WageningenUniversity-DepartmentofSocialSciencesPublicAdministrationandPolicy(PAP)

Polycentricmarinegovernancefortheoffshorerenewableenergytransition

EvaluatingtheabilityofNorthSeaWindPowerHubconsortiumtoaddressbarriersanddriverstotheenergytransitionontheNorthSea

MScthesis,April2020RobinVerheij,941006875120MasterInternationalDevelopmentStudies(MID)SpecialisationPolitics&Governance-SustainableDevelopmentDiplomacy

Supervisor:dr.TamaraMetzeSecondreaders:dr.JudithvanLeeuwen,prof.dr.ir.KatrienTermeerThesiscode:PAP-80336

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Abstract

Theshallowandwind-richNorthSeaofferspotentialforlarge-scaleoffshorewindenergygenerationand contribute significantly to the European Union renewable energy goals. Yet, the energytransition on the North Sea faces technical, political, economic, legal, spatial and institutionalbarriers.AccordingtotheNorthSeaWindPowerHubconsortium,themainbarrieristhelimitedandfragmented nature of international cooperation for offshore wind. This thesis considers theconsortium as an embodiment of an alternative, more polycentric approach to offshore windgovernancethatemphasisesmulti-actorandmulti-levelcooperation. Itevaluatestheabilityof theconsortiumtoaddressexistingbarriersanddriverstotheenergytransitionontheNorthSea.Thisthesis argues that the consortium effectively addresses technical and legal barriers; moderatelyaddressespoliticalandeconomicbarriers;andinsufficientlyaddressesinstitutionalbarriers.Withitstechno-economic focus, the consortium risks to overlook disputes that may arise betweenstakeholders because of knowledge lacunas on the environmental impact of large-scale offshorewind. Furthermore, thenatureof stakeholder involvement remainsunclear. This thesisprovidesaframework for further research into polycentric governance of offshore wind energy, whichanalyticallyseparatesoffshorewindfromotherrenewableenergysourcesduetoitssituationinthemarinespace.Besides,thisthesiscombinesthedescriptiveuseofpolycentricgovernanceliteraturewith its prescriptive purposes, allowing for (future) evaluations and recommendations to improveexistingpolyentricgovernancearrangementssuchastheNorthSeaWindPowerHub.

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Contents

Abstract...............................................................................................................................................iContents.............................................................................................................................................iiAcknowledgements...........................................................................................................................iiiChapter1:Introduction......................................................................................................................1Chapter2:Conceptualframework.....................................................................................................4

Issuearea:technical.......................................................................................................................5Issuearea:political.........................................................................................................................6Issuearea:economic......................................................................................................................6Issuearea:legal-spatial................................................................................................................6Issuearea:Institutional..................................................................................................................7Polycentricindicators.....................................................................................................................9

Chapter3:Contextualbackground...................................................................................................12CooperationontheNorthSea.....................................................................................................12TheNorthSeaWindPowerHub...................................................................................................13

Chapter4:Methodology..................................................................................................................15Researchdesign............................................................................................................................15Datacollection..............................................................................................................................16Dataanalysis.................................................................................................................................18Limitations....................................................................................................................................20

Chapter5:Analysis...........................................................................................................................22Issuearea:technical.....................................................................................................................22Issuearea:political.......................................................................................................................23Issuearea:economic....................................................................................................................26Issuearea:legal-spatial..............................................................................................................29Issuearea:institutional................................................................................................................32Polycentricindicators...................................................................................................................37

Chapter6:Evaluation.......................................................................................................................41Empiricalevaluation.....................................................................................................................41

Barriersanddrivers.................................................................................................................................41Polycentricindicators..............................................................................................................................45

Academicevaluation....................................................................................................................50Strengthsandlimitations.............................................................................................................52

Chapter7:Conclusion.......................................................................................................................55Discussion.....................................................................................................................................56Recommendations.......................................................................................................................57

Bibliography.....................................................................................................................................58

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Acknowledgements

The relationship between natural resources and politics fascinated me throughout my studentcareer.Inmybachelorthesis,Iresearchedtheexistenceofasubnational‘resourcecurse’inRussia’soil-andgasrichregionsquantitatively.Inthismasterthesis, IanalyseinternationalcooperationonoffshorewindenergyontheNorthSeainaqualitativemanner.Interestingly,notonlymyresearchtopicstransitionedfromfossilfuelstorenewableenergy:theglobalmomentumdidsoaswell.

IwouldliketotakethisopportunitytothankmysupervisorTamara.Shecontinuouslychallengedmeto clarifymy thinking and always leftme feeling inspired after ourmeetings. Her enthusiasm forrenewable energy transitions contributed to mine and I am looking forward to have her as thesupervisorofmyinternshipattheEuropeanCommission.

Jesse,Leb,Michiel,Karen,Joor,Max,Casper,Emmaandmyhousemates:thankyouforthevariouswaysinwhichyousupportedmeduringthewritingprocess.

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Chapter1:Introduction

In2015,195countriesnegotiatedthe‘ParisAgreement’thatstimulatesanovelapproachtoreduceGreenhouseGas (GHG) emissions and keep the global temperature rise ‘well below’ two degreesCelsius above pre-industrial levels (United Nations, 2015). Reducing GHG emissions requires anenergy transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources (RES). Renewable energy entailsdifferentsources,includingsolar,thermal,hydro,tidal,wind,waveandgeothermal(Boyle,2004).InanefforttoreachthegoalsoftheParisAgreement,theEuropeanUnion(EU)promotestheenergytransition through its ‘Renewableenergydirective’withbinding targetsofat least20%renewableenergyby2020and32%by2030.Offshorewindenergyplaysacrucialroleintheenergytransitionofcountriesborderingtheshallowandwind-richNorthSea,whichprovidesgreatpotentialforthegenerationoflarge-scaleoffshorewindenergy.

EUMemberstatesdraft‘NationalEnergy&ClimatePlans’,basedupontheir‘startingpointand overall potential for renewables’ (‘’Renewable energy directive’’, n.d.). The Netherlands forinstance, formulateda ‘ClimateAgreement’withthetargettogenerate70%of itsenergydemandfromrenewablesourcesby2030.TheClimateAgreementhighlightsthe‘tremendouspotential’forlarge-scale offshore wind energy to realising this 2030 target (Klimaatberaad, 2019: 167). TheseoffshorewindambitionsnecessitatearevisedspatialplanningontheNorthSea,wherevariousseausessuchasenergygeneration,foodproductionandnatureprotectionareatplay.Forthisreason,various stakeholdersactiveon theNorthSea, togetherwith theDutchgovernment,negotiate thespatialdistributionoftheDutchExclusiveEconomicZone(EEZ)inanefforttoproducea‘NorthSeaAgreement’(OverlegorgaanFysiekeleefomgeving,2019).

AsthisexampleoftheNetherlandsshows,thecurrentapproachcreatesasituationwhereEUmemberstatesindividuallydraftandimplementenergypoliciestoreachnationaltargetsthatarederivedfromtheoverarchingEUtargets.Currently,the‘NorthSeacountries’,whichincludeFrance,Belgium, theNetherlands,Germany, Ireland, theUnitedKingdom,Sweden,NorwayandDenmark,individuallydevelopoffshorewind farms in theNorthSeaand thegeneratedelectricity feeds intoone country. There is little institutionalised cooperation between countries and the littleinternationally coordinated decision-making that exists takes place in fragmented areas of theprocesssuchasmarinespatialplanningandgridconnection.SincetheNorthSeacountries’energyprioritiesvaryinapproachandspeed,thissituationimpactsthebusinesscaseforrenewableenergyaswellasthespaceforenergypolicyimplementationinneighbouringcountries(Franzaetal.,2018:8).Hence,a largepartoftheoffshorewindpotentialoftheNorthSearemainstobeharnessed inthelightofthetargetsoftheEUrenewableenergydirectiveandtheParisAgreement.

Apartfromthelimitedandnon-integratedinstitutionalisedcooperationbetweenNorthSeacountries, the energy transition on the North Sea encounters other factors that hamper oracceleratetheprocess.These‘barriersanddrivers’ includetechnicalbarrierssuchas intermittencyof supply; political drivers such as the Paris Agreement; economic barriers concerning marketinsecurities;andlegalandspatialbarriersconcerningmarinespatialplanning.Hybridoffshorewindprojects aim to overcome these barriers by linking (existing and new) offshore wind farms to atransboundary, interconnected,gridon theNorthSea.The idea is that jointlydevelopingoffshorewind farms and interconnectors creates ‘a platform for coordination’ between countries

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(Weichenhainetal.,2019).TheNorthSeaWindPowerHubconsortium(hereafter:‘NSWPH’or‘theconsortium’),consistingofTenneTNetherlandsandGermany, thePortofRotterdam,GasunieandEnerginet, is an example of a party that stimulates large-scale offshore wind on the North Seathrough hybrid offshore wind projects. The consortium informs policymakers on the techno-economiccostsofoffshorewind-relatedprocessesandaimstofosterinternationalcooperationandoffshore grid interconnection, for instance by creating a platform for dialogue between variousstakeholders.

This thesis considers the consortium as an effort to increase the degree of polycentricoffshorewindgovernanceinordertoaddressexistingbarriersanddriverstotheenergytransition.Apolycentricgovernancesystem ischaracterisedbymultiplecentresofdecision-makingonmultiplescales,fromlocaltoglobal,involvingadiversityofactorsfrompublic,privateandnon-governmentalspheres interacting with each other (Nagendra & Ostrom, 2012: 116). Although the currentEuropean renewable energy system is polycentric since various issue areas (technical, political,economic, legal, spatial) reflect various centres of decision-making, its degree of polycentricgovernance is limited due to the little amount of cooperation between governments andstakeholdersonaninternationalscale.Increasingthedegreeofpolycentricgovernancecouldhelptoaddressexistingbarriersanddrivers inanefficientandeffectivemanner.Aprincipaladvantageofhighdegreesofpolycentricgovernanceisthatitallowsforexperimentationandlearningatdifferentlevelsofgovernance,whichoffersopportunitiestotestnewandpotentiallypreferableinstitutionalarrangements (Ostrom, 2009; Galaz et al., 2011: 8-9). This way, knowledge on the efficiency andeffectiveness of policies will increase through trial and error (Ostrom, 2009: 31; Aligica & Tarko,2012: 242). Ultimately, polycentric governance has the potential to reconfigure existing regimes(Hodson&Marvin, 2010: 482). This thesis approaches theNSWPHas an exampleof a potentiallypreferableinstitutionalarrangement.ItidentifiesbarriersanddriverstotheenergytransitionontheNorth Sea and evaluates the ability of the polycentric governance arrangement proposed by theNSWPHtoaddressthem.

Thehybridcharacteroftheproposedoffshorewindarrangementaddsextracomplexitytoitsgovernancegivenitstransboundarynatureanditssituationinthemarinespace.Existingresearchon polycentric renewable energy governance is not sufficient to identify barriers and drivers as itoverlooksspatialissuesspecifictothemarinecontext.Therefore,thisthesisseparatesoffshorewindanalytically from other RES and takes into account the marine governance literature. Marinegovernance is defined as: ‘the sharing of policymaking competencies in a system of negotiationbetweennestedgovernmental institutionsatseveral levels (international, (supra)national, regionalandlocal)ontheonehandandgovernmentalactors,marketpartiesandcivilsocietyorganizationsontheotherinordertogovernactivitiesatseaandtheirconsequences’(VanTatenhove,2011:87).With its emphasis on the diversity of actors at play on different levels of governance, marinegovernanceresearchclearlycontainspolycentricelements.

The polycentric governance perspective appears in existingmarine governance literature,addressing different actors and sea uses ranging from shipping (Van Leeuwen, 2015; Gritsenko,2014), ecosystem-based marine resource management (Raakjaer et al., 2014; Gruby & Basurto,2014;Morrison,2017;Österblom&Folke,2013;Somaetal.,2015),fisheries(Gelcich,2014),marinelitter (Kerber, 2017), marine spatial planning (Greenhill & Tett, 2018) and recently also in global

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ocean governance (Mahon & Fanning, 2019). However, literature specifically on the polycentricgovernanceofoffshorewindenergyisstillscarce.Thisthesisprovidesaconceptualframeworkforfutureresearchintopolycentricgovernanceforoffshorewindenergy.Itsuggeststhatresearchtakesintoaccountthegrowingroleofinformationinstakeholderinteractionsaswellasvariousformsofstakeholderinvolvement.

A particular strength of polycentric governance research is that it allows for ex-antehypotheses on polycentric indicators and their importance for specific institutional designs(Andersson&Ostrom,2008:79).Weareabletoex-anteevaluatetheeffectivenessoftheNSWPHconsortium because it concerns a proposed governance arrangement with concrete measuresformulated to address existing barriers and drivers. Thus, the evaluation entails the goals andpreferred cooperation of the consortium. Before we can ex-ante evaluate this polycentricgovernancearrangement it is important to identify theexistingbarriers anddrivers to theenergytransition on the North Sea. This raises the following research question: ‘‘what hinders andacceleratesthetransitiontolarge-scaleoffshorewindenergyontheNorthSea?’’,whichconsistsofthefollowingtwosub-questions:

• Whatbarriersanddriversinfluencethetransitiontolarge-scaleoffshorewindenergyontheNorthSea?

• Towhatextentarehybridoffshorewindprojectsabletoaddressthebarriersanddriverstothisoffshorewindenergytransition?

While the firstquestion isdescriptive, the secondquestionevaluates theeffectivenessofanewlyproposedgovernancearrangementand is thereforeprescriptive. Inaneffort toanswer these twoquestions,thisthesisprovidesaconceptualframeworkofbarriersanddriverstooffshorerenewableenergytransitionsemerginginseveral issueareas:technical,political,economic, legal-spatialandinstitutional. This framework of issue areas enables us to analyse empirically the case-specificbarriers anddrivers emerging fromdocuments and interviews. For somebarriers anddrivers, thesituationintheNetherlandsservesasanillustration.

Theinstitutional issueareaplaysadualrole inthisresearch.Ontheonehand, itdescribesinstitutionalbarrierstotheoffshorewindenergytransitionsuchasthelowdegreeofinternationalcooperation. On the other hand, it provides a list of overarching drivers for cooperation in apolycentric governance construct, including for example ‘diversity of stakeholders’, ‘informationsharing’and‘mechanismsformonitoring’.Wecalltheseoverarchingdrivers‘polycentricindicators’:the more indicators a governance arrangement displays, the more effectively the arrangementaddressesbarriersanddrivers.Theseindicatorsprescribewhateffectivecooperationoughttolooklike and enable us to evaluate the ability of the NSWPH governance arrangement to address thecase-specific barriers and drivers. One of the strengths of this thesis is that it combines thedescriptiveaswellastheprescriptiveuseofpolycentricgovernanceliteratureintooneframework.

Eventually, this thesis argues that a couple of polycentric indicators are present in theconsortiumsproposedgovernancearrangement,especially‘dataoncostsandbenefits’.Thisenablestheconsortiumtoefficientlyaddressthebarriersapparentinthetechnicalandeconomicissuearea.On the other side, some important indicators including ‘transparency and trustworthiness’ and‘mechanisms formonitoring’ remainunaddressed and are thereforenot sufficient tomitigate the

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barriersanddriversintheinstitutionalandspatialissueareas.Theconclusionofthisthesisprovidesrecommendationsonhowtoapproachtheremainingissueareasfromapolycentricperspective:itsuggests that theNSWPH ismore susceptible to the roleof information in variousoffshorewind-relatedprocessesand that it closely considers itspreferrednatureof stakeholder implementationand environmental protection. As the hybrid project of the NSWPH consortium is still on-going,theserecommendationscreateanintermediatefeedbackmoment.

Chapter2:Conceptualframework

Throughout the literature, thepolycentricgovernanceperspectivemayplaymultiple roles, servingdifferent aims: from descriptions of existing governance arrangements, to more normativeapproachesofhowsucharrangements shouldbeorganised.Thesearedifferent, yetnotmutuallyexclusive componentsof the sameperspective.According toThiel (2016,3), theunderstandingofpolycentricgovernanceasadescriptiveconceptdevelopedovertimeintoadditionalunderstandings,includingpolycentricityasnormativetheory. Inthefirstplace,polycentricgovernancecanbeusedtodescribe‘structuralfeaturesofstaticgovernancearrangements’,takingintoaccountthedifferentactorsatplayandtherelationshipsbetweenthem(Thiel,2016:6).Thisapproachcanbeconsideredasananalyticalmodelthathighlightscomponentsofexistingpolicynetworks(VanTatenhove,1993;Van Tatenhove & Leroy, 1995). In an additional understanding of the theory, the normativeapplication of polycentric governance refers to ‘the interrelations between a set of variables andtheir effect upon a specific, desirable outcome’ (Thiel, 2016: 6; see also Hajer, Van Tatenhove&Laurent, 2004: 17). In this approach, policy networks can be considered as a guiding model,prescribinghow toarrangepolicynetworks in suchaway thatpolitical and societal problemsaresolvedmosteffectively(VanTatenhove,1993;VanTatenhove&Leroy,1995).

This thesis unites two different uses of polycentric governance theory: on the hand, itdescribesthebarriersanddriversthatexistinthecurrentpolycentriccontext.Ontheotherhand,itevaluates the ambition of the NSWPH consortium, which is a more normative statement aspolycentricindicatorshinttowardswhatpolycentricgovernanceoughttolooklike.Thisrevealstheunderlying normative assumption that higher degrees polycentric governance arrangements aremore efficient and effective than governance arrangements with low degrees of polycentricgovernance. These twoapplications come together in the conceptual frameworkdescribed in thissection,whichprovidesoneofthestrengthsofthisthesis.

Polycentric governance research is particularly prominent in the domain of naturalresources,wherethemanagementofa‘commonpoolresource’isapproachedasacollectiveactionproblem.Acommonpoolresourceischaracterisedbybothahighsubtractabilityofuseandandthedifficultyofexcludingpotentialbeneficiaries,whichcreatespossibilitiesforfree-ridingbehaviourofcertainstakeholders(Ostrom,2010:5).Thegovernanceofcommonpoolresourcesinvolvesmakingcomplex decisions under uncertainty, biophysical constraints and conflicting values and interests(Dietz,Ostrom&Stern,2003:1907).Examplesofworkpolycentricgovernancetheoriesappliedtonatural resources include articles on irrigation systems, fisheries, land (degradation) and forests(Ostrom,2005;Nagendra&Ostrom,2012;Galazetal.,2011).

Thissectionlooksintopolycentricgovernanceappliedintheliteratureonrenewableenergygovernanceandmarinegovernanceinordertodescribebarriersanddriverstooffshorerenewableenergy transitions. These barriers and drivers emerge in different issue areas: technical; political;

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economic; and legal-spatial. Combining two strands of literature allows us to identify a broaderspectrumofissueareasthanconsideringonlyone:marinegovernanceliteraturelargelyinformsthelegal - spatial issue area. Combining different issue areas into a framework allows us to identifyempirically the barriers and drivers specific to our case in the analysis of this thesis. Thus, theframeworkservestoanalyseallincludeddocumentsandinterviews.

After discussing the technical, political, economic and legal-spatial issue area, which willserve to describe the current governance arrangement and is thus the descriptive application ofpolycentricgovernance theory, this sectionproceeds to the institutional issuearea.Thisparticularissue area includes barriers and drivers as described in the renewable energy and marinegovernance literature, as well as drivers to effective cooperation in polycentric governanceconstructsderivedfromgeneralpolycentricgovernanceliterature.Theseoverarchingdrivers,whichwecallpolycentric indicators,enableustoanalysetowhatextenttheseindicatorsareapparentinthedocumentspublishedby theNSWPH– reflecting thenormativeuseofpolycentricgovernanceliterature.Table1mergesthedriversandbarriersperissueareaandthepolycentricindicatorsintoaconceptualframework.

Issue area: technical

Since energy systems consist of complex infrastructure such as large power utilities and gridconnections(Koster&Anderies,2013:34),energytransitionsrequirestructuralchangestobroadersocio-technical systems (Smith & Stirling, 2010). As scaling up renewable energy technologyincreases the complexity of energy systems, with different energy sources across different scalesincreasingly integrated into one grid, the grid infrastructure should be able to support itstransmission(Goldthau,2014:138;Koster&Anderies,2013:40).Inotherwords,beingabletouselarge-scalerenewableenergynecessitatesappropriateinfrastructure.

Translatingthisinsighttothemarinecontext,weseethattheenergytransitiontooffshorewind involves both the development of technology that generates offshore wind (such as theturbine),aswellastheintegrationofthisenergyintoagridthattransmitstheenergytoland.Theoffshore grid in the North Sea combines power from renewable sources (mostly wind) withtransmissionlinesofothertechnologiessuchasoilandgas(Dedeccaetal.,2019:56).

Technicalbarriersincludeensuringthereliabilityandresilienceofdevices,forinstanceinthecase of extremewaves or little wind. Currently, the offshore grid in the North Sea is expanding.Important challenges andopportunities relate to theway inwhichenergy is transmitted from forexampleanoffshorewindfarmtoland.Conventionally,awindfarmisconnectedtoonecountryandfrom there canbe transmitted to another country, resulting into a ‘non-integrated grid’. Recentlyhowever,newdevelopmentshavepavedthewayforan ‘interconnectedgrid’,wheretheplanningfor both energy generation and transmission occurs simultaneously (Dedecca et al, 2019: 56).Concretely, this means that already off the shore, grids are interconnected and energy can flowdirectly from thewind farm tomultiple countries. Such ‘hybrid projects’ (ofwhich theNorth SeaWindPowerHubisconsideredanexample),couldproducemoresocio-economicandenvironmentaladvantagesthanthetraditional,non-integratedapproach.However,hybridprojectsalsoencounterbarriers and drivers due to their transboundary character. Some of the following issue areaswilltouchuponsuchbarriersanddrivers

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Issue area: political

The main political driver for energy transitions emerging from the literature is governmentcommitment,which includes theneed forgovernments todeliberately interveneandshiftcurrenttechnologiesandpractices(ShoveandWalker,2007:763;Koster&Anderies,2013).Concretely,thisentailsawillingnessto‘levytaxes,implementregulations,andinvestininnovation’(Sovacool,2011:3842).Intheirinterventionshowever,governmentsmustalsobewillingtosharepowerwithotherstakeholdersSovacool(2011:3842).AccordingtoGoldthau(2014:138),thiscanposeabarrierinthesense that regulationbyagovernmentbecomesmorecomplex,as ‘themore the liberalparadigminforms national or regional energy policy, the more the number of involved actors is likely toincrease’

The marine governance literature also highlights the importance of governmentcommitment. Yet, Johnson, Kerr & Side (2013: 497) highlight the difficulty that governmentinterventions such as economicmeasures and infrastructure planningmakemarine renewables averypoliticisedtopic.WhathelpsinthisregardisthebackingoftheEUgovernanceframeworkthathelps to shape the evolution of offshore wind, for example with its ‘Energy Union’ as a holisticapproachtoaddressseveralenergyandclimategoals(Dedeccaetal,2019:55-56).

