Portugal and transnational terrorism challenges: externalisation of

internal security through europeanisation?

Verónica Martins

Sciences-Po Paris (CEE)/ Universidade do Minho (EEG)

martinsveronica@yahoo.fr

Paper presented at

XXIInd IPSA World Congress

Universidad Complutense Madrid, Madrid, 8-12 July 2012

[Provisional version. Please do not quote without author‟s permission

This paper is based on researches done in the framework of a PhD Thesis (financed by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia no âmbito do QREN - POPH - Tipologia 4.1 – Formação Avançada, comparticipado pelo Fundo Social Europeu e por fundos nacionais do MCTES). The author also wants to thank the financial support of Sciences-Po Paris. Some parts of this paper are largely drawn from the communication presented at the OBSERVARE‟s Ist International Congress, November 2011, Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, Lisbon.

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Introduction

During the Cold War, ideological confrontations were favourable to the exacerbation of terrorist activities, but as some experts have noticed, despite the end of the Cold War and the fragile Middle East Peace Process, the deep causes of ethnic and religious conflicts remain and most of the conflicts are still to be settled (Wilkinson, 1995). If domestic ideological terrorism has been diminishing in Europe – though separatist terrorism still remains-, international terrorism, in particular of Islamic inspiration, became a growing concern in this region of the world, bearing in mind the geographical proximity to areas generating Islamic terrorism movements.

Though Portugal has not been a “potential target”1 of domestic terrorism since the 19802, it is still an “opportunity target” 3and, as logic of prevention, Portugal has been developing since the years 1980 legislative and operational capacities to fight terrorism. Nonetheless, as mentioned by António Martins da Cruz, “no nation is self-sufficient, no matter how powerful it might be. Not even big countries can do all by themselves”4 and, in this context, Portugal stands for multilateralism, joining its efforts to those of the European States. Thus, the United Nations is considered as an “irreplaceable leader as a forum of coordination for a common reaction of the Community of States and as primary source of international legitimacy in the fight against a common threat (Da Cruz, 2002)”, but Portugal has also supported “without reserve” the efforts developed within regional organizations, firstly in the European Union (EU), followed by NATO and the OSCE (Da Cruz, 2002). Well aware of the advantages of multilateral cooperation, Portugal has externalized its internal security through europeanisation.

Therefore, this paper aims at verifying how and under which conditions may the existence of a European Foreign policy for the Mediterranean influence Portugal‟s foreign policy preferences towards Morocco and Algeria in the field of the cooperation in the fight against terrorism and how and under which conditions may national preferences influence the European foreign policy towards these countries? According to some authors, this process is not a synonym for European integration (Radaelli, 2000; Vink and Graziano, 2007:10), but common sense shows that it is linked to the penetration of the European dimension in the national arena (Radaelli 2000: 3). Nevertheless, we do not limit the analysis of the “European dimension” to the EU, though it represents the main point of the paper, considering that it is also pertinent to look at other institutions as NATO and the OSCE. The temporal limits of the paper goes from 1995 to 2010 and it considers two dimensions of the europeanisation – “reception” and “projection” taking into account the interactions

1 Victims of terrorism (against their territory or against their interests which face a high risk of being

attacked again. Interview Official, National Defense Ministry, July 2008 (b). All the statements in the text coming from the interviews were translated “freely” by the author. 2 The Popular Forces 25 (Forças Populares 25), which activities took place between 1980 and 1987,

were responsible for 17 murders. Interview Official, National Defense Ministry, July 2008 (b). Op.Cit., Interview Official, Ministry of Justice, July 2008 (f), Op.Cit.; Interview Official, Ministry of Interior, July 2008 (c). 3 They are not a target for an attack but they are still “logistical support bases”. Interview Official,

Ministry of National Defense, July 2008 (b). Op.Cit. 4 DA CRUZ, António Martins. “Discurso na 57ª Assembleia Geral da Nações Unidas [online]”. Nova

Iorque, 15 de Setembro de 2002 (author‟s free traduction).

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between the national and the European levels – as well as the above mentioned regional organisations and more restricted forums such as the 5+5 Dialogue and the Mediterranean Forum. We begin with the analytical and theoretical frameworks and then in a second part, we analyse the evolution of Portuguese preferences towards Morocco and Algeria. In the last part, we will synthesise the interactions between the two levels considering the changes at the national level caused by the EU and the possible Portuguese contribution through the projection of its preferences to the European policy and we will present our conclusions.

I- Analytical and theoretical frameworks

A- Bidirectional Europeanisation5

The definition used in this paper takes into account the interaction between the European and the national levels, that is to say, an entangled causality model which considers both dimensions of europeanisation-“top down” and “bottom up”6. We also partially used the classification presented by Reuben Wong which includes national adaptation, national projection and identity reconstruction7. The definition adopted is partly based on this classification and Wong‟s definition (Wong, 2007: 326; Wong, 2006), but it is mainly the result of a combination of two definitions – Radaelli‟s (Radaelli 2000: 4) and Bulmer and Burch‟s (Bulmer and Burch, 2000 : 2). So we define the europeanisation of foreign policy as follows:

A process that includes two dimensions, i.e., projection of national preferences to the European level and laterally among States, and reception of formal and informal rules, procedures, “ways of doing”, preferences, norms and beliefs consolidated at the European level and then incorporated in national discourses and policies.

In this context, the mechanism of entangled causality was adapted8 in order to include the “goodness of fit”9, as well as the “platform of coordination” mechanisms

5 Consult Bulmer and Burch‟s definition BULMER, Simon and BURCH, Martin. 2000. « Coming to

Terms with Europe: Europeanisation, Whitehall and the Challenge of Devolution [online]». Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation, n°9. p. 2 ; BORZEL, Tanja. 2001. “Pace-Setting, Foot dragging and Taking EU Policies : Member State Responses to Europeanization”. Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation, n°4. p.1 6 SAURUGGER, Sabine. 2009. Théories et Concepts de l’intégration européenne. Paris : Presses de

la Fondation nationale des Sciences politiques. p.261-262. One of the first authors using both expressions in the field of foreign policy is Ben Tonra, but in the constructivist perspective. Ben Tonra. 2001. The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy. Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union. Op.Cit. Instead Tanja Börzel used the two directions in a new-institutionalist theoretical framework: Tanja Börzel. 2001. “Pace-Setting, Foot dragging and Taking EU Policies : Member State Responses to Europeanization”. Op.Cit. 7 This last aspect is not considered, since our study is situated in a post-institutionalisation phase of

the European foreign policy (Single European Act in 1986 and second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty) that has perpetuated the socialization phenomenon existing since the 1970‟s. WONG, Reuben. 2006. The Europeanization of French foreign policy: France and the EU in East Asia. Basingstoke : Palgrave, p.16; 8 The scheme adapted and used by the author is based on the schemes presented by Sabine

Saurugger. Op.Cit. p.261-262; the one presented by Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles et James Caporaso (eds). Transforming Europe, Europeanization and Domestic Change. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. p. 6. and the Framing mechanism of cognitive convergence proposed by Claudio Radaelli. 2000. « Whither Europeanization ? Concept stretching and Substantive change [en ligne]». European Integration Online Paper. Vol.4, n°8. figure 2.

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which comprises minimalist directives and it is expected of the EU to find collective solutions and the necessary legitimacy to act (Radaelli, 2000: 18). This is possible through the cognitive convergence around the action of the EU (Radaelli, 2000:18). Thus, in terms of reception, the europeanisation can produce inertia, absorption, accommodation and retrenchment (Radaelli, 2000: 14; Radaelli, 2003: 37) and, in terms of projection, the State can assume a position of policy shaper, policy taker and policy supporter10.

a) Preferences in foreign policy and the conditions for europeanisation

We use in this study Federica Bicchi‟s crosspilar definition of European foreign policy (Bicchi, 2007: 2), though we do not take into account national foreign policies as a constituent at the European level11, on the one hand, because States foreign policy is not driven “in the name of the EU” (Bicchi, 2007: 16); on the other, in order to better evaluate the interaction between the national and the European levels.

As far as national preferences likely to be europeanised are concerned, we will focus on the evolution (1995-2010) of the priority given to the fight against terrorism in the luso-algerian and luso-moroccan bilateral relations agenda, as well as the evolution of the preference for a bilateralisation or a European approach of that matter. Finally, we analyse the tendency to resort to other forums, more restricted, as well as regional organisations like NATO and the OSCE. All these forums have a clear propensity to deal with security matters and, since we deal with the cooperation in the fight against terrorism and the two Maghrebian States are members or have partnership with these forums, these can strengthen or even be substitutes of the EU.

