presentation: health financing in central and west asia: country studies of pakistan, uzbekistan and...
DESCRIPTION
Presented by ADB Intern Yeonhee Yang last 9 Sept 2015 at the Asian Development BankTRANSCRIPT
1
Yeonhee Yang
CWRD/CWPF Intern
MPH-MBA student at Johns Hopkins University
Intern Presentation
Health Financing in Central and West Asia:
Country Studies of Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyz Republic
Final Version (Presentation)
September 09, 2015
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper/presentation are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), or its Board of Governors, or the
governments they represent. ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibil ity for any consequence of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent
with ADB official terms.
Outline
2
Background
Comparative Review of Health Financing in CW Asia
Country Studies
Recommendations
Conclusion
Outline
3
Background
Comparative Review of Health Financing in CW Asia
Country Studies
Recommendations
Conclusion
Ultimate
health
system goal
Health
financing
policy goal
Health
financing
objectives
4
Health financing policy focuses on
how to move closer to UHC
• “Health financing is much more than a matter of raising money for health.
It is also a matter of who is asked to pay, when they pay, and how the money raised is spent.”
(WHO, 2011)
Revenue collection Pooling Purchasing/provision
The way money is raised to pay
health system costs
The accumulation and management
of financial resources to re-distribute
the financial risk
The process of paying for health
services
Sufficient and sustainable
resource generation Financial accessibility Optimal use of resource
Universal Health Coverage
Improved and equitable health outcome
Health
financing
functions
How to raise? How to allocate? How to use?
Source: Adapted from WHO
Ultimate
health
system goal
Health
financing
policy goal
Health
financing
objectives
5
Analytical framework to undertake
a systemic review of health financing system
Revenue collection Purchasing/provision
Sufficient and sustainable
resource generation Financial accessibility Optimal use of resource
Universal Health Coverage
Improved and equitable health outcome
How to raise? How to allocate? How to use?
Source: WHO-OASIS; Note: OASIS=Organizational ASsessment for Improving and Strengthening Health Financing; BP=Benefit package
Level of
population
coverage
Level of
equity
financing
Degree of
financial risk
protection
Level
of
pooling
Level of
administrative
efficiency
Equity
in BP
delivery
Efficiency
in BP
delivery
Cost-
effectiveness
& equity in
BP definition
Pooling
Health
financing performance
Indicators
Health
financing
functions
Level
of
funding
6
There are huge gaps moving toward UHC
in Central and West Asia
…and burden on the direct payment
by households is high
Source: World Bank, WHO; Note: OOP=Out-of-pocket
*Abuja Declaration (WHO): a pledge of allocating ‘at least’ 15% of
annual government budget to improve the health sector.
In the region, fiscal space for health is low...
General govt. health expenditure as % of total govt. expenditure, 2013 OOP expenditure on health as % of total expenditure on health, 2013
*Result Framework for the OPH (ADB): OOP expenditure kept under 30% by 2030.
7
In spite of growth over the decade,
the spending on health in the region is low…
Source: World Bank, WHO; PPP=Purchasing power parity
Total health expenditure in US$ PPP per capita from private and public sources, 1995-2013
Low and middle income countries, 2013
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
199
5
200
0
200
5
201
0
201
3
199
5
200
0
200
5
201
0
201
3
199
5
200
0
200
5
201
0
201
3
199
5
200
0
200
5
201
0
201
3
199
5
200
0
200
5
201
0
201
3
199
5
200
0
200
5
201
0
201
3
199
5
200
0
200
5
201
0
201
3
199
5
200
0
200
5
201
0
201
3
199
5
200
0
200
5
201
0
201
3
199
5
200
0
200
5
201
0
201
3
Kazakhstan Azerbaijan Georgia Armenia Uzbekistan Turkmenistan KyrgyzRepublic
Tajikistan Afghanistan Pakistan
US
$ P
PP
pe
r c
ap
ita
Public Private Low and middle income countries
8
… and most of expenditures are financed by
private funds, especially out-of-pocket
Source: World Bank, WHO; Note: VHI=Voluntary health insurance; OOP=Out-of-pocket
Proportion of total health expenditure by financing agent, 2012
Public funds Private funds
