power transition and conflict initiation

CONFLICT hlANAGEhlENT AND PEACE SCIENCE, VOL. 12, NO. 1, 1992, 1-1 6

POWER TRANSITION AND CONFLICT INITIATION'

Daniel S. Geller University of Mississippi, Pol i t ica 1 Science

Abstract. Most theories of war nnd lesser forms of international conflict rest on nssumptions of rational choice. Moreover, many of these explanations explicitly incorpornb decision maker estimntcs of rclntive power nmong competitors. However. a major theory of great power war-power trnnsition thcory-postulntcs initintion by the weaker contender. This study demonstratcs thnt nmong the stmngcst states nn internctivc relotionship exists bctween the static power balance, differentinl growth rntes in eopnbilities, and conflict initiation: initiation patterns arc nssocinted with changes in a stab's relative military/economicpowcr nnd power potentinl. The findings are consistent with the inherent logic of power trnnsition theory nnd are consonant with a n nssumption of rntionnl cnlculntion in decisions involvingconflict initiation.The results may be interpreted ns reinforcing the realist contention thnt n shifting power bnlnnce is of critical significance nmong the cnuses of war and peace.

INTRODUCTION Most theories of war and lesser forms of international con-

flict rest on assumptions of rational choice. For example, Mor- genthau (1948), Blainey (1973), Waltz (1979), Bueno de Mes- quita (1981), and Gilpin (1981), to cite but a few, all argue that rational calculations guide decisions of war and peace. Moreover, all of these explanations of interstate conflict explicitly incorporate decision maker estimates of relative power among competitors. As Small and Singer (1982: 194) note: it is ". . . likely that the relative prospects for . . . victory or defeat will play a key role in such a decision." In fact, data linking the frequencies of war initiation and subsequent victory often have been used as evidence in support of the assumption of rational choice. Howev-

The nuthor grntefully acknowledges the assistance of J. David Singer in providing the Correlntes of War dntnbnse used in this analysis and the thoughtful comments nnd criticisms of Stunrt Brcmer, Jncek Kugler, J. David Singer, and the refcrecs of Conflict hfanagemenf and Peace Science. Earlier versions of this study were presented at the International Studies Association 32d Annunl Convention, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, March 19-23, 1991, nnd at the International Political Science Association XVth World Congress, Bucnos Aires, Argentina, July 21-25, 1991. Thc Nntionnl Science Foundntion provided n travel grant to the IPSA World Congress.

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2 CONFLICT hlANAGEhlENT AND PEACE SCIENCE, VOL. 12, NO. 1,1992

er, a major theory of great power war-power transition theory (Organski, 1958)-postulates initiation by the weaker contender. Thus the issues of relative power a i d conflict initiation bear heavily on theories of war and on assumptions of rational decision making. This study will examine empirically the question of power balances and conflict initiation within dispute dyads and relate the findings to assumptions of rational choice.

RELATIVE POWER, CONFLICT INITIATION, AND RATIONALITY

War as a result of a changing power balance due to uneven growth rates is a theme found consistently in the literature of international relations. For example, power shifts due to differential growth rates are explicitly or implicitly noted as a source of conflict by Organski (1958), Organski and Kugler (1980), Gilpin (1981), Howard (1983), Modelski (1983), Wallerstein (1984), Thompson (1988), and Midlarsky (1990). Moreover, all of these works incorporate assumptions of some form of rational calculation (e.g., cost-benefit/expected utility) in war decisions.

Based on early Correlates of War (COW) data, Singer (1972), Bueno de Mesquita (1978, 1981), and Small and Singer (1982) noted the strong empirical association between war initiation and victory, and discussed the implications of this association both for capability distributions among disputants and for rational choice assumptions in conflict theory. For example, Bueno de Mesquita (1978: 252) stated that since war initiators are assumed to act so as to maximize expected utility, it should be anticipated that most war initiators possess a capability advantage over their targets. He subsequently (1981: 21-22, 29- 30) argued that given the record for victory, war initiators either have maintained some ". . . systematic advantage, or they have been extraordinarily lucky." He held the more plausible explanation is that they possessed a capability advantage and employed it, and he concluded that war initiation is calculated on a rational basis.