Issue area: economic

Economic incentivesmaydrive theachievementofenergy targets. Examplesofeconomic supportschemes are tenders, fiscal measures (Kitzing, Mitchell & Morthorst, 2012), subsidies, loans andfeed-intariffs.Feed-in-tariffsensurethatagridoperatorpaysasetpriceforrenewableenergy,sothecostsoftherenewableenergygeneratorarecovered(Koster&Anderies,2013:43).Promotingonlyonefinancialincentivewillnotincreaserenewableenergyuseinasystemthatisascomplexasthe energy system. Therefore, governments need to promote a diverse range of measures. Theeventual aim is that sustainable financial schemes can replace state support with market-basedsupport(Koster&Anderies,2013:54).

Investmentinrenewableenergytechnologiesissteadilyincreasing(Koster&Anderies,2013:34) as decreases. As a consequence, renewable energy has become competitivewith fossil fuels.Economic competitiveness is a necessity for a (renewable) energy technology to develop. Beingcompetitiveasacountryrequiressuchhighlevelsofinstalledpowerthatitcouldbetooambitiousforonecountry todeploy,whichhighlights theneed for transnational cooperation (Guerra,2016:531).

Accordingtothemarinegovernanceliterature,accurateplanningandstabilityarevitalsinceoffshorewindprojectsaredevelopedover longtimescales(Guerra,2016:533).However,forward-planningofoffshorewindislargelynon-existent,whichincreasesriskandtherewithcosts.Here,the‘ad hoc’ nature of the sectoral marine management approach creates uncertainty, for exampleaboutthespacesthatwillbededicatedtowindfarms(Young,2015:157).

Issue area: legal - spatial

The literature on the polycentric governance of renewable energy addresses legal barriers to alimitedextent.Itstatesthatcincepolycentricgovernancespansoverdifferentscales,itencounters

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variouslawsandregulations.Avariationinrulesatthenationalandinternational levelcanleadtounclarityforactorsandfosterinefficiency(Sovacool,2011:3833).

Inthecontextofoffshorewindandtherewithinthemarinegovernanceliterature,thelegalaspect in combinationwith space becomes salient. This has to dowith the increasing amount ofocean stakeholders and interests, which makes seas more and more crowded, combined withdecliningoceanhealth(Wrightetal.,2016:115).

TheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawof theSea (UNCLOS)of1982outlineshowtheworld’soceansaredividedbetweencountriesandseauses.ThisconventionforexampledividestheNorthSeaintodifferentExclusiveEconomicZones(EEZ)ofsurroundingcountries.EventhoughtheUNCLOS regulates sea uses, it does not covermarine renewable energy completely: regulation ofthis sector is scattered over various national and international regulations without a coherentinstitutional framework (Castelos, 2014: 228;Wright et al., 2016: 128).Different countries pursuedifferentregulationsforplanningandsitingofoffshorewind(Guerra,2016:533),whichconstitutesbarriers for the construction ofwind farms aswell as for offshore cable infrastructure. Improvedinternationalcoordinationandcooperationcouldreduceinefficientlevelsoffragmentation,butthisprocesscanbetime-consuming(Wrightetal.,2016:128).

AccordingtoYoung(2015),marinespatialplanningprovidesawaytoovercometheabovedescribedbarrieras it is ‘an integratedplanningframeworkthat informsthespatialdistributionofactivities inanontheocean inordertosupportcurrentandfutureusesofoceanecosystemsandmaintain the delivery of valuable ecosystem services for future generations in a way that meetsecological, economic and social objectives’ (Young, 2015: 154-155). MSP is an instrument tocoordinatethefragmentedmanagementofdifferentseausesinarationalwaywhilealsoensuringenvironmental responsibility. MSP has the potential to harmonise legal frameworks, differentgovernmentdepartmentsanddifferent sectoral interests (Wrightetal.,2016:131).Dependingonthe way in which priorities are assigned and implemented, MSP can facilitate the offshore windindustry. Concrete factors that drive implementation are for example the degree of stakeholderengagementandcommitmenttoprioritiseoffshorewindintheallocationofmarinespace(Young,2015:173).

EventhoughMSPonpaperaddressesmanybarriers,itssignificanceforthedevelopmentofoffshorewindisalsocontested.GuerraarguesforexamplethatMSPisanexampleofa‘mono-instrumentalapproach’, which does not recognise the broader constellation of various actors, contexts andexistingpoliciesatplay(2016:530).Wrightetal. (2016:131)notethatearlyexperiencewithMSPsuggests that it can undermine environmental protection, depending on the prioritisation of usesandwhetheritfocusesonopportunitiesorratherlimitations.

Issue area: Institutional

Thebarriersanddriversbelowreflectinstitutionalbarrierstothecurrentenergysystem.Theyrevealthe ways in which cooperation within and between the previous issue areas is organised amongvariousactorsonvariouslevels,whichwillenableustodescribeandanalysethecurrentpolycentriccontext. This section subsequently describes the polycentric indicators that serve as evaluationcriteriaforgovernancearrangements,whichwillenableustoformulateanormativestatementonthegovernancearrangementproposedbytheNSWPH.

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Undeniably, for polycentric governance theorists, the level of centralisation of energygovernance shapes outcomes. Amonocentric and thus centralised approach to energy transitionsminimises the options for effective solutions to appear at different levels in society, let alone toengageinsub-orinternationalfeedbackloops(Goldthau,2014:138).Anexampleofamonocentricgovernance arrangement unable to address the various scales at which energy governance takesplaceistheGerman‘Energiewende’,wherethelowdegreeofinternationalcoordinationresultedingridstabilityproblemsinsurroundingprovincesinPoland,theCzechRepublicandtheNetherlands(Buchan,2012).

Transitions are path-dependent (Verbong & Geels, 2007: 1026), case-specific (Smith &Stirling,2010)andneverending(Kempetal.,2007).Systemchangerequirescoordinatingmultipleactors and resources: only when developments connect institutions, networks and actors atdifferent levels, they can transform an existing socio-technical system (Smith et al., 2005: 1492).Often, the diffusion of a certain energy technology is hampered by the stable nature of existingregimes:vestedinterestsinasocio-technicalregimecanforexamplepreventtheadoptionofanewenergysource(Smithetal.,2005:1491).

The marine governance literature also highlights the level of centralisation of energygovernanceasafactortotakeintoaccount:thegovernanceofmarinerenewableenergyshouldbesensitive for the existence of various stakeholders on multiple levels and the networks betweenthem.Problemsmayarise ifnocoordinationexistsbetweentoomany institutionsand issueareas(Guerra,2018:28;Zürn&Faude,2013).Regardingthesemultipleissueareas,creatinganenablinginstitutionalcontextforoffshorewindfurthermayinvolve‘addressingthepossibleinteractionsofagivenpolicy instrumentwithotherenergyornon-energypolicies’ (Guerra,2016:534).Concretely,this implies thatdifferentgoalsanddifferentpolicydomains should interactwitheachother (VanLeeuwen&VanTatenhove,2010)inordertopromoteoffshorewind.Examplesofsuchinstitutionalsynergiesexistinthedomainsofenergysecurity,economicdevelopment,internationalcooperationandenvironmentalprotection(Guerra,2018:26).

AnotherbarriertotheaccelerationofrenewableenergyidentifiedbyGuerra(2016:529)isthe underdeveloped state of environmental impact assessments. This has to do with existingknowledgegapsontheenvironmentalimpactsofoffshorewindfarmsandtransmissionexpansion,given the difficulty of studying the marine environment (Wright et al., 2016: 128; Young, 2015;Smith,2008).These issuesrelatetoabroaderconcern inenergygovernance,namelythequestionhowpolycentricsystemsshoulddealwiththe increasingdominanceof information ingovernance,which Soma et al. (2016) call the ‘Information Age’. This concept touches upon how informationtechnologies, information networks and social media influence environmental governanceoutcomes. The authors argue that on one side, this creates opportunities for, among others,information exchange, feedback, debate, learning and innovation,while on theother side it blurs‘thepowerofclassicpublicandprivateinstitutionsasnobodyisincontrolofinformation’(Somaetal.,2016:89).Consequently,variousactorsdeploythetransformativepowerthattheuncontrolledflowsofinformationprovides(Mol,2008).

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Polycentric indicators

Nowthatwediscussedthebarriersanddriversto(offshore)renewableenergytransitions,wewillzoomouttobroaderpolycentricgovernanceliteratureandderivenormativeindicatorsforeffectivecooperation in polycentric energy governance constructs. Governance of common pool resourcesinvolvesmakingcomplexdecisionsunderuncertainty,biophysicalconstraintsandconflictingvaluesandinterests(Dietz,Ostrom&Stern,2003:1907).Therefore,asindividualactorsdousuallynothaveaccesstoperfectinformation,environmentaldecisionsinherentlyentailtrade-offs(Dietz,Ostrom&Stern,2003:1909).Yet,certainsettingsaremoreconducivetolearningabouteachother’sinterestsandvaluesthanothersettings(Ostrom,2009:11).Thepolycentricgovernanceperspectiveprovidesan analytical lens for examining what factors drive cooperation and decision-making in complexgovernanceconstructssurroundingcommon-poolresources.Morespecifically,itcanelucidatewhatinstitutional arrangements actors develop to become effective partners, unfolding effectiveperformance on the long term (Nagendra & Ostrom, 2012: 127). Concerning these institutionalarrangements, there are several indicators that enable cooperation in polycentric governanceconstructs,whichwewilldiscussbelow.

The introductionof this thesispointedout thatpolycentricgovernanceentailsgovernancebetween various stakeholders at various levels of governance (Nagendra & Ostrom, 2012: 116).Information plays a central role in polycentric governance constructs: it should be trustworthy,verifiableandunderstoodatrelativelylowcost(Dietz,Ostrom&Stern,2003:1908).Furthermore,itshould be shared frequently and consider the short- and long-term costs and benefits of actions(Ostrom, 2009: 12). As science is never exhaustive, decision-makers also need information onexistinguncertainties(Dietz,Ostrom&Stern,2003:1908).

This information should be monitored at all levels, even though this can be challenging(Dietz,Ostrom&Stern,2003:1908),becausemonitoringthroughasetofagreed-uponrulesallowsfor feedback and learning (Ostrom, 2009: 11). In order to create consensus on governance rules,various actors should be actively involved in a structured dialogue (Dietz, Ostrom& Stern, 2003:1908). The larger the natural resource, the more difficult monitoring will be. For this reason,monitoring should happen in a transparent way and be open for the possibility of challenge bystakeholders (Nagendra & Ostrom, 2012: 125). In order to further encourage adaptivity ofinstitutionstounanticipatedevents,rulesshouldnotbetoofixedonthestatusquoasoptimalscalesof organisation can shift, as well as biophysical and social systems (Dietz, Ostrom& Stern, 2003:1909).

Monitoring should ideally induce compliance. Another factor that induces compliance iswhenactorstrusteachotherandfeelthattheiractionsandwillingnesstocooperatearereciprocal.This also builds commitment and can motivate actors to take responsibility for their ownachievements,onboththeshortandthelongterm(Ostrom,2009:12).

Inherentlytocooperationbetweenvariousenvironmentalactorswithdivergingpowersandvalues, conflictswill arise. If a polycentric systemmanages to dealwith conflict effectively, it canevoke learningandchange(Dietz,Ostrom&Stern,2003:1909).Mechanismstoresolveconflictatlow cost are therefore vital (Ostrom, 2002: 1331). Thus, formal and informal sanctions that areconsideredlegitimateandenforcedequitablyonallareinplace(Ostrom,2009:12).

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If we understand polycentrism in terms of degrees, we could argue that low levels ofpolycentricismcanposeinitselfabarriertoeffectiveenergygovernance.Inthecaseoflowdegreesofpolycentricism,decisionswithenvironmentalconsequencessuchas levelofenergyuse, typeofinvestments and new technology for energy production, are made by independent actors infragmented policy areaswithout communication between them (see Kemp et al., 2007: 78). Thiscouldleadtopolicyinconsistency,contradictingactionsandinefficiency(Ostrom,2009:9),whichinturn may hamper effective energy governance. In other words, increased sensitivity of thepolycentricindicatorspresentatthedescribedlevelsmightcontributetoourunderstandingofwhatinfluencestransitionstorenewableenergy.

In sum, this chapterprovideda conceptual frameworkof several issueareaswithbarriersand drivers to energy transitions and, more specifically, offshore wind energy transitions. Theseissueareascontaintechnical,political,economic,legal-spatialandinstitutionalbarriersanddriversand enable us to analyse the case-specific barriers and drivers as they appear in the analyseddocumentsandinterviews.Besidesservingasanissueareaforappliedpolycentricgovernance,theinstitutionalissueareaprovidesgeneralindicatorsforeffectivepolycentricgovernance:polycentricindicators. These indicators are based upon broader polycentric governance literature and areconsidereddriverstoovercomethebarriersindifferentissueareas.Theindicatorsare:governanceonmultiplescales;interactionbetweenscales;diversityofactors;informationsharing;transparencyand trustworthiness of information; data on costs & benefits; and mechanisms for: monitoring;feedback; inducing compliance; conflict resolution; sanctioning; and encouraging adaptivity. Thepolycentric indicators enable us to analyse documents publishedby the consortium to evaluate iftheirproposedgovernancearrangementisindeedabletoovercomethecase-specificbarriers.

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Technical Political Economic Legal - spatial Institutional Governance of renewable energy transitions (descriptive)

Driver: - Ability of energy infrastructure to support scaling up of RES

Driver: - Government commitment

Driver: - Existence of diverse economic support schemes - Competitiveness with fossil fuels, e.g. through transnational cooperation

Barrier: - Variety of rules on national and international level

Barriers: - Centralised (monocentric) approach to energy transitions - Divergent interests - Vested interests

Marine governance (descriptive)

Barrier: - Reliability and resilience of offshore grid Driver: - Energy transmission through interconnected grid

Barrier: - Government intervention politicises marine renewables Driver: - Backing of EU Energy Union

Barrier: - Little forward-planning of offshore wind, creating uncertainties for investors

Barrier: - Crowded seas - Variety of regulations for planning and siting of offshore wind Driver: - marine spatial planning (but is contested) - Improved international cooperation

Barrier: - No coordination between actors and issue areas - Knowledge gaps on environmental impact of offshore wind; influence of information on governance outcomes

Polycentric governance (prescriptive)

Polycentric indicators (drivers): - Governance on multiple scales; interaction between scales; diversity of actors. - Information sharing: transparency & trustworthiness; data on costs & benefits. - Mechanisms for: monitoring; feedback; inducing compliance; conflict resolution; sanctioning; encouraging adaptivity.

TABLE1:CONCEPTUALFRAMEWORKOFISSUEAREASWITHBARRIERSANDDRIVERS.

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Chapter3:Contextualbackground

The potential for generating offshorewind energy in a specific water basin is determined by theaverageperformanceofthewindspeedoverthecourseofayear; thedeepnessofthebasin;andthe distance of a wind farm from shore.With its high quality wind, relatively shallowwater andproximitytoshore,theNorthSeaprovidesgoodconditionsforgeneratingoffshorewindenergyonalargescale(OffshoreWindOutlook,2019:49-51).Besidesthesegeographicalfactorsthatdeterminethetechnicalpotentialforoffshorewind,therearemanyfactorsthatinfluenceitsimplementation.This chapter discusses the broader context of offshorewind developments before it zooms in onhybridoffshorewindprojects.

Cooperation on the North Sea ThecountriessurroundingtheNorthSea,individuallyorganisetheirmaritimeaffairsregardingtheirExclusiveEconomicZones(EEZ).Concerningmarinespatialplanningforexample,theNetherlandsisintheprocessofdraftinga‘NorthSeaAgreement’,whichshouldfacilitatetheenergytransitionandtherewithreachthegoalsoftheParisAgreement.Consequently,thecurrentspatialdivisionoftheDutchpartof theNorthSeaneedstoberevised,whichrequires takinganewlookonthedivisionbetween energy, nature and food provision (fisheries) (Adviesrapport Noordzee, 2019). During‘North Sea consultations’, various stakeholders that have a claim on the North Sea participate indiscussionsonwhatthenewspatialplanningwilllooklike.

These national affairs are situated in a broader, European context. In 2016, ten Europeancountriessignedthe‘PoliticalDeclarationonenergycooperationbetweentheNorthSeasCountries’to follow up on the Paris Agreement. These countries include France, Belgium, Luxembourg, theNetherlands,Germany,Ireland,theUnitedKingdom,Sweden,NorwayandDenmark.Theaimofthiscooperation is firstly to facilitate the cost-effectivedeploymentofoffshore renewableenergyandsecondly, to promote grid interconnection between the countries in the region. This energycooperation involves four work areas: maritime spatial planning; development and regulation ofoffshoregrids;financeforoffshorewindprojects;andasupportframeworkfortechnicalrulesandregulations. The Political Declaration suggests that countries voluntarily move to a bottom-upapproach, including ‘strong political commitment at the national level’ (Political Declaration onenergy cooperation between the North Seas Countries, 2016: 2). According to the declaration,regional cooperation is an important instrument to progress towards an internal energy marketincludingfurthermarket integrationandgrid interconnection.Cooperation iscost-effectivesince itcan reduce transaction costs and has the potential to exploit benefits of scale. The EuropeanCommission, as ‘an important source of knowledge, analysis and capacity’, should stimulate thiscooperation process (Ibid.). There are different platforms and support groups in place wheremember states can liaise, such as the European Maritime Spatial Planning Platform or ENTSO-Ewhere Transmission System Operators (TSOs) cooperate on the transmission system. Besidescooperationbetweennationalgovernments,thereportunderlinesthatitisimportanttoensureanopendialoguewithkeystakeholderssuchassystemoperators,regulatoryauthorities,business,civilsocietyandinstitutionalinvestors(Ibid.).

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In2019,threeyearsaftertheinitialPoliticalDeclaration,theNorthSeascountriespublisheda‘JointStatementonthedeliverablesoftheenergycooperationbetweentheNorthSeasCountries’.ThisStatementmentionsthatthecostsforoffshorewindfarmshavedroppedfasterthanexpectedandthattheneedforregionalor internationalcooperation ‘mayalsocomesoonerthanexpected’(p.2).TheStatementfurtheridentifiesconcretisedtargetsforthefourworkareasdefinedin2016.Examplesof thesetargetsare increasingknowledgeonthecumulative impactassessmentofwindfarms and the need towork towards a common environmental impact assessmentmethodology.Another insight gained since the Political Declaration of 2016 is that regional coordination in thedevelopment of ‘hybrid offshore wind projects’ linking offshore wind farms internationally withinterconnectorscouldprovidecostreductionsincomparisontoisolateddevelopments(NorthSeasEnergyCooperation,2019:1).

The North Sea Wind Power Hub TheNorthSeaWindPowerHubconsortiumisaconcretehybridprojectthattheNorthSeasEnergyCooperation points out. The consortium consists of four Transmission System Operators (TSOs):TenneTNetherlandsandGermany,GasunieandEnerginet;andthePortofRotterdam.RegardlessoftheabovedescribedEU-wideeffortsforinternationalcooperationonoffshorewind,theconsortiumstates that currently there is no institutionalisedprocesswithin the EuropeanUnion regarding aninterconnected trans-European grid (Interviewee 2). The consortium embodies an alternativeapproach to this ‘short term and fragmented’ energy system, by emphasising concertedinternationalandmulti-stakeholdercooperation(NorthSeaWindPowerHub(1),2019:3).

Traditionallyon theNorthSea,electricitygeneratedonawind farm is transported toonecountryasthepowerfeedsintoonenationalgrid.Onshore,electricitycantravelforexamplefromtheNetherlandstoGermanyortheotherwayaround.Inotherwords,thegenerationofwindpoweronwindfarmsandthetransmissionofthispowertolandthroughagridaredevelopedandoperatedas twoseparateelementsofoffshorewind.Thismeans that conventionally, there is limited tonocoordination between the planning and construction of wind farms, the grid they feed into andwherethisgridleads.TobeabletomakeuseofthelargepotentialforoffshorewindontheNorthSea,futurewindfarmshavetobebuilt furtherout inthesea,whichcomplicates itsdevelopment.Hybridoffshorewindprojectsaimtocombinethedevelopmentofoffshorewind(theconstructionof the turbines)with its operation (transmission of generated energy).With a ‘modularHub-and-Spokeconcept’,windfarmswillbeconnectedtoa(coupleof)hub(s)ontheNorthSea,connectingenergymarkets of the countries bordering the North Sea and integrating them into the onshoreenergy networks. Concretely, this could be implemented by at least two countries that jointlydevelop an offshore wind farm and an interconnector, with grids leading to both countries. Thisallowsformoretransboundaryenergycoordination,iseconomicallyattractiveanduseslessoverallsea space than conventional projects, leavingmore space for other sea uses (Weichenhain et al.,2019).Additionally,theHub-and-Spokeconceptcanpotentiallyserveasasourceforotherformsofenergy,forexamplebyusinghydrogenforenergystorage(NorthSeaWindPowerHub(1),2019).

