesubjectivityofthehumanperson.

Thefirstresponse,thatbeing-as-objectisnotapredicateoftheego,iscongruentwithScheler'srenownedphenomenologicalrealismandhisevenmorenon-Husserlianpositionthattherealityofanythingisnotexhaustedinintentionality.Somewhatmoreradically,theresponsealsoenvisionsthebeingofanobjectas,inherently,objective.Inotherwords,Schelerconsidersthatobjectsareobjectsnotbecausetheyareobjectifiedbyanysubject,butbecausetheirverymodeofbeingisbeing-as-object.Anobjectisanobject,ontologically.Acautiousclarificationmightbeinterjectedinthis,however,forSchelerdoesnotabsolutelyrejectaconstitutiverelationshipbetweenpersonandworld("subject"and"object").Suchconstitutiondoesexistatamoresuperficiallevel.Asnotedabove,theobjectsoftheworld,naturalandhistorical,establishtheframeworkofpotentialitiesandpossibilitiesforaction.Actions,andbyinferencethehumanperson,findexpressiononlywithinthecontextofthissituationintheworld.Clearly,thespecificpotentialactivitiesofthepersonare,infact,constitutedbytheobjectsoftheworld.Obversely,butinasimilarmanner,Scheleralsograntsthatobjectsacquiremeaningswhichareconstitutedforandthroughpersons.Therelationshipbetweenpersonandworldatthislevel,therefore,isoneinwhichthemeaningofobjectsandpotentialforpersonalactionsareconstitutedindeed,aremutuallyconstitutive.Yet,atthemoreprimary,ontologicalstratum,Scheleradamantlyinsiststhatobjectandpersonareindependentofeachotheranddistinctinbeing.Themeaningandfunctionofobjectsintheworldareconstitutedinrelationwithpersons,buttheobjectiveessenceoftheirbeingisnot.Theframeworkofexistenceintheworldconstitutesthemediumandpossibilityofexpressionforpersonalactions,butthebeingofthepersonperseisautonomous.

94

Inconsiderationofthesecondresponse,Schelerarguesthattheegoisbutanotherobjectamidstaworldofobjects.AnticipatingsimilarpronouncementsbylaterphenomenologistsandexistentialistsandelaboratedpriortoanypublishedaccountsofHusserl'soppositeturn,hespeakspointedlyagainstthepossibilityofwhathetermsthe"transcendentalego,"whetherasa"consciousnessassuch"orevena"speciesconsciousness."

Forthe"ego,"includingthe"egoness"inallindividualegos,isonlyan"object"(ineverysenseoftheword)foracts,especiallyforactshavingthenatureof"innerperception."Wemeettheegoonlyinthisperception....[b]uttheegoisneitherthepointofdepartureforthisapprehensionnortheproducerofessence.Itisnotanessencewhichunilaterally''founds"allotheressencesorevenallessencesofacts.

95

Insupportforthis,Schelerinphenomenologicalfashionexploresthenotionof"innerperception."Heconcludesthatsomethingis,infact,giveninsuchperception,thatamongotherthingsaselforegoisperceived.Becauseitisthus"perceived,"itmustbelongtothemodeofbeing-as-object.RatherinsufficientlydiscussedbyScheler,thethrustofthisisdirectedtowardmakingasharpdistinctionbetweentheegoandthepersonbetweentheobjectifiableaspectofmanandthenon-objectifiableunityofactswhichistheperson.TheunnamedadversaryinhiseffortsmaypossiblybeHusserl'sintentionality.SchelerseemstoforeseethatHusserl's"consciousness-of-something"necessitatesatranscendentalego.Arguingelsewherethatallcognitionisarelationshipbetweenobjects,anontologicalrelationship,heapparentlyconcludesthat"consciousness-of-something"isaperceivingrelationshipbetweenathingandanego-object.96Thisrelationship,moreover,isnotanobject,butanactivity.Hence,therelationshipbetweenegoandotherobjectsintheworld,orbetweenanyobjects,restsuponafurtherground.

This"furtherground"isaunityinacts.Onlyaslinkedthroughactsdoobjectsexistinrelationwithoneanother.Theseparateness,distinctnessandindividuationofobjectsissuchthatonlythatwhichisnon-objectivecangroundtherelationbetweenthem.Illustratedinthisisanaspectofbeing-as-actwhichisofparamountimportanceforScheler'sthoughtand,ultimately,forpersonalismaspoliticaltheory.

Asthatmodeofbeingbywhichobjectsaremeaningfullyrelated,actisitselfrevealedtobenon-objectifiable.Schelernotes,that"anactisneveranobject;foraccordingtothenatureofthebeingofacts,theyareexperiencedonlyintheirexecutionandgiveninreflection."Eveninreflection,hementionsfurther,anactisnotanobject.Reflectionaccompaniesanact,butdoesnotobjectifyit,andnoactcanbeperceivedintheobjectsensebywhichegoisperceivedininnerperception.97Thislatterisakeeninsight,onedeservingcloserscrutiny,especiallyfrompoliticaltheorists.Reflection,itwouldseem,doesnot

necessitateobjectification.Theactsofthesubjectareaccessibleonlyintheirexecutionor,asshallbeseen,onlyintheco-experiencingofpersonswithpersons.

Theforegoingbecomescrucialwhenitisrememberedthatthepersonsharesact'smodeofbeingandisdiscussedasa"concreteunityofacts."Thisisakeypoint,onewhichistoofrequentlymisunderstood.Comprehendablesolelyaspure,unreifiedexecution,actescapesanymomentofhypostasis.Itisbeyondobjectificationandinconceivabaleasathingorsubstance.Theperson,aunityofacts,islikewiseoutsidetherealmofobjects;itisnotathingorsubstance.And,imperatively,itcannotandmustnotbetreatedassuch.Yet,tosketchtheconceptsonegativelye.g.,notanobject,thingorsubstanceaffordsonlythebarestglimpseofthepersonhimself.Whatexactlyistheunityofactswhichdefinestheperson?Schelerisperhapsover-muchrestrainedinhisanswer.Everyact,heexplains,isintrinsicallyindividualinitselfandessentiallydifferentfromallotheracts.Therootofthisindividuationliesinthefactthatactsareeveractstowardsomething,thingswhichthemselvesrequireactstobridgetheirmonad-likeseparateness.JustasHusserl,therefore,Scheler,wouldbefacedatthispointwiththechaosofacosmosofdisparatephenomenadevoidofmeaningandunity.But,whereHusserlturnstohistranscendental,phenomenologicalegotosurmountthisdilemma,Schelerisleeryoftheimplicitidealismandtheepistemologicalsubject-objectproblemsuchanegowouldbringinitstrain.Respondingdifferently,heundercutsthesubject-objectdilemmaberedefiningtheegoasanobjectamongobjectsandbypositingthatanyrelationbetweenegoandobjectwouldbeconstitutedbyadeepermodeofbeing.

Toobject,asmanycriticshavedone,thatScheler'smoveonlypostponesanddoesnotovercomethesubject-objectdilemmaimplyingthatherelies,andsuccumbsintheendtoanobfuscatedCartesiansubjectmaybeprematureandnotadequatelysensitivetohis

argument.For,hedoesnotstopwiththeredefinitionoftheegoasanobjectgroundedonanothersubstantialsubject.Personisnotasubstance,anditisnotseparatefromtheworldbecauseitisaunityofessentiallydifferentactswhichnecessarilyarejoinedtotheworld.Thus,hewrites,"thepersonistheconcrete[i.e.,'real'],essentialunityofactsofdifferentessences,""the'foundation'ofessentiallydifferentacts."

98

Thestatusofthesubject,followingfromtheabove,becomesonewhichisquitedifferentfromthesubjectofDescartes,Kantandeven

Husserl.Itisnotacognitiveprocessoragency,butanon-goingconstellationofactswhichsurroundsandgivesunitytovastlydifferingspecificacts.Nonetheless,itremainsstillasubject.Schelercontendsthatitisnotexhaustedinanyparticularactionorinthesumofallactions.Servingasthe"foundation"forallpossibleacts,itoperatesusingthetermratherlooselyasaprioriandtranscendentalforeveryspecificact.Whilenotentirelynoveltophilosophy,beingreminiscentofFichte'sobjectionstoKant'snoumenalsubject,suchassertionsremainprovocative,especiallywithintheframeworkofwhatisostensiblyphenomenology.Yet,Schelerevenmoreprofoundlyreaffirmstheperson'snon-substantialandnon-cognitivestatus,contendingthathissubjecthasbeingonlyintheperformanceofitsacts.Thus,hecommentsinoneplace,that"itbelongstotheessenceofthepersontoexistandtolivesolelyintheexecutionofintentionalacts,"andherecapitulatesinanotherplace,that''person'is'onlyastheconcreteunityofactsexecutedbythepersonandonlyintheexecutionoftheseacts."

99Literally,itwouldappear,tobe(inthesenseofbeingaperson)istodo.

Eventhoughhesucceedsinovercomingmodernity'sego,theemphasisonacts,whicharebydefinitionintentional,coupledwithadefinitionofthesubjectasa"transcendental"constellationofacts,lendsastrongexistentialistflavortotheplaceofsubjectivityinScheler'sthought.Sharpeningthefocusonhissubject,however,revealslimitstowardunderstandingScheler'sprojectinthisfashion.Thepersonis"transcendental"onlyinhisfunctionvis-a-vishisspecificacts.Furthermore,actsarethemselvesdependentonobjectsasthemediumfortheirexpression,andtherebyoccuronlywithintheframeworkofaparticularsituationintheworld.Alongsimilarlines,

Schelerelaboratesthreeareaswhichrevealtheneedtocomprehendsubjectivityasembeddedin,andexistingthrough,objectivebeing:inactsandvalues,inpersonandworld,andinspirit[Geist]anddrive.100

Inthefirstarea,theareasofactsandvalues,Schelerpresentsatheoryofactionwhichseesallactsasdependentupontheperceptionofandaninclinationtowardsomevalue.Valuesareobjectivelyrealinhisthinkingandareperceivedandevaluatedpriortoanyandallotherconationincludingreasoning.Intentionalactsareperformedfortheacquisitionofthesevalues.Consequently,inScheler'stheory,unlikethe"actphilosophies"ofmanyotherwriterssuchasSchopenhauer'sandSorel's,actsarenotseentoemergefromablindwilling,butfroma"knowing"discernmentofvalue.Accordingly,actsaredemonstratedtobelimitedtotherangeofpossibilitiesforex-

ecutionwhichmightbeaffordedbythecomplexofvalueswhichfacesthem.

101Thisvalue-complexcorrespondstowhatSchelerreferstoasthe"practicalworld,"whichinturnistheobjectivebeingwithwhichthesecondareaisconcernedtheareaofpersonandworld.Justasactcorrespondswithanobjectivevalue,sotootheperson(aunityofacts)correspondstoaworld(acomplexofvalues).Likeacts,thepersonisabletoexpresshispersonhoodonlywithintherangeofpossibilitiesgrantedbyhisindividualworld.Inotherwords,apersonfindshimselfamidstaworldwhichestablishestheboundsofhispersonalexistence.Tothisextent,thepersonisashisworldis.Dependentupontheworldforthepossibilityofhisexpression,moreover,personisinseparablefromhissituationinthisobjectivereality.102Finally,inthethirdarea,theareaofspiritanddrive,Scheler'slaterworksdepictasomewhatradicalizedversionofthissameembeddednessofsubjectivityinobjectiveprocesses.Thedepictioncentersonadiscussionoftherolesofspiritanddrive,wheremanisseenasasthemeetinggroundofthesetworealities.Here,theclaimismadethatspiritwhichistherealmofactandsubjectivityispowerlessinandofitself.Spirit,bymeansofanalmostFreudiansublimation,onlyacquiresefficacywithintheexistentialworldbychanelingthepotencyoftheobjectivelifedrivetowardsitsends.Likeactandperson,spiritasitexistsintheworldisverymuchareflectionofitssituationandisabletoimpactuponitssituationonlytotheextentthatitcandrawupontheforcesoflifewhicharereadyathand.Thus,ineachofthesethreeareasthesubjectiveisconstrainedbytheobjectiveforbothitsmediumofexpressionanditsefficacy.

AnintriguingpictureofapoliticalsubjectcoalescesaroundtheideaofScheler'sperson.Notobjectifiable,thepersonascitizenoughtnot

betreatedandmanipulatedassomethingorobject.Existingonlyintheperformanceofactsintheworld,yetretainingareflectiveelementasgiveninactsthemselves,thepersonevokesimagesoftheclassicalcitizenofpracticalwisdomandofthemorecurrentunderstandingofpoliticalresponsibilityaspraxis.Indeed,Scheler'sunderstandingofthepersonlendssupporttothosewhowouldseea"transformedpolitics"lyingbeyondtheso-called"endofpolitics"onewhichperhapswouldserveascomplementtoScheler'slooked-for"transformedman."Whether,however,Scheleristrulycapableofestablishingthepersoninthemannerheattemptsinhisphilosophy,remainsanunresolvedquestion.Hispresentationoftheconceptisfarfrombeingatidy,systematicthesis.Morethanmerelylackingthepolishandattentiontodetailwhichoneexpectsfrom

academicphilosophers,thereexistanumberofinconsistenciesandinadequatelydevelopedarguments.Theserequirecarefulconsiderationbeforeanydefenseofpersonalismaspoliticaltheorycanbesustained.Further,anydiscussionofScheler'sconceptionofthepersonsolelyinregardtohisobjectiveandsubjectivestatusleavestheconceptappearingaltogetherdisembodied.Scheler,however,issharplycriticalofanyreductionoftherichnessoftheconcrete,realpersontoghostlyabstraction;and,thus,concernshimselfnotonlywithitsontologicalstatus,butwiththeperson'splace,historyanddestiny.

GenesisOfPersonOntogenesisAndMorphogenesis

Drawinguponwide-rangingresearchesfromasfarafieldasGestalttheoryandanimalpsychology,Schelerillustratestheplaceandgenesisofthepersoninhisowncarefulappraisalofmanyofthefindingsofpsychologyandbiology.Withregardtobothofthese,personhoodemergesthroughanascendinghierarchyofpre-personalstagesfromthemostcontingentanddeterminedtotheleastso.However,aswillbecomeclear,Schelernowherearticulatesanirrepressiblehistoricalordevelopmentalprocessrelativetotheemergenceofthepersondespitethetacitteleologyapparentinhishierarchicalcategories.Neitherdoesheadmitanysortofcausalconnectionbetweenthesestages,forthelowerordersarenotthe"cause"ofthehigher.Thisisnot,however,todenyalldependencyandorderinhisschemas.Despitewhatheseesasthedifferenceofessencebetweeneachoftheindividualcategoriesinhishierarchicaltypologies,Schelercontendsthatthereisachainofdependencywhichlinksthemall,eachhighercategorybeingpossibleonlyuponthefulfillmentofthepreceding,lowerone.

103Thelowerorders,thus,servetomakepossibletheconditionsinwhichthehighermightemerge,muchasaplantrequiressoilinwhich

togrow.

TheontogeneticorpsychologicalgroundsofScheler'spersonarespecificallyexploredinmanyofhisworks.Nowhere,however,doestherigorandcareofhistreatmentofthetopicapproachthatofhisrenownedworkTheNatureofSympathy.104Herehisinvestigationcombinesthethenmostcurrentempiricalstudiesofchilddevleopmentandlinguisticswithperhapshismostpreciseandthoroughutilizationofthephenomenologicalmethod.Fromhiseffortsitbecomesclearthatman'searliestexperiencesdonotincludeanexperienceorawarenessoftheself.105Humanconsciousnessbeginswithoutanego,withoutreflection,completelyatonewiththestream

ofexperiencesacquiredinitsenvironment.Aninfant'sfirstworld,sotospeak,isundifferentiatedbetweenegoandalterego,orbetweentheselfandthesurroundingsocialandnaturalmilieu.Instead,Schelercontends,itisacompletelyunindividuatedfluxofexperienceswhereintheinfantexistsinseamlessunitywithitssocialandnaturalenvironment.Itisonlysubsequentlycuriously,bymeansoffirstisolatingindividualobjectsintheenvironmentabouthimthatheisabletodetachhisindividualpersonalityfromitspreviousimmersioninitssituation.Gradually,viathisslowdissociationalprocess,thehumanpersonisabletodistinguishhispersonalsubjectivityfromtheobjectiverealitieswithinwhichitisenmeshed.Inferringfromthis,adevelopmentalsequencecanbeperceivedwhereatitshighestpointeventheisolationoftheegoanobjectamongobjectsisachieved.Atthisleveltheself,orperson,emergesinfullstatusaswholly"other"thanthemenagerieofobjects,substancesandthingsinwhichhefindshimself.

Mirroringtheontogenesisofthepersoninpsychology,SchelerturnstothebiologicalunderpiningsofthepersonbypartitioningthephenomenonoflifeintofivecategoriesasshownundertheheadingofmorphogenesisinTable1.

106Thelowestcategory,Schelerreferstoasthe"vegetative,"andisseenascomprisedofonlythemostprimitive"vitalimpulse,"abasicurgetowardgrowthandthemaintenanceoflife.Lifewhichbelongspurelytothiscategoryplantsandmicrobesiswhollywithoutconsciousness,evenwithoutthetrueperceptionorsensation.Thesimplelevelofactivitywhichoccurshereisonewhichislittlemorethanablindresponsetothevagariesofthesurroundingenvironment.Withoutanymeasureofreflective"feedback"intheperformanceofacts,lifeatthislevelexistsasentirelysubmergedinitsenvironmentandastotallyunabletodifferentiateitsownbeingfromtheobjective

worldinwhichitfindsitself.Thistotalsubmersionoftheorganisminitsenvironment,whichSchelerdesignatesas"ec-static''existence,playsacrucialroleinthedevelopmentoftheperson.Itistheoriginfromwhichallpsychiclifearises;allhighercategoriesoflifedrawuponrootswhichburrowdeeplyintotheprimallifeurgeofthevegetative.Furthermore,itisatthislowestlevelthatthemostbasicexperienceoftherealityofexistenceishad;fortheworldisexperiencedandforhighercategories"known"toberealbytheresistancewhichtheobjectiveworldposestothisvitalimpulse.107

Morecomplexthantheprimitive"vegetative"category,thenextlevel,"instinct,"revealstwosubtledistinctionsfromthelowerlevel.

First,organismsareperceivedasnascentlyabletodissociateorisolatecertainelementsintheirenvironmentfromthefluxoftheenvironmentasawhole.Second,followingfromthedissociation,organismsoftheinstinctivecategorypossessthebeginningsofpurposiveaction.Thecapacityforthisisnot,however,anaccomplishmentofanyindividualorganismperse,butreflectsonlyagenetic"stimulus-response"patternwhichisingrainedwithinthespecies.Allflatworms,forexample,wouldrespondtoagivenstimulusinpreciselythesamemanner,theactionsofeachorganismpreciselyidenticaltotheactionsofothers.Thus,forScheler,instinctisintegratedwiththemorphogenesisofthespeciesandfunctionsincloseassociationwithanorganism'sphysiologyandgeneticevolution.

108Thereisaunityofpre-knowledgeandactionatthisleveli.e.,thereisnomore

Table1.ParallelTypologiesAssociatedwithOriginofthePerson

"knowledge"athandthanthatwhichisnecessaryfortheperformanceofthenextstepoftheactionsequencegivenininstinct.Moreover,thisknowledgeisimmediatelygivenwithexperience,asifprogrammedintothegeneticsofthespecies.Lifeatthislevel,nonetheless,isabletodirectitsactionstowardspecificobjectsoraimswhicharedistinguishedfromthebackgroundofitssituationintheworld.

Thethirdcategoryoflifeisacontinuationofthedevelopmentofthecapacityfordissociation.Thislevel,whichSchelerdesignatesasthelevelofassociativememoryor"habit,"isthelevelofconditionedreflec.

109Actionsbyorganismscorrespondingtothisleveldemonstratethefirstevidenceofindividuation.Eachorganismisabletoestablishaspecificindividualpatternofbehaviororhabitbaseduponfeedbacksensationsassociatedwtihactsof"trialanderror"directedtowardsomethingperceivedinexperience.Inperformingsometasks,thus,apigeonisabletomodifyitsbehaviorandestablishahabitofcertainactionswhenrepetitivepositiveornegativereinforcementisexperienced.Habitualactionsrepresentafurtheringofthedissociationoftheorganismfromtheenvironment,requiringtheorganismtointerjectadegreeofpreferenceinatleastsomeofitsactions.

ThefourthcategoryoflifeinvolveswhatSchelerterms"practicalintelligence."110Schelerarguesthatanorganismbehavesintelligentlyifitactsspontaneouslyandwithapurposewhenfacedwithapreviouslyunexperiencedsituation.Sodoingisaqualitativeleapfromthe"trialanderror"behaviorwhichwouldcharacterizeorganismsofthepreviouslevel.Practicalintelligenceisseenasaproblemsolvingenterprisewhichresultsinactionswhichareutterlynewand

unlearned.AsSchelerdescribestheactivityoforganismsofthiscategory,thereispresupposedanabilityintheorganismtoanalyticallydrawoutusefulinterrelationshipsbetweenvariousobjectsintheenvironment,andonthisbasistosyntheticallymanipulatetheenvironmenttotheorganism'sparticularpurposes.Additivelyaccumulatingastoreoflearningfromthisprocess,theorganismwouldfurtherbeabletousefullybuilduponpreviousexperiencesfortheacquisitionofevengreaterutility.Hence,thereisagainatthislevelanincreaseoftheabilityoftheorganismtodissociateitselffromitssituationintheworld.Animalsbehavingintelligentlyareabletoutilizesuchelementsoutsideofreferencetothehere-and-now.

ThefifthandfinalcategoryinScheler'sschemaoflifeisthelevelofspirit,orGeist.Here,asisseenwiththehighestleveloftheonto-

geneticschema,afundamentaltransformationoccurs.Insomemanner,Schelerevenfindsitinappropriatetoincludethiscategorywiththeothersofthebiologicalschema,foritrepresentsmuchmorethanmerelyanotherincrementaladvanceinanorganism'scapacityfordissociation.Itradicalizesdissociation,astheorganismthepersonisabletodissociateevenhisownegoandpsychologicalfunctions.PerhapsthelevelofGeist,therefore,mightbeperceivedasinherentlyandessentiallyopposedtotheobjectiverealmtowhichlifegenerallybelongs.Indeed,inhislastperiod,Schelermakessuchanargument,claimingthisnewlevel

...transcendswhatwecall"life"inthemostgeneralsense.Itisnotastageoflife,especiallynotastageoftheparticularmodeoflifewecallpsyche,butaprincipleopposedtolifeassuch,eventolifeinman.Thus,itisagenuinelynewphenomenonwhichcannotbederivedfromthenaturalevolutionoflife,butwhich,ifreducibletoanything,leadsbacktotheultimateGroundofBeingofwhich"life"isaparticularmanifestation.

111

Clearly,Schelerinvokeshisdualityofbeinginthispassage.Spiritisofthemodeofbeing-as-act,andcannotbeunderstoodasderivedfromthealmostevolutionarysequenceofstageswhichmarkthelowercategories.Spiritthelevelofpersonbecomesthebasisbywhichmanispossessedofaspecialplaceinreality.Althoughabsolutelypowerlessinandofitself,requiringasublimationofthepotenciesofthelowerlevelsoflifeforitsefficacy,spirityetrepresentstheoriginofpersonalfreedominacts.Thepeculiarityofthisfreedomisitsutterdependenceupontheobjectivebeingoftheworldforitsoperation.Spiritisutterlyinseparablefromlifeandlife'splaceintheworld,whileitisneverwhollyimmersedwithinit.

Returningtotheontogenesisorpsychologicalrootsoftheperson,it

canbeconcludedthatthepersonsimilarlydrawsuponthemoreprimitivepsychologicalstagesofthepersonalityforhisefficacyasdoesspiritonlife.Responsibleandfreepersonhoodrequiresdeepreservoirsintherawerlowerlevels,justasthematureindividualityofthepersonstandsatopaninitialmilieuwheretheselfisundifferentiatedfromthesocialandnaturalbackground.112Personhoodisnot,then,aseveringoftherootstothesemoreprimalpsychologies.Itdrawsontheundefinedexperiencesofthepre-selfandpre-personastaprootsforitsmorerareandsubtleexistence.

PersonAndOther,SocialityAndIntersubjectivity

Scheler'sworkonthenatureofsympathyalsooutlinesaphenomenologyoftherelationshipbetweenthepersonandtheotherintheguiseofanextendedcritiqueofethicaltheorieswhichrestonthefeelingofsympathy.

113Inaddition,theworkinitiatesadiscussionofanapproachtotheproblemofintersubjectivitywhichhasitsbasisinwhatSchelerfindsasthegenuineperson-otherrelationship.Insubsequentworks,theinsightsgleanedintheseareasareelaboratedtoformintegralelementsofhisethics,hisepistemologyandhissociology,andestablishthesubstanceofthecommunitywhichisthenecessarygroundforturningpersonalismtotheproblemofthepoliticalcommunity.

Brieflydiscussedintheprevioussection,thestartingpointforScheler'sunderstandingoftheperson-otherrelationship,andallsociality,liesinhisinvestigationintotheontogeneticstagesoftheperson.Aswasnoted,heperceivestheinitialstageoftheprocesstobeonewhichiswhollydevoidofindividuation,wherethehumaniswithoutself-consciousnessorotherself-awarenessandisunabletodifferentiateitsownexperiencesfromthewebofexperiencesofitssocialmilieu.Scheleratonepointwritesofthisstage,thatitis"animmediateflowofexperiences,undifferentiatedasbetweenmineandthine,whichactuallycontainsbothourownandothers'experiencesintermingledandwithoutdistinction."114Man'saprioriworld,sotospeak,isatotallysocialoneonewhichSchelertermstheMitwelt.Inhisgenesis,atleast,man'simageinScheler'sthoughtsomewhatresemblestheancientpictureofthezoonpolitikon.Yet,aswasalsonoted,thehumanbeingonthebasisofthisprimalsocialworldisgraduallyabletodissociatehisindividualegoandultimatelyhis

personfromtheenvelopingsocialmilieu,muchasachildfirstdiscoversandgreedilyrejoicesintheselfonlyideallytomatureintopersonhoodthatisabletoappreciateandcarefortheconcernsofothers.Hedoesnotsee,ofcourse,anyguaranteesinthisprocess.Humanscannotbeprogrammedlikeautomatonstoclimbstep-by-steptowardpersonhood.Itrequiresneigherapsychologistnorasociologisttorecognizethatcivilizationisnotpossessedofanabundanceof"ideallymature"persons.Schelersuggestsonlythatthisisthepatternoftheemergenceoftheperson.Thegenesiscanunfoldfromanunconsciousandunitentionalmilieuwithoutdistinctionbetweenselfandother,throughaggressiveandadolescentegoism,towardgenuineindividualfreedomandtheconcomitantacceptanceofother-directedconcernandsocialresponsibility.

Complementingtheontogenesisofsocialityintheperson,Schelerproposesasimilartypologyofstagesasevidencedinthephylogenesisofhumansociality.GoingbeyondFerdinandToennies'dochotomousdivisionofsocialityintoGemeinschaftandGesellschaftandevenbeyondthetripartiteanalysisofHegeltowhichitisobviouslyindebted,Scheler'sisafour-tieredtypology.AspresentedinhisFormalisminEthicsandNon-FormalEthicsofValues,thebottom-mostlevelofsocialityistheherd,atwhichleveltheindividualistotallysubmergedinabeast-likesocialorganism.

115Abovethis,atthenextlevel,isthelifecommunity,wherethebarestshadowoftheindividualcanbediscerned.Whatsmallmeasureofindividualityisaffordedinthelifecommunity,however,wouldbeanindividualitydeterminedandcreatedbythecommunityforthelargerpurposesofthissocialwhole.Schelerdescribessuchindividualityasanappendageofcorporatecommunity,muchasone'shandhasanindividualcharacterbutismeaninglesswithoutthewholebody.116Atthenextlevelofthetypology,thesociety,whichSchelerlikenstothemodernindividualistsociety,morecompletelydifferentiatedindividualsappear.Individualsatthislevelsucceedintranscendingtheunderstandingofthemselvesasonlyobjectsormeansforthevariousendsofthecommunity.However,insodoing,thecommunityceasestoexistinitsownrightandbecomesmerelyameanstothemanydisparateendsofthenumerousindividuals.Men,similarly,byassertingtheprimacyoftheself,isolatethemselvesfromtheirfellowswhoatbestbecomeobjectifiedmeansfortheego'sends.Indenyingthecommunitytoasserttheself,Schelercontendsthattheindividualsofthesocietyfailtoachieveafundamentalaspectofthetrueindividualismofthepersoni.e.,thepersonaldignityandrespectfortheselfwhichisonlyfreelygivenintheeyesofone'sfellows.Byviewingothersasobjectstheindividualhereishimselfobjectifiedintheperspectiveofeachofhisfellows.117

Personcommunity,thehighestlevelofsociality,envisionsatranscendencenotonlyoftheselfasanobjectofthecommunity,butofthecommunityandothersasobjectsoftheself.Inthisinstance,thecommunitywhichdisappearsasaseparateexistenceatthelevelofthesociety,isreformedandtransformed.Inonesense,acceptingthepersonhoodandinherentdignityofotherseliminatesthesubject-objectrelationshipbetweentheselfandothers.Inanothersense,however,personalindividualityismostdeeplyaffirmedintheacceptanceofone'sownpersonhoodintheeyesofothersandintheembraceofthecommunity.118ThisconceptionofthepersoncommunityissomewhatreinterpretedbySchelerinthesubsequentlypublished

FormalismunderthetermGesamtperson[collectiveperson],whichhedefinesas"theunityofindependent,spiritual,andindividualsingleperson'in'anindependent,spiritual,andindividualcollectiveperson."

119Itisacollectivityinthesenseofthelifecommunity,butitisactuallyandhistoricallyincorporatedbythefreeintentionsofindividualsasisreminiscentofthesociety.TheGesamtpersonorpersoncommunity,however,isnotsomuchacreationofindividuals(aswouldinfactbethecaseinthesociety)butisratherconcomitantwiththeexistenceofthepersonhimself,owingtothecharacterofpersonhood.Thus,heclaims,that"anindividualpersonandacollectiveperson'belong'toeveryfiniteperson,"for''bothfactorsareessentiallynecessarysidesofaconcretewholeofpersonandworld."120

Inmorefamiliarterminology,itisclearthattheparallelcharactersofScheler'sontogeneticandphylogeneticstagesofpersonandsocialityofferanintriguingcomplementtoatheoryofintersubjectivityinvolvingperson,otherpersonsandthecommunalperson.Incircularfashion,heillustratesthattheindividualispossibleonlyonthefoundationoftheengulfingnaturalsocialityand,yet,thatthehighestsocialityrepresentsthechoiceofindividualpersonswhoforegotheirnarrowselfhoodbyjoininginthepersoncommunity.

Schelerthephenomenologist,however,isnotcontentwithuncoveringmerelythesocialandindividualbackgroundofintersubjectivity.Hismainconcern,indeed,istheillustrationofitsactualoperationandfunctioning.Moreimportantly,heseekstoclarifythestatusoftherelationshipbetweenthepersonandtheotherbywhichthepersonisableultimatelytojoininthepersoncommunity.Towardthis,Scheler'sthesis,again,beginswiththeconceptoftheperson.Asnoted

previously,thepersoncannotbereifiedorobjectified.Itis"essentially"differentfromallobjectsincludingthepsychophysicalobjectwhichistheegobecauseperson'smodeofbeingisbeing-as-act.Asaconstellationofactsandexistingonlyintheperformancethe"doing"ofacts,thepersonhimselfisbeyondobjectification.Inthesameway,otherpersonsarealsobeyondobjectification.Aspureexecution,thebeingofothersescapestheobjectificationtowhichevenone'sownegosuccumbs."ifactcanthereforeneverbeanobject,"Schelerwrites,"thenthepersonwholivesintheexecutionofactscanafortiorineverbeanobject."Equally,"ifweareconcernedwithotherpersons,"hecontinues,"thereisnoobjectification."121Agreeing,thus,withImmanualKantthattheother"mustneverbeconsideredathing,"Schelerbelongsintherichtraditionofthosewhofindamoralimperativeinthattheotheroughtnever

betreatedasameansbutalwaysasauniquelocusofsubjectivityequalindignitywithone'sownperson.

122Thereare,however,immediatelyencounteredlimitsinrepresentingSchelerintheKantiananalogy,forintheendKant'spersonisfoundbySchelertobenomorethanacognitiveego,anegoinlightofwhichothers,too,areabletobeperceivedasmerelythinkingobjects.HereSchelerarguesthatKant'sfailureliesintheformalizingofthesubject.Indutifullyconsideringall"persons"asformallyidenticalinregardtotheiressentialnature,theotherisunderstoodaslessthanthefullpersonheis.Kant'sformalism,likeallformalisms,ineluctablycanconceiveofmenonlyas"theXofcertainpowers"orthe"Xofsomekindofrationalactivity"i.e.,asanobject.123

Scheler'srevelationoftheessentialnon-objectifiabilityoftheotheropenswidevistasofpossibilityforethics,morality,socialphilosophyandpolticaltheory.Littleimaginationisrequiredtoforeseethecharacterofapoliticalcommunityanditspoliticswhereineachpersonisaffordedtreatmentappropriatetotheincomparablyuniquedignityofherpersonhood.Onthisbasis,issuggestedatransformationofthepracticeofpolitics.Scheler'spersonalismwouldseecitizensrecognizingtheirfollowsnotasequaltothemselves,butasentirelytranscendentaltotheobjectificationbywhichanymeasureofequalitymightbeachievedanideawhichinsomesensemaybemorerevolutionarythanmereequality.Atthisjuncture,theradicalnatureofScheler'spersonalismhis"radicalhumanism"asoneauthortermsitbecomesstartlinglyevident.124Wheretheliberalmovementswerefoundedontheradicalizationofthemedievalunderstandingofman,i.e.,endowingmanwithformalorsovereignequality,andwherethesocialistmovementssimilarlyradicalizedtheliberalconceptionby

endowingmanwithmaterialequality,Schelerwouldtranscendthenotionofequalityitself.Beyondequalityliestheinestimabledignityandabsoluteuniquenessoftheotherasaperson.

Yet,theveryradicalnessofScheler'snotionofthestatusoftheother,despitetheutopiansocialandpoliticallandscapewhichitreveals,posesanumberoftroublingquestions.Foremostamongtheseisthedilemmawhichappearsrelativetotheunderstandingor"conation"ofothers.Howis"knowledge"ofotherpersonstobearrivedatwhenallknowledgeofothersasobjectsisprecluded?Or,betterput,whatisthemeansorprocessthroughwhichthepersonisabletorecognizehisownprimitivesocialcharacter,seetheotherpersonasasharingpartnerinthesocialmilieu,andresonsiblyjoinwith

theotherinafullypersonalcommunity?Ifotherscannotberenderedasobjectsforknowing,thenonwhatbasiscanacoming-together[Miteinandersein]ofanysortbecomepossible?

125Inanswer,amostprovocativeaspectofScheler'spersonalismisintroducedanaspectwhichremainscentraltohisthoughtfromhisstudentyearsatJenauntilhisdeath.Speakingtotheapparentdilemma,hewritesinalateessay...

Otherpeople,too,aspersonscannotbecomeobjects.(InthissenseGoethesaidofLiliSchoenemannthathe"lovedhertoomuch"tobeableto"observe'her.)Wecanonlycometoknowthembyenteringintotheirfreeacts,throughthekindof"understanding"possibleinanattitudeofempatheticlove,theveryoppositofobjectificationinshort,by"identifying,"aswesay,withthewillandloveofanotherpersonand,thereby,withhimself.126

Throughco-actingorco-experiencing,therefore,a"knowledge"isgainedoftheotherbywhichthepersonperceiveshisownsocialcharacterandorigin.Throughthis"knowledge,"inperceivingtheimmeasurabledignityoftheotherasperson,thepersonisabletojoinresponsiblyandintentionallyandtoacceptthehighestsocialityofthepersoncommunity.

IntheNatureofSympathy,Schelerdiscussesthissame"co-experiencing"initshighestformasa"non-cosmicpersonallove,"aconceptwhichhelocatesatopahierarchyoftypesofsympathywhichheseesasthegroundsofintersubjectivity.127Again,heparallelsthestagesofthishierarchywiththestagesoftheontogenesisofthepersonandthegenesisofsocialityitself.Attheloweststage,correspondingwiththesocialitystageofthe"herd,"Schelercontendsthatthenatureofthis"intersubjectivity''restsuponatotallyunconscious,unintentionalandundifferentiatedemotional

identification[Einsgefühl)betweenpeople,somuchthattheindividualsubjectandtheotherareemotionallyindistinguishable.128FamiliarwiththemassmovementsoftheWeimaryears,Schelercaststhisstageinaratherperjorativelight,takingthetorchlit,leaderless,nighttimemobasacontemporaryexampleofthisunconsciousemotionalidentificationofonehumanwithanother.Abovesuchradicalidentificationofonewithanother,thenextstageofsympathy,correspondingwiththesocialityofthelifecommunity,isonewhichisestablishedonwhatSchelercallsvicariousfeelings[Nachgefühl].Aswiththeloweridentificationstage,thislevelseesanunintentional

sharingofexperiencesbetweenallsubjects,butthecompletenessanddirectnessofthisco-experiencingisvitiatedbyarelativelygreateremotionaldistancebetweensubjects.Bywayofillustration,SchelerdepictsthepassingfromtheloweridentificationleveltothehighervicariousfeelinglevelbyreferringtothechthonianmysteriesofGreekantiquity.Intheearliestperiodoftheserevelsagenuine"identification"wasexperiencedamongparticipantsaseachindividualsurrenderedtotheemotionalrhythmsoftheamorphouswhole.Withtime,however,historyseesagradualformalizationoftheserites,congealingintotheritualartoftragictheater,wheredirectindentificationpassesoverintothevicariousparticipationoftheaudienceinthedrama.

129

WiththeattainmentofthenexttwostagesofScheler'shierarchyofsympathy-groundedintersubjectivity,theterm"intersubjectivity"itselfbecomesappropriate.Inidentificationandvicariousfeeling,theindividualsubjectcannotbesaidtobeviableinitself,anditlackstheself-consciousnessnecessaryforintentional(i.e.,responsible)action.Theemergenceoftheself-conscioussubject,however,wouldseemtounderliethefellow-feeling[Mitgefühl]whichisthesympatheticbondatthenextlevelofintersubjectivity.Schelerremarksthat"itisthroughfellow-feeling,inbothitsmutualandreciprocatedforms,that'othermindsingeneral'[alreadypreviouslygivenasafield]arebroughthometousinindividualcasesashavingarealityequaltoourown."Vicariousfeelingisnotsufficienttoconferthissenseoftheother'sequality.Thebasisforpossibleintersubjectivity,whichcorrespondswiththeindividualismofthe"society"stageofsociality,fellow-feelingisanintentionalreachingoutfromonesubjecttowardtheother.Throughit"self-love,self-centeredchoice,solipsismandegoismarefirstovercome.''130Abovefellow-feeling,yetstillbeneath

thehighestpossiblegroundofforintersubjectivity,ishumanitarianism[Menschenliebe].Humanitarianismishigherandmoreall-encompassingthanfellow-feelingpreciselybecausehumanitarianismrecognizestheintrinsic,specialdignityoftheotherasafellowandequalhuman.Isisthepeculiarsympathyoneexperienceswhentheequalityoftheotherisrecognizedinhishumanitydespitetheexistentialdifferencesinwhichthisequalitymaybecloaked.Thus,forexample,SchelercitesthewatchphrasebywhichGoethewouldallowentranceintoheaven:"ForIwasamanandthatistobeafighter."131

Humanitarianism,however,isnotthehighestofsympathies.Scheler'searlyworks,infact,areunrelentinglyharshintheirappraisalofhumanitarianism,identifyingtheconceptwiththe

bourgeoisandromanticnotionofuniversalbrotherhoodanetherealfraternitywhichinevitablyneverquitereachestotheflesh-and-bloodhumanityoftheeverydayworldofpractice.Onecouldimaginethehumanitarianprofessingloveformankindwhileincapableofrecognizingthepersonalhumanityofthoseencounteredindailylife.InhismostNietzscheanwork,Ressentiment,Schelerarguesthathumanitarianismisbutadisguisedoutgrowthoftheresentmentwhichdarklyissuesfromthebourgeoisrecognitionoftheuniquenessandtherebypossiblesuperiorityoftheother."Modernhumanitarianism,"heexplains,"doesnotcommandandvaluethepersonalactoflovefrommantoman,butprimarilytheimpersonal'institution'ofwelfare."