Thus, as we have already mentioned, we should not mix up europeanisation and European integration. Nonetheless, it can be asserted that europeanisation relies on a set of common values and objectives underlying the activities of these institutions, in particular the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In fact, in the case of NATO, the member States are “determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law (...) are resolved to unite their efforts

9 Concept used by, amongst others Tanja Börzel. « Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting:

Member State Responses to Europeanization », Op.Cit.; BÖRZEL,Tanja and RISSE, Thomas. 2003. « Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe » In FEATHERSTONE, Kevin and RADAELLI, Claudio (eds). The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.57-80. 10

This classification is based on the one presented in BÖRZEL, Tanja. 2003. « Shaping and Taking EU Policies : Member States Responses to Europeanization [online]». Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation. n°2; BÖRZEL, Tanja. 2002. « Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization », Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol.40, n°2. p. 193-214. In this last article, the author refers to the status of “fence-sitting” according to which States build strategic alliances depending on the subject. Our concept of “policy supporter” is closer to the projection, since the State takes the position of supporting entrepreneurs‟ initiatives, though it is not at the origin of these initiatives. 11

Consult Christopher Hill and Brian White‟s definition. HILL, Christopher. 1993.« The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role ». Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 31, n°3. p. 322-323 and WHITE, Brian. 1999.« The European challenges to Foreign Policy Analysis». European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5, n°1. p.46-47.

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for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security”12. The States which signed the Treaty of Rome (1957) have also stated their will to “preserve and strengthen peace and liberty and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join their efforts”13. Likewise, the Final Act of Helsinki asserted that “the common History shared by the Member States and the existence of elements common to their traditions and values can assist them in developing their relations and (…) overcoming distrust and increasing confidence, solving the problems that separate them (…) recognizing the indivisibility of security in Europe and the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole”14.

The established conditions favouring the europeanisation by reception and/or projection are based on the concept of “international actor”15 and on the new-institutionalism theoretical framework comprising three currents: rational, historic and sociological16.

Conditions favouring europeanisation17

Reception Projection

EU as an international actor18

EU as an international actor

Entrepreneurs (States/EU)19

Entrepreneurs (States)

Perception of a common problem leading to a consensus for a common solution

20

Presidency21

12 OTAN. « Traité de l‟Atlantique Nord », 4 avril 1949.

http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm 13

CEE. Préambule du Traité instituant la Communauté économique européenne [online], Rome, 25 mars 1957. Available on : http://eur-lex.europa.eu/fr/treaties/dat/11957E/tif/11957E.html [consulted on 16 April 2007] 14

Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe. « Questions relatives à la sécurité en Europe. ». Acte Final, Helsinki 1975 [online] . http://www.osce.org/fr/mc/39502 15

Based on the analytical framework of Bretherton and Vogler. For more information about the three criteria (opportunity, presence and capacity), consult: BRETHERTON, Charlotte and VOGLER, John. 2006. The European Union as a Global Actor. 2nd Ed. London and -New York: Routledge. 16

Based on the classification of HALL, Peter A. and TAYLOR, Rosemary C.R. 1996. « Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms ». Political Studies, XLIV. p. 936-957. 17

Consult the justification of the conditions in the author‟s paper Portugal e a UE na luta antiterrorista : europeização da política nacional, presented at the I Congresso OBSERVARE, 16 de November 2011, UAL. Available on: http://observare.ual.pt/images/stories/conference%20images%20pdf/S1/Veronica_Martins.pdf 18

The condition is valid for both dimensions. Vogler and Bretherton. Op.Cit. p. 24, 29-30. 19

It is also valid for both dimensions. In the case of reception, entrepreneurs are national ones (national/State representatives) and/or Europeans ones, since it is the role more or less active of European institutions in the Mediterranean policy that has to be verified; while in the projection, entrepreneurs are national ones, that is to say, Member States. Generally used as a mediating factor by new-institutionalists. Marie G. Cowles, James Caporaso and Thomas Risse (eds). 2000. Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change. Op.Cit. p.9 ; Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse. « Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe ». Op.Cit. p.67, 69; CAPORASO, James. « The Three Worlds of regional Integration Theory » in GRAZIANO, Paolo and VINK, Maarten (Eds). 2007. Europeanisation : New research agendas. Basingstoke; New York : Palgrave Macmillan. p.30-32. 20

Based on sociological and rational new-institutionalisms. The EU appears as an alternative arena for problem solving. It is an “interlocking arena” that affects preferences‟ formation. We draw on Federica Bicchi‟s analytical framework, though used all by itself this condition would only indicate a “bottom-up” movement. But the “problem solving” logic adopted by the States, ready to make some

5

Formal and informal constraints22

EU « source » of complementary and supplementary instruments

23

Low level of cooperation in the area of study

24

EU as a « cover »25

Strong national interests Algeria and Morocco

26

B- The articulation of three new-institutionalism currents27

As argued before, the conditions favouring europeanisation are based on the concept of “international actor” and a combination of the three currents of new-institutionalism28 meso-theory, in order to obtain an in-depth explanation of the evolution of Portuguese foreign policy preferences towards Morocco and Algeria in the cooperation against terrorism. We adopted the definition of institutions presented by Johan Olsen and James March, in which institutions are seen in a broader sense, in other words, formal and informal:

An institution is a relatively stable collection of rules and practices, embedded in structures of resources that make action possible - organizational, financial and staff capabilities, and structures of meaning that explain and justify behaviour – roles, identities and belongings, common purposes, and causal and normative beliefs (March and Olsen, 2004: 5).

The currents are linked to different variables, the rational being linked to the interests, the historical to the institutions and the sociological to the ideas (Palier and Surel, 2005). While the first one underlines actors'calculations between constraints and opportunities (Ingram and Clay, 2000: 525-546)29 inherent in the participation to European as well as national institutions and advocates an action complying with the “logic of consequentiality” (March and Olsen, 1989; March and Olsen, 1996), the last one advocates the adoption of the “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen, 2004), expression of the normative and cognitive dimensions, considered as “natural, legitimate and expected” (March and Olsen, 2004: 3). Finally, the historical current emphasises the concepts of “path dependency” (Peters, 1999:65) “unexpected consequences” coming from past positions and decisions taken by the actors (Pierson, 1998: 27-58). That is to say, member States‟ preferences are conditioned

concessions to reach a solution indicates a reception. Federica Bicchi. 2007. European Foreign Policy making toward the Mediterranean. Op.Cit.p.5 21

For more information : TALLBERG, Jonas. 2004. «The Power of the Presidency : Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU Negociations». Journal of Common Market Studies. (December), Vol.42, n°5. p.999-1022. This condition is based on historical and rational new-institutionalisms. 22

It completes the previous condition and it is based on historical and sociological new-institutionalisms. 23

Based on rational new-institutionalism. 24

Based on rational and historical new-institutionalisms. 25

Based on rational new-institutionalism. 26

Based on rational and historical new-institutionalisms. 27

Consult: LECOURS, André (ed.).2006. New Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis. Toronto, Buffalo, London: Toronto University Press. 28

According to the classification of HALL, Peter A. and TAYLOR, Rosemary C.R. 1996. « Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms ». Political Studies, XLIV. p. 936-957 29

Consult : INGRAM, Paul and CLAY, Karen. 2000. « The choice-within-Constraints New Institutionalism and Implications for Sociology ». Annual Review Sociology. n°26. p.525-546.

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by past decisions in Europe, underlying the “stickiness” of the institutions and a potential “lock-in” effect30.

II – The europeanisation of Portuguese preferences in the fight against terrorism with Algeria and Morocco: growing bilateralisation and externalisation of internal security

In order to evaluate the existing interaction between the national and European levels, we will now analyse what are the Portuguese preferences with each of the Maghrebian States and the developments at the European level with Algeria and Morocco between 1995 and 2010.

A- Late prioritarisation with Algeria and underlying concern but progressive prioritarisation with Morocco

As far as the prioritarisation of the question in bilateral agenda is concerned, starting with Algeria, we can assert that, until 2005, the Portuguese political priority was limited to the rhetorical dimension. Nonetheless, this does not mean that there was an indifference or ignorance of the Portuguese authorities concerning the terrorist activities striking Algeria31. However, besides the Portuguese interest in taking position at the European level and sending signals of support to the Algerian democratisation process, it also had an interest in stabilizing the country since it was necessary to ensure the safety of the natural gaz pipelines (Negreiros, 1996, 7; Cravinho and Brito, 2007).

Bilateral visits were amplified in the 2000‟s32 with 15 visits33 between 2001 and 2010, though they remain limited. If bilateral relations were boosted after President Jorge Sampaio‟s visit in 2003, it was the visit of Prime Minister Santana Lopes (January 2005) to sign the friendship Treaty in Algiers and the visit of President Bouteflika (May 2005) in Lisbon that represented a real turning (Telephone Interview, July 2008 (a)). Moreover, no official document or interview could allow us to conclude that the terrorism matter has been a priority in the bilateral agenda before34.