Providing extensive evidence from their COW project data, Small and Singer (1982: 194-95, 199) reported that from 1816 through 1980:

. . . initiating forces emerged victorious in 42 (or 68 percent) of the 62 cases [of interstate wars], suffering 20 defeats.. . . There were 22 wars initiated by major pow-



GELLER POWER TRANSITION AND CONFLICT INITIATION 3

ers against minor powers, and the majors were success- ful in all but two, or 91 percent, of the cases.. . . From [this] viewpoint, it could be urged that foreign policy decision makers are indeed quite competent in evaluat- ing capabilities.. . . Furthermore,. . . one might go on to conclude that the pre-war process is indeed a highly rational one (in the limited, problem-solving sense).

When data on sub-war international disputes are combined with the data on wars, the evidence looks remarkably similar: more powerful nations initiate conflicts against weaker nations. Gochman and Maoz (1984: 597) examined the distributions in their Serious Interstate Dispute database (for the years 1816 through 1976) and noted the strong tendency for major powers to be initiators rather than targets in conflicts with minor powers. Interestingly, Maoz (1983: 215, 221) argued that capability advantages determine victory or defeat only in contests between major powers. In all other dispute classes, conflict initiators win disproportionately not because they are stronger than their targets but rather because they possess higher relative levels of resolve.

POWER TRANSITION AND CONFLICT INITIATION

A curious anomaly involves the pattern of conflict initiation and victory among the set of strongest states. Specifically, Small and Singer (1982: 195) reported that from 1816 through 1980 ‘I.. . when a major power initiated war against another major power, the initiator was victorious in only 3 of 9 such wars, or 33 percent ... .”This finding is disconsonant with the more general patterns of war/dispute initiation and victory, and implies either that there is something about great power conflict that affects the rational choice abilities of decision makers for those states, or else that conflict initiation among major powers occurs under conditions different from those of other nations.

One possible explanation for this anomaly may be found in the work of Organski (1958) and Organski and Kugler (1980) on the power transition. According to the thesis advanced by Or- ganski and Kugler (1980: 55), two factors account for major conflicts between the most powerful nations (or “contenders”) in the system: 1) the relative capabilities of the states; and 2) the growth rate differential of power between the challenger and the dominant nation. These two factors are assumed to have equal



4 CONFLICI’ I’vWAGEhlENT AND PEACE SCIENCE, VOL. 12, NO. 1,1992

causal weight. The theory suggests that major wars are produced by unstable power balances-war occurs when a dominant nation has its advantage in relative capabilities eroded due to the rising power trajectory of a challenger. Houweling and Sic- cama (1988) maintain that the theory holds for the entire set of major power wars and not merely contender wars, and they produce evidence in support of this contention. Regarding the identity of the conflict initiator, Organski and Kugler (1980: 27) hypothesized that the aggressor will be the weaker state. Organ- ski’s (1958: 333) original description reads as follows:

It might be expected that a wise challenger, growing in power through internal development, would hold back from threatening the existing international order until it had reached a point where it was as powerful as the dominant nation.. . , for surely it would seem foolish to attack while weaker than the enemy. If this expecta- tion were correct, the risk of war would be greatest when the two opposing camps were almost equal in power, and if war broke out before this point, it would take the form of a preventive war launched by the dominant nation to destroy a competitor before’it be- came strong enough to upset the existing international order. In fact, however, this is not what has happened in recent his tory.... [World Wars I and I1 involved challengers attacking] the dominant nation and its allies long before they equalled them in power, and the attack was launched by the challengers, not by the dominant camp.

Bremer (1980: 69) reported empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that it is the weaker of the great powers which begins the conflict. Specifically, Bremer noted that the set of sec- ond-ranking nations (over the 145-year span from 1820 to 1964) had the highest relative rate of war initiation, whereas the set of first-ranking nations (of the top five ranks) had the lowest war initiation rate. He concluded that:

To the extent that initiation is a valid indicator of who “forces” a dispute into war, this finding would be consonant with the theoretical positions of those like Organ- ski.. . who emphasize the inherent conflict between the [dominant state] and the number 2 nation in the hier- archy. Other evidence adduced in support of the contention that



GELLER: POWER TRANSITION fUJD CONFLICT INITIATION 5

the power transition aggressor will be the weaker state is provided by Maoz (1982 160). His analysis of dispute data indicated that conflict initiators tend to be dissatisfied states undergo- ing significant increases in capability growth rates, rather than satisfied nations experiencing a relative capability decline.