132And,althoughSchelerlaterretractstheextremevitriolwhichhedirectsheretowardhumanitarianism,hemaintainsthathumanitarianismislockedintotheperversionofformalismtreatingtheotherasmerelyequalinhishumanitywithoneself.Asnoted,theradicalnessofScheler'sthesisliesinitstranscendenceofmereequalitybyitsrecognitionoftheessentialandabsolutelyuniquedignityofeachperson.Hence,thesympathywhichformsthebasisforthehighestintersubjectivityisonewhichacceptsandrejoicesintheother'sinfinitedignity,onewhichallowsformoredirectandpersonalco-experiencingwiththeother,andonewhichretainsthepreservationofindividualpersonalresponsibility.Thishigheststageofsympathy,theconceptofpersonallovewithwhichthisinquiryintosympathywasinitiated,SchelerequateswithChristianlove:forhimasynthesisoftheGreeksensesofagapeanderos.Againsthumanitarianism,hestates,thissympathy"issharplydistinguishedfromthegeneralizedloveofhumanitywhichmerelyregardsindividualsaslovablequa"'specimens'ofthehumanrace."133

TheforegoingportrayalofScheler'sunderstandingofintersubjectivityisincompletewithouttheperceptionofitscloselinkageofhistheoryofvalues.Bywayofthislinkage,further,heendowshisthesiswithethicalimperativesthroughwhichitbecomesatleastequallyanormativeasanexplanatorytheory.Scheler'sethicsisa"material"ethics.UnlikeKant'snon-substantialandformal"goods,"valuesareseenasrealandobjective,andasintrinsicallylexicalaccordingtoanapriorirankorder.Scheler'stypologyofvalues,however,(utility-vital-spiritual-salvational)doesnotaffordacategoryforassessingthevalueoftheother.ThisisconsistentwithScheler'snotionofthenon-objectificationofothers,forvalueshaveobjectivestatusinhisconceptionofreality.Otherpersonsarenotobjectiveevenasvalues,andtheotheroughtneverbetreatedasavalue

foroneself.Instead,Schelerspeaksof"personalvalues"asthosevalueswhichbelongorarecarriedbyaperson,bothone'sownthepersonoftheother.

134Hence,inthepersonallovewhichmarksthehighestintersubjectivity,oneco-experiencesthevaluesoftheother,therebymutuallysharinginthepursuitofthehighestvaluesappropriateforeachuniqueperson.

Inthecommunityofpersons,orGesamtperson,inwhicheachindividualpersonpartakes,theimplicationsofScheler'svaluetheorypaintasomewhatfabulous,albeitattractive,vision.For,inthecorporateperson,asanintentionalandresponsiblecommunionoffreeindividualpersons,amoralsolidarityisachieved.Herethewholeassumesthemoralresponsibilityfortheactionsofeachpartandeachpartacceptstheresponsibilityforthewhole.TheGesamtpersonandtheindividualpersonarefreelyenteredintowhatcanonlybedescribedasa"loving"relationship,whereeachpursues(incoactingthroughtheother)thefulfillmentofthehighestvalueofeach.Notadreamyutopia,Schelercontendsthat

Ifonetakesalookattherelationofthishighestformofsocialunityastheideaofasolidaryrealmofloveofindividual,independentspiritualpersonsinaplualityofcollectivepersonsofthesamecharactercomparedtotheideasoflife-communityandsociety,onecanseethatlife-communityandsocietyasessentialformsofsocialunityaresubordinatedtothishighestessentialsocialform,andthattheyaredeterminedtomakeitappear,but,tobesure,indifferentmanners.Althoughtheideaofthehighestformofsocialunityisnota"synthesis"oflife-communityandsociety,essentialcharacteristicsofbothareneverthelesscogiveninit:theindependent,individualperson,asinsociety;andsolidarityandrealcollectiveunity,asincommunity.135

FurtherinsightsintoSchelersociologicalandpoliticalthoughtfollow

fromhistheoryofintersubjectivity.Sinceothersarenon-objectifiableandopaquetocognitiveknowing,understandingoftheotherstemsfromaprimarysociality(asontologicalground)andfromanintentionalparticipationintheactsandexperiencesoftheother.Abandoningself-centeredinwardnessandacceptingtheuniquepersonhoodoftheother,itisthroughco-experiencingandcoactingwithhim,sharinginhispractices,thatall"knowing"oftheotherispossible.Moreover,itisinthismannerthatthecommunity,politicsand(presumably)socialandhumansciencescanoccur.Forpolitics,Scheler'sphenomenologicallyunearthedintersubjectivitytendersanopportunealternativeforthosetheoristsdubiousofthelegitimacyof

politicaltheorieswhichcelebratetheformalreasonofpost-Enlightenmentbourgeoisliberalism,orwhichdepanduponthesocalled"rationalman."Forsocialscientists,Scheler'sintersubjectivityproffersconvincingevidenceoftheinadequacyofobjectivistandpositivistmethodologyandstrongsupportfortheabsoluteprimacyofatypeofVerstehenasthebasisforallinquiryintomanandthehumancondition.

136

World:NatureAndHistory

Foreveryperson,asaconstellationofacts,thereexistsasacorrelatea"world,"asaconstellationofobjects.137TheworldinScheler'sthought,roughlyspeaking,istheexistentialframeworkinsidewhichthepersonispresentedwiththemediumand"limits"wherebyactsareabletobeperformed.Itestablishestheboundariesandopportunitiesforbeing-as-act(orspirit)toberealized.Theworldisthatconstellationofobjectiverealitywhichispresenttotheperson,towhichthepersonisalwaysacorrelate,butalsowithwhichnopersoncanutterlybe"identified."Inhispenchantforfinelydefineddistinctions,Schelerassignsthemanyobjectsofagivenperson'sworldwithnumerouslabelsobjectsoftheinnerworld,outerworld,bodiliness,idealobjectsandvalueobjects.However,inlightofimmediateconcerns,thedetailsofhisanalysismaybeputasideandScheler'sthesisofthe"enframedness''ofthepersonintheworldmightbevaluablydiscussedintheterminologyofthetwofolddistinctionbetweennatureandhistory.

Scheler'sconceptofnaturehasalreadyattractedpassingconsiderationinthisstudy,especiallyinregardtothemorphogenesisofthepersonandtherelationshipofspiritanddrive.Inthefirstinstance,itwas

seenthatthepersonholdsaprivilegedpositioninlifebyvirtueoftheabilitytodissociatehissubjectivityfromtheobjectsofthenaturalworld,includinghisownegoandpsychology.Inthesecond,itwasseenthatperson,asalocusofspirit,mustdrawuponthepotencyofdriveandthenaturalworldfortheexpressionofpersonalexistenceandtheaccomplishmentofpersonalends.Thespiritualcoreoftheperson,hisbeing-as-act,isrealizedinthebodyandthroughthenaturalworld.Curiousandcompellingasthisperceptionofman'splaceinthenaturalworldis,thepassingconsiderationgivenitfailstoconveythefullintentbehindScheler'sthinking.

Quiteopeninhisrejectionofthemodernconceptofnature,onewhichhestates"firstbludgeonsnatureintoacorpseandthenclaims

tohavediscoveredtheinnermostsecretofitslife,"Schelerwiththeromanticsbewailsthetragicalienationofmodernitywheremanappearsdisjointedfromhisproperplaceinthenaturalworld.

138Likemanyoftheromantics,moreover,hetracestheoriginoftheperversionofthemodernconceptofnaturetotherootsofmodernityitselfseeingthebrightestfloweringoftheconceptinthe"purespirit"oftheEnglightenmentandinthephilosophiesofBerkeley,Kant,HegelandFichte,whilefindingthemostdisquietingresultsoftheconceptinthemechanisticscientismofNewtonandEdisonandinthepositivismofComte.Yet,Schelerisnoromantic.Hisownconceptionofnatureisnotapiningforaunityofmanwiththeunspoilednaturalworld;norevenisitanescapistretreatfromthehere-and-nowtoapresumedhalcyonantiquity.IntheNatureofSympathy,theclearestglimpseofhisownunderstandingislentinananalysisofpastandpresenttheoriesofman'sunitywiththecosmos.139Fromaprimevalunderstandingofmanasecstaticallysubmergedinnature,throughtheGreekawe-inspiredwonderatthemyriadofnaturalformsandtheirorder,throughtheJudeo-Christianperceptionofnature'ssubordinationtoman,tothemodernconceptionofnatureassomethingtobemastered,dominatedandutilizedSchelerfollowsathreadthatculminatesinsomethingratherdifferent.Whereothers,fromMaxWebertoJacquesEllul,perceiveaninevitabledevelopmentoftheconceptofnaturefromanorganicmodeltowardanincreasinglymechanistic,Schelerwishestoincludeafurtherstage.

Paralleling,oncemore,thestagesofhisseveraltypologies,itcanbesupposedcorrectlythatScheler'spreferredunderstandingofnaturecomplementshisnotionsofthepersonandthepersoncommunity.Man'smostprimitiveattitudetowardnatureisonewhichseeshimimmersedinthenaturalworldandindistinguishablefromit.Thisis

supplantedbyasubsequentstagewhereinmanstillbelongstothenaturalworldbutisdistinctwithinitowingtohispeculiarplaceintheverticalhierarchywhichisseeninthecosmos.Inthemodernconception,thistooissupplanted;theverticalsenseisinitiallyretained,butanessentialdifferenceofkindisintroducedbywhichmannolongerbelongsinnaturebutisanalieninitslandscape.Atfirstelevatinghumanityabovethebeingofthenaturalworld,natureisreducedtoobjective"thingness,"tothestatusofamechanicalprocesswhichmustbelearnedandmastered.Likemanyothers,Schelerseesinnercontradictionsanddepersonalizingtendenciesinthisunderstanding.Coupledwiththelatercollapseoftheverticalschemaofmanovernatureinscientificmaterialismand

positivism,modernity'sattempttodominatethenaturalworldprovesultimatelytobeadouble-edgedendeavor.For,asSchelerwrites:

Withthedevelopmentofmoderncivilization,nature(whichmanhadtriedtoreducetoamechanismforthepurposeofrulingit)andobjectshavebecomeman'slordandmaster,andthemachinehascometodominatelife.The"objects"haveprogressivelygrowninvigorandintelligence,insizeandbeautywhileman,whocreatedthem,hasmoreandmorebecomeacoginhisownmachine.

140

What,then,isthenon-romanticandnon-mechanisticunderstandingofnaturethatSchelerwouldproposetosupplantmodernity'sWillezurHerrschaftüberdieNatur,141andtocomplementhisunderstandingoftherelationshipbetweenthepersonandotherpersons?Curiously,itisintheoddlyfraternaloutlookofFrancisofAssisiwhereSchelerfindstheattitudetowardnaturewhichinformshisownanalysis.142Inhisevaluation,ChristianityasawholeisrecognizedasdrawingtheJewishconceptionofman'sdominionovernature,theGreekworshipandindentificationwiththeorderofnature,andtheRomansenseoflegalmastery,intoaconvergencewhichinThomisticscholasticismwouldclaimthatomneensestbonum,butwhichplacedmanauthoritativelyatop,andnotcompletelyinside,thepyramidichierarchyofthecosmos.Inthis,asNietzschenotedbeforehim,Schelercontendsthatthestageissetforthescientismandhumanalienationofthemodernconception.TheFranciscanunderstanding,however,movesinaremarkablydifferentdirection.Contrarytotheverticalhierarchywhichpervadestheearlierattitudes,wherenaturemanifestsadivine"chainofauthority,"theFranciscanwouldseeahorizontalfraternity.Notastheembodimentofdivinitiesastheancientsperceived,norasmereobjectstodissectandutilizeasisthepredominantcontemporaryperspective,theFranciscanhymnspeaks

ofthesunas"brother"andmoonas"sister."''WhatisreallynewandunusualinSt.Francis'emotionalrelationshiptoNature,"Schelercomments,"isthatnaturalobjectsandprocessestakeonanexpressivesignificanceoftheirown,withoutanyparabolicreferencetomanorhumanrelationshipsgenerally."143

TowhatextentScheleracceptstheconceptionofnaturewhichhefindsinFranciscanthoughtisuncertain.Thenotionoffraternitywiththenaturalworldisappealing,buttherewouldseemtobedifficultiesinaccommodatingsuchapositionwithhisontologicaldualism.Thedistinctionbetweenbeing-as-actandbeing-as-objectappearscontrary

andprohibitivefortheequalityofstatuswhichahorizontalfraternitypresumes.Granted,Schelerdoesspeakoccasionally(inlateryears)ofa"GroundofBeing"whichwouldapparentlyundergirdbothmodesofbeing,hence,suggestingsupportforthepossibilityoffraternitybetweenpersonandnature.But,wouldnotthisnotionerodethespecialdignityofpersonalsubjectivitywhichSchelerseekssodesperatelytopreserve?Indeed,wouldnottruefraternity,inthislight,suggestmorethanasemblanceofsubjectivityintheobjectiveworldofnature?Correspondingly,doesnotthisleavethepersonmuchclosertothemodeofbeing-as-objectthanevenmostphenomenologistswouldadmit?Perhaps,thisispreciselythedirectionwhichScheler'sthoughtwouldtravelgiventhebearingsofhislastyearsdespitehisownearlyeffortstolinkhumandignitytoa"special"perceptionofvaluesandtheirhierarchy.Atbest,weightingtheemphasisheplacesontheFranciscaninspiration,theoftenmisunderstoodHeideggeriananalogyof"theshepherdofBeing''mightbemorevaluablyutilizedtodescribetherelationshipbetweenthepersonandthenaturalworldinScheler'sunderstanding.

144

Unfortunately,Schelerhimselfneverfullyexploresthemanyimplicationsofhisconceptionsofnature.Tobesure,inthephilosophicalanthropologyofhislastyears,hedevelopsingreatdetailasketchofman'splaceinnaturebutheindicatesonlycircumspectlywhatmankind'sattitudetowardthenaturalworldoughttobe.Furthermore,hissociologyofknowledgegoesfartowarddemonstratingthataradicalreconciliationwithnature,anachievementoftruefraternity,isutopian.Fromthevantageofbothhisanthropologyandsociology,Schelerarguesquiteconvinceinglythatoneaspectofman'sbiological,anthropologicalandhistoricalmakeupisadirectednessorinterestindominatingandcontrolling

objectivebeingespeciallyobjectsofthenaturalworld.Interestingpassageshintatotherdirections,butoverallSchelerlamentsman'salienationfromnaturewhileofferingscantconcretegroundsforviablealternativeattitudes.Similarly,heisquickinhiscriticismofthemethodologicalapproachandtheoreticalvanityofmodernscience,butonesearchesinvainthroughScheler'sworksformorethanpassing,obliquereferencetothepossibilityofsome"newscience."145

Inregardtothehistoricalcontextoftheperson'sworld,Schelerisfarlesscircumspect.Oddly,however,historyisnotseenasanentirelyindependentelementinthecompositionoftheworld,butisitselfenframedashumanspiritgenerallywithintheconfinesofnature.Writingin1917,henotesthat"allhumanhistoryraceswithinthe

boundsoftheessentialstructureofhumannatures."

146AkeyinsightintoScheler'sowntheoryofhistoryisunearthedinthisremark,forhistoryisrevealedtobesomethingthatisinnosenseanindependent,"apersonal"absolute.Itissomethingwhichisitselfverymuchmundaneandcontingent,tied-upcloselywithpersonsthemselves.InScheler'sunderstanding,history,ononehandisverymuchhaphazardandverymuchaproductofthechaoticinterplayofobjectivefactors.Owingtothedualityofbeing,thereisanontological"otherness"tohistorybywhichitfarlessknowablethantheorthodoxHegelianorMarxistwouldadmit.Ontheotherhand,whileSchelerallowsonlylimitedinfluenceforspirit(superstructure)intheprocessoftheworld(substructure),theimpactofspiritandpersoncannotbedisregarded.Personsperformactionswhichchangehistoryandalterdevelopment.Persons,further,arenot''things"amenabletoexplanationandpredictionbyanyobjective"human"orhistoricalscience.Thereis,then,atwofoldopaquenesstohistoryintselfforhumanknowledge,becauseobjectiveaspectsofhistorypossessamodeofbeingwhichisdistinctfromtheperson,andthesubjectsofhistorycannotbecountedontomarchlockstepwith"demGangGottesinderWelt."History,asitwere,existsratherintimatelywithbothpersonsandnatureandcannotbeconceivedasatrulytranscendentalprocess;Schelerisloathetoextendsubjectivitybeyondthebordersoftheperson.History,thus,mustbeunderstoodasacomplexdialecticinvolvingreal,materialnecessitiesandconditionsconjoinedintensionwithpersonalinsightandresponsibility.BorrowingComteanterminologywithapproval,hefindsintherealmoftheperson,theculturalandspiritualsphere,"'freedom'andautonomyofeventswithrespecttoquality,meaningandvalue.""Yet,"hecontinues,"intheirpracticalexpressionthesecanalwaysbesuspendedthroughthecausalityofthe'substructure'propertoit;'libertemodifiable'(suspendable)onemightcallit."Conversely,

Schelerperceives"inthesphereofrealfactorsonlythat'fatalitemodifiable,"whichComteaptlyandcorrectlydiscussed."147

Schelersubstantiatesthepersonalaspectofhistory,thefieldoflibertemodifiable,byillustratingthatthatwhichiscalled"history"isinlargepart"made"bythepresent.Historyisnotaninertreflectionofthepastbecausetheverygazeofcontemporarymanaltersit.Aneventinhistorydoesnotpresentitselfasaconstantunchangingreality;itdependsonthepresentforitscontinuedexistenceanditscoming-to-be.Plautusslept,Schelernotes,untilhewasreborninMoliere.148Moresignificantandsubtlethanthecommonplacenotion

thatallinterpretationsofhistoryhaveexistentialroots,hispointhereisacounterthrustagainsttheimplicitmetaphysicalargumentofhistoricism.Notonlydoesknowledgeofhistoryebb,flowandchangewithexistentialvaluesandinterests,buthistoryitselfascontingentuponsuchvaluesandinterestis,thus,relative.Inotherwords,"notonlyourcognitionof'historicalfact'but'historicalfact'itselfisrelativetothebeingandessencenotjustthemere'consciousness'oftheobserver.Or,asSchelercommentsfurther,

[H]istoricism,asaworld-viewandasabadcrypticmetaphysics,pervadingalltruemetaphysicalproblems,hasbeenuprootedwiththisview....Thehistoricismthatrelativizedallcognition,firstinmetaphysics(Dilthey),thenalsoinnaturalscienceandmathematics,andfinallyeveninitsowncognition(Spengler),isitselfrelativizedbytheaboveinsight.Historicismhasmadehistoryintoa"thinginitself."Andwhatelsedoesthismeanbutthatitattributestohistoricalrealityandtoitscognitionametaphysicalmeaningandsense?If,aswestatedearlier,allpositivehistoricalgoodsbecomerelative,viz.relativetotheabsolutesystemofnon-formal[materialen]values,historicalwhatnessandvalue-beingisitselfrelative.

149

In,therefore,undercuttingallclaimsthathistoryisanabsolute,Scheleriseffectivelypresentingthesubjectiveaspectofhistoryasaresultofpersonalactionspastactionsandpresentactionsintermingled,mutuallyconstitutive,andconjoinedwithanabsoluteorderofvalues.Asheclaimselsewhere,"withoutman,thereisnohistory."150Doesthisthengrantthempersonatranscendencerelativetotheconstitutivewebofhistory?

Schelerisclearinhisresponse.Althoughpersonandthehistoricalworldareboundinamutuallyconstitutiverelationship,thereeverremainsanaspectofpersonalactswhichreflectsthesubjectivityandresponsibilityoftheperson,anaspectwhich,whileenframedby

history(andnature),insomefashionismorethananypossiblecombinationoftherealelementsoftheworld.Inanearlypassage,Schelerstatesthat"thereremainsanexterioritytoourtrue,deep'self;'andtheholinessandunholinessofthisliessublimeandstillbeyondtheweather-stormofworldhistory.""Thewonderandthequestion,"hecontinued,that"'Iam'andthatthereisa'world'whatweopenup[anfangen]withbothtogetherisaneternalconstantwithinhistoryandweltanschauung."151Enmeshedinthehistoricalworldliesasparkofpersonalsubjectivitybywhichaspects

ofhumanactioncanbesaidtoberesponsibleandnotmerelyhistorical.Manisnotsimplyaproductofhistory.Historylikemaniscomprisedofsubjectiveandobjectiveaspects.Sharingasimilarityinessence,manandhistoryaretogetherenraveledinamutual"making"process.Hence,althoughpersonalactionhashistoricalactualityandefficacyonlybyaccommodatinganddrawingontherealfactorsoftheworld,Schelernowhereabrogatespersonalsubjectivityoritsconcomitantresponsibility.

152

Alateessay,"ManandHistory,"lendsdetailtothebackgroundofhisunderstandingofhis"sublimeandstill"specialresponsibilityofpersonsinhistory.Hedifferentiatesfiveconceptionsofhistorybaseduponfivephilosophicalanthropologies:theJudeo-Christianconceptionoffreewillandfallennature,thePlatonicandEnlightenmentconceptionofhomesapiensandtranscendentalreason,thepositivistandnaturalisticconceptionofhomofaber,theromantic-pessimisticconceptionofhumandecline,andtheNietzscheanconceptionoftheoverman.ItistheNietzscheanovermanwithwhichScheler,inthislateperiod,identifieshisownunderstanding.ThefreedomofthepersoninhistoryhereisnottheWesternreligiousconceptionof"free"willwhichSchelerseesastiedtoafundamentalfearoftheworldandofman'sownfallennature,noristhefreedomofthepersontobeequatedwiththenegativefreedomofthetranscendentallogosineitheritsPlatonicorEnlightenmentforms.Atthesametime,Scheleralsodeclinesthe''freedom"ofthenaturalists,onewhichisperceivedasonlyatoolfortheadaptationoftheorganism,andthe"freedom"oftheMarxist,whereitisperceivedasanadhocproductortooltobeusedinconjunctionwiththeclassandeconomicdialecticsofhistory.Nor,finally,doesScheleraccepttheromanticdecadencemodelwherethissparkofsubjectivityisseenas

theoriginofman'salienationfromthevitalcurrentsofhisnatureandwhere,asaresult,personalactionsareseenasthemotiveforceintheregressionanddeclineofhumannobility.Instead,thislateworkpostulatesasubjectivityinhistoryof"thegreatestimaginableincreaseofresponsibilityandsovereignty."WheretheChristianandJewseesuchresponsibilityasstemmingfromman'sdivinenexus,wherethePlatonistandKantianseeitstemmingfromman'stranscendentalreason,SchelerwithNietzschefindsmanradicallyresponsibleforhisactspreciselybecauseheisonlyandsolelyabeingintheworld.Asifinemphasis,hechoosestoexpressthisthesisinthethenstillshockingNietzscheanmotifofmanandthe"deathofGod."TopositthedeathofGod,Schelerremarks,doesnotreleasemanfromhissubjectivity

andresponsibility;itradicallymakessuchresponsibilitypersonalandhisalone.AsNietzsche,Schelertooproclaims,"EcceHomo"theoverman,theall-man.

Thefullreverence,love,andadoration,whichmenonceexpendedonGodandtheirgods,aredue,then,tothiskindofperson.Inicysolitudeandabsoluteself-reliance,notaderivativebeing,thepersonstandsbetweenthetwoorders,therealmofmechanisticreality,andtherealmofanobjectiveorderofvaluesandideas,freelysuspendedinitself,andnotpositedbyanyliving,spiritualLogos.Inordertosetthedirection,meaningandvalueofhistory,manmustnot,inthoughtandwill,relyonoutsideforces.

153

Inthis,thehistoricalandcategoricalpersonalismofbeingandvaluesisconsiderablydeepened.Collective,realforcesinhistoryarenotdeniedasinCarlyle'sassumptionthat"menmakehistory;"theyarefullyrecognized.Itremainsonlythathistoryisnoescapefrompersonalresponsibility.

Scheleralsodistanceshisthinkingfromthesecondhornofthehistoricistdilemmai.e.,therelativityofnormsissuingfromaninfinityofhistoricalinterpretations.Itispreciselythisfaceofthedilemmawhichhasdrawntheclosestscrutinyofmanypoliticalphilosophers.Strugglingforaterminologyinwhichtodescribehistheoreticalenterprise,Scheleratvariousperiodadoptscertainlablesandtermsascatch-phrasesforcentralthemesofhisbroadundertaking.Hisconceptionofhistoryisnoexceptiontothis,andinhislateperiodtheconceptionissubsumedunderwhathecalls"philosophicalanthropology"or,moreenigmatically,"meta-anthropology."Inasmuchasthepresentstudyconcernsitselfwiththepoliticaltheoryofhispersonalism,suchphrasingisespeciallyworthyofattention.

Fromtheearliestbeginningsofpoliticaltheory,itsendeavorcanbeseenasanefforttoclarifyforpoliticsanaspectofhumanbeingwhichis"special"byvirtueofitbeingmorereal,completeorabsolutethanthedross,changeable,mortalbackgroundinwhichitisseenimprisoned.Takingthisaspectofhumanbeingasanabsolutestandard,thetheoristthenattemptseithertoengenderatransformationofthepoliticalrealmsoastoreflectthisstandardinthepoliticalorder,ortostructurethepoliticalorderinsomemannerwhichmaximizesthepotentialinthecommunityformembersthemselvestopursuesuchastandard.154Seemingly,thisequallyappliestotheancientandmedievaltheoristsastothemodernsinclusiveofKant.155Inotherwords,thetheoristactsonthepresumptionthat

thereisapermanentandunchangingaspectofhumanbeinguponwhichapermanentandenduringpoliticalordercanbestructured.Followingmanyothersfrom"HegeltoNietzsche"asKarlLöwithhasremarkedSchelerrejectsthisnotionoutright,fullyadmittingthehistoricalcharacterofhumanbeing.

156Takinghistoryseriouslyinthisfashionisclaimedbymanytoleavemankindbereftofinternalcriterion(orapparatus)bywhichtruth,goodnessandsoforthpoliticalandotherwisearetobeascertained.Itremovesallcertaintyofdirectionaccordingtowhichhumanactionspoliticalactionsmightbebestguided.Hence,personsaredeniedaccesstoanyunchangingabsoluteowingtotheirownparticipationinthefluxofhistory,andall"orders,"politicalandotherwise,areseenasreflectingonlyaninfinitudeofindividual,situationalinterpretations.

Onthebasisofhismeta-anthropologyandhismaterialvaluetheory,however,Schelerskirtsthis"infinitudeofinterpretations."Hepointstowhatheperceivesasa"foundationalorder"inman'santhropology.157Inaccordancewiththis,beinghumanremainsfullyhistoricalincharacter,butthe"order"latentintheanthropologicalbackgroundoftheperson,whichisreflectiveoftheabsoluteorderofvalues,servestodenyanypurelyrelativistposition.ItisinthisthattheimportanceofScheler'sterm''meta-anthropology"beginstobeunderstood.SinceKant,ifnotsinceDescartes,thepredominantthrustofallinquiryhasbeentowardanalysisandclarification.FromDilthey'shermeneuticstoHusserl'searlyphenomenology,theimmediatebackgroundofScheler'sownthinkingfitswiththispush.Manandman'sexperiencesetthelimitsofwhatisacceptableforanalysis.Obviously,theturntowardanthropologyasthefoundationforknowledgeandnormshasclearrationale.Scheler,inlargepart,

moreover,followsthisthrustasisevidencedbyhissociologyofknowledge.Yet,insofarasmanisahistoricalbeing,thefoundationsoughtinanthropologyissuspect.Wheresomethinkersturntohistoryitselfasanorderlendingstructuretoanthropology,Schelerdeniestheexistenceofanyabsoluteinhistory.Heturns,instead,toafoundationalorderwhichisinseparablefromanthropologyitselfandlinkedwiththeresponsibilityandcreativityofthepersonanorderwhichparallelstheorderhefindsinvalues.

Historyisintimatewithpersons,relativetopersonalsubjectivity.Whatorderisfoundisgivenitbythepresent.And,whileSchelerconcedesthepossiblenarrowingofpersonalresponsibilityinthedevelopmentofhistoryman,is,afterall,enmeshedwithinitsuchresponsibility,Schelerinsists,"willneverbecomeanothing."158Personalresponsibilitywillneverutterlydisappear.

ChapterThreePersonalismasPoliticalTheory

BeyondASchelerianPoliticalTheory

ContainedinMaxScheler'sunderstandingofthepersonisatheoryofpolitics.Unfortunately,itremainsratherimplicit.For,althoughSchelerindicatesanawarenessoftheradicalimplicationswhichhispersonalismposesforthetheoryandphilosophyofpolitics,andalthoughasaphilosopherofengagementheisembroiledinthetumultouspoliticalaffairsofhisday,atnotimeisafullysystematicpoliticaltheoryoutlinedinhisworks.ThereisnoSchelerian"Politics"wherein"personalismaspoliticaltheory"isfoundsandwichedbetweenaprefaceandpostscript.Thisstateofaffairsisnot,however,withoutitsownmerits.Inadayfraughtwithbitterconflictbetweenpolitical"systems,"perhapsthelackofsystematicpoliticaltheorizingonScheler'spartcanbeconstruedtounderscorethereflectiveandphilosophicalcharacterofthepoliticaltheoryderivedfromhisthinking.Moreover,Schelerisbynomeansentirelyalooffrompoliticaltheorizing.Asiswell-known,Scheleroff-handedlydoesdiscusspoliticalimperativesdrawnfromparticularaspectsofhispersonalism.Insimilarfashion,hiswritingsaresaltedandpunctuatedwithreflectiveandpolemictractsaddressedtothemesofthepoliticalworld:socialism,liberalism,Marxism,democracy,war,pacifism,freedomandpower.Furthermore,(despitetheheterogeneousnatureofhispoliticalwritings)vis-a-vishispersonalism,acoherencyofdirectonandintentgraduallybecomesevident.Nonetheless,greatcaremustbeexercisedinappraisingthetheoreticalunderpinningsofScheler'spoliticalpronouncements.ItremainsunresolvedtowhatextentmanyofScheler'spoliticalwritingsfindtheirrootsinhisphilosophyofpersonalism.Thus,althoughthe

presentstudyattemptstobringtolightthesignificanceanddegreeofthisconnectionandwillcarefullyweighmanyspecificallypoliticalpassagesinhisworks,itisthepoliticaltheoryofScheler'spersonalismitselfwhichcomprisesits

predominantinquiry.

159Thepresentchapterofthisstudy,inthislight,triestodrawtogethervariousstrandsofScheler'spersonalismwhichreflectitssignificanceforpoliticaltheory.Insodoing,itishopedthatpersonalismaspoliticaltheorycanbebroughttoclarity.

Aspoliticaltheory,personalismcanbeseeninpartasacontinuationoftheostensiblymodernnotionthatallinquirymustbegininanthropology.Theparticularinquiryofpoliticaltheorywouldappearespeciallytoaccentuatethisnotionofthefundamentalityofanthropology.Indeed,itisclaimedwidelyinthedisciplinethat(atleastsinceKant'srejectionofnoumenalknowledge)politicaltheoryisananthropologicaldebate,oraseriesofinterpretationsofhumanandsocialanthropology.Withinthisvein,thefar-reachingandinsightfulphilosophicalanthropologyofScheler'spersonalismserveswellasanantrhopologicalfoundationforpoliticaltheory.Itopensnewavenuesforthecomprehensionofpoliticalpracticesandcounselsnewmeaningforthe"doing"ofpoliticalacts.Lessclearly,Scheler'spersonalismaspoliticaltheoryoutlinescertainpossibilitieswhichwouldbelietheso-called"endofpoliticaltheory"or"endofpolitics,"reaching(perhapstowardwhatmightbedesignatedasatransformedpoliticsoratransformedpoliticalvision.Thislatterremarkistransformedpoliticsoratransformedpoliticalvision.Thislatterremarkisintendedfrankly;theimageofpoliticsglimpsedintheintersticesofScheler'sinquiriesintothepersonandtheperson'splaceisanimageatsomedistancefromandatoddswithwhatisnowwidelytakenaspolitics.Curiously,however,thepossibilityofsuchtransformationisjoinedcloselywiththosepremisesofScheler'sthoughtwhichreachbeneathanthropologytowardontologyandrealistmetaphysics.Aswillbeseen,thetransformationsdrawnfrom

thepoliticaltheoryofpersonalismpursueanaccordnotonlywiththerealityofman'scharacteranddevelopment(man'santhropology),butalsowiththerealityofthecosmos,towhichthepersonentirelybelongs.Nonetheless,thetransformationalaspectsinheringinpersonalismaspoliticaltheoryrequiretheclosestscrutiny.Thespecificcharacterofsuchtransformationcannotbeglibly(orevenneutrally)treated.Pursuingthisthread,inelaboratingthepoliticaltheoryofpersonalism,thefollowingpagesconsiderthetransformationofpoliticalorder,authority,fraternity,equalityandpower.Yet,rigorouscaremustbeexercised;undeniablepoliticaldangersstalkthebordersofsuchtransformationsafactwhichpoliticaltheorycannotresponsiblydismiss.

ModelsAndLeaders:ExtendingThePurviewOfPolitics

SomesenseofthenatureofthetransformationlatentinScheler'spersonalismisgraspedeasily.Followingtheillustrationoftheoriginofthemodernsubjectasdiscussedinthepreviouschapter,apatternor"orderoffoundation"canbeobservedwhichsuggestsanoutlineoftheso-called"transformedpolitics."

160Ontogenetically,thepersonemergesonlyafterasuccessionofstageswherepersonalresponsibilityswellsasthepersonisdissociatedfromnaiveidentitywiththeexperientialworld,fromthecorporateunitywithmotherandfamily,andfinallyfromtheindividualityoftheego.Equally,ifsociality(orintersubjectivity)isdiscernedtohaveafoundationalorderwhichproceedsfromorganichomogeneity,throughhierarchicalcorporatismandpossessiveindividualism,tothefreesolidarityofthepersoncommunity,thenasimilarsequenceintheontologyofthepoliticalorderhardlycouldbeunforeseen.Thetransformationsassociatedwith"personalismaspoliticaltheory"mustclearlyreflectthatleapinmutualautonomy,freedomandresponsibilitywhichSchelerseesaccompanyingtheemergenceofthepersonandthepersoncommunity.Onthebasisofthisargument,anorderoffoundationrelativetothepoliticalaspectofhumanbeinglikewisemightbepostulated.Thus,politicscanbepicturedinasequenceoftransformationswhichfollowafoundationalorderfromamorphousandaresponsibleherdactivitytohierarchicallystructuredandcorporatelyresponsiblefeudalvirtue,fromfeudalvirtuetoeconomicallystructured,materialself-interest,161fromself-interesttoafreelyandpersonallystructuredpoliticalorderwhichcelebratestheuniquenessandradicallydifferentcontributionsandneedsofeachspecialcitizen.162Itgoeswithoutsaying,ofcourse,thatitisthelattertransformationwhichthecurrentstudyoffersasalikelyoutlineforthetransformationofpoliticsinherentinScheler's

personalism.

SeveralofScheler'sworksdiscusspoliticsinafashionwhichsupportsthissupposition.FromhisunpublishedNachlass,hewritesinanessayentitled"ModelsandLeaders"[VorbilderunddFührer]ofaparallelschematicpertainingtotheobviouslypoliticalconceptof"leadership."Thework,asthetitleindicates,isuncomfortablypoignant.Concernedasitiswithatheoreticalappraisalofsocialandpoliticalguidanceandleadership,Scheler'sinquiryobliquelyinvokestheclamoroftheWeimarpoliticalcommunityinitsfrenziedsearchforthewhichmightbringorderanddirection.Intheworkhe

distinguishesleadersfrommodelspreciselyashedistinguishesrealfactorsfromidealfactorsinhisappraisalofthesociologyofknowledge.Leadersareactuallivingmenwhoauthoritativelyinspireanddrawtheirfollowerstoaction.Leadersareactual,temporalandhistorical.CitingRobertMichels,Schelerseesleadership,then,asasociologicalfact,"alaw,thatinthelastlineofanalysisisgroundedinthenatureoforganiclife."

163Designatedas"thelawofthesmallnumber,"Schelerfindsitaplainlyfactualprinciplethat"inanygiven[bewusst]humansociality,inanygroupconsciousofitsunity,thereisasmallnumberwhichrules."164Hence,biologicallyandanthropologically,leadersandleadershipfindtheirorigininthebiological-anthropologicalcharacterofthehumananimal.

ModelsarequitedifferentinScheler'sestimation.Amodelisanexemplarforacertainwayofbeinghuman.Assuch,itisaframeworkwhichordersvaluesandstructuresnoeticexperiences.Accordingly,everymodeltacitlyraisescertaincriteriaforwhatmightcountas"valuable"or"meaningful"forthewayrealityandhumanbeingareandthewaytheycouldandshouldbe.Amodelmaybefalse,incorrectorevenevil,butitsrealityissuchthatitcanneverbeunderstoodsobythosewhotrulysubscribetoit.165Atthehighestlevel,further,modelsarenotevensomuchdeterminedorabstractedfromhistoricalexperiencesastheyarereflectiveofthespecialbeingofthepersonwhois,however,enmeshedinhistoryandnature.AsSchelerremarks,"themodeliseverapersonallyformedvaluegestalt,"byandthroughwhichone'sbeing,livinganddoingareconsciouslyorunconsciouslyorganized.Thus,"leadersdonotdeterminemodels,butratherthereigningmodels(inconjunctionwithoutsidepowers[i.e.,realfactors])determinewhoandwhatbecomesa

leader."166Or,asSchelerstatesincontrastingfashion,"leadersultimatelydirectpractices[Handeln],performanceandbehavior,''while"themodeldirectsbeing,agestaltofthesoul."167

Tosomeextent,Scheler'sdistinctionbetweenleadersandmodelssupportsthetraditionaldistinctionwhichpoliticaltheorydiscernsbetweenpoliticsastheartofrulingandpoliticsaseducation.Seemingly,Scheleroptshere,atfirstblush,foreducationmodelsbeingconceivedasstructuringhumanbeingitselfandasaprioriframeworksforleadership.Suchaninterpretation,nonetheless,isinsensitivetothefinelinewhichSchelersketches.Hisphilosophy,asshouldbeclearatthispoint,isnotanunrepentantidealism.Justashissociologyofknowledgedeniestheefficacyofidealfactorsexceptinsofarastheyfindexpressioninandthroughtherealfactorsofnature

andhistory,sotoomodelsrequire"realization"inordertoaffectmundanehumanactions.Rathermelodramatically,Schelerillustrates,contendingofmodelsthatthese

delicate,ghostly[schattenhaften]imagesmustindeeddrinkbloodattheprimalspringofhistoryandexperience.For,ifmodelsdrinkofthisblood,theybecomeconcretemodels.