30 According to Pierson, «When actors adapt to new rules of the game by making extensive

commitments based on the expectation that these rules will continue, previous decisions may “lock-in” member State governments to policy options that they would not now choose to initiate». Paul Pierson. « The Path to European: A Historical-Institutionalist analysis ». Op.Cit. p.45-46. 31

According to the press, the events were closely followed and according to diplomatic sources, Jaime Gama‟s visit in May 1996 had several political objectives. The Minister was willing to send a signal in order to overcome the trauma of the Roma negotiations and to send a message to the Algerian authorities to stop the terrorist attacks as well as to stick out the previous European position that left the EU without instruments to act against terrorism in North Africa after suspending the political dialogue with Algeria. Interview with a Portuguese Interviewee, Lisbon, February 2009(a). Op.Cit. 32

The number of visits is an important indicator to verify bilateral relations‟ intensity concerning certain questions. We have selected Ministerial visits (Interior, Foreign Affairs and Justice) and those of the Prime Ministers and Presidents, bilateral as well as multilateral like in the framework of the 5+5 Dialogue and the Mediterranean Forum (when they take place in one of the States concerned). Between 1995 and 2000, there were only 4 visits between the two States. 33

It is interesting to notice that President Cavaco Silva has still not visited Algeria. The same happens with Morocco. 34

During the visit of President Bouteflika, the two ministers of foreign affairs signed a treaty in the field of Defense which includes cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Resolução da Assembleia da República n.º 60/2008. Aprova o Acordo de Cooperação no Domínio da Defesa entre a República

7

Following the signature of the friendship Treaty, the Algerian police presented a proposition of an agreement in the field of terrorism, as well as diverse propositions in the judicial domain35. Besides, in the final declarations of the second and third luso-Algerian summits, the authorities have reasserted “the need to conclude the negotiations concerning the Convention on the cooperation in the fight against terrorism and organized crime”36. Therefore, the prioritarisation of judicial and police questions was not really felt on the Portuguese side until recently and the initiative to conclude these agreements came from Algeria (Telephone interview, July 2008 (a)), thus there is no direct impact derived from European developments. The question of the fight against terrorism and police cooperation in this field remained marginal in the political agenda, until 2007, principally dealt with by experts. Consequently, it is a late bilateralisation.

In Morocco‟s case, the priority remained latent since the 1990‟s, although it became more evident before the beginning of our study period with the signature of a luso-moroccan agreement for the cooperation in the field of terrorism and organized crime (1992) and, more systematically since 2003. The interviews pointed out to several reasons for the negotiation of this agreement, in the first place, prevention (geographical proximity between the two states) then, personal affinities between interior Ministers (Interview, February 2009 (b)) and, finally, a close cooperation between Portuguese and Moroccan services in the field of information exchange37. However, considering the latent Islamic terrorism threat in Europe, it became obvious that it was necessary to renegotiate the agreement so as to adapt it to the reality of contemporary terrorism38.

As far as visits are concerned, as for Algeria, there was an intensification of the relation with Morocco, though the number of visits is comparatively higher and diplomatic relations are also more deep-rooted with this last one. Until 2000, we have listed 12 visits and only one of the Moroccan Interior Ministry in 199739, and although

Portuguesa e a República Democrática e Popular da Argélia, Diário da República, 1.ª série, n.º 201, 16 de Outubro de 2008. p.7416-7424. 35

This information is available on the website of the Portuguese embassy in Algiers, in “Relacionamento bilateral luso-argelino”: www.embaixadaportugalargel.com/ The Conventions on Judicial Mutual Assistance in Penal matters and on Extradition has entered into force. 36

PORTUGAL. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Declaração final da II cimeira luso-argelina[online]. Oeiras, 9 de Junho 2008; PORTUGAL. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Declaração final da III cimeira luso-argelina [online]. Oeiras, 9 de Novembro 2010; PORTUGAL. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Declaração final da III cimeira luso-argelina[online]. Oeiras, 9 de Novembro 2010. 37

Interview Official, Ministry of Interior, July 2008 (c). Op.Cit. ; Interview Official, Ministry of Justice, October 2009. Op.Cit. The Friendship and good neighbourhood Treaty (1994) had no article on terrorism that could confirm the Agreement signed two years before. PORTUGAL.Tratado de Amizade, boa vizinhança e cooperação entre a República portuguesa e o Reino de Marrocos, assinado em Rabat, 30 de Maio 1994. Decréto da Assembleia da República n°20/97. An Agreement on criminal judicial assistance was signed in November 1998 including quite general measures which may contribute to an improvement in the cooperation in the judicial area of the fight against terrorism. 38

According to an official of the Ministry of Justice, in 2009, the negotiations for an Agreement on mutual assistance in terms of organized crime between Portugal and Morocco were blocked in part because of the existence of death penalty in the Kingdom. Interview official, Ministry of Justice, October 2009, Op.Cit. 39

The list was provided by the Foreign Affairs ministry and was completed by the author.

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the existence of “exemplary relations between the two ministries40» has been underlined, it was not possible to find concrete examples of cooperation. In this context, we can conclude that relations in the field of security have developed essentially at the administrative not the political level41. Between 2001 and 2010, there were 24 visits42 and the rhythm accelerated between 2003 and 201043. It should be emphasised that eleven summits took place between the two States until 2010 and that if terrorism has assumed a growing importance in the agenda of the summits, it is interesting to notice that the matter was absent of the X Summit in 2008 (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2008). Thus, the prioritarisation in the EU-Morocco relations did not exercise a real influence on the Luso-Moroccan agenda though it reasserted the bilateral interest for the area.

B- Between bilateralisation and europeanisation of the approach to the fight against terrorism: mutual strengthening for the political dialogue

According to what have been said, we can conclude that there was a progressive bilateralisation in the handling of the fight against terrorism with Algeria and Morocco, though earlier with the last one. As it was asserted by, António Guterres in 1992 :

It is better not to forget that the main concrete threat to our security today can be found in the danger of Islamic fundamentalism triumph in the Maghreb and in the conditions that could be created against stability and peace in the Occidental Mediterranean (Guterres, 1992: 690)

44.

In other words, Portugal was already seen as a privileged “front door” (Ventura, 1996:110). Besides, Maghreb countries became visible for the Portuguese information Services after the terrorist attacks that occurred in France, since the French Services were the first to draw the attention of their European counterparts to the Islamic danger in this region (Interview, July 2008 (c)). Nonetheless, the Muslim community living in Portugal in the 1990‟s only represented a few tens of thousands individuals coming from different Islamic countries (mainly Portuguese-speakers) and the Portuguese information Services did not find any connections with fundamentalist doctrines or with radical religious organisations advocating terrorist acts (Ventura, 1996:111). In this context, in the first years of our study period, annual internal security reports did not indicate any kind of terrorist activities in the territory or against

40 Portugal. Ministério dos Negócios estrangeiros. Declaraçao Comum IV Cimeira luso-marroquina.

Évora, 13 e 14 de Novembro de 1998. p.3. The list was provided by the Foreign Affairs ministry and was completed by the author. 41

Maroc. Ministère des affaires étrangères. 1999. Déclaration commune Vème réunion de haut-niveau maroco-portugaise. Tanger, 6 e 7 Setembro. p.14. Moreover, in 1998, there were some progresses in terms of Justice because several agreements were signed. In 1999, (Convention in terms of Assistance to Prisoners and of transfer of convicted Prisoners). It was only in 1999 that the conclusions of the fifth summit included a section about “internal affairs” in which the parties decided to give a new impetus to the cooperation and the exchange of information concerning various subjects among which terrorism. There are no data to support the idea that there were bilateral progresses at the political level. 42

Only two for Portuguese Interior Minister in Rabat, one multilateral (CIMO) in October 2005 and May 2007 which proves the importance of internal security matters in general. List provided by the Foreign Ministry and completed by the author. 43

Even if we acknowledged only one visit of the Moroccan Foreign Ministry in Lisbon in July 2009. The list of the visit is also available on the website of the Portuguese Embassy in Rabat: http://ambportugalrabat.org/ptmar.html. 44

Author‟s free traduction.

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its interests45, a fact that can justify the lack of interest of the State for the bilateralisation in the handling of the subject at least until 200146.

We can assert that, during the launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995, Portugal shared the need for cooperation to guarantee its own safety as a vital interest for the country (Guterres, 1995: 423). The promotion of a political dialogue in which all political discussions could take place appeared as a leitmotiv, as well as the support of confidence-building measures in the security field (Interview, March 2008 (a)). Therefore, even if it was not a “policy shaper”, Portugal did not assumed a position of “policy taker” since it has preferred an European approach of the question, in particular with the Maghreb countries, acting as a “policy supporter”. Portugal « acts collectively with the “southern countries‟ block”» (Interview, September 2008 (b)), following a “logic of appropriateness”.

