pols 373 foundations of comparative politics what makes a democracy? november 21, 2006

POLS 373 Foundations of Comparative Politics

What Makes a Democracy?

November 21, 2006

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• What is democracy?

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• In the academic literature, democracy is generally defined either formally (i.e., narrowly) or substantively (i.e., broadly), or sometimes as a combination of the two

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• The formal definition of democracy is straightforward. Here is one definition: “I would say democracy exists where you have a

multiparty system with political parties competing with one another, free and non-corrupt voting procedures to elect political leaders, and an effective legal framework of civil liberties or human rights that underlie the mechanisms of voting processes.”

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• If the foregoing definition down, we have three readily discernable components of democracy:

A competitive multiparty system Free and non-corrupt elections An effective legal framework of civil liberties or human

rights

• To this list, we might add a fourth component:

Universal and equal suffrage (suffrage is simply the right or privilege of voting)

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• Many scholars, though, argue that the formal Many scholars, though, argue that the formal requirements of democracy aren’t enough …requirements of democracy aren’t enough …

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• Is an imperfect democracy still a democracy or is it something else?

To properly answer this question, it is critical to contrast “democracy” with potential alternatives: authoritarianism, totalitarianism, monarchy, and so on

You must be able to say that an imperfect democracy is not meaningfully different from any alternatives--consider the issue in more concrete terms …

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What Makes a Democracy?What Makes a Democracy?

• Is it legitimate to say that there is no meaningful difference between an Is it legitimate to say that there is no meaningful difference between an imperfect democracy, such as exists in the United States and many other imperfect democracy, such as exists in the United States and many other countries, and, say, Nazi Germany or Cambodia under Pol Pot or countries, and, say, Nazi Germany or Cambodia under Pol Pot or Uganda under Idi Amin? Uganda under Idi Amin?

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• With the foregoing discussion in mind, we can now focus on the next big set of questions, which are:

How and why do democracies emerge? Why do some survive while others do not? Why do some thrive and become stronger over

time, while others just sort of limp along?

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Structural Approaches to the Study of Democracy

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• Let’s begin with a simple, but telling observation: the people (or the social class) that have predominant control over economic resources in society are generally not friends of democracy

• Why?

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• For the dominant groups in society, genuine democracy represents a concrete threat to their own interests, since, by its very nature, democracy gives power to the “oppressed” subordinate classes who constitute the large majority of any society’s population

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• Think of it this way: If the majority of people in a society are poor and exploited would they not be immediately tempted, in a democratic system, to use their new-found and overwhelming voting power to redistribute economic resources and, ultimately, to undermine permanently—if not destroy—the position and privileges of the wealthy (or political and economic elite)?

• More to the point, would not the elite be well aware of this potential threat and, therefore, do whatever they could to prevent democracy from taking hold?

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• Given the almost undeniable tension between democracy and social inequality, Ruschemeyer et al. make a basic assertion, one which undergirds their entire argument: Democracy is above all a matter of power

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• As a “struggle for power, democracy is highly conditioned

This means that transitions to democracy are constrained and enabled by broad structural changes that reorder the balance of power among different classes and class coalitions in society

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• Central Contention: Capitalist development is related to democracy because it shifts the balance of class power, because it weakens the power of the landlord class and strengthens subordinate classes

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• Key Point: For democracy to emerge, subordinate classes must have sufficient power to challenge the dominant classes.

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• How is this a structural argument?How is this a structural argument?

Because Because capitalist developmentcapitalist development inexorably inexorably creates the foundation for subordinate classes to creates the foundation for subordinate classes to exercise powerexercise power

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• How and why does capitalist development shift power to subordinate classes?

Short Answer: Capitalist development generally entails the an increasing concentration of workers, all of whom toil under the same general (and generally exploitative and powerless) conditions

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• Consider a typical urban factory and the emergence of “factory towns”Consider a typical urban factory and the emergence of “factory towns”

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• Class organization is key, for the power of workers is maximized only when they can act in united manner

• As long as they are divided, they are weak and will remain weak. But a united working class is a powerful working class.