168

Moreprosaicallyphrased,modelswhicharesomehowabstractedfromoressentiallytranscendenttoexperienceandhistoryarepowerlessandmerelyutopic.169Inordertoaffecttheworld,modelsmustdrawonthepowerandassumetheparticularrealityoftheworld.Itis,then,inappropriateinthiscontexttothinkintermsofeitherleadersormodelsasnaivelyprimaryorsecondaryvis-a-viseachother,asifinsomecapacityonecausesoreventemporallyprecedestheother.AshasbeenmadeclearinregardtomanyaspectsofScheler'sthinking,therelationshipsbetweenanysortofnoeticrealityandhistorical,physicalrealityadmitnomannerofeitheraspectofrealitydominatingorfullydeterminingotherother.Furthermore,these"superstructure-substructure"relationshipsarealsoneitherdialecticsofmutaloppositionnorsophomoricPlatonismsofformandmatter.Ashasbeenseen,Schelerunderstandstherelationshipsasmutuallyconstitutive.Thesuperstructureconstitutestheparametersofvaluesbywhichthesubstructureisgivendeontologicalorderandmeaning.Thesubstructureconstitutestheparametersofefficacybywhichthesuperstructurecanfindmaterialandhistoricalexpression.Hence,returningtotheconcernwithmodelsandleaders,thenoeticrealityofmodelsmust"fit"thehistorical,materialrealityofavailableleadership,andtheleadermust"fit"hisorherleadershipwithintheframeworkofvaluesestablishedwithinthereigningmodel.Anyprimacywhichmodelshaverelativetoleadersisnon-temporal,non-

causalandreflectiveofanorderinbeingitself.

Thecruxofthisunderstandingforpersonalismaspoliticaltheoryisthecentralityoftheimageofman,asafoundationalconceptandasanactuallivingindividual,bothformodelsandforleaders.Centralforeverymodelisaparticularunderstandingofmanrelativetowhichactualleadersmustbecongruent.Characteristically,Schelerillustratestherangeoftheseunderstandingsorimagesbyelaboratingatypologyofsuchimages,"agreat,generalschemaofpossiblemodel-types,"whichincludethe"guilding-models[Vorbildmodelle]of:thesaint,thegenius,thehero,theleadingspiritofcivilizationandtheartistofenjoyment[Lebenskunstler]."Suchguiding-models,fur-

ther,areperceivedbySchelerasbelongingessentiallytothebeingofthehumanperson.Theseguidingmodels,inScheler'scomprehension

arenottheresultantsofabstractingfromtheexperienceofparticularhistoricalmen.Evenlessaretheythe"innateideas"perceivedbyPlato.Rather,theyaretobeviewedastheyareperceivedbyanyactualmen,aseternalvalue-ideasofpersons[Wertpersonideen],bywhichwecanrecognizethedegreeofdistanceofhistoricalmenfromthem.

170

Clearly,Schelerpicturesthisschematicasanobjectiveandeternalfoundationalorderwhichisperceivedintheessenceofthepersonhimself.Aswiththepreviouslyconsidered"ordersoffoundation,"eachhighertypeispossibleonlyupontheshouldersofthelowertypes,whichenablesunderstandingtheorderasanon-causalsequenceoftransformations.Atthebaseinthistypologystandstheguidingmodelofthepersonasanartistof"enjoyment."Politically,itwouldseemthatsuchamodelenvisionsapolitycomprisedofindividualsdirectedtowardtheimmediatesatisfactionoftheirassortedphysicalneedsanddesires.Generallystructuredbythevaluesassociatedwiththenecessitiesandenjoymentsoflife,thismodelregardlessformstheprimalsoilfromwhichsucceedingtypesmightemerge.Recognitionofthevalueoflifeandbeing(omneensestbonum)atthislevel,makespossibleanappreciationofthemoresubtle,invariablylesstangibleandlessimmediatevaluesassociatedwiththehighertypes.Inotherwords,thenexthigherguidingmodeltheleadingspiritofcivilizationdoesnotnegateorovercometheartistofenjoymentasmuchasitswellsupfromthelowertype.171Arisingfromthelower'sappreciationoftheimmediatevaluesoflife,theleadingspiritofcivilizationsublimatestheimmediacyofsatisfactioninthevaluesofthepresentforperceivedgreaterfuturesatisfaction.Atthisjunctionatransformationoccurs.Theartistof

enjoymentremains,inasubstantivesense,butisequallytransformedintothatwhichis"higher."Wherethelowermodelsettlesforthepleasuresofimmediategratification,theleadingspiritofcivilizationdeferssatisfactionandlooksaheadtothepossibilityofmoregratificationtobeacquiredthroughplanningandtemporarysacrifice.Hence,themodelisintricatelytiedtonotionsofprogress,accumulationofwealth,technicalachievementandmasteryoverthephysicalworld.Apolityorganizedaccordingtosuchanimageofthepersonislikewiseonewhichisutilizedbyitscitizensasatoolfortheirindividualaccumulationofwealth,dominationofnatureandacquisitionofsurplussesofsecurityandutility.

Atthenextlevel,"thehero"canberecognizedasatransformationofthe"leadingspirit."Thelowertype'sconcernwithprogressisaninterestinmore,ingreater"quantities"ofthosethingswhichoffervaluesofarelativelylessloftyvarietymorewealth,moreutilityorconvenience,more"goodsandservices''inthetime-honoredusageoftheterms.Seeninthebestlight,theprogresstowardmore-and-moreattheleveloftheleadingspiritisvaluedforwhatsuchprogresslendstotheinterestsanddesiresofindividualsgenerally.Incontrast,theherofindsgreatestvaluenotinthenumberoraccumulationofthe"goodthings"ofliving,butwiththequalityoflifeitself;notwiththelivesofindividualsgenerally,butwiththelifeofthewholeofaparticularcommunityaboveandbeyondanyaggregateoftheinterestsofindividuals.Onlyatop,however,theforegoingappreciationofquantityisanappreciationofqualitypossible.Inthesameway,thehero'sconcernwithandperceptionofthevalueofthewholeisatransformationoftheleadingspirit'sperceptionofthevaluesofindividualsgenerally.Referringtotheheroasapersonificationofthevaluesof"nobility,"Schelerdiscussesthemodelintheterminologyelsewhereassociatedwithhissphereof"vitalvalues,"andillustratesanappropriatehistoricalsettingfortheheroinsituationsreminiscentofthetraditional,ritualisticpremoderncommunitieswhichfigureprominentlyinthesociologiesofWeber,Sombart,Mannheimandothers.Inaddition,suchsettingsalsofindSchelerinvokingacertainunderstandingofpoliticalorderandactivity.Thelevelofthehero,hecontends,isthelevelofpoliticsasunderstoodinastrictlyetymologicalsenserevolvingaroundthelifeofthepolis,ascontrastedwiththeless(andpossiblynon-)politicalpoliticsofthelowermodels.Further,thereexistsanunmistakeableNietzscheanambiancetoScheler'sportrayal;theheroicmodelofthepersonisimpelledanddrawnbyanabundanceof"spiritualwill"asopposedtomorephysicalforces.Likehomericmythicheroesorplatonicguardians:

Theheroisamanofwill[Willensmensch],meaningequally:amanofpower[Machtmensch].Ahero-structuredsoulcanresideinanybody,butitcanneverbeconjoinedwithaweakvitality.Potency,strength,power,fulsomenessandaninner,almostautomaticorderingofthevitallifedrives,allbelongtotheessenceofthehero.

172

Hence,Schelercloselyjoinsthemodeloftheherowiththerenownedpremodernvirtuesofnobility,honor,patriotism,courage,andwiththeStoicandRenaissancenotionofvirtu.

By"genius,"thenextascendingtypeintheschematic,ismeanta

guiding-modelofthepersonwhichreflectsthevaluesofpurelyspiritualideasthenoeticvaluesofthebeautiful,pureknowledge,the"right"[Recht]andsoforth.

173Onceagain,moreover,atransformationisseenbetweenthismodelandthepreceding.Indeed,justasAristotleuncoversthesoilforthephilosopherinthezoonpolitikon,Schelerdiscernstheconcernforthevaluesofpurelyspiritualcharactertosucceed,inthesequenceoftransformations,aconcernforthevaluesofthecommunityasawhole.Asseen,then,themodeloftheartistofenjoymentpursuestheimmediatevaluesoftheself'sdesiresandneeds,theleadingspiritofcivilizationpursuestheprospectofsatisfactionforindividualsgenerally,theheropursuesthevaluesofthelifeofthewholeand,themodelofthegenius,inlikemanner,pursuesthevaluesofpurespirit.Centraltothemodelofthegeniusareobjectsofvaluewhichareperceivedtobesomewhatlesshistoricalandlesscircumstantiallyrelativethanthevalue-objectsofthelowertypes.WhileSchelerdemonstratesinmanyplacesthatknowledge,beautyandsimilarnotionsareverymuchrootedinthedynamicrealitiesofsociologyandanthropology,heaffirmstheobviouslymoreenduringandmore"universal"natureofthosethingswhichcarrynoeticvalue.Anappreciationofthosethingswhichbearvaluesappropriatetothemodeloftheheroagivenhistoricalcommunityornation,forexampleistoagreatextentmorerelativetoaparticulartimeandplacethananappreciationofthebeautyconveyedinaworkofartortheknowledgeconveyedinmeasurementsoftheheavens.Likewise,thepoliticsofthehero,relativeasitistothelifeofthecommunitywithinthewallsandboundariesofthepolis,istransformedinconjunctionwiththecharacterofthegeniusandthepoliticalbecomeswhatSchelerterms"thecosmo-political."174Wherethepoliticsoftheheroisassociatedwithachauvinisticandlikelyaggressivepatriotism,thegeniusisdirectedtowardothersnotwithaneyewhichadjudgesthem

brotherorfoe,"Greekorbarbarian"inpatria,butwithaneyetowardtheirsupra-"political''commongroundasperceiversofthevaluesofpurespirit.Thepoliticsofthistype,thus,wouldseemtobeonewhichreachesbeyondthehistoricalandgeographicspecificityofanygivenpoliticalcommunitytoencompassthemacro-orcosmo-politicalcommunityofotherpersonsaspersonslikeone'sownperson.Inotherwords,the"politics"ofthemodelofthegenius,itselfatransformationofthepoliticsofthehero,isapoliticswhichmightinalimitedsensebecalledapoliticsofpersonalism.Ascosmo-politicalitssphereanditsfootingisinsomesensemorebasic,more"foundational,"thanthebrute-likesphereofin-

dividualneedsanddesires,thanthesphereofutilitycalculationandexchangevalues,andeventhantheotherwiseverybasichumansphereoftraditionalpolityandpolitics.

Curiously,Schelerdoesnotconcludehistypologyofguiding-modelswiththefigureofthegenius.Incontrasttohispreviouslyreviewedtypologies,hisschematicofpersonalmodelsherelistsfiveratherthanfourtypes.Abovethemodelofthegenius,inorderoffoundation,Schelerlocatestheguiding-modelof"thesaint."Attherootoftheessentialdifferencebetweenthesaintandtheprecedingmodelofthegeniusliesadistinctionregardingthenatureofthesubjectivityofbothandaparalleldistinctionregardingthecharacteroftheintersubjectivityappropriatetoeach.Contendingthatthegeniusonly"livesactivelyinitsworks,"andthatitisthen''trulynotitsspiritualpersonhood,bututterlyitsindividualitygivenperceptivelytherein,"Schelerfindsthedistinctiontobeoffundamentalimportance.Thegenius,despiteitsrecognitionofotherstobepersonsinthenarrowsenseofbeingfellowperceiversofthevaluesofpurespirit,stillapproachesitsworld,itsvaluesanditsothersonlyfromtheperspectiveofitsownpersonhood.InScheler'sestimation,thegeniuseverbeginswithitsownsubjectivity-personhoodasapriori."Thesaint,"hepresentsincontrast,"inamostgod-imaging[gottebenbildlichsten]sense,inamodelsense,hasnoindividuality."

175Here,therefore,afurthertransformationinScheler'sfoundationalsequencebecomesapparent.Thegenius,constrainedbyitsactive,individualsubjectivity,canunderstandthepersonhoodofothersonlyfromacomparisonwithitsownpersonhood.Itsactivitybeginsas"its"activity,startingaprioriatitsindividuality.Essentiallydifferentfromthis,thesaintbeginswiththepersonoftheother.176Whattransformationoccursisatransformation,again,ofthenatureofthepersonitself.Nolongeronlyaperceiverofthevaluesofpurespirit,

thepersonasrevealedintheguidingmodelofthesaintparticipatesdirectlyinthepersonalbeingoftheother.177Too,thenatureofintersubjectivitybecomesotherthantherecognitionoftheotherasafellowperceiverofsuchvalues;instead,itfindsitsorigininthedirect,mutualparticipationofpersonsinthepersonhoodofothers.Aptly,SchelerreferstothisnewintersubjectiverelationshipasaLiebesgemeinschafta"lovingcommunity."178

Surely,thetransformationofthepolityfromthecosmo-politicaltothe"lovingcommunity"wouldbereflectedinasimilartransformationofthepracticeofpoliticsitself.Scheler,however,israthersilentinthisregard.Itcanbepostulatedthatthesaint'spervasive

concernwithloveforthepersonoftheotherwouldrequirethedevelopmentofnewortransformedconceptionsofsuchobviouslypoliticalnotionsascommunity,authority,justiceandsoon,whichwouldmanifestthispeculiarnewintersubjectivity.Alongtheselines,thisstudywouldliketorefertothenewcharacterofsuchnotionswiththemodifierof"personalist,"andseethegeneralaegisunderwhichsuchconceptsmightbegroupedasitselfamodelforpersonalismaspoliticaltheory.Thereis,however,aninescapablequixoticqualitytosuchthinking;itstrikesthemodernearodd,orfabulous,todesignatesas"political"thatwhichdoesnotinvolveddomination,competitionorthecalculationofcostsandbenefits.

179Scheler,moreover,aswillbemadepainfullyclearinhisinquiryintothematterof"politicalpower,"certainlyrecognizesthatapoliticaltheoryderivedfromthepersonalmodelofthesaintwouldnotaccuratelydepicttheempiricalrealityoftwentiethcenturypolitics,ortheempiricalpoliticalrealitiesofanygivenhistoricaltimeorplace.Perhaps,however,thepresent'sexpectationthatpoliticaltheorymustofitsessencebelimitedtoissuesofconflict,dominationandsoforth,isinpartareflectionoftheembeddednessofthecurrentunderstandingofthepoliticalwithintheanthropologicallimitsofthepersonalmodelofourtimes.Mightnotpoliticaltheoryconcernitselfnotonlywiththewaypoliticsis,andhasbeen,butwiththewaypoliticscanbe?Fewtheorists,surely,wouldlimitpoliticalinquirytotheencyclopedaeist'staskofanalysisoftheempiricalpoliticalactivitiesofcurrentevents.Most,certainly,wouldatleastaccedetothepossibilityofincludinghumanactionsotherthanthoseintendedwithdominationorcompetitionwiththeproperpurviewofpoliticaltheory.Fromitsmostobviousprofile,Scheler'spersonalismisaphilosophicalanthropologywhichprovidesprofoundandintriguinginsightsintocertainwaysinwhichhumanityis,hasbeen,andcanbehumanity.Aspoliticaltheoryhasgrownaccustomedtoappraisingthe

politicsofhumananthropologies,thissideofpersonalismaspoliticaltheoryoughttobefamiliar.TotheextentthatScheler'spersonalismaspoliticaltheoryismorethananthropology,personalismaspoliticaltheorymustbeconsideredfromasomewhatdifferentperspective.

Power,MoralityAndPolitics

Inthelastyearsofhislife,MaxSchelerreconsideredmanyofthevaguelypoliticalthemeswhichhasbeenhisconcernduringandim-

mediatelyaftertheperiodofthewar.Unfortunately,nopublishedmaterialsensuedfromthisreconsiderationduringhislifetime.Itisevident,however,fromthelooselyorganizedcollectionofmaterialswhichhegathered,thatasubstantialstudyofpoliticswasenvisioned.Fortunately,variouslecturesarisingformthisreconsiderationweredeliveredattheuniversityinCologne,andironicallyattheWeimargovernment'sMinistryofDefenseandattheGermanInstituteforPoliticalStudies.Morefortunately,manyofthematerialsfromthiscollectionsurviveinScheler'sarchiveandtwoexcerptshaveappearedinprint,oneabriefassortmentoflecturesketchesandnotes,GedankenzuPolitikundMoral(ThoughtsonPoliticsandMorality),andoneamorepolishedessay,"TheIdeaofPeaceandPacificism."

180Togetherwithavailableinformationfrompresentedlectures,thesematerialslendamoredistinctoutlinetothenotionofpersonalismaspoliticaltheory.

TheargumentmadeinthesketchesandnotesoftheGedankenexcerptconcernstheimportantdistinctivenessofpoliticsrelativetomorality.Thisdistinctionhasitsorigininthefurtheroriginsofbothmoralityandpolitics."Morality,"Schelerclaimshere,"isatechnique,"atechniquefor"realizinginanethosthegivenorderofvalues."But,politicsisnotatechniquenotsomethingcontrivedoradaptedbymantoachievesomeend.Rather,politicsisafundamentalaspectofhumanbeingwithitsownanthropologicallyrootedend.Itisa''strivingforpower,awantinggroundedinpower-seeking,withagoalinsovereignlyactualizingpositivevaluesinthecommonwealwithintheboundariesoftheorderofvalues."181Owingtoitsdifferentcharacter,politicsisnotresponsibletothemoralorder.Toargueotherwise,fromthestandpointofpersonalism,wouldbereductionist,forthehighestpurposeofpersonalexistenceisnotamoralone.The

highestpurpose"istherealizationofvalues,"Schelerargues,"butnotexclusivelyofthemoral."Thereareotherintrinsicvaluesfortheperson.Indeed,"the'goodoftheperson'isnothighest,butratherthegood,wholeman."182Yet,inasmuchasSchelerfindspoliticstobeanaspectoftheverybeingoftheperson,itwouldseemthatpoliticswouldbeessentialtotheexistenceandemergenceofthepersoninamannermorefundamentalthanmorality.

Subordinatetothehighestvalueofthe"good,wholeman"(orperson),politicsandmoralityshareacommonend.Each,however,concernsitselfwithadifferentfacetofthetotalityofvaluesintrinsictothefullrealityoftheperson.Obviously,then,Schelerfindspoliticstorequirethatsortofdirectionwhichhefindstheperceptionof

valuestoprovideforpersonsgenerally.Asanaspectofbeinghuman,politics,asitwere,hasitsownproperperspectiveontheorderofvalues.But,whatarethevaluesrightlytobeperceivedfromthestanceofpolitics?Moreover,whatistherolewhichpoliticsplaysforthelargewholeoftherealityoftheperson?HerethereissuggestedanimportantdifferenceofunderstandingbetweenScheler'sargument(intheGedankenexcerptandelsewhere)andtheinterpretationofpersonalismaspoliticaltheorydevelopedinthisstudy.

Schelercontendsthatthevalueswhichareproperforpoliticsarethosevitalvalueswhichareconcernedwiththewelfareandpreservationofthecommonweal.

Withintherank-orderofvaluestherearecommonvitalvalues(i.e.thevaluesofdevelopmentandoftheobjectivewelfareofthenation),whichareprimaryforallpoliticsinquestion,andforwhichthecommonlowerandhighervalues[beneathandabovevitalvalues]aresecondary.Thehigherlevelsofvaluearenotrealizablethroughpoliticalactionwhichcanonlycultivateorcreatetheirpreconditions.Thelower,especiallytheutilityvalues,aresecondarysincetheyareimportantforthevaluesoflife.

183

Inotherwords,theperspectiveappropriateforpoliticsontheorderofvaluesispartial,andlimitedtothesphereofthevaluesoflife(alsocalled"vital"values);itislimitedstillfurthertothosevitalvaluespertinenttothelifeofthepolityasawhole.Congruentwithhisothertypologies,Schelerintendstolocatepoliticsinaparticularnicheoneparallelwiththenichehefindsforvitalvalues,thelifecommunityandsoforth.Werethisapproachtobeelaboratedtoresolvethequestionoftheroleforpoliticsinthelargerrealityoftheperson,politicswouldbeseenasbutonetypeormanifestationofmankind'santhropologicalconcernwithpower.Likely,itwouldbefoundtobea

manifestationofhumanpower-seekingwhichaimsattheactualizingofthevaluesofthepolity.

WhilethisactualizingisvitalfortheexistenceofthepolityitselfandafortiorifortheexistenceofthepersonitoverlooksotherelementsofScheler'sownreflectionsonpersonandpolis.Toconsiderpoliticsonlyintermsofitsnarrownichewithinthelargerhumanconcernwithpower-seeking,failstorecognizethatthe"type"ofpower-seekingwhichispoliticsispartofanorderoffoundationinthesensethatthesetypeshavebeeninterpretedinhisothertypologies.Thatis,

Schelerappearstoconcernhimselfwithpoliticsasifitwereaphenomenonindependentanddelimitedtonarrowrangeoffunctions.But,aswasnotedinthelastchapter,Scheler's"types"arebetterunderstoodnotasseparateandisolatedcategories.Instead,theyoughttobeinterpretedasintrinsic,foundationalelementsofalargerwhole.Hence,abetterunderstandingofpoliticsfromthisinterpretationwouldbeginwithapictureofpoliticsnotmerelyasanisolatedstageortypeofpower-seeking,butasaninterdependent,inherentaspectofallhumanconcernswithvaluesinasmuchastherelationsofpowerareafundamentalaspectofhumanbeing.

Thegroundworksforsuchaninterpretationofpoliticsandpowerarewell-laidinScheler'sinvestigationofthefunctionofpowerrelativetotheexistenceofnoeticrealities,whichisacentralissueofhislaterworks.ThisinvestigationleadsSchelerintwointriguingdirections,bothofwhichhavebeenalludedtoearlierinthisstudy.Thefirstdirectionistowardarecognitionofpower'sroleinthedeepestexperienceofsubjectivity.ThesecondistowardScheler'sdeterminationthatthemostsublimerealitiesofhumanexperiencetheloftiestvaluesandnoeticrealityingeneralareimpotentinthemselvesandcometoeffectiveexistenceonlybywayofthepowersublimatedatlowerlevelsofreality.Together,thesetwodirectionsoutlineaprovocativeinterpretationofpowerandanalogouslyofpolitics.InsidethefirstdirectionistheSchelerthesisthattheprimalexperienceofsubjectivityisoneof"resistance"toacts.Asnotedinpreviouspages,theresistancethatrealityposestoone'sacts,theawarenessofwhichispre-cognitive,isthedeepestcoreoftheawarenessofoursubjectivity.

184Moreover,becausethepersonisessentiallyaconstellationofacts,thisexperienceofsubjectivityistheexperientialrootofpersonalconsciousness.AsSchelerdescribesit,thisexperienceofresistanceis

notadefinedsensation,butanimmediateandundifferentiateddemonstrationoftheexteriorityandsubstantialityoftheworldwhichisrevealedasaresistancetotheverybeingoftheperson.Befittingthepresenttopic,inotherwords,thefoundationalexperienceofbothsubjectivityandworldisanexperienceofpower.Theworldrevealsitspresenceasapowertoresistone'sacts.Theperson'sawarenessofhisownsubjectivityrestsfinallyuponanexperienceofdifferenceconveyedbythepoweroftheworldtoresisttheperson'sacts.Onthisbasisitiseasy,then,tounderstandScheler'sidentificationofaninherenthumanconcernwithpower-seeking,ofwhichpoliticsisbutaparticularmanifestation.Ifthe

primaryexperienceofbothsubjectivityandworldisoneofpower,thenourrelationswithworld,selfandothers,too,mustbeinsomemannerrelationsofpower.

Toacceptthisthesis,inkeepingwithpersonalism'sconcerntoovercomeapproachesofdominationandrepressionrelativetotheworldandothers,powerinitselfmustnotbenegativeorrepressive.HereScheler'sseconddirectionisrevealing.Thisdirectionisthethesisoftheessentialpowerlessnessofspirit,highvaluesandnoeticrealityingeneral.Asdiscussedinpreviouspassages,thesenoeticrealitiesarediscernedtobeimpotentinthemselvesandcometoefficacyonlybyderivingpotencythroughthesublimationofthepowerofmoresubstantialrealities.EvenintheGedankennotes,forexample,despitehesitationsconcerningtheconsiderationofpolitics,theargumentisputthat"powerhasincontradistinctiontopowerlessnessthemeansvalueforspiritualvalues."

185Powerisnottobecomprehendedasanegativeorrepressiveforce.Instead,powerisshowntobeanecessaryandpostivevaluebywhichthepursuitofallothervaluesispossible;powerisproductiveandcreative,eventotheextentthattheexperienceofpowerisattherootofsubjectiveself-awareness.Thatis,powerdoesnotbringthesemoresublimerealitiesintobeing,butpoweristhemeansbywhichtheybecomeactualizedintheworld.AsSchelernotes,"onlytotheextentthat'ideas'ofanykindareunitedwithinterests,drivesandcollectivedrivesor'tendencies,'aswecallthelatter,doideasindirectlyacquirethepowerofbeingrealized."Hence,itisthepowerofthebasic,mundanelevelsofrealitywhichprovidestheimpetusbywhichnoeticrealitiescanberealized.

Raphaelneedsabrushhisideasandhisartisticvisionsdonotcreateit;heneedspoliticallyandsociallypowerfulpatronstoemployhimtoexalt

theirideals:otherwisehecannotactouthisowngenius.Lutherneededtheinterestsofdukes,cities,territoriallordsleaningtowardparticularlism,andtherisingbourgeoisie;withoutthesefactorsnothingwouldhavecomeoutofthedoctrineof'spiritussanctusinternus'readingoftheBibleandof'solafides'.186

ThesetwodirectionswhichSchelertakesinhisinvestigationofpowerandnoeticrealitiesdomuchtodemonstratethecentralfunctionwhichpowerplaysatalllevelsoftheperson'srelationshipwithreality.Powerisboththecharacteroftheprimalexperienceofrealityandthemeansbywhichhigherrealityacquiresefficacy.Yet,the

revelationoftheubiquityofpowerwithinthepersonalexperienceofrealitydoesnotitselfcompletethebroadeningreinterpretationofpoliticsasaninherentaspectofallhumanacts.Tosaythatpowerisinherentinthisfashion,doesnotconfersimilarstatusonpolitics.Indeed,thoughSchelerdefinespoliticsasavarietyofpower-seeking,politicsisdeterminedtobeonlythatpower-seekingconcernedwiththevaluesofthelifeofthecommunity.Neededstill,intheefforttobroadenthepoliticsofpersonalismbeyondthisnarrowdelimitation,isalinkagebywhichpowerrelationsthemselvescanbepresentedasessentiallypolitical.Scheler,unfortunately,doesnotdirectlyproposesuchalinkage.Nonetheless,thisunderstandingisclearlyinkeepingwiththeelementsofpersonalismoutlinedinthisstudy.Intheontogenesisoftheperson,forexample,itwasfoundthatthepersonexistsfromthefirstonlyinrelationwithothers,thatindividualityisbutanoutgrowthofsocialityandiscompletedonlybyareturntosocialitywiththepersoncommunity.Similarly,SchelernotesthateachindividualpersonisequallyaGesamtpersonanaspectofthecommonpersonwhichisthepolity.Onthesegrounds,itfairlycanbeinferredthattherelationsofpowerbetweenperson,worldandothers(relationswhichinhereineverypersonalact)arealso"political"inauniquesenseoftheword.Hence,personalismaspoliticaltheorywouldfindman'sfundamentalrelationshipwithrealitytobecharacterizedbyanexperienceofpower,andthatthisrelationshipandexperiencewouldbe,inapeculiarway,political.

Theunderstandingofthepoliticalcharacteroftheexperienceofreality,inferredfromScheler'spersonalismhere,hasinrecentyearsgarneredsupportfromdiversequartersofcontemporaryphilosophy.FromHans-GeorgGadamer'sphilosophicalhermeneutics,MichelFoucault'slinkageofrealitytotherelationshipbetweenpoweranddiscourse,PeterBerger'ssocialconstructionofrealityandsoforth,therehasarisenasubstantialliteraturewhichstandsingeneralaccord

withthisthesis.Theliteratureoffersvariousinsightsrelevanttothequestionofthepoliticalcharacteroftherelationshipwithrealitywhichmayvaluablydeepenpersonalism'sownhesitantstepsinthesedirections.

Theambianceofthethesisofthepoliticalcharacterofman'srelationshipwithrealityisalsoevidentintheonlypublishedpoliticalessayofScheler'slastyears,"TheIdeaofPeaceandPacificism."

187IntermixedwithideologicalyearningsforaunifiedEurope,theessay'sthemeisanexhortationforworldpeacebaseduponabalance

ofpluralisticdifferencesandpowersamongindividuals,groupsandstates.Suchpeaceispossibleonlybywayofrecognizingtheuniqueandrichdistinctivenessofeveryperson,groupandstate.IncommonSchelerfashion,theessaytakesanobliqueapproachinitsrhetoric,comingtoitspositionbywayofoutliningtheinnercontradictionsofallotherformsofpacifism.Thatis,Schelerdemandsapacifismwhichgrowsfromagroundinthefullreality,ortotality,oftheperson.Herejects,then,theviabilityofwhatheterms"instrumental"pacifisms:theself-centeredpacifismofindividualconscience,religiouspacifism,liberalpacifism,juridicalpacifism,Marxistpacifism,imperialist(PaxRomana)pacifism,capitalistpacifismandcultural-intellectualpacifism.Eachoftheseinstrumentalpacifismsrestsuponareductionism;eachrestsuponautilizationofone,narrowaspectofthehumanbeingasitsmechanismbywhichconflictswouldberesolvedandwarsavoided.Failingtobuildpeaceuponthetotalityoftheperson,Schelerjudgesthateachisunabletoachievethesedesirableends.AswiththeGedankenmaterialsandthediscussionofthemodelsandleadersessay,Schelerinthiscontextcloselyjoinsthatthesphereofthepoliticaltothenotionofpersonitselfandinferentiallytothemeta-anthropologyoftheAllman.Politics,therefore,wouldderiveitslegitimacythroughitsfoundationinandreflectionofthefullrealityoftheperson.Eveninthisessayoninternationalaffairs,seeminglyfarremovedfromheadierphilosophicalworks,Scheleroptsforapersonalistfoundationandcriterionforresponsiblepolitics.

Withthe"ModelsandLeaders"essay,theselatermaterialslendaroughoutlinetothepictureofpoliticsfromScheler'spersonalism.Still,thereremainsmuchambiguity.Withcare,then,aturntothemoredirectlypoliticalworksofScheler'scorpus,fromtheperiodimmediatelyfollowingthewar,isrevealingforpresentconcerns.

PersonalistSocialism,PersonalistDemocracy

ThisstudyhasamplynotedthedifficultywithanyconsiderationofScheler'sovertlypoliticaltracts,whichwerelargelycomposedduringandimmediatelyaftertheFirstWorldWar.Manyoftheearliestoftheseworks,asdiscussedpreviously,arelittlemorethanchauvinisticorpropagandisticapologiesfortheGermanwarefforts,occasionallywithallusionstothemesinScheler'searlierphilosophicalwritings.Yet,inthepost-warperiod,SchelerabruptlyshiftsfromtheideologicalthemesofhisearlypoliticalpiecestowardamoretheoreticalappraisaloftheplaceofpoliticsinthefutureofWesterncivilization

andthefutureofGermany.Withinthisappraisal,variouspoliticaltopicsaretoucheduponwhichbeardirectlyonthepossibilityofpersonalismaspoliticaltheory,includingsuchnotionsaspersonalistsocialismandpersonalistdemocracy.Twointerrelatedessaysareespeciallyworthyofattention:"ChancenundMächtedesAufstiegsundNiedergangs"(ProspectsandPotenciesforAscentandDecline)and"ChristlicherSozialismusalsAntikapitalismus"(ChristianSocialismasAnti-Capitalism).

188

ThecatalystfortheChancenessaywasthethenwidepopularityofOswaldSpengler'sthesisofthedeclineofwesterncivilization.ObjectingtothedespairofSpengler'swork,Schelernonethelesstakesacuriousstandonthenotionofdeclineitself.Theessayreviewsthemanyexpressionsofthethesisofthedecline.Surveyingevidenceinsupportofeach,SchelerbeginswiththatofthebiologicaldeclineoftheEuropeanpopulationasrevealedbyEurope'sdecliningbirthrate.Thisdeclineisattributedtocapitalismandcapitalism'sneedfortheestablishmentofamasssocietyasitsbase.Asimilarargumentismadeforthepotentialofculturaldecline,theimmediatecauseofwhichisperceivedtobemasssociety'sreductionofqualitativedifferencetonumericaldifferencesofquantity.Inthisvein,therisingWeimarGermantrendstowardromanticnationalismandtowardGermanbolshevismareonlycomplementarypolesofmasssociety'sculturalreductionism.But,culturaldeclinehasimpactbeyondthemasslevel.Theseharbingersofdeclinepointtowardapossiblenarrowingofwesternman'sopportunityforresponsibilityandcreativity.Thereductionofqualitativediffrenceswithinthesphereofhumanlife,apossibilityapparentinbothpolesofmasssociety,wouldprecludeavenuesforpersonalexpression,whichcomprisesthecharacterofthoseactsconstitutiveofthepersonhimself.Finally,

Scheleralsoturnstoconsiderthelikelihoodofapoliticaldeclinewhichwouldbejoinedwiththesetrendsinthecomingofmasssociety.Heremarkswithfearthatofthemajor,contemporarycurrentsinpolitics,"bolshevism,fascism,themovementwhichthenewmilitarydictatorofSpainleads,theSouth-Germanpeople'smovement,allareanti-democraticandanti-parliamentarian."189

Thefailinglightofdemocracyandthedeclineofpoliticsitselfarepresentedasinseparable,sufferingacommonbaseintheemergingmasssociety.Foremostevidenceofthepossibledeclineofpolitics,inthisanalysis,isthegrowingpredominanceofeconomicovertrulypoliticalconcerns.Thispredominancerobspoliticsofitsproperfocus;politicsisreinterpretedonlyasamechanismforeconomicdistribution.Inthewakeofsuchreinterpretation,Schelerforesees

citizensfleeingfromtheresponsibilitiesofgenuinepoliticalparticipationtowardapoliticsofmysticism,amusementandprivatematerialinterests.Intheretreatfromgenuinepolitics,however,abitterironybecomesapparent.Fragmentedbyprivateinterestsandbytheirreconcilableideologiesderivedfrommysticism,democracybecomesdeadlockedandnon-functional.Facedwithsuchdeadlock,Scheler'sgreatfearisthathepeoplewouldturnto"acharismaticdictatornotarisenfromaconscriptedarmy,butfromanelitepowerfulyouthwhowouldplacethemselvesathisdisposal,inmilitaryformation,ashisbodyguardandashishighestexecutiveorgan."

190

Notwithstandinghisobvioussensitivitytothesignsofimpendinghorrorsinthecontemporaryage,Schelerrejectsanyargumentoftheinevitabilityofdecline.Spengler'svision,withitsdespairingphilosophyofhistory,isjudgednottobeanaccurateperceptionofthefutureoftheWest-onlyofSchwabingin1921.Indeed,withthepotentialsfordecline,potentialsforascentaretobeseenaswell.ThesameworldwarexperiencewhichSpenglerusedasabuttressforthethesisofdecline,forexample,SchelerperceivesasacatharsisoutofwhicharebirthfortheWestispossible.Aprofoundexperiencecommontothemindofallcitizensoftheworld,thewaroffersthepeopleoftheWestafertilesoilforanewconsciousnessofunityandsolidarityfromwhicha"genuinedemocracy"couldgrow.Hence,theessaycitesthecontemporary,widespreadconcernamongpeoplesfor"solidarity"amongreligiousgroups,politicalgroups,theliteratiandmanyothercircles.Thissolidarity,itiscontended,standsascounterindicationtothereductionismofmasssocietyandtothetendencyfordeclinewhichitsignifies.Particularly,solidarityundercutstheprimarydynamicofdeclineintheWest,whichisidentifiedtobethespiritofcapitalism.Outofitsreificationof

personsandpersonallabor,initsmaterialism,initsfurtivepsychologyofananarchichumandriveforprivateaccumulationofwealth,Schelerfindsthespiritofcapitalismbehindtheoutwardsymptomsofapathologyintheage.Thedeclineofpolitics,theincreasingfailureofdemocracy,thedecayofhighcultureandsoon,arederivativeillsoftheproblemofmasssociety.But,masssocietyanditsproblemsmaybeavoided,Schelerclaims.Thesedevelopmentsarenotinexorable;Marx,Spengleranddeterministicphilosophiesofhistoryingeneralarejudgedincorrect.Capitalismneednothavecomeintoexistence,norbolshevism,norneedcomethedeclineoftheWest.Schelerassertsthatthespiritofsolidaritysuggeststhepossibilityofanotherfuture.Further,suchsolidaritysuggestsalsothepossibilityofanewpoliticsanda"genuinedemocracy.''

Thefocusoftheessayoncapitalismisnotnewground,ofcourse.Intheperiodfrom1912to1915severalstudiescriticalofcapitalismappeared,DerBourgeois,DieZukunftdesKapitalismus,andothers.Theseearlierstudies,liketheChancenessay,revolvearoundtheargumentthatthecontemporarysocialorderreflectsapeculiarinversionintheorderofvalues,whichinturnaccompaniestheappearanceofcapitalism.ForScheler,plainly,capitalismrepresentsnotmerelyaneconomicsystemofprivateownershipandenterprise,butamanneroflivingwhichactualizesaspiritthat,likeavirus,imbuestheentiresocio-culturalorderwithitscharacter.Thenewgroundoftheessayisthenotionofsolidarityandpersonalistdemocracyasanantidotetocapitalismanditsmasssociety.Overlookingtherhetoricalexcessoftheforegoing,thegistofScheler'spoliticalthinkinghereisanideaofademocracywhichfunctionswithinanintersubjectivitybaseduponsomethingotherthantheepistemologicallydifficultnotionofoverlappingself-interest(thetheoryofcapitalismandmodernliberalism).Genuineor"personalist"democracy,inotherwords,operateswithinthecontextofapoliswhichisnotahappenstanceaggregationofindividualspursuingparallelprivateinterests.Inconjunctionwithotheraspectsofthepresentstudytheunderstandingoftheperson,personcommunity,theorderofvaluesandsoforthpersonalistdemocracyhasanunmistakeableoutline.Thisthreadofanalysisiscontinuedin"ChristlicherSozialismusalsAntikapitalismus,"inwhichScheler'sthoughtmovesfromanalysisofcapitalismtorejectMarxismasbutcapitalismfortheproletariat.Thestudyconcludes,however,byaffirmingaChristian(or"personalist'')socialism,incontrasttobothcapitalismandMarxism.Personalistsocialismisprofferedasthatsocialorderforouragewhichavoidsthetwinpathstomasssociety.Insuchapersonalistsocialism,personalistdemocracyandsolidaritymeettosuggestsomeprosaicsubstance,atlast,forpersonalismaspoliticaltheory.

TheSozialismusmanuscriptisincompleteandhastilycomposed.CaremustbetakeninregardingitasmorethananindicationofScheler'smatureandconsideredthoughtonthissubject.But,itsargumentfitseasilywithinthebroadinterpretationofpersonalismaspoliticaltheorytakeninthepresentstudy.WritteninwholetocontrasttherepressivesocialismofMarxandothers[Zwangssozialismus]withChristian,personalist"expressive"socialism,theessay'scentralargumentisfoundinthelastfewpages.Appropriately,thegreatestcontrastbetweenpersonalistsocialismandrepressivesocialismliesinthenatureoftheintersubjectivityuponwhichtheirrespectivepoliticalcommunitiesstand.Personalistsocialismwould

understandindividualpersonstobeconcernedwithothersnotoutofsharedmaterialneeds,primarily,noroutofoverlappingself-interests.Instead,personsareconcernedonewithanotheroutofadispositiontoloveeachother[diesozialeLiebesgesinnung].

191Exploredinthesecondchapterofthisstudy,therootsofthisdispositionarefoundinthenotionofpersonasaconstellationofactsandintheideaofactsbeingdirectedtowardvalues.Thehighestvaluesarenotvaluesofthings,buttheunlimitedvalueofpersonsavaluewhichtranscendsevenobjectificationandisperceivedonlyincoex-periencingthepersonalsubjectivityoftheother.Moreover,thisdispositionreflectsthesocialcharacterofpersonsgenerally,whoseownindividualityispossibleonlyinacommunitywithothersandwhoseownindividualpersonisequallyaGesamtperson.Thecontrastbetweenrepressiveandexpressivesocialismfollowsfromthisideaoftheperson.ForScheler,othersocialismsareachievedbyexternalconstraintstomoldmantofittheirperceptionofwhathisanthropologyoughttobe.Personalistsocialism,incontrast,isthesocialorderreflectingtheorderintheanthropologyoftheperson;itcomestobenotbyexternalrepression,butissuesfromthebeingoftheperson.Wheretheexternalsocialismswouldcontendregardingthedistributionofgoodsthat"Whatisyoursshouldindeed,mustalsobemine."Schelerclaimsofpersonalistsocialismthat"Whatisminewouldalsobeyours(Sozialismus,p.673).Thatis,personalistsocialismisanoutwardgivingofoneselftoothersasafreeexpressionofpersonalbeing.