According tooneof itsconceptpapers,oneof theprimarybenefitsof theHub-and-Spokeconcept‘conceptinaninternationallycoordinatedapproachisthehigherlikelihoodofdeliveringontheParisAgreement,throughlowercosts,highervalueforsociety,lowerriskofdelayandstranded

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assets, stable long-termmarketconditionsandminimisedenvironmental impact’ (NorthSeaWindPowerHub(4),2019:4).Besides implementing thishybridconcept, theconsortiumaims to informthe broader discussion on the energy transition and large-scale offshore wind developments. Itintends to facilitate decision-making of governments by bringing in expertise of the variousconsortium partners, mainly concerning the techno-economic implications of different policydecisions(Interviewee2).AnexampleofapolicydecisionthattheconsortiumtriestobeinvolvedinisthedesignationofspaceforoffshorewindfarmsandcablesontheNorthSea:ifonlyfragmentedareasremainforoffshorewind,forthebenefitofforexamplenaturereserves,thiscouldhinderthepotentialforeconomiesofscale(Interviewee2).OtheractivitiesoftheHubcomprisefinance,rule-making, information sharing and networking (North Sea Wind Power Hub Consortium presentsachievablesolutiontomeetclimategoals,n.d.).TheconsortiumcooperateswiththegovernmentsofDenmark,GermanyandtheNetherlands,theEuropeanCommissionandotherstakeholderssuchas policymakers, offshore wind farm developers and non-governmental organisations. TheconsortiumfurthermoreinvitesotherNorthSeacountriestoalsoparticipateinthediscussion,suchas the network operators of Norway and the United Kingdom (North Sea Wind Power HubConsortiumpresentsachievablesolutiontomeetclimategoals,n.d.).

Hybrid projects are complex because they integrate ‘multiple assets in one project acrossmaritimeboundaries’ (Weichenhain et al., 2019: 29). The first project couldbeoperational in the2030s,asittakesovertenyearsofdevelopment-andconstructiontimeinordertorealisetheHub.Forthisreason,itisimportantthattheinvolvedcountriessoondecideonthecrucialelementsoftheproject. This thesis shows that the implementation of hybrid offshore wind projects is notstraightforwardduetoexistingbarriersanddriverstotheenergytransitionontheNorthSeaaswellashybrid-specific barriers anddrivers. It evaluates the ability of theproposedhybrid approach tooffshorewind toaddress thesebarriers anddrivers. The following chapterdescribes themethodsusedforresearchingthis.

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Chapter4:Methodology

ThisthesisdescribesthebarriersanddriverstotheenergytransitionontheNorthSeaandevaluatestheabilityof thehybridoffshorewindapproachby theNSWPHconsortiumtoaddress them.Thischapterdiscussestheresearchdesignandmethodsusedfordatacollectionandqualitativecontentanalysis.

ResearchdesignPolycentric governance research inherently entails multi-level and multi-actor cooperation. Itsuggests that the way in which this collective action is shaped, produces certain outcomes.Cooperation on multiple levels can for example produce a more efficient way to approachpolycentricchallenges.Thatistosay,actorsconstructthesocialworld(seeRitchieetal.,2013:13).Thisconstructionistcharacterdictatesthequalitativeresearchdesignofthisthesis.

Theresearchstrategyofthisthesis istoconductacasestudy,whichfitsthenatureoftheresearch question since it concerns a ‘what’-question. Case studies can provide a detailed andcontextualised understanding of processes underlying a phenomenon (Bhattacherjee, 2012: 107).They also allow for an investigation into the perspectives of various actors at multiple levels ofanalysis(Bhattacherjee,2012:93),whichisrelevantforthisresearchonmulti-actorandmulti-levelgovernance.TheselectedcaseisthatoftheNorthSeaWindPowerHubconsortiumbecauseitaimstoaddressexistingbarriersanddriverstotheenergytransitionontheNorthSea.Withtheirhybridoffshorewindproject,whichstimulatesinternationalandintegratedcoordinationbetweenmultiplestakeholders, theNSWPHprovidesapolycentricanswertothecurrently lowdegreeofpolycentricoffshorewindenergygovernance.TheNSWPHconsortium isaconstellationofactorswithaclearaim, which tailors multi-level and multi cooperation accordingly. Because this governancearrangement isdesignedforaddressingspecificbarriersanddrivers, itmakessensetoevaluate itseffectiveness indoingso.Thesubsequentchapterprovidesadescriptionofthebroadercontext inwhichtheNSWPHemerges.SincethreeoutofthefivebusinessesthatmakeuptheconsortiumareDutch,thisthesiszoomsinontheDutchperspective.Thisenablesustoprovideconcretenational-levelillustrationsoftheinternationalbarriersanddriversthatemergeintheanalysis.

Case studies on polycentric governance have additional benefits, including their ability to‘inspire conceptual refinements’ (Poteete, Janssen & Ostrom, 2010: 77). This thesis provides aconceptualframeworkforfurtherresearch,includingsomeconceptualrefinements.Anexampleofsucha refinement is thedistinctionthe frameworkmakesbetween informationaland institutionalfactors that influence offshore energy transitions. Some degree of information is inherent toinstitutionalarrangements.However,thisthesisarguesthatconsideringthetwofactorsapartdoesmorejusticetotheimportantrolethatinformationplaysinoffshorewindgovernance.Thisrelatesto another benefit of case studies on polycentric governance: their ability to ‘tease apart distinctelementsof tightly interwoven factors’ (Poteete, Janssen&Ostrom,2010:77).Anotherbenefitofcasestudiesentailstheirpotentialforagenda-setting(Poteete,Janssen&Ostrom,2010:77).Giventhetimelinessofourcase,weareabletoproviderecommendationsfortheconsortiumwhiletheirprojectisstillon-going.Thisprovidesanintermediatefeedbackmomentfortheconsortium.

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Data collection

Aparticularstrengthofthisthesis’casestudyapproachisitsabilitytodealwithvarioussourcesofevidence, including document and interview analysis (Kohlbacher, 2005). The period of datacollection is from November 2019 until January 2020. The unit of analysis is the polycentricarrangementforgoverningoffshorewindontheNorthSea,asproposedbytheNSWPHconsortium.Given the multi-stakeholder and multi-level nature of polycentric governance arrangements, thisarrangement consists of a diverse group of stakeholders: national governments, the EU, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and businesses. The contextual chapter described the variousinterests regarding nature, energy and food provision that are at play on the North Sea. Thecollected data includes seventeen documents and four interviews, which reflect the variousstakeholdersinthegovernancearrangementaswellasthevariousinterests.TheinterestsofnaturearerepresentedbyadocumentofGreenpeaceandaninterviewwiththeWWFandtheinterestsoffood production are reflected in the Visned document. All selected documents touch upon theinterestsofrenewableenergytosomeextent.SincethecasestudyparticularlyfocusesontheDutchperspective, three documents highlight the efforts of the Dutch government regarding offshorewind. The selection of documents provide a sound context of barriers and drivers to the energytransitionon theNorth Sea, including informationon somebarriers anddrivers specific to hybridoffshore wind projects. The other documents include concept papers published by the NSWPHconsortium; a report specifically on hybrid projects; and two documents of the EuropeanCommissiononcooperationbetweenNorthSeascountries.

In this research, document analysis plays a primary role whereas the interviews, addingmore detail to this analysis, play a secondary role. While documents serve to specify the case-specificbarriersanddriverstotherenewableenergytransitionontheNorthSeaandinformthecasestudy chapter and the interview questions, the interviews provide additional information on thebarriers and drivers identified in the documents. The aim to balance between different types ofactorsalsodetermined theselectionof respondents.Even thoughnotexhaustive, theselectionofintervieweesincludesonememberoftheconsortium,onerepresentativeoftheDutchgovernment,one representative of the offshore wind industry and one non-governmental organisation. Withtheirspecificknowledge,therespondentsprovidedinsightsonspecific issueareas.Forthesakeofconfidentiality, this thesis does not provide the names of interviewees. The interviews wereconducted in a semi-structured manner, conducted semi-structured interviews, questions areprepared in advance. At the same time, this approach enables the researcher to ask follow-upquestionswhen interviewees raised issues thatwere of particular relevance to this research (seeLonghurst, 2003: 103). The interviewees knew that they were participating in a research on ‘thefactorsthataccelerateandhampertheenergytransitionontheNorthSea’.Everyinterviewstartedwith the question if the interviewee could introduce her/himself and her/his responsibilitiesregarding offshore wind. The interview would then proceed to the barriers and drivers that therespondenthighlighted.Thebarriersanddriverswerenotalwaysmentionedstraightforward:often,thisapproachproducedgeneralresponses.Insuchcases,thequestionsweredirectedtowardsissueareas.Sinceall four interviewswereconducted inDutch, theywerealsotranscribed inDutch.Thequotes used to support conclusions in the analysis chapter are translated into English. Theimplicationsofthiswillbediscussedinthelimitations.

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Institution Documentname Referenceinanalysis

NorthSeaWindPowerHub Conceptpaper1-TheChallenge:Urgentactionisneededtoreachalow-carbonsocietyintime(2019)

NSWPH-CP1

NorthSeaWindPowerHub Conceptpaper-TheVision:TheHub-and-Spokeconceptasmodularinfrastructureblocktoscaleupfast(2019)

NSWPH-CP2

NorthSeaWindPowerHub Conceptpaper3-ModularHub-and-Spoke:SpecificSolutionOptions(2019)

NSWPH-CP3

NorthSeaWindPowerHub Conceptpaper4-TheBenefits(2019) NSWPH-CP4

NorthSeaWindPowerHub Conceptpaper5-RequirementtoDevelop(2019) NSWPH-CP5

NorthSeaWindPowerHub Conceptpaper6-RequirementstoBuild(2019) NSWPH-CP6

NorthSeaWindPowerHub Webpage1fromNewsUpdateDecember2019#6:NorthSeaWindPowerHubProgrammeandPortofRotterdam:towardsalong-termview(2019)

NSWPH-W1

NorthSeaWindPowerHub Webpage2fromNewsUpdateDecember2019#6:NSWPH:FromProjecttoProgramme(2019)

NSWPH-W2

NorthSeaWindPowerHub Webpage3fromNewsUpdateDecember2019#6:ABriefIntroduction:NSWPH’sWorkstreamLeads

NSWPH-W3

RolandBergerfortheEuropeanCommission

Hybridprojects:Howtoreducecostsandspaceofoffshoredevelopments.NorthSeasOffshoreEnergyClustersstudy(2019)

RB

EuropeanCommission PoliticalDeclarationonenergycooperationbetweentheNorthSeasCountries(2016)

EU-PD

EuropeanCommission JointStatementonthedeliverablesoftheenergycooperationbetweentheNorthSeasCountries(2019)

EU-JS

OverlegorgaanFysiekeLeefomgeving

OnderhandelaarsakkoordvoordeNoordzee(2019) OFL

Greenpeace ANorthSeaelectricitygrid[r]evolution:electricityoutputofinterconnectedoffshorewindpower-avisionofoffshorewindpowerintegration(2008)

GP

ConsortiumofvariousfisheriesactiveontheNorthSea,formulatedbyVisNed

RuimtevoorVisserijindeNoordzeevolwindmolens-GezamenlijkeVisie(2018)

VIS

TweedeKamerderStaten-Generaal(DutchGovernment)

Wijzigingvandewetwindenergieopzee:notanaaraanleidingvanhetverslag(35092-6)(2019)

Nota1

TweedeKamerderStaten-Generaal(DutchGovernment)

Wijzigingvandewetwindenergieopzee:notanaaraanleidingvanhetnaderverslag(35092-8)(2019)

Nota2

TABLE2:ANALYSEDDOCUMENTS

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# Affiliation Date Typeofinterview Referenceinanalysis

1 DutchMinistryofInfrastructureandWaterManagement

21November2019 Face-to-face Int-1

2 TenneTNetherlands 26November2019 Face-to-face Int-23 VanOord 9December2019 Face-to-face Int-34 WorldWideFundforNature(WWF) 21January2020 Phonecall Int-4

TABLE3:LISTOFINTERVIEWEES

Data analysis

This thesis describes the barriers and drivers to the energy transition on the North Sea andformulatesastatementontheabilityoftheconsortiumtoaddressthem.Letusfirstgodeeperintohowthis thesisapproachestheanalysisofbarriersanddrivers.Theconceptualchaptersketchesaconceptual framework consisting of issue areas, based on barriers and drivers from the appliedpolycentricgovernanceliteratureonrenewableenergytransitions.Duetothetransboundarynatureoflarge-scaleoffshorewindenergyanditssituationinthemarinespace,theliteratureonrenewableenergyisnotsufficienttoidentifyallissueareas.Therefore,theliteratureonmarinegovernanceisincludedaswell,which informsthe legal-spatial issuearea.Thus,barriersanddriversto(offshore)renewable energy transitions from the literature serve to identify issue areas. The technical issuearea concerns grid-related factors. Thepolitical issue area touchesupon those issues that requirepolitical decision-making. The economic issue area includes barriers and drivers that affect thebusiness case of offshore wind energy. The legal-spatial issue area includes barriers and driversrelatingtorulesandregulationsandtheinterplaybetweenactorswithaspatialclaimontheNorthSea.The institutional issueareaconcernscooperationbetweenvariousactorsonvarious levels. Inthissense, itreflectsacertaindegreeofpolycentricorder.Theinstitutional issueareaplaysadualrole in the conceptual framework and data analysis. We will first discuss how the case-specificbarriers and drivers were identified and then proceed to the second, evaluative, role of theinstitutionalissuearea.

The issue areas are merged into a coding scheme that serves to empirically identify andcategorisebarriers anddrivers appearing in the analyseddocuments and interview transcriptions.These barriers and drivers thus reflect a certain degree of polycentric order, resulting from thedescriptiveuseofpolycentricgovernancetheory.Thequotesreferringtobarriersanddriversweregroupedunder themostappropriate issuearea inExcel.Here, thecategorywhere theeffectsaremost salient gets priority. The matter of subsidies for instance, involves a political debate butultimately affects the business case of offshore wind. Therefore, this was grouped under theeconomic issue area instead of the political one; the evaluation chapter will reflect upon suchoverlaps.Thedocumentsandinterviewswerecodedpartially,asonlysomequoteswererelevantforthisresearch.Fordecidingifaquoteconcernsabarrieroradriver,itmatteredifafactoriscurrentlya reality or not. Take for example the barrier ‘lack of international cooperation onmarine spatialplanning and grid interconnection’. Some documents highlight the need for more internationalcooperationasadriver,butthiswascodedasabarriersincethissituationiscurrentlynotthecase.Factors that (directly or indirectly) contribute to overcoming a barrier were coded a driver. Anexampleof this is ‘the increasingamountofpoliticalagreementsanddeclarationshighlighting the

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importanceofinternationalcooperation’.It is importanttonoteherethatthisdistinctionbetweenbarriersanddriversintheanalysisisdifferentfromthedistinctionusedinconceptualframework.Intheliterature,barriersanddriversareoftenhypothetical,sowhensomethingisdescribedasadriverbyanauthor,itisincludedintheconceptualframeworkasadriverindependentofwhetherthisiscurrentlythecaseornot.

Wepointedoutbeforethattheinstitutionalissueareaplaysadualroleinthisresearch.Ontheonehand, it serves to identify institutionalbarriers to theoffshorewindenergy transition.Onthe other hand, it provides a list of overarching drivers for effective cooperation in a polycentricgovernance construct derived from general polycentric governance literature: governance onmultiple scales; interaction between scales; diversity of actors; information sharing; transparencyand trustworthiness of information; data on costs & benefits; and mechanisms for: monitoring;feedback;inducingcompliance;conflictresolution;sanctioning;andencouragingadaptivity.Wecallthese overarching drivers ‘polycentric indicators’. The more polycentric indicators a governancearrangement displays, the more effectively the arrangement addresses barriers and drivers. Thepolycentricindicatorsareprescriptive,astheysuggestthattheyareconducivetowardseffectiveandefficient cooperation in a polycentric arrangement, based upon the normative use of polycentricgovernance theory. The polycentric indicators are used to categorise quotes from documentspublished by the NSWPH consortium and the interview transcription with TenneT, a consortiummember. Thequotes explicitlymention ‘the consortium’ andhow it aims towork, both internallybetweenconsortiumpartnersaswellasexternally,withoutsideactors.

The qualitative and interpretive nature of this research implies an inductive data analysisprocess. This means that the analysed data shows patterns that help to answer the researchquestion (Ritchieet al., 2013:6). Theanalysis chapterpresents somepreliminary conclusions thatemerge from these patterns, with supporting quotes per statement. It firstly presents the case-specificbarriersanddriversperissueareaandthendiscussesthepolycentricattributesastheydidordidnotappearintheNSWPHdata.Theevaluationchapterconnectsthetwopartsoftheanalysisbyevaluatingtheabilityoftheproposedgovernancearrangementtoaddresstheidentifiedbarriersand drivers. Despite the limited generalisability of this Western-European oriented case studyresearch,thisthesissuggestsaconceptualframeworkforfurtherresearchbasedupontheoutcomesofthisresearch.This‘analyticgeneralisation’(Yin,2003a),oftheframeworkthatcanbeappliedtofutureresearch,providesoneofthestrengthsofthisthesis.

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Limitations

Asthisthesisdoesnotaimtosketchanexhaustiveoverviewoftheexistentbarriersanddriverstothe renewable energy transition on the North Sea, this thesis should be considered a primaryinvestigation. For this reason, inevitably, limitations arise. This part shortly discusses somelimitations of thismethodology. The evaluation chapter touches addresses the limitations of thisthesis.

Duetothetimescopeandreachofthisthesis,itisnotabletoprovideacompleteoverviewoftheuniverseoffactorsthatinfluenceoffshorewinddevelopment.Thisisforinstancereflectedinthenumberof interviews. Inaneffort tomitigate thisdrawback, theanalysis includesdocumentsandinterviewsfromthemostrelevantactorsinthegovernancearrangement.However,thisthesisdoesprovidearichinterpretationofthecase-specificbarriersanddrivers.Thebarriersanddriversthat emerge from the analysis are roughly similar to those identified in the literature review;wemight consider this as an indication that the analysis does not overlook the most fundamentalbarriers anddrivers. Furthermore, themain barriers anddrivers emerge inmultiple data sources,whichsuggeststhatacertaindegreeofsaturationisreached.

Additionally,asthedecision-makingprocessregardingforexamplethespatialdivisionoftheNorthSeaandthepreciselocationoftheHub-and-Spokeconceptisstillongoing,someinformationis confidential. For this reason, certain interviewees had to generalise some statements touchingupon confidential affairs. Concretely, this means that there might be factors that hamper the

Technical Political Economic Legal - spatial

Institutional

All documents& interviews (descriptive)

BarriersDrivers

BarriersDrivers

BarriersDrivers

BarriersDrivers

DriversBarriers

NSWPH consortium data only (prescriptive)

Polycentric indicators (drivers):- Governance on multiple scales; interaction between scales; diversity of actors.- Information sharing: transparency & trustworthiness; data on costs & benefits.- Mechanisms for: monitoring; feedback; inducing compliance; conflict resolution; sanctioning; encouraging adaptivity.

TABLE4:CODINGSCHEME

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implementationofoffshorewindontheNorthSeathatthepublic isnotsupposedtoknowabout.Overtime,theresultsofnegotiationsbecomepublic,whichhighlightstheimportanceofconsecutiveresearch.

The constructionist character of this research means that the researcher interprets theliterature,documentsand interviews thatultimately leads toananswer to the researchquestion.One couldargue that this affects the internal validityof the research. Inorder toensure that theresearchquestion isanswered in thebestpossiblemanner, theconceptual frameworkandcodingschemewere crosscheckedmultiple times using various sources throughout the research process(triangulation).Somethingthatrelatestothis isthetranslationoftheinterviewsheldinDutchandsomeoftheanalyseddocumentsinDutch.TheanalysispresentsquotesfromDutchinterviewsanddocuments, translated intoEnglish,whichcouldpotentiallyalter theway thereare interpretedbythereader.Yet,thetranslationofinterviewquotesisascloseaspossibletoanycolloquiallanguageusedduringtheinterviewinordertokeeptheoriginalnuances.

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Chapter5:Analysis

The analytical framework of the technical, political, economic, legal-spatial and institutional issueareasenablesustodescribeandanalysetheexistingbarriersanddriversspecifictothetransitiontolarge-scaleoffshorewindenergyon theNorthSea.Theseare thebarriersanddrivers theNSWPHconsortium, our case, encounters. We identify the case-specific barriers and drivers throughanalysing all selected documents and interview transcriptions. For some issue areas, specificexamplesfromtheNetherlandsillustratewhatthebarriersanddriversmaylooklikeonthenationallevel.AmongtheanalyseddocumentsarethedocumentspublishedbytheNSWPHconsortium.Wenotice that the consortium highlights certain barriers in their concepts papers, while positioningitselfasadrivertoovercomethesebarriers.Forthesecondpartoftheanalysis,weusedatafromonly NSWPH documents to analyse how the consortium shapes their transnational and multi-stakeholdercooperation.Theprescriptivepolycentricindicatorsfromtheanalyticalframeworkserveasatoolforthis.

Issue area: technical

Themaintechnicalbarriertooffshorewindenergyistheissueofintermittency,meaningthatwindsupplyandtherewithenergyproductionisvariable(NSWPH-CP1,4),whichhasimplicationsforthesecurityofsupply.Thisbarrierappliestomanytypesofrenewableenergy,accordingtointerviewee3who states that ‘renewable is almost always intermittent, and youhave todo somethingaboutthat’(Int-3).

Even though the precise increase of offshore wind in the future energy system is stillunknown,twointervieweesseemtoagreethatfurthergrowthisinevitable(Int-1;Int-3).Thisraisesthe challenge of integrating renewable energy into the existing (offshore and onshore) grids.Currently,gridsconnectoffshorewindfarmstothenearestonshorepoint.AccordingtotheNSWPHhowever, this does not leverage synergies (NSWPH-CP4, 5). What would leverage synergies,according to the analysed documents, is an interconnected grid on the North Sea that connectssurroundingcountriestooffshorewindfarms.Thefollowingquotefurtherexplainswhythis is thecase:‘Althoughwindisavariableenergysource,thisislessthecaseoveralargearealiketheNorthSea.Variationsinproductionatonewindparkcanbepartlybalancedbythatofanotherparkseveralhundredsofkilometresaway’ (GP,3).Thisquoteshowshowan interconnectedgridcouldprovidemore flexibility regarding intermittency. Also, such a grid could facilitate increasing shares ofrenewableenergyintheenergysystem(NSWPH-CP1,6).Besidesgridinterconnections,also‘sectorcoupling’ is mentioned as providingmore flexibility to the energy system.With this, the NSWPHmeans ‘power-to-gas’ options, in their case predominantly by converting power into hydrogen,whichcanbestored(NSWPH-CP2,5-6).Thismighthelpto‘avoidonshoregridcongestionandsupplyrisks’ (RB, x). As the Hub further explains: ‘Using power-to-gas conversion in coastal regionsconnected to transmission todemand centres locateddeep inlandmay relieve congestions in theelectricitytransmissiongrid.Therefore,itcanreducecurtailmentduetotransmissionbottlenecksofvariablerenewableenergyandsupportsystemadequacy’(NSWPH-CP4,8).