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Turkmenistan Kyrgystan Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Armenia Pakistan Tajikistan Azerbaijan Afganistan Georgia
Pe
rce
nta
ge
State budget Social security funds VHI Other OOP
Outline
9
Background
Comparative Review of Health Financing in CW Asia
Country Studies
Recommendations
• Pakistan: Leaky bucket
• Uzbekistan
• Kyrgyz Republic
Conclusion
10
In PAK, poverty gains are fragile
and health outcomes lag behind
• GDP per capita: US$ 1,275
• Sixth most populous country in the world, reaching 182.1 million people
• 62.1% of population lives in rural area
• 60.1% of population is considered as the vulnerable
• Administrative unit:
Four provinces: Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, KP
One federal capital territory: Islamabad Capital Territory
A group of federally administered tribal areas (FATA)
• Life expectancy: 66 years
• Infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births: 69.0 (LIMC: 44.0)
• Under-five mortality rate per 1,000 live births: 112.6 (LMIC: 93.4)
• Maternal mortality rate per 100,000 live births: 170 (LMIC: 240)
• Births attended by skilled health personnel: 52% (LMIC: 34%)
• Measles immunization among 1-year-old: 61% (LMIC: 76%)
• Density of health workforce per 10,000 population;
Physician: 8.3 (LMIC: 7.9)
Nursing/midwifery personnel: 5.7 (LMIC: 18.0)
16,641
20,789
13,554
11,796
4,611
4,893
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000
LMIC
Pakistan
DALYs per 100,000 population
Group I: Communicable, maternal, perinatal and nutritional conditions
Group II: Noncommunicable diseases
Group III: Injuries
Burden of disease by cause group, 2012
Economic indicators
Health indicators
Source: World Bank, WHO; Note: LMIC=Lower-middle-income countries; DALY=Disability-adjusted life year
The 18th Constitutional Amendment (30 June 2011)
• Granted provinces long-promised autonomy and
empowerment in many parts of health system
• The Ministry of Health was devolved to the
provinces
• Health service delivery is primarily a provincial
matter while the federal government plays a
supportive and coordinating role
(created Ministry of Inter Provincial Coordination)
11
Selected health financing index 2000 2012
Total health expenditure as % of GDP 3.0% 2.8%
Total health expenditure, per capita (US$ PPP) $80.6 $122.4
General govt. health expenditure as % of total govt. expenditure 3.5% 4.7%
General govt. health expenditure as % of total health expenditure 21.7% 36.9%
OOP expenditure as % of total health expenditure 63.4% 54.8%
OOP expenditure as % of private expenditure on health 81.0% 86.8%
Private prepaid plans as % private expenditure on health 9.6% 12.2%
External resources for health as % total expenditure on health 0.8% 4.9%
2000 2012
4.0% 4.1%
$99.5 $217.5
6.1% 6.2%
21.7% 36.9%
58.6% 54.8%
81.0% 87.2%
0.3% 0.6%
2.7% 3.2%
Lower-middle-
income countries
Source: World Bank, WHO
Total health spending in PAK is
extremely low, compared to other LMICs
Pakistan
The 18th
amendment
in 2011
12
Source/
collection
Pooling
Purchasing
Provision
Federal budget Province / district
administrations
MoD
MoD
Military
Health
Care
system
PDoH
PDoH
3-tier public
providers
(BHU, MCHC,
RHC, THQ,
DHQ, provincial
tertiary care)
Each
autonomous
body
Each
autonomous
bodies
Contracted
networks of
health
providers
Employers’
contributions
Each
institution
ESSI
(province level)
Contracted
networks of
health
providers
Households
OOP
Private
providers
(Fee-for-
service)
Several vertical
programs
through MoIPC
Tax-financed Social security Private funds
(9.7%) (Gov employee: 4.9%) (2.0%) (4.4%)
Each
province Military
ESSI-
registered
employers
Autonomous
bodies’
employers
Population
Coverage Coverage Coverage Coverage
Public financing system is highly fragmented,
and the use of private services has increased
Source: Author’s compilation; Note: MoD=Ministry of Defense; MoIPC=Ministry of Inter Provincial Coordination; PDoM=Provincial department of Health; ESSI=Employee’s Social Security
Institute; BHU=Basic Health Unit; RHC=Rural Health Center; MCHC=Maternal and Child Health Center; THQ=Tehsil Headquarters Hospital; DHQ=Districts Headquarter Hospital
Uninsured*: 78.1%
(Coverage)
*except from private employers
(0.6%) and safety nets (0.2%)
13
In all aspects, PAK’s health financing
performance is low
Level of
funding
Level of
population
coverage
Level of
financial risk