InterestingasthethesisoftheSozialismusessayis,thereisampleroomforfurtherclarification.Perhaps,approachingpersonalismaspoliticaltheorymoreobliquelybywayofcomparisonwithdominantcontemporarytheoriesofpoliticswouldproveuseful.

ChapterFourScheler'sPersonandTheModernPoliticalParadigmTheunderstandingofthepersonpresentedinScheler'sthinkingobviouslycorrespondswithaninterpretationofthepoliticalsubject,thepoliticalcommunityandpoliticsitselfwhichisfundamentallyunlikethedominantinterpretationoftheseinourtimes.Apoliticaltheoryisimplicitinthispersonalistinterpretation.TosketchintheoutlineofthepoliticaltheorywhichScheler'sunderstandingofthepersonsuggests,however,mightbemosteasilyapproachedobliquelybywayofcontrastandcomparisonwithmodernpoliticalthought.

Owingtothedominanceofaparticulartypemaninthecurrentage,Schelerperceivesthecharacterofmodernpoliticsnotasfragmentedintoseveralessentiallydistincttheories(suchasliberal,Marxistandsoon),butasgenerallycoherentincharacterandrootedinasingluarparadigm.

192Modernpolitics,regardlessoftheparticularformorpoliticalmovementinwhichitfindsitsexpression,isconcomitantwiththevalue-complexandpeculiarweltanschauungofwhatSchelerterms"thebourgeoisman."193Bourgeoisliberalism,bourgeoisMarxismandthemass-basedextremistpoliticsoftheleftandright,inScheler'sestimation,areatrootonlydifferingmanifestationsofacommonunderlyingunderstandingofthepoliticsofthismodernman.

TheessentialcoreofmodernpoliticsislaidbareinScheler'ssomethinesvirulentandsometimescoollydispassionateinquiryintothecharacterofmodernman.Inhisconsideredappraisal,modernpoliticsappearsepiphenomenallywiththeemergenceofthe

bourgeois.This"new"man,heargues,istheproductofananthropologicaltransformationwhich,atleastinpart,issuesfrompersonalcreativityandresponsibility.194AccordingtoScheler'sthesis,thefusedGreco-ChristianunderstandingofmanoftheMiddleAgesisstrippedofbothitssenseofcommunalsolidarityanditsteleological

linkageandhierarchicalstructureofworld-man-God.Bourgeoismanisthusleftwithirresolvablebreachesbetweenhimselfandothers,andbetweenhimselfandtheworld.Recognizingthisalienationandfueledbythepassionofressentimentwhichisentailedbysuchalienation,thebourgeoisman'sattitudebecomesoneofdominationtowardboththeworldandothers.Heseeksfranticallybywayofforceandcunning,inthisregard,tore-establishasemblance,howeverartificial,oftheearlierworld-man-Godlinkage.

195Thefranticscurryingleadstoaboundlessacquisitivenessand,withthelossofhierarchy,toablindandindiscriminategreedforquantitiesofobjects.

Likewise,withthisresponsibleandcreativeevolutionofthenewmancomestheemergenceofaconceptualandnormativeframework,aparadigm,bywhichtheworldviewofthebourgeoisisrationalizedandaccordingtowhichallquestionsofself,worldandothersareresolvable.Thisparadigmestablishesthebroadcontextinwhichpoliticstakesplace,andinvolvesanumberofdifferentdimensions.FollowingtheprimacyofvalueperceptionwithwhichSchelerunderpinshispersonalism,theprimarydimensionoftheparadigmisportrayedasanarrayofvaluesandastheparticular"appearances"ofthesevaluesintheobjectsoftheeverydayworld.Ashasbeenconsideredinpreviouspassages,fromtheperspectiveofpersonalism,heconcludesthattheabsoluteorderofvalueshasbeenturnedonitsheadintheworldofbourgeoisman.Utilityvalues,whichrepresentthelowestvaluesinScheler'sschema,becomesthesolecriteriabywhicheveryaction,everyvirtueandeverygoodmustbemeasured.Even"lifeitself,"Schelerclaimsinanearlywork,"thesheerexistenceofanindividual,arace,anationmustbejustifiedbyitsusefulnessforawidercommunity.''Where"accordingtotheearliernotion,"he

continues,"lifeinitsaimlessactivity,itsmere'respiration'anditscharacteristicinnerprocesses,representsaninstrinsicfullnessofvalue,"withtheappearanceanddominanceofbourgeoismanandhisyardstickofutility,"thepureexpressionoflifeisonlyballastandevilluxuryakindof'atavisticsurvival'offormsofbehaviorandactionthatwereusefullongago."196Modernpolitics,whetherasbourgeoisliberalism,bourgeoisMarxismorthemasspoliticsoftheextremerightandleft,reflectsthissamefundamentalerror.Revealingtheiroriginintheanthropologyofbourgeoisman,eachsuccumbstothe"perverse"valueorderofthebourgeois.Modernpolitics,thus,despiteitssurfacedifferences,isineluctablyimprisonedinthesingledimensionofutilityvalues.

Inlookingsolelyuponthevaluedimensionoftheparadigmofmodernpolitics,however,importantconceptualaspectsofbothcom-

parisonandcontrastbetweenpersonalismaspoliticaltheoryandmodernpoliticsarelost.EveninrelationtoScheler'sownpoliticalinclinations,therestandsmuchmoreroomforreviewingaffinitiesanddisaffinitiesthanhisuncompromisingrejectionofmodernpoliticsonvaluegroundspermits.Indeed,thoughwidelytoutedasaconservative,SchelerardentlyarguesforareligioussocialismandadoptsanincreasinglyliberalpoliticalstanceastheWeimarrepublicdevolvedintoababbleofextremistvoices.Closeconsideration,therefore,mayprovevaluableregardingtheconceptualdimensionofpersonalismaspoliticaltheoryvis-a-vismodernpoliticalthought.Since,furthermore,itislargelyliberalismandMarxismwhichhavecometobeviewedasthemajorpoliticalmovementsandtheoriesofthemodernera,theseservehereastheprincipalfociforcomparison.

BourgeoisLiberalism

Byandlarge,Schelerdeterminesbourgeoisliberalismtobethepurestexemplarofmodernpolitics,avarietymoreattunedtotherealityofbourgeoismanthanotherstrainsofmodernpolitics.

197Hisearlyantagonismandlaterambiguitytowardliberalismillustrateacontinual,ifperipheral,concernwiththephenomenonassociatedwithhisgeneralconcernwiththestatusofmaninthemodernworld.Drawingonhisresearch,fourconceptualaspectsofbourgeoisliberalismseemtostandatgreatvarianceforthepictureofpersonalismaspoliticaltheorysketchedearlier.Thesefour(formalism,individualism,needs-utilitymotivationandmodernrationalism)offerinterestingcontrastswithpersonalistpolitics.

Formalism

Althoughtherewouldappeartobealittleneedtorestatewhatevenitsproponentsarewillingtoadmittobethe"formal"characterof

liberalism,noneedcertainlytoduplicatetheexhaustivescholarshiponthetopicbyotherresearchers,itisworthwhileforpresentpurposetotakeaperspectiveofsomedistancefromthemanydebatesregardingliberalismandtopaintquicklywithabroadbrushthemajorfeaturesofitsformalism.198Especiallyfromtheangleofpersonalismaspoliticaltheory,liberalismis"formal"intwoimportantways,bothofwhichdrawclosescrutinyfromSchelerinmanyofhisinquiresintothephenomenaofpoliticsandcommunity.Liberalismistheoreticallyformalinprocessandinitsbasisinformalizedelements.Accordingly,theprocessofliberalismisanoperationwhich

followsastrictformulaofestablishedrulesandprocedures.Thisisepitomizedintheworksofearlyliberalwriterswheretheactionsofpoliticsareconceivedastheresultsoftheprocessesofindividualinteractionscoordinatedthroughcontracts.Inthetheoriesofthelaterliberalwriters,wheretheoperationofthepolityisinsomesensemoreconcreteowingtotheconsiderationofactualutilityorpleasure,theprocessremainsinlargepartformalwhenthemotorofpoliticalactionisreducedtoaformal,mathematicalaggregateofindividualhumandesires.Evenmoreclearly,laterliberalthinkersarguingforacategoricalimperative,totheextentthatitcanbeconstruedasamaximforthepoliticalorder,canalsobeperceivedasadheringtotheformalcharacterofliberalism.Despitethevariousandsometimesimportantdifferencesamongtheseveralversionsofliberalism,therefore,thereexistsacommonalityintheirprocess;eachcounselsthedeterminationofproperpoliticalactionsviaamethodologicalfollowingofcertainprinciples.Politicalactionsarelegitimate,regardlessoftheparticularsofoutcome,ifthepropermethodshavebeenfollowed.Politicalpracticeisconsidered"good"ifitissuesfromtheappropriate,establishedprocessesapointapplicableforbothsocietyasawholeandforindividualpoliticalactionswithintheliberalschema.Thereisnoacknowledgementofthelegitimacyofsocialgoodsandvaluesapartfromthisadherencetoformalprocedure.Hence,politicalpracticecanneverattainmorethanthestatusofanadhoc,formaltooldevisedbyitscitizensasameanstowardtheirseparateends.

MaxScheler'smostthoroughinvestigationof"formalism"appearsinhismasterworkonethics,FormalisminEthicsandNon-FormalEthicsofValues.

199TakingKant'sformalism,"acolossusofsteelandbronze,"ashisstartingpoint,Schelerdemonstratesthepossibilityandnecessityofa

flesh-and-blood,substantivelyhumanapproachtoquestionsofdeontologicalsignificance.DespitetheimpressivenessofKant'scolossus,andwhileacknowledgingthevalidityofmuchofhisconclusion,Schelerfindsthecolossustobeinadequatepreciselybecauseformalismoffersno''downtoearth"valueforrealmenfacedwithactualnormativechoices.200Formalism,inthisconcpetion,isadenialofknowledgeoranyconationofthe"right"or"good"actionitself,andanassertionthatonlytherightnessorwrongnessofthemethodorprocessofchoosinganygivenactioncanbeknown.ThisinadequacyofKant'sandallotherformalapproachestonormativeissuesliesinthechasmwhichisdrawnbetweenformalproceduresandmaterialfacts.Schelerremarksthatthecharacterofsuch

procedures(general,abstract,inflexible)isitselfillustrativeofitsinapplicabilitytotheuniquenessofeachpersonandeachparticularhumansituation.Personalism,incontrast,ischaryofthelodgingofhumanresponsibilitysolelyinsuchmethodsandprocessesandwouldseemtorequireagreateremphasisontheresponsibilityofpersonsfortheactualresultsoftheiractionsaboveandbeyondanyresponsibilityassociatedwiththemeansbywhichsuchresultsareattained.Moreparticularly,bywayofconvincingphenomenologicalpresentation,asdiscussedearlierinthisstudy,Schelerrevealsthatspecialmaterial"facts"aredirectlyperceivedineverynormativeexperience.Thesefactsare"values,"valueswhichareimmediatelygivenandwhichofferconcreteguidanceforaction.Thepropercourseofactionisthatonwhichthe"higher"valuelies.Wheninconflict,forexample,andallelsebeingconsideredequal,oneoughttopursuetherelativelyhighervalueofsocialwelfareoverthelowervalueofindividualutility.

201Hence,Schelercontraststheformalismofliberalismwithhisownnon-formal,directperceptionofvalues.Intheplaceofliberalism'sprocessofpoliticsintermsofartificialconstructions,itwouldseemthatSchelerisholdingoutthepossibilityofapoliticsbasedonactual,thoughdeontological,"facts."

Asnoted,however,liberalismisformalinmorethanitsprocess.Itisformalaswellinwhatmightbetermeditsbasicstructuralelements.Commontomuchofliberaltheoryistheconceptionofthecivilsocietyasonlyanetworkofcontractsorcovenants,rulesorprocedures.Asclassicallyphrased,itsgovernmentisoneoflaws,ratherthanofmenandwomen.Beyond,then,theconcernswhichSchelervoicesovertheformalmethodsandproceduresofliberalpoliticaltheoriesliesamoredisquietingimplication.InScheler's

estimation,liberalisminevitablyreducesactual,humanpersonstoless-than-humanabstractionsofthemselves.Theformalcharacterofliberalismrequiresthatuniquepersonalneedsandtalentsbeignoredinorderthatindividualmenmightbemoreeffecientlyhandledbythepoliticalprocess.Indemocraticliberalisms,menwouldbetreatedasradicallyequalunitsofpoliticaldemandsandinputsasidentical,faceless,votingdigitsinthecountingofnumberswhichconstitutesliberaldemocraticpolicy-making.Evenaformalismwhichclaimsthatpersonsmusteverbetreatedasendsandneverasmeansmaybeinthefinalregardadepersonalizingcontruction.ScheleragreeswithImmanualKantthattheperson"mustneverbeconsideredathingorasubstance,"andassertsalongsimilarlinesthatthepersonmustbethe"immediatelyco-experiencedunityofexperiencing."Nonetheless,

hecontendsthateffortsbyKanttoovercometheobjectificationoftheotherbydutifullyconsideringallmenasidenticaltooneself(inregardtopossessingthesamestructuresofreason)ironicallyleadstoaconceptionoftheotheraslessthanthefullpersonheorsheis.Kant'sformalism,likeallformalisms,ineluctablycanonlyconceiveofmenas"theXofcertainpowers"or"theXofsomekindofrationalactivity."Thedepersonalizationoccurs,therefore,becausetheX,"that'something'whichisthesubjectofrationalactivity,mustbeattributedtoconcretepersonsindeed,toallmeninthesamewayandassomethingidenticalinallmen."

202Regardlessofitsintentions,itseemsthattheformalismofbourgeoisliberalismunavoidablyreducesthepersontoaghostlycaricatureofhisorherfullpersonhoodanddistortsandnarrowsthepracticeofpoliticsbyrelegatingchoicetoblindproceduresremovedtherealityofhumanexperiencesandtherealityofvalues.

Individualism

Aswithformalism,individualismisnotsomuchacausalfactorinthedevelopmentofliberalismasitisanaspectoftheconceptualandnormativeframeworkofbourgeoisman.Aswasdiscussedabove,Schelerpercievesbourgeoismantoapproachtheworldandothersalwaysfromtheperspectiveoftheself.Thebourgeoisselfeverbeginswithitsownsubjectivity,emphasizingits"ownness"inregardtotheothernessinwhichitfindsitself.Inliberalism,todifferentiateitfromthesubjectivitywhichSchelerseesinMarxism,itistheindividualhuman,understoodasareasoninganddesiringlocusofsubjectivity,inwhichthissubjectivityfindsitsexpression.Liberalpoliticaltheoriesdividethepoliticalcommunityintostandardizedandformallyequalchunksofrights,liberties,dutiesandsoforthchunksthatareindividualmen.Becauseliberalismlooksatthepolityinthisfashion,

becauseitseekstoexplainpoliticsanddirectpoliticalactioninaccordancewiththismodel,thesubjectivityofbourgeoisliberalismaptlyistermed"individualism."

Schelerillustratesthemodernnotionofindividualismanditsrelationshipwithliberalismbycontrastingtheidealoftheliberalsocietywiththedominantidealofsocietyexistingpriortotheemergenceofthebourgeoistypeofman.203Thepreviousconceptionwasoneofanaturalcommunitywhereinmemberspartakeofsocialrightsandresponsibilitiesproperforeachmember'sdeterminedplaceinthesocialorder.Muchdifferentfromthis,Scheler'sportrayal

oftheliberalsocietyfindsrightsandresponsibilitiesrelativenottoone'sproperplaceinthepoliticalorder,buttoaproceduralorformalunderstandingofone'srightsandresponsibilitieswithoutthepoliticalorderindeed,outsideallassociationwithothers.Inthispicture,responsibilityforothercanonlybeasecondaryconsiderationwhichfollowsandisbuiltonaprimaryconcernforunilateralself-responsibility.Inthesameway,rightsarenolongertobeunderstoodas"socialrights"(theonlymannerofunderstandingthempriortobourgeoisman).Rather,rightsintheliberalparadigmareunderstoodaswhollylodgedintheindividual.Asaresult,thepolityis"notaspecialrealityoutsideorabovetheindividual."Itis,infact,"onlythesimilarityordissimilarityofindividuals'interests...[a]fabricofrelationsthatrepresent'conventions,''usage,'or'contracts,'dependingonwhethertheyaremoreexplicitormoretacit."

204Scheler'sresponsetotheconceptofindividualismisnottoromanticallyhearkenbacktotheso-callednaturalpolityortoanorganiccommunity.Individualisminmanywaysmustbeseenasanimprovementtothestultifying,statichierarchiesofthepreviousmedievalconception.Neither,however,doesSchelerchampionthenotionofindividualismasitispresentedwithintheframeworkofbourgeoisman.Whileheacknowledgesthatboththeearlierconceptionofthepolityandbourgeoisindividualismoffervaluableinsightsintothecontextofman'ssociallife,itisbelievedthatbothconceptionsultimatelyfailtoencompassthefullrangeofhumansocialityandindividuality.Bothtoonarrowlydelimitthepossiblerelationshipsbetweenperson,otherandthecommunity.Inaddition,Schelercontendsthatneithertheindividualnorthecommunitycanbeentirelyunderstoodbyisolatingonefromtheother.ForScheler,botharemerelyseparateandincompletemanifestationsofman'santhropologicallybasedsociality.205Both,moreover,aresubjecttothedestinyofman.206

Fromtheperspectiveofpersonalismaspoliticaltheory,ashasbeenclarifiedwithsomedetailinearlierdiscussion,theprimacyoftheindividual,whichisacentralpremiseofbourgeoisindividualism,isuntenable.Despitetheemphasisonthespecialdignityoftheindividualperson,Scheler'spersonalismseesthegenesisoftheindividualpersoninagradualemergencefromcommunitythroughaseriesoftransformationswherebythepersonacquirestheabilityto"dissociate"orobjectifytheworld,thenothersand,finally,theself.207Likewise,viewingtheacquisitionofindividualisminthedevelopmentofthespecies,humansocialityisperceivedmost

primitivelyasanamorphousherd,thenasaspecializedlifecommunity,andonlysubsequentlyintheformofthefamiliarindividualismofsociety.

208Bothintheoriginoftheindividualcharacterofthepersonandintheoriginofindividualitywhichisobviousinthehumanspecies,thesocialorcommunalisdiscerned,atleastfoundationally,toprecedetheindividual.Hence,bourgeoisliberalismerrsinaverybasicsense,whenitendeavorstofoundthecivilsocietyonaprioriindividualism.

Thisisnot,however,afullelaborationofthedistinctionbetweenpersonalismaspoliticaltheoryandbourgeoisindividualismonthesubjectofindividualism.Notonlydoesbourgeoisindividualismfailtocomprehendthecontingentanddevelopmentalnatureofindividualismitself,itequallydoesnotrecognizethatindividualismisbutamomentoraspectofthelargerrealityofhumansociality.Inthiserror,noquarterisgrantedforconsideringthepossibilityofthetransformationofthesocialityofindividualismtothepersonscommunity.Justastheindividualpersonalitymayovercomeitsself-centeredadolescentindividualismmaturelytorecognizethesubjectivityofothersanditsownrootsintheenvelopingcommunity,sotootheindividualityofbourgeoisliberalismmaybeovercomeinapersoncommunitywherepersonsrecognizetheoriginoftheirindividualityinthecommunityand,withtheresponsibilitysuchrecognitionentails,wouldcreativelyconstitutethepersoncommunityitself.Humanindividualismfindsitsgenesisonlyincommunity,inotherwords,butthehighestcommunitythepersoncommunityhasitsorigininthecreativeovercomingofmereindividualismbyindividualpersons.Theperson'sindividualityisanachievementofhisorhersociality;theperson'shighestsocialityisanachievementofhisorherindividuality.Hence,thepersoncommunitymustbeseenas

inherently"political"inthebestsenseoftheworld.Eachpersoncreativelypartakesinconstitutingthepersoncommunity(itselfacorporatepersonality),acknowledgingandacceptingtheconstitutionofhisorherownindividualpersonalitybythecommunity.209

Returningtothequestionathand,threecounterpointstotheindividualismofliberalismcanbederivedfromtheforegoing.First,becausethebackgroundoftheindividualisthecommunity,liberalindividualismisincorrectinviewingtheindividualaspriortothecommunity.Althoughonlybyorderoffoundation,personalismdemonstratesthatthesocialexperienceisprimaryandtheindividual,secondary.Liberalismismistakeninregardingtheindividualasthetheoreticalgroundandmostbasicbuildingblockofsocietyand

politics.Second,individualismfailstodofulljusticetotheindividual.Trueindividualityrequiresthemutualacceptanceoftheuniquepersonhoodsofone'sownperson,otherpersonsandthepersonofthecommunityasawhole.Becausetheliberalschemeseesthecommunityasdependentupontheparallelbutseparateactionsofdistinctindividuals,thedignityoftheuniquepersonhoodoftheothersandthecommunityisprecluded.Denyingthesubjectivityofthecommunityandothersunderminesthepossibilityoftheindividual'sownsubjectivity.Third,individualismintheliberalschemeissubstantivelyunachievable.

210Becauseeachindividualdiscovershimselfonlyaginstthebackdropofthecommunity,thenanyconceptionoftheindividualasisolatedfromthecommunitywouldbebutanillusoryabstraction.AlthoughScheler'spersonalismdoesnotclaimthatthereisacausaldependencybetweentheindividualandthecommunity,orevenacircularinterdependency,hedoesassertthatboththecommunityandtheindividualarenecessaryforafullunderstandingoftheperson.Asillustratedbythesecounterpoints,personalismaspoliticaltheoryrejectsthesimpleindividualismofbourgeoisliberalism.

Motivation

Withinbourgeoisliberalism,twodifferingexplanationsforthemotivationbehindthepolityandbehindallpoliticalactionhavefiguredprominentlyamongtheorists.Typically,however,thedifferencebetweenthesetwoexplanationsofmotivationisoftenblurredbysuchthinkers.Evenatbest,distinctionsbetweenthesemotivationsareonlyvaguelynoted.Yet,fromtheperspectiveofScheler'sphenomenologicalstudiesonvaluesand,moreimportantlyforpresentconcernsfromtheperspectiveofpersonalismaspoliticaltheory,asharplinemustbedrawnbetweenliberalismwhichis

motivatedbythenegativevalueof"need"andliberalismwhichismotivatedbytherelativelylow,butpositivevalueofenhancedutilityorpleasure.)211

Need-motivatedliberalismwouldconceiveofmenandwomenasmotivatedintheirpoliticalactionsbyaneffortmerelytoescapefromapresentgreateviltowardfutureconditionswithpotentiallylessevil.Inthispessimesticprotraitofhumanexistence,thestatusquoisperceivedtobeforeverasceneofwoefulcircumstancesthatistoleratedonlyoutoffearofdegenerationintoworsesituations.Thereisnotranquil,resignedacceptancereflectedinwhatevertolerationmightbegrantedtothepresent.Indeed,thecircumstancesofthepre-

sentareaneternalgoadingforhumankindtoseekprogresstowardpredicamentsoflesserevil.

212Allpoliticalactionsmustthereforebeunderstoodasdirectedatminimizingorblindlyavoidingthediscomfortsofexistence.Hobbes,inthisvein,seeshumankindactingpoliticallyduetofearofviolentdeath,Spinozaoutoffearofaimlessanarchy.Itmightbeobjectedthatanyidentificationofapureneed-motivatedliberalismisitselfanabstration,thatnoliberalthinkercompletelyignoresmotivationfrompositivevalues.Hobbes,forexample,mightalsobecitedforhisstressonthedesireforacommodiouslife.But,whileitwillbeacknowledgedbySchelerthatanumberofneed-motivatedpoliticaltheoriesalsoconsidersomeminorpositivevaluesinmotivation,suchpositivevaluesareverymuchsecondarymotivationsforthesetheories.Moreover,whenpresentintheseschemes,suchpositivevaluespleasure,physicalsatisfaction,etceteraremainvaluesofthelowerlevelsinthefoundationalorderofvalueswhichisconjoinedsocloselywithScheler'spersonalism.Thus,aneed-motivatedliberalismmightdiscussamotivationsuchasfearoranxiety.Indeed,moretypically,suchoflesserimportanceintheexplanationofmotivationthananegativemotivationssuchasfearoranxiety.Indeed,moretypically,suchthinkersdespairoftrulypositivevaluesandcometonamethatwhichfulfillsaneedasa"positive"value.Whatevertheparticulars,allneed-motivatedliberalismsoperateaccordingtotheprincipleofamelioratingthedeficienciesofexistencewhichcanneverbewhollyovercome.

AgainfollowingScheler'sinquiryandsurveyingallothertheoriesofliberalismitmightbesaidthatwhatisnotdefinableintermsofneedsmotivationcanberoughlycatergorizedunderthegeneralheadingofutilitymotivation.213Underthisheading,politicalpracticeis

motivatedbyarecognitionofonlyanarrowrangeofwhatforSchelerarethelower,materialisticutilityvalues.Duetothenatureofsuchvaluesandthefailuretoconsidervaluesbeyondthislevel,motivationinsuchliberalismsaimstowardtheamassingofgreaterandgreaterquantitiesofthosethingswhichcarrythesevaluesi.e.,property.214Unlikeneed-motivatedliberalism,whichpicturesmenengagedcontinuallyinseeking(thoughnevercompletelyfinding)easementoftheevilsoflife,utilityliberalismfindsthebasicmotivatingfactorinhumanactiontobeanatractiontoperceivedvaluessuchas"pleasure."Theyoperatenotonnegativevalues,therefore,butonpositiveones.Aswiththeneedsversion,however,thereareseldompureexamplesofthisutility-basedexplanationof

humanmotivation.Mostliberalthinkersinthiscategoryalsoadmitthenegativevalueof"pain"andassignitasecondaryroleinthemotivationprocess.Somemorecomplexexamplesofutilityliberalismcontendthatnegativevaluespredominateintheoperationofcivilsocietyuntilacertainlevelofcivilizationisattainedatwhichpointutilityvaluescometodominate.

215However,regardlessofitsvariousguises,utilityliberalismsremainbaseduponthenotionof"utilityseeking"astheprimarymotivationofindividualsandthepurposeofpolitics.

Scheler'sevaluationofthesetwodifferentexplanationsformotivationinliberalismvarieswitheach.Inregardtoneed-motivatedliberalism,Schelerbeginsbyinvestigatingthefeelingofneeditself.Hecontraststhefeelingofneedwithinstinctualimpulsessuchashunger,termingitanexperienceofdispleasurewhichaccompaniestheperceptionofalacking.216Althoughsuchanexperienceoccursaswellinhungerandthirst,Schelernotesaprofounddifferenceinthat"needs"arenotaphysical,naturalexperienceoflacking,butratherareinsomesenseanartificialproductofmindsandcultures.Hesupportsthispointbywayofveryconvincingexamples,notingthatastarvingtribeofprimitivesdoesnot"need"thefishinnearbylakesiftheirculturehasnotcometoconsiderfishasfood.Similarly,pre-Columbian,Americanaboriginesdidnot"need"thehorse,despitetherealitythattheirchildren'schildrenoftheAmericanplainstrulydidhavethisneed.Needs,thus,arenotinnate,butaredevelopedinpsychologyandhistorybymen'sactions.

Suchrevelationintheseregardscutstotheheartoftheneed-motivatedconceptofliberalism.Ifneedsareaproductofpsychologyandhistoryiftherearenocommon"innate"needsthenneedscanhardlybetakenasthefoundationofcultureorthemotorofhistorical

processes.Needscannotbethebasisforexplanationofcivilizationorpoliticalpracticewhentheythemselvesariseinhistoryandreferencetohumanacts.217Furthermore,needsarecertainlyincapableofexplainingtruegrowth,whetherhistorical,culturalorindividual.Suchgrowthismeasuredintheattainmentofnewheight,inthecomingtoknowofthatwhichwaspreviouslyunknown.Yet,asSchelermakesevident,onecanonlyneedwhatonehasknownorexperiencedbefore.Asnegative,reaction-likefeelingsfocusedonwhatareperceivedasthelackingsofthepresent,needsareunabletrulytolookforward;theyareunabletoguideactioninanticipationofthenew"heights"ofgrowth.Whiletheneed-motivatedmodelofliberalismischaracterizedbyastateofconstantagitationdueto

men'scontinualreactiontotheinadequaciesofthestatusquo,suchascenariowouldresultnotingenuineforward-lookinggrowthbutratheronlyinaimless,incrementalflux.Tosupposethatthepolityariseshaphazardlyfromsuchaprocessistodenyitpositivepurposeandtoreduceitsexistencetothestatusofhappyaccident.

218

Inoppositiontothisunderstanding,personalismaspoliticaltheorywouldcontendthatallactionsbymenhavetheirbasisintheperceptionandsubsequentpursuitofpositivevalues.Morethanthis,thesubsequentpursuitofpositivevaluesitselfhasits"sourceinasurplusofpositivefeelingsatthedeepeststratum."219Humanactionsprings,accordinglynotfromneed,butfromsurplus.Truedevelopmentorgrowth(physicalorspiritual)occurswhenthepresentsituationisnotonly"tolerable,"butwhenthereexistsinthepresentagreatenoughoverabundanceofpositivevaluesoastobeginreachingforthatwhichisgreaterthanthepresent.Civilizationsdonotarisewherehumanityisingreatestneed,butinsteadwherethereexistsagreatsurplusofresources.Politiesdonotariseofoutofneeds,butoutofvisionvisionfreedfromtheballandchainofnecessity.Politicsisproperlyapatternofhumanactions,notreactions.

Atfirstglance,utilityliberalismwouldappeartobeinconcurrencewithScheler'sresponsetotheneedsvariety.Theneedsmodel,afterall,failsinScheler'sestimationpreciselybecauseofitsblindnesstopositivevalues.Incontrast,utilityliberalismfindsthepursuanceofpositivevalues,inthiscaseutilityvalues,tobeboththemainspringandtheproperendofhumanactionand(so-called)development.Oddly,however,itisexactlybecauseutilityliberalismfindsutilitytobeboththemotivebehindindividualactionandtheultimateendofhumansociality,thatSchelerutterlyrejectssuchliberalismasan

explanationandnormativeguideforsociallifeandpolitics.Utilityliberalism,heclaims,restsuponan"inversion"ofman'shierarchyofvalues.Thereby,Schelerseesitasonlya"perversion"ofthepropermeansandendofthesocialorder.Schelertracesthehistoricalgroundsofthisinversioninanumberofearlyworkstothefeelingofressentimentwhichcomestopredominatetheconstitutionofmanasheemergesasthetypusofthebourgeois.LikeNietzsche,Schelerfindsressentimenttobeaself-poisoningofthepsycheissuingfromthesuppressionofthesmolderinghatredofalessermanforonegreater.220Ressentimentintimeunderminesthenormativeframeworkofthegreaterman/lesserman(master/slave)relationship.Ifonlybytheweightoftheirnumbers,themasses,filledwithressentiment,cometosubverttheorderofvaluewhichmarksthegreater,excep-

tionalmanassuperiortothemselves.Thecommonvirtuesofthemultitudeareextolledwhilethesecretly-enviedvirtuesofthesuperiormanareheldupforridicule.Theproperorderofvaluesisoverthrownthroughappealstothemostbasevalues(i.e.,"utility")andlowervaluesareplacedinascendancyoverthehigher.Usefulnessiscelebratedovernobility,quantityoverquality,homogeneityovercreativediversity.Moreover,Schelerarguesthattheartofrulingisthusrenderedas"economics;"sciencebecomes"technology;"developmentbecomesnotgrowthbut"gluttony"andtruthitselfbecomesmerely''pragmatictruth."

222

Thesignificanceofthisbecomesclearinconsideringthepatternofvaluesitself,whichSchelerdividesintofivemodallevels:theagreeable,theuseful,thevital,thespiritual(geistliche),andtheholy.223Fromtheagreeableaslowesttotheholyashighest,eachlevelcorrespondstoitsowndistinctsphereofactsandvalues.Atthesametime,thearrayofvaluesitselfmustbeseenasanorderofsorts,afoundationalsequenceofstageswherethevaluesofthelowerlevelsaretobeconsideredasdirectionalsignspointingtowardthehighestlevels.Utilityliberalism,therefore,greatlyerrsinitsconsiderationofthevalueofutility(pleasure,agreeableness)astheproperendofthepolityorastheultimategoalofpoliticalaction.TheimplicitimperativeofScheler'sorderofvaluesrequiresthateverypositiveactionbedoneinconsiderationofthehighestvalues,or,ashestateselsewhere,inconsiderationofthe"destinyofman."224AlthoughSchelercertainlydoesnotobjecttotheintrinsicimportanceandindependenceofeachmodallevel,inasituationofconflictingvalues,thelowermustgivewaytothehigher;theutilityvaluesmustbesubordinatedtothevital,thevitaltothespiritualandthespiritualtotheholy.

Crucialhereistherecognitionthatpersonalismaspoliticaltheory,totheextentthatitsharesScheler'svaluetheory,doesnotdenytheimportanceofthevalueofutilityperse.Thedistinctiontobemadeisthatpersonalismaspoliticaltheorydoesnotnarrowlydelimititselftoanunderstandingofpoliticsmotiviatedonlybyutilityoranyothersinglecategoryofvalues.Rather,itperceivesavarietyofmotivatingvaluesinthepracticeofpoliticsindeed,theentirerangeofvalues.Schelerhimselfstruggleswiththisextensionofthepolitical.Inhisearlywritingsheconceivesofpolitics,inthenarrowestusageoftheterm,tooperatewhollywithinthesphereofwhathecalls"vitalvalues."Inlargepart,followingfromthis,hisdismissalofutilitybasedliberalismstemsfromaperceivedperver-

sionwherebourgeoismanraisestheutilityvaluesofeconomicsabovethevitalvaluesofpolitics.FromtheimplicationsofScheler'spersonalism,however,itwouldseemthattheconceptofthepoliticalcannotevenbeconstrainedtothesinglecategoryofthevitalvalues,butmustbeseentoencompasstheentirearrayofvaluesandalwaysinlightofthehighervalues.Themotivationofpoliticalaction,thus,hasmanysources.Forpersonalismaspoliticaltheory,whatevertheimmediatemotivationforpoliticalaction,politicalpracticeoccursinanarenawhichrecognizesthehighestvalues.

225

Rationalism

AccordingtoScheler,theinterpretationandunderstandingofreasonalsoundergoprofoundchangewiththeemergenceofthebourgeoisman.Wherepreviouslyreasonwassomehowunderstoodasverymuchintertwinedwithfaith,love,man'sultimatevalues,goods,endsandsoforth,withthisnewtypeofmanreasonisstrippedandisolatedfromsuchheadyconcepts.Reasonbeingconceivedinamuchmorenarrowandrestrictedsense,Schelercontendsthatwiththebourgeoisman,it"emancipatesitselffrombothemotionalandorganic-schematicguidances."226Reason,thus,becomesestrangedfromtheworldandothers.Theoryisdistancedfromnatureandpractice.Factsarethoroughlyseveredfromvalues.

Twosomewhatdifferentbutessentiallyinterrelatedversionsofthisnewinterpretationofreasonareevidentwithintheparadigmofmodernpoliticalthought,bothofwhichdirectlyevidencethemselvesinbourgeoisliberalism.Accordingtothefirst,reasonisrenderedamundane,instrumentalandcalculativetoolservingtheinterestsofindividuals'needsandutility.This"reasoning"is,therefore,onlyconceivedasaninstrumentoftheunderlyingneedsandutility

motivationswhichwereearlierconsideredandrejectedbyScheler.Indeed,Scheleronlysketchilytreatsthisparticularversionofmodernity'stransformationofreason.227Thesecondversion,however,attractshisclosestattention.Perhapsinawarenessoftheinadequaciesanddangersofestablishingethicsandpoliticsuponafoundationofutilityorneed,thissecondversionofthenewreasontakesthe"purified"reasonofthebourgeoismanitselfasaguideandstartingpointforpracticalaction.Liberalthinkersinthis"rationalist"veinwouldstandapprovinglywithSchelerinoppositiontotheclaimsofotherliberalsregardingauniversalneedorutilitymotivation.Suchrationalistscontendthatneedsorutilitymotivationsbelongingeneral

totheworldofsensoryexperienceand,thus,aredangerousgroundsforpoliticalprinciplesanduntrustworthybasesforthelegitimatepolity.Therationalistskirtstheproblemsofsuchempirically-basedsocialandpoliticaltheoriesbyclaimingthat"thegroundofobligationmustnotbesoughtinthenatureofmanorinthecircumstancesinwhichheisplaced,butsoughtapriorisolelyintheconceptsofpurereason."

228Inotherwords,Scheler'srejectionofthoseliberalismswhichoperateontheassumptionsofneedorutilitymotivationisinapplicabletoliberalismsbasedontheaprioriimperativesofuniversallysharedreason.Rationalismhere,aderivationofrulesforactionfromreasonitself,becomestheexplanationofandjustificationforsocietyandpolitics.

Operationally,thisunderstandingconceivesofhumankindasmoldingthesensibleworld,throughtheinnateprocessesofreason,intogeneralcategorieswhichreasonitselfcansubsequentlyworkwithandmanipulate.Rationalismcontendsthattherawworldisunsuitableasalocationfromwhichtomakesocialandnormativejudgementsbecauseitisparticularizedandindividuated.Indeed,somuchiseachbitofexperienceintheeverydayworldunderstoodasanindividualanduniqueoccurrence,thattheworldoftheseexperiencesistakentobeonlyameaninglesschaosofdisparatephenomena.Tomakenormativedecisionsinthemidstofsuchanunsettledstateofaffairsandonthebasisofsuchincoherentdata,therationalistsreason,wouldbefolly.Toestablishapoliticalcommunityonafoundationofthissortthechaotic,rawfactsofthesensibleworldbeforereasonhasdigestedthemwouldbeabsurd.229Similarly,therationalistliberalthinkerlookstoreasonforacommonframeofreferencebywhichhumankindcanacknowledgeandactinaccordancewithothers.

Withoutsuchaframeofreference,therationalistsargue,thateachindividualman,beingisolatedfromhisfellowsbyspaceandtime,wouldperceiveanutterlydifferentworldthanthatofhisfellows.Itisinthissensethathumansareindividuated.Withoutreason,theycontent,thisindividuationwouldbesuchthateverymanwouldberadicallyalienatedfromeveryotherman.Politicsandethicsareonlypossible,therefore,wherethisradicalindividuationiscircumventedbythepossessionofthefacultyofreasonamongallpersons.Becauseboththeempiricalperceptionofvaluesandthederivationofthe"good"fromnaturearedependentupontherelativityofhumanexperienceinasuspectworld,normativechoiceisseentorequiresomefirmerfooting.Therationalistsfindsuch"footing"inreasonitself.Theultimateground(or,better,"criterion")

fornormsandactionmustbefoundinreason.Byreason,therefore,theworldcanthenbedealtwith,societywithotherscanbepossible,andhumanactionscanattainnormativesignificance.