However, Bueno de Mesquita (1980: 379-80) pointed to a problem in this aspect of the power transition logic: the hypothesis of a weaker challenger initiating a transition war against a more powerful nation can be true only if the challenger’s decision makers are extremely risk-acceptant. Moreover, the transition theory stipulates that alliances are not critical among the factors in contender wars. In short, according to Bueno de Mes- quita, “... it is irrational for a weak state to initiate a war against a stronger state when the war is expected to be bilateral and the goal is to win.. . .”

Levy (1987: 83-84), in his analysis of preventive war, also noted the lack of a theoretical basis for the presumptive identification of the transition aggressor as the weaker state. Faced with a faster-growing challenger, Levy argued, preventive military action by the dominant power would appear to be a plausible foreign policy choice. Gilpin (1981: 191, 201) similarly discussed calculations that might make “preemptive war” an “attractive” option for a dominant power whose capabilities are declining relative to a rising challenger.

In fact, in The War Ledger, Organski and Kugler (1980: 57- 60) reexamined the war initiation hypothesis in terms of the power balances prior to World Wars I and I1 and noted that in each case the challenger had passed the transition point before the conflict erupted. Nevertheless, they indicated that “[wlith such small numbers one has, at best, traces of trends . . .” with firm conclusions impossible to draw.

In sum, power transition theory holds that both static and dynamic power balances are involved in war decisions, and that these balances determine the identity of the conflict initiator. The following analysis will examine the general issue of the identity-in relative power terms-of conflict initiators, and the specific conditions under which that identity is likely to change. The implications of the findings for assumptions of rational choice in conflict decisions will also be noted.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Power transition theory focuses on the interrelation of power potential and conflict among the strongest states in the



6 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PEACE SCIENCE, VOL. 12, NO. 1,1992

international system. For this reason, a Composite Index of Na- tional Capability (CINC) was developed to reflect the relatiue capability scores of this small subset of countries. The initial se- lection of major powers was made on the basis of the Correlates of War identification procedures (Small and Singer, 1982: 44- 45). CINC scores were created by Fist obtaining the sum of major power values on each of six variables' indicating a different aspect of a nation's actual or potential "power" (Bremer, 1980: 63). Next, the percentage of the total value for all major powers' that was controlled by each nation on each of the six variables was calculated. A summary score was then computed indicating the percentage share of the total capability pool of all majors possessed by each major power. For example, in 1820 England controlled a .3028 share of the total capabilities possessed by all major powers, whereas France had a ,1943 share of the pool. These summary capability scores (CINCs) combining the six variables were computed for all major powers on a yearly basis from 1816 through 1976. A further distinction was then drawn between those major powers (i.e., contenders) which controlled at minimum a .lo00 share of the capability base and those major powers whose CINCs were below 10 percent. This narrowed the set of major power/contenders to between three and five states in a given year. A final procedure involved the computation of average CINC scores for every contender over five-year periods beginning in 1820, with the years 1816 through 1819 constituting the first data point average. Figure 1 depicts the individual power trajectories of all contender states from 1816 through 1976.

The next step in the research design involved the determi- nation of relative power within every contender dyad. To accom- plish this, the period between 1820 and 1976 was partitioned into 10-year segments. For the purposes of comparability and cumulation, the Organski and Kugler (1980: 49) power transition categories and threshold levels were retained. Therefore, dyadic power relationships among contenders were determined to be either: unequal (the relative capabilities differed by more

' The Corrclntes of War National Capability dntn set incorporatcs six mensums covering three dimensions of national attributes. Two measurea involve rnilifary capabilitics (militnry expenditures and military personnel); two measures asseas h f u f r i u l capabilities (energy consumption and iroqhtcel pmductionl and two measures involvo dem0gMphk variables (totnl populntion and urban population).



