Module 4. Taking action

Session 4.4 Project level methodologies and best practice

Training Workshop6-7 Apr 2010

Strengthening transparency, integrity and accountability IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre

Contents

• Three case studies:– Kecamatan Development Project (KDP), Indonesia– Kerela Rural Sanitation Programme, India

Kecamatan Development Project (KDP), Indonesia

• Tackling grassroots corruption in a large rural development project

• KDP – a central government project focused on poor villages and highly dispersed

• Very high risk environment

• Weak institutions for control

• Mapping is a key step in tackling this

Source: Guggenheim (2007)

Mapping identified sources of corruption

• Bribing officials to get projects

• Cuts taken at high levels• Illicit fees• Under-delivery of

materials/ work• Embezzlement by staff

Kecamatan Development Project (KDP)

Solutions identified• Reducing discretion• Reducing transactions• Promoting competition• Lowering costs of

acquiring information• Promoting social controls• Strengthening formal

oversight• Applying sanctions

Kecamatan Development Project (KDP)

KDP - Concrete measures

• simplifying financial formats so that they can be understood easily by villagers

• transferring funds directly into collective village bank accounts• all financial transactions have at least three signatures and that at

least three quotations are found for the procurement of goods, to be shared publicly at village meetings

• details of all financial transactions are posted on village notice-boards

• regular village meetings are held to account for project funds at which villagers have the

• right to suspend further disbursements of funds if irregularities are found

KDP - Concrete measures

• providing village-level sources of information and channels for complaints that are independent of local government

• intensive field-level supervision by elected village facilitators (two in each village) and sub-district level project facilitators

• independent monitoring of the project by NGOs and local journalists

• Audits reduced losses from 30-20%

• the threat of an audit as effective as its execution

• highly cost-effective• auditors report back to

villagers and local governments who then act

• auditors need auditing

Effect of Audits on Percent Missing

Wages

Wages

Materials

Materials

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Control Audits

Per

cen

t M

issi

ng

KDP - audits

• Participation was effective, but further participation was not cost effective in reducing losses

• individuals lack incentives to report

• accurate information is hard to acquire

• costs of collective action are high

KDP - participation

Effect of Invitations on Percent Missing

Wages

Wages

Materials

Materials

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

Control Invitations

Perc

en

t M

issin

g

Kerala Rural Sanitation Programme, India

• Partnership between local government, NGOs, user committees

• High levels demand creation and private sector involvement

• Mix of strategies to tackle high levels of malpractice (30-35%):• more information• extra checks & spot checks • public postings • double signatures• action on complaints at

lowest level • referral of problems

Existing rural sanitation program in India

• Joint rural sanitation program by central and state governments• Only one model, the double vault pour flush composting toilet, adviced by

Technical Advisory Group from India, UNDP, UNICEF & World Bank.• High unit cost (US$ 120 in 1983) and built by state-contracted contractors. • 80-100% subsidy• Funds allowed few toilets/village, usually for elite. Later subsidy to BPL households only.• Coverage up <3% per year. • A study showed only 3% use of subsidised latrines as toilet. • In Kerala 5,5 million people

practiced OD in 1991.

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Malpractices: a brief summary

Malpractice in many forms and widespread, estimated loss 30-35%:• Allocated central funds not always released & dispatched for sanitation at

central/state/district/community level; • Contractors paid for contracts to various level government officials, formed

cartels and made secret price agreements; • Second rate materials supplied in first-rate packing;• Toilets constructed on paper only or not complete;• Price agreements and bribing between private contracting firms,

government bureaucrats, elected officials and later also NGOs;• Workers also took their cut from materials, short-cut construction, etc.;• Households paid/had to pay to be on BPL list to get subsidies;• No user information, participation, ground verification, quality control;• No accountability beyond annual # constructed on paper and funds spent;• No sanctions for public & private sector on malpractice. Payment for

government positions normal (“bribe price lists”). 12

Corruption prevention & reduction measures

developed over 5 years (1)

• Communication: all rules communicated to LG, committees and public: criteria for participation, subsidy rules, composition, formation and roles of commitees, Sanitation Implementation C’tee (SIC), local pricing, tendering, construction and quality control. NGO staff check knowledge at random and encourage strengthening when low.

• Financial control: All payments to earmarked san account. Two persons (1 LG, 1 NGO) sign for deposits and large withdrawals. Independent audits. Verification of construction against funds, incl. quality control by Works Inspector & member SIC/WSCs. NGO also spot-checks financial administration several times/year. Serious fraud → legal action.

• Accountability: LG accountable for implementation of local plan and budget, and allocation of subsidies to ultra poor. WSCs report on quality of delivered materials. Last 20% disbursed after certification by WSCs.

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Corruption prevention and reduction measures

developed over 5 years (2)

The small-scale, locally informed and controlled process prevents cartel formation and price agreements in private sector:

Training: NGO provides training to masons, including on rules, customer communication and controls and builds local demo latrine to identify local materials & for local costing and provides guidance for private sector contracting. (Materials already available in local shops). Female masons (poor women) highly motivated & less open to malpractice

Tenders: SIC spot-checks prices before tendering starts. At least 3 tenders, written. Opening in presence of min. SIC, LG and NGO member.

Control: Knowledgeable member WSC and Works Inspector visit local shops with BoQs, negotiate best price-quality orders, guarantee (e.g. <5% bricks damaged) & financing arrangements. Building starts after better-off paid 100% and poor 25% and attended training. Masons must check signed receipt and attendance card. WSS certifies before final 20% payment and mediates conflicts. Non-adhering providers get blacklisted.

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Results

• 1988-1995 (pilot): 60.000 toilets in 80 c’ties (av. size 40,000 people)• 1996-2003: 200,000 HH toilets, 2,200 school toilets incl. “child-friendly”.• Annual output 2x the previous centralised program.• Unit costs 1,5 times cheaper, yet quality good: permanent toilets with 2

alternating soak pits and superstructure in brick or blocks. • 96% used as toilet against 5% in supply-driven program. After 9 years:

94% consistent use by women, 59% by men.• External subsidy: 80% → 15%. LG contributed US$ 380.000 (1992-97). • Ownership by poor more than doubled. • Less than 5% of poor did not complete payment of their contribution.• Poverty reduction by employment poor women and – presumably -

productive use of compost (not yet investigated).

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Lessons Learned

• Learning from experience - There was no blueprint solution, the programme has adjusted, tested and built its governance strategies over many years

• Variation of strategies -The programme included a combination of different activities

• Inclusion of all stakeholders - A variety of groups participated in the monitoring processes (e.g. households, local governments, water/sanitation committees, women’s groups, youth groups, etc.)

• It is easier to prevent corruption beforehand than having to deal with it or mop it up after it has occurred

• Participation and capacity building of community groups takes time and resources

• Participants and staff involved usually don’t perceive these tools as anti-corruption activities, but see them as ways of checking and ensuring quality and effectiveness