Opportunities and Constraints for the

Disarmament & Repatriationof the FDLR, FNL and ADF/NALU

in the DRC

Hans RomkemaConflict & Transition Consultancies

For the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP)

Scope Objectives

Methodology

Overview of AGs

D&R To Date

Opportunities

Constraints

Recommendations

Impact of fighting in North Kivu

Objectives of this Study

Goal: provide recommendations to ‘enhance the success of the D&R process for foreign AGs in the DRC’

Key-objective: To analyse ‘the opportunities and constraints faced by male and female foreign combatants and their dependents in the DRC seeking to disarm and repatriate to their countries of origin’

COFS Ex-COFS

Communities Others

Interviews with key-informants (≥ 200) X X X X

Questionnaires(45) X

Focus group discussions (13) X

Comparative study(5 territories) X X

Literature X

Methodology

Estimated numbers of COFS in DRC

AG Origin Estimated #

FDLR Rwanda 7,000

FNL Burundi 200-300

ADF Uganda 900 max(of which 60-70%

Congolese)NALU Uganda

Overview of the FDLR Today FDLR is concentrated in the North and South Kivu

provinces

FDLR objectives

Human rights abuses

Parallel authority

Control over resources and trade

Internal control structures

Internal conflicts/divisions

D&R To Date The number of FDLR combatants decreased from

more than 20,000 (1999) to about 7,000 (2007)

Disarmament and repatriation have been progressing slowly since 2002 Voluntary repatriation is reaching its limits (e.g., MONUC SRSG Swing

recently acknowledged the potential need for military intervention)

There is a widespread acknowledgement that the COFS problem needs to be resolved

On the Rwandan side, returning COFS and their dependents receive demobilization and reintegration support through the RDRP

D&R Military Operations to Date Past RPA/RDF/RCD (1998-2001) operations

weakened the FDLR considerably Recent military operations (FARDC and

MONUC) had little D&R impact MONUC engaged the FDLR under the mandate to

‘protect the population’ only, and this did not advance D&R

FARDC was not sufficiently equipped, trained and supported

The operations were isolated events, not based on a larger overall strategy related to D&R

Opportunities for D&R Today Majority of FDLR combatants in favour of D&R FDLR Rome Declaration (March 2005) Internal Divisions Better cooperation among regional states

ICGLR Security Pact, Tripartite Plus Joint Commission

Elected government in DRC RDRP in place Planned FDLR leadership meeting in eastern

DRC next week

Constraints for D&R Today FDLR command structures extreme

(200 – 300 leaders hold many ‘hostage’) FDLR control structures powerful GoDRC lacks policy, strategy and institutional

arrangements to tackle D&R of foreign AGs systematically

FARDC military weakness MONUC D&R mandate constraints (‘voluntary only’)

and execution uneven Too few D&R opportunities, especially in remote areas

Limited action against political leadership operating largely from Europe and North America

Fighting in North Kivu

June 2006

FDLR Presence Around Mwenga

Recommendations on FDLR D&R Way Forward

First, try once more a non-violent solution Point of entry: Rome Declaration (March 2005)

Coordinated pressure from GoDRC, region and IC ‘Last chance’ meeting GoRDC-FDLR If FDLR responds favourably give them limited time An obstacle could be the 200-300 men who are

unlikely to accept any solution

If (parts of) the FDLR decide(s) to be cooperative, countries of the region and IC need to provide timely and effective support to D&R and other aspects of the operation

Recommendations to GoDRC Make it clear that it will no longer tolerate the

FDLR on its territory Develop its own D&R policy and strategy, and

establish institutional arrangements for planning, coordination and implementation

Mandate the FARDC, PNC and the local administration to receive, protect and facilitate the (voluntary and non-voluntary) D&R of COFS

Terminate collaboration between Congolese individuals / local armed groups and FDLR

Secure regional political and military support if necessary

Recommendations to GoR Reaffirm at high levels the commitment of GoR to encourage and facilitate

the return and reintegration of Rwandese COFS E.g., making it clear that younger COFS cannot have been involved in the

genocide RDRC needs to continue its current demobilization and reintegration

activities Enhance cross-border sensitization with a focus on information sharing on:

Active involvement of relatives and friends of COFS Overall (economic) situation in Rwanda, Gacaca and reintegration package

Share information on RDRP with relevant GoDRC officials Further strengthen regional collaboration (on COFS and with GoDRC in

particular) Consider options for addressing the obstacle of 200-300 FDLR leaders

Recommendations to MONUC

Improve the D&R field approach and increase its presence in the field Remote deployments, flexible and timely

repatriation, transit sites, etc. Share D&R experiences with the GoDRC and

help it to develop its own D&R capacity Support a D&R lessons-learned exercise Continue efforts to strengthen FARDC

Recommendations to MDRP Partnership Continue to provide technical and financial support

to the national demobilization and reintegration programs in the Great Lakes region so that COFS can be received

Enhance support activities to D&R of foreign armed groups Strategy development and capacity-building in the DRC if

requested Facilitation of confidence-building, coordination and

planning among relevant countries Support efforts to strengthen FARDC

Recommendations to the International Community UNSC should review mandate of MONUC regarding

‘voluntary only’ D&R approach for foreign AGs Inhibit political and fund-raising activity as well as travel

of FDLR political leaders (in Africa, Europe and N. America). Make it clear that will not tolerate presence.

Systematically pursue and prosecute the war criminals and those who have committed crimes against humanity

Participate in the reflection on options for 200-300 FDLR leaders

Support the development of a D&R capacity in the DRC and support strengthening of FARDC

Strengthen support to regional collaboration initiatives Encourage greater cooperation among governments, MDRP

and relevant UN agencies (e.g., UNHCR, MONUC, UNICEF, etc.)

Military Dimensions Intensify military pressure on FDLR to increase

willingness to accept voluntary D&R If credible, may in itself be sufficient to “crack”

FDLR leadership control

If voluntary D&R fails within a few months military operations should start Target disabling and dismantling FDLR command

and control and splitting leaders from rank & file Focus on D&R of maximum number, with option of

forcible D&R Take measures to protect civilian population

If necessary, reinforcements from AU, Tri-Partite, bilateral, etc. should be considered

Fighting in North Kivu As long as the fighting goes on, D&R in that

province cannot be effective Government should look for a negotiated

solution It cannot afford to loose (and it might) Nkunda and his men may have chosen the wrong

attitude and line of action but some of their concerns are legitimate

International community should help finding a negotiated solution Why are there no (apparent) attempts?

Questions & discussion