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• While the role of the working class and the internal dynamics of capitalism occupy center stage in the authors’ argument, they also acknowledged a couple of other important factors:

The first is the structure of state and state-society relations, and the relative power balance between the state and social actors

The second factor, or power cluster, involves international power relations

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• The structure of state and state-society relations, and the relative power balance between the state and social actors

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• International power relations

During the cold war, international power relations were a key force in blocking democratization, since dominant states like the United States often directly supported and helped strengthen dictatorships, as long as they were anti-Communist (while the Soviet Union supported anti-American regimes)

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International power relations

• Indeed, in a few cases, the United States directly intervened to help bring down democratically elected governments in the developing world for fear that those governments would not support US interests

• Chile is a good example of this

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• Important Point:

“Power clusters” are inter-related; they act together to produce or undermine democracy

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RATIONAL CHOICE

APPROACES

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Democracy: Rational Choice

• A key difference between structural and rational choice approaches might be encapsulated in the following statement:

Waiting for democracy versus making democracy

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• Two basic approaches in rational choice:

Elite-centered (top-down) “Cooperative” approaches

Bottom-up (or mass-based movements) “Non-cooperative” approaches

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Elite-centered Approaches

• Based on the premise that political/economic power in non-democratic societies resides primarily in the hands of the elite

• In this view, democracy is always a product of essentially voluntary and (of course) self-interested decisions made by elite actors

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• Elite-based rational choice explanations posit that any changes must be a product of disputes among the elite themselves

Usually result of a cleavage or split between “hard-liners” and “soft-liners”

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• Important Question:Where do demands for change arise?

Usually “exogenous” source, such as economic or political crisis that threatens the legitimacy of the ruling elite

“Outsiders” in political system may also play a role (putting pressure on elite for political change)

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• A democratic transition is most likely when soft-liners in the regime have relatively equal power to hard-liners and…

Exogenous shock cannot be easily overcome, and/or

When opposition is moderate, as opposed to radical

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• Nature of top-down democratization means that …

Transitions to democracy are generally the product of negotiated “pacts” or agreements among the elite

Transitions represent a “second best” outcome

Transitions do not require a commitment to democracy on the part of any elite group

“Democracy without democrats”

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Bottom-up explanations

• Based on the premise that democracy is not a product of elite negotiations, but of strong pressure from the “masses” or from “outsiders”

• Democracy therefore reflects a relative (and significant) loss of power among the elite in general, rather than just a split between elites

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Authoritarian Regime Types and Democratic Transition

Type of Authoritarian Regime

Likelihood of Democratic Transition

Primary Basis for Transition

Primary Mode of Transition Examples

Personalist Low Iraq/Hussein Uganda/Amin Argentina/Peron

Military High Brazil (1964-85) Argentina (1976-83) El Salvador (1948-84)

Single-Party Very Low China/CCP Mexico/PRI Tanzania/CCM

Amalgam (Depends on nature of amalgamation)

Indonesia/Suharto Chile/Pinochet

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Authoritarian Regime Types and Democratic Transition

Type of Authoritarian Regime

Likelihood of Democratic Transition

Primary Basis for Transition

Primary Mode of Transition Examples

Personalist Low

Exogenous shock (esp. economic crisis); death of incumbent

Violent overthrow (coup, assassination, popular uprising)

Iraq/Hussein Uganda/Amin Argentina/Peron

Military High Factional split (among ruling elite)

Negotiated Pact; top-down transition

Brazil (1964-85) Argentina (1976-83) El Salvador (1948-84)

Single-Party Very Low Exogenous Shock (often severe and multiple)

Mass-based pressure; Negotiated “extrication”

China/CCP Mexico/PRI Tanzania/CCM

Amalgam (Depends on nature of amalgamation)

(Depends on nature of amalgamation)

(Depends on nature of amalgamation)

Indonesia/Suharto Chile/Pinochet

pols 373 foundations of comparative politics what makes a democracy? november 21, 2006

Documents

imperfect democracy

contrast democracy

genuine democracy

study of democracy slide

formal definition of

privilege of voting

foregoing definition

pol pot