We can consider the constitution of the NSWPH a driving force behind overcoming thebarrierofintermittencybecausetheconsortiumactivelypromotesaninterconnectedgridbetween

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NorthSeascountries.Besides,theconsortiumaimstofacilitatesectorcoupling,whichmighthelptoovercome the barrier of renewable energy integration. With this hybrid approach, the NSWPHattemptstodeployamoreholisticapproachtotheenergysystemthantraditional,national-orientedprocesses.Eventhoughtheinterconnectedgridiscurrentlynotimplementedasithasonlyrecentlymovedoutoftheassessmentphase(NSWPH-W2),theconsortiumisconsideredadriverbecauseitraisesattentionforhybridprojectsandaimstobringdifferentpartiestogether.Whathelps inthisregard is that the Hub-and-Spoke concept is technically feasible, according to desktop studiescommissioned by the consortium (NSWPH-CP3, 3). The following quote also support this: ‘Afterseveralcriticalstudiesandanimatedconversationswithspecialists,developersandstakeholders,theanswer was clear. Yes, a network of hubs that connect far offshore wind farms to North SeaCountries’energymarketsispossible’(NSWPH-W2).

Issue area: political

This part draws some preliminary conclusions on political drivers and barriers for the energytransitionontheNorthSea,followedbyquotesthatsupporttheseconclusions.

An importantbarrierhighlightedby theNSWPH is the current lackof clarityon long-termgoals for renewableenergy.As theNSWPHconsortiumstates in theirconceptpapers, thecurrentoffshore wind plans run until 2030. There is a need for a post-2030 spatial and grid planning(NSWPH-CP6, 7) because ‘the North Sea countries’ combined maritime spatial plans cannot yetaccommodate the envisaged offshorewind capacity addition’ (NSWPH-CP1, 6). The reasonwhy alack of long-term planning can pose a barrier is that ‘these type of projects (e.g. combinedtransmission assets and interconnectors, or development of large scale P2X conversion capacity)typically have lead times of more than 10 years, while the full energy transition must beaccomplishedwithin30years’(NSWPH-CP1,6).ThisneedishighlightedinotherNSWPHdocumentsaswell, stressing forexample theneed for specific renewables targetsbeyond2030, ‘toallow fortimely grid planning and spatial planning of offshore wind farms’ (NSWPH-CP6, 4). Interviewee 2formulates this issue as follows: ‘the plans of a transmission system operator have a longer timehorizon than theplansof a government. Thereare studies that lookathow to integrateoffshorewinddevelopments,butthereisamismatchheresincethegovernmentonlymakesplansuntil2030.Alongtermvisioncanfurtherfacilitateanintegratedrolloutofoffshorewind’(Int-2).

Datafromtheanalyseddocumentsand interviewssuggestthatthis lackofclarityon long-term goals relates to insufficient politicalwill and governments not taking their responsibilities informulating such goals. According to Int-3, ‘the business case of the Hub-and-Spoke concept isdeterminedbycountries’politicalwill:withoutpoliticalbacking,theTSOsinmyperceptionwillnotbe able to realise this, this is not going to happen’. The interviewee elaborates that ‘if thegovernmentdoesnotwanttheseenergyislands,Iamnotgoingtobuildthem.Sothebusinesscasehastobethere,whichisnotthecasebecausethegovernmentneedstomakelong-termpoliciesandtheyalsoneedtosaywhatisneededtoimplementthem.Thebusinesscaseispartlydeterminedbypolitics, but there is nobody that governs all aspects of it. Sowho takes the lead? In this kind ofcomplicated cases, this can only be the government’ (Int-3). Interviewee4 also touches upon theneedforgovernmentstotaketheirresponsibilityinleadingtherealisationofoffshorewind,inthiscase in relation to biodiversity: ‘currently there is no proactive government policy on where to

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situateoffshorewind farmsbecause there is not a very obvious demand for this. I think that thegovernmentdoesnotfeelthepressuretodosomething,asthereisnotaveryloudscreamfromtheadministrationtoact regardingthebiodiversitycrisis’ (Int-4).Thesequotessuggest thatat least intheNetherlands, the government currently does not take a leading role in formulating long-termgoals and stable policies. Another issue relates to the day-to-day reality of politics. In theNetherlands:‘withintheCouncilofMinisters,multipledossiersoccuratthesametime,soministerskeep track of who giveswhat onwhich dossier, and howmoney is divided. Especially now,withPAS1,wheremillionsaredistributed.Everybodyinthecoalitionwantstohaveapieceofthecake’(Int-1).

One factor that couldplaya role in this is theamountofdifferent interests thata (liberaldemocratic) government represents. Interviewee 3 notes for example that ‘In politics, there arealways contradicting wishes, that are all defended simultaneously, with a similar intensity. Thiscreates a difficult balance for a government’ (Int-3). Thus, the ability of government(s) to providelong-termclarityonrenewableenergygoalsandpolicyisdependentuponpoliticalprioritisationinapolitical landscapethatrepresentsmanydifferent interests.TheGreenpeacedocumentformulatesthisasfollows:‘Thetopologyofanoffshoregridwillresultfromthesedrivers(connectivitybetweencountriesandeconomicallyefficientconnectionofOWfarms)andwillthereforeheavilydependontherelativeimportanceassignedtoeachinpoliticalandeconomicdecisionmaking’(GP,20).

Somestakeholdersarerepresentedinpoliticsmorethanothers,withmoreopportunitiesfordefending their interests. In the Netherlands for example, there appears to be an connectionbetweenthefisheriessectorandsomeparties inthegovernment.DuringthedebatesprecedingaNorthSeaAgreement,thefisheriessectormakesanappealtothecoalitionagreement,whichstatesthat‘nomorefishingareaswillbeclosedthannecessaryfollowingfromEuropeanregulations.TheNetherlandswillargueinanEUcontextthatthelocationofwindturbinesatseatakesintoaccounttheinterestoffishingandwill,whereverpossible,allowmultifunctionaluse’(VIS,7).Interviewee1states,regardingtheNorthSeadebateandinternationalcooperationonspatialplanning,that‘theannoyingthingis,thatyoucantrytogettointernationaloptimisation,butatthesametimeyouseethatimportantfishinggroundsaresituatedinBritishwaters.Thismeansontheonehandthatyoutry to optimise for offshore wind internationally, and on the other hand you see that the Dutchgovernmentaimstoletthefisherskeeptheirgoodfishingareas.Andyouseethatatthatmoment,politically it isoftenmore importantthatourfishersareserved intheirpoliticalneeds’ (Int-1).Wefurther see this representation of the fisheries sector in a question asked during a governmentdebateregardingtheamendmentofa lawonoffshorewindenergy,where:. ‘Themembersof theVVD note that by expanding the licensing procedures in order to deal with the situation thatoffshorewindenergyrequires lessornosubsidy,morecompaniesfromthewindsectorwillapplyforapermitforoffshorewindfarms.Asaresult,theshareofoffshorewindfarmswillincrease,withtheresult that fishinggroundswillberestricted.Themembersof theVVDaskhowtoensurethattheeconomicpositionofthefishingsector isprotected.- Inviewofthis,theeconomicpositionof

1PASreferstoaprogrammeoftheDutchgovernmenttoprotect‘Natura2000’sitesfromnitrogensurpluses,which negatively affect biodiversity. In 2019, a ‘nitrogen crisis’ emerged in the Netherlands when theconstructionofmanybig infrastructuralprojectswas suspendedbecause itwas ruled that thePASwasnotabletoaccuratelyprotectthenatura2000sites.

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the fishing sector in relation to the development of offshore wind energy is currently beingprotected’(Nota2,2-3).

Wewill nowgodeeper into thepolitical drivers for international cooperationonoffshorewind on the North Sea. An important driver is the growing amount of political agreements thatincreaseattentionandpoliticalpressureforreducingCO2-emissionsandglobalwarming,suchastheParisAgreement,whichaims‘tolimitglobalwarmingwellbelow2degreesandpursuingeffortstolimit it to 1,5 degrees’ (EU-PD, 1). According to Int-1, the ‘Paris Agreement created a politicalmomentum for the energy transition’. Apart from the Paris Agreement, which aims to unitecountries globally, there is a growing amount of regional and national agreements, ‘driven bysociety’s desire to decarbonise’ (RB, iv). According to the NSWPH, ‘In each of these North Seacountries,aswellasintheUK,renewableenergyishighontheagenda.Theambitionsforoffshorewind energy are strong in all of the North Sea countries’ (NSWPH-W2). In Europe, particularlyoffshorewindisconsideredapromisingsourceofrenewableenergy,astheEUwantstobecome'aSiliconValleyofoffshorewindandbecometheplacefordevelopingnewandcost-efficientsolutions'(EU-JS,6).Anexampleofa‘crucialdevelopment’inthisregardwasaDutch-Germanclimatesummit,where ‘The two countries declared their ambition to work together more closely on sustainableenergy – offshore wind farms being one of themore promising potential sources’ (NSWPH-W2).Hence, in2016,‘CountriesintheNorthSeasregion(Ireland,theUnitedKingdom,France,Belgium,the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden) signed the North SeasEnergy Cooperation declaration. It aims to strengthen cooperation on energy and improveconditions for the development of offshore wind energy, ensuring a sustainable, secure andaffordableenergysupplyintheregion.Aspartofthis,itencouragestransmissionsystemoperatorsandoffshorewinddeveloperstobecomeearlymoversinhybridprojects.Suchinitiativesarehelpinghybridprojectstogainmomentum’(RB,v-vi).Morerecently,in2019,thecountriesparticipatinginthePoliticalDeclarationreleaseda ‘JointStatementonthedeliverablesof theenergycooperationbetween theNorth Seas Countries’,which claims that ‘Since then considerable results have beenachieved. Governments have directed significant resources to the implementation of the PoliticalDeclaration and are taking forward the actions as identified through a series of Support Groupmeetings with experts’ (EU-JS, 2). More specifically, ‘The cooperating countries are preparing acommonchapteronthecooperationofoffshorewindwithintheNorthSeasEnergyCooperationtobe included in theNational Energy andClimate Plans of theNorth Seas countries’ (EU-JS, 5). TheabovequotesshowthattheEUacknowledgesthepotentialofoffshorewindinitsenergytransitionandthe importanceof internationalcooperation therein.Thisconstitutesadriver for theoffshoreenergytransitionontheNorthSea.

ApartofthisEuropeancollaborationrefersspecificallytohybridprojects:‘Severalinitiativessuch as the North Seas Energy Cooperation and long-term strategies and plans have hinted atintegratedNorthSeainfrastructuredevelopment’(NSWPH-CP3,4).Thenotionthat‘theconstructionoftheKriegersFlakhybridproject intheBalticSea,theonehybridprojectnearingcommissioning,showsthatthesebarriersaresurmountable ifstakeholdersmakeaconcertedeffort’ (RB). Inotherwords, ‘Kriegers Flak provides an example for other parties, as it illustrates the feasibility andbenefits of hybrid projects in a European context where there is little experience with hybridprojects’(Int-2).

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As discussed before, not only regions but also countriesmake use of themomentum forclimate agreements. The Netherlands, as a ‘maritime nation’, wants to play a leading role indeveloping newperspectives through innovationon theNorth Sea (OFL, 9). According to theOFLdocument,thereisbroadsupportforwinningaconsiderableamountofenergyfromthesea(OFL,6,7).Twointervieweesstatethatitisinevitablethatoffshorewindwillgrow(Int-1;Int-3):‘evenifthebusinesscaseworsens,thegovernmentwillstillproceeditsroll-out’(Int-3).

Issue area: economic

Themost salienteconomicbarrieremerging fromtheanalysisofdocumentsand interviews is theexistenceofuncertainties,which impactsthebusinesscasefor (hybrid)offshorewindas itcreatesfinancialrisksforinvestors.Thepoliticalissueareapointedoutthatthereiscurrentlynoclearlong-termmarket perspective for offshorewind. According to theNSWPH, ‘Present business cases forhybrid projects (combining interconnection and wind farm transmission asset infrastructure) arealreadyunderpressureduetouncertainty,short-termfocusandlackofcoordination inoptimisinguseof the infrastructure formaximum social economic benefits’ (NSWPH,CP1-5).One contextualfactorthataddstotheuncertainty isBrexitand itspossibleeconomicconsequences. Ifwe lookattheRolandBergerreport,itmentions‘UncertaintyregardingtheBritishmarket’(RB,vii)asabarriertohybridoffshorewindprojects.

Another factor that creates uncertainty specifically for hybrid projects is the‘Disproportionateallocationofcostsandbenefitsacrossinvolvedstakeholders’(RB,vii).Thismeansthat investing inahybridprojectdoesnotnecessarilyequal thebenefits thata countrygets fromthis, which could influence countries’ willingness to participate in such projects. Interviewee 2furtherexplainsthisasfollows:‘ItcouldbethatGermanyforexamplecarries50%ofthecosts,eventhough they only get 30% of the benefits. It could also be that the Netherlands, Denmark andGermany carry the costs for grid infrastructure, but that other countries also significantly benefitfromthis,even though theydonotpay for thisdirectly’ (Int-2). Interviewee3adds, regarding theNSWPH, ‘Imagine that all countries surroundingus subsidise theproductionof renewable energy,youknow that thepricewill drop. If theHubwouldbe realised, the subsidisedenergyentersourcountryandIwillnotbuildanymorewindfarmshere’(Int-3).

Following theRolandBerger report,anotherpotentialbarrier is ‘The lackofanapplicable,transnational subsidy scheme for renewable energy sources’ (RB, ix). The Dutch government iscurrentlydiscussingtheamendmentofthelawonoffshorewind,wheretheconsiderationbetweenprovidingsubsidiesorpursuingzero-subsidytenders isan importantpointofdiscussion.Accordingto the government, ‘it is in the interest of both developers and society to make sure that thebusiness case for offshore wind is profitable, also for the long term and in principle withoutsubsidies’ (Nota1, 6). On the other side, interviewee 3 claims that ‘The world has changedcompletelysincewemovedintothezero-subsidyera’andlateradds:‘Theissuehereisthepriceofelectricity: if this drops below a certain point, who bears the costs? And if it rises, who gets themoney?’(Int-3).TheRolandBergerreportrecommendsusingpublicmoneytomitigaterisksforthedevelopment of hybrid projects. The report explains that: ‘Hybrid projects are riskier thanconventional offshore developments. They are largely untested, require collaboration betweenmultiple parties and integrate several projects into one. Developers therefore need incentives to

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switchfromaconventionaloffshoreprojecttoahybridoneduringitsearlystages;thebesttimeaschangesnaturallybecomemoredifficultandcostlyinlaterstages.Publicfinancialsupportiskeytothis, helping developers and investors to de-risk pilot hybrid projects and allowing for early-stagealignmentacrossassetsandcountries‘(RB,x).Thispointsourattentiontotheuseofpublicmoney.In theUnited KingdomandDenmark, the ‘contract for difference’ subsidy systemprevails. In thissystem,thegovernmentsubsidisesthedifferencewhenthepriceofelectricitydropsbelowacertainlevel,takingawayariskfortheinvestor.Asinterviewee3putsit‘thiscreatessecuritybecauseyouknow that you are going to get the money’ (Int-3). However, the government states that ‘withcontractfordifference,wewouldincreasethesupplyofelectricityattheexpenseofcitizens,whichwillfurtherlowerthemarketpricesandincreasetheproblem.Thesolutionisonthedemandside.We must make sure that there is sufficient demand and an accurate price for electricity fromoffshore wind. Price risks have always been for the market parties. This is nothing new for themarket’(Nota1,6-7).Inotherwords,thegovernmentishesitanttousepublicmoneyforsubsidisingrenewableenergy.Thelasttwotenderswerezero-subsidytendersand‘IdeducefromthatthatitisattractiveformultiplepartiestodevelopwindfarmsontheNorthseawithoutsubsidy’(Nota1,6).Analternativetothecontractfordifferencesubsidyschemeis‘SDE+’,whichisconsidered‘areverseauction,withthelowestcostsforsociety.Here,theenergyproducershowsitssubsidydemandinanofferandtheproducerthatbiddedthelowestgetsthepermit.IntheSDE+tendertheproduceritselfhastotakevaryingrevenuesintoaccount’(Nota1,11).Inshort,thereseemstobeaninconsistencybetween the industry that demands public funds and the government promoting zero-subsidytenders. Currently, the Dutch government is engaged in a debate on how to shape the situationwhereinoffshorewindneeds less,ornosubsidyatall.Theoutcomeofthisdebatealso influencesthespeedofdecision-makingregardingpermitting foroffshorewind.Th ‘legal - spatial’ issueareawillgodeeperintothis.

An important factor in this discussion is who determines the price of electricity. This ispertinentbecauserisingelectricitypricesfosterinvestmentinrenewableenergy.Conversely,lowerelectricitypricesmakeinvestmentlessattractive,especiallywhentheyfallbelowthepriceoffossilfuels. There seems to be an incongruence betweenwhat theDutch government states andwhatinterviewee3saysonthistopic.Inthecontextofthelawonoffshorewind,theDutchgovernmentstatesthat‘Thepricethatproducersreceivefortradingelectricityistoalargeextentdeterminedbysupplyanddemandonthemarket;thatmarketisaNorthern-Europeanmarketwhereanindividualproducercannot influencetheprice’ (Nota1,2). Interviewee3ontheotherhand,statesthat: ‘Weneedanexpectationthatthepriceofelectricitywillrise.Butwhodeterminesthepriceofelectricity?Thegovernmentdeniesthis,theysaythatthemarketdeterminesthis,andthemarketsaysthatthegovernment determines it to a large extent. The daily price is probably based upon supply anddemand,butwhodetermines thebigger trends?This createsahuge insecurity.This is the reasonwhythereisnoconstructionsecurityforwindfarms’(Int-3).

The price of electricity partly depends on the demand for it. Multiple documents andintervieweeshighlight the (future)demand forelectricityasa crucialdriver forenergy transitions.Decarbonisation of the industry and transport sector plays a large role in this. According to theNSWPH, ‘Decarbonising the power sector is generally considered to be a first step, as it is costeffective,has significant impactonCO2emission reductionand is consideredpossiblewellbefore

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2050’ and ‘In parallel, options need to be developed to decarbonise non-electric final energydemand e.g. for industry and mobility’ (NSWPH-CP1, 4). However, we consider ‘demand forelectricity’asabarrierheresincethedatasuggests that thecurrentdemandforelectricityshouldincrease in order to facilitate the energy transition. As interviewee 1 puts it ‘the demand has todevelop towards sustainable formsof energy.One canputmanywind turbines on a sea, but theenergyhastobebought.Weseethattheindustrystillneedstomakethistransition.Ifthisdoesn’thappen soon enough, the price of energy will decrease, which worsens the business case foroffshorewind’(Int-1).Interviewee2statesthat‘thegovernmentcanplayanimportantroleinthis’(Int-2).However, thereseemtobedifferentviewsontherolethatthegovernmentshouldplay instimulatingdemand.Accordingtointerviewee3:‘Oneofthebiggestobstaclesisthattheproductionofrenewableenergyissubsidised,whichlowersthemarketprice.Andsubsidisingeverythingontheproductionside,that isadeadsystem.Thedemandforrenewableenergyneedstobestimulated,thiscanhappenindifferentwayssuchasaCO2-tax.ifyoudonotpunishCO2,yougetaracetothebottomornobodywill invest incleanenergybutthenwewillnotreachatransition’(Int-3).Whileinterviewee2and3pleadforaproactivegovernment,theDutchgovernmentdoesnotactivelypushforstimulatingelectricitydemand.Eventhoughthegovernment‘endorsesthenecessityofadequatedemandforelectricityfromoffshorewindforthefurthergrowththereof’(Nota1,4),thefollowingquote shows that it decided not to (further) stimulate electricity demand directly because thepreciseincreaseofdemandisstillunsure:‘Theenergytransitionshouldleadtoanincreaseduseofelectricity in the built environment, the industry and inmobility. The demand for electricity fromrenewable sources will therefore increase, but in what tempo and with what amount is notpredictableinadvance.Thegovernmentthereforedoesnotpursuepolicytoincreasethedemandofelectricity. It does pursue policy to limit the CO2-emission of the built environment, industry andmobility,whichpossiblyleadstomoreuseofelectricityinthosesectors’(Nota2,11).

An economic driver for the business case of offshore wind is that, even though theNetherlands pursues zero-subsidy tenders, the European Commission supports hybrid projectsfinancially. The following quote supports this: ‘Ministers and the European Commission underlinetherelevanceandopportunitiesofnewfinancinginstrumentssuchasthefutureConnectingEuropeFacility (CEF) as well as the European Union renewable energy financing mechanism under theGovernanceRegulationwiththeaimofsupportingthedevelopmentoffirstjointoffshoreprojectsintheNorthSeas’(EU-JS,4).IntheirPoliticalDeclaration,theNorthSeascountriesmentionthattheywillalsocooperateon ‘Concepts forconcrete joint (pilot)projects,andexploringopportunities fortheopeningofsupportschemesand joint tenders,ensuringwin-winsituations forallparticipatingcountries’and ‘Thefurthermobilisationof investmentcapital for joint (pilot)projects, for instancethroughEUfundssuchasEFSIandCEF,and institutional investors’ (EU-PD,4).Another factorthatmightcontributetothedevelopmentofhybridprojectsspecificallyisthatrecently,theNSWPHwasappointed as a ‘European Project of Common Interest’, which means that ‘there will be moreattentionandfundingforhybridprojects’(Int-2).

Comparabletothetechnicalsection,theexistenceoftheNSWPHisalsoconsideredadriverwithin the economic issue area because it promotes an international coordinated approach tooffshore wind, which ‘can ensure a steady offshore wind deployment throughout the North Searegion, securingmarket stability to further reduce cost foroffshorewindand realise the required

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upscaling of the entire supply chain and introduce the necessary innovations’ (NSWPH-CP2, 5).Creatingmarketstabilitythrough internationalcooperationalsohelpsdeveloperstoanticipatethezero-subsidy era, which the following quote from the NSWPH shows: ‘The frameworks shouldprovide the appropriate incentives to offshore wind developers to enable offshore winddevelopments in a “post subsidy” environment. A stable market outlook on offshore winddevelopmentsisessentialforasignificantbuild-upofsupplychaincapacityintheindustry’(NSWPH-CP1,6).