Politicalinstitutionsandstructuresforpoliticalpracticefollowupontheserationalsuppositions.Sincepoliticsinvolvestheexerciseandconditioningofchoice,itsdomain(inclassicalparlance)isthatofthewill.Therationalistpositionconceivesofthewill,however,onlyintermsofitbeingmerelyacreatureofreason.Reasondeterminesthegroundofwill,constitutingtheobjectstowhichchoiceapplies.Forpolitics,reasonthuspositspracticalprincipleswhichgenerallydeterminetheconditionsofpoliticalpractice.Inasmuchassuchprinciplesareestablishedonandthroughreason,therationalistscontendtheyarevalidandbindingforeveryrationalbeingtheyare,inotherwords,"universal."Theultimatecriterionofthevalidityofpoliticalpractice,theultimatetestofthelegitimacyofanypoliticalinstitutionisthereforethemeasureofitsuniversality,itsgeneralityinregardtoallrationalbeings.Inthiscontext,itfollowsthattherearenopoliticalgoodsinthemselves,"good"beingonlythoseprincipleswhichstandthetestofbeingrendereduniversal.Generalrulesandprocedureswouldfollowfromsuchprinciples.Yet,thefarthersuchrulesandproceduresstretchfromtheuniversalizedprinciplestowardtheparticularsituationintheworld,thelessvalidtheybecome.Hence,anapparentlyliberalpoliticallandscapeemerges.

Schelerraisesseriousobjectionstothiswholeprocessobjectionswhichgobeyondhispreviouslyconsideredrejectionoftheformalismimplicitwithinit.Hequestionstheveryapplicabilityofsuchreasontopracticalaffairs.Heclaims,first,thattherationalistconceptionrestsuponanantiquated,staticunderstandingofmanwhichwronglyassumesallmeninalltimespossessequalaccesstoreason.Second,hequestionswhetherreasonisthesecurehavenfromtheworldofexperiencewhichtherationalistsseek.Third,hedeniestheassertion

oftheaprioriplaceofreasoninnormativeconcerns.

BeginningwiththefirstofScheler'spoints,henotesthattherationalistpicturesmankindtotobesomethingfirmandstableinitspossessionofcertainfaculties.Thoughmostrationalistwriterscontendthattheyareconcernednotwithhumanreasoning,butwithreasonitself,theirworksofferlittleevidencetosupportthepossibilityofreasonexistingoutsideofactualmen.

230Withscantfewexceptions,tobeamanisseentobearationalmanregardlessofpersonaldevelopment,cultureandsoforth.AsSchelerwrites,intherationalistview"theconceptofmanwas,inaway,involuntarily

idealized,andarealspecieswassubsumedunderthisidealconceptasacorrelate,whichtodayseemspossibleonlyonthebasisofinsufficientknowledgeofthefact.Thisresultsinthe'universallyhuman,''humanity,'andthe'alltoohuman.'"

231Schelercitesagrowingbodyofempiricalevidencewhichundercutsthisrationalistposition.Mendifferfromoneanotheracrosstimeandspace.Mankindevolvesgeneticallyandanthropologically.Justasthechildgrowsandchangesinreason,sotoodomenincultureandmankindasaspecies."Mankindis,likeanyrace,people,orindividual,changeableinprinciple,anditsconstitutionisaproductoftheuniversaldevelopmentoflife."232

Suspicionisthereforewarrantedfortherationalists'efforttoutilizemen'sfacultyofreasonasasecureanduniversalbase.Sincemankinditselfisnounchangingthingintheworld,butisinsteadadynamic,developingentity,andassumptionthatmen'saccesstoreasonisidenticalforallhumankindishardtoswallow.FiremightburnequallyinPersiaasinAthens,buttherationalityofthePersianswassuspecteveninancienttimes,andlittleimaginationisrequiredtospeculateonthePersianconclusionsregardingAthenianrationality.Schelerrejects,ontheseandothergrounds,anynotionofanunchanging,factualunityofhumannatureandrejects,therefore,any"notionthatthereisacertainfixed,'inborn'functionalapparatusofreasongiventoallhumansfromthebeginningtheidoloftheEnlightenmentaswellasKant."233Thereisnofixedandfrozenhumannature,andrationalismcannotdisregardthisfactbypontificatingontheuniversalityofreason.Reasonmayormaynotitselfbealwaysandeverywherethesame,butman'sfacultyofreasonislockedwithinhisdynamicanddevelopingessence.Themerepossessionofthefacultyofreasonbymandoesnotavailthehopesof

therationalistsforfindinginreasonagroundfornormsandactions.234

ThesecondobjectionwhichSchelerraisesagainsttheuseofsuchreasonastheprimaryguidetopracticalaffairsradicalizesthefirst.Fornotonly,heargues,doesdoesthefacultyofreasonchange,butreasonitselfchanges.ThekeytoScheler'sclaimiswhathetermsthe"functionalizationofessentialinsight."[FunktionalisierungderWesenseinsicht).235AsSchelerexplainstheconcept,reasonexistsmuchmoreintimatelywithmanthantherationalistswouldadmit.Reasoningaffectsreason,ononehand,andtheobjectsofreason,ontheother.Reasonitselfispulledandstretchedtoaccommodatebothforces.Subjectivity/experienceconstitutestheconditionsofreason;reasonbecomeswhatitisrequiredtobebybothmanandworld.Itdevelops

andgrows."Thefunctionalizationofessentialinsightenablesustounderstandthattherecanbeanevolutionandgrowthofreasonitselfgrowth,thatistosay,ofitspropertyinapriorirulesofselectionandfunction."

236Contrarytothehopesoftherationalist,reasonisnotimmunefromthefluxofexperience.Norisitimmunefromtheactionsofmen.AsSchelerputsit,reason"growsanddiminishes,'evolves,'and'regresses,'becausecertainoftheessentialinsightsbywhosefunctionalizationitsprogressiscontrolledareattachedtothisorthatparticularlocusintheconcreteworld-processandarepossibleonlyatthosepoints."237Ironically,addinginsulttoinjury,Schelerconcludesthattheparticularreasonuponwhichtherationalistliberalseizes,isbutthepeculiarreasonoftheEuropeanEnlightenmentandonlyacul-de-sacinthedevelopmentofreasoninWesterncivilization.238

Thethirdpoint,whichSchelerraisesagainsttheutilizationofreasonforpracticalmatters,concernstherationalists'assertionoftheprimacyofreason.Asnoted,rationalismutilizesreasonasboththeguidetoactionandthejustificationforaction.Thewillfollowsreasonanddependsuponreasonforitslegitimacy.Reason,fortherationalistconception,isthustheapriorisourceofacts.Scheler,ofcourse,deniesthis.Scheler'srejectionofthepriornessofreasoninregardtoactionandnormsdoesnotsuccumbtothevoluntaristchargethatablind,unknowingwillisprimary.BothwillandreasonforSchelerareinherentlyinthedomainoftheindividualegoand,asdiscussedpreviously,theindividualisitselfnotprimary.Headmitsfreely,concurringwiththerationalists,thatallwillingisa"strivingforthatwhichisknown."Yet,isthe"knowing"whichprecedeswillingarationalknowing?Schelerthinksnot.Examplescanbeimaginedwhichillustratea"knowing"unknowntoreason.Such"knowing"can

lenditselftowillingandactionbeyondarticulationintermsofrationalpurpose.Scheler,however,doesnotestablishhisrejectionofreason'sprimacyonasinglecategoryofexamples.Asremarkedearlyinthisstudy,atitsdeepestrootknowledgeisarelationshipofbeing,specifically,therelationshipofonebeingpartakingintheessentialcharacter[Sosein]ofanotherbeingwithoutincurringanychangeinthecharacterofeithertheknowerortheknown.Whatisthuspresupposedinknowingisaprimalactofabandoningtheselfinordertocomeintoexperientialcontactwiththeworld.Asarelationshipofbeing,knowledgefollowsthepeculiaractofovercomingtheselfinordertoreachoutforsomethingperceivedintheworld.And,atthisdeepeststratum,theperceptionwhichprecedesrationalknowing,isa

perceptionofvalue.Ratherthanreasonconstitutingtheconditionsofwill,astherationalistsclaim,Schelerconvincinglyarguesthattheconditionsofreasonareconstitutedbytheperceptionofvalues.

239

Eventheperceptionofvalue,however,cannotbeseenassufficientgroundsforreason,fortheremustbeatendencyintheknowertorisebeyonditselftoparticipateintheknown.Theremustbean"evaluating"or"takinginterestin"thatwhichisbecomingknown.Inthemostmundanesense,Schelerreferstothistendencyas"interest;"inthehighestsense,hecallsit"love."Itisonlybywayofthisfundamentaltendencythatmanisabletoovercometheself,inordertoreason.Heclaimsthatman''beforeheisanenscogitansoranensvolens,isanensamans."240Reasonis,therefore,notastherationalistsseeit.Thebedrockofourrelationwithanotherisalwaystheperceptionoftheinestimablevalueoftheotherandthetendencytodenytheselftopartakeintheother'sessentialcharacter.Therootofourrelationtotheworldisalwaysinterest.Reasoncannotbetheprimarygroundofnormativechoiceandaction.Reasonfollowsthe"knowing"oftheheart,andtherationalistliberalerrs,therefore,byestablishingthelegitimacyofpoliticsonthepriorityofpurifiedreason.

Personalism,LiberalismandPolitalLegitimacy

Onthebasisoftheforegoinginquiryintotheconditionsof"bourgeois"liberalism,itmayappearpuzzlingthattheremightbefoundanyaffinitybetweenliberalpoliticalthoughtandpersonalismaspoliticaltheory.Yet,itisthepeculiarimageofbourgeoismanandthevalue-complexofthebourgeoiswhichhasbeenrevealedtolieattherootoftheuntenabilityoftheseconceptionsofliberalismandnotexplicitlyliberalismitself.ItisthencurioustoreappraiseMax

Scheler'sowngrowingliberalinclinationsastheGermanpoliticalenvironmentofthe1920sgrewincreasinglydominatedbyextremistvoices.TheperiodisoneofgrowingreflectioninScheler'sownwritings,andwhileinnosenseisitmarkedbyanyretrenchment,heisseentobeincreasinglycarefultodistancehisownthinkingfromcertainmisinterpretationsofhisearlierworks.Notably,hetakespainstoclarifythatheisfarfrombeingtheirrationalistthatsomereviewersofearlyworks,suchasRessentiment,haddesignatedhim.241Similiarly,thisperiodmarksthefinalbreakbetweenSchelerandCatholicism,onewhichheveryclearlyexplainstobecongruentandevenfoundedonhiscontinuingphilosophyofpersonalismand

realistphenomenology.

242ThissamethreadisalsoapparentinhischastisementoftheGermanyouthmovements,whosespirithehadpreviouslyapplauded,(groupssuchastheWandervögel,andvariousreligiousandpoliticalgroups),fortheirgrowingmysticism,irrationalismandblindobediencetotheirleadershipallwhilestilllaudingtheirrejectionofthebourgeoisvaluesoftheirparents.243Likewise,thetimesfindSchelerengaginginbitterrenunciationofthemass-basedandmob-likepoliticalpartiesoftherightandleftfascist,racistandcommunist.244Intheseexamplesandmanyothers,thereisevidencedagrowingemphasisontheimportanceofconsideredreflections,individualliberty,andwhatmightbecalledpersonalist"pluralism"inScheler'sthinking,especiallyasthesequalitiesrelatetopoliticalpractice.Assuch,avaguely"liberal"qualitytohispositionisdiscernable.

Unresolved,however,iswhetherbyanysenseoftheword,personalismaspoliticaltheorymightbedescribedas"liberal."Thequestionistroublesomeandinnowayisitsresolutionfundamentaltothisstudy.Obviously,apersonalistliberalismwouldbeoneshakenloosefromthemooringsliberalismnowretainsintheparadigmofthebourgeois,forthecruxofpersonalistthoughtisthepossibletransformationofman.Moreparticularly,personalistliberalismwouldbeonewhichrecognizesutilityvaluesasbutanarrowsliceofanarrayofvalueswhichstretchestothevaluesofthesublimeandholy.Whatsuchaliberalismwouldresembleisbestlefttospeculation,butattentionmightbepaidtotheforegroundsequenceoftransformationswhichprecedebourgeoisliberalismitself.Thehighvirtueworldofliberalism,"legitimacy"isillustrativehere.Wherethebourgeoisliberalcanconceiveoflegitimacyonlyasbasedonconventiondueto

ahappenstanceconvergenceofvariousindividualinterests,thewordhasintriguingroots:legitimatus,legitimus,lex,legere,legein,logos.245Thelegitimacyofthepoliticsofpersonalismmayinsomemannerincludeandtransformeachofthesenotions.Hence,apersonalistliberalism,seemingly,maydifferfrombourgeoisliberalismmoreplainlyinitsessencethanitsappearance.

BourgeoisMarxism

ApoliticaltheorywhichhasasitsbasisMaxScheler'spersonalism,standsinanambiguousrelationshipwithMarxistpoliticaltheories.246Inlargepart,therelationshipwouldbeoneofmuchaffinityandmanyparallels.LikeMarxism,forexample,personalismis

verymuchanargumentforthesituatednessofsubjectivityanditsmanyattributeswithinthecontoursandcircumstancesofworldandhistory.Inthisvein,Schelerpositsasociologyofknowledge,afunctionalizationofessentialinquiry,andanthropologicalphilosophyofman,andarejectionofbothpureidealismandethical-politicalformalism.Additionally,hefinds,asdoesMarxisttheory,thatthematerialconditionsofclass,economicsandlaborareofcentralimportanceforunderstandingtheactionsandpracticesofpersonsintheworld.Withtheso-calledKathedersozialistenofWeimaracademia,SchelerisalsocloselyengagedintheapplicationofelementsofMarxistculturaltheoryinabroadandcriticalanalysisofbourgeoismanandtheoftenunperceivedidealsofbourgeoissociety.Moreover,andfinally,therearereadilyobviousparallelsbetweentheMarxistnotionoftheemergenceoftruecommunistsocietyandScheler'sownthesisofthetransformationofthepersonandtheconstitutionofthepersoncommunity.

Yet,innosensecanSchelerbetermed"Marxist."AlthoughhefreelyutilizesMarxisttheoryforhisownpurposesandadoptscertainelementsofMarxistthoughtwhicharecongruentwithhisownphilosophyandhissocialandpoliticaltheory,herejectsMarxisminageneralsensebecausehefindsitmiredinthecuriousvalue-complexofbourgeoisman.

247Marxism,inotherwords,maybeausefulandpowerfulinstrumentwhichisvaluableforitsinsightfuldissectionofcertainpathologiesinthesocial,economicandpoliticalstructureofmodernsociety,butfromtheperspectiveofpersonalismandrealistphenomenology,Marxismasitiswidelyinterpretedisalsofoundtobeenmeshedwithintheshortsightedvaluesystelm,ifnottheworldview,ofthebourgeois.Morespecifically,Marxism(whichisassociatedwithtermssuchas"scientific,""mammonistic"and"economic''in

Scheler'susage)unwittinglyandwithoutreflectionacceptsbourgeoisman'smyopicfocusonthevaluesofutilityasthe"measure"ofallthings.ContrarytotheunderstandingofmanyMarxistthinkers,infact,itmaybeclaimedonthebasisofthisinsightthatthepoliticaltheoryofbourgeoisMarxismisonlyadiguisedandnewtriumphofthebourgeoispsychologyofressentiment,wherethemoralandpoliticaland(patently)theeconomicagendaofbourgeoismanissinisterlyextendedbeyondtheactual,historicalclassofthebourgeoisiethemselves.InScheler'sreadingofMarx,itiseconomicvaluesandthepatternsoftheirhistoricmaldistribution,theexperienceofalienationgroundedintheunequalexchangebetweenlaborandtheeconomicvalueofsuchlabor,andaverybourgeoiscalculatingrancorovertheseadmit-

tedlyrealandinexcusableinequities,whichareunderstoodtocombineanddrivetheMarxistengineofhistory.Obviously,ifthevalidityofScheler'sreadingisaffirmed,Marxismoperatesprimarilyatthelowerlevelsofpossiblevalues.Whateverinconsequentialfrictionsmightexistbetween"bourgeoisMarxism"andbourgeoisliberalism,therefore,donotreflectanunderlyingessentialdifference,butsteminsteadfromonlywhatisclearlyabourgeoiscompetitionfortheinevitablyscarceobjectsofutilityvalues.

Thisstudy,althoughcognizantofthemanyfacesofMarxisminrecentdecades,followsMaxScheler'sownunderstandingofwhatisherereferredtoas"bourgeoisMarxism."Justaswiththeinquiryofbourgeoisliberalism,bourgeoisMarxismmustberecognizedasafacetofanessentiallyunitarymodernpolitics,aunitywhichisitselffoundedontheconceptualanddeontologicalparadigmofbourgeoisman.Likethepreviousconsiderationgivenliberalism,then,bourgeoisMarxismalsostandstobevaluablycomparedandcontrastedatcertainpointswithpersonalismaspoliticaltheory.Thefollowingpagesconsiderdialecticalmaterialism,classsubjectivityandthecritiqueofideologyfromthisstandpoint.Aswithliberalism,andasoughttobeexpected,theresultsofthecomparisonrevealageneraldisaffinity,butequallyindicatepossibilitiesforcuriousandthought-provokingaffinity.

DialecticalMaterialism

TheheartofbourgeoisMarxismisdisclosedinitsemphasisontheprimacyofmaterialrealityandintheconstitutive(evendeterminant)rolewhichtheprocessesandconditionsofmaterialrealityplayintheformationofnoeticreality.Ideas,consciousness,metaphysicsandmoralityareunderstoodasentirelydependentcategorieswithoutintrinsichistoriesexistingonlyasproductsofwhatistermedthe"materialdialectic."

248Occurringinthis,relativeespeciallytothegeneraldirectionoftheWesternunderstandingofman'splaceinthecosmos,isathoroughgoingdelimitation(althoughnotquiteelimination)oftherangeofhumancreativity,responsibilityandsubjectivity,coupledwithanobversebroadeningofthescopeofthatwhichisnecessary,scientificallyexplainableandobjective.Particularly,theprocessofhistoricalchangeisgreatlydistancedfromsubjectivehumanactivityandisinsteadassociatedwiththedynamicsofthematerialdialectic.

Intheacquisitionofthenecessitiesofhumanlivingthroughlabor,itisargued,menandwomenarefoundinvolvedindefinite

relationswitheachotherwhichareineluctableandindependentoftheirwill.Theserelations,whichareMarx'scelebrated"relationsofproduction,"correspondtothematerialrealitiesofthegivenhistoricalstageofproduction.Togethersuchrelationscomprisetheeconomicstructureofsociety,whichisthebasisforthespecificnonmaterialrealitiesofsociety'ssocialstructure,politicsand,indeed,humanconsciousnessitself.Therestiswell-known.Thenatureofsuchrelationsengenderscertainobjectiveantagonismsortensions.FollowingMarx'spurported"righting"ofHegel'supside-downdialectic,bourgeoisMarxismconceivesofmaterialrealityasdevelopingthrougha"dialectical"processwhereanygivenstructureofrelationsinternallyfomentsanegativecounterstructure.Becausehumanconsciousnessisbutareflectionofthematerialconditionsofrealityasmanifestedinagiveneconomicstructure,theparticularsofmen'sandwomen'sconsciousnessofthemselves,theirworldandtheirhistorytheirideologies,asitwerearedeterminedbythespecificcharacterofeconomicsinacausalmanner.Hence,inasmuchasnonmaterialrealitiessuchasethics,politicsandsoforthareobjectiveincharacterandareunvaryingresultantsofthedynamicprocessesinmaterialreality,theycanbeknownandexplainedinthesamescientificmannerthataphysicistmightexplainthenecessarytransformationofhydrogenintoheliumundercertainempiricalconditions.

249

Despitecertainaffinitieswhichwillbecomeapparent,forthepersonalisttheoryofpoliticsasdiscussedabove,thetheoryofdialecticalmaterialismasrenderedinbourgeoisMarxismisuntenable.Fromthisperspective,bothbourgeoisMarxism'smaterialismitselfandtheoperationofthematerialdialecticaresuspect.Ofthetwo,itismaterialismitselfwhichdrawsScheler'smostrigorousscrutiny.250He

revealsthatmaterialism'soriginliesintheemergenceofthebourgeoistypeofman;indeed,itisfundamentallylinkedtotheformalismwhichhasearlierbeenshowntohaveitssourceinthebourgeois.Itislinked,inhisestimation,withthatsubject-objectorself-non-selfalienationwherebourgeoismandivorceshissubjectivityfromtheworldandfromsolidaritywithothers.Issuingfrom"theunrestrictedtendencyofthecity-bourgeoisiestowardasystematic,andnotonlyoccasional,controlovernature,andanendlessaccumulationandcapitalizationofknowledgeforcontrollingnatureandsoul,"thephysicalworldisperceivedasanencirclementofalienthingsasobjectivethingstobeused,dominatedandgatheredupforfutureuse.251Forbourgeoisman,natureistransformedintoacollectionofobjectswhichareentirelyseparatefromhimselfandwhicharedevoidofintrinsicvalue.Theobjectsofthematerialworld,moreover,

acquirevalueonlywhentheyinsomewayareputtotheuseof,orareseentoservetheinterestsofbourgeoismanhimselfonlywhen"owned,"atwhichtimetheycanbegrantedanexchangeraterelativetootherownedobjectsorunresolvedinterests."Thatistosay,"Scheleradds,"everythingappearsfirstasmerchandise."

252Likewise,thedivorceofthesubjectivefromnatureisequallyattheoriginofmodernformalism.AsSchelerremarks,"the'forms'whichduringtheMiddleAgeswereonticandGod-givenandhadfixedmeaningsbecome,throughoutbourgeoisthinking,consequencesofactsofhumansubjects,viz.theybecomeregardedprimarilyasformsofhumanthinkingonly."Inotherwords"objectivelyoneregardsthemascontaining'laws'thatcanbemathematicallyformulated,oratleastofaformal-mechanicaltype.''253Thus,modernmaterialismandmodernformalismarebutdifferentfacesofthesamecoin.Moreimportantly,botharetoberecognizedaspursuingthesameinterests,inlightofasharingofthebourgeoiscomplexofvalues.

Theparticularvaluesorinterestswhicharisewiththecomingofthebourgeoismaninterestincontrol,acquisitionandutilitygiverisetoaparalleltypeofknowing,whichSchelerdesignatesasHerrschaftswissen(aknowingwithregardtohowthingsmightbecontrolled,dominatedorputtouse.)254Fromthisstandpoint,formalism(asdiscussedaboveinthediscussionofbourgeoisliberalism)andmaterialismarebothapparentlyextensionsofHerrschaftswissen.Forformalism,whichiscloselyalliedwithidealism,thedirectionofHerrschaftswissenisonewhichturnsawayfromthedifficultprojectofknowingandcontrollingthematerialthingsintheworldandtheparticularityofothersinfavorofthecategorizationandobjectificationofvaryingphenomenawithin

unchanging,knowableandcontrollable"forms."Inthisway,thesupposedfluxofmaterial,phenomenalrealityisabletobeorderedandputtouse.255Inbourgeoisliberalism,aswasnotedbefore,thisisthepathbywhichHerrschaftswissenisappliedtotheordering,controllinganddominatingofpoliticalpractice.FormaterialismthedirectionofHerrschaftwissenissomewhatdifferentitmeans,butidenticalinend,becausetheendstemsfromasharedcommongroundinthevalue-complexofbourgeoisman.Materialisminitsessenceis,therefore,anendeavorseekingtheobjectificationoftheworldandotherswhichblossomsfromthebourgeoisinterestinutility,acquisitionanddomination.

AsBlaisePascalremarksinaperceptiveepithetfromthePensees,reflectingonthecharacterofmodernman:"Thereisnothingwhichwecannotmakenatural,andnothingnaturalwhichwedonot

destroy."

256Nature,intheunderstandingwhichSchelerassignstothetypeofmanhetermsthebourgeois,istherealmofthings,ofobjects.Tobenatural,fromthelocusofthisunderstanding,meanstoexistsolelyatalevelwhichrespondstounvaryingcausallawstobeabsolutely,inaword,"necessary."Thisstateofaffairsiseminently"useful."Toknowthecausallawsandnecessitieswhichoperateamongtheobjectsofmaterialrealityenablessuchobjectstobeputtouse.Recognizingthis,materialismisanextremeeffort,inScheler'sevaluation,toreduceallrealitytothelevelofthecausallawsandnecessitiesofphysicalobjectstothelevelofthatwhichisknowablewithinthestricturesofHerrschaftswissen.BourgeoisMarxism,therefore,tothedegreeitpursuesthereductionofhumanconsciousness,creativityandresponsibilitytothecausalforcesofthephysicalworld,tothedegreeitpresentsthedevelopmentofhistoryandthepoliticalpracticesofpersonsatthelevelofnecessaryandscientifically"knowable"laws,andtothedegreethatthematerialdialecticisconceivedasonlyanobjectivematerialprocess,succumbstotheself-samereificationofpersonsandworldwhichitfindstobeaperversioninmoderncapitalistsociety.

Scheler,ofcourse,isawarethatsuchpossibleresultsruncountertotheostensibleintentofbourgeoisMarxism.Insomesense,itisthedichotomywhichbourgeoismanraisesbetweenselfandnon-self,betweensubjectandobject,whichbourgeoisMarxismmaintainstobetheunderlyingproblematicofcapitalistsociety,andtobetheoriginofthealienationwhichisseenbehindthesunderingoftheworkerfromtheproductsofhislabor.Consistentwiththesepoints,headmitsthatthedialecticalmaterialismofbourgeoisMarxismissomewhatdifferentfromanypurematerialism.Heremarks,forexample,thatthe

Marxistmaterialconceptionofhistory[materialistischeGeschichtsauffassung]isseldomunderstoodcorrectly.ThegeneralobjectiontothematerialismofMarxism,henotes,isitsfinding"theprimacausaandtheindependentvariableinhistoricalevolutionintheso-called'economicrelations'whichareequallyseenasthehighestvalueandhighestendofhumanexistence.Thisconception,however,(regardlessofwhetheritistrueorfalseinitself)isabasicallyerroneousinterpretation,"because,"onlyprevioushistory,accordingtotheCommunistManifesto,isahistoryofeconomicclassstrugglesandisunfree,suchstruggleshavingbeenmerelyillusory'ideologies.'"Thisisacrucialpoint,hecontinues,becauseMarxismsecretlysharesthesamedreamasGermanidealism.Hence,forbourgeoisMarxismthebeliefisretainedthat"thenewsocialistsoci-

etyoughttobringaboutanimmediate'leap'intofreedom."

257Itisexactlytheuncriticalrelianceonthevalue-complexofthebourgeoiswhichaccountsforthefailureofbourgeoisMarxismtoachieveitsintent.BourgeoisMarxismiskeenlyinsightfulinitsbringingtolightthehiddenbourgeoisdichotomyofselfandnon-selflatentinmodernidealism.But,justasidealism'sefforttoovercomethisdichotomythroughreductiontopurespiritisonlyaradicalizationofthebourgeoisinterestsandvaluesfromwhichthedichotomysprings,sotooisareductiontomaterialism.Botharadicalizationoftheself(inspirit)andaradicalizationofthenon-self(inmatter)arefurtivemanifestationsofHerrschaftswissenandthenarrowingofvalueperceptiontothevaluesofutility.Bothapproaches,therefore,raiseinternalcontradictionsfortheirgoalinmaximizingpersonalcreativityandresponsibility.

SomeimageofScheler'sownthinkingintheseregardsisofferedinhisall-too-hastytreatmentofthenotionofthedialecticitself.258Beginningwithhissociologicalanalysisofknowledge,hispreliminaryapproachtodialecticsistoconceiveoftheprocessasareasoningwhichproceedsfromthematerialandhistoricalconditionsofthelowerclass.Findingitplausible"thatthelowerclasstendstoreflectuponbecomingwhiletheupperclasstendstoreflectuponbeing,"hecontraststhehistoricalunderstandingofthelowerclasswiththeupperclasswhichlooksattheprocessofhistoryasa"static'realmofthepast,'whichresemblesa'halloffame'forgreatmenandworks."Forthelowerclass,however,theprocessofhistoryisseenas"whatisbecoming,i.e.,fromthe'dialectical'clashofdynamicpossibilities."259InthishefindsthattheerrorofbourgeoisMarxism'sabsolutizingofthedialecticresidesinitsuncriticalexchangingofmerelyoneclass-basedunderstandingofhistory(thevisionofthe

upperclass)foranother.Marxism,thus,doesnotextenditsclassanalysisofknowledgetoitsownclayfeet.

Norishisrecognitionofthesociologicalrelativityofdialecticalthinkingthesolefactorinhishesitation.Behindthishesitation,moredeeply,liesthepluralistcharacterofpersonalism.Unlikemanyotherobjectionstothedialectic,Scheleraffirmsthevalidityofitsunderstandingofhistoryasasuccessiveengenderingandovercomingofantagonism.AsinMarxism,historicalchangeinhistheoryofpersonalismfollowsacertainorderorpatternofmaturationwheretensionscanburgeoninanarenaofstrivingpersonaldrivesandtheexerciseofpower.260AllofthisSchelerfindsincontrovertiblealthoughheverymuchfindsitsimpetustobemuchmorethanamatterof

economicsanditslocitoincludemuchmorethanclassantagonisms.Therub,forScheler,isthathistoryandhumanaffairsgenerallycannotonlybeunderstoodinthisfashion.Changeoccurswhichdoesnotresultfrompittedstruggleandthedialecticalresolutionofantinomies,andhumanpracticesaremotivatedbyothervaluesthanutilityforself.Scheler's"change,"itismadeclear,isalsonotsimplyexplainedbyabsolutelawsofdevelopment.Revolutionsinthisaretransformationsofmanhimself,andwittinglyornotmustpartakeofpersonalcreativityandshoulderpersonalresponsibility.BourgeoisMarxism,then,isseentobeoblivioustothehistorical-anthropologicalgroundfromwhichitsabsolutizingofthedialecticstems,viz.thebourgeoisnotionofcompetition,andthestrugglebywhichtheselfendeavorstodominatethenon-self.Schelerisespeciallyfearfulofthoseinterpretationsofthedialecticwhereitisviewedasaprocessoffrictiousgrindingawayinalinearmarchtowardachiliasticprogress.Ratherthanadialecticwhichpositstheeventualovercomingofdifferences(betweenpersons,ideasandso-forth)inconflict,personalismwouldsubscribetoacelebrationofdifferencesamongutterlyuniqueandspecialpersons.Thiswouldlikelyentailapoliticswhichseekstheradicalunravelingoftheconflictualknotsandrelationshipsofdominationwhichspringfromthepeculiarcharacterofbourgeoisman.Thegravel-grindingmachineofbourgeoiscompetition,inScheler'sportrayal,hasalreadysucceededingrindingthecreativedifferencesamongpersonsintothecommonsandofmass-society.Inabsolutizingthedialectic,andinconceivingitsolelyasanobjectiveprocess,Scheler'sobviousfearisthatbourgeoisMarxismmaybeonlyunwittinglyextendingthisprocess.

261

ClassandSpeciesSubjectivity

By"classandspeciessubjectivity"thisstudyreferstothebourgeoisMarxistrejectionoftheindividualsubjectofliberalisminfavorofthehumanspeciesasasubjectivewholeandthepeculiarsubjectiveroleofcertainclasseswithinthiswhole.Somesymmetryis,therefore,intendedbetweentheexpressionofsubjectivityinliberalismthroughtheindividualandMarxism'slocatingofsubjectivityinthespecies,andinparticulargroupswithinthespecies.Itmayberemarked,ofcourse,thatScheler'spersonalismdoesnotonlyassignsubjectivitytothesocialbeingoftheperson,buttothetotalityofthepersonbothsocialandindividual.Fromthis,sinceSchelerinhisearlyworksseestheMarxistspecies-subjectasswallowingthein-

dividualinthemawoforganiccommunity,itmightbesupposedthattheclearestcontrastbetweenpersonalismandMarxismresidesinthisdistinction.Yet,asSchelercomestorealizeinhislaterworks,thespecies-subjectofMarxismdoesnotdenyasubjectiveroleforindividuals,andinthisregardthedistinctionbetweentherelationshipofindividualtospeciesinMarxandtherelationshipofindividualtoGesamtpersoninSchelerbecomessomewhatfoggy.Asbefore,thematteratissueisonewhichhasreceivedattentionforitscentralitytoMarxism,andonewhichhasattracedallmannerofinterpretation.

262ConcernedasthisstudyiswithbourgeoisMarxism,thegeneralbodyoftheseinterpretationsmaybeusefullydividedintotwoapproaches:anapproachwhichseesthecorporatesubjectastheindividualsubjectwritlarge,andanapproachwhichseesthecorporatewholeasbutanobjectiveagency,notasatruesubjectintheusualsense.Briefly,fromthevantagepointofpersonalism,Scheler'sevaluationoftheMarxistpositionreflectstheambiguityamongMarxiststhemselvesintheinterpretationofthisconcept.Hedismissestheindividualsubjectwritlargenotiononroughlythesamegroundsbywhichheelsewheredismissesliberalindividualism.Theapproachwhichdeniestruesubjectivityandlocatesthevehicleforchangeinanobjectivecorporateagency,however,provesrathermoretreacherous.Hence,thissecondnotionmightreceivefirstattention.

TheexplanationforthedifficultwhichScheler'spersonalismexperiencesinwrestlingwiththecorporate"subject"asanobjectivecorporateagencyhasitssourceintheproximityofthisinterpretationtohisowntheoryofthesocialityoftheperson.Tobesure,theconceptisuntenableforpersonalismfromthefirstduetoitsimplicitrelianceonamaterialisticreductionaswasaddressedintheprevioussection.But,atthesametime,theconceptionconformsinan

importantwaywithaspectsofScheler'sownsocialtheory.Heconfirms,justasdoesMarxism,thatanthropologicallyahumanbeingis,apriori,asocialbeing.263Moreover,atthelevelofthespecies'anthropologicalorigins,thebehaviorofthissocialbeingisobjectiveincharacteranddeterminedbytheconditionsandrealitiesofbeing.Herejects,plainly,"anytheory(reminiscent,forexample,ofHegel)thatholdsthatthecourseofculturalhistoryisapurelyspiritualprocess."Thebehaviorofthehumansocialbeingatitsdeepestlevelisdeterminedbyrealfactors,"realitieswhichfollowtheirstrictlynecessarycoursewithrespecttoexistence,"thelatterbeing"acoursethatis'blind'fromtheviewpointofthenotionsofvalueandmeaningbelongingtothesubjectivehumanspirit."264Personalism,however,

findsthisconceptionofhumansocialbeingalbeittrueandvalidasfarasitgoestobeonlyoneperspectiveoraspectofthefull,totalrealityofthesocialityoftheperson,asocialitywhichisequallysocialandindividual,andwhichisasubjectivityatopanobjectivity.Inotherwords,forpersonalismtheobjectiveagencyoftheprimevalhumansocialbeingisonlytherootofthetotalperson.Fromthisroot,personalsubjectivitygrowsbywayofaseriesoftransformationsthatissueoutofaprocessofdis-sociationfromtheobjectiverealitiesofexistence.Likewise,fromthisroot,thesocialityofthepersonpassesfromtheorganicsocialityoftheherdtothespecializedcorporatesocialityofthelifecommunity,fromthelifecommunityitpassestotheindividualistsocialityofthesociety,andfromthesociety,ultimately,tothecreativeandresponsibleestablishmentofthepersoncommunity.

Themosttroublingerrorfromthepersonalistperspective,inthisunderstandingofMarxism,istheabnegationofpersonalsubjectivity.Personalismrecognizestheessentialsocialityofpersonalbeing,anditacknowledgestheobjectivityofman'ssocialbeingwithinitsprimevalorigin.Yet,the"highest"socialbeing,thepersonalcommunity,ispreciselythemostsublimebecause,regardlessofitsoriginalnecessity,itisnotnecessaryinitselfandnotsimplyanobjectivereality.Moreover,unlikethoseinterpretationsofbourgeoisMarxismwhichscientificallypredicttheemergenceofpersonalsubjectivityinthecomingoftruecommunism,Scheler'spersonalismispremisedonagrowthofsubjectivitythroughaseriesoftransformations.Theresultisthatevenbourgeoisman'ssocietyisnotnecessaryalthoughitfailstoachievethefullcreativityandresponsibilityofpersonsinapersoncommunity.Therealpotencyofpersonalism'sanalysisofbourgeoisman,modernculture,societyandpoliticsrestsonthisinsight.Despitethemyriadofrealfactorsinvolvedintheconstitutionofhumansocialexistence,forpersonalismthereremainsanundeviatingperception

thatthepathologyofman'ssocialbeingisnotnecessaryatitscorethatmanasaspeciesis,atheart,responsibleforhisownmaking.InScheler'sunderstanding,finally,theburdenofthisresponsibilitydoesnotfallonlyontheambiguousshouldersofhumanityingeneral,oronlyonmoretangibleshouldersofthesocialbeingoftheperson,butfallswithequalweightupontheindividualbeingoftheperson.Thesocialbeingofthepersoninpersonalcommunitycanthenbespokenofasa"moralsolidarity."TheintimatepersonbearstheresponsibilityfortheGesamtperson,andtheGesamtpersonfortheintimatepersonbecausetheGesamtpersoniscreatively

constituted(atthisjuncture)inthesolidarityofintimatepersonsandeachintimatepersonisopentobeingconstitutedinhisorherindividualitybytheGesampterson.

265Scheler'spersonalismisdifferentiatefromthisMarxistconceptionofsocialagency,therefore,notforanoutrightrejectionoftheMarxistthesisbutduetoarecognitionthatfundamentalaspectsofpersonalsocialbeingliebeyondtheamorphousandnecessarysocialityoftheobjectivehumanspeciesintheworld.

Ontheheelsofthisdifferentiation,itmightbeimaginedthatpersonalismaspoliticaltheorywouldadmitagreateraffinitywiththosebourgeoisMarxisttheorieswhichportraythehumanspeciesinhistory,andparticularlycertaineconomicclasses,assubjectiveinessence.Yet,thematterisverymuchmoreuncertain.Inparttheuncertaintyreflectsthevaryingdifferencesamongthesetheoriesrelativetothecharacteranddegreeofsubjectivitydiscerned,butequallyitreflectstheambiguityofMaxScheler'sownconceptionofpersonalsubjectivity.Totheextentthatclassandspeciesonlyreplacetheindividualsubjectofbourgeoisliberalism,however,thereisacertainreciprocitybetweenthetheoriesofspeciesassubjectandthetheoriesofspeciesasobjectiveagency.JustasSchelerrejectsthetheoryofsocialbeingaspurelyobjectiveinnaturebecauseitfailstorecognizethesubjectiveaspectsofman'ssocialreality,sotooherejectsthesimplysubjectivetheorybecauseitfailstorecognizetheinescapableobjectivefeaturesofthatsamesocialreality.InScheler'seyes,foremostamongapproacheswhichsubscribetothelattertheoryarethoseinterpretationsofMarxwhichelevatetheproletariat(oftenwiththemaieuticassistanceof[saveus!]intellectuals)fromapositionofobjectintheworldtotheroleofgenuinesubjectincapitalistsociety.

Inthisresponse,anticipatingmanyofthelatercriticismsofKarlMannheim,Schelercontendsthatthereisnoprivilegedorcentraleconomicpositionforsubjectivityintheworldandhistory.266Hearguesfirst,fromthebasisofhissociologyofknowledge,thattheparticularcircumstancesoftheproletariatdostructuretheagendaofinterestsrelativetothatclassinterestsinaccordwiththoseofthebourgeoisie:materialwelfare,greaterquantitiesofgoods,dominationofthenaturalworldandothermen.Sharingthesameinterestsasthebourgeoismanandhissociety,itseemsdoubtfulthatsomehowtheproletariatautomaticallyacquiresaspecialsubjectivityable

totranscendthebourgeoisweltanschauung.Inasmuchasknowledgefollowssuchinterests,isitnotevenmorelikelythatsuchthinkingisitselfevidenceofonlytheobjectivesituationandcharacteroftheproletariat?Scheler'sresponse,then,extendsaMarxist-likesociologicalanalysistotheideaoftheproletariatasprivilegedsubjectinhistorymuchasMarxhimselfhadanalyzedtheideologyofthebourgeoisie.Indeed,fromSchelers'perspective,bothclassesandtheirancillaryworld-viewsare"victims"ofthepeculiarillusionoftheself(whethersocialorindividual)assubjectandallelseasobject,anillusionwhichhasitssourceinthetransformationtobourgeoisman.