protection
Level of
equity in
financing
Level of
pooling across
the financing
system
Level of
efficiency and
equity in the
delivery of BP
Degree of
cost-
effectiveness
and equity
consideration
in BP scheme
Level of
administrative
efficiency
---
Low High
Health shocks 54%
Natural calamities
7%
Agricultural shocks
4%
Economic shocks
28%
Law and order 3%
Family matters 4%
Share of OOP medical spending in household
budgets by income quintiles, 2005-2006
Shocks faced by
the poor/vulnerable, 2005
- 54.8% of external resources were not allocated to any
provinces or to any programs in 2012
- 11% of the government health expenditures are used in
administrative work in 2012
Source: Author’s analysis based on PSLSMS, PSNS, HIES, NHA, etc; Note: OOP=Out-of-pocket
Trends of proportion of external resources
for health, 2000-2013
14
PAK: Problem tree for health financing
Protection through
pre-paid mechanism
is limited
Predominant play of
private sectors w/o curb
on high cost expansion
Capacity of risk
distribution is weak and
less effective
Inequity to access
appropriate health service
Increased poverty gap due to
catastrophic health expenditure
Poor and inequitable
health outcome
Constrained economic
growth
Core Problem
Effects
Causes
Scarcity of
public
health
facilities
Poor quality of
services and
distrust for public
health providers
No
established
referral
patterns
No regulation
of payment
for private
sector
No effective control
of multi-channel
payment system
Highly frequent
pooling system
(institutional /
provincial level)
No VHI
mechanism
No earmarked tax
for health
Public services
are de facto
paid
Extremely low public funding
Weak integrated
health sector policy
and planning
VHI-unfriendly
environment
(lack of regular capacity
and affordability) Low
revenue
collection
Various investment
level on health
across provinces
Public sectors are
“choked pipes”
No government
purchasing
power
Lack of incentives to
improve efficiency in
service delivery
No statutory
explicit BP
scheme
No monitoring and
evaluation
High inefficiency
of public resource
management
Source: Author’s analysis; Note: BP=Benefit package; VHI=Voluntary health insurance
Financial hardship for the poor/vulnerable
Outline
15
Background
Comparative Review of Health Financing in CW Asia
Country Studies
Recommendations
• Pakistan
• Uzbekistan: Rocky road from the Semashko model
• Kyrgyz Republic
Conclusion
16
• GDP per capita: US$ 1,878
• Population is 30.2 million, accounting for about 40% of Central
Asia’s total
• 63.8% of population lives in rural area
• Ranked 102 out of 169 countries on the UNDP’s Human
Development Index
• Administrative unit:
12 regions (viloyats)
One autonomous republic: Karakalpakstan
One administrative capital: Tashkent
• Life expectancy: 69 years
• Infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births: 36.7 (LIMC: 44.0)
• Under-five mortality rate per 1,000 live births: 63.9 (LMIC: 93.4)
• Maternal mortality rate per 100,000 live births: 36 (LMIC: 240)
• Measles immunization among 1-year-old: 97% (LMIC: 76%)
• Density of health workforce per 10,000 population;
Physician: 25.3 (LMIC: 7.9)
Nursing/midwifery personnel: 119.4 (LMIC: 18.0)
Pharmaceutical personnel: 0.4 (LMIC: 4.2)
Economic indicators
Health indicators
16,641
6,840
13,554
14,571
4,611
2,713
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000
LMIC
Uzbekistan
DALYs per 100,000 population
Group I: Communicable, maternal, perinatal and nutritional conditions
Group II: Noncommunicable diseases
Group III: Injuries
Burden of disease by cause group, 2012
Overall health outcomes in UZB are commensurate
with those in LMICs, facing double burden of disease
Semashko model in the Soviet period
• Highly centralized planning with minimum
discretion allowed to local managers and a strong
emphasis on curative services
• Characterized by a large network of providers, a
high degree of specialization, and input-based
financing
• Made tangible progress, including financial
protection through universal access to basic health
services and success in fighting infectious
diseases
Source: World Bank, WHO; Note: LMIC=Lower-middle-income countries; DALY=Disability-adjusted life year
17
Selected health financing index 2000 2012
Total health expenditure as % of GDP 5.3% 6.1%
Total health expenditure, per capita (US$ PPP) $103.5 $305.6
General govt. health expenditure as % of total govt. expenditure 8.7% 9.6%