Issue area: legal - spatial Inthisissuearea,thelegalbarriersapplyparticularlytotransnational(hybrid)offshorewindprojectsas part of theoffshore energy transitionon theNorth Sea.Oneway inwhich suchoffshorewindprojectsdiscernthemselvescomparedto‘conventional’offshorewindisthetransnationalgridthatinterconnectswindfarmsontheNorthSeatosurroundingcountries.Thisspecificfeatureproducesa legalbarrierbecause countrieshavedifferent rulesand regulations regardinggrids. TheNSWPHdescribesthisissueasfollows:‘WhilstEuropeisonalong-termtrajectorytowardsbecomingasingleenergymarket, coordinated jurisdictional planning of the energy system is not currently a reality’(NSWPH-CP5, 6). Even though the EU Joint Statement highlights the possible cost reductions thatmight come with aligning rules between countries, ‘Today the existing rules, regulation andstandardsdiffertoacertainextendamongtheNorthSeascountries’(EU-JS,5). Interviewee3alsotouchesupontheneedforgovernmentinvolvementininternationalcoordinationsincetheyaretheones who need to align regulations: ‘TSOs develop the Hub-and-Spoke concepts. But withoutsupportofunderlyinggovernments,thiswillneverhappenbecausetheydecideifthebusinesscaseisrightornot,sincetherearealotofrulesandregulationsthatneedtobealigned’(Int-3).Ontheotherhand,increasedinternationalcoordinationmightdelaythedevelopmentofoffshorewind,dueto the ‘Required permitting and commissioning timelines of theHub-and-Spoke project’ (NSWPH-CP3,4).

Aspatialbarrierfortheoffshoreenergytransitionis‘thelimitedavailableareaintheNorthSea’(NSWPH-CP1,3).TheavailablespaceontheNorthSeaisnotonlylimitedinsize,butalsolimitedbyotherseausessuchasoilandgasplatforms,protectedareas,fisheriesandshippingroutes.Bothnationallyandinternationally,countriesengageinmarinespatialplanningeffortstodividetheseaoverthesedifferentusers.FromtheperspectiveoftheNSWPH,itiscrucialthatMSPleavesenoughspace for large-scale offshore wind, preferably in adjoining areas on the sea. As the NSWPHdescribes, the currently available area for offshorewind on theNorth Sea is ‘relatively scattered,when considering water depths up to 55m and assuming full exclusion of current use areas(shipping,military,operationalandplannedwindfarmsupto2030,etc.).Thiswouldallowforupto50-90GW,dependingonwind farmcapacitydensity. Therefore, anexclusion strategyofoffshoreareaswill likelynotallow fora fulldeploymentofanyconceivable futureenergysystem includingoffshore wind capacity, green hydrogen facilities, hubs and grid connections (NSWPH-CP6, 4). Inother words, a spatial planning that prioritises other sea uses over offshore wind would pose asignificantbarriertothedevelopmentofhybridprojectsbecauseitwouldnotleavesufficientspaceforoffshorewindfarmsandinterconnectedgrids.

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Thus,itremainsyettobeseenwhattheexactspaceforoffshorewindontheNorthSeawillbe, since ‘Thecombinationof today’snationalmaritimespatialplanshavenotcaughtupwith theprojectedoffshorewindcapacityincrease,mainlybythelackofappointedoffshorewindfarmareasafter 2030’ (NSWPH-CP5, 4). In the Netherlands for example, there is currently no commonframeworkforspatialplanningontheNorthSea(OFL,11;VIS,7).TheNorthSeadebateshouldleadto a North Sea Agreement that arranges the spatial planning of the Dutch EEZ. According tointerviewee 3, ‘At thismoment, the legislation on howwe can build andwhere is not clear. TheNorth Sea Agreement is a potential danger because it may grant too much space for others incomparisontothespaceforoffshorewind’(Int-3).ThisconcernreflectsthefollowingbarrierfromtheRolandBergerreport:‘Uncertaintyaboutresponsibilityandrulestoprovideaccesstomaritimespaceforoffshorewindfarms(locationselection,sitepre-investigationandtenderexecution)’(RB.vii).

The consortium tries to influencemarine spatial planning processes, which interviewee 2explainsasfollows:‘OneoftheaimsoftheNSWPHconsortiumistoaccuratelyinformthebroaderdiscussionregardingtheenergytransitionandlarge-scaleoffshorewind.Whatareforexamplethesocio-economic costs when only areas x and y remain left for wind farms? Taking into accountnature protected areas and fragmented designation of offshore wind areas can hamper thepossibilities foreconomiesofscale. It is the intentionof theconsortiumtofacilitatewell-balanceddecision making of policymakers by bringing in expertise from the consortium partners, mostlyfocusedonthetechno-economicimpactsofdifferentpolicydecisions’(Int-2).Followingthisaim,theconsortium investigated four locations ‘to understand themain differences in environmental andtechno-economic impact. These locations do not represent a preference for a location for a firstproject–buthavebeenusedtoassessdifferentlocationsspecificimpactsonHub-and-Spokedesign’(NSWPH-CP3, 9). Besides this techno-economic perspective to spatial planning ofwind farms, theconsortium states in one of their concept papers that ‘Not all impacts of offshore area use arestraightforward tomonetise (especially long-term environmental effects) and all carry substantialuncertainty. These aspects need to be addressed in a spatial planning debate which clearly goesbeyond a techno-economic analysis.’ (NSWPH-CP6, 6). This introduces an issue relating to thepotential location of the Hub-and-Spoke concept. The following quotes illustrate the tradeoffbetween economic and environmental concerns in spatial planning for large-scale offshore windenergy. Interviewee4fromtheWWFhighlightsthistensionbystatingthat ‘‘Thereality isthattheindustryoftendevelopsfasterthanresearchandregulations.This iswhycurrently,windfarmsarebuilt on thebasis of:wheredowehave space left andwhere is it cheap’ (Int-4). Building furtheruponthis, interviewee4providesanexampleoftheNSWPH:‘Acoupleofyearsago,whenTenneTannouncedtheideatobuildwindfarmsontheDoggerbank2,whichwouldhappenontopofabadfisheries management plan, we raised our alarm. You cannot just put offshore wind farms inprotectedareas.Wehadhigh-leveltalksandthemediashowedinterest.Wespentalotoftimetopersuade the consortium that thiswasnotacceptable, that constructingandoperating suchwindfarmshasecologicaleffects.TherehasbeenanimpactassessmentonwhatwouldhappeniftheHubweretobeontheDoggerbank,andthiswasofaverybadlevel,soweagainhadtalksaboutthis.

2TheDoggerBankisaNatura2000siteintheNorthSeaofapproximately300kilometerslong.

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Ultimately, they realised that they would encounter resistance if they wouldmove onwith theirplans. We kept on repeating that this area should finally be protected. They went looking foralternativelocations,andcurrentlywearestilldiscussingthis’(Int-4).Fromtheconsortiumside,thisevent is shortly touched upon in a concept paper: ‘To address the feedback from NGOs theconsortiumhasintroducedanadditional“investigativelocation”toitstechno-economicanalysisofmain drivers for the design of a Hub-and-Spoke project’ (NSWPH-CP6, 6). All in all, the activeinvolvement of theWWF and other nature organisations is considered a barrier for the NSWPHbecausetheyprobablywillnotbeabletodeveloptheirHub-and-Spokeconceptintheareathatwassuitableaccordingtotheirownsocio-technicalanalysis.

Another issue relating to the spatial tension between nature, fisheries and energy on theNorth Sea concerns the different takes on the desirability ofmulti-use areas (seeOFL, 9; VIS, 23;Nota2,14&33).TheWWFandGreenpeacewantsingle-useforprotectedareas(natura2000),whichmeansthattheseareascannotbeusedforwindfarmsnorfishing(VIS,23).TheDutchgovernmentisnotof theopinion that (future)wind farmsshouldbeclosed forall formsof fisheries (Nota2,33);these areas can also be used for ‘nature development projects’ (Nota2, 14). Single-use is not anoptionforthefisheries,astheyclaimthiswouldentaila‘cumulativeconstraint’oftheirfishingarea(VIS, 23). According to the NSWPH however, ‘Given the current and planned use of space in theNorth Sea, a co-utilisation approach is necessary in the future to reach the required installedcapacity of offshore wind. A recent study concluded that if all the currently utilised areas areexcluded,only14,000km2or3%ofthesuitablespaceintheNorthSearemainsavailableforOWFswhichisonlysufficienttohost50-90GW,dependingonthepowerdensity.Inaddition,thisspaceishighlyfragmentedlimitingthepotentialtobenefitfromscaleeffects’(NSWPH-CP5,6).TheNSWPHpleads for ‘clarityonco-utilisation’,which ‘willhavedifferent impactsonthecostsof theoffshorewindroll-out’ (NSWPH-CP6,5).This issuecreatesanotheruncertaintyregardingspatialplanningoftheNorthSeaandtherewiththelarge-scalerolloutofoffshorewind.

In one of its concept papers, the NSWPH observes that ‘Currently several processes areongoing on a national level regarding spatial planning of offshorewind farms, such as the CrownEstates market engagement for Round 4 in the UK and the Flächenentwicklungsplan 2019 inGermany; but they are not integrated. It is essential in these processes to consider all aspects,includingsynergiesforconnection infrastructure,onan international level’ (NSWPH-CP6,5). InthetechnicalandeconomicissueareawenoticedthattheNSWPHpromotestheintegrationofseveral,currentlyseparated,offshore-windrelatedprocesses.Theabovequotesuggeststhatmarinespatialplanningisoneoftheseprocesses.Therefore,wecouldalsoconsidertheconsortiumasadriverinthisissuearea.Additionally,theNorthSeasEnergyCooperationprovidesaplatform,whichsupportsthegoalsoftheNSWPH.WithintheworkareaMaritimeSpatialPlanning,theNorthSeascountriesnamely agree to cooperate on ‘Coordinating the planning and development of offshorewind andgridprojectsbeyondnationalbordersincludingareamapping’(EU-PD,4).

A legaldriver is that in the2016EUPoliticalDeclaration,participatingcountriespledge towork towards harmonisation on different standards, technical rules and regulations regardingoffshore wind, for example of ‘health and safety requirements’; ‘certification standards forcomponents in offshore wind projects’; and ‘a common approach to rules applicable to offshoreturbines in territorial waters and exclusive zones’ (EU-PD, 4-5). This shows that the North Seas

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countries already acknowledged the legal barriers at the time. Three years later, in a JointStatement, the countries mention their commitment to ‘reducing unnecessary regulation andthereby costs for the industry (EU-JS, 5).Greenpeace alsomentions this need: ‘Authorisation andlicensingproceduresforoffshorewindfarmsacrossEuropeshouldbestreamlined,transparentandefficient’ (GP, 4). This EU-level attention for the need to harmonise rules might diminish theperceived legal barriers, according to the Roland Berger report: ‘At the same time, progress inharmonising EU energy policies and regulation has changed perceptions of the challengesdevelopersfaceinrealisingthem’(RB,vi).

Issue area: institutional

This issue area firstly presents institutional barriers and drivers that relate to the ways in whichoffshorewindcooperationbetweenvariousactorsondifferentlevelsiscurrentlyorganised,drawingupon all analysed documents and interviews. Subsequently, this part discusses the polycentricindicatorsas theyappear indocumentspublishedbytheNSWPHconsortium.These indicatorsareconnectedtoquoteswhereintheconsortiumtouchesupontheirproposedcooperation.

A barrier that relates to the broader context of the energy transition encompasses thevested interests of existing, non-renewable energy industries, which hampers the transition torenewableenergyinfavourofthestatusquo.ThisbarrierisapparentintheGreenpeacedocument,whichstates that ‘Despite thehealthygrowthof thewind industry, theEUpowersystemtoday isstilldominatedbylargecoalandnuclearplants.Theselarge-scalepowerplantsarenotdesignedtobeswitchedonandoffaccordingtheriseandfallofelectricitydemand;theyareinflexiblewhenitcomestoourneeds’(GP2,4).Furthermore,‘EuropeanelectricitycompaniessuchasEDF,E.ON,RWEor Suez are fiercely opposing the closure of their ageing nuclear power and coal plants and arepushing for newones to be created. These inflexible, inefficient plants are incompatiblewith thelarge-scale integrationof renewable energy sources. Everynew, large fossil fuel or nuclearpowerplantinstalledwilloperateforfortyyearsormore,lockingusintomassiveenvironmentalproblemsand blocking the transition to an efficient, flexible and renewable electricity system’ (GP, 4). Oneinterviewee adds to this by stating that ‘What hampers us? Just vested interests, it is not morecomplicatedthanthat:everythingthatrelatestofossil fuels.There isa lotofmoneyinoilandgasandthiswill justkeepongoing’ (Int-3).The interviewee lateradds that ‘Shell is investing ingreenenergy,butatthesametimeamemberininterestgroupsthatmaintainfossilfuels.Theearthwillkeep on spinning’ (Int-3). These quotes suggest that the world is still largely dominated by non-renewableenergyinterestsandthereisahighprobabilitythatthisstatusquowillremainasitisinthe(near)future.

The main barrier for the development of hybrid offshore wind projects that the NSWPHstresses in their concept papers is that currently, there is no institutionalised internationalcoordination for offshore wind in terms of space and grid interconnection as this is treated as anationalaffair.Thishastodowithpoliticalprioritisationbygovernmentsandtheircurrentemphasisonnationalgoalsandpolicies.Differencesingovernanceculturescouldalsonegativelyinfluencetheeaseofinternationalcooperation.

The following quote provides an example of how this barrier is formulated by theconsortium:‘Offshorewindprojectsareplannedanddevelopedonanationallevelwithoutintensive

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international coordination in terms of spatial planning’ (NSWPH-CP1, 4). According to Int-2: ‘thecurrentinstitutionalframeworkdoesnotcaterforhybridprojects,sinceinstitutionsdonotmanagethe coordination between national governments and different international Transmission SystemOperators(TSOs).Thereisinternationalcooperation,butonlyondifferentpartsofoneortheotherprocess, such as spatial planning or the cooperation on interconnection between TSOs in an EUcontext. However, it is not the case that plans are jointly made and implemented’. Possibleconsequencesofthisseparationbecomeclearinthefollowingquotes:‘thecurrentnationalorientedapproach to offshore wind development and system integration, and its separation frominterconnection development is expensive and insufficient to meet the long-term climate goals’(NSWPH-CP4,4).Generally, ‘thishindersthe implementationoftransnationalprojects,suchasthehybridprojectsconsideredinthisstudy’(RB,x).One reason for this ‘failure of developers to alignplanningacrossassetsandcountries’ (RB, vii) is that ‘although theEuropeanUnion isplanninganinternalenergymarket,mostcountriesstillplacemoreemphasisontheirownenergypoliciesandrules’(RB,x).Nootherdocumentstouchuponwhyexactlythisisthecase,onlytwointervieweesdo.Interviewee2 states that ‘energypolicyhasahighpolitical sensitivity: countriesandgovernmentswant to maintain their national autonomy. Different countries have different national contexts.Recently, theNetherlandsandGermanypleaded to cooperatemorecloselyon theNorthSeaandoffshore wind; this pledge only does not concretise what such cooperation entails. Denmark forexample has formulated different targets for its share of renewables/offshore wind than theNetherlands’ (Int-2). This prioritisation of national policies over international cooperation alsobecomesclearinthefollowingquote:‘thereisalwaysthepoliticalrealityofacountrythatwantstokeep itsown reality andwants tomake itsownpolicy. So you can coordinate internationally,butnationalpolitics,hereaswellasinothercountries,remainsdominant.Youalsoencounterdifferentgovernancecultures.TheNetherlandsisverymuchfocusedoncooperationwithstakeholders,whiletheGermansfirstmakeaplanandthenshowittootheractors’(Int-1).Theintervieweelateraddsthat‘notallcountriesmaketheirplanssimultaneously,sotherearealwaysdifferencesinthephasethat theyare in.Sweden isnowtakingthe initiativetosee ifwecanget tostructuralcooperationandcommonpolicy formulationontheNorthSea level.This isoftendifficultbecauseyouhavetogiveandtakesomethinginternationallyandthisisnotaseasyforcertaincountries’(Int-1).

Ifwegodeeperintothetopicofgovernancecultures,weobservesomenational-levelissuesthat might influence international cooperation. One of them relates to internal cohesion withingovernments. In the Netherlands, ‘even though the government speaks with one voice’, ‘it hasbecomeveryclearthatthedifferentpolicydomainsandgovernmentdepartmentsarenotaligned’,and differences exist between but also sometimeswithin departments (OFL, 10-11). According tointerviewee1however, ‘theNetherlands isquiteunique in itsdegreeof internalalignment, this isdefinitelynotthecaseinothercountries:inGermany,firsttheshippingroutesaredrawnandonlythen the spatialplanning starts. Soyouencounter some internalobstructionsaswell’ (Int-1). Thiscould lead to the conclusion that internal alignment within governments happens to differentextents, dependent upon the respective country. Since internal coordination takes time, suchdifferences in governance cultures can become apparent when countries aim to workinternationally.

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Another factor thatmayrelate to the lowdegreeof internationalcoordination is thenon-bindingnatureof thecurrentPoliticalDeclarationbetweenNorthSeascountries.Eventhoughtheamount of climate-related agreements and therewith international cooperation is growing (the‘drivers’sectionbelowwillfurthertouchuponthis),thenatureofthePoliticalDeclarationofNorthSeascountriesreflects ‘apolitical intentalone’ (EU-PD,3).Thismeansthat there isnosanctioningmechanism to induce compliance, so cooperation happens on a voluntary basis which couldinfluencetheintensityoftheircooperation.Thefollowingdisclaimerfromthe2019JointStatementshows the non-legally binding character of the cooperation: ‘This document does not create anyrightsorobligationsundernationalor international lawanddoesnot intend to replaceormodifyanyexisting legalobligations,nor is itmeanttoprejudgeinanywayanoutcomeofdiscussionsonthegovernancesystemfortheEnergyUnion’(EU-JS,6).Oneintervieweereflectsonthisnon-bindingnaturebystatingthat‘weneedaleapforward:itisnotthecasethatweplantogether.YouseethatTenneTsprojectemergesinthiscontext,anditisnotthecasethatcountriesimmediatelysay‘let’sdoit’.Thishastodowith‘is itobligatory’:coordinatingspatialplanningisdesirable,but it isnotabindingEuropeanobligationtoworktogether’(Int-1).

A lackof knowledgeon theprecise impactof large-scaleoffshorewindgenerationon theNorth sea constitutes another institutional barrier because it influences the way in whichstakeholders cooperate regarding the transition to large-scale offshore wind. According to theNSWPH, ‘In general, there still are many environmental data gaps and potential environmentalimpacts and opportunities should be jointly investigated further with relevant stakeholders’(NSWPH-CP3,9).Multipledocumentshighlightthatthepreciseeffectsof large-scaleoffshorewinddevelopment on themarine environment, birds andbats are existent, yet unclear: ‘Installationoflargewindfarmsandhubswillmostlikelyhaveapermanentimpactonthelocalhabitat,whichwillhaveaknock-oneffectonthespeciesabundanceandbiodiversity’(NSWPH-CP3,9,seealsoOFL,15;VIS,10).Therefore, there isaneed to fillup lacunas incurrentknowledgewithscientific research(OFL, 15; VIS, 30). This influences stakeholder cooperation because various stakeholders havevarious, often conflicting, takes on existing information. The role that information plays instakeholder cooperation on the North Sea became apparent in the analysed interviews, whichmainlymentionmarinespatialplanningasanissueareawhereinformationaltensionsarise.Wewillpresentsomeexamplesbelow.

Usually,environmentalimpactassessmentsareconsideredasawaytoincreaseknowledgeonenvironmentalconsequencesofoffshorewind.IntheNorthSeascountries’JointStatement,theEuropeanCommissionrecognises‘thepossibleecological limitsof largescalewinddevelopmentatseaandacknowledgethenecessityofincreasingknowledgeinthefieldofmaritimespatialplanning,environmental research and cumulative impact assessment of wind farms’ (EU-JS, 3). It alsoreaffirms‘tocontinuetoworktowardsacommonenvironmentalimpactassessmentmethodology,which requires an integratedapproachand close cooperationbetween responsible authorities forenergy,maritime spatialplanningandenvironment’ (EU-JS,3).Relating to this ‘cumulative impactassessment of wind farms’, interviewee 4 states that to date, there has not been an adequatecumulativeimpactstudy.‘It is importanttomeasurecumulativeimpact,becauseifeverybodyonlymeasures its own use in an isolated manner without looking at the effects in combination withexisting farmsandpreferablyalsowith fisheries, shipping,dredging, cablesandpipes, itmay look

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likeonewindfarmmightnothavesuchabigeffectontheecosystem.Therearecumulativeimpacts,butsofarnoonehaslookedatthesystemasawhole’(Int-4).Interviewee4furthermorementionsthat the WWF will keep on challenging the people working at the NSWPH to take a broaderperspective,butthe intervieweedoesnotknowyet if thiswillbethecase; ‘Thiswillbecomeclearfrom their research questions, how they set up their impact assessments and what potentiallocations they lookat’ (Int-4).Thisstancesuggests that thestakeholders that theNSWPHengageswithremaincriticalonthewaysinwhichtheconsortiumacquiresitsinformation.

Itbecomesclearfromthedatathatinterpretationsofexistingknowledgeonenvironmentalconsequences differ. Interviewee 3 states that offshore wind ‘farms are healthy for the marineenvironment since fishers are not allowed too close to the turbines’ (Int-3). Interviewee4 on theotherhand,states: ‘Donotsellwindfarmsasnewnatureareas,becausetheyjustarenot’(Int-4).Theintervieweeelaboratesthat ‘whatyoucando, istomakesurethatforthetimethatyouhavewindfarms,youtrytodothiswithaslittleharmtonatureaspossible.Butdonotpretendthatwindfarmsareamazingnaturereserves,becausetheyarenotmeantanddesignedtobethat.Behonestaboutthetrueimpactithas,andlookathowtocompensatethis,especiallywithlarge-scalenatureprotection’(Int-4).