267

Personalism,paradoxically,undercutsthebourgeoisnotionoftheselfassubjectandwithequalforcedoesnotadmitthecavalierobjectificationofthatwhichisnon-self.Beingcannotbenaivelybifurcatedalongthelinesofthesubjectandobjectdivisionsofbourgeoismananinsightdemonstratedasmuchinthecharacterofthepersonassocialbeingasitisinthecharacterofthepersonasintimatebeing.Inappointingtheproletariattotheprivilegedpositionof"subject,"bourgeoisMarxismfollowsthesamemistakenpathwhichbourgeoisliberalismtakesinelevatingthepureindividualtothisposition.Onereducessubjectivitytoanindividualandtheothertoaclass.But,forpersonalism,thereisnoprivilegedplacewhereinsubjectivityinheres,nosinglelocusofresponsibility.Subjectivityandobjectivitypermeatethewholebeingofthepersonbothsocialandindividual.Man'ssocialbeingisbutaperspectivalviewofthetotalityoftheperson;itcannotbeabsolutizedaseithersubjectivityorobjectivity.

CritiqueofIdeology

AmongthemoreprovocativeelementsofMaxScheler'sphilosophic

enterpriseisthepositiontakenrelativetothemodernnotionofcritique,especiallyasexpressedintheKantianKritiktradition.AlthoughthisstudyhasdealtatlengthwiththeantipathicaspectsofthepositiontakenbyScheler,asforexampleinhisapparentdisdainforHusserl'stranscendentalturnandinhisvituperativeresponsetoliberalrationalism,therealsocannotbedeniedanevidentandpossiblyunacknowledgedinfluenceofthatcriticaltraditionuponhissamephilosophicenterprise.Scheler,withmanyothersofhisgenerationofscholars,seesathickstrandofthetraditionofKritikinterwovenwiththefabricofMarxistthought.Norsurprisingly,boththeout-

wardantipathyandthetacitinfluencearepresentandmadetransparentincomparingScheler'sownpersonalistphenomenologicalanalysisofideologywithMarxism'scritiqueofideology.

268

ThecontrastwithScheler'spersonalistthesisis,again,mostpronouncedoverandagainstthoseMarxisttheorieswhichremainlockedwithintheaporialbourgeoisdichotomyofselfandnon-selfor,asindicated,againstthoseMarxisttheorieswhichstandmostproximatetothetraditionofKritik.SuchtheoriesunderstandtheMarxistnotionofthematerialproductionofconsciousnessinacuriouslyrestrictedfashion.Theobjectivepatternsintherelationsofproductionareperceivedtogiverisetocomplementary,parallelpatternsofconsciousness,asforexampleinthedevelopmentofclassconsciousnessinthebourgeoisieortheproletariatintheeraofearlycapitalism.Thesepatterns,or"ideologies,"areseentodefinebroadlyanddetermineman'sunderstandingofself,worldandothers,servingtootoenframeandstructurethosehumanpracticeswhichderivesubsequentlyfromsuchanunderstanding.Inthismanner,theconditionsofone'smaterial,socialexistenceareequallytheconditionsofone'sknowingandcognition.Moreover,theknowledgewhichfollowsfromtheseconditionsofknowingservestoperpetuatetheconditionsofone'ssocialexistenceinaloop-likeprocess.Intriguingasthistheoryisanddespitewhatevervalidityitdeservesasanepistemology,itrequiresnospecialgeniustowondertherefrom,howaMarxisttheoristisablewithconfidencetoascribeanymeasureofcertaintytohis(orher)ownanalysisandtheory?If,asispertinent,thepoliticaltheoryofmodernliberalismistobespurnedonaccountoftheMarxist's"knowledge"thatitreflectsonlytheideologyofthebourgeoisie,onwhatmorehallowedgroundscantheMarxistclaimimmunityfromideologyofanothersort?Howinanycaseisescape

fromthefalseconsciousnessofideologypossible?

Infact,itisherewherethetentacleofthetraditionofcriticalrationalismbecomeevidentinbourgeoisMarxism.Not"grounds"exactly,buttranscendentalroomisgrantedwhereinthecriteriaoftrueconsciousnessmightberationallyandcriticallyascertained.Justaswithrationalliberalism,reasonisunderstoodasabletoenlightenconsciousness.Bycriticallyexaminingtheoriginsandhistoryofideologiesundertherubricofthecontradictionsinheringintherelationsofproduction,suchtheoriescontendthatreasoncananddoestranscendandemancipatefalseconsciousness.Thus,onesupposes,thebourgeoisMarxistrestsassuredinthecertaintyofhisorheranalysisduetoitsbasisinthecriticalutilizationofreason.Inthis,fur-

ther,liesthedominantinterpretationofwhataptlyhascometobecalledthe"critique"ofideology.

FromScheler'spersonalistvantage,however,thecriticalutilizationofreasoninbourgeoisMarxismdiffersonlyindetailfromtherationalisttheoriesofbourgeoisliberalism.Bothmanifestthefar-reachingreinterpretationofreasonwhichhasitssourceintheanthropologyofbourgeoisman.Incontrast,forSchelerreasonisnevertranscendental.Theprocessesofreasonfollowtheperceptionofvalues.Foundedthereon,critiqueisnotavaluefreeassessmentofthecriteriafortrueconsciousness,trueknowledgeorsoforth,butissteepedintheconditionalvaluestructureofactualmenandwomen.Likewise,consciousnessstandsrevealedasdependentuponthissameconditionalcomplexofvalues.InadebatewiththeKathedersozialistMaxAdleratHeidelbergin1924,Schelerspeakstothispoint.Adler,betrayinganeo-KantianinfluenceonhisMarxism,contendsthatclassideologycanbeatranscendedorovercome.Schelerfindssuchtranscendencetroublesome.

AgenuineMarxist,orarepresentativeofthe"absolute"classstruggle,couldnotmaintainthis.Iaminthisregardevenmore"Marxist"thanAdlerinsofarasI,too,havereducedallconsciousnesstobeingandallsupremelawsandformsofreasontotheprocessesoffunctionalizationwithintheformalcomprehensionofbeingbutcertainlynotasMarxdid.Rather,Ihavereducedthemnotonlytomaterialbeingbuttothewholebeingofman.

269

Inotherwords,Scheler'sobjectiontotheturnofbourgeoisMarxismtowardcriticalidealismhingesonaperceptionthatsuchaturnlacksontologicalfootinginthefullrealityoftheperson.Consciousnessisnevertranscendental;itinevitablyspringsfromandleadsbackto"not

onlymaterialbeing,buttothewholebeingofman."Hence,any"critique"offalseconsciousnessmustarisefromthetotalityoftheperson'sreality,notfromanytranscendenceofthisrealitynorfromanynarrow,privilegedaspectofthetotality.

Sucha"critique"isScheler'sownconcern.Fromanoverviewofthewholeofhispersonalism,itisapparentthatitstandsasanefforttogatherintocomprehension(phenomenologically)thetotalityofthebeingofthepersonpartially,beyonddoubt,inordertoclarifythegroundswhereintrueconsciousnessmightemerge.Insodoing,uponsuchgrounds,itmustbepresumedthatallconsciousnesswouldnotbefalseconsciousness.A"critique"ofideologyhereisnot

onlyapossibility,butanimperative.ThisintentliesbeneathScheler'ssociologyandanthropologyofknowledge.Byidentifyingthevariousconditionsofconsciousness,Schelerbelievesthattheseconditionscanbecontrolledfor,''suspended"andovercome."Classprejudices,andalsotheformallawsoftheirformation,caninprinciple,beovercomebyanymemberofaclassthemoretheyarerecognizedintheirsociologicallawfulness."

270Althoughoftenopaquetohisownawareness,itseemsthatScheler,too,sharesavisionofenlightenment.LikethebourgeoisMarxistcritiqueofideology,evenliketheneo-Kantianshevilifies,Schelerwishestoenlargeandenhancetherealmofhumancreativityandresponsibilitybybringingtolightandisolatingtheconditional,necessaryandobjectiveelementsofhumanbeingandconsciousness.

Similarastheirgoalsmaybe,however,afundamentaldifferenceexistsbetweenthecritiquesofideologyinScheler'spersonalismandwhathasherebeentermedbourgeoisMarxism.Schelerdeniesanyrecoursetoatranscendentalfunctionforreason.Allreasoningoperatesasvalue-seeking.EventhebourgeoisMarxist's"knowledge"thatthereisaccesstoatranscendentalfunctioninreasonhasitsrootsinthevaluesofbourgeoismanandisitselfonlyaparticularvarietyofHerrschaftswissen.Ratherthanderivedfromtranscendentalcriticism,thepersonalist"critique"ofideologybeginsinacarefulclarificationandaffirmationofthetotalrealityofpersonalbeingtherealityasoutlinedinthisstudyofScheler'spersonalism.Specifically,sucha"critique"mustaffirmtheontologicalfootingofman'sexistentialityandanthropology,the"realfactors"ofhumanliving,yetsimultaneouslymustrecognizepersonalresponsibilityandpersonalpossibilityrelativetoarangeofvalueswhichstretchtothesublimeandholy.Inbringingtoclarityhisownobjectivityviasuch"critique,"

thepersonisgrantedarecognitionofhissubjectivity;indiscerningthefullarrayofvalues,thepersonisgrantedarecognitionofthepossibilitiesinheringinthefullmeasureofhisresponsibility.271BourgeoisMarxisminthisinterpretation,therefore,errsontwocounts.Therationalistnotionofcritiquewhichitadoptsisunattainableandthisnotionitselfisbutanotherfurtivemanifestationofthecharacterofbourgeoisman.

PersonalismAndMarxism

Morethanwasthecasewithliberalism,theaffinitiesevidentbetweenMarxismandScheler'spersonalismsuggestthepossibilityofa

non-bourgeois,personalistreinterpretationofsomethingthatisstillvaguely"Marxist."Asjustnoted,MarxismandScheler'spersonalismshareamaterialrealism,althoughSchelerobviouslyunderstands"material"and"real"inabroadersensethanMarxwouldhaveallowed.Moreover,thereissimilarityintheirrespectiveunderstandingsofhistoricalsocietyandbothperceivecognitionandknowledgeinsociologicalandhistoricalconditions.Functionally,itwasoutlinedinthelastchapterthatScheler'sChristiansocialismor"personalist"socialismwouldbelittledifferentinoperationfromsomeofthesocialisms''withahumanface"whichsomewouldcallMarxist.MightitthenbepossibletoconsiderapersonalistMarxisminthesamemannerinwhichapersonalistliberalismwasconsideredearlierinthischapter?

Thelikelyansweris"No."DespitethemanyparallelsbetweenMarxistthoughtandpersonalism,MarxismunderstoodasatheorywhichfaithfullyseekstorepresentthethinkingofKarlMarxisaconceptwithboundarieswhicharemoreclearanddefinitethanthoseoftheideal"liberalism."MarxismcouldnotbeMarxistifitwereinfullaccordwithScheler'spersonalism.Thisismuchmorethantheusualdistinctionbetweeneconomic-scientific-orthodoxMarxismsandhumanist-philosophical-neoMarxisms.Scheler'sanalysisfindsMarxismcloselyinterlinkedwiththeessentialcharacterofbourgeoisman.Indeed,astheselastpageshavedemonstrated,thephilosophicalandhumanistvarietiesofMarxism,suchasthoseoftheearlyLukacs,ofthe"criticalschool,"ofSartreandsoforth,distancethemselvesfrompersonalismbytheirrelianceonreason,critiqueorprivilegedsubjectivity.Inmanyrespects,moreorthodoxMarxismsavoidtheseaspectsofthebourgeoismanandstandincloserproximitytoScheler'spersonalism.Yet,clearly,Marxhimselfwoulddenytheintrinsicandindependentrealityofvaluesandofspiritgenerally.ForScheler'spersonalism,sucharejectionisinevitably

reductionistofferingadeformedrepresentationofwhatbeingahumanpersontrulyis.

IfthereisrequiredsomedegreeofrapprochementofpersonalismwithMarxism,whichisnotclear,thenitmightbesuggestedthatquarterforsuchmaybefoundintheworksofMauriceMerleau-Ponty.Merleau-Ponty'sopen-endeddialectic,hisphenomenologicalapproachtocognition,hisbroadunderstandingofthehumanconditionaresuggestiveterrainfromthevantageofpersonalism.Nonetheless,Merleau-Ponty'sphenomenologyveersinmanyrespectstoocloselytowardthatofEdmundHusserl's,whichitselfsharesanaffinitywiththebourgeoisnotionsofrationalityandcritiquethataresosuspectinScheler'sthinking.

ConclusionAnEvaluationofPersonalismasPoliticalTheoryThisstudyleavesmuchadditionaltobesaidregardingthepossibilityofScheler'spersonalismaspoliticaltheory.IthasendeavoredtofocusonlyuponthoseaspectsofScheler'spersonalismmostgermaneforthefoundationsofpoliticaltheory,andlargelyhaselectedtoconcentrateupononlysuchaspectswhichengagemostdirectlywiththeprominentissuesandconcernsofcontemporarypoliticaltheoryandphilosophy.Itsefforthasbeentomaptheverysuggestiveterrainoftheimplicationsofpersonalismforpoliticaltheorytoidentifythegeneralcharacterofsuchtheorywhilenotingonlythereinthemostobviouslandmarksandperils.Asamappingexercise,itsfailuresreflectthenaivetewhichisrequisiteforunprejudicedexplanationofgroundwhichwaspreviouslyunknown.Hence,thereisapparentacertaininattentiontotroublingdetailand,conversely,acertainnarrowintensityofconcentrationregardingmoreintriguinginsightsandrevelations.

Personalismaspoliticaltheory,tosummarizebriefly,findsthebe-allandend-allofpoliticstobetherealityoftheperson.Anon-going,realconstellationofacts,thepersonsubsistsasessentiallyapracticalbeing,constitutedbyactsbutinsomefashiontranscendentinrelationtotheseacts.Assuch,moreover,thecharacterofthepersonsharesthecharacterofactsthemselves.Importantlyhere,sinceactsareintentionalvis-a-vistheworld,actsbeingalwaystowardorforsomethingintheworld,thenperson,too,isinseparablefromanintentionalexistencewiththeworldespecially,sincetheworldisfromthefirstgiventoexperienceasvalues.Additionally,byvirtueofthetranscendentalrelationshipbetweenthepersonasaconstellationofactsandspecificacts,theredoesnotexistacausalrelationship

betweenvaluesandacts,butarelationshipwhichincludesaspectsofresponsiblechoicearisingfromarecognitionofamultitudeofpossiblevalues.Thecharacterofpoliticsinpersonalismaspoliticaltheory

reflectsthisconceptionoftheperson.Politics,too,isconstitutedbyactswhichareintentionallyjoinedwiththeperceivedvaluesoftheworld.Itisapracticalaffairofpersonalacts,enframedwithinagivenarrayofvaluesintheexperienceoftheworld.Politicsmaynot,onthisaccount,riseabovethegivenarrayofvaluesbelongingtoitscontextintheworld,butinasmuchaspersonsareresponsiblebyvirtueofthetranscendentalcharacteroftheirrelationtospecificacts,sotoopoliticsisnotanecessaryconstructofitscontextintheworld.Atitsheart,thepatternofpracticesinpoliticsissuesfrompersonalresponsibility.Indeed,becausetherangeofpossiblevaluesextendstothesublimeandholy,the"measure"ofpoliticalpracticesmaynotbenarrowlydelimitedtoindividualutility,socialwelfare,humanneedandsoforth,butmustbeopentothegreatestpossiblerangeofpersonalvalues.

"Person,"asunderstoodinthis,encompassesboththeintimatepersonalityandtheGesamtperson.Theintimatepersonmustrecognizetheanthropological,sociological,anddevelopmentaloriginsofhisindividualityincorporation.Equally,fullpersonscreativelystandatopmereindividualitytotransformitinapersonalcommunity.Thepoliticalcommunity,likewise,canberecognizedasaspecialaspectofthesocialityoftheperson.Justastheindividualpersonhasrootsinaninfant'sunitywiththeexperientialworldofthemotherandinalongdevelopmentalprocessisabletofirstidentifyandrejoiceinitsself,ideally,tofinallyovercometheselfinordertoresponsiblyjoininthecompanyofothers,sotoothepolitymaybeseentoemergethroughasequenceoftransformationswhichpointtowardapossibleculminationinapoliticalcommunitywhichcelebratestheuniquenessandpluralityofitscitizenswhileforegoingtheegocentriclimitsofmerelyamultiplicityofselves.Inthispossibiltyanewmannerofintersubjectivityisrequired,a"communionofpersons."Rememberingthatthepersonisa

constellationofacts,thattheseactsarepurelyexecution,andthataspureexecutiontheyarebeyondobjectification,thenpersonsintheiressencearealsobeyondobjectification.Onthisground,thepoliticalrelationshipsbetweenpersons,andbetweentheintimatepersonandtheGesamtperson,cannotberelationshipsunderstoodintermsofselfversusnon-self.Indeed,eventheobjectificationwhichderivesfromtreatingothersasequaltoone'sownselfisuntenable.Rather,thepersonmustforegohisownselftoparticipatedirectlyinthepersonoftheother.Beyondasocietyofselvesandnon-selves,therefore,liesthepossibilityofapoliticalcommunitywhichwelcomesandenhancestheharmony

whichonlyanopennesstothepluralismofpersonaldiversitymakespossible.

Thepoliticsseenbetweenthelinesofpersonalismaspoliticaltheoryisapparentlyonewhichsharesacuriousambiguitywiththepoliticsfamilartocontemporaryexperience.Personalistpoliticstakesthepoliticsofsuchexperienceasitspointofdeparture.Itinquiresintotheoriginofeverydaypolitics,locatingitsroots(foundationally,ifnothistorically)inman'santhropology,andtracesitscurrentcharactertothecomingofbourgeoisman.Personalismaspoliticaltheory,however,findsthefullrealityofpoliticstobesubsumedbyneitheritspresentcontextnoritspastorigins.Thefullrealityofpoliticsmustconsideritsimpendingpossibility.IfScheler'sownestimationistobeacceptedasindication,thatimpendingpossibilitymayliemoredeeplyinatransformationofthecharacterofpoliticsratherthanitsappearance.Hisownvisionimaginespersonalistsocialisms,andpersonalistdemocracieswhereintheineluctableuniquenessisnotobscuredbyarecognitionoftheobjectiveaspectsofhumanexistenceorbyanappreciationofthefullbreadthoftherealityofhumanandpersonalsociality.Inthis,Scheler'senterprisesharesthevisionofpoliticalphilosophyintheclassicaltraditionand,withsomereservations,thatofthepoliticaltheoriesoftheEnlightenmenttradition.Byidentifyingtheobjectiveandnecessaryaspectsofpersonsandthepoliticalorder,thatwhichisresponsible,creativeandhighestinpersonalhumanityisenhanced.Notpryingthepersonfrommooringsinthecontextofexistence,suchenhancementwouldfind"politics"tobemorethanbeast-likereflectionofthecontoursofexistenceandlessthanasomewhatdivinevisitationwithinexistence.

Inlargepart,theforegoingpagesofthisstudyhavebeen"interpretive"incharacter.ElaboratingcertainelementsofMaxScheler'spersonalismaspoliticaltheory,contrastingthesesameelementsagainstoppositeelementsoftheparadigmofmodernpolitics

and,onoccasion,moreboldlytracinganoutlineofapersonalistpoliticaltheoryitselfassuggestedbytheseelements,thestudyhasbeengenerallymoreelaborativethanreflective.Therealityofpoliticsissuch,however,thatthepoliticaltheoristcannotresponsiblysufficewithinterpretationor,attheveryleast,cannotresponsiblysufficewithmereinterpretation.Responsiblepoliticaltheory,inotherwords,requiresthatpersonalismaspoliticaltheorybeweighedasmorethananotherinterpretationtobecompiledwiththemanyhistoriesandsurveysofpoliticalthinkingandphilosophy.Sodoingdemandsatouchstoneofsortsagainstwhichthevalueofper-

sonalismaspoliticaltheorymightbeassayed.InfairnesstoScheler'sownintentandwork,thattouchstoneneedstobethefullrealityboththeexistenceandthepossibilityoftheperson.

272Thismeansofevaluation,furthermore,isonewhichstandsincloseproximitytotheunderstandingofpraxisthatisincreasinglysharedamongdiversecurrentsinpoliticaltheory.

Unfortunately,afullevaluationofthepoliticaltheoryofpersonalismwouldrequireastudyequalinlengthtothelargelyinterpretiveoutlineofferedhere.Onthebasisofthesepages,however,certaindifficultieshavebeenbroughttolightwhichdemandatleastcursorymentioninconcludingthisstudyperhapsinpartfulfillingthespecialobligationswhichmustbebornebystudiesofpoliticaltheoryinthishalfofthecentury.Thesedifficulties,variouslynotedandaddressedbySchelerhimself,are:first,theproblemoftransformation;andsecond,theproblemofvalueperception.

Inthepassageoflifefromstagetostage,inthepassagefromlifecommunitytosociety,inthepassageoftheguidingimageofmanfromthe"spiritofcivilization"tothehero,andintheemergenceofthebourgeoisman,Schelerisdescribingatransformationwhichheseesinlightofafoundationalorderofreality.273Suchpassagesmarkanessentialchangeinthecharacterofthegivenrealityandtheprocessoftransformationisevidentlyacentraland,likely,crucialelementinScheler'sfundamentalunderstandingofthings.Nonetheless,theconsiderationprofferedofthecharacteroftransformationlacksasensitiveappreciationofmanydifficultiesevidenttocontemporarythoughtandthereisnowhereelaboratedananalysisoftherequisiteconditionsforsuchtransformation.EarlyworkssuchasRessentiment,TheNatureofSympathyandFormalismconceiveoftheprocessinformreminiscentofthelifephilosophies.It

isatwo-fold,organicprocess,inotherwords,whereasatiationorabundanceofvalueexperiencedatthelowerformleadstowardsaperceptionoftheloftievaluesofthehigherform.Further,whereaspectsofpersonalsubjectivityarepresent,atransformationmaythenoccurwhichisresponsibleandcreative.274Inlaterworks,DieWissenformen,Man'sPlaceandsoonthetransformationprocessassumesamoreobjectivecharacter.Scheler,here,beginstospeakoftheprocessindevelopmentalterminology,emphasizingtheroleofrealfactorsandhumanconditionswhiledeemphasizingtheroleofspiritandthesubjectiveaspectofhumanaffairs.Forboththeearlierandthelaterversions,however,theunderstandingoftransformationisoneofanessentialchangeinthecharacterofagivenrealitywhetherhumansociality,aguidingmodelormanhimself.

Yet,inwhatwaysdoesthisessentialchangemanifestitself?Needthetransformationbearadicalbreakwithwhatwasgonebefore,orisitacontinuationorfulfillmentofthispast?Forpoliticsandpoliticaltheorytheseareneitheridlenoracademicquestions,yetScheler'sownresponselacksrequiredclarity.Hespeaks,inmoments,ofthe"new"standingatopthatwhichhasbeentransformed,butsuchanassertionaddslittlelighttowhatisgenerallyamuddledambiguity.Afurtherrefinement,patently,isappropriate.

Consider,then,thewell-knownexchangeofcorrespondencebetweenHans-GeorgGadamerandLeoStrauss.

275HavinglongperceivedGadamerasacheckpointbetweenhimselfandhisbêtenoir,MartinHeidegger,StrausswritesinoneinstancewithexasperationinresponsetoGadamer'sexplicitlyhermeneuticalturn,remarkingthatGadamer,likeHeideggerinhisestimation,wasdirectednowtoplodthepathcelebratedinSpengler'scurioustitleas"theDeclineoftheWest."WasGadamertoopreachingthe"worldnight"oftheendofphilosophyandtheendofpoliticalresponsibility?Inreply,GadamerdistanceshimselffromboththemorbidfascinationwithandtheabsolutizingoftheDecline.Heidegger,hesuggests(perhapswithunfairness),staresfixedlyattheeasternhorizon.SureoftheUntergangandthenightbeyond,Heideggerlooksforthereturn.Gadamer,speakingofhimself,"isturned,however,inanentirelydifferentdirection.''"Mypointofdeparture,"henotes,"isnotthecompleteforgetfulnessofbeing,the'nightofbeing'butratherIsaythisagainstHeideggeraswellasagainstBubertheunrealityofsuchanassertion."276Neitherdeclinenorprogress,inthisperspective,encompassestherealityofthepresent'srelationwithwhathasgonebefore.Indeed,therelationisinnosensevertical,buthorizontal.Itisnotarelationshipofdetermination,compulsionordomination,asmuchasitisdialecticdialecticunderstoodasapracticalartwhich

pursuesnotthedestructionofdeficientargument,butits"transformation."Forpersonalismaspoliticaltheory,then,thereisroomtosharpenaspectsofScheler'slegacy.Transformationneednotbeaviolentrejectionofthetransformed,noraradicalbreakwiththepresent.Casuallyandloosely,personalismaspoliticaltheorymaypursuethismore"practical"pathtowardtherealizationofitspossibilitiessurveyingthehorizonofpossibilitiesfordirectionwhileavoidingtheradicalnessofancientoriginsandmillenialeschatons.

WhatevertheplacementandfunctionoftheprocessoftransformationinScheler'spersonalism,theroleofvaluesandtheirimmediateperceptionisundoubtedlythemainspringofitstheoryofactionandthefoundationforitsethicsanditsanalysisofknowledge

andideology.Theproblemofvalueperception,onthisaccount,isadifficultywhichimperilstheestablishmentofanypoliticaltheoryfoundeduponthispersonalism.Scheler'smasterworkonethics,FormalisminEthicsandNon-FormalEthicsofValues,isasubtleandcomplexargumentmaintainingthatvaluesarenotsimplysubjectivevaluationsbuttrue,objective"value-facts"whicharesensibleandindependentofhumanemotionsandconditions."Thereisatypeofexperiencing,"hewrites,"whose'objects'arecompletelyinacessibletoreason;reasonisasblindtothemasearsandhearingareblindtocolors."Suchexperience,hecontinues,

isakindofexperiencethatleadstogenuinelyobjectiveobjectsandtheeternalorderamongthem,i.e.,tovaluesandtheorderofranksamongthem.Andtheorderandlawscontainedinthisexperienceareasexactandevidentasthoseoflogicandmathematics;thatis,thereareevidentinterconnectionstheactsofpreferring...[that]onthebasisoftheseagenuinegroundingofmoraldecisionsandlawsforsuchdecisionsisbothpossibleandnecessary.

277

Uponthisorderofvalues,moreover,groundedasSchelerindicates,standstheanalysisofthevaluesofthemodernworld,theconclusionofwhichuncoverstheprofoundperversionofthemodernworldlyingdeeplyrootedintheheartofbourgeoisman.ItistheperceptionofanarrayofvalueswhichreachestothesublimeandtheholybywhichScheler'spersonalismaspoliticaltheoryisabletoobservethatthepoliticsandsocietyoftheparadigmwhichbeginswiththecomingofthebourgeoisisconstrainedtoonlythelowestofpossiblevalues,thoseofmereutilityandbestialwelfare.

Despitethelengthandextentofthediscussionofvaluesandtheirorder,however,the"revelation"ofthesensibilityofvaluesandtheir

eternalandobjectiveorderofferedinScheler'sworksdependsovermuchuponmovingproseandlessthanself-evidentinsight.Yet,surely,theperceptionofvaluesrequiresgreatersufficiencyandmoreexplicitdemonstrationevenabidingthesenseofimmediateinsightbywhichSchelerunderstandsphenomenologicalAnschauungthenisrenderedinsuchpresentation.Scheler'sintentinhisvaluetheoryistoestablishanunchanginganduniversalorder,anordersecurefromthefluxofexistentialconditions,towhichessentiallychangeablemenandwomencanappealformoralandpoliticalguidance.ItisKantianism,asheunderstandsit,whichloomsbefore

himinhisefforta"secondbest"approachwhichrequiresatroublesomeuniversalityinreason,whichdeformsandabstractstherichpluralityofrealityincategoriesandwhichforegoesthegooditselffora"categoricalimperative."Schelerdemandsreal,value-basedcertainty,replacingreasonwithvalueperceptionandtheimperativewithanontologicalorderofvalues.Politically,followingfromthis,thatpracticeisbestwhichrealizesthehighestinvalue.

ThedifficultyhererestsinthedistancewhichSchelerwoulddrawbetweentheessentiallydynamicand"becoming"beingofthepersonthebeingofwhommustadapt,responsiblyornot,withhisembeddednessinthecontextofexistenceandtheessentiallystaticandeternalbeingofvaluesandtheirorder.Heisoncemorereturnedtothedualityofbeing,theactandobjectdistinction,withwhichhebeginshisphilosophy.How,then,isthisdichotomytobebridged?Inwhatmanneristhepersontoobtainmoralorpoliticalguidancefromtherealmofvalues?ThisisthefounderingpointofScheler'svalueperception,thisseparationinbeingbetweenthebeingofvaluesandthebeingoftheperson.Onconsideration,itwouldseemthattherearetwolikelypathswhichpersonalismmaypursuetoresolvethisdifficulty,bothofwhichinvolveamoveawayfromthedualityofbeing,bothofwhichsuggestintriguinglinkageswithcurrentsincontemporarythought,andbothofwhichareevidentaspectsofthefrantictheorizingofScheler'slastyears.Thefirstpathisafar-reachingextensionofpersonalism'santhropology,apathwhichSchelerterms"meta-anthropology."

278Thesecondisablurringandinterminglingofactandobject,spiritandlife,manandworld,andpersonandvalue,madepossiblebyapostulatedunderlyingunityinbeingthatSchelerterms"theGroundofBeing."279

Thefirstpath,thepathofmeta-anthropology,appearstobemorecloselycongruentwiththelife-longdirectionofScheler'spersonalism.Theroleofvaluesinmorality,politicsandsoforth,isretainedbylocatingtheirexistenceandessencewithinthegenesisandanthropologyofthepersonhimself.SincetheearlySchelerperceivesthecommunity,theontogenesisofthepersonandavarietyofotherhumanprocessesasproceedinginaccordancewithanorderoffoundationthatisconceivedtomirroranobjectiveandeternalorderofvalues,isitnotindeedpossiblethatthatorderofvaluesismorelikelyareflectionofanorderinthissamegenesisandanthropology?Inotherwords,ratherthanassigningtosuchvaluesanindependentandnon-contingentexistenceexternaltoman'sownexistence,mightnotthesevaluesandtheirorderbethemselvesanthropological?Un-

doubtably,thisisoneofthedirectionstowardwhichScheler'sownlaterphilosophywasmoving.

Withthisconception,thetranscendentalcharacterofvaluesasaproblematicisaltered.Itbecomesnolongeraquestionofbridgingadualityinbeing,nolongeroneofpersonsreachingbeyondconditionalexperienceinordertograspobjectsofnon-conditionalcharacter.Instead,valuesarediscernedbyinquiryintothedynamiccharacteroftheperson,orinthefoundationalorderbywhichthepersonisconstituted.Suchaconceptionisnowquitecommonintheliteratureofcontemporarysocialandpoliticaltheory.Itassumesavarietyofforms:thelinguisticquasitranscendentalssuchasthoseofJohnSearle,JürgenHabermasandKarl-OttoApel,theclassicpsychologicalquasi-trascendentalssuchasthoseofSigmundFreudandJeanPiaget;and,morecircumspectly,thestructuralquasitranscendentalsofthestructuralistsandethno-methodologists.

280TocompletetheturnSchelerindicatestoward"meta-anthropology,"personalismaspoliticaltheorymightvaluablybenefitfromthethinkingundergirdingthesetheories.But,therearealsogroundsforconcernregardingtheappropriatenessofsuchamoveforotheraspectsofpersonalism.

ThenowpopularworkofJüergenHabermasisacaseinpoint.CentraltoHabermas'endeavorissecuringquasitranscendentalcriteriabywhichsocialandpoliticalcritiquewouldbefacilitated.Inlinewiththedirectionsuchtheoriestake,suchcriteriaarequasitranscendentalbecausehelocatesthemwithinhumananthropologyratherthangrantingthemindependentsubsistence.Inanearlywork,KnowledgeandHumanInterests,forexample,HabermasborrowsmuchfromthelastperiodofScheler'swritingsandestablishesthesequasitranscendentalsasanthropologicallyrootedinterestswhich

constitutehumancognition:atechnicalinterest,apracticalinterestandacriticalinterest.Theseinterests,especiallythe"critical"interest,assumeatranscendentalstatusforallresponsiblehumanchoiceandaction.281Withhislaterworks,Habermasshiftsthelocationofhistranscendentalfromhumanintereststohumanspeech,butitsfunctiondoesnotchange.Humancommunicationitself,inhisappraisal,implicitlysuggestsanidealofwhatsuchcommunicationoughttobeunderforming,unconstrained,honestandsoon.This"idealspeechsituation,"asitiscalledatonepoint,isproposed,inplaceofhisearlierknowledge-constitutiveinterests,asatranscendentalof

sortsagainstwhichactualspeechsituations(aswellassocialandpoliticalsituations)aretobejudgedandcritiqued.

282

Habermas'thesissuggests,atleastasoutlinedhere,apossibledifficultyforresolvingpersonalism'sproblemofvalueperceptionbymeansoftheturntowardmeta-anthropology.ThedifficultyisthatmanysuchapproachescloselyapproximatetheKantiannotionofcritiquefromwhichmuchofScheler'searlypersonalismsoughttoescape.habermas,ApelandsoforthjustasKantfindwithinmankindaspecialcapacityorsituationthatservestoestablishascreenorcriterionbywhichrealityismeasuredandcategorized(beitanidealspeechsituationassomesimilaranthropologicaluniversal).ForSchelerandforthepersonalistpoliticaltheoryadaptedfromhisthought,thisistroublesome.Aselaboratedinthisstudy,valuesforpersonalismaredirectlyandimmediatelygiveninexperience,notuncoveredviacritique.Thereis,therefore,aradicallyempiricalsenseofpersonalismwhichisperhapsjeopardizedbythereductionofvaluestothesphereofanthropology.Moreover,doesnotsuchareductiononlyagainservetoemphasizethehumansubjectanditsspecialroleinbeinganotionwhichthelaterworksofSchelerwouldlargelyreject?Indeed,isnotanthropologyitselfthesortofreductionismwhichSchelerfindsunacceptable?Ifthemeta-anthropologyofthelastperiodofScheler'sthoughtisinclinedinthisdirection,thenmuchofScheler'searlierthinkingwouldlikelystandinneedofrevision.Fortunately,asnoted,thereisasecondpathsuggestedbySchelertoresolvetheproblemofvalueperception.

Thesecondpath,thattowarda"GroundofBeing,"inpartcomplementsandinpartradicalizesthemeta-anthropologicalturn.For,wheremeta-anthropologyfinds"objective"valuesandtheirorder

tobelodgedwithintheanthropologyoftheperson,theturntowardaGroundofBeingfindsthepersontoshareacommongroundwithallotherbeing.Theontologicalorderofvaluesandvaluesthemselves,therefore,neednotbeutterlyseparatefromthebeingofthepersondividedbythedifficultontologicalrift.Instead,asanorderinbeingitselfabeingsharedbythepersontheorderofsuchvaluesmightbeunderstoodaspeculiarlypresenttothepersonmuchaswouldbehislife,hisworldandotherpersons.When,forexample,Schelerdiscernsan"orderoffoundation,"apatternorsequencebywhichtransformationmayproceed,itispreciselyanorderintheGroundofBeingtowhichherefers.Thegroundsforresponsibleper-

sonalaction,followingthis,wouldlieinbringingtoclarity,recognizingandactinginaccordwiththevaluesandtheirorderwhicharepresentinthecontextual"orderofthings."

ThispathisthepathoftheearlyworksofMartinHeidegger,ofcourse.InBeingandTime,HeideggerdescribestheparticularcharacterofbeinghumanasDaseininterpretedasthataspectofbeingthroughwhichbeingrecognizesitself.

283Theunderstandingobviouslychangestheconceptionofwhatbeinghumanisallabout.Beinghumanisnotfundamentallydifferentthananyotheraspectofbeing.Evensubjectivityisnotparticularlyahumanattributeasmuchasitisoneexpressionofbeingitself.Yet,atthesametime,thisconceptionofbeinghumanstandsincomplementwithScheler'srealistphenomenologyandwiththeunderstandingofpersonasaconstellationofacts.284Thus,theproblemofvalueperceptionisgreatlyresolvedbyeliminatingtheontologicaldistancebetweenvaluesandtheperson.Moreover,suchanapproachwouldappeartoskirttheepistemologicaldifficultiesevidentinthemeta-anthropologicalturn.

Yet,itmustalsoberecognizedthatthereisfoundadanger,apoliticaldangerespecially,incertainoftheapproachestothisunityinaGroundofBeing.Indecenteringhumansubjectivity,inlocatinghumanbeingwithintheGroundofBeingwithoutfundamentaldifferentiationbetweenitandotherwaysofbeing,theriskisrunofcomingtounderstandthepersonasweunderstandallotherbeings.Itisalltooeasytoimaginethepoliticalhorrorswhichfollowfromsuchaconception,wherein,forexample,thejusticeaffordedmenandwomenwouldbebutanextensionofthe"justice"bywhichwetreatotherbeingsofourexperience.Here,onehopes,theSchelerianconcernwiththedignityoftheperson,withpersonalresponsibility

andcreativity,wouldperseveredespiteanadmissionthatpersonsharesacommonplaneofbeingwithallcreation.PerhapsweretheSchelerianinterpretationoftheFranciscanfraternityofmanwithcreationtoberealized,thepossibilitythispathlendstopersonalismwouldbemorereadilyperceived.

Oneitherpath,themeta-anthropologicalortowardaGroundofBeing,thedirectionwhichpersonalismaspoliticaltheorymustpursueremainsonewhichisattunedtothefullrealityexistenceandpromiseoftheperson.

Notes1.Hans-GeorgGadamer,"WhatisPraxis?,"inReasonintheAgeofScience,trans.FrederickG.Lawrence,(Cambridge:MITPress,1981).SeealsoRichardBernstein's,PraxisandAction:ContemporaryPhilosophiesofHumanActivity(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvanisPress,1971).

2.Discussedingreaterdetailsubsequently,itisworthherenotingthatthemostintriguingpossiblelinkbetweenScheler'spersonalismandthepraxistheories,ishisunderstandingthepersonitselfi.e.,itsessenceasarealandconcreteunityofacts.

3.MaxScheler,"Philosopher'sOutlook,"inPhilosophicalPerspectives,trns.OscarA.Haac(Boston:BeaconPress,1958),p.10.

4.SeeScheler,"VersucheeinePhilosophiedesLebens,"inhisGesammelteWerke,Vol.3:VomUmsturzderWerte,ed.MariaSchelerandManfredFrings(Bern:Francke,195X),p.xxx.Cf.FriedrichNietzsche,

This,indeed,isthemostdifficultthing:toclosetheopenhandoutofloveandtopreserveone'smodestyasagiver."TheChildwiththeMirror"

ThusSpokeZarathustra,trans.R.J.Hollingdale(Middlesex:Penguin,1969),p.107.

5.Heidegger,"AndenkenzuMaxScheler,"inPaulGood,ed.,MaxSchelerimGegenwartsgeschehenderPhilosophie(Bern:FranckeVerlag,1975),p.9.

SeealsotheparallelsbetweenScheler'sPersonandHeidegger's

DaseinasillustratedinManfredFring'sexcellentstudy,PersonandDasein:ZurFragederOntologiedesWertseins(TheHague:Nijhoff,1969).

6.MartinHeidegger,"AndenkenzuMaxScheler,"inPaulGood,ed.,Gegenwartsgeschehen,p.9.HeideggermadethiscommentinMarburg,onMay21,1928,atthebeginningofaseriesoflecturesattheuniversity.

7.Ibid.

8.ThankstoScheler'swidow,MariaScheler,andtheworkofManfredFrings,thecurrenteditorofhisNachlass,essentiallyallofScheler'smanuscriptmaterialandvariouspersonaldatahasbeentranscribedandcollectedattheBayerischeStaatsbibliothekinMunich.SeeEberhardAve-Lallemant,DieNachläsederMünchnerPhänomenologeninderBayerischenStaatsbibliothek(Wiesbaden:Harrassowitz,1975).