FIGURE 1. Relative Power Scores

- rI.Id I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I 1 I I r-I I I I 1 I I I

- End and KJK

.---- France

.....,... Prussia/Gerrnanv

. I - I - Russia/USS R

. , . - . I - Aus tria-Hungary

-ys

1816-1950

1816-1934

1865-1945

1816-1976

18 16- 1859

1900-1976 . _ _ _ _ PRC

1950-1976

Five-Y ear Intervals: 181 6- 1976

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8 CONFLICT hfANAGEhfJ3NT AND PEACE SCIENCE, VOL. 12, NO. 1, 1992

than 20 percent during the 10-year test period); equal without overtaking (the relative capabilities differed by less than 20 percent during the test period); or overtaking (the passing of one nation’s CINC score by the other nation’s CINC score one or more times during the 10-year test period). Utilizing the Corre- lates of War Serious Interstate Dispute data: this procedure produced 13 warring contender dyads (in six wars) and 71 sub- war contender dispute dyads (in 64 disputes). The identity of each contender as conflict initiator or target was then recorded?

The advent of nuclear weapons in 1945 presented a possible confounding factor, and required an analysis of the continued relevance of CINC scores as a measure of national capabilities! Of the set of contenders, the United States detonated a nuclear device in 1945, the Soviet Union in 1949, and the PRC (China) in 1964. As a means of comparing relative CINC scores and relative nuclear capabilities, American and Soviet yearly data were plotted as shown in Figure 2. (During the period under consideration, China’s small nuclear arsenal did not threaten to invalidate its relative position in conventional power.) The figure indicates that a transition in CINC scores occurs in 1971, with convergence beginning in 1947. Based on the 10-year CINC test periods, the US/USSR conventional capability condition was unequal for 1946 through 1955, equal for 1956 through 1965, and overtaking for 1966 through 1976. By comparison, according to DOD/DOE estimates of nuclear stockpiles, a transition occurs in 1976 due to rapid Soviet growth-with an unequal condition existing until 1970. In short, there is a five-year discrepancy in transition points between relative capabilities as

For n dcscription of the dnta set, see Maoz (1982) and Gochmnn and Maoz (1984). By definition: “A scrious interstote dispute is a set of interactions among states involving the explicit, overt, and governmcnt-directed threat, display, or us0 of f o m in short temporal intervnls” (Maoz, 1982: 7).

sThe dispute initintor is the stntc thot begins the military confrontation with the fvst codable nction. The targct is that state agninst which the initiator directs its action. (Scc“Ccding Rulcs for Serious Interstate Disputes,” Correlates of War Project, Univ. of Michigan, Mimco.) Most wars begin as militarized disputes, although the dispute initintor nnd wnr initintor arc not necessarily the same. By including sub-war militarized conflicts as well as wars in the analysis, the theoretical and empirical base for the test of transition theory and conflict initiation is broadened. ‘ Recent studies dealing with the influence derived from the possession of nuclear weapons include: Orgnnski and Kugler (1980), Intriligator and Brito (1981), Bucno dc Mcsquita and Rikcr (1982), Kugler (1984), Huth and Russctt (1984,1988), Betts (1987), Huth (1988), Russett (1989)). and Geller (1990).



GELLER POWER TRANSITION AND CONFLICX INITIATION 9

measured by CINC scores and nuclear stockpiles.6 Other measures of relative nuclear forces could be utilized (e.g., throw- weights, EMT, launchers, etc.): but all such static measures (including stockpiles) fail to capture fundamental qualitative shifts in the nuclear balance. An alternative means of approach- ing this issue is through a general evaluation of the evolution of the US/USSR nuclear balance offered by the Harvard Nuclear Study Group (Carnesale, et al., 1983) which also can be com- pared to the shifts in CINC scores. According to the HNSG description, US/USSR nuclear forces were unequal from roughly 1945 to 1962, equal from roughly 1962 to 1970, and overtaking from 1970 to 1977.7 Other periods with contrasting end points could also be described? However, the demonstrated correspon- dence between basic shifts in the US/USSR dyadic power condition whether measured by CINC scores or nuclear weapons suggests enough similarity so as not to be a factor in the estimate of relative capabilities?