In the Netherlands, science also plays a role in the discussions regarding the North Seaagreement (OFL, 15). The following quotes show the delays that might occur in stakeholdercooperationdueto informationaldisputes.ThedebateprecedingaNorthSeaAgreementhappensonthebasisofJointFactFinding(JFF),withtheintentiontoestablishsharedfactsandworkfurtherfromthere(OFL).AccordingtoInt-1,‘JFFgoeswellaslongasitdoesnottouchuponanactor’sowninterest; from thatpoint, it is impossible to lookat the factswithoutattachingvalue to it’ (Int-1).And:‘Whenitcomestobalancinginterestsandwhenitisgoingtocostmoney,partiesbecomemoreand more critical on the information and increasingly try to refute it: established knowledge isquestioned over and over by certain parties. There is also distrust between parties’ (Int-1). Theintervieweeadds:‘WhatwouldnotsurprisemeisthatwhenwefinishtheNorthSeaAgreementandthenextstepistoadoptthistocertainwindenergyareasforreservingspaceandsandextraction,that this discussion will come back again, that the joint facts that we have gathered will againbecome subject to discussions’ (Int-1). An example of a point of discussion thatmight re-emergerelatestofishingareas.Thefisheriesdocumentstatesthat‘thecurrentmethodofusingvaluemapsthatdeterminethemostvaluablefishingareasontheNorthSea istooabstracttotrulyassessthethoseareas.Suchmapsshouldnotillustratethefinancialimpactofwindfarmsonfisheriesbecausefishcanmovebetweenareasovertime,sothisecosystemcannotbecapturedinseveralrestrictedareas’(VIS,23).Referringtothepreferencesofthefisheriessector, Int-1statesthat ‘theannoyingthingis,ifyoucannotgroundsomethingontheNorthSeascientifically,youwillrunintothefisheriessectorwhowillusethistoblocknatureprotection,andtheyalwayshaveamajorityforthis intheparliament’(Int-1).ThisquotealsoremindsofthelikelyinterwovennessbetweenthefisheriessectorandtheDutchgovernmentthatthepoliticalissueareapointedout.

Involvingavarietyofactorsintheprocessconcerningoffshorewindseemstobeadriverforboth governments and stakeholders. The EU Political Declaration highlights for example ‘Theimportance of maintaining an open dialogue with all stakeholders including system operators,regulatory authorities, business, civil society, institutional investors, governments and politicians,

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when drawing up and implementing awork programme and further shaping North Seas regionalcooperation’ (EU-PD, 2). In this quote, we also see that these stakeholders will be involved increating and implementing a work programme. However, in the Joint Statement released threeyears after this Declaration, the industry is stressed as an important stakeholder and theinvolvementofstakeholdersseemstobelimitedto‘preparinganewworkprogramme’: ‘Ministersand theEuropeanCommission recognize the importanceofmaintaininganopendialoguewithallstakeholders,especiallytheindustry,whenpreparinganewworkprogrammeandacknowledgetheroleoftheindustryinexploringthepotentialoftheNorthSeasandthewindowofopportunitiesthisoffers for the industry; therefore welcomes the recommendations delivered by the industry as avaluable input for future keyheadlines for thenext phaseof theNorth Seas EnergyCooperation’(EU-JS,6).

In the Netherlands, stakeholder involvement is deemed crucial for reaching a North SeaAgreement. During the North Sea debate, where TenneT (a consortium member) is included,‘stakeholders are involved in the development of an agenda in many ways. Sometimes moreintensively, for example regarding spatial use, the knowledge agenda or nature. Sometimesmoreinformalandopen-endedin‘catchupsessions’withabroadergroup’(OFL,9).Thisquotesuggeststhattherearemultiplewaystoinvolvestakeholders.

This institutionalised cooperation between government and stakeholders did not alwayslook the way it does today: the decision-making process changed from a ‘consultative to aparticipative’process,fromrespondingtoofficialgovernmentconceptstotogethercreatingaNorthSea Agreement’ (OFL, 11). The traditional consultative process was perceived as a ‘black box’ bystakeholdersbecausetheydidnotgetinsightintowhatexactlyhappenedwiththeirinput.Besides,this consultation often took place per sector or per issue, instead of looking at the North Seaintegrally.Forthesereasons,‘accordingtostakeholdersessentialchoiceswerenotmade.Andwhentheyweremade,thestakeholdersdidnotfeelasiftheywereapartinthis.ThisdidnotsurprisetheOFL:theprocessofconsultationischaracterisedbydefinitionastheconsultationthattheownerofthe process haswith interest groups,withwhoma serious conversation is held, butwho are notmembersofthedecision-making.Itis,putsimply,notamodelthatleadstoacommondeliberation’(OFL,9).

Currently,theNorthSeadebateismovingtowardsamoreparticipativeprocess,wheredueto the setting stakeholders and the government sit at the table as equal partners, which createsmutual trust and goodwill. This is supported by the following quotes: ‘The fact that we had anindependentandheavy-weightchairman,whichmadethatweweresittingatthetablewiththem(the stakeholders), created a situation of fair hearing, so people felt as if they weremore equalpartners.Sowedidgetcloser,inthatsense.Alsothefactthatweacteduponthestakeholders’wishto get to a North Sea Agreement created goodwill’ (Int-1). The following quote underlines howstakeholderparticipationcan leadtomoretrust: ‘In theopinionof theOFL,aconscious transitionfrom a consultative to participative decision-making helps to do something against the growingdistrust that stakeholders have against the government. This will come naturally. But truecollaborationcreatesanewbasisfortrust’(OFL,11).Inthissense,moreandmeaningfulstakeholderparticipation in the Netherlands seemed to increase the likelihood of stakeholder support fordecisionsregardingtheNorthSea.

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In order to overcome the above-discussed informational challenges between stakeholdersduringtheNorthSeadebate,thegovernmentsometimesletspartiescomeupwithreportstogether(Int-1).Anotherwayistointroduceascientificcommittee,whichcanvalidatetheinformationthatisused (Int-1).Adriver thatmitigates theabsenceof cumulativeenvironmental impactassessmentsrelates to the North Seas Energy Cooperation, which provides a platform for cooperation on‘Developingacommonenvironmentalassessmentframework’(EU-PD,4).

Polycentric indicators

TheNSWPHconsortiumproposesanalternativeapproachtothecurrentEuropeanenergysystem,promoting international multi-stakeholder cooperation and integration of multiple processesincludinggrid interconnectionandmarinespatialplanning.Thissectiondrawsupondata fromtheNSWPHtoenlightenthepolycentricgovernanceconstructthattheconsortiumproposestoachievethisalternativeapproach. It is structuredby thepolycentric indicatorsdescribed in theconceptualchapter.Most of the analysed data revolves around the ways in which the consortiumwants toorganisecooperationforoffshorewindenergyontheNorthSea.Inthecasesthatitwasavailable,dataon the internal organisationbetween consortiumpartners is included aswell.Wenoteherethat,intheanalyseddocuments,theconsortiumdoesnottouchuponallpolycentricindicatorsandonly concisely on some others. For this reason, for some indicators it remains unclear how theconsortium conceives them. The evaluation chapter goes deeper into what this means for theresearchoutcomes. With the consortiums aim to increase international cooperation betweencountries that traditionally approach the energy system individually, it inherently pleads for‘governanceonmultiplescales’andmoreinteractionbetweenthesescales.Theinteractionthattheconsortium promotes takes place mainly between the national and the European scale, morespecificallybetweenthecountriesthatsurroundtheNorthSea.Thetwoquotesbelowareexamplesthat show the efforts of the consortium to increase governance on multiple scales. “With ourprogramme,we’renotonlyaimingtofacilitateamajorenergytransition–we’realsobreakingthenationalperspective.We’reworkingonalargescale,fromalong-termpointofview’(NSWPH-W3);‘TheconsortiumandindustryinvitetheDutch,DanishandGermangovernmentstoconsidersettingup a cross-governmental consultation to find solutions for the issues highlighted in this report inordertoenabletheoffshorewindpotentialoftheNorthSeatocontributetoachievetheambitionsof the Paris Agreement.We are also keen to open up the discussion for participation fromotherNorthSeacountriessuchastheUnitedKingdomandNorway’(NSWPH-CP5,7).

The next polycentric indicator is ‘diversity of actors’, which includes the diversity of theconsortium members as well as the variety of actors with whom the consortium liaises. Theconsortium consists of four Transmission System Operators and the Port of Rotterdam, whichsuggests that thediversityofactors inside theconsortium isquite low.As theconsortiumputs it:‘Theconsortiummembersareallplayersinlargeenergyinfrastructureandarecommittedtorealiselong term climate goals by developing the energy infrastructure of tomorrow’ (NSWPH-CP2, 7).Concerningtheoutsideactorswithwhomtheconsortiumworks,theconsortiumbringsforwarditscommitment to increase cooperation between ‘all North Sea stakeholders’, which suggests a bigvariety of actors. See for example the following quote : ‘Therefore, a concerted action andcooperation across all North Sea stakeholders is required now to enable this internationallycoordinated roll-out and integration of offshore wind, which is pivotal in reaching the Paris

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Agreement’(NSWPH-CP1,6).Inotherquoteshowever,theconsortiumseemstostressspecifictypesof actors. The following quote particularly mentions ‘industry, NGOs and TSOs’: ‘It also requiresproperalignmentwithnationalandEuropeangridplanningprocesses.Suchdecisionsrequirevisionanddirectionfrompolicymakerswhichtakesintoaccountfeedbackfromindustry,NGOsandTSOsto ensure realisation at lowest cost and highest value for societywhileminimising environmentalimpact’(NSWPH-CP3,11).Thefollowingtwoquotesalsoshowthattheremightbeafocusonactorsfromtheindustryinsteadof‘allNorthSeastakeholders’:‘Inearly2019,theconsortiumhasengagedwith more than 10 leading and influential OWF3developers to get feedback and input on asuccessfulbusinessmodel fora first-of-a-kindproject,combininggridconnectionofoffshorewindpowerwithinterconnectors.Duringthediscussionswithindustry,anumberofprinciplesregardingaviablebusinessmodel of theHub-and-Spoke conceptwere commonly agreedupon’ (NSWPH-CP5,5); ‘After several critical studies and animated conversations with specialists, developers andstakeholders,theanswerwasclear.Yes,anetworkofhubsthatconnectfaroffshorewindfarmstoNorthSeaCountries’energymarketsispossible’(NSWPH-W2).

Another polycentric indicator that emerged from the conceptual chapter is ‘informationsharing’.Accordingtointerviewee2,theactorsthatmakeuptheconsortiumcollaborateina‘stableandopen’manner.They‘shareinformationregardingtheproject’undertheconditionthat‘sensitiveinformationstaysbetweentheconsortiumpartners’(Int-2).Thissuggeststhatinanycaseinsidetheconsortium, information is shared. Ifwe look at how the consortiumperceives the importanceofinformationsharinginitscontactwithoutsideactors,weseethatoneofthegoalsoftheconsortiumisto‘adequatelyinformthebroaderdiscussion,regardingtheenergytransitionandspecificallythelarge-scale offshore wind development’ (Int-2). Even though the consortium aims to intensifyengagementwithallNorthSeastakeholders, italsoaimsto ‘facilitatedeliberativedecision-makingfrompolicymakersbybringing intheexpertiseof thedifferentconsortiumpartners’ (Int-2).Whatremainsunclearhereisifitisonlytheexpertiseoftheconsortiumthatissharedwithpolicymakers,or if theexpertise fromallNorth Sea stakeholders is included in theNSWPH’s efforts to facilitatepolitical decision-making. Another question that remains here is whether actors also shareinformationwiththeconsortium,orifitisprimarilytheconsortiumthatprovidesit.

The(perceived)degreeoftransparencyandtrustworthinessofinformationthatissharedina polycentric governance construct is a component of ‘information sharing’. The analyseddocuments and interviewdonot particularly touchupon the transparency and trustworthiness ofthe shared information.Conversely, theother componentof information sharing is ‘dataon costsandbenefits’andappearsinfouroutofsixNSWPHconceptpapers.Baseduponthesedocuments,itis clear that the consortium specifically brings a ‘techno-economic perspective’ to the discussionswith policymakers (NSWPH-CP1, 7; NSWPH-CP2, 7; NSWPH-CP3, 9, NSWPH-CP6, 7). This techno-economic view stresses the feasibility of different technical approaches to the Hub-and-Spokeconcept and the costs and benefits that theywould bring. For example, the consortiumwants to‘quantifythecostsandbenefitsassociatedwithfurthersectorcouplingbetweentheelectricityandthe gas (Hydrogen) grid in relation to the integration of large scale North Sea offshore wind’(NSWPH-CP4,8).

3OWFstandsfor‘OffshoreWindFarm’

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Other polycentric indicators include mechanisms for monitoring; feedback; inducingcompliance; conflict resolution; sanctioning and encouraging adaptivity. None of the NSWPHdocuments clearly reveals a commitment to monitoring, conflict resolution or sanctioning. Somedocuments however, touch upon the need for feedback from stakeholders. The perceivedpreference for input from industry stakeholders versus stakeholders from non-governmentalorganisations that is highlighted above under ‘diversity of actors’, seems to be apparent in theconsortiums feedbackmechanisms aswell.Multiple quotes, including the following, highlight theinput from industry actors that the consortiumdeems important: ‘Decisions are required on howrevenuemodelsforgeneratorsandtransmissioninfrastructureoperatorsshouldbestructured.Firstdiscussions with the offshore wind farm (OWF) industry have started on which models couldpotentially work best; this however requires careful consideration and further interaction withindustry’ (NSWPH-CP5, 5). And: ‘The businessmodel of the Hub-and-Spoke projects will strive tosupportthebusinesscaseforOWFdevelopersthroughminimisedcosts,accesstoaninterconnectedenergymarketandenhancedlongtermrevenuestability.Toachievethisambition,earlyinputfromOWFdevelopershasbeenakeypriority for theconsortiumas it isessential tocreateasuccessfulbusinessmodelandadvancethefirstHub-and-Spokeproject’(NSWPH-CP5,5).

Drawing upon the analysed data, we might conclude that feedback from non-industrystakeholdersisdesirableinotheraspectsapartfromthetechno-economic:‘Nexttoenvironmentalandtechno-economicstudies,theconsortiumhasspecificallyengagedwithNGOsoverthepastyeartoconsidertheir inputontheHuband-Spokeconcept. Inadditiontospecificworkshops, feedbackwas gathered throughdirect interaction. To address the feedback fromNGOs the consortiumhasintroducedanadditional“investigativelocation”toitstechno-economicanalysisofmaindriversforthedesignofaHub-and-Spokeproject’ (NSWPH-CP6,6).What theseaspectsexactlyaredoesnotbecomeclear,but thisquote suggests that the input fromNGOswasused for the issuewhere tolocatetheHub-and-Spokeconcept.ThefollowingquotesuggeststhatinputfromNGOsisalsousedfor the topic of grid planning: ‘It also requires proper alignmentwith national and European gridplanningprocesses.Suchdecisionsrequirevisionanddirectionfrompolicymakerswhichtakesintoaccount feedback from industry, NGOs and TSOs to ensure realisation at lowest cost and highestvalueforsocietywhileminimisingenvironmentalimpact’(NSWPH-CP3,11).

According to the polycentric governance literature, ideally there is a mechanism for‘inducing compliance’ in polycentric governance constructs. Between the consortium partners,‘Thereareconditionsunderwhichthecooperationtakesplace,alsowithalegalcomponent.Thereare arrangements regarding the content and the way in which strategic decisions are made’,accordingto interviewee2.The legalcomponentmightcreateconformity inthe interactionoftheconsortium.Concerningthecomplianceofoutsidepartners,theconsortiummentionsthat‘Forthelong term, it (the consortium) aims to ensure that proper and robust incentives across allstakeholdersthroughouttheroll-outandenergytransitionareinplace’(NSWPH-CP2,7).Thisquotedoes not completely clarifywhat such incentivesmay look like. The following quotemight give aclarification, however this quote stresses only the potential compliance from offshore wind farmdevelopers vis-à-vis the Hub: ‘Agreed principle from discussion with OWF developers: Roles andresponsibilities have to be defined early and clearly, for example who is operating the gridinfrastructure,whoisresponsibleforbalancingthepower,etc.’(NSWPH-CP5,5).

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Polycentric governance arrangements have the benefit of fostering experimentation. Thissuggests that in theory, if the consortium effectively organizes cooperation, it could promoteexperimentation with different energy system approaches. The conceptual chapter showed thatbeing able to adapt andpreferably even ‘encourage adaptivity’ plays an important role here. TheNSWPH touches upon this in the following quotes: ‘Facilitating a step-by-step roll-out of projectsthrough itsmodulardesign to findanoptimalbalancebetween scaleanddevelopment timesandinvestmentphasing. Each specificproject canadapt to its specific physical environment’ (NSWPH-CP3, 4). And: ‘The modular Hub-and-Spoke concept provides flexibility to adapt each project tolocationspecificneeds.Scaleanddesigncanbeadaptedtolocationspecificneeds–widerangeofdesignoptionsavailableacross scale, foundation type,andconfiguration,optimisation to leveragesynergies with end-use sectors’ (NSWPH-CP4, 5). Regarding the foundation type, interviewee 2statesthat‘theNSWPHconsortiumisnotonlyfocusedoncreatinganisland,alsootherfoundationtypes arepossible. This iswhy the term interconnected ‘hub’was chosen; this can encompass alltypes’ (Int-2).Wemight derive from these quotes that ‘adaptivity’ in the context of the NSWPHrelatesprimarilytothephysicalenvironmentoftheHub-and-Spokeconceptanditsabilitytoadapttolocation-specificneeds.

However, twomore recentquotes fromtheNSWPHnewsletter suggest that ‘adaptivity’ isalso (to a certain extent) understood in a broader sense, including sensitivity for country-specificpoliticalcontexts: ‘TheupcomingstagesoftheNSWPHProgrammerequireconstant flexibility:notjustby respondingquickly to recentpoliticaldevelopmentsand the latest insights in the field,butalsobycloselyreviewingtherolesofallthepartnersinvolved.Duringthelatterprocess,thePortofRotterdam recently suggested to take up a new role in the Programme. By getting a betterperspectiveontheentireprocess,italsobecameclearthatthePortofRotterdamwouldn’tbeabletoplaytheroleithadinitiallyinmind–atleastnotinthenearfuture’(NSWPH-W1).And:‘Nowthatthe green light has been given, it’s time for the next stage: from project to programme. ‘Aprogrammethisambitiousandwidespread requires somuchpreparation that ithas tobedividedintosmallersteps’,Michielexplains.‘Insteadoftryingtodevelopablueprintfortheyearstocome,wetakeaprogrammeapproachtofacilitatetheenergytransition,focusingoncrucialquestionslike:what can we do to make the energy transition as smooth as possible?Which challenges do weforesee in thenear future?Whatare thedemands for the individualhubs?Andhowcanwestartgettingeverything inplacetobeabletorealisethefirsthub intheearly2030s?’Theprogramme-orientedviewofferstheconsortiumthepossibilitytobemoreflexible:‘Insteadofworkingwithfixedlong-termgoals,wecanadjustourplansaccordingtothedifferentstagesoftheprogrammeandthelatestdevelopmentsinthecountriesinvolved’(NSWPH-W2).

Inconclusion,thefollowingpolycentricelementsarenotclearlyapparentintheanalysisofNSWPHdata:transparencyandtrustworthinessofinformation;mechanismsformonitoring,conflictresolutionandsanctioning.Accordingtotheanalysisofpolycentricindicators,theprimaryfocusoftheNSWPHseems tobeonprovidingdataon the costs andbenefitsofhybridprojects topolicy-makers.TheHubmentionstoincludeallstakeholders,yetsomequotessuggestthattheconsortiumreceivesmorefeedbackfromindustryactorsthanfromNGOs.

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Chapter6:Evaluation

Empirical evaluation

AlthoughthecurrentEuropeanrenewableenergysystemispolycentric,withthevariousissueareasreflectingvariouscentresofdecision-making,itsdegreeofpolycentricgovernanceislimitedduetothe littleand fragmentedcooperationbetweengovernmentsandstakeholdersonan internationalscale. As a result, thismay hamper the large-scale rollout of offshorewind and the possibility ofNorth Sea countries to reach the EU renewable energy targets. This thesis considers the hybridoffshore wind approach of the NSWPH consortium as a proposed polycentric governancearrangement thataddresses thisproblem.Thischapter firstshortlydescribescase-specificbarriersand drivers per issue area and subsequently evaluates the consortiums proposed governancearrangement using polycentric indicators. It argues that the governance arrangement effectivelyaddressesthetechnicalandlegalissuearea,moderatelyaddressesthepoliticalandeconomicissueareaandinsufficientlyaddressestheinstitutionalissuearea.

Barriers and driversLetus firstdiscuss themainbarriersanddriversper issuearea thatemerged fromthequalitativecontent analysis. Table 5 synthesises the outcomes of the analysis. The upper row of the tableinvolves the barriers and drivers that occur at the international level, between the North Seascountries.The lowerrowentails thebarriersanddriversastheyappear intheNetherlands,whichserveasanillustrationforhowsomebarriersanddriversmayplayoutonthenationallevel.

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Technical Political Economic Legal-spatial Institutional

International/EU

Barriers:-Intermittencyofrenewableenergysources-IntegratingREinexistinggridsDriver:-Hybridapproachtooffshorewind,promotedbyNSWPH

Barrier:-lackofclarityonlong-termrenewableenergygoalsDriver:-Climateagreements;NorthSeasEnergycooperation

Barriers:-Uncertaintiesduetolackofclearmarketperspective;potentiallyunequaldivisionofcostsandbenefits-NeedforincreasedelectricitydemandDrivers:-TheNSWPHpromotesmarketstability-FinancialEUsupportforjointoffshoreprojects

Barriers:-Gridinterconnectionbetweencountrieswithdifferentrulesandregulations-SizeofNorthSeawithmultipleseauses;unclarityonspaceforoffshorewindandpossibilityformulti-useareas-OppositionfromstakeholdersagainstpotentialHublocationDrivers:-EUPoliticalDeclarationsupportsharmonisationofstandards-TheNSWPHpromotesintegratedspatialplanning-NorthSeasEnergyCooperation

Barriers:-Vestedinterests-Nosignificantinternationalcoordinationonoffshorewind,duetopoliticalprioritisationofnationalpolicies,differentgovernanceculturesandnobindingmechanismforcooperation-Energysystemoperatesinsilos-LackofknowledgeonenvironmentalimpactDriver:-NorthSeasEnergyCooperation:developingcommonenvironmentalassessmentframework

National/Netherlands

Barriers:-Governmentdoesnotsufficientlytaketheleadinformulatinglong-termgoals-Politicalbackingforthefisheriessector

Barriers:-Uncertaintyonsubsidydesign:pursuingzero-subsidytenders-Governmentdoesnotdirectlypursuepolicytostimulateelectricitydemand

Barrier:-InexistenceofcommonframeworkforspatialplanningontheNorthSea

Barriers:-Internalalignmentwithingovernmentistime-consuming-JointFactscontinuouslydisputedbystakeholders,especiallybyfisheriessectorDriver:-Fromaconsultativetoaparticipativeprocess:broaderstakeholderinvolvement(OFL)

TABLE5:THEBARRIERSANDDRIVERSTHATEMERGEDFROMTHEANALYSIS

Themain barriers in the technical issue area include the intermittency of energy supply and theintegrationof renewableenergy inexistinggrids.Hybridoffshorewindprojectscouldaddress thischallenge, since interconnected grids mitigate potential fluctuations in energy generation andfacilitate the integration of renewable energy into the current energy system. The NSWPH isconsideredadriver in this issueareabecause the consortiumactively invents andpromotes theirhybrid solution to address these technical barriers. This leads us to conclude that the technicalbarriersrelativelyhavealowerpriorityforevaluatingtheconsortiumsgovernancearrangementsaswedidnotidentifyanyotherbarriersbesidestheonesthattheconsortiumalreadyaddresses.