9.ThepasttenyearshaveseenarekindlingofinterestinScheler.IngreatpartitwouldseemthatthisisduetothenumerousEnglishtranslationofScheler'sworkswhichhaverecentlybecomeavailable(seetheaccompanyingbibliography),butinparttoo,itseemsthatthefocusofhisthoughtisverymuchinaccordwiththethinkingandworksofanumberofcontemporarythinkers.

10.MuchofthispersonalmaterialisindebtedtoRaphaelStaude'sfine,ifsomewhatunsympathetic,biography,MaxScheler:AnIntellectualPortrait(NewYork:FreePress,1967),toWilhelmMader'smorebalancedconsiderationofScheler'slifeandthought,MaxScheler(ReinbeckbeiHamburg:RowohltTaschenbuch,1980),andtoFr.JohnM.Oestereicher's"MaxScheler:CriticofModernMan,"inWallsareCrumbling:SevenJewishPhilosophersDiscoverChrist,forewardbyJacquesMaritain(NewYork:Devin-Adair,1952).

11.WilhelmStern,"AutobiographicalSketch,"inVol.1,TheHistoryofPsychologyinAutobiographyed.CarlMurchison(Worcester,Mass.:ClarkUniversityPress,1930),pp.2556.SeealsoStaude,P.9,andMader,pp.1820.

12.Scheler,BeiträgezurFestellungderBeziehungenzwischendenlogischenundethischenPrinzipien,GesammelteWerk,inVol.1:FrüheSchriften,ed.MariaSchelerandManfredFrings(Bern:Francke,1971).

13.Scheler,"ArbeitundEthik,"ibid.

14.DietransendentaleunddiepsychologischeMethode,ibid.Cf.Mader,p.2930.

15.Ratherobliquely,thisisnotedbySchelerinhisessay,"DiedeutschePhilosophiederGegenwart,"GesammelteWerke,inVol.7:WesenundFormenderSympathie(Bern:Francke,1973),p.308.EdithSteininherrecollectionsoftheGöttingenphenomenologicalcirclecitesinstanceswhenhisclaiminthisregardwereratherlessthanoblique.SeeEdithStein,"VondenStudienjahreninGöttingen,"inEdithSteinsWerke,Vol.7:AusdemLebeneinerjudischenFamilie,ed.L.Gelber(Freiburg:Herder,1965),pp.181183.

16.DietrichvonHildebrand,"MaxScheleralsPersönlichkeit,"inHochland,Vol.26(September,1928),pp.41318.

17.Scheler'smarriagewasfallingapartandhiswifereporteddetailsofanextra-maritalaffairtoMunich'ssocialistnewspaper.SeeMader,pp.3741andStaude,pp.246.

18.Scheler,Resentiment,trns.WilliamHoldheim(NewYork:FreePressofGlencoe,1961);TheNatureofSampathy,trns.PeterHeath(London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1954);andFormalisminEthicsandNon-FormalEthicsofValues:ANewAttemptTowardtheFoundationofanEthicalPersonalism,trns.ManfredFringsandRogerFunk(Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1973).

19.Scheler,DerGeniusderKriegundderDeutscheKrieg,inGesammelteWerke,Vol.4:Politische-PädagogischeSchriften,ed.ManfredFrings(Munich:Francke,1982).Itmightbenoted,notasanapology,thatSchelerwasfarfromaloneamongGermanacademicsin1914insupportingtheGermanwar:WitnessthepropagandistictractsofWernerSombart,ErnstTroeltschandGeorgSimmelofthesameperiod.

20.Scheler,KriegundAufbau,ibid.

21.Scheler,OntheEternalinMan,trns.BernardNoble(London:SCMPress,1960).

22.TheexchangeoflettersbetweenScheler'sColognefriend,PeterWust,andtheeditorsoftheCatholicjournalHochland,OttoGruendlerandCarlMuth,demonstratethedepthofScheler'simpactonCatholicintellectualsoftheperiodandrevealmuchofScheler'spersonalsoulsearching.SeePeterWust'sVorlesungenundBriefe,ed.AloisHunig,Vol.10,ofhisGesammelteWerke,ed.WilhelmVernekohl(Muenster:VerlagRegensberg,1974).N.b.thelettersfromGruendlertoWust,pp.1534(7/14/22),pp.21823(5/1/23)andWust'sChristmaslettertoMuth,pp.3078(12/20/23).SeealsoDietrichvonHildebrand'scommentsin"MaxScheleralsPersönlichkeit."

23.Mader,p.1046,passim.

24.Scheler,GesammelteWerke,Vol.7:DieWissenformenunddieGesellschaft,ed.MariaScheler(Munich:Francke,1960).Seealso

ProblemsofaSociologyofKnowledge,trns.ManfredFrings(London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1980).

25.Scheler,Man'sPlaceinNature,trns.HansMeyerhoff(NewYork:Noonday,1961).

26.Scheler,ProblemsofaSociologyofKnowledge,trns.ManfredFrings(London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1980),p.54.

27.Scheler,"ManandHistory,"inPhilosophicalPerspectives,trns.OscarHaac(Boston:Beacon,1958),p.65.TheabovetranslationisactuallyfromHansMeyerhoff's"Introduction"tohistranslationofScheler'sMan'sPlaceinNature,p.xii.

28.IthasbeengenerallyagreedamongSchelerscholarsthathisthoughtcanroughlybedividedintothreeperiods,whichmightbroadlybecharacterizedasintermsof:alifephilosophyperiod,aphenomenologicalperiodandaphilosophicalanthropologyperiod.Nonetheless,thepresentworkgoesfartoillustrateapervasivecon-

tinuitytoScheler'sthought.AlthoughScheler'sthinkingundergoesmanysignificantshifts,itneedstobenotedthatitneverinanysensebreakswithhispreviousthinkingasmuchasitdevelopsfromit.Schelerremarkshimselfinthe"PrefacetotheThirdEdition"(1926)ofhismonumentalethicalwork,FormalisminEthicsandNon-FormalEthicsofValues,thattheveryideasofhisearlyworks"representsomeofthereasonsandintellectualmotives"(p.xxvi)forthelaterdevelopmentsinhisso-called"periods."Tobesure,hisreligiousthoughtdoesundergoprofoundreversal,butoutsideoftheology,hisphilosophyisrathersystematicanduniformfromhisMunichperiodthroughhisdeath.

29.ThetwomostviciousinterpretationsofSchelerinthisveinareMarvinFarber'sNaturalismandSubjectivism(Springfield,Ill.:Thomas,1959),andJuliusKraft'sbook,VonHusserlzuHeidegger;KritikderphänomenologischePhilosophie(Franfurta.M.:OeffentlichesLeben,1957).BothwritersareconcernedtodemonstratethatScheler(andHeidegger)wereproto-Nazis.Farber'sisespeciallyinteresting;helavishespraiseonEdmundHusserlwhileattackingbothSchelerandHeideggerfortheirsupposedNazisympathies.Oddly,however,inhishastetodiscreditScheler,FarberalsoclaimsthatSchelerisaMarxistandanapologistforsuperstitiousCatholicismandsomesortofanti-Darwinistcrank.Farberfailstooffersubstantiationforanyofthesecharges,muchlessrevealhowitmightbepossibleforanyoneindividualtobeallthesecontradictorythings.Inactuality,SchelerisruthlessinhisattacksontheNazimovement,whichinpartaccountsfortheircensureofhiswritingsaftertheirrisetopower.Similarly,Mussolini'sfascismisalsoridiculedandracistpoliticalmovementsofalltypesdrawhisharshestcriticism.ThereareelementsofasociobiologyinScheler'sthinking,butinregardtorace,hisonlyremarksrecommendinterracialmarriageasasolutiontoracialfrictions.Schelerwasclosely

acquaintedwiththeworksofMarxandwithanumberofacademicMarxists,buthisMarxismisonlyanoccasionaltoolforhiminhisanalysisofmodernity.AlthoughhisinfluenceisunmistakeableintheearlyLukacsandFrankfurtcriticaltheory,politicallyScheler'saffiliationsmovefromaristocraticcorporatismtoCatholiccentrismtoleft-liberalism.

30.JoseOrtegayGesset,ObrasCompletas,12vols.,4:p.510,astranslatedandquotedinHerbertSpiegelberg,ThePhenomenologicalMovement,2vols.(TheHague:Nijhoff,1960),1:p.228.

31.Schelerdescribeshispre-Husserlianinclinationsinthedirectionofphenomenologyin"DieDeutschePhilosophiederGegenwart,"p.308.

32.SeeScheler,"VersucheeinerPhilosophiedesLebens;Nietzsche-Dilthey-Bergson,"inGesammelteWerke,Vol.3:VomUmsturzderWerte,ed.MariaScheler(Munich:Francke,1955),pp.31139.

33.Gadamer,Hans-Georg,TruthandMethod,trans.SheedandWordLtd.(NewYork:Crossroad,1982),p.214.

34.Althoughtheimportantdistinctionsbetweenthesethinkers,especiallyinregardtotheirstancevis-à-visthequestionofmetaphysics,isbeingoverlookedatthispoint,Schelerdoesnotoverlooktheimportanceofthequestion.Thepossibilityofmetaphysicssharplydividesthesethinkers,justaswillbeseenitdividesthephenomenologists.Scheler,inbothtraditions,findshisownstanceprecariouslyinbetween.

35.ErnstTroeltsch,DerHistoricismusundseineProbleme,Vol.3ofhisGesammelteWerke(Tübingen:Mohr,1922);reprinted.,Raphael(Aalen:Scientia,1967),p.609,AlsoseeRaphaelStaude,p.5.

36.Scheler,BeziehungenzwischendenlogischenundethischenPrinzipien,pp.1412,and''ManandHistory"inPhilosophicalPerspectives,pp.745.ThemostsensitiveconsiderationScheleraffordsNietzscheisinhisessay"VersucheeinerPhilosophiedesLebens."

37.Scheler,Ressentiment,trns.WilliamHoldheim,ed.LewisCoser(NewYork:Schocken,1972).

38.Ibid.,p.67.

39.ThethemeisdiscussedinvariousplacesinScheler'sworks;seeamongothers,hiscomparisonofKant'ssubjecttoNietzsche'sinhisFormalismandNon-Formalism,pp.5156.

40.Scheler,"VersucheeinerPhilosophiedesLebens,"p.315.

41.MortizGeiger,acolleagueofSchelerinMunich,revealsinhiseulogyontheoccasionofScheler'sdeath,thatSchelerwasinstrumentalinarrangingforanearlytranslationandpublicationofBergson'sworksinGermany.SeeStude,p.21,whocitesGeiger's"Zu

MaxSchelersTode,"VossischeZeitung(June1,1928).

42.TheauthorapologizesfortheviolencewhichthiscursoryreviewdoestoBergson'ssubtlecriticismofreasonandhisconceptofintuition.ReadBergson'sCreativeEvolution,trns.ArthurMitchell(Westport,Conn.:Greenwook,1975;reprinted.,1944).

43.Scheler,"PhenomenologyandtheTheoryofCognition,"inSelectedPhilosophicalEssays,trns.DavidLachtermann(Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1973),pp.1901.Seealso"VersucheeinerPhilosophiedesLebens,"3368.

44.Scheler,"VersucheeinerPhilosophiedesLebens,"p.333.Thisthemeistreatedinmoredetailinhislongessay"ErkenntnisundArbeit,"inGesammelteWerke,Vol.8:DieWissenformenunddieGesellschaft,ed.MariaScheler(Munich:Franche,1963),pp.2469.

45.Scheler,"PhenomenologyandtheTheoryofCognition,"pp.1634.SeealsothesectiononDiltheyin"VersucheeinerPhilosophiedesLebens,"whereSchelerislavishinhispraiseofthethinker.

46.Itissurprisinglyeasytoviewthisdistinction,positedbyDilthey,asthestartingpointofmuchofScheler'sownphilosophy.Considerhis

foregoingcritiqueofBergson'smonisticlifephilosophy,hisdivisionofbeingintobeing-as-act(cultural?)andbeing-as-object(natural?),hisoft-beratedseemingdualitybetweenspiritandlife,andhisowndivisionofcognitionandscienceintocatergorieswhichseemonlylittlemorerefinedthanDilthey's.Thehistoryofideasisatrickybusiness,however,andultimatelyisoflimitedvalueinappraisingthesignificanceofagivenideaorwriter.Moreover,aswillbecomeclear,thesharpdichotomiesofDiltheyareverymuchsoftenedinScheler,andastressontheunityofthesedivisionsinthebodyoflivingmanbecomesfundamental.Thekeytothisunityinman,isthatunlikeDiltheywhofollowsKantindenyingtheaccessibilityofthehumanspiritinitsinteriorityto"knowledge"Schelercontendsthatnotonlytheobjectivecontoursofhumanspirit,butthesubjectiveintentionsofhumanspiritare"knowable."See"ErkenntnisundArbeit,"p.205.

47.AswithBergson,thereader'sunderstandingisbeggedforthisextremelycursorytreatmentofDilthey.ConsultRudolfA.Makkreel'sDilthey:PhilosopheroftheHumanStudies(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1975),foramorefullconsiderationofthesetopics.

48.Scheler,"IdealismandRealism,"inSelectedPhilosophicalEssays,p.324.

49.Inotherwords,Dilthey,asishispurpose,onlyattemptstoperceivethe"outward"structuresofhistoryandculture.Hedoesnotendeavortoprobebeneaththis"objective"levelinordertoexperiencethesubjectiveintentionsofpersons.

50.Asanexample,seehis"FormsofKnowledgeandCulture,"inPhilosophicalPerspectives.

51.Scheler,"DieDeutschePhilosophiederGegenwart,"p.274.

52.Scheler,"DietranszendentaleunddiepsychologischeMethode,"

p.335.Alsosee"DieDeutschePhilosophiederGegenwart,"p.2745.

53.JahrbuchfürPhilosophieundphänomenologischeForschung,vol.1(1913),p.v.ThistranslationisborrowedfromHerbertHeinrichMeyer,"ACriticalStudyofMayScheler'sPhilosophicalAnthropologyinitsRelationtohisPhenomenology"(Ph.D.dissertation,BostonUniversityGraduateSchool,1972),p.16.

54.ThesituationofHusserl'sthoughtversuspsychologism,aspresentedabove,greatlybenefittedDallasWillard,"TheParadoxofLogicalPsychologism:Husserl'sWayOut,"AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly,9:1(January1972),pp.94100.

55.SeeHusserl,LogicalInvestigations,2vols.,trns.J.N.Findlay(NewYork:HumanitiesPress,1970),1:pp.35062.

56.Ibid.,pp.31226and32930.

57.SeeEdmundHusserl,Ideas:GeneralIntroductiontoPurePhenomenology,trns.BoyceGibson(London:Allen&Unwin,1931),pp.546and1256.RomanIngarden'sOntheMotiveswhichLedHusserlto

TranscendentalIdealism,trns.A.Hannibalsson(TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1975),muchmorethoroughlyconsidersthistransitioninHusserl'sthoughtandprovedhelpfulinpreparingthismaterial.Seealso,"HusserlandtheProblemofIdealism,"byTheodorW.AdornoinJournalofPhilosophy37(1940),pp.518.

58.Husserl,Ideas,pp.1134.

59.Ibid.,pp.25765.


61.SeeSpiegelberg,pp.22831.

62.SeeGeorgMisch,LebensphilosophieundPhänomenologie(Leipzig,1931;reprinted.Stuttgart:Teubner,1967),foranexcellenttreatmentofwhatlifephilosophyandmetaphysicswouldentailforphenomenology.UnfortunatelyhistreatmentofSchelerisincorporatedintohisdiscussionofMartinHeidegger.

63.Husserl,"PhilosophyasRigorousSciences,"inPhenomenologyandtheCrisisofPhilosophy,trns.QuentinLauer(NewYork:Harper&Row,1965).

64.Scheler,"PhenomenologyandtheTheoryofCognition,"p.137.

65.Thequotedessay,forexample,datesfrom1913.ScheleratthistimeprobablyhadsomeawarenessofHusserl'sgrowingidealism,buthisIdeasisnotcitedinthetextandlikelyhadnotasyetbeenpublished.AlthoughthereisadifferenceofpurposesuggestedbetweentheearlyHusserlandScheleratthistime,thereappearstobenosubstantivedisagreementastotheunderstandingofphenomenology.JörgWillerarguesthatSchelerhadpremonitionsofHusserl'sformaltendenciesfromthebeginning;see"DerBezugaufHusserlimFrühwerkSchelers,"Kantstudien,72:2pp.17585.

66.Scheler,"PhenomenologyandtheTheoryofCognition,"pp.1389.

67.Ibid.,p.1389.


69.Scheler,"PhenomenologyandtheTheoryofCognition,"p.140.SeealsoScheler'slatepiece,"Idealism-Realism,"whichisalsotranslatedinLachtermann.

70.BynotfollowingHusserlintotranscendentalidealism,SchelerincursHusserl'srejectionofhisthought.Thebreachwhichensuesleadstoageneralfragmentationofthephenomenologicalmovement.InresponsetotheidealismofthelaterHusserl,SchelerremarkstoHelmuthPlessnerinthelate1920'sthat"thewordphenomenologyoughtnevermorebeused,"forwithHusserl"itisdoingnothingmorethanwhatphilosophyhasalwaysdone."Husserllesskindly,referstoScheler'sthoughtassham,or"fool'sgold."SeePlessner'sHusserlinGottingen,GottingerUniversitatsreden,N.24(Gottingen:Vandehoeck&Ruprecht,1959),p.21;andSpiegelbergquotingHusserlinprivateconversation,inSpeigelberg,p.230.


72.Scheler,"PhilosophischeWeltanschauung,"inGesammelteWerkeVol.10:SpäteSchriften,ed.ManfredFrings(Munich:FranckeVerlag,1975),p.76.SeethesomewhatfreetranslationofthisesayinPhilosophicalPerspectives,trns.OscarHaac(Boston:BeaconPress,1958),p.2.

73.Scheler,"PhenomenologyandtheTheoryofCognition,"SelectedPhilosophicalEssays,p.159.Cf.ManfredFrings,MaxScheler,AConciseIntroductiontotheWorldofaGreatThinker(Pittsburgh:DuquesneUniversityPress,1965),p.179.

74.Scheler,"Idealism-Realism,"p.312.

75.Supra,pp.368.

76.Scheler,"Idealism-Realism"p.305.

77.Scheler,"Idealism-Realism,"p.318.Cf.Non-Formalism,pp.1356."Ontology"isusedhereinthebroadsensenotintheHeideggeriansensewhichsharplydistinguishesbetween"ontic"and"ontological."BeingitselfisnotScheler'scentralconcern,thoughhisdiscussionofitinthetermsofthe''groundofBeing"isveryevocativeofHeideggertothecontemporaryreader.Scheler'sforemostconcern,however,iswiththeuniquebeingofbeingman;thisheterms"Person"andHeideggerterms"Dasein."

78.Scheler,"ErkenntnisundArbeit,"p.360.

79.Ibid.,p.365.SeealsoNon-Formalism,p.135.MartinHeideggerhasaverypersuasivecritiqueofthegeneralthesisofresistanceastheprimalexperienceofrealityinhisearlyperiod;cf.BeingandTime,trns.JonathanMacquarrieandEdwardRobinson(London:SCMPress,1962),p.210ffandp.290ff.


81.Scheler,"ErkenntnisundArbeit,"p.363.

82.SeeLudwigLandgrebe,MajorProblemsinContemporaryEuropeanPhilosophy,trns.KurtReinhardt(NewYork:Ungar,1966),pp.36-39,andManfredFrings,PersonundDasein(TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1969),pp.88-97.

83.Scheler,Formalism,pp.1337;alsoseeOntheEternalinMan,trns.BernardNoble(London:SCM,1960),pp.836.

84.Scheler,Man'sPlaceinNature,trns.HansMeyerhoff(NewYork:Noonday,1961).

85.Scheler,"Idealism-Realism,"pp.3156.

86.Scheler,Man'sPlace,pp.514.


88.Scheler,DieStellungdesMenschenimKosmos,inGesammelteWerke,Vol.9:SpäteSchriften,ed.ManfredFrings(Bern:Francke,1976),p.9.SeealsoMan'sPlace,p.3.

89.Scheler,"ManintheEraofAdjustment,"inPhilosophicalPerspectives,p.102.SeealsotheexcellentexplicationoftheconceptofmaninScheler'slastperiodinFrancisN.Dunlop,"Scheler'sIdeaofMan,"Aletheia,2(1981),pp.22033.

90.Scheler,Formalism,p.29;seealsop.37092.

91.See,amongseveralsources,hisearlyworkRessentiment,trns.WilliamHoldheim,ed.withintroductionbyLewisCoser(Glencoe:FreePress,1961)andhislatermonographProblemsofaSociologyofKnowledge,trns.ManfredFrings(London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1980).OftheBourgeois,morewillbesaidsubsequently.

92.Scheler,Man'sPlace,pp.315.Scheler'sthinkinghereseemsmuchinfluencedbyhisacquaintancewithWilhelmDilthey.Foranintriguingcomparison,seeMichelFoucault'sessay"TheSubjectandPower"inMichelFoucault:BeyondStructuralismandHermeneutics,2nded.,byHubertDreyfusandPaulRabinow(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1983).

93.Scheler,Formalism,p.374.

94.Apparentlyawareofthismazeofsubtletiesregardingtherelationshipbetweenpersonandworld,Scheleroccasionallyreferstobeing-as-objectatitsmostbasiclevelasexperiencesofundistinguished"pocketsofresistance."Hence,thesearenotthenepistemologicalobjectsexceptafortiorithroughobjectificationbypersons.See"Idealism-Realism,"passim.

95.Scheler,Formalismpp.767.Seealsothesubsequentsectioninibid.,"Personandthe'Ego'ofTranscendentalApperception,"p.374ff,andhisessay"TheIdolsofSelf-Knowledge,"inLachtermann,pp.1730.Cf.Jean-PaulSartre,TheTranscendenceoftheEgo,trns.withintroductionbyForrestWilliamsandRobertKirkpatrick(NewYork:Noonday,1957),whereSartreexploresasimilartheme.Although

SartredoesnotrefertoScheler'swork,heandSchelerbothtakeKant'snoumenalsubjectandphenomenologyastheinitialstartingpointfortheirdiscussionandconcludewitharejectionofthepossibilityofthetranscendentalego.

96.Scheler,"ErkenntnisundArbeit,"pp.2037.

97.Scheler,Formalism,p.374.Thepossibilityofreflectioninhisthoughtisonewhichneedstobeaddressedintheliterature.Schelerwouldcertainlyopposeanysortofrationalistcritique,butwhatothermannerofreflectiondoeshepropose?

98.Ibid.,p.383.Forthesakeofclarity,abitoflicensewastakenwiththesequotes.TheseremarksandmuchofthesubsequentmaterialinthissectionsupportthoseinterpretationswhichperceiveastrongFichteaninfluenceinScheler'sphilosophy,derivedperhapsviaEuckenandTrendelenberg.SeeReinholdJ.Haskamp,Spekulativerund

PhänomenologischerPersonalismus:EinflüsseJ.G.FichtesundRudolfEuckensaufMaxSchelersPhilosophiederPerson(Freiburg:VerlagKarlAlber,1966).Nonetheless,itshouldbenotedthatSchelerisgenerallycriticalofFichte'sthoughtasawholeowingtoitsidealism.

99.Ibid.,p.390andp.482.

100.Actually,theseareasareselectedasrepresentativeofnumberofsimilartopicsinScheler'sthinkingwhereact,person,spiritandsofortharedepictedasconstrainedorexpressedonlythroughobjective,existentialreality.

101.SeeFormalism,pp.1306.

102.Ibid.,pp.142andpp.3936.

103.Scheler,TheNatureofSympathy,trns.PeterHeathwithintroductionbyWernerStark(Hamden,Conn.:ShoeString,reprintedition,1970);seeChapter6,passim.

104.Ibid.

105.Ibid.,pp.24452.


107.Ibid.,pp.134.Seethepreviousdiscussionoftheconceptofresistance,supra,pp.3941.


109.Ibid.,p.22.TerminologyhereisborrowedfromAlfredSchutz's"Scheler'sTheoryofIntersubjectivityandtheAlterEgo,"inhisCollectedPapers,Vol.1,ed.PaulArthurSchlipp(TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1962),p.151.

110.Scheler,Man'sPlace,pp.2934.Schelerrefersspecificallyto

Koehler'sworkwithapesinregardtothislevel.SeeWolfgangKoehler,TheMentalityofApes,Trns.EllaWinter(London:KeganPaul,1925).

111.Ibid.,p.36.

112.Cf.SigmundFreud'spsychoanalyticthesisofthehumanpsycheanditsdevelopment,especiallytherelationoftheidtotheegoandsuperego.SeeSigmundFreud,TheEgoandtheId,inVol.19ofTheCompletePsychologicalWorksofSigmundFreud,trns.JamesStrachey,etal.(London:Hogarth,1947).Parentswillattest,moreover,thatinchildhooddevelopment,theinfantdemonstratesincreasingcapacitybothforidentifyingandmanipulatingobjectsintheirenvironmentandforbecomingcognizantoftheself.ThecontemporaryreadermayalsoperceiveaninterestinganticipationofJeanPiaget'stheoryofhumanpsychologicaldevelopmentwhichisparalleledinScheler'sbrieftreatmentoftheontogenesisofthepersonality.SeePiaget'sclassic,TheChild'sConceptionoftheWorld(NewYork:BasicBooks,1968).

113.Scheler,TheNatureofSympathy.

114.Scheler,Sympathy,p.246.

115.Scheler,Formalism,p.526.SeealsohisProblemofaSociologyofKnowledge,trns.ManfredFringswithintroductionbyKennethStik-

kers(London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1980),p.48.Cf.Toennies,CommunityandSociety,trns.CharlesP.Loomis(NewYork:Harper&Row,1963).

116.Scheler,Formalism,pp.5268.

117.Ibid.,pp.52933.

118.NotethestrikingsimilaritytoHegel'streatmentoftherelationshipbetweentheindividualandcommunity.Cf.Hegel'sPhilosophyofRight,trns.T.M.Knox(Oxford:Clarendon,1965),pp.14860.

119.Scheler,Formalismp.533.

120.Ibid.,p.522.


122.Ibid.,p.371.

123.Ibid.,p.372.

124.RonaldPerrin,"MaxScheler'sConceptofthePerson:TowardsaRadicalHumanism,"(Unpublisheddoctoraldissertation,UniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego,1971).Perrin'sDissertationwasdirectedbyHerbertMarcuse.

125.Socialscientistsmightnotethatthedoingofsocialsciencehangsinthebalanceofthisquestion.Howisahumansciencepossiblewhenthepersonofanyhumanisprecludedfromobjectificationand,thus,directcognitiveknowing?

126.Scheler,Man'sPlace,p.47.

127.Scheler,Sympathy,pp.96102.

128.ItmightbenotedthatSchelerassertsthatthishierarchyisonly

anorderoffoundationand,thus,isnon-causalalthoughthehigherstagesrestuponthelower.ThetranslationofthevariousstagesofthesympathyhierarchyfollowsthatofPeterHeath,thetranslatorofSympathy.AlthoughHeath'stermsaresomewhatstrained,theirusagehasbeengenerallyacceptedamongEnglishreadersofScheler.


130.Ibid.,p.98.

131.Ibid.,p.99.ThequoteisfromGoethe's"Einlass"toBuchdesPardies.

132.Scheler,Ressentiment,p.121.SeethemodestretractionofthisstatementinSympathy,p.99.


134.Scheler,Formalism,p.1001;seealso"OrdoAmoris,"translatedinLachtermann.Scheler'smostdetailedelaborationofhisethicsisinhisFormalism.


136.SchelerrepeatedlyidentifieshimselfwiththelikesofSimmelandJaspersinregardtotheneedforVersteheninthehumansciences.See"DieDeutschePhilosophiederGegenwart,"p.3056.

137.Ibid.,p.3934.Thsbegsthequestionofpersonalfreedom,whichwillbeconsideredsubsequently;see"ZurPhänmonologieund

MetaphysikderFreiheit,"inGesammelteWerke,Vol.10:SchriftenausdemNachlassI,ed.MariaScheler(Bern:FranckeVerlag,1957).

138.Scheler,OntheEternal,p.273.


140.Scheler,Ressentiment,p.172.

141.Scheler,"DerBourgeois,"P.351.


143.Scheler,Sympathy,p.89.Scheleralsonotedwithapprovalthatthisnon-hierarchicapproachisthebasisfortheFranciscansocialministry;ibid.,p.91.

144.SchelerappearstoreconsideranumberofthetroublingimplicationsoftheFranciscanandsimilarconceptionstowardtheendofhislife.Seethecollectionsofmanuscripts,"ManuskriptezudenMetaszienzien"and"ManuskriptezuLehrevomGrundealleDinge"inhisGesammelteWerke,Vol.11:SchriftenausdemNachlassII,ed.ManfredFrings(Bern:Francke,1979).Evenintheselatepapers,however,Schelerdoesnotconsiderdirectlythequestionofman'sproperattitudetowardnature.

145.SeeSchlelr's"TheFormsofKnowledgeandCulture,"inPhilosophicalPerspectivesand"ManuskriptezuMetaszienzien"inNachlassIIinreferencetosuchanewscience.

146.Scheler,"ÜberUrsprungundWertdeskapitalistischenGeschichtsauffassung,"intheunpublishedcollectionofmanuscripts,"ZurSitutationderZeit,"CC.V.9,p.51,inScheler'sarchiveattheBayerischeStaatsbibliothek.TheauthorwaskindlygivenpermissionbyManfredFrings,editorofScheler'scollectedworks,toreviewthis

portionofScheler'sunpublishedmanuscriptsandnotes.Muchofthefollowingdiscussionisderivedfromthisandotherpiecesfromthe"SituationderZeit"materials.

147.Scheler,SociologyofKnowledge,p.39.

148.Scheler,"Dekadenzprobleme:ZuSpenger,"intheunpublishedmanuscriptsof"ZurSitutationderZeit,"pp.25-30.Cf.Scheler,ProblemsofaSociologyofKnowledge,trns.ManfredFrings(London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1980)pp.1513.

149.Scheler,Problems,pp.1534.

150.Scheler,"ManandHistory,"inPhilosophicalPerspectives,p.46.

151.Scheler,"Dekadenzprobleme,"p.9.

152.InhisSociologyofKnowledge,Schelerdiscussesinsomedetailthisthesisthatsubjectivitymustmanifestitselfintherealandidealobjectsofone'sexistenceintheworldi.e.,theobjectsofnatureandhistory.

153.Scheler,"ManandHistory,"pp.923.

154.ThisdiscussionisindebtedtoRichardRorty'sPhilosophyandtheMirrorofNature(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1979)andtoLeoStrauss'WhatisPoliticalPhilosophy?(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1961).

155.IntheCritiqueofPureReason,Kantdoestaketheradicalstepofseveringessentialknowledgefromman,requiringphilosophyaprioritofocusonman.Inthismanner,KantbeginstheanthropologicalturninphilosophywhichSchelerinherits.Yet,Kantisunabletoappreciatethefullhistoricalcharacterofmanhimselfand,thus,transcendentalreasonandcritiquebecomesdefactoanabsolutestandard.

156.ThishistoricalunderstandingofthepersonisbynomeansalateconceptioninScheler'sthought,foreveninworksasearlyasRessentimenthedismissesanybasisfora"fixed"humannature.

157.TheNietzscheanterm"genealogy"woldseemtobeparticularlyaptfordescribingScheler'snotionof"orderoffoundation."Bothideasstreethenon-causalcharacterofasequenceofeventsbehindagivenhistoricalphenomenon.Inotherwords,bothstreetherelativityofhistoryitselfandtheimmersionofsubjectivityinhistory.Moreover,SchelerwasverywellacquaintedwithNietzsche'sintentbehindhischoiceoftermsinthismatter,asiswitnessedinRessentiment.Yet,Scheleroptsnottoutilizetheterminology,settlinginsteadforhisowncumbersome"orderoffoundation."IfsomereasonissoughtforScheler'schoice,itmaylieinhisinsistencethattheorderofvaluescentraltohisethicsisseenas"objective"initsbeing.See,SociologyofKnowledge,pp.3940.

158.Scheler,"Dekadenzprobleme,"p.12.

159.Thiscaveatisintendedtooutlinetheboundariesofthisstudy.ItconcernsitselfwiththepoliticaltheoryofthepersonalismelaboratedinScheler'swritingapersonalismwhichisfoundedonarealist,ontologicalphenomenologyandintricatelylinkedwithasimilarlyfoundedphilosophicalanthropology.IntriguingasScheler'spoliticalinclinationsmaybe,theirbasisinhisphilosophyandtheirinfluenceonhisphilosophyarefocimoreappropriatetothestudyofthehistoryofideas.ThefineworksbyStaudeandMaderonScheler,moreover,

adequatelyexploresuchinterconnections;and,referencemustbemadetoWalterLaqueur'sWeimar:ACulturalHistory(NewYork:Putnam,1974)andtoH.StuartHughes'ConsciousnessandSociety:TheReorientationofEuropeanSocialThoughts,18901930(NewYork:Knopf,1958)forstudieswhichoutlinethegeneraltableauoftheintellectualatmosphereandcultureofScheler'shistoricalsetting.

160.Ibid.

161.ItneedstobenotedthattheMarxistnotionofclassinterestisstillself-interestaccordingtoScheler.Hence,Marxismisviewedasmerelyasomewhatdifferentmanifestation,alongwithbourgeoisliberalismandbackward-lookingconservativism,ofasinglepoliticalparadigmonewhichseespoliticsintermsofself-interestandmaterialwelfare.

162.Scheler,ofcourse,neverspecificallyoutlinessuchaschema.

163.Scheler,"VorbilderundFuhrer,"p.260.

164.Ibid.,p.261.

165.Cf.theneo-Marxistnotionoffalseconsceousnessandthecritiqueofideology;seeMarx,TheGermanIdeology,andGeorgLukacs,HistoryandClassConsciousness.OthernotionsmightalsobeconsideredheresuchasMannheim'sthesisinIdeologyandUtopia,regardingtheroleofthefreeintellectuals,andThomasKuhn'sunderstandingofparadigmandhistoricalchangeinhisStructureofScientificRevolution.

166.Scheler,"VorbilderundFührer,"p.267.

167.Ibid.,p.263.

168.Ibid.,p.269.

169.Neitherinhissociologyofknowledgenorherein"Vorbilderu.Führer"doesSchelermakecleartheontologicalstatusofideas,modelsandsoforth.Thisisafundamentalinadequacyinhisthinking,whichpiercestotheveryrootofhisphilosophy.Inthe"Idealism-Realism"essayofhislateryears,heseekstograntoutrighttheobjectiverealityofideasonthebasisthattheyoffer"resistance"toeffortsof"suspension"ornegation.Onewonders,followingthis,howsuchideasdifferfromnon-noeticreality?TheauthorwouldliketoreadintosuchpassagesagradualmovebySchelerawayfromhisontologicaldualism.Thisinnotthepresentstudy'scentralconcern,butonedoesseeanobviousshiftinhislaterthoughtfromacomprehensionofnoeticrealityasautonomousandessentiallydistinctinitselftoapositionwhichunderstandsnoeticrealityasinseparablefromthenarrowlyexpressibleonlythroughhistoricalandexperientialreality.See,forexample,hisessay"Spinoza,''inPhilosophicalPerspectives.Atanyrate,unlikeHusserlwhowasabletosurmounttheproblemoftherealityofideasbyreductionofallrealitytophenomenologicalintentionality,Scheler'sdilemmaresults

fromadistinctionbetweenbeing-as-actandbeing-as-object.Perhapsadialecticalsubstructure-superstructure"unityincontradiction"suchasM.Merleau-Ponty'swouldresolveScheler'sdilemma,butScheler'sinsistenceonthepowerlessnessofnoeticrealitywouldprecludesuchanoption.

170.Ibid.,p.268.

171.Scheler,in"VorbilderundFührer,"doesnotdescribethetypologyoftheseguiding-modelsinregardtotheirfoundationalorderwiththedegreeofdetailgivenhere.Moreover,heexaminesthetypologyintermsofawaningofpersonalresponsibilityanddignityfromthetop(thesaint)tothebottom(theartistofenjoyment).Thepresentstudyconsiderstheorderinobversefashionorreasonsofsymmetrywithprevioussections.Note,also,thecontrastsandsimilaritiesofScheler'ssequenceoftransformationsaccordingtoan"orderoffoundation"withHegel'scelebratedAufhebungandthedialecticofspirit.

172.Scheler,"Vorbilderund,"Führer,"p.313.

173.NotethatSchelerverymuchdistanceshimselffromKant's,Schopenhauer'sandthecolloquialusageoftheword"genius."Thegeniusisnotaclevercalcultornoratechnicalorscientificwizard.

174.ThisconceptdoesnotcontradictthesharpcriticismwhichSchelerhaspreviouslydirectedagainstthe"international."Ashestates,the"cosmo-politicalrealmisnaturallydistinctfromthe'international.'"Indeed,hecontinues,"itstandsasfarabovethe'national'asthe'international'standsbelow."("VorbilderundFührer,"p.289)Apparentlyhewouldlocatethe''international"withinthemodeloftheleadingspiritofcivilization.

175.Scheler,"VorbilderundFührer,"p.290.ReferalsotoFredR.Dallmayr'sverysensitiveconsiderationoftheseissuesinhisTwilightofSubjectivity:ContributionstoaPost-IndividualistTheoryofPolitics(Amherst:UniversityofMassachusettsPress,1981).

176.Inthehighestform,SchelerhereintendsthepersonofGodastheotherwithwhichthesaintbeginsbuthebynomeanslimitsittothishighestperson.Perhapshehasinmindsomethinglikethewell-knownprayerofFrancisofAssisiwhichbegins"Lord,makemeaninstrumentofyourpeace..."Herethereisnonegationofpersonalsubjectivity,butthesubjectivityoftheotherinthiscase,God'sprecedesandisjoinedtoone'sown.AlthoughScheler'sterminologyindicateshisownlinkageoftheseconceptswithcertainreligiousaspects,henowhereidentifiessuchnotionsdirectlywithreligiousbeliefsorexperience.Indeed,hispersonalism,heclaimsatonepoint,ultimatelyprovedtobethesourceofhisbreakwithCatholicismanddeistreligioningeneral.

177.Thisparticipationinthebeingoftheotherpersonisdiscussedinprevioussections;seeChaper2,"PersonandOther."

178."VorbilderundFührer,"p.2812.

179.Witness,forexample,theironicandnowfashionablejaundicedeyebywhichmanymodernMarxistsviewMarx'sownpredictionofthecommunistsociety.ItisfascinatingtoassesstheparallelsandcontrastsbetweenMarxandScheleronthisscore.IntheGermanIdeologyandelsewhere,Marxtakesgreatpainstoassertthatcommunismisnotanidealtowhichsocietymustconform,butarealdynamisminmaterialhistoryitself.AvoidingtheproblemsofScheler'sapparentduality,Marx's"ideal"isnotanideal,itisanecessarybutstillemerging"real."Thedifficultieswiththis,struggledwithbywritersadiverseasLukacsandLenin,istheroleofhumancreativityandresponsibilityinthearenaofsuchnecessity.Scheler,asexploredintheworkoftheFrankfurtSchoolthinker,KurtLenk,strugglesforamiddlegroundbetweenMarxisthistoricalmaterialismandidealisminthisregard.Hence,whilemaintainingaduality(overlookingotherhintsinhislate

works),therealmofspirittheIdealispresentedasentirelypowerless.Onlytotheextentthatidealscanfindsomeaccordwiththedynamicsofmaterialrealitycantheyacquireefficacy.

180.AmongothersourcesseeHowardBecker'sreviewofScheler'slectureatthewarcollege,"BefuddledGermany:AGlimpseofMaxScheler,"AmericanSociologicalReview8(Spring1943):pp.20921.Scheler,GedankenzuPolitikundMoral,ed.ManfredFrings,(Bern:FranckeVerlag,1973).Scheler,"TheIdeaofPeaceandPacificism,"trns.ManfredFrings,BritishSocietyforPhenomenologyJournal,7(October1976)pp.15466and8(January1977)pp.3650.