In the framework of the EU, various developments should be mentioned with respect to Algeria and Morocco. Considering that Algeria experienced civil war and terrorism in the 1990‟s, it felt abandoned by the international community, and it took advantage of the 11 September‟s attacks to get closer to the EU with the signature of the Association agreement in April 200247, which includes an anti-terrorism clause48, as well as a clause of non-proliferation. The first one came into sight as a reaction to the 11/09 attacks (Conseil de l‟Union européenne, 2002, annexe V, parag 4). The EU decided to evaluate systematically its relations with third countries in line with the contribution Algeria can give to the terrorist activities (Conseil de l‟Union européenne, 2002, parag.36). Despite a limited conditionality, the will of the Union to cooperate with Algeria in the field of technical assistance became a priority even if the Association Agreement came into force late (2005) and the first meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs sub-committee also took place late (UE, c.a. 2010: 26).

With Morocco, the relations have developed earlier since the Association Agreement came into effect in 200049, but this one did not mention anti-terrorist cooperation50 and the bilateral dialogue only acquired a certain substance after the beginning of the “Justice and Home affairs Sub-Committee” meetings (the first took place on 20 November 2003). In this context, it is pertinent to refer to the Casablanca attacks in May 2003 as “boosters” for this dialogue.

45PORTUGAL. Suplemento : Relatório anual em matéria de segurança interna. Diário da Assembleia

da República. 3 de Agosto de 1996, VII legislatura, primeira sessão legislativa (1995-1996), II Série C, n°24, p.84 46

However, we can refer that in the fifth summit with Morocco, in September 1999, both States decided to give a new impetus to cooperation and the exchange of information, in particular against terrorism. MAROC. Ministère des Affaires étrangères. 1999. Déclaration commune Vème réunion de haut-niveau maroco-portugaise. Tanger, 6 et 7 septembre. 47

Interview with an official, European Commission, February 2008 (a) 48

The European Council of Sevilla took the decision to include systematically an anti-terrorism clause in the new association Agreements to guarantee third States „cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Conseil de l‟Union européenne. Conclusions de la Présidence du Conseil européen de Séville 21 et 22 juin 2002 [online].p.32 ; Accord euro-méditerranéen établissant une association entre les Communautés européennes et leurs États membres, d'une part, et l'Algérie, d'autre part [online]. Journal Officiel n°L265 du 10/10/2005, p.0002-0228. 49

Signed on the 26 February 1996. 50

Accord euro-méditerranéen établissant une association entre les Communautés européennes et leurs États membres, d'une part, et le Royaume du Maroc, d'autre part. Journal officiel n° L 070 du 18/03/2000 p. 0002 – 0204

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In parallel to the bilateral dimension, during the 2000‟s presidency, Portugal tried to strengthen the Mediterranean policy of the EU by guaranteeing the adoption of the European Common Strategy for the Mediterranean which included a JHA chapter (Conseil de l‟Union européenne, 2000). With an active presidency, the State gains a certain leverage that it couldn‟t obtain bilaterally, a superior capacity of diplomatic intervention as a member of the EU, which represents a multiplying factor of the Portuguese presence in the region (Telephone Interview, September 2008 (g)). But, aware of its limitations, Portugal has acted according to its own resources51, this is why, meanwhile, we have not notice an increase in the bilateralisation of the approach of terrorism.

The European Commission has only launched a new initiative with the European Neighbourhood Policy and, with the Action Plans, it has negotiated some detailed arrangements in order “to continue to develop” the cooperation in the fight against terrorism with Morocco (Algeria has no Action Plan) (Commission européenne, 2004: point 10). However, there were little projects besides the political dialogue at the European level and the bilateral cooperation with some Member States52. The Commission worked out a project for the management of Moroccan borders (Interview, March 2008 (f)) which, indirectly, should contribute to the fight against terrorism. The balance is mitigated, but in the Neighbourhood Strategy Document the Commission mentioned that Morocco “could become a „pilot country‟ for actions that could be developed later with other partners of the region” (Commission européenne, c.a 2006:11). In fact, in the framework of the COTER (working group of the second pillar), the Member States have decided to launch a technical assistance plan, but it was more like a disparate list of actions taken by each of the Member States in order to avoid duplications than a coherent and global Community strategy53.

Even if both States are favourable to a police and judicial cooperation, necessary to Morocco in order to reach the “advanced Status” with the EU, the fact is that the technical and operational cooperation with the United States is more visible and efficient bilaterally as well as in the framework of the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative (Bras, 2006: 464).

As we have already seen, terrorism appears more often in the bilateral agenda with Morocco after 2003, Casablanca‟s attacks being de facto a booster element. There was a greater bilateralisation in the field of Justice due to a bigger proximity

51 Ibidem. In this context Portugal has worked in order to make the adoption of the Common Strategy

for the Mediterranean possible. It includes a JHA chapter with some measures on terrorism oriented, namely, to the ratification and implementation of the UN‟s conventions. 52

As far as financing is concerned, the National Indicative Plan 2005-2006 emphasised the social aspects necessary to improve the living conditions of the terrorism‟s victims, to fight against poverty, namely among young people which are targets for the recruitment of terrorists, through the improvement of human resources (TEMPUS project). Commission européenne. « IEPV Maroc. Document de Stratégie 2007-2013 & Programme Indicatif National 2007-2010 [online] ». p.21-22. 53

Interview official, European Commission, February 2008 (d). This initiative gathers four States (except for Libya) and five Southern Sahara States (Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Chad). It aims at implementing a global strategy in the field of regional security in order to secure the borders against terrorists‟ infiltrations. BRAS, Jean-Philippe. 2006. «Le Maghreb dans la «guerre contre le terrorisme» : enjeux juridiques et politiques des législations «anti-terroristes»». Année du Maghreb 2005-2006, p.464.

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(since the last ten years54), namely in the relation between the polices of investigation, also as a consequence of older relations (Interview, July 2008 (f)). For Algeria, we have seen that Jorge Sampaio‟s visit of December 2003 was beneficial to revive the relations55, by arguing that the luso-Algerian relations “cannot be held hostage of criminal activities of terrorist organizations56”. Moreover, the rapprochement continued with the signature of the Friendship Treaty in January 2005 which includes an article (16°) on juridical and judicial cooperation57 and with the negotiation initiative taken by the Maghrebian State for a Convention on the fight against terrorism and organized crime (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2008; Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2010). Portugal also took advantage of its presidency of the EU (second semester of 2007) to strengthen its position within the European foreign policy, assuming a position of “policy shaper” through the suggestion of a troika dialogue within COTER (terrorist working group on terrorism of the second pillar) with Algeria and Morocco58 and a re-evaluation of EU‟s Technical Assistance Strategy with Algeria (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2008:126). In fact, there was a projection of Portuguese preferences so as to strengthen the fight against terrorism at the European level, but also within other forums, assuming simultaneously a “logic of consequentialism” as far as prevention is concerned and a “logic of appropriateness”, as far as solidarity is concerned. This does not prevent indicators to point to an intensification of the bilateralism of the Luso-Moroccan relations and, though in a lesser extent, of Luso-Algerian relations in the field of fight against terrorism59. The launching of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008 has not changed anything, because after more than one year of paralysis, participants emphasised non problematic themes such as environment, water, education or social questions60. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty points to the continuity of a preference for an European approach of the fight against terrorism, but also for a strengthening of bilateralisation. These two facets are mutually reinforcing. In fact,

54 Some justice agreements were signed as the one about the transfer of convicted persons (14

November 1998) and the agreement on judicial assistance on criminal matters (on the same day). 55

President Sampaio was willing to develop the relations with Algeria in order to reach the same level as the neighbours of Algeria, namely by strengthening the political dialogue, completing the contractual framework that governs the bilateral relations and the promotion of economic and cultural exchanges. SAMPAIO, Jorge. Discurso de Sexa Presidente da República por ocasião da Assembleia Popular nacional da Argélia [en ligne]. Argel, 3 de Dezembro de 2003. Nevertheless, the worries towards several attacks targeting Algeria since the beginning of the 1990 were present at the national level because the press revue of some daily newspapers and some weekly ones showed an assiduous coverage of these events in the 1990‟s. 56

Jorge Sampaio. Discurso de Sexa Presidente da República por ocasião da Assembleia Popular nacional da Argélia. Op.Cit. (author‟s free traduction) 57

To cooperate in the fields of prevention and fight against transnational organized crime, terrorism and its financing (…) PORTUGAL. Resolução da Assembleia da República n.º 14/2006, Aprova, para ratificação, o Tratado de Amizade, Boa Vizinhança e Cooperação entre a República Portuguesa e a República Democrática e Popular da Argélia, assinado em Argel em 8 de Janeiro de 2005. Article 16° alinéa c. 58

According to an official document of the Foreign Ministry, “[t]his meeting had very positive results, pointing the interest in an in-depth dialogue with this Maghrebian country”. With Morocco, there was no meeting due to an incompatibility between agendas. Portugal. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. 2008. Balanço da Presidência Portuguesa 2007. Lisboa: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, p.126. 59

The second Algerian-Portuguese summit occurred in June 2008. The Foreign Minister Luis Amado asserted that EU‟s support to Algeria is essential to counter terrorism. Sem Autor. «Portugal e Argélia querem “solução aceitável”para Sahara ocidental [en ligne]». Tv1.trp.pt, 9 Junho 2008. 60

Consult: http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/projects/ ; http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_fr.htm

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Portugal continues to support EU‟s action, though this one remains limited in its capacities61, for as acknowledged by some experts, “its normative power stagnates at the gates of the diplomatic-strategic arena62” and, therefore, it is necessary to cultivate the bilateral facet to strengthen the national policy as well as the European one.