ApoliticalbarrierthattheNSWPHhighlightsisthecurrentlackofclarityonlong-termgoalsfor renewable energy,which hampers the integrated rollout of large-scale offshorewind. Currentplansrununtil2030,whiletheconsortiumpleadsforplansuntil2050becauseofthelongleadtimesof hybrid projects. In the Netherlands, interviewees mention the lack of political will and theacknowledgementof a government that it should take the lead inoverarching societal challengessuchastheenergytransition.Thiscouldhavetodowiththedailyrealityofpoliticsas‘quidproquo’,wherepoliticians keep trackofwhogives and takesonwhatdossiers. Thisplaysout in apoliticallandscapewherepoliticianshave tobalancebetween themanydifferent interests they represent,which could result in policies that contradict each other. Here, some interest groups have morepolitical backing than others. In the Netherlands, the fisheries sector is one of those groups thatrelatively have a lot of political backing frommultiple parties. Concretely, this can clashwith theinterestsoftheNSWPHsincetheDutchgovernmentwantstoprotecttheeconomicpositionof‘our

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fishers’. A political driver is the emergence of various climate agreement that create politicalattentionandmomentumfortheenergytransition. InEurope,theNorthSeasEnergyCooperationDeclarationendorsesthepotentialforlarge-scaleoffshorewind,specificallymentioningtheaimtoworktowardshybridprojects.KriegersFlak,thefirsthybridprojectconnectingDanishandGermanwindfarmsontheBalticSeashowsthatitispossibletoovercomeexistingbarriers.Allinall,thereseemstobeaconsensusthatoffshorewindontheNorthSeawillgrow.

Economically,theexistenceofuncertaintiesimpactsthebusinesscaseofoffshorewindasitcreates financial risks.Examplesofsuchuncertaintiesarethe impactsofBrexitonthemarketandthe potentially unequal division between costs and benefits among interconnected countries.Another important economic factor concerns subsidies for renewable energy. In theNetherlands,politicians are debating the amendment of the law on offshore wind, where different subsidyschemesarediscussed.ThelasttwoDutchtendersweresubsidy-freeandthegovernmentwanttopursuethisline.However,theanalysissuggeststhattheabsenceofsubsidiescreatesuncertaintieswhenthepriceofelectricitydropsbelowacertainpointandeitherthebusinessorthegovernmenthastocompensatethedifference.Thereseemstobeadisagreementbetweenthegovernmentandtheindustryonwhethertousepublicmoneyforsubsidiesornot.Theneedforahigherdemandofelectricityalsoposesabarrier.Here,anotherdivergencebetweengovernmentandindustryarises:the Dutch government does not directly pursue policy to increase demand, only to limit CO2-emissions,which ‘possibly’createsmoreelectricityuse.The industryontheotherhand,highlightsthecrucialroleofthegovernmentinstimulatingdemand,whichwouldpositivelyaffectthebusinesscase for (hybrid) offshorewind.We consider theNSWPH a driver in this issue area, as it activelypromotesmeasuresthat increasemarketstability.Anotherdriver is thefinancialsupport fromtheEuropean Union for joint offshore projects and the ‘Project of Common Interest’ status that theNSWPHreceived,whichmayeasefundingandpermittingprocesses.

Forthelegalandspatialissuearea,wefoundthathybridprojectsinherentlyencounterlegalbarriers since they integrate grids of countries with different rules and regulations. Governmentsupport is also crucial in this regard. Yet, both the consortium and the North Seas Energycooperation raise awareness and aim to overcome this barrier. A driver is the aim of North Seascountriestoharmonisetheirrulesandregulations,whichshowsthatthisbarrierisacknowledgedbytheEuropeanUnion.Thisimportantsteptakestime,butthereisworkinprogress.

Spatially,themainbarrier isthe limitedavailableareaontheNorthSeaforoffshorewind,includingmanydifferentandoftencompetingseauses.AnuncertaintyisthepossibilitythatonlyascatteredareaisleftfortheHub-and-Spokeconcept,whichmakesitdifficultfortheHubtocreatethe synergies it could provide. In the Netherlands, there is currently no framework for spatialplanningintheDutchEEZ.AbarrierthatemergesinthiscontextistheoppositionfromstakeholdersregardingthepreciselocationoftheHub;especiallytheDoggerbankasanatureprotectedareaiscontroversial. We can consider the NSWPH as a driver in this issue area because it promotesintegrated spatial planning between countries. The North Seas Energy Cooperation also showseffortstofurtherintegrateEuropean-levelspatialplanning.

Concerning the institutional issue area,we observe that vested interests of existing, non-renewableenergyindustrieshamperthetransitiontorenewableenergyinfavourofthestatusquo.

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ThemainbarrierdescribedbytheNSWPHisthelackofsignificantinternationalcooperationforoffshorewind.Thecooperationthatdoesexisttakesplaceinseparatedpartsoftheprocess.Thereasons for this are the prioritisation of (often sensitive) national energy policy and the will ofgovernments tomaintain national autonomy over this. Differences in governance cultures on forexample the degree of stakeholder cooperation and planning timelines also pose difficulties forinternational cooperation. In the Netherlands for example, alignment within the governmentbetweenseveraldepartmentsthatworkonoffshore-windisoftendifficultandtime-consuming.Thedegree of internal alignment varies between the North Seas countries, which may further delaycoordination processes. Furthermore, there is international cooperation between the North Seascountries,butthisisbaseduponpoliticalintentaloneasthereisnobindingsanctioningmechanismfornotcomplyingtotheagreementsmadeunderthiscooperation.

The institutional issue area furthermore highlighted the knowledge gaps concerning theimpactoflarge-scaleoffshorewindontheNorthSeaecosystem.TheNSWPHwantstoconductmorescientific research (with relevant stakeholders). The analysis suggests that stakeholders makedifferent research choices, which produces different results and generates different conclusions.This happens for example regarding environmental impact assessments,whereNGOs such as theWWF promote cumulative environmental impact assessments versus non-cumulative options.Furthermore, existing knowledge is interpreted in various ways and NGOs remain critical on themethods that the Hub uses. In this opacity on environmental impacts, uncertainty for the HubemergesaboutwheretolocatetheirHub-and-Spokeconcept.IntheNetherlands,‘JointFactFinding’encounterssimilarproblems.Thesituationisthatthereisdisagreementonthesefactsbetweenthevariety of stakeholders involved in the discussion, which delays the process. Information isquestionedagainandagain, illustratingthedistrustthatexistsbetweenstakeholdersonthistopic.EspeciallythefisheriessectorseemstohampertheprocessinanefforttoblocknatureprotectionastheymightrekindleolddiscussionsagainwhentheNorthSeadebateentersthenextphase.

Awaytoovercomethebarrieroflimitedinternationalcooperationistoengageinadialoguewith various stakeholders. Interestingly, the input from industry stakeholders is often particularlymentioned,whichhighlightsapreferenceforindustryactorsincomparisontootheractorssuchasNGOs. The nature of stakeholder involvement may vary, but seems to be mostly present in thepreparationphaseofaprogrammeinsteadofduringtheimplementationphase.IntheNetherlands,the institutionalised cooperation between government and stakeholders morphed from aconsultativeintoaparticipativeprocess.Before,stakeholderscouldgiveinputonseparateissuesbutdid not seewhat happenedwith it, so theywere not truly involved in decision-making.With themove towards amore participative process, government and stakeholders deliberate together asequalpartners.Thisbuildstrustandgoodwillbecausestakeholdersareinvolvedinmanyprocesses,rangingfromcreatingacommonagendatospatialuse.Eventhoughtheprocesstakesmoretime,the likelihoodof stakeholder support foreventualdecisionswill increase,which is adriveron thelongterm.

Altogether,weseethatsomebarriersanddriversinterrelateastheyarenotalwaysboundtooneissuearea.Buildingupontheanalysis,weattacharelativelyhighweighttothepoliticalissuearea forweobserve that (the absenceof) political decision-making ripples through toother issueareas, mainly the economic: political decisions on longer-term targets for renewables and

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stimulating electricity demand could providemoremarket stability. The economic issue area alsoshowssomeincongruenciesbetweenwhatthemarketneedsandwhatthe(Dutch)governmentsaysitwillprovide. In linewith this, thegovernmentdoesnotseemto fullyacknowledge its (smallyetsignificant) contribution to the bigger trends in electricity prices. Take for example the varioussubsidysystemsofNorthSeascountries.Withaninterconnectedgrid,subsidisedandunsubsidisedenergywill flowbetweenthosecountries.Thismightnegatively influencethecompetitivenessandtherewiththebusinesscaseforoffshorewindincountriesthatdonot,ortoalesserextent,providesubsidies for renewable energy. It is important to notehere that somepolitical barriersmight beharder to address by the consortium since they are subject to political decision-making. Theconsortiumdoes informpolicymakers,but it doeshave themandate tomake the finaldecisions.The current debate on subsidy schemes in the Netherlands illustrates this: the consortium caninformpolicymakerswithtechno-economicinformation,butnotmakethefinaldecisions.Onecanthereforearguethatsomebarriersremainlargelyoutsideoftheconsortiumsscope.Forthisreason,someof therecommendationspresented intheconclusionaddresstheDutchgovernment.Yet, inthefollowingsectionwherewediscussthepolycentricindicatorsthattheconsortiumtouchesupon,wedonoticethatthereisstillroomforimprovementontheindicatorof‘informationsharing’.

Ingeneral, thebarriersanddrivers identified in theanalysisoverlapwith thosepreviouslyidentifiedintheconceptualframework.Comparingthebarriersanddriversemergingintheanalysisto the barriers and drivers described in the conceptual chapter,we see primarily that the spatialcomponent of the legal-spatial issue area is indeed relevant for large-scale offshore wind, whichconfirmstherelevanceofconnectingtheliteratureonpolycentricgovernanceofrenewablestotheliteratureonpolycentricmarinegovernance.Infact,thespatialissueareaprovedtobesoimportantthatwe suggest todecouple it from its legal component.Wewill godeeper into this later in thischapter. For the technical issuearea,wesee forexample that intermittencyofenergy supplyandgrid interconnection between multiple countries remain the most important barriers. Thefragmentednature of global energy governance thatwedescribed in the literature review comesbackastheneedforincreasedinternationalcoordinationandintegrationthattheNSWPHstresses.Concerning thepolitical issuearea, theneed forgovernmentcommitment is shortlymentioned intheconceptualframework.Theanalysisprovidedmoreinsightsintothisasittouchedupontheday-to-day reality of politics and the representationof certain stakeholders in the government. In theNetherlandsforexample,theinterestofthefisheriessectorisrepresentedtosuchanextentthatitisabletoblockdecisionsthatco-determinetheavailablespaceforoffshorewindontheNorthSea.Economically, the lack of forward-planning and the need for increased electricity demand alsooverlap. Interestingly, a driver in the conceptual framework is the ‘diverse range of economicincentives’, which has become barrier in the Netherlands where, according to the analysis, thegovernmentonlyplaysalimitedroletoprovideeconomicincentives.Thelatterpartofthischapterwillgodeeperintotheinstitutionalissuearearelatetheresearchoutcomestotheinitialconceptualframework.

Polycentric indicators NowthatwesketchedthebarriersanddriversspecifictotheenergytransitionontheNorthSea,wewill evaluate the governance arrangement that the NSWPH proposes to address them. Thisgovernancearrangementconcernsthewayinwhichtheconsortiumshapesinternationalandmulti-

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stakeholder cooperation. The polycentric indicators serve to evaluate this arrangement, reflectingthe normative use of polycentric governance theory. Since the polycentric governance literaturedoesnotclearlyaddmoreweighttoonepolycentricindicatorovertheother,wedonotnecessarilydiscuss the indicators in the order in which they happen to be presented in the conceptualframework. The polycentric indicators that appear in the NSWPH documents are ‘governance onmultiplescales’;‘diversityofactors’;’dataoncostsandbenefits’;‘feedback’;‘inducingcompliance’and‘encouragingadaptivity’.Theextenttowhichtheseindicatorsemergeinthedocumentsvaries.The indicators that arenotexplicitlymentioned in theanalyseddocumentsare ‘transparencyandtrustworthiness’; mechanisms for monitoring; and ‘mechanisms for conflict resolution andsanctioning’.Table6displaysthepolycentricindicatorsfromtheconceptualframeworkandthewayinwhichtheyappearintheanalysedNSWPHdata.

Polycentricindicator

Governanceonmultiplescales

Diversityofactors

Informationsharing:

Transparency&trustworthiness

Dataoncostsandbenefits

Mechanismsfor:monitoring

Feedback Inducingcompliance

Conflictresolution&sanctioning

Encouragingadaptivity

AnalysisofNSWPHdata

Yes:aimtoincreaseinternationalcooperationandinteractionbetweennationalgovernmentandEU-level.

Internally:low,astheconsortiumconsistsof4TSOsandoneport.Externally:aimtoengagewithallNorthSeastakeholders,butpotentiallyprioritisingindustryactors.

Internally:consortiumpartnersshare(sensitive)informationwitheachother.Externally:informingpolicymakerswithexpertiseofconsortium

Theanalyseddocumentsdonotexplicitlymentionthis.

Prominentinthedocuments,thatmainlyhighlightthe‘techno-economicperspective.

Theanalyseddocumentsdonotexplicitlymentionthis.

Consortiummentionstheneedforfeedbackfromstakeholders.Theremightbeaslightpreferenceforinputfromindustryactors.

Internally:cooperationbetweenconsortiumpartnersonthebasisofalegalagreement.Externally:definedrolesandresponsibilitiesbetweenOWFdevelopers

Theanalyseddocumentsdonotexplicitlymentionthis.

Mentionedacoupleoftimes,mostlymeaningtheabilityoftheHub-and-Spokeconcepttoadapttoitsphysicalenvironment.Alsounderstoodmorebroadlyassensitivityfornational(political)contexts:noblueprint,butprogrammeapproach.

TABLE6:POLYCENTRICGOVERNANCEINDICATORSANDHOWTHEYAPPEARINTHEANALYSEDNSWPHDATA.

OneofthepolycentricindicatorsmostprominentintheNSWPHdocumentsis‘governanceon multiple scales’: the consortium clearly highlights its dedication to cooperate internationally,therewith showing its support formulti-level governance.Wedonotehere that these scalesonlyincludethenationalandtheEU-level,notthesubnationallevel.Withthisindicator,theconsortiumaddressesthemain institutionalbarrierof limitedinternationalcooperationforoffshorewind.Theanalysis pointed out that this limited international cooperation has to do with an emphasis onnationalpolicies,differentgovernanceculturesandthelackofabindingsanctioningmechanismfornon-cooperation.Concerningthelatter,wedonotconsiderimposingsanctionsasamandateoftheconsortium: rather, this is a concern for public actors. On the other hand, stimulating effectivecooperationbetweenself-interestedactors fromdifferent (governance) cultures is something thatthe consortium can address in a polycentricmanner. Besides ‘governance onmultiple scales’, itsability to do so depends on the presence of other polycentric indicators such as ‘inducingcompliance’ and ‘mechanisms for conflict resolution’. We will come back to the ability of the

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consortiumtoaddressthebarriersbehindthelackofinternationalcooperationintheconclusionofthissection.

Concerning‘dataoncostsandbenefits’,whichmakesuponepartof ‘informationsharing’,theconsortiumseesitselfasanimportantknowledgebrokerregardingthetechno-economicaspectsof large-scaleandhybridoffshorewindontheNorthSea.Wenoticethis intheanalysisofbarriersanddrivers aswell,where theHub ismainly a driver that addressesbarriers in the technical andeconomic issue areas. While the consortium efficiently addresses the technical barriers with itshybrid concept, some economic uncertainties remain such as the need for increased electricitydemand.InthecaseoftheNetherlands,itisapoliticaldecisiontonotdirectlystimulatethisdemandso addressing this barrier largely remains outside of the scope of the consortium. What theconsortiumcandotoaddresstheinterrelatedpoliticalandeconomicissueareas,issharingdataonthe costs and benefits of political decisions and underline the need for clarity on long-termrenewableenergygoals.Here,isnotentirelycleariftheinformationissharedreciprocallybetweenthe consortium, stakeholders and policymakers. What we do know is that some sensitiveinformation stays inside the consortium and is thus not shared externally. In the analyseddocuments,itseemsliketheconsortiummostlyprovidesinformationtopolicymakersinsteadofalsoreceivingandusinginformationfromotherstakeholders.Wedonoticethattheconsortiumreceivesinformation in the form of feedback. However, there seems to be a predilection for input fromindustry actors regarding techno-economic affairs. Other affairs, such as environmental, social orspatial,may include input from other stakeholders, but the documents do not explicitlymentionwhatthisstakeholderinvolvementlookslikeandwhetherornotisdiffersfromthedesiredindustryinvolvement.

Even though theconsortiumshares information,weargue that thisaspectdoesnotcoverthefullbreadthofthepolycentricindicatorasdescribedintheconceptualchapter.Areasonforthisisthatthesharedinformationispredominantlytechno-economic,whileothertypesofinformationarealsoimportant.Weseeforinstanceintheinstitutionalissueareathattherearemanyknowledgegapsontheimpactoflarge-scaleoffshorewindontheNorthSeaecosystemandtheinterpretationof available knowledge may create disputes between stakeholders. Even though the consortiumhighlights the need to address the current knowledge gaps, it does not mention the polycentricindicatorof‘transparencyandtrustworthiness’ofinformation.Itwouldhoweverberelevantfortheconsortium to acknowledge the varying takes on the transparency and trustworthiness ofinformation, sincechoicesmade in their researchproducecertainoutcomes,whichwill in turnbeinterpreted differently between stakeholders. Being transparent about decisions made duringresearch and being sensitive towards different takes on the trustworthiness of specific data, cantherefore increase the ability of the consortium to cooperate effectively with stakeholders withdiverging interests. This is relevant given the example of research on potential Hub-and-SpokelocationswhereNGOsremaincriticalonthedatasharedbytheconsortium.

Taking into account the informational disputes that may emerge between variousstakeholders,thepolycentricindicatorof‘mechanismsforconflictresolution’isalsorelevantfortheconsortium.Wedonot have sufficient information to drawdefinitive conclusions on this: neitherabout the internal cooperation in the consortium, nor about the way in which the consortiumengageswithotherstakeholders.Whatwedoknowfromtheanalysisisthatthelimitedamountof

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informationonenvironmental impactsofoffshorewind influencesstakeholdercooperation. It cancreatedissentbetweenstakeholders,forexampleonthepossibilityofmulti-useversussingle-useofwind farm areas. In the Netherlands, we see that conflicts emerge mostly around the differentvalues attached to information on environmental impacts. Taking into account the lacunas inknowledgeandthevarious interpretationsofexistingknowledge, it is likely thatdisputeswill (re-)emerge in the futureanddelay thedecision-makingprocess.Therefore,wedeem it important fortheconsortiumtohaveabasicmechanismforconflictresolutioninplace.

One domainwhere there ismore need for data on costs and benefits concerns potentialfree-riding, which polycentric governance literature describes as inherent to collective actionproblems. The analysis touched upon the potentially unequal allocation of costs and benefitsbetweenNorth Seas countries as an economic barrier to invest in hybrid offshorewind projects.Followingtheconceptualframework,knowledgeontheefficiencyandeffectivenessofpolicieswillincreasethroughtrialanderror(seeOstrom,2009:31;Aligica&Tarko,2012:242).Inlinewiththis,itwouldmakesensetocloselymonitorifandtowhatextentthispotentialfree-ridingtakesplace.Inotherwords, amechanism formonitoring couldprovidedataon the costs andbenefits forNorthSeascountries.However,basedupontheanalysis,theconsortiumcurrentlydoesnotdeploysuchamonitoringmechanism.

Wedonothavesufficientdatatoassessthecompliancemechanismsinsidetheconsortiumsinceweonlyknowthatcooperationhappensonalegalbasis.Theirdocumentsalsodonotprovidemuch information on how they aim to induce compliance, only that from a discussionwithOWFdevelopersemerged that ‘rolesandresponsibilitieshave tobedefinedearlyandclearly’ (NSWPH-CP5,5).Thisdoesnotincludecompliancemechanismsbetweentheconsortiumandothertypesofstakeholders besides offshorewinddevelopers. Taking into account the aimof the consortium toincreasevoluntary internationalcooperation, itwouldseemreasonable toaddress thispolycentricindicator.Accordingtotheconceptualchapter,compliance increaseswhenactorstrusteachotherand feel that their willingness to cooperate is reciprocated by others (Ostrom, 2009: 12). In theNetherlands for instance, the switch fromaconsultative toaparticipativeprocess for stakeholderinvolvementcreatedmutualtrustandgoodwill.

This brings us to another polycentric indicator that the consortium mentions in somedocuments: ‘diversity of actors’. The analysis showed that the internal diversity within theconsortiumisquitelow,sincefouroutoffivemembersareTSOsandoneisaport.Giventheaimofthe consortium to integrate currently separated offshorewind-related processes, it is remarkablethattheconsortiumconsistsofsignificantplayersinenergyinfrastructure.Fromtheotherside,themembersof theconsortiumareDanish,GermanandDutch,sotheydoreflectapartof theNorthSeascountries.Involvingavarietyofactorsisacrucialcharacteristicofpolycentricgovernance.Itisthereforenotsurprisingthattheconsortiummentionsthisinthecontextoftheirexternalpartners.Interestingly,theanalysisofbarriersinthelegal-spatialissueareashowsthatthatactorspromotingtheinterestsofbiodiversitypursueeffortstoconvincetheconsortiumnottodeveloptheHub-and-Spokeconceptinanatureprotectedarea.ThisconstitutesabarriertotheswiftimplementationoftheHub-and-Spokeconcept.Moreover,thiscouldexplainwhytheconsortiumprioritisesinputandfeedback from industry actors, whose interests are most likely comparable to that of theconsortium.