181.Scheler,Gedanken,p.12.

182.Ibid.,p.15.

183.Ibid.,p.17.

184.Thisnotionofresistanceastheprimaryexperienceofsubjectivityistreatedwithmoredetailinthefirstchapterofthisstudy.SeethesectionontheRevivalofMetaphysics,Anti-EpistemologyandPhenomenology.Also,seeScheler'sessay"Idealism-Realism.


186.Scheler,Problems,pp.378.

187.Scheler,"PeaceandPacifism."

188."ChristlicherSozialismusalsAntikapitalismus"(1919),whichwasintendedtobeapartofalargerstudyentitled"TheEssenceanddevelopmentalLawsofCapitalism:AwaytoChristianSocialism,"hasrecentlybeenprintedinGWV.4:Politisch-PädagogischeSchriften,editedbyManfredFrings(Munich:Francke,1982)."ChancenundMächtedesAufstiegsundNiedergangs''(1923?)has

yettoappearinprint;inScheler'sarchiveitisnumberedCC.V.21,andisgroupedwithsimilarmaterialsundertheheadingZurSituationderZeit"TowardstheSituationoftheTimes."

189.Scheler,Chancen,p.13.

190.Ibid.,p.15.ThetextgoesontonotethatMussoliniandthenewSpanishdictatorwillbebutthefirstswallowsofacomingflock.Ironically,ScheleralsospeaksofHitler'sgrowingmovementinthisessay.Remember,thiswasprobablywritteninonly1923!

191.Scheler,Sozialismus,p.672.

192.Ibid.,p.673.

192.Noallusiontothenotionof"paradigm"aspopularizedinThomasKuhn'ssenseofparadigmshiftinscientificrevolutionsisintendedinthiscontext.ParadigmisusedheretoencompassvariousScheleriantermssuchasVerfassung,Begriffandsoforth,becauseitdoesnotinvoketheepistemologicalovertonesassociatedwithwordslike"conception."Scheler's"paradigms"involveconstellationsorpatternsofvalueswhichprecedeany"thinking."TherearemodestaffinitiesbetweenthethesisofSchelerandKuhn.Yet,indistinction,Scheler'stransformationsareofmanandthethingswhichbearvalues,whereas

Kuhn'sareradicalconceptualchangesrelativetoman'sperspectiveonthenaturalworld.SeeKuhn'sTheStructureofScientificRevolutions(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1962).

193.Scheler,"DerBourgeois,"inGesammelteWerke,Vol.3:VomUmsturzderWerte.SeealsoRessentiment,"DieZukunftdesKapitalismus"andthesecondpartofProblemsofaSociologyofKnowledge.

194.RefertoChapter2foradiscussionoftheoriginofpersonalsubjectivity.Also,see"ZurIdeedesMenschen"inGesammelteWerke,Vol.3:VomUmsturzderWerteand"ManintheEraofAdjustment."Noteaccordinglythattheideaofself-responsibleevolutionpicturesmanaspossessingataleastmomentoffreedominhistory.Even,however,intheradicalsenseofsuchfreeevolution,freedomisconstrainedandconditionedbyhistoryforScheler:cf."ManandHistory."

195.Aswillbecomeclearsubsequently,Schelerisnothereurgingaromanticreturntothemedievalworld-vieworcommunitystructure.Theconceptsofself,otherandcommunitywereequallyasincompleteinthatperiod,ifonlyindifferentways.ThesimilaritybetweenScheler'sthesisandthesociologiesofWeberandSombartmaystemfromhisstudyyearatHeidelbergduringWeber'stenurethereandfromhiscloseacquaintancewithSombart.

196.Ressentiment,p.158-9.

197.Liberalismwillbegenerallydefinedincontext;however,itsusageinthisstudyconformstotheusualdefinitionlongassociatedwith:formal,individuallyheld,apriorirights;limited,participatorygovernment;proceduraljustice;contractually-basedpoliticaldutiesandobligations;etc.Scheler'smostdirectremarksonliberalismareperhapsfoundininhisotherwiseunremarkableessayonthe

populationgrowthrateinpost-warGermany,"BevölkerungsproblemealsWeltanschauungsfragen,"especiallythesection'LiberalWeltanschauung,'inGesammelteWerke,Vol.6:SchriftenzurSoziologieundWeltanschauungslehre,ed.MariaScheler(Bern:Francke,1963).

198.Althoughofferingaliberalpoliticaltheoryhimself,JohnRawls'swork,ATheoryofJustice(Cambridge:Belknap,1976),offersabriefbutsynopticoverviewoftheformalaspectsofliberalpoliticalthought.

199.Scheler,FormalisminEthicsandNon-FormalEthicsofValues.Seeespeciallyhissection"FormalismandApriorism,"pp.45110,andhissection"FormalismandPerson,"pp.370595.

200.Ibid.,pp.56N.b.ScheleragreeswithKantthat"goods"arerelativetothelifeexperiencesofmen.Schelerclaims,however,thatKanterrsbyassumingthatgoodsandvaluesareidentical.ValuesandtheirorderforScheler,asnotedpreviously,aretheobjectiveandrealbasisforethicsbecausethey,unlikegoods,arenotrelativetomen'sexperiences.

201.SeetheconsiderationgivenScheler'sethicsinthefirstchapterofthisstudy,supra,pp.4243.

202.QuotoationsinthispassagearetakenfromFormalism,pp.3712.

203.Scheler,however,goesbeyondtheusualcommunity-individualismdivisiontowardamoreWeberiannotionofthesuccessionofsocietalforms.Ibid.,pp.52635andsupra,pp.101116.

204.Ibid.,p.529.

205.See,amongseveralsources,Scheler'sremarksconcerningAristotle's"politicalanimal"inibid.,p.524.

206.CF.Scheler'sGedankenzuMoralundPolitik,editedbyManfredFrings(Bern:Francke,1973),pp.56;hisFormalism,p.525;andhisessay"ManintheEraofAdjustment"inPhilosophicalPerspectives,passim.

207.RefertoChapterIIandthediscussionoftheontogenesisoftheperson,pp.94101.

208.RefertotheChapterIIdiscussionofthephylogenesisoftheperson,pp.101116.

209.RefertoFormalism,pp.533ff.

210.Ibid.,pp.5313.

211.Itistemptingtorefertothisdistinctionasonebetweenearlyandlaterliberalism,orbetweenclassicalliberalismandutilitarianism.Inhiswork,Ressentiment,trns.WillianHoldheim(NewYork:FreePress,1961),Schelercomesclosetomakingsuchaconclusion,However,sinceSchelerdoesrefrainfrommakingsuchadivision,utilitarianismandclassicalliberalismaretreatedunderthegenericterm"bourgeoisliberalism"inthisessay.

212.Formalism,p.3523.Notealsotheinherentnotionofmaterialprogresswhichischaracteristicofliberalism.

213.Schelerdoes,infact,arguethatutility,pleasureandadvantageareallmerelydifferentaspectsofthesamephenomenon.SeeRessentiment,p.152ff.

214.SchelerinpassagessuchasthisseemstobeclearlyreferringtothelikeofBentham.Benthamplainlytreatsallpleasuresasequalandadditive.Onewonders,however,howwellSchelerwasacquaintedwiththeworksofJ.S.Millwhoproposedthattherewerequalitativedifferencesbetweenpleasureandthatpleasureswerenotadditiveatthehighestlevelswheretheycouldonlybetrulyappreciatedbysuperiormen.Also,considerthatprogressherewouldbeconceivedonlyasaquantitative,continuedaggregationofmoreandmorethings.

215.J.S.Millisanexampleamongseveral.SeetheintroductorychaptertohisOnLiberty(Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,1958).

216.Formalism,pp.3501.

217.InFormalism,Schelerclaimsthatthemoreprimaryfactorsuponwhichneedsarebasedwouldbethevital,naturalimpulsesoflife.Asweshallseesubsequently,however,thesearealsounacceptableforotherreasonsasthecornerstonesofcivilizationandpolitics.

218.Ibid.,p.3512.

219.Ibid.,p.349.

220.SchelerdoesnotagreewithNietzschethatChristianityistheresultofressentiment.Rather,hebelievestheressentimentemergeswithbourgeoismanandsubsequentlyhaspervertedallinstitutionsincludingChristianityofthemodernage.

221.SeeErkenntnisundArbeit,inScheler'sGesammelteWerke,Vol.8:DieWissenformenunddieGesellschaft,editedbyMarieScheler(Bern:Francke,1960),pp.21239.

222.Ressentiment,p.154.

223.Formalism,p.154.Scheleroccasionallyorganizesvaluesinfourmodesinsteadoffive.

224.GedankenzuMoralundPolitik,p.5.

225.Gedanken,pp.1620.

226.Scheler,SociologyofKnowledge,p.124.


228.Cf.Kant'sprefacetoFoundationsoftheMetaphysicsofMorals,trans.L.W.Beck(Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,1959),p.5ff.

229.Inthisvein,seeJohnRawl'sATheoryofJustice(Cambridge:Belknap,1976);seeespeciallyhisthesisoftheseparationofthereasoningmanfromthechaosofrealitybywayoftheveilofignorance.Inotherrespects,however,itisimpossibletowhollyclassifyRawlsintherationalistliberalcamp.Toooftenhealsointerjectselementsofutilityliberalismintohisthesis.

230.Evenimagininganartificialintelligencewhichcouldreason,onecanscarcelybelievetherationalistswouldallocatehumanchoicetoamachine.Heretheheartwouldmurmurwithinthemitwouldseem.

231.Formalism,p.275.

232.Ibid.,p.271.

233.ProblemsofaSociologyKnowledge,p.401.NotethatSchelerishererejectingtwodifferentversionsofrationalism.Herejectsarationalismofhumanreasoningandarationalismbasedonanobjectiveanduniversalreason.

234.SeeScheler'sMan'sPlaceinNature,trns.HansMayerhoff(NewYork:Noonday,1961),pp.6970,wherehediscussesthenatureofmanasbecominghumani.e.,activelyparticipatingintheunfoldingofbeing'sselfawareness.

235.SeethelatterportionofthtefirstchapterofthisstudyorrefertoErkenntnisundArbeit,p.2012andpp.2313andScheler'sOntheEternalinMan,trns.BernardNoble(London:SCMPress,1960),pp.198213.

236.OntheEternalMan,p.202.

237.Ibid.,pp.2067.

238.ErkenntnisundArbeit,pp.197200.

239.Ibid.,pp.2035.Seealso"LiebeundErkenntnis"inhisGesammelteWerke,Vol.6:SchriftenzurSoziologieundWeltanschauungslehre,ed.MariaScheler(Bern:Francke,1963).

240.Scheler,"OrdoAmoris"inSelectedPhilosophicalEssays,trns.DavidLachtermann(Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1973),pp.11011.Cf.alsoJürgenHabermas'notionofknowledgeconstitutiveinterestsinhisKnowledgeandHumanInterests,trns.JeremyShapiro(Boston:BeaconPress,1968).

241.Refertohisarticle,"DieDeutschePhilosophiederGegenwart."

242.RefertothesecondforewordtohisFormalism.

243.Seehisessay"DieJugendbewegungen."

244.Manyofthematerialsincludinginthecollectionofhisunpublishedpapers,ZurSituationderZeit,arefrighteningintheirinsightsintothegrowingpopularityofAdolfHitlerandtheNationalSocialists.Inregardtocommunism,itmightbenotedthatSchelerfirstwelcomestheRussianRevolutionasafreeingoftheRussianpeoplefromthebarbarismofthefeudalismofCzarandland,andasafreeingoftheEasternspiritfromtheshacklesoforthodoxy.Bythepivotalmid-Twenties,however,hisenthusiasmforthenewregimewanedasnewshackleswereseentoreplaceorthodoxyandeventheworksofancientphilosopherswereplacedundercensorship.

245.Appealingastheseetymologygamesmaybe,thereremainsacertainnominalistillusionwhichmustbeguardedagainst.Theauthorisdubiousthatthecontemporaryusageoftheterm"legitimacy"carriestheimplicationsofDivinelaw,naturallaw,cosmicorontologicalorderaswereinvokedbyitsroots.

246.SchelerisawareofvariouscurrentsinMarxismandmanyinterpretationsofMarx'sworks.Bythelarge,however,itiswhattodayhasbecomereferredtoas"orthodox"Marxismwithwhichheismostfamiliar.Too,manyofthemorephilosophicalofMarx'swritingsweregenerallyunknownbefore1930.ItmaybethathisacquaintancewithMarxistthinkingreflectshisfamiliaritywithWernerSombart

and/orwithhisstudyyearatHeidelbergduringtheheightofMaxWeber'sscholarship.

247.Bywayofillustration,somementionofScheler'srelationshipwithSovietcommunismisinorder.Intheearly1920'shisviewoftheSovietregimeaslargelypositive.AtthistimeheseestherevolutionasfreeingtheRussianpeoplefromafeudalservitudetoCzarandland,andasfreeingtheRussianspiritfromthedogmatismoforthodoxy.Indeed,itisroughlyatthistime,accordingtoMader(p.123),thatheacceptsaninvitationfromTrotskytopresentaseriesoflecturesatthereorganizeduniversityatMoscow.OnlyfinancialproblemsontheSovietendlaterprecludedthetrip.Bythelater1920's,however,Sovietcommunismisseenonlynegatively.CallingitCzarismreborn,henoteswithsadnesstheneworthodoxyimposedbycensorshipandtheextremelybourgeoischaracterofthenewregime.SeeProblems,p.167.

248.Aswiththepreviousvignettesinthischapter,heretoothestudypaintswithabroadbrushwhattrulydeservesmuchgreaterattentiontodetail.

249.RelevantpassagesfromMarx'swritingsmightbereferredtoforcomparisonwiththeabovebourgeoisMarxistinterpretation.SeethePrefacetohisContributiontotheCritiqueofPoliticalEconomy,hissection"CritiqueoftheHegelianDialecticandPhilosophyasaWhole"whichappearsinTheEconomicandPhilosophicalManuscriptsof1844,his"ThesesonFeuerbach,"thefirstsectionofTheGermanIdeology,hisIntroductiontoTheGrundrisse,andhisAfterwordtothesecondeditionofCapital.ExceptionstothisinterpretationcanbefoundinGeorgLukacs'HistoryandClassConsciousnessandinMauriceMerleau-Ponty'sAdventuresoftheDialectic,trns.JosephBien(Evanstron:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1973).

250.Forrelevantworks,see(innoparticularorder)thesectionon"ValueShiftsinModernMorality"inRessentiment,"DerBourgeois,""DieZukunftdesKapitalismus,"''ManandHistory,"thesection"ChristianLoveandtheTwentiethCentury"inOntheEternal,andthesections"CulturalSociology"and"MaterialProblems"inProblemsofaSociologyofKnowledge.

251.Scheler,Problems,p.118.

252.Ibid.,p.134.

253.Ibid.,p.125.

254.Thisisacommontheme.ForScheler,knowledgeisguidedbyinterests;itisnotaneutraloperationapoint,bytheway,whichhasbeenborrowedbysomewritersoftheFrankfurtSchool;seeJürgenHabermas,KnowledgeandHumanInterests.InScheler'stheory,typesofknowledgeaccordwiththetypesofvalue-objectsinagiven

person'scomplexofvalues.Refertothesection"MaterialProblems"inProblems,"ErkenntnisundArbeit,""LiebeundErkenntnis"andsupra,pp.5557.

255.Seethediscussionofliberalformalismandrationalism,supra,ChapterFour.

256.Pascal,Blaise,Pensees,ascitedinLorenEiseley'sTheFirmamentofTime(NewYork:Knopf,1963),p.159.

257."DerGeistunddieideelenGrundlagenderDemokratiedergrossenNationen,"inGesammelteWerke,Vol.6:SchriftenzurSoziologieundWeltanschauungslehre,ed.MariaScheler(Bern:Francke,1963),p.174.

258.Scheler'sdiscussionofthedialecticiscursoryandnowheresystematic.Onemustwonder,furthermore,ifSchelerhasadequatelyreflectedontheproximityofhisownthinkingtodialectics.What,infact,occursinthevarioustransformationsdiscussedinhisphilosophyifitisnottherenownedAufhebungofdialectics?



261.Scheler;amongseveralsources,refertohisessay,"DekadenzproblemzuSpengler,"pp.5760.

262.RelevantmaterialsinMarx'swritingsinclude:"OntheJewishQuestion,""CritiqueoftheHegelianDialecticandPhilosophyasaWhole,"theIntroductiontoTheGrundrisseandtheManifestooftheCommunistParty.

263.Supra,ChapterTwo.

264.Scheler,Problems,p.38.ThisisFrings'translation,althoughthewordGeistischangedhereto"spirit"insteadof"mind."

265.SeeFormalism,pp.5335.

266.Thismaybeoverstatingthepoint.InpassagesofOntheEternalinManandProblems,itishintedthat,againlikeMannheim,philosophersorintellectualsmightbespecialinthisregard.SeeProblems,p.168andcf.KarlMannheim,IdeologyandUtopia,pp.20912.

267.See"ErkenntnisundArbeit,"pp.3802.

268.RelevantworksofMarxwouldbethefirstportionsoftheTheGermanIdeology,thePrefacetoContributiontotheCritiqueofPoliticalEconomy,andhisessay"CritiqueoftheHegelianDialecticandPhilosophyasaWhole."

269.Scheler,Problems,p.147.ThetranslationisFrings',anditillustratestheproblemsoftranslatingScheler.TheGermanhasatonewhichismissedinEnglish."DerechteMarxistundVertreterdes'absoluten'Klassenkampfesdürftediesjanichttun.Ichselbstbindarinfastmehr'Marxist'alsAdler,insofernalsauchichallesBewusstseinaufdasSein,alleobserstenVernunftgrunsätzeund-

formenaufFunktionalisierungerfassterSeinsformenzurückführeallerdingsnichtwieMarxaufdasnurmaterielleSein,sondernaufdasganzeSeindesMenschen."Probleme,p.145.


271.TheauthortakesabroadviewofScheler'spersonalisminthispoint,onewhichoverlooksasignificantbutunclearelementinhisargumentwhichwouldfogthisinterpretation.Schelerargues[Problems,pp.16770,OntheEternal,pp.98101,andPhilosophicalPerspectives,pp.112]thatthereisacertaintypeofknowingwhichservestoovercomeideology.Heidentifiesthisvariouslyas"philosophical"or"slavational"knowing.Tosomeextent,thisknowingisthesamegraspingofthetotalityofthehumanpersonwhichhereisdesignatedsimplyas"critique.''Unfortunately,ScheleralsoatmomentsbringsthistypeofknowingdangerouslyneartotheideaoftranscendentalknowledgewhichherejectsinrationalismandrationalistbourgeoisMarxism.

272.WereScheler'sthoughtempiricist,itmightbeconcludedthataweighingofthevalidityofthetheorywouldrevolvearoundexplainingtheexperiencedfactsofpoliticalpractices.Wereitidealist,

likewise,thismightbeaccomplishedbycomparingitwithsomeidealofthepoliticalorder.Wereitcritical,perhapssomeanalysisofthemethodsofthetheorywouldbeinorderbaseduponcertainuniversallyrecognizedcriteria.Butgoodscholarshipdoesnotliebehindthissortof"fairness."Onemayvaluablyargue,forexample,thatPlato'sRepublicisnotapracticalblueprintforcityorganization,orthatDavidEaston'sASystemsAnalysisofPoliticalLifefailstoaccountforthefullnatureofmaninpoliticsbyfocusingtoonarrowlyonexternalpoliticalbehavior.Suchevaluationiseminently"fair"inthebestsense.ThefairnessofevaluatingScheler'spersonalismaspoliticaltheoryagainsttherealityofthepersonideallyinvolvesthelatternotionoffairnessasubstantivenotion,notaproceduralone.

273.Hisusageofterminologytodescribethepassagefromoneessentialcharactertoanotherisnotstandardized.Onoccasiontheword"transformation"isused,butmoreoftentheprocessisonlydescribedwithoutdesignation.

274.SeeFormalism,p.34446.

275.RefertothetranslationofmuchofthscorrespondenceintheIndependentJournalofPhilosophy,2(1978):512.

276.Ibid.,p.8.TheconcernofStrauss,bytheway,coincideswithGadamer'spublicationofTruthandMethod(NewYork:Crossroad,1982).

277.Scheler,Formalism,p.255.Seealso"OrdoAmoris."

278.Scheler,"Philosopher'sOutlook,"p.11.

279.Scheler,Man'sPlace,p.88.

280.Thisisabroadstatement,obviouslyignoringtheimportantdistinctionsbetweenthesetheories.SeetheBibliographyfor

referencetothesewriters'relevantworks.

281.Habermas,KnowledgeandHumanInterests,trns.J.Shapiro(Boston:Beacon,1972).

282.Habermas,"TowardaTheoryofCommunicativeComptence,"Inquiry13(1970),pp.35976.

283.Heidegger,BeingandTime.

284.SeeFrings,PersonandDasein,fordiscussionofrelationshipbetweenScheler'spersonandHeidegger'sDasein.

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Theunissen,Michael."WetterstumundStille.ÜberdieWeltdeutungSchelersundihrVerhältniszumSeinsdenken."InPaulGood,Gegenwartsgeschehen.

Toennies,Ferdinand.ComunityandSociety.TranslatedbyCharlesP.Loomis.NewYork:HarperandRow,1963.

Turski,G.K."SomeConsiderationsonIntersubjectivityandLanguage."Gnosis1(Spring1979):pp.29-44.

Tymieniecka,Anna-Teresa.PhenomenologyandSciencenContemporaryEuropeanThought.NewYork:Farrar,Straus&Cadahy,1962.

Vacek,Edward."MaxScheler'sAnthropology."PhilosophyToday23(Spring1979):pp.238-48.

Voegelin,Eric.Anamnesis.TranslatedbyGerhartNiemeyer.NotreDame,Ind.:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1978.

Voegelin,Eric.FromEnlightenmenttoRevolution.EditedbyJohnH.Hallowell.Durham,N.Carolina:DukeUniversityPress,1975.

VonWiese,Benno.IcherzählemeinLeben.Frankfurta.M.:Insel,1982.

VonWiese,Leopold."MaxScheler:EinigepersönlicheErinnerungen."KölnerVierteljahrsheftefürSozialwissenschaften7(Fall1928).

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NameIndex

A

Adler,Max127

Adorno,TheodorW.147

Apel,Karl-Otto138,139

Aquinas,Thomas11,68

Arendt,Hannah6

Aristotle2,3,46,82

Assisi,Francisof68-69,140,155

Augustine11

Ave-Lallemant,Eberhard142

B

Becker,Howard156

Bentham,Jeremy158

Berger,Peter89

Bergson,Henri15,20,25,47,145

andlifephilosophy17-19

Berkeley,George67

Bernstein,Richard141

Bloch,Ernst5

Brentano,Franz28

Brod,Max10

Buber,Martin10,135

C

Camus,Albert5

Carlyle,Thomas72

Clemens,Rudolf9

Comte,Auguste67,70

Conrad,Theodor9

Conrad-Martius,Hedwig9

Curtius,ErnstRobert12

D

Dallmayr,FredR.ix,155

Descartes,Ren2,15,29,50,74

Dilthey,Wilhelm7,10,15,23,40,47,71,74,145,149


understandingofWeltanschauung20

Dix,Otto12

Driesch,Hans12,37

Dunlop,FrancisN.149

E

Easton,David163

Edison,Thomas67

Ellul,Jacques67

Eiseley,Loren161

Eucken,Rudolf8,10,15,37,149,150


noologicalmethod23

F

Farber,Marvin144

Fichte,JohannGottlieb23,51,67,149,150

Fink,Eugen33

Foucault,Michel89,149

Frege,Gottlob26

Freud,Signmud52,138,150

Friedrich,Carl6

Frings,Manfredix,141,142,152,162,163

G

Gadamer,Hans-Georg6,15,89,141,145,163

Geiger,Moritz9,145

Goethe,JohannWolfgangvon8,62,63,151

Guardini,Romano12

Gründler,Otto143

H

Habermas,Jürgen5,138,139,160,161,163

Haskamp,ReinholdJ.149

Heath,Peter515

Hegel,GeorgF.W.8,13,15,59,67,70,74,117,122,151,154

Heidegger,Martin5,6,45,69,135,140,141,144,148,163

Heraclitus17

Hildebrand,Dietrichvon5,9,142,143

Hitler,Adolf156

Hobbes,Thomas104

Hughes,H.Stuart153

Husserl,Edmund2,9,21,24,31,40-41,42,48-49,50-51,74,125,129,144,146,147,154

intellectualdevelopment26-27

phenomenology26-31

&Scheler'sphenomenology32q-35

I

Ingarden,Roman9

J

Jaspers,Karl151

K

Kant,Immanuel8,15,23,24,35,39,50-51,64,47,71,72,74,76,98,99,100,145,146,149,152,153,155

Koehler,Wolfgang150

Koyre,Alexander99

Kraft,Julius144

Kuhn,Thomas154,156

L

Landgrebe,Ludwig148

Lenk,Kurt155

Lenin,V.I.155

Leyendecker,Herbert9

Lipps,Theodor9,26

Loewith,Karl74

Lukacs,Georg129,154,155,161

Luther,Martin88

M

Mach,Ernst7

Mader,Wilhelm142,143,153,160

Makkreel,RudolphA.146

Mannheim,Karl81,124,154,162

Marcel,Gabriel5,45

Marcuse,Herbert6,151

Marx,Karl13,70,72,92-94,117,122,124,125,144,154,160,161,162

Merleau-Ponty,Maurice5,36,154,161

Meyer,HerbertHeinrich146

Michels,Robert78

Mill,J.S.158

Misch,Georg147

Mounier,Emmanuel5

Muth,Carl143

N

Newton,Isaac67

Nietzsche,Friedrich4,5,10,11,13,114,15,46,64,72,73,74,81,106,145,153


andRessentiment16

andtransvaluationofvalues19

anddeathofGod72-73

O

Oestereicher,JohnM.142

OrtegayGasset,Josè14,144

P

Pascal,Blaise118,161

Perrin,Ronald151

Pfänder,Alexander9

Piaget,Jean138,150

Plato35,80,163

Plessner,Helmuth147

R

Rathenau,Walter9

Rawls,John157

Reinach,Adolf9

Rilke,RainerMaria12

Rolland,Roman12

Rorty,Richard152

Russell,Bertrand26

S

Sartre,JeanPaul129,149

Scheler,Max

life7-12

education7,8

phenomenology9,32-37

asteacher9,11

Catholicism8,11,16

theology11

lifephilosophy15-24

andNietzsche16-17

andBergson17-19

andDilthey19-22

andEucken22-24

phenomenology31-37

andMarxism128-130

Schönemann,Lili62

Schopenhauer,Arthur51,155

Schutz,Alfred6,150

Searle,John138

Simmel,Georg7,143,151

Sombart,Werner9,10,81,143,157,160

Sorel,Georges51

Spengler,Oswald72,91-93,135,152,162

Spiegelberg,Herbert147

Spinoza,Benedictusde154

Stark,Werner150

Staude,Raphael142,145,153

Stein,Edith9,37,142

Steiner,Rudolf8

Stern,Wilhelm7,142

Strauss,Leo135,152,163

Stumpf,Carl34

T

Tillich,Paul12

Toennies,Ferdinand59

Trendelenburg,Adolf22,149

Troeltsch,Ernst143,145

Trotsky,Leon160

V

Vaihinger,Hans9

Voegelin,Eric6

W

Weber,Max8,64,81,157,160

Weise,Leopoldvon12

Willard,Dallas146

Wojtyla,Karol(JohnPaulII)5

Wust,Peter12,34,143

SubjectIndex

A

Acts2,41,46,49-53,131-132

andbeingofperson46-51,131-132

andvalues51-52,131-132

intentionalincharacter51,131

notobjectifiable49-50,131

Action135

Eucken'sconception23

Alienation13,20,67,68,72,96,109,115,119

All-man46-47,73,90,127

Anthropology5,12,42-43,69,73-74,76,111,137-129

andtransformationofman45-46

andtheBourgeois97-98.

SeealsoMeta-anthropologyandPhilosophicalanthropology

Anti-humanism4

Artistofenjoyment[Modallevelofguidingmodel]79-80,82

Aufhebung,154,161

B

Being45-47,57,68-69,127,139-40

modesobjectandact46-49,57,66,68

GroundofBeing57,69,138-40

Bolshevism91,160

Bourgeois11,47,64,66,93,95-97,106,108,111-118,123,125,133,134

bourgeoisliberalism97-114

bourgeoisMarxism114-132

Bracketing.SeeEpochè

C

Capitalism90,92-94,119,124

Categoricalimperative98,137

Catholicism11,42,113

Childdevelopment53-54

Civilization106.

SeealsoLeadingspiritofcivilization

Classstruggle119-121,124-125

Co-acting62,65

Co-experiencing62-63,65

Cogito2,45

Cognition19,37,39,42,138

Scheler'stheoryofcognition37-41,112-113

anontologicalrelationship49,112,126-127

Communistsociety115,123

Community22,58,59,73,100-103

andtheindividual100-103

SeealsoSocialityandthevariousmodesofsociality

Consciousness116-117,119

Husserl'sconceptionofconsciousness26-30

andresistance41,87

andideology(falseconsciousness)126-128

andclass126-127

Cosmo-political82

CriticalTheory129

Critique33,109-110,126-128,138-139.

SeealsotheKritiktradition

Critiqueofideology116,125-128

Culture90.

SeealsoHistory

Dilthey'sunderstanding19-21

culturaldecline91-92

D

Dasein5,140,148,163

comparisonwithScheler'sPerson5,140

DeathofGod72-73

DeclineoftheWest91-92,135

Democracy11,75,90,91-92

personalistdemocracy92-93,133

Destinyofman101,107

Development15,22,134

andlife17,22

andbecoming17

Dialectic70,72,120-121,129,135

material13

dialecticalmaterialism116-121

Dissociation54-57,66,77,101,123.

SeealsoObjectification

E

Economics91,107,108,115,117

Ego47-51,54,59-60,66,77,112

egoasanobject48-50

Epoche(bracketing,eideticreduction,suspension)29,42-44

Equality61,63-64

Ethics8,10,64,106-108,109,117,135,

materialethics64,106-108

Ethno-methodology138

Evolution15,18

Existentialism5,45

Experience

Dilthey'sunderstandingof20-21

andsubjectivity25

Experientialscience38

F

Fact/valuedichotomy108

Falseconsciousness126-128

Fascism91

Fellow-feeling[ModallevelofSympathy,seetablep.55.]63

Feudalism95-96

Formalism15,61,64,118

liberalformalism97-100,110

FrankfurtSchool[SeeCriticaltheory.]

Freedom75,120

Freewill72

Functionalizationofessentialinsight111-112,127

G

Geist(spirit,mind)15,20,23,24,42-43,51-52,66,69,70,134

asmodallevel(highest)ofLife[Seetablep.55.]56-57

Eucken'sunderstandingof22-23

asinherentlypowerless42,57,66,87-88

Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft59

Geneticstages53.

SeealsoTransformation

Genius[ModallevelofGuildingmodel]79,81-82,83

Gesamtperson(corporateperson)60,65,89,121-124,132.

SeealsoPersoncommunity

Group78

Growth105,106.

SeealsoDevelopment

Guidingmodel77-84.

Seealsospecifictypes:Artistofenjoyment,Leadingspiritofcivilization,Hero,Genius,Saint.

H

Habituallife[ModallevelofLife,seetablep.55.]56

Herd[ModelofSociality,seetablep.55.]59,62,102,123

Hermeneutics74,135

Hero[ModallevelofGuidingmodel]79,81,82,134

Herrschaftswissen(knowledgefordomination)19,68-69,118-119,120,128

Historicism3,4,13,70-72

History69,105,116,119-121


asanaspectofWorld69-74

philosophyof69-74,92

Holy(sacred)[ModellevelofValue,seetablep.55.]107,114,128,131

Homofaber72

Humanandculturalsciences20-22

Humanitarianism63-64

I

Idealfactors12,70,78

Idealism31,34,35,36-37,40,78,118-119,120,127

idealism/realism38,129

Idealspeechsituation138

Ideation(Wesensschau)28,42-43,136

Ideology117,119,125,136.

SeealsoCritiqueofideology.

Individual17,58-59,83,89,109,121-123,132

Individualism59,63,77,97,100,102,103

liberalindividualism97,100-103

Individuation58-59,109

Instinct[ModellevelofLife,seetablep.55.]54-56

Bergson'sunderstandingof18

Intellectuals124

Intentionality24,26-28,30,34,35-36,41,42,48

Interests124,138-139.

SeealsoValuesandSelf-interest

Intersubjectivityix,22,58-59,62-64,66,83,93,132

Bergson'sunderstandingof18-19

phenomenological25

Husserl'sunderstandingof28

J

JahrbuchfürPhilosophieundphänomenologischeForschung10,24

K

Kantianism8,10,23,31,37,125-126

andDilthey21

Kathedersozialisten115,127

Knowingandbeing41,112,126-128

Knowledge28,112-113

andValue112-113

Kritiktradition[SeeKantianism,neo-Kantianismandcritique.]

andbourgeoisMarxism125-127

L

Leadingspiritofcivilization[ModallevelofGuidingmodel]79-80,82,134

Leadership77-78

Legitimacy114

Liberalism61,66,75,93,95,126,128

bourgeoisliberalism97-114,125

Scheler'sliberalism113-114

Libertemodifiable/fatalitemodifiable70

Liebesgemeinschaft(lovingcommunity)83-84

Life15,96,111

Bergson'sunderstandingof19

Eucken'sunderstandingof22-24

modallevelsingenesis54-57,134

Lifecommunity[Modallevelofsociality,seetablep.55.)59,60,62,65,86,102,123,134

Lifedrive40,42

asvitalimpulse54,66

andGeist52

andresistance54

Lifephilosophy[Lebensphilosophie]5,6,10,14,31,45,134

andBergson17-19

andDilthey19-22

andEucken22-24

andNietzsche16-17

andScheler15-24

Lifeworld28-29

Scheler'sMitwelt58

Logic8,9,26

Logos72-73,114

Love10,62,64-65,94,113.

SeealsoPersonalloveandLiebesgemeinschaft

M

Man'splace4,12,13-14,45,67,72,74,116,138-140

Eucken'sconception23

Marxism75,93,95,124-126

bourgeoisMarxism114-130

orthodoxvs.humanist129

Masssociety91-94,121

Master/slaverelationship106

Materialism

scientific67

Marxist117-120

Meta-anthropology12,73,74,90,138-139

Metaphysicalrealism18,19,26-27,35,39,76

Metaphysics12,14,15,31,33,38,39,116

revivalofmetaphysics37-44

Mind.SeeGeist

Models.

SeealsoGuidingmodels77-84,134

Modernity3,13,14,16,27,95-97

Morality16,84-90,116

Morphogenesisofperson54-57.Seemodallevelsintable,p.55

N

NationalSocialism7

Naturalism3,4,36-37,39,72

Naturalstandpoint29-30,36

Nature20,66-69,108,109,117-118

asanaspectofWorld66-69

modernconceptionof67

Needs103-6,132

Needs-utilitymotivation97,103-108

Neo-Kantianism23,37,39,40,121,128.

SeealsoKantianism

Nihilism3,4

Noblevalues(spiritual)[Modallevelofvalues,seetablep.55.]107

Noesis/noeme29-30,31,35

Noologicalmethod23

Noeticvalues82

Noumena15,35,76.

SeealsoPhenomena

O

Object40-42,47-49,117,119

predominanceofobjectinmodernity47-48

constitutionofobjectbycogito46-47

Objectification(reification)47,49-50,52,54,60,69,100,101,118-119,132.

SeealsoDissociation

Objectivism4,16-17,27,66

andmaterialism119-120

andtheobjectivistreduction122-123

Ontogenesisofperson53-54,57,58-59,76,89

Ontology4,21-22,34-35,36,37,76,77,139-140,148

Scheler'spositionvs.Dilthey21-22

andGroundofBeing139-140

Other,the58,60,118-119

beyondobjectification60

asobjectforliberalismandMarxism100-102,118-119

Overman13,17,46,72,73

Ownership118

P

Pacifism10,75,85,89-90

Peace89-90

Person2,3,5,11,16,36,42,45-47,50-52,58-60,61,64,66,70,86,95,99,100,127,131-132,134

notobjectifiable6,22,60,132

unityofacts41,46-47,50-52,66,87,94,131,140

aspoliticalsubject52-53,60-61,132

ontogenesisof53-54

morphogenesisof54-57

andpower85-88

individual53-54,59-60,101-103,123,132

Gesamtperson[SeeGesamtperson.]

Personalism2,3,5,6,17,36,46,58,61-62,73,75-77,88,113,114-115,122-123,125,128,131-132

Personcommunity[ModallevelofSociality,seetablep.55.]59,60-62,65,77,93,123,132

Personallove[ModallevelofSympathy,seetablep.55.]64-65

Phenomena15,25,108.

SeealsoNoumena

Phenomenologicalego,31,36,41,50

Phenomenology5,9-10,14,15,24-26,40-42,45,58,74

Husserl's26-31

phenomenologicalreduction25,29,36,41,43

Scheler's31-37,115,140

transcendentalphenomenology28-29

Philosophicalanthropology6,12,14,42,69,73,76,84

Phylogenesisofpersoncommunity59-60.Seetablep.55

Platonism35,72,79

Pleasure80,98,106-107

Politicalcommunity(polis)58,60,80-82,86,93,99,100-101,108,132

Politicaltheory1-3,5,6,46,61,65,73,75-94,95,102,103,131-135

ancient2,3,73,133

contemporary2-3,131-136

modern3,73,84,95-99

personalismaspoliticaltheory5,36,46,61,65,75-94,101,102,131-133,140

Politicsix,1-3,6,11,46,52,61,65,73,75-77,95,98-99,106-108,113,117,131

bourgeoispolitics95-97

andmorality85-86

andpower84-90

transformedpolitics52,76,77,131-132,140

andvalues86,89

Post-structuralism4

Power5,16,75,84-90

andexperienceofrealityinresistance86-87

necessaryforactualizingvalues88

"willtopower"5,16

Practicalintelligence[ModallevelofLife,seetablep.55.]56

Pragmatism13,24

Praxis1,2,3,134

Progress91-92,104,120-121

Proletariat124-125,126-127

Psychologism23,26,32,36,37

Psychology53,66,105

Q

Quasi-transcendentals138-139

R

Radicalhumanism61

Rationalism3,15,24,33,126-127,128,129

andliberalism108-113,125

modernrationalism97,108

Resistance19,22,40-44,54,87


Ressentiment16-17,64,96,106-107,115

Rights99,100-101

Romanticism3,64,67

Realfactors12,13,70,78,115,122-123,128,134.

SeealsoIdealfactors

Reason18,66,108-113,110-112,127-128

asbasisforpolitics110

Bergson'scritiqueof18

andexperience110-111

nottranscendental111-112,127-128

Scheler'sanalysisof111-113

Relationsofproduction117

S

Saint,the[ModellevelofGuidingmodel]79,83

Scientism67,68

Self-consciousness21.

SeealsoOntogenesisofperson

Self-interest59,80,933-94,120

Socialism11,61,75,90-91,97

personalistsocialism93-94,133

Sociality58,59,62-63,77,89,101,122-123,132,134.

Seemodellevelsontable,p.55.

AlsoseeIntersubjectivityandCommunity

SocietyModallevelofSociality,seetablep.55.59,60,63,65,102,123,134

Sociology58

Sociologyofknowledge5,14,69,74,78,115,120,124-125,128

Solidarity65,92,95,117

moralsolidarity123-124

Spirit.SeeGeist.

Structuralism138-139

Subject(subjectivity)2,4,12,13,16-17,25,27,36,50-52,61,63,66,69,72,74,83,100,111,116-117,118,122-123,128,139-140

classsubjectivity116,121-125

ascogito2

existsonlyinacts51

andhistory72-74,122

asobject16-17

person and polis: max scheler's personalism as political theory

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