C- The participation in other forums: essential spaces for the cooperation in the Mediterranean

We are now going to consider the third aspects of national preferences, the participation in other forums. Portugal assumes a role of “policy supporter” and, sometimes, of “policy shaper” in the way it deals with the fight against terrorism at the European level. As it has been referred to in the introduction, we deal with two types of forums, an informal one, more restricted and whose members are Euro-Mediterranean–Dialogue 5+563 formations64 and the Mediterranean Forum65; the others, formal, larger and whose members are not Mediterranean countries but with which they maintain political dialogues - the regional organization NATO and OSCE.

As far as the first are concerned, Portugal is a “founding member” and the terrorism question was dealt with since the beginning in the 5+5 Dialogue (Foreign Ministers/Interior Ministers) as well as in the Mediterranean Forum. In this one, in the 1995 meeting, the French Foreign Minister mentioned that the debates should focus on “security and stability, the democratic process and Human Rights, terrorism and extremism” (Juppé, 1995: 3).

As the 5+5 Dialogue‟s formations are concerned, due to security problems in the 1990‟s, Foreign Ministers‟ conferences were suspended66 before they were relaunched in January 2001, on the initiative of Jaime Gama (Interview, June 2008 (d)). This was an evidence of the diplomatic added-value of this forum when considering a mitigated balance of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (PEM). The Ministers of Interior have also dedicated a special place to the fight against terrorism at least since 1999 (V CIMO, 1999)67, in Algiers. In 2000, when Portugal became President of the European Union, the theme of the organized crime was reinstated as a central point of the agenda, followed by terrorism (VI CIMO, 2000). The conclusions

61 For some experts, the end of the pillar‟s structure and the creation of the European External Action

Service can contribute to the creation of a common diplomatic culture and an improved coherence “if European Nations agree to play more collectively” (author‟s free traduction). HILLION, Christophe et LEFREBVRE, Maxime. 2010. « Le service européen pour l‟action extérieure : vers une diplomatie commune ?[en ligne] ». Question d’Europe.17 mai 2010, policy paper n°169, Fondation Robert Schuman, p.7-8. 62

LAÏDI, Zaiki. 2009. « L‟Europe, puissance normative internationale» In DEHOUSSE, Renaud (dir). Politiques Européenne. Paris :Presses de Sciences-Po. p227-242 (author‟s free traduction). 63

Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, Malta, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania. 64

Meetings at the level of the Foreign Ministers and of Interior Ministers. 65

The 5+5 Members and Egypt (founder), Greece and Turkey. 66

Marseille in February 1988, Rome in October 1990 and Algiers in 1991. For more information, consult : MEDEA. « Dialogue 5+5 (Méditerranée occidentale) [online]» ; CHERIGUI, Hayète. La politique méditerranéenne de la France : entre diplomatie collective et leadership.Op.Cit. p.146-152 for information on its organisation and its functioning. 67

We did not have access to the three first meetings‟ conclusions. The first took place in 1995. Dialogue 5+5. V réunion des ministres de l‟intérieur des pays de la Méditerranée occidentale. Déclaration finale. Alger, 20-21 juin 1999.

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consulted since 2001 have confirmed the importance of terrorism on the agenda (VIII CIMO, 2002). For a diplomat, “ the belonging to a more restricted group gives a better visibility to Portugal and a bigger weight, and concerning security matters, the 5+5 Dialogue is an important group, maybe even more important than the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the bilateral relations EU-Maghrebian States” (Telephone interview, July 2008 (a)). In fact, the action in an informal framework is a way to progress and, more concretely, to get around the difficulties of the Partnership in security matters (Ibidem).

The Mediterranean Forum has contributed to the development of counter-terrorism cooperation. Portugal was President in 2000 as well as for the 5+5 Dialogue and the EU (second semester), as we have seen, a fact that could have make the transmission of information easier between the different forums. The Ministers called for the continuation of the dialogue in the field of the fight against terrorism on a regular basis so as to contribute to the Barcelona Process68. The Agadir‟s conference of 2001 was dedicated to the theme “Mediterranean: facing terrorism and for the cooperation "69 and an extra meeting was organized on the 25 and 26 of October, the first one between Northern and Southern States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks70. The Ministers have taken into account the works initiated before the events of September 2001, under Spanish Presidency, and have continued to endeavour to conclude a project on a Code of conduct against terrorism and to submit it to the next meeting of the Mediterranean Forum (Forum Méditerranéen, 2001).

Portugal (and the other European participants) clearly tried to transfer policies and solutions towards the Euro-Mediterranean arena, therefore finding supports to project its priorities. It is a “crossloading71 when the States stick up for propositions which reflect their ideas and values in front of the European and Mediterranean partners in more restricted forums, so as to take them afterwards to the Euro-Mediterranean

68Indeed, the ad hoc group for the fight against terrorism met in February and the Ministers asked the

Forum to transmit the conclusions of the meeting to the Presidency of the Barcelona Process. Oral Conclusions of the Seventh Ordinary Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Mediterranean Forum [en ligne], Funchal, 30-31 March 2000. 69

The Belgian Presidency of the EU and the European Commission were exceptionally invited to this meeting. Forum Méditerranéen, Agadir, 25 et 26 octobre 2001. Disponible sur : http://www.maec.gov.ma/fr/EUROPE/ForumInternet00.htm. 70

It was an occasion for the Ministers to express their condemnation of terrorism, the solidarity towards the United States and the refusal of any kind of confusion between terrorism and a culture or a religion. 71

Claudia Major and Karoline Pomorska and Reuben Wong have presented definitions of crossloading which were used as a basis for our definition: “the exchange of ideas, norms and „ways of doing‟ things between countries or other entities for which the EU sets the scene; thus change is not only „due‟ to but takes place „within‟. Europe”. MAJOR, Claudia. and POMORSKA, Karoline.2005. « Europeanisation : framework or fashion [en ligne]? » FORNET CFSP Forum. September, Vol. 3, issue 5; According to R. Wong, crossloading is: «the result of projection and reception (adaptation and policy convergence). Harmonization process tending towards middle position; common EU interests are promoted ». Reuben Wong. 2007.«Foreign Policy». Op.Cit. p.327. Therefore, our definition is the following: It is the result of projection and reception movements (policy supporter and absorption). The exchange of ideas, norms, « ways of doing » among States to which the EU provides a framework. The interactions among States take place not only within the EU but also within other forums to coordinate their positions and to promote the European interest. The EU becomes the framework rather than the origin of the change (the interaction does not go through the European institutions properly said. We want to thank Renaud Dehousse for this suggestion).

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Process. The fact that the Mediterranean Forum managed to agree on a Code of Conduct against terrorism before the EU and, we should recall, because Portugal has presented no significant initiative, the Portuguese support to the Code of conduct turned it into a “policy supporter”. This status was assumed by Portugal, in general, concerning the contacts between the restricted forums and the EU in the field of the fight against terrorism.

As far as regional organisations are concerned, while Portugal is a founding State of NATO, it has only become a member of OSCE in 1 January 1995. Both organisations have established relations with the States of the Southern Mediterranean: the Mediterranean Dialogue of NATO, launched in 199472 and the Mediterranean Contact Group of the OSCE, also created in 1994 and formed by experts73. NATO‟s fight against terrorism in the Mediterranean area is best represented by the operation Active Endeavour, launched on 6 October 2001, following the 9/11 attacks74. Morocco has been a voluntary partners and the acknowledgement of this collaboration has led to the participation of this State to Active Endeavour since February 2011 (Fihri, 2011). For Portugal, NATO and the EU are the main multilateral frameworks of reference in the fight against terrorism (Costa, 2010:2). The Portuguese participation to NATO‟s missions has been constant in the framework of Active Endeavour75. In fact, besides the inherent prestige of the existence of a NATO‟s headquarter in Portugal, NATO‟s operations in the Mediterranean area contribute to the security of the country and promote the development of military cooperation with Morocco in the field of terrorism that is why Portugal is a “policy supporter”.