DATA ANALYSIS

Table 1 depicts frequencies for the balance of static capabilities and war/dispute initiation among contender nations for the years 1816 through 1976. The distributions indicate that contender states with inferior capabilities are just as likely to initiate wars and lesser disputes as are contenders with superior

I t should be noted, howevcr, thnt both transition points fnll within the 1966-

For exnmple, scc Cochrnn, Arkin, Norris, and Sands (1989: 22-27). 1976 (overtnking) tcst period.

’ Thc precise HNSG (1983: 78-99) periods ore: U. S. Superiority and Invulnernbility (1945-1957) U. S. Invulnerability Endcd, Superiority Chnllcnged (1957-1962) From Superiority to Pnrity (1962-1970) Pnrity, Arms Control, and Diverging h g r a m s (1970-1977) Parity Disputcd (1977- )

For cxnmple, see Smoke (1984: passim); Beth (1987: 144-211). ’ Altcrnntivc measumiof power may tcnd to produce different cstimntcs of relative capabilities.Orgnnski andKugler(1980: 33-38) useGross National Product as nn indicator of powcr for its parsimony, reliability, nnd theoretical relevance; however, in a lntcr study, Kugler and Orgnnski (1989: 119-26) find stable nnd consistent rankings for the United States whethcr hiernrchicnl position is mcnsurcd by GNP, cxports, or Rclntivo Political Capncity. Arguments for the use of multiple capability indicators arc presented in Singer, Bremer, and Stuckcy (1972) nnd Bremcr (1980). Various appronches to power measurement arc discussed in hlerritt and Zinnes (1989), and a compnrison of the COW index and GNP is provided in Kugler and Arbetman (1989).



FIGURE 2. US/USSR Relative Capabilities (1946-1976)

1.0 Q) r= 13.9 a

0

N

% 0.8

& 0.6 0.7

v1 c

g 0.5 t 0.4

u 0.3 3

"u '-b 0.1

I

z 0.2

0.0

us CrNC"

USSR CINC*

US Nuclfiir Wea ons Stoclpilc

Stock pirc USSR Nuclear Wea ons

CINC 0 Cornpmilc lnda of Nalionol Copobilitis

1. Pvmnt shore of total conlrndcr apnhilily p l . 2. I ' m t rho- of tobl US/USSR nuclar slockpile OVohlstcltcr. 1984. The USSR fipuru rrpment the high atimntc).

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GELLER: POWER TRANSITION AND CONFLICI' INITIATION 11

capabilities. The 2 statistics are .8320 (wars) and .1186 (disputes) showing no meaningful relationship (P > .lOOO)'o between capabilities and either form of conflict initiation." These findings regarding contender capabilities and conflict initiation provide an explanation for the Small and Singer (1982: 195) anomaly that in wars between major powers, the initiator wins in only 33 percent of the cases. The frequencies show that-for contender states-the static distribution of capabilities is not associated with conflict initiation. Thus, among contender states, war and dispute initiators are as likely to be inferior to their opponents as they are to be superior in the static balance of relative capabilities.

TABLE 1

Contenden: Capabilities and Conflict Initiation (1816-1976)

COhTl.ICT CLASP

Militarized Disputes INTIATOR CAPABILITY (r ISQ (Sub-war)

40

44

Initiator Inferior

Initiator Superior

13 71 84 conflict dyads

Z = A320 Z = .1186 P > .loo0 P > .I000

lo Significance tests arc used for comparative purposes only, since the universe

I' The computation of the 2 statistic hen: employs the binomial test used by of conflicts is being analyzed.