General govt. health expenditure as % of total health expenditure 47.5% 51.1%
OOP expenditure as % of total health expenditure 52.3% 46.0%
OOP expenditure as % of private expenditure on health 99.7% 94.0%
Private prepaid plans as % private expenditure on health 0.6% 5.6%
External resources for health as % total expenditure on health 6.7% 1.4%
2000 2012
4.0% 4.1%
$99.5 $217.5
6.1% 6.2%
21.7% 36.9%
58.6% 54.8%
81.0% 87.2%
0.3% 0.6%
2.7% 3.2%
Uzbekistan Lower-middle-
income countries
Government health expenditure in UZB are
higher than peer groups, but can’t lower costs
to households
Source: World Bank, WHO; Note: PPP=Purchasing power parity
18
Source/
collection
Pooling
Purchasing
Provision
Population
Inefficiency inherited from the former
Soviet system…
Viloyat health department,
Viloyat finance department
Viloyat health department,
Viloyat finance department
Republican budget
Ministry of Health
Republican
health facilities
Households
OOP
Tax-financed Private funds
General population
Viloyat and tumans/city administrations Republican budget
Purchasing-provider spilt
capitation rate
Viloyat/city
hospital
SVPs Poly-
clinics
SRBs
(rural) (city)
Partially
Integration
line-item budgeting
& Self-financing
Coverage
Prevalent
Informal payments
Source: Author’s compilation; Note: OOP=Out-of-pocket; SVP=Rural physician point; SRB=Outpatient clinics of central rayon hospital
(Region)
19
…results in households having financial
impediments in seeking healthcare
Level of
funding
Level of
population
coverage
Level of
financial risk
protection
Level of
equity in
financing
Level of
pooling across
the financing
system
Level of
efficiency and
equity in the
delivery of BP
Degree of
cost-
effectiveness
and equity
consideration
in BP scheme
Level of
administrative
efficiency
---
Low High
Share of OOP medical spending in household
budgets by income quintiles, 2003
Incidence of informal payment
in rural areas, 2005
Financial barriers to health care
in Ferghana, 2001
Source: Author’s analysis based on Living Standards Assessment, Cashin et al. etc; Note: OOP=Out-of-pocket
3.8
2.3 2.5
3.0
3.4
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
Poorest Q2 Q3 Q4 Richest
% o
f to
tal
exp
en
dit
ure
0.49
0.26
0.45
0.19
0.24
0.44
0.18
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
Poorest Q2 Q3 Q4 Richest Statedoctor
Privatedoctor
Info
rmal-
to-f
orm
al p
aym
en
ts
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0 120.0 140.0
Richest
Q3
Q2
Poorest
% of those seeking health care in the past 30 days
Did not seek health care because not enough money
Finding the money to pay for health care was difficult
Needed to borrow money to pay for health care
UZB: Problem tree for health financing
Financial hardship for the poor/vulnerable
Informal payment is
prevalent
Protection through
pre-paid mechanism
is limited
Primary care is under-
utilized
Capacity of risk
distribution is weak and
less effective
Lack of
medical
supplies
“Shallow”
BP scheme
Frequent
pooling system
(vlioyat level)
Low salary
of health
workers
Lack of quality
in primary care
No VHI
mechanism
No established
referral
procedure
Various investment
level on health
across oblast
No government
purchasing
power
Rigid input-based
financing in hospital
(line-item budgeting)
Insufficient public funding
Inequity to access
appropriate health service
Increased poverty gap due to
catastrophic health expenditure
Poor and inequitable
health outcome
Constrained economic
growth
Low level of
external aids
No monitoring
and evaluation
(data scarcity)
Core Problem
Effects
Causes
20 Source: Author’s analysis; Note: BP=Benefit package; VHI=Voluntary health insurance
Inefficient
resource
management
Inefficient
government
revenue
VHI-unfriendly
environment
(lack of regular
capacity and demand)
Outline
21
Background
Comparative Review of Health Financing in CW Asia
Country Studies
Recommendations
• Pakistan
• Uzbekistan
• Kyrgyz Republic: Regional leader in health system reform
Conclusion
Source: Author’s compilation
• State program for NCD
prevention (2013-2020)
• National program for TB
(2012-2016)
• Perinatal program (2008-
2017)
• State program for HIV
prevention (2012-2016)
• Introduction of the Mandatory
Health Insurance Fund
(MHIF) and purchaser-
provider spilt
• Replacement of line-item
health financing with new
provider payment methods
for the use of MHIF