Portugal assumed the presidency of OSCE in 2002. It was an opportunity for the State to prove its commitment to the fight against terrorism, taking into account the attacks of 2001. As referred by Martins da Cruz, terrorism was (inevitably) at the center of the agenda and, in this context, it organized the first International Meeting on Terrorism in June 2002, bringing together the senior Officials of the principal organizations in the domain of the fight against terrorism (Da Cruz, 2002). Moreover, the presidency has proposed the drafting of an OSCE Charter on preventing and combating terrorism. The endeavours continued with an International Meeting on

72 Composed of NATO‟s members and seven Mediterranean States: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria,

Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Israel. It is opened to the countries of the region and it is focused on security questions in the Mediterranean area. Consult : IEMed et Fundació CIDOB. 2004 « Chronologies : autres initiatives multilatérales en Méditerranée [online] ». Med2003. p.300-302. Consult : NATO. « Le Dialogue méditerranéen de l‟OTAN ». Available on : http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/SID-5C827698-7D5D5228/natolive/topics_60021.htm? 73

It includes the Member States of the OSCE and of Mediterranean partners: Israel, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and the Egypt. Exchanges are informal. It is about maintaining a dialogue so as to discuss and exchange ideas on the most important thematic for both margins, but the question of immigration is not included. Ibidem. 74

Consult : NATO. Opération Active Endeavour. Available on: http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natolive/topics_7932.htm [8 janvier 2012]. This is not NATO‟s first initiative, since in 1992, it has launched the STANAVFORMED and, as a follow up, the Southern European States have created EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR in 1996. For more information on the articulation of NATO, UE and the Mediterranean, consult: BENANTAR, Abdennour. 2006. “NATO, Maghreb and Europe”. Mediterranean Politics. July 2006, Vol.11, n°2. p.167-188. 75

The Portuguese Air force participated to the control of the Mediterranean Sea between 2003 and 2008 with an airplane P-3P; The Navy also participated to short missions between November 2001 and June 2008. BRANCO, Carlos Martins.2010. “A participação de Portugal em operações de paz.. Êxitos, problemas e desafios: Anexos[online]”. E-Cadernos CES.

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Terrorism II, in September 2003, with an enlarged participation, including Morocco (Lusa, 2003). As for the EU, the OSCE has a comprehensive definition of security. However, in operational terms, the Mediterranean is far from constituting a priority for the OSCE, because the biggest part of the developed actions takes part in Europe76. According to the information gathered, in practice, Portugal has only participated to trainings and seminars (promotion of the tolerance and non-discrimination, freedom of press...) since the organization does not develop operational actions in the Mediterranean area77.

III – The europeanisation of the fight against terrorism: inertia in the reception, moderation of the projection and the importance of crossloading

Let us see now which conditions78 -that could have favored europeanisation by projection or reception- were verified.

A) Dimension of reception: between inertia and growing crossloading

It is necessary to specify the condition according to which the EU is recognized as being an international actor in the three Maghrebian States. The data collected established a clear distinction between the political and the operational and technical aspects of the cooperation in the fight against terrorism. This distinction emphasizes the “civilian” nature of its action, but it is “civilian power” (Duchêne, 1973) by default79. If EU‟s capacity as an international actor is contested, since it is considered more as the result of the power of the 27 Member States (Telephone Interview, June 2008 (f)), the fact is that the political dialogue is an integral central element of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and of the Neighbourhood Policy. It has developed progressively, but as it is advocated by the incrementalism, a political decision is considered to be fair if it produces a consensus among the various actors (Jönsson, 2006: 263).

The results of cooperation may not be optimal, but according to the data collected among the primary and secondary sources indicate that the decisions taken are strongly oriented by the existing policies and values (Jönsson, 2006: 261). Portugal recognizes EU‟s status of “international actor”, and in this context, José Sócrates had announced the strengthening of police and judicial cooperation as one of the priorities of Portugal‟s presidency (Socrates, 2007). Therefore it would be necessary to maintain as a common objective of Member states the anti-terrorism policy (ibidem). Portugal has assumed a position of “policy supporter” and, exceptionally, of “policy shaper”.

76 Consult OSCE Annual Reports: http://www.osce.org/item/66000

77 The operations are essentially developed in South Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia.

FRANCE. Ministère des affaires étrangères. Présentation de l’OSCE [online]. 78

Vide conditions in the first part. 79

“Civilian Power by default” is a concept proposed by Stelios Stavridis who drawn from Maull‟s concept. Stavridis asserted that «the militarizing of the Union‟s institutions, capabilities and intentions is strengthening the concept of a civilian power Europe», STAVRIDIS, Stelios. 2001. « Militarising the EU: the Concept of Civilian Power Europe revisited ». The International Spectator. Vol. 36, n°4. p. 47.

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If we continue the verification of the conditions favoring the reception movement, we can notice the existence of the perception of a common problem. Portugal remains a « target of opportunity», the geographical proximity has always been a factor that worried the Portuguese authorities for, even if the risks of military attacks coming from the Maghreb are almost non-existent, the Iberian Peninsula could be infiltrated by illegal terrorists willing to commit attacks against Portugal or its neighbour, Spain or even against other countries of the EU (Ventura, 1996: 109-110). Portugal belongs to the group that we can call “Mediterranean bloc”80, composed by Southern Europe States whose role as entrepreneurs stem from the acknowledgment of a common problem and could correspond to a movement of projection. Nonetheless, when adopting an attitude of problem solving based on consensus, the States are forced to make concessions so as to form a cognitive frame at the European level81, assuming the “logic of appropriateness” of March and Olsen and leading to a reception movement. But this effect has not been noted in a bilateral plan82 because we couldn‟t find any “misfit” (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2000; Börzel, 2002; Börzel and Risse, 2003) in the matter of terrorism, since the question was already important to Portugal, even if there was « no security obsession concerning the region» (Interview, February 2009 (a)). The conscience of a common problem has been intensifying in Portugal in the 2000‟s, multiplying its involvement in the international forums, as we have seen in point C. As a “policy supporter”, we can confirm that there is a “crossloading”83, a convergence where the European interests are promoted in order to achieve a middle position (Wong, 2006: 326). Thus the Portuguese government has subscribed to this European global solution to fight against terrorism.

As far as formal and informal constraints generated by the acquis are concerned, the question of terrorism has occupied a relatively low profile during the first years of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership‟s activities whose conclusions did not indicate any important evolution84. However, as the other Southern Europe States, Portugal was already participating to the different forums in the middle of the 1990‟s where political dialogues with the Mediterranean States were also taking place and within which Portugal tried to promote the concerns of the EMP related to terrorism. This behaviour resulted in its “policy supporter” status as well as in absorption because of the socialization inherent to its “membership” to the

80 During an interview, the interviewee has referred to the abovementioned “bloc”(telephone Interview,

June 2008 (f)) to characterize a more homogeneous position, in solidarity with the Southern countries of Europe which defend a more “generous” policy towards the Maghreb States (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal), but also Greece and Malta (members of the 5+5 Dialogue and the Mediterranean Forum) and Cyprus. 81

This cognitive frame is progressively constituted and characterized not only by a comprehensive concept of security (that includes the terrorist threat), but also by a global strategy to secure the Mediterranean mainly based on economic stabilization and social development as well as political dialogue. Federica Bicchi. European Foreign Policy making toward the Mediterranean. Op.Cit.p.166. 82

The bilateral agenda did not emphasize the question of terrorism and only a few agreements on the field of Justice were signed, concerning only partially the fight against terrorism. 83

A synthesis movement between reception and projection (absorption and policy supporter), but closer to projection and therefore we do not consider it as a third direction. Let us not forget that our study is situated in a “post-institutionalisation” phase of the European external policy, from a formal point of view (Maastricht 1993) as well as from an informal one and the participation to this policy since the 1970‟s implies, at least, absorption. 84

There were three meetings of the ad hoc Senior Officials group, but since there no written conclusions, they were not helpful to check the evolution of the matter.

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“Mediterranean bloc”. That is to say, Portugal plays consciously this role (Checkel, 2005: 804) and, we should remember that according to the European Treaties, the Member States should support the European external policy without prejudicing its effectiveness and coherence in the international relations85. We saw that, at the Euro-Maghrebian level, the question was not present in the agenda partly because the Association Agreement signed with Morocco did not include any clause on terrorism. Thus, bilaterally, between Portugal and Morocco/Algeria, during the period 1995-2000, we cannot establish any relation of causality between the developments at the national and European levels.

The assessment of the lack of a strong formal acquis has contributed to the validation of the condition related to the existence of a weak bilateral cooperation in the field of the fight against terrorism since, for Portugal, there was also no development during that period. In fact, in order to verify the occurrence of a “top-down” europeanisation, the existence of a formal and informal acquis would also be necessary as an evidence of important developments at the European. Thus, it was a period of inertia.