Bucno de Mesquita (1981: 22). The formula for the test is

whero X is the number of wars/disputes with initiator superiority N is the number of cnses p and q are prior probabilities of initiator superiority and infe- riority (p = q = .5)



12 CONFLICI' hfANAGEhlENT AND PEACE SCIENCE. VOL. 12. NO. 1. 1992

Table 2 depicts the distributions for contender war initiation from 1816 through 1976 under shifting dyadic power conditions. In other words, the table indicates initiator identity under differential rates of capability growth. The Tau C statistic reveals that, again, no meaningful pattern is evident: the frequencies show that war initiators tend to have superior capabilities under all three power conditions, but these frequencies are not markedly different from those for contenders with inferior capabilities. In short, the 13 contender war dyads reveal no significant pattern relating initiator capability to shifting dyadic power conditions (i.e., differential rates of growth).12

Table 3 provides the set of distributions for all contender disputes below the level of war covering the years 1816 through 1976. Here, the Tau C indicates the presence of a pattern between initiator capability and shifting dyadic power conditions (i.e., differential rates of growth). Under unequal power conditions, stronger nations initiate fewer disputes than their weaker counterparts, perhaps due to their ability to secure their goals without militarized conflict. However, changing power relations alter the likely identity of the aggressor. Specifically, as the relative power condition shifts from inequality to transition, the probable dispute initiator increasingly tends to be the contender with the capability ad~mtage . '~ This finding is consonant with the inherent logic of power transition theory-although it does not conform to the initial hypothesis-and suggests that power closure on the dominant nation or the actual passage of the dominant state by the challenger may lead the stronger nation to attempt to utilize its capability ad~antage. '~ Not every transition results in war (Geller, 1992), but the assumption that dispute initiation is conditioned by factors of shifting relative power is supported.

'* These frequencies arc consistent with the rcsults reported by Organski and Kugler (1980: 57-60) regarding the identity of the war initiator. In their discussion of World Wars I and 11, they point out that the conflicts werc begun by the challenger affer transition had occurred (i.e., by the superior slate).

l3 When war frcqueneies arc added to those of lesser militarized disputes (i.e., combining the frequencies from Tables 2 and 3, producing 84 conflict dyads), the pattern depicted in Table 3 remains the same with a Kendall's Tau C of 24150 and a P of .0189.

I' Kugler and Zagare (19W) note the differences in power transition logic as presented in Organski (1958) and Organski and Kugler (1980) and conclude that The War w e e r version is consistent with a n expected utility model of rational calculation.



GELLER WWER TRANSITION AND CONFLICX INITIATION 13

TABLE 2

Contenders: War Initialion (18161976)

U D I C PO\\ER COh~\nTcIO?I (10-Ymr Test hinds)

Equal R I T I A T O ~ B I ~ Y Wn;Q Uncqual No Overtaking Overtaking

5

a

13 war djods

Initiator Inferior

Initiator Superior

5 3 5

Kendall's Tau C = .oooO P = .so00

TABLE 3

Contenders: Sub-War Dkpule InitQtion (18161976)

D D l C POWER COhDITION IlO-Ymr let Pmods)

RITIATOR CAPA BlLrrY ICISQ

Initiator Inferior

Initiator Superior

37 19 IS 71 dbpute djadr

Kendall's Tau C = .2761 P = .0140



14 CONFLICT hy\NAGEhlENT AND PEACE SCIENCE, VOL. 12, NO. 1,1992

CONCLUSION

This study demonstrates that-in terms of conflict patterns among the strongest nations-an interactive relationship exists between the static power balance, differential growth rates in capabilities, and conflict initiation. Initiation patterns are associated with changes in a state’s relative military,/economic power and power potential. Under unequal power conditions, stronger nations initiate fewer disputes than their weaker counterparts. As capabilities converge, pressures to exploit transient power advantages make the stronger state the more probable conflict init iat~r.’~ The results of this study are consistent with the inherent logic of power transition theory, even though they indicate that the likely identity of the conflict initiator under a condition of power convergence is the contender with superior capabilities-counter to the original hypothesis. These results are also consonant with an assumption of rational calculation in decisions involving conflict initiation and account for the Small and Singer (1982: 195) anomaly of fewer relative initiator victo- ries in great power conflicts than are found in the general set of interstate wars. Moreover, the findings may be interpreted as reinforcing the realist contention that a shifting power balance is of critical significance among the causes of war and peace.

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