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Beingabletofacilitateexperimentationrequiresgovernancearrangementstobeadaptive.Theconsortiumclearlymentionstheneedfor flexibility.This ismostly referredtoas theabilityoftheHub-and-Spoke concept to adapt todifferentphysical contexts, includingdifferent foundationtypesforwindfarms.Thisflexibilitywillprobablybeofuseinthecontextofunclarityofinformationon environmental impacts, where future developments in for example cumulative environmentalimpactassessmentsmightalterthepreferredHub-and-Spokedesign.Besidesbeingabletoadapttobiophysicalcontexts,theconceptualchapteralsomentionstheabilityofpolycentricgovernancetoadapttovaryingsocialcontexts. Intheirrecentnewsletters, theconsortiummentions itsabilitytorespondtopoliticaldevelopmentsandinsightsinthefieldasimportantpartsofbeingflexible.Thereason for this might be the new stage that the consortium recently entered: ‘From project toprogramme’.With theprogrammeapproach (asopposed toamore rigidblueprintapproach), theconsortium is able to bemore adaptive because it can alter its plans according to the stage andcountry-specific developments. Connecting this to the different governance cultures of countriesand the uneven developments of offshore wind-related processes that emerged within theinstitutionalissuearea,wecanarguethatthisbroaderinterpretationofflexibilitymayprovetobeuseful.Monitoringofthebiophysicalandsocialcontextmightenabletheconsortiumtobetteradapttopotentialchangesinthiscontext.

Altogether,acoupleofelementsofthegovernancearrangementthattheNSWPHproposescontributetoitsdegreeofpolycentricgovernance,mainlybecauseofitsflexibilityanditsprovisionof data on costs and benefits, but some important indicators, including ‘transparency andtrustworthiness’,and‘mechanismsforinducingcompliance’remainunaddressed.Asaconsequence,therearecertainlyopportunitiesfortheconsortiumtoaddresssomebarriersmoreefficiently.Also,given the limiteddata that theconsortiumprovideson itsproposedgovernancearrangement,weconclude that there is certainly room for improvement in the amount of information that theconsortiumsharesonitsdesiredinternationalcooperationwithvariousstakeholders.

The evaluation of barriers and drivers points out that the consortium is considered aneffectivedriver in the technical issueareaand the legal componentof the legal-spatial issueareabecause it addresses all identified barriers. The consortium also aims to be a driver within theeconomic issue area, given the techno-economic information it provides to policymakers. Sinceeconomic barriers are partly dependent upon political decisions, regarding the stimulation ofelectricitydemandforexample,somebarriersintheeconomicandpoliticalissueareasareoutsideof the reach of the consortium. For this reason, the conclusion of this thesis providesrecommendationsforboththeconsortiumandtheDutchgovernment.

Theremainingissueareasarethespatialcomponentofthelegal-spatialissueareaandtheinstitutional issue area. Interestingly, these are the areas where potential clashes betweenstakeholdersmayemergeasaresultofthelackofknowledgeontheenvironmentalimpactoflarge-scale offshore wind. Given the absence of the polycentric indicator ‘trustworthiness andtransparency’ of information, the consortium risks to overlook the influence of informationaldisputes in multi-stakeholder cooperation. Furthermore, there consortium does not describe a‘mechanismforconflictresolution’tosettlesuchpotentialconflicts.

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Concerning the institutional dimension, even though the consortiumaims for ‘governanceonmultiple scales’ the limitedmentionof other crucial polycentric indicatorsmakes it difficult toovercomethereasonsbehindthecurrentlackofinternationalcooperation,whichincludecountries’emphasis on national policies and the different governance cultures. For instance, the concisemention of ‘inducing compliance’ does not clarify how the consortium induces countries’ andstakeholders’ willingness to cooperate voluntarily. Yet, the analysis showed that the nature ofstakeholder involvement influences compliance because some types of stakeholder involvementcreate more mutual trust and willingness to cooperate than others (e.g. consultative versusparticipative). In this sense, it could be interesting for the consortium to monitor how otherpolycentricgovernanceconstructsapproachstakeholderinvolvementandexperimentwiththisinitsownproposedarrangement.Itisnotpossiblefortheconsortiumtoovercomeallidentifiedbarriersintheinstitutionalissueareadirectly:especiallyvestedinterestsoftheoilandgasindustryaremoreencompassingthantheoffshorewindenergytransitionontheNorthSea.Yet,theconsortiumdoesaddressthisbarrierindirectlybecausemakesuseofthebroadermomentumforenergytransitions.

Academic evaluation

The methodology chapter already touched upon the limited empirical generalisability of thisWestern-Europeanorientedcase study research.Since this thesisaims topave theway for futuremarinegovernanceresearchonoffshorewindenergy, it isbettersuitedforanalyticgeneralisationinstead than empirical generalisation. This section uses the research outcomes to reflect on theinitialconceptualframework.Itarguesthatthefollowingcategoriesshouldreceivefurtherattentioninfutureresearch:theinformationalissuearea;thespatialissuearea;andthenatureofstakeholdercooperationinpolycentricattributes.

Theframeworkintheconceptualchapterconsistsofissueareasthatemergedfrombarriersand drivers described in literature on renewable energy governance and marine governance.Initially, we included barriers relating to information, such as the lack of knowledge onenvironmental impacts, in the institutional issueareabecause informationsharing isan importantfactor in multi-actor and multi-level cooperation. Soma et al. (2016) argue for example thatinformation creates opportunities for feedback, debate, innovation andmore. However, a lack ofenvironmental informationandthe increasingamountofactors thatclaimtopossess information,altersthetransformativepowerofinformation(seeMol,2008).Intheliteraturereview,wesawthatfor example Guerra (2026: 529) highlighted the underdeveloped state of environmental impactassessments.TheanalysispointedoutthatintheNetherlands,informationaldisputesregardingforinstancetheoutcomesofenvironmentalimpactassessmentsandthewayinwhichtheseoutcomesare interpreted by diverse stakeholders, may significantly delay the rollout of offshore wind asdisputes over ‘Joint Facts’ revive. Even though the institutional issue area touches uponenvironmental information,thedominanceof informationshapedcooperationsosignificantly thatcreatingaseparateissueareaforenvironmentalinformationwoulddomorejusticetotheconcept.Wethereforestronglysuggestthatfutureresearchaddressestheroleofinformationandknowledgegaps in cooperation. This amendment enables future research to be more susceptible for theimpacts of uncertainties or contradictory information. It would be especially interesting in thisregard to consider presence of the polycentric indicators ‘transparency and trustworthiness’ and‘mechanismforconflictresolution’toaddressthisissuearea.

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Buildinguponthis,thenextsuggestedamendmenttotheinitialconceptualframeworkistodecouplethelegalandspatialissueareaintotwoseparateareas,onelegalandonespatial.Initially,marinespatialplanningwasconceptualisedasadriveraddressingthelegalbarrierofcrowdedseasand varying coastal state jurisdictions. The analysis pointed out that there are significant legal tohybrid offshorewind projects, but the consortiumalready addresses themeffectively. The spatialbarriersontheotherhand,emergedmoreprominentlyintheanalysisbecausetheygeneratemuchmore discussion between stakeholders than the legal barriers. In this sense, the degree ofpolycentricmulti-level andmulti-stakeholder governance aremore relevant when addressing thespatialissueareathanthelegalissueare.Therefore,wearguethatdecouplingthisissueareaallowsformore awareness of barriers and drivers in future research, which is especially salient for thespatialissuearea.

Another proposed alteration to the conceptual framework addresses the polycentricindicators used in this research to evaluate the proposed governance arrangement. Even thoughtheseindicatorsclearlytouchupontheimportanceinvolvingadiversityofstakeholders,theyfailtoconcretise the nature of stakeholder inclusion. It is relevant to take this into account in futureresearchbecausetheanalysispointedoutthattherearevariouswaysinwhichstakeholderscanbeincludedand that some stakeholders are involved in differentways thanothers,which influencestheeffectivenessofmulti-actorandmulti-levelcooperation.Wesawforexamplethatstakeholdersmay be consulted, participate or give feedback and that is affects outcomes. Adding anotherpolycentric indicator on ‘stakeholder participation’ enables researchers to evaluate the nature ofstakeholder involvement in polycentric governance arrangements. This addition to the initialpolycentric attributes brings us to a final remark: besides paving theway for further research onpolycentricoffshorewindgovernance,thisthesisalsoencouragesfurtherresearch intopolycentricenergygovernanceingeneral.Eventhoughtheissueareasoftheproposedconceptualframeworkaretailoredforresearchingoffshorewind-specificbarriersanddrivers,thepolycentricindicatorsareapplicabletootherpolycentricgovernancearrangementsaswell.That istosay,the indicatorscanbe used to evaluate other polycentric arrangements, for example on other renewable energysources.

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Technical Political Economic Legal Spatial Informational Institutional

Describingbarriers&drivers(descriptive)

BarriersDrivers

BarriersDrivers

BarriersDrivers

BarriersDrivers

BarriersDrivers

BarriersDrivers

BarriersDrivers

Evaluationofpolycentricgovernancearrangement(prescriptive)

Polycentricindicators(drivers):-Governanceonmultiplescales;interactionbetweenscales;diversityofactors;stakeholderparticipation.-Informationsharing:transparency&trustworthiness;dataoncosts&benefits.-Mechanismsfor:monitoring;feedback;inducingcompliance;conflictresolution;sanctioning;encouragingadaptivity.

TABLE7:THECONCEPTUALFRAMEWORKFORFUTURERESEARCH

Strengths and limitations

The introduction and the methods chapter already touched upon the ex-ante nature of thisresearch,whichisoneofitsstrengthsastherecommendationsthattheconclusionpresentsapplytoa process that is currently still inmotion rather than set in stone. This provides an intermediatefeedbackmoment for the consortium, grounded in academic research. By combining two uses ofpolycentric governance literature into one framework, we are able to first describe the existingcontextandsubsequentlyformulateanormativeex-antestatementonthepotentialeffectivenessofa proposed governance arrangement. Yet, the timely nature of the selected case underlines theneedforconsecutiveresearch.Wesawforexampleintheanalysednewsletterthattheconsortiumaddressesthepolycentricindicatorof‘flexibility’morecomprehensivelythanintheconceptpaperspublished before. The aim of the consortium to be adaptive also suggests that their proposedgovernancearrangementmayundergochanges,whichshowsthepossibilityforfutureevaluations.Theproposedconceptualframeworkpavesthewayforsuchfutureresearch.

Anotherstrengthof this research is its integralperspectivetooffshorewinddevelopment.Whereauthorsoftenhighlightonlyoneorseveral issueareasofthebarriersanddriversfor large-scale offshorewind, this thesis brings forward barriers and drivers frommultiple issue areas andshowsthattheyinteract.Thisapproachallowedustorevealroughexplanationsforbarriersthatareoften considered in isolation. For instance, the analysis provided insight into what informationalaspects affectmarine spatial planning and showed that governance culturesmayhamper smoothinternationalcooperation.

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A limitation that we previously touched upon in the methods chapter encompasses thelimited amount of information on some confidential topics, which prevents us from drawingconclusionsonthosetopics.Forinstance,wesawintheanalysisofthattheNSWPHdocumentsdonot touch upon all identified polycentric indicators. This does not necessarily mean that theconsortium does not want to pursue these indicators, but it does mean that we cannot drawdefinitiveconclusionsbasedupon this limiteddata.Thispotentiallyaffects the researchoutcomesbecauseontheonehand,werisktooverlookpolycentric indicatorsthattheconsortiumwishestostimulateandontheotherhand,werisk tounderstatethetruedegreeofpolycentricgovernancethattheconsortiumaimstoreach.

Additionally, interviewing multiple stakeholders that engage with the consortium couldprovide more clarity on its proposed governance arrangement, given the limited amount ofinformationthattheconsortiumprovidesinitsconceptpapers.Thiscouldenlightenforexamplethedesirednatureofstakeholderinvolvement.Itcouldhaveprovidedmoreclarityontheconsortiumsseeming predilection for input from industry rather than from NGOs. This practical drawbackaffectedtheconclusionsmostbecauseitcreatesthepossibilityofoverlookingimportantpolycentricattributesforaddressingbarriersanddrivers.

This thesismainly addresses the national and international scale, even thoughpolycentricgovernance literature also highlights the subnational scale. Increasingly, subnational initiativesregardingtheenergytransitionemerge,withforexamplecitiessettingtheirownrenewableenergytargets.ThemunicipalityofAmsterdamforexamplealsohasa‘ClimateAgreementforAmsterdam’with the targetof80% renewableenergygeneration (byoffshorewindand solarenergy)by2030(‘HetAmsterdamsKlimaatakkoord’,n.d.),which is10%higherthantherenewableenergytarget inthe Dutch Climate Agreement. This shows that on all levels, energy policies interact, also withincountries.ThisthesisdidnottakeintoaccountthesubnationallevelbecausetheNSWPHconsortiumpromotes cooperation between the national and international scale and thus does not addresssubnational actors. One could argue that this inherently produces flawed polycentric governanceconstructbecausemultiple scales are inherent topolycentric governance.On theotherhand, theconsortiumaimstofulfilnationalandEUclimatetargetsthatarederivedfromtheParisAgreement.Inthissense,theclimateagreementsthattheconsortiumadherestoreflectthreelevels:national,EU and global. Yet, future research into how the subnational, national and international scalesinteractwouldbeinsightful.Energytransitionsincitiescouldforexamplebetreatedaspolycentricexperimentsthatmayinspirebroaderinstitutionalchange.

In conclusion, a remaining strengthof this thesis is that it is able toprovide anadditionalinsightforfurtherresearch,basedupontheanalysisinsteadofonlyontheresearchoutcomes.Thisgivesustheopportunitytosuggestthatfutureresearchlooksdeeperintotheconnectionbetweenthefisheriessectorandthegovernment.TheanalysisshowedthatintheNetherlands,thefisheriessector is well represented by the government, who speaks of ‘our fishers’ in its documents. Thesector is also vocal in the marine spatial planning debate regarding a North Sea Agreement.Polycentricgovernanceentailscooperationbetweenvariousstakeholders.Ifsomestakeholdersarerepresented relatively more than others, they may have political decision-making on their side,whichaffectsother stakeholders’ interests. This couldmean forexampleaprioritisationof fishinggrounds over space for offshore wind farms. Research on this potential interwovenness could

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provide insightsonbarriersanddrivers in thepolitical issuearea.One intervieweesuggested thatthe fisheries sector is also strongly represented in Denmark, which highlights the relevance todiscoverwhatpoliticalpressurethefisheriessectorcancreateinotherNorthSeascountries.

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Chapter7:Conclusion

ThisthesisdescribedthebarriersanddrivestotheenergytransitionontheNorthSeaandevaluatedthe ability of the NSWPH consortium to address these. It draws the following conclusions. ThebarriersanddriversfortheenergytransitionontheNorthSeaemergeinthefollowingissueareas:technical, political, economic, legal, spatial, informational and institutional. The consortiumeffectivelyaddressesthetechnicaland legal issueareaandmoderatelyaddressesthepoliticalandeconomic issueare.Thescantappearanceofcertainpolycentricattributesdecreasestheabilityofthe consortium to address barriers and drivers in particularly the institutional, spatial andinformational issuearea.Themaininstitutionalbarrierthattheconsortiumidentifies isthelimiteddegree of international cooperation and the non-integrated way in which offshore wind-relatedprocessesareapproachedinthiscooperation.Eventhoughtheconsortiumpromotesgovernanceonmultiplescales,thelimitedmentionofforexample‘inducingcompliance’makesitdifficulttodriveinternationalcooperation.Furthermore,thereseemstobeapredilectionforfeedbackfromindustrystakeholders. The consortium could more effectively integrate fragmented offshore wind-relatedprocessesifit(re)considersitsdesiredstakeholderinvolvement.Thiscouldforexamplerangefromrather consultative to more participatory. This thesis argues that participatory stakeholderinvolvementcreatesmutualtrustandwillingnesstocooperate.

Furthermore, this thesisstates that thespatialand informational issuearearemain largelyunaddressed.Interestingly,thesearetheareaswherethelackofknowledgeontheenvironmentalimpactoflarge-scaleoffshorewindismostsalientasabarrier.Givenitsfocusontechno-economicinformation and the absence of the polycentric indicator ‘trustworthiness and transparency’ ofinformation, the consortium risks to overlook potential informational disputes betweenstakeholders,whichmayinfluencetheefficiencyofcooperation.

This thesis analytically separates offshore wind energy from the broader concept of‘renewableenergysources’asitlooksintobarriersanddriversspecifictotheoffshorewindenergytransition. This approach allows us to provide a conceptual framework for further marinegovernance research on offshore wind energy. The main suggestions for further research are tocreateaseparate issueareatoscrutinisetherolethat informationplays inpolycentricgovernanceconstructs, which includes distinguishing between the legal and the spatial issue area; and to besusceptible for the nature of stakeholder involvement when conducting evaluations usingpolycentricindicators.

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Discussion

This thesis describes barriers and drivers to the energy transition on the North Sea from theperspectiveoftheselectedcase,theNSWPHconsortium.Thismeansthatsomefactorswerecodedasabarrierbecausetheyinterferewiththeswiftroll-outoftheconsortiumshybridproject.Wesawforexamplethatstakeholdersprotectingtheinterestsofnatureposedabarrierfortheconsortiumbecausetheychallengedtheinitialplanto locatetheHub-and-SpokeconceptontheDoggerbank,which is a protected area. This raises questions aboutwhether the identified barriers and driverswould be experienced similarly for other actors that also aim to reach the goals of the ParisAgreement.Iwillshortlydiscussmyviewontheenergytransitionasawaytoreachclimategoals.

There aremany paths that lead to a reduction of CO2-emissions. By its nature, the ParisAgreementencouragescountries tocreate theirownpathways,according tonaturalendowmentsand national potential. Novel environmental policies usually do not immediately spark change;experimentation, which is inherent to polycentric governance, also entails failure. An importantthing tokeep inmindhowever, is that theultimategoalof reducingCO2-emissionsdoesnotonlyentail the transition to an emission-free society, but also necessitates maintaining the quality ofnaturalresourcestosequestratecarbon.Inotherwords,ifwetrulywanttodecreasetheamountofCO2intheair,environmentalmeasuresshouldnotbedeployedattheexpenseofnature.

Taketheexampleofbiomass.Biomassisnotconsideredarenewableenergysourcebysomeauthorsbecauseithasoppositeeffectsfortheenvironmentasitsubstantiallyincreasesthelevelsofcarbon dioxide in the atmosphere (see Norton et al., 2019). In my view, this will havecounterproductiveeffectsonthe longrunas itdiminishes theabilityof forests tocapturecarbon.The same counts for large-scale offshore wind development. If this happens without sufficientlytaking into account themarine ecosystem, notwithstanding the current knowledge gaps, chancesarethattheabilityoftheseasocaptureCO2diminishesovertimeandthenetCO2emissionswillremain roughly the same. This balancebetween rapid action and accurate climatepolicy requirespolycentricgovernanceandinclusivestakeholderinvolvement.

ThisideaofgrowthwithinecologicallimitsiscapturedcompellinglybyKateRaworthinherbookDoughnutEconomics(2017).Thisnovelapproachtoeconomicsthatconsiders,amongothers,climatechangeandoceanacidificationasconsequencesoftrespassingtheearth’secologicalceiling.Raworth(2017)arguesthatthetraditionalapproachtoeconomics,with itsemphasisoneconomicgrowth,increasesinequalitiesandisnotsustainableonthelongterm.Iwouldliketoaccentuatethisthought-provoking approach to balancing growth with sustainability as we move to the finalrecommendationsofthisthesis.

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Recommendations

Higher degrees of polycentric governance may increase the ability of the NSWPH consortium toaddressexistingbarriersanddriverseffectively.Takingintoaccountthemainlythebarriersinissueareas that the consortium fails to address with its current polycentric attributes, we provide thefollowingrecommendationsfortheNorthSeaWindPowerHubconsortium:

• Aim to be more sensitive for the role of information in offshore wind developments.Consciously increasing thedegreeofpolycentricgovernance in theproposedarrangementmighthelptomitigatepotential issues.This includes,but isnot limitedto:besidessharingtechno-economicdata, promote cumulative environmental impacts and share this data aswell;betransparentabouttheresearchmethodsused;beawarethatthetrustworthinessofdatamaybeexperienceddifferently across stakeholders; increasemonitoring, in any caseonpotentialfree-ridingbehaviourofcountries.

• Closelyconsiderthedifferentnaturesofstakeholderinvolvementandthetypeyouchoose,while taking into account the importance of stakeholder support andmutual trust; valuefeedback from awide range of stakeholders equally. Include stakeholders not only in thepreparation phase, but also during the potential implementation, since the contextmightalterintermsofenvironmentalknowledge,orsociallyorpolitically.Itwill‘payoff’todoso,since at the end of the day, stakeholders represent a larger public. Also, provide moreinformationonhowaimtoorganisemulti-actorandmulti-levelcooperation.

• Pursuealong-termvision,justlikeyouaskfromgovernments.Thisincludesexplicitlytakinginto account the environmental aspects of large-scale offshore wind, even though theyremain largely unknown: on the long term, resilient natural resources capture carbon aswell.

Somebarriers in thepolitical andeconomic issue areas remainpartly outsideof the scopeof theconsortiumtoaddress.WethereforealsoformulatearecommendationfortheDutchgovernment:

• Eventhoughultimatelyitmightbedesirabletocreatezero-subsidytenders,reconsiderifthecurrentzero-subsidyeradidnotcometooearly.Engagewithsurroundingcountriesonwhatsuch national decisions imply if in the future wind farms are interconnected. Especiallyconsiderhere that thecurrentpercentageof renewableenergy in thecountry is relativelylow and that this could negatively affect the position of the Netherlands if surroundingcountries do give subsidies. Otherwise, consider stimulating electricity demand.Acknowledge that the government has to take the lead in transitions as big andencompassingastheenergytransition.

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