How formal and informal constraints can have an impact on the national preferences between 2001 e 2010? There was a precedent with the adoption of several documents86 and both European and Maghrebian States have entered into a “path dependency” and even the more reticent ones about dealing with security matters were pushed to tackle them at the European level, and also at the bilateral meetings among the Members of the Union. We could also notice some programming effects produced by the institutionalisation of the Euro-Mediterranean policy and by established procedures in the framework of the preparation of the 2007 Presidency‟s agenda which has created difficulties to Portugal. In fact, “the agenda was conditioned as far as the meetings with Indonesia, India and Pakistan were concerned and there was a little margin of manoeuvre to imprint its personal mark to the presidency so it was necessary to negotiate the proposal of a technical dialogue with Morocco and Algeria with the Council General Secretariat” (Interview, June 2008 (d)). Nevertheless, the Euro-Maghrebian acquis is not enough consolidated and restrictive yet. It is expected that, after the adoption of EU Internal Security Strategy in March 2010 (Union européenne, 2010), the European approach to security could be more comprehensive and proactive through a closer cooperation with third countries. This period has thus oscillated between absorption87 and inertia.

85 Article J.1, n°4. Traité de l‟Union européenne, Journal officiel n°C191 du 29 juillet 1992.

86 As far as the formal acquis is concerned, we took into consideration four Euro-Mediterranean

measures: the decision to include an anti-terrorism clause in the Association Agreements, namely the Algerian one; The adoption of the JHA regional program of Valencia in 2002 which comprises several specific measures on anti-terrorism cooperation; the Neighbourhood Action Plan for Morocco (and Tunisia also) which includes measures for the cooperation against terrorism; and, finally, the adoption of the Euro-Mediterranean Code of conduct in countering terrorism. EUROMED. Sommet euro-méditerranéen organisé à l’occasion du dixième anniversaire du partenariat euro-méditerranéen, Barcelone, les 27 et 28 novembre 2005. Code de conduite euro-méditerranéen en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme. 15075/05 (Presse 328), 28 novembre 2005, Bruxelles. 87

Change considered as an adaptation, there is no fundamental change in the national preferences and the demands are accommodated without really modifying the essential structures or changing the logic of political behaviour. Claudio M Radaelli. 2000. « Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and Substantive change ». Op.Cit. Adrienne Windhoff-Héritier, Christopher Knill and Dieter Kerwer. 2001. Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National policymaking.Op.Cit

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If we consider again the condition linked to a weak bilateral cooperation in the field of terrorism between 2001-2010, it should be noticed that, in bilateral meetings, the importance attributed to the cooperation between the EU and the Maghrebian partners and to the EMP is recurrent, even if we cannot affirm that the bilateral relations in the fight against terrorism are really developed. After the 9/11 attacks, the dialogue among the cultures became central. Furthermore, it is possible to state that bilateral contacts (Portugal-Morocco/Algeria) were visibly strengthened since the middle of last decade due to the terrorist attacks in Euro-Maghrebian space, which led to the conclusion of bilateral agreements and bilateral Summits that emphasized the importance of cooperation in the fight against terrorism. However, we cannot assert that this evolution is a direct consequence of a reception process since the Maghrebian partners have also proved to be entrepreneurs88, though the interest is also motivated by the systematic approach of terrorism with the EU and that, bilaterally, the question is mainly tackled as a “burning issue” of general interest to create an area of peace and security in the Mediterranean (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 2002: 2). There is a support to the EMP‟s principles and, in this context, the socialisation effect is intensified by transnational terrorism and by the persistence of “cognitive uncertainty” among decision-maker (Bicchi, 2007: 180).

To end the verification of the conditions favoring the reception, it must be mentioned that neither the Commission nor the Parliament had an entrepreneur‟s role. In fact, despite a shared power of initiative within the third pillar since 2004, the Commission has only presented some proposals when it is invited to do so by the Member States and the police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters remained an intergovernmental domain89. Besides, no national political personalities stood out in the way of favouring a movement of reception and changing preferences in the fight against terrorism with Algeria and Morocco. In general, there is a convergence concerning the measures that have to be taken, in other words, there is no “misfit”. This period has oscillated between inertia and absorption90.

B) The dimension of projection: the usefulness of political dialogue

After the analysis of the conditions favouring the reception, let us see now the ones which facilitate the projection, starting by the existence of strong interests towards Algeria and Morocco, in particular in the fields of security and economy, that stimulate the Portuguese government to transfer its concerns to the European level, not only because it is a Member of the European space but also because national

88Let‟s recall the Algerian initiative for the conclusion of an agreement in the fight against terrorism and

organized crime. 89

We should mention a lack of coordination due to interinstitutional and intrainstitutional rivalries which weaken the European intitutions in face of the Member States. Interview Official, European Commission, March 2008 (f); MARTINS, Verónica. 2009. « Maghreb Challenges and EU Measures Taken Towards the Region [online]». UE-CONSENT- Priority 7 – Citizens and Governance in the Knowledge-based Society. Deliverable n°121. Team 23, 2009 (financed by the 6th PCRDT); WOLFF, Sarah. 2009. « The Mediterranean dimension of EU counter-terrorism ». Journal of European Integration. January, vol. 31, n°1. p.142. 90

Claudio M Radaelli. 2000. « Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and Substantive change ». Op.Cit.; Adrienne Windhoff-Héritier, Christopher Knill and Dieter Kerwer. 2001. Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National policymaking.Op.Cit

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solutions are no longer efficient91. The Strategic Concept of National Defense of 2003 identified the terrorism to a threat to the security of the country and mentioned « the new risks and potential threats among which the tragic events of 9/1192». Thus, in this context, we saw that Portugal has supported the inclusion of the fight against terrorism in the framework of the EMP and has acknowledged EU‟s role as a “leader” in this fight, despite the limits to its functions as a “political dialogue arena”.

Bearing in mind existing national interests, does Portugal consider the UE as being a supplier of supplementary resources for the fight against Islamic terrorism?93 Even if there were no important developments during the first Euro-Mediterranean conferences, the meetings of the antiterrorism ad hoc group continued to be organized (it is difficult to notice practical results). According to a French diplomat, “the meetings constitute a confidence-building measure (...) an informal dialogue which occurs in an environment without tensions, non-conflicting, that is to say, a kind of common awareness...” (Interview, March 2008 (k)). The interviews consider that the meetings within COTER and the third pillar working group (GTT) are “a privileged level to establish contacts, because the fact of knowing the people we are working with is an added-value” (Interview, July 2008 (c)). The European dimension is de facto fundamental for exchanges, even if “the nature of information exchanged is only abstract” (Ibidem). In the bilateral relations between the EU and Morocco/Algeria, « there are many ideas, declarations, but they mainly stay at the political level, there are great difficulties to realize concrete projects» (ibidem), though the attribution of the “advanced status” to Morocco is an evidence of improvements in the cooperation, including in the field of terrorism. As for international police and judicial cooperation promoted between Portugal and both Maghrebian countries- despite an in-depth research in databases of official documents and interviews – it is interesting to notice that it is very occasional94. The tendency is rather for cooperation with Portuguese-speaking African countries. Moreover, in the balance of technical and police cooperation of the Interior Ministry (2007-2009), the Instituto Português de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento (IPAD) as well as the Interior Ministry asserted that the priority was “ international, European and national given the cooperation with

91 In fact, we can mention the securitisation of energy supplies coming from Algeria. RTP. “Argélia

fornece 40% do gás[online]”. RTP.9 de Novembro 2010. 92

Portugal. Conselho de Ministros. Introdução do Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional, Resolução do Conselho de Ministros nº6/2003. Diário da República n°16, Série I-B de 20 de janeiro de 2003. 93

We should not forget that the external dimension of JHA only had a real expansion since the Tampere European Council of October 1999, though the first ad hoc meeting of Senior official on terrorism took place in 1998 and institutionalized this facet, even if it is dependent on the initiative capacity and the actions of Member States. EUROMED. Conclusions formelles de la Présidence. Troisième conférence euro-méditerranéenne des Ministres des affaires étrangères, Stuttgart 15 et 16 avril 1999, paragraphe 15. 94

During his visit to Algiers, in December 2003, The President Sampaio refered to a training of 30 Algerian policemen fez a referência a um estágio de 30 polícias argelinos na polícia judiciária portuguesa, no âmbito do programa MEDA , no domínio do grande banditismo que se devia realizar em breve. Sampaio, Jorge. 2003. Discurso de Sexa Presidente da República por ocasião da Assembleia Popular nacional da Argélia [online]. Argel, 3 de Dezembro. In the Annual Internal Security Report, it has also been mentioned that two Algerians have participated to a training organized by the Instituto Superior da Polícia Judiciária e Ciências Criminais. PORTUGAL. 2006. Gabinete do Coordenador de Segurança. Relatório anual em matéria de Segurança Interna de 2005. Lisboa: Ministério da Administração Interna. p.205.

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Portuguese-speaking Africa95”. Nonetheless, the interviewees have admitted the usefulness of the MEDA funds96 and of the planning and organisation of several seminars, even if Portugal did not become a leader for the projects. It is more like a lack of strategic vision for the cooperation with the Maghrebian States and this is a limit to the participation of the State to European projects (Interview, October 2009), suitable for technical and operational rapprochement.

As far as the condition according to which the EU is considered as an “alibi”97, it has not been verified, since Portugal has not been a target of Islamic terrorist attacks and, we have seen that it is not a problem in bilateral relations and the Islamic terrorist activities are almost nonexistent in the territory98. So it has not been necessary to resort to the EU and the EMP as “alibis” to improve its relations with Algeria and Morocco in the domain of the fight against terrorism, since the question is tackled from an international point of view.

Portugal had active EU‟s presidencies, even if the first one (first semester of 2000) could be sum up by the facilitation for the adoption of the EU Common Strategy for the Mediterranean99, which JHA chapter includes measures for the fight against terrorism. Taking into account the growing interest of the Portuguese diplomacy towards Algeria and Morocco, the second presidency was more ambitious and proactive in all the fields. Portugal is aware of the “good image” the Maghrebian countries have of it and its presidencies represent a good opportunity to turn Portugal into a “motor” of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, despite the European constraints on its agenda. According to a French diplomat, “within the COTER, there were political dialogue with Arab States, and it was a pity, so we supported Portugal because we thought it was necessary to have more political dialogues, namely with Morocco and Algeria” (Interview, May 2008 (b)). Besides, according to the TE-SAT 2008, Portugal has communicated that the increase of the activities of Al –Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb against international targets also had an impact on the threat level in its territory100. The presidencies have thus allowed the projection of national interests to the European level.

95 Consult the website Direcção Geral da Administração interna:

http://www.dgai.mai.gov.pt/?area=101&mid=109&arquivo [accessed on 3 Janury 2012] 96

Consult the website of the European College (CEPOL): European Police College. « Euromed Police II [Réf . 26 février 2010]»; European Commission. 2002. Regional Cooperation programme in the field of Justice, in combating drugs, organised crime, and terrorism as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of migrants, migrations, and movement of people. Draft documents. Euromed report. N°44, 29 April. 97

The European policies can provide a supplementary legitimacy to national authorities so as to justify the content and implementation of national policies‟ reforms, that is to say, it is a way to use European solutions or positions strategically and rationally. Legitimacy is even more important when it is about fundamental reforms. KNILL, Christopher and LEHMKUHL, Dirk. 1999. “How Europe matters: Different Mechanisms of Europeanization”. European Integration Online Papers, Vol.3, n°7, p.9-10. 98

Consult : PORTUGAL. 2008. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Balanço da Presidência Portuguesa 2007. Lisboa: Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. p.54; EUROPOL. 2011. TE-SAT 2010: EU Terrorism situation and Trend Report. Doc. QL-80-10-278-EN-C. p.27 e anexo 4. 99

CONSEIL DE L‟UNION EUROPEENNE. Stratégie commune du Conseil européen du 19 juin 2000 à l'égard de la région méditerranéenne. DOC 2000/458/PESC, 19 juin 2000, Lisbonne. Journal officiel n° L 183 du 22/07/2000 p. 0005 – 0011. 100

EUROPOL.2009. TE-SAT 2008 : EU Terrorism and Situation and trend Report. Doc QL-AI-08-001-EN-C. p.17. Moreover, in the report, Portugal has confirmed that a luxury car traffic network has operated in the South of the country and in Spain with the objective to deliver and sell the cars in the North of Africa to finance local Islamic groups. Europol. TE-SAT 2008. Op.Cit. p.23.

21

So we can affirm that Portugal has assumed a role of “policy shaper” in the dialogues EU-Morocco and EU-Algeria but despite the fact of remaining a “target of opportunity”, it is not an entrepreneur in that the daily activities of the EMP. The Portuguese authorities do not have enough experience or expertise yet in the field of Islamic terrorism in order to really influence the developments of the Partnership in this domain. However, during our study period, Portugal did not behave simply like a “policy taker”, not only because the State has supported the developments of the political dialogue with Algeria and Morocco as a “policy supporter” following the “Mediterranean bloc” but also in order to beneficiate from the positive effects of the Euro-Maghrebian cooperation.

Table 1: verification of the conditions for reception and projection

Portugal- fight against terrorism

Reception

EU as international actor Yes

Entrepreneurs (States/EU) No

Perception of a common problem producing consensus for a common solution

Yes

Formal and informal constraints partially

Weak developments of bilateral cooperation

Yes

Projection

EU as international actor Yes

Entrepreneurs (States) No

Presidency Yes

Strong national interests in Algeria and Morocco (region)

Yes

EU as « cover» No

EU as « source » of complementary and supplementary instruments

Yes

Conclusions

In this study, we sought to analyse the evolution of the Portuguese foreign policy preferences towards Algeria and Morocco as far as the fight against terrorism is concerned. We have shown that the europeanisation includes two dimensions: reception and projection and that the combination of the two of them produces a “crossloading”. Theoretically, it was also necessary to use the articulation of three currents of New-Institutionalism in order to explain all the aspects of the influence of institutions as well as the influence of interests and ideas, acknowledging that during the fifteen years of the study period, they have coexisted, though they do not have the same time reference (Palier and Surel, 2005).

We used the “process tracing” method to analyse the evolution of several aspects of national preferences: the prioritarisation of terrorism in the bilateral agenda with Morocco and Algeria, the adoption of a bilateralisation and/or

22

europeanisation approach to the question and, finally, the importance occupied by the other forums as far as antiterrorism cooperation with the Maghrebian States is concerned. We have seen that the European policy has took quite some time until it could develop due to the sensitiveness of the terrorism question and that the assistance was mainly limited, until now, to a political dialogue since there is a lack of political will of the Member States to multilateralise the operational aspect. Furthermore, the EU has no competence in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, even after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, since the passage to the qualified majority and co-decision will only take place the 1st of December 2014101.

The Portuguese experience related to Islamic terrorism is quite limited, especially when compared to the States which have already been victims of terrorist attacks of Islamic inspiration. Nevertheless, it developed a policy based on prevention and it felt concerned by the latent threat as well as by the solidarity and the engagements regarding the European space. Our analysis revealed a progressive prioritarisation of terrorism in the bilateral agenda, as well as a strengthened bilateralisation and the support to a European policy – aspects which are not contradictory – and the continuous participation to several forums that also deal with the question of terrorism. All these findings can be explained by several internal and external factors and the europeanisation is only one amongst others (Haverland, 2007: 62-63, 66-67). To verify europeanisation‟s pertinence, we have established a set of conditions favouring the dimensions of reception and/or projection. Both dimensions coexist but this study has revealed the predominance of the conditions for a projection. The dimension of reception has shown inertia and, in some cases, a slight absorption if we take into account the European agenda of Portugal, the functioning of the working groups of the EU and of the EMP as well as the programming effect inherent to the practices established that have been limiting the breathing space of the Presidencies of the EU, as it was the case for Portugal. The projection has imposed itself due to the importance of “crossloading”, which tends to projection and is promoted by policy supporters. The projection dimension is more evident because Portugal was aware that it is less vulnerable in the European space and it needed to develop a bilateral and a European cooperation policy to fight against terrorism and, in this context, the State has asserted itself as a “policy supporter”. Between 1995 and 2010, the Portuguese preferences proved to be relatively resistant to changes, since bilateralisation remained moderate (though some progresses have been noticed) and we could observe the continuity of a preference for the European approach of political dialogue and to some extent of technical cooperation. Bearing in mind that Portugal kept its status as a “target of opportunity”, the tendency is clearly one of externalisation of internal security and interstate cooperation, a result of the convergence with the European policy.

Table 2: Europeanisation of the tackling of the fight against terrorism in Portugal’s foreign policy towards Algeria and Morocco

U.E TOP DOWN BOTTOM UP CROSSLOADING

101 Traité de Lisbonne modifiant le traité sur l'Union européenne et le traité instituant la Communauté

européenne, signé à Lisbonne le 13 décembre 2007, Article 9.C, n°4. Available on : http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:FR:HTML

23

Algeria Morocco Algeria Morocco Algeria Morocco

Portugal Inertia

Absorption

-European agenda

-since 2002, signature Association Agreement, antiterrorism clause,

-cooperation within the COTER)

-Indirect – will of Algeria to cooperate

Inertia

Absorption

-European Agenda

-technical assistance plan

- Neighbourhood action Plan

-cooperation within COTER

-Indirect – will of Morocco to cooperate

Punctually:

Policy shaper

(mainly during its 2007 presidency – setting-up political dialogues with Morocco and Algeria within COTER)

Mainly:

Policy supporter (since the preparation of the declaration of the Barcelona Process)

- international organization and restricted forums

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