Hospital: case-based
payment
PHC: capitation
• Introduction of State
Guarantee Benefit
Package (SGBP) and
official co-payments
• Pooling of funds at
oblast level
• Launch of Additional
Drug Package (ADP)
providing drug benefits
to citizens enrolled in
the MHI
22
1996 2000 1998 2002 2004 2008 2006 2010 2012 2014 2016
Manas (1996-2006) Manas Taalimi (2006-2010)
“Lessons from Manas”
Den Sooluk (2012-2016)
• Reforming the health care delivery system with the aim of
strengthening primary health care, developing family
medicine and restructuring the hospital sector
• Reforming health financing, including introduction of
outcome-based payment methods
• Improving medical education and developing human
resources
• Improving the provision with pharmaceuticals
• Improving quality of care
• Strengthening public health
• Introducing new health management methods in the
context of greater autonomy of health facilities
• Improving equity and
accessibility of health services
• Reducing the financial burden
on the population
• Increasing effectiveness of the
health system
• Improving quality of care
• Increasing responsiveness and
transparency of the health
system
• Improving quality of care
• Creating a strong link between
program activities and their
impact on health gains in four
priority areas;
Cardiovascular disease
Maternal and child health
TB
HIV infection
• Maintaining hard-fought gains in
financial protection, access and
efficiency of health services
• Pooling of funds at
national/republican level
(single payer system)
• Improvement of
purchasing
arrangements of the
MHIF and the Ministry of
Health
• Expansion of co-
payment exemptions
enrolled in the MHI
• Salary
increase
for health
workers
1991
Integrated the Health Policy Analysis and
Monitoring Unit under MoH’s structure (2006)
Established the Health Policy Analysis Center,
in close collaboration with MHIF (2009)
Ma
jor
ch
an
ge
s in
he
alt
h
fin
an
cin
g f
un
cti
on
s
Hea
lth
Refo
rm P
rog
ram
s
Kyrgyz Republic’s
independence
KGZ was quicker to embrace change and
develop comprehensive reform programs
23
Selected health financing index 2000 2012
Total health expenditure as % of GDP 4.7% 7.0%
Total health expenditure, per capita (US$ PPP) 76.1 $208.6
General govt. health expenditure as % of total govt. expenditure 12.0% 12.2%
General govt. health expenditure as % of total health expenditure 44.3% 60.2%
OOP expenditure as % of total health expenditure 49.8% 35.2%
OOP expenditure as % of private expenditure on health 89.3% 88.5%
Private prepaid plans as % private expenditure on health 0.0% 0.0%
External resources for health as % total expenditure on health 6.0% 12.2%
2000 2012
4.0% 4.1%
$99.5 $217.5
6.1% 6.2%
21.7% 36.9%
58.6% 54.8%
81.0% 87.2%
0.3% 0.6%
2.7% 3.2%
Lower-middle-
income countries
Source: World Bank, WHO; Note: PPP=Purchasing power parity
15.2
8.7 6.7 6.7
3.3 3.9 0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Perc
en
tag
e (
%)
External resources for health (% of total expenditure on health)
Health expenditure, total (% of GDP)
Health expenditure, public (% of GDP)
Sector-wide approach to coordinate the external funds…
Annually
↑ 0.6%
…has been gradually decreasing the donor dependency
Most of health financing indicators in KGZ
are ahead those in other LMICs…
Kyrgyz Republic
24
Source/
collection
Pooling
Purchasing
Provision
Population
…by squeezing efficiency gains out of the system
and using the savings to improve the coverage
Local budget (rayon/city
and ayilokmottu (rural)) Republican budget
Social Fund (earmarked
2% payroll tax)
Households
Republican MHIF
(nation-level pool)
SGBP administered by republican MHIF (single-payer)
General population
Co
-pa
ym
en
t
Co
ve
rag
e C
ove
rag
e
FGPs, oblast and rayon hospitals,
private pharmacies, etc.
Tax-financed Social security Private funds
Contract (PHC: capitation, hospital: case-based payment)
Health services not
included in the SGBP
SGBP:
Type, scope and
conditions for providing
health services free and
based on benefits
Serv
ice c
overa
ge
“Complimentary”
Source: Author’s compilation;
Note: MHIF=Mandatory Health Insurance Fund; SGBP=State-guaranteed benefit package; PHC=Primary health care; FGP=family group practices
25
7.1%
5.5% 5.0% 5.2%
4.5% 4.9%
4.2% 3.6%
5.3%
3.9% 4.4%
2.9%
3.9% 3.6%
4.0%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
Poorest 2 3 4 Richest
2003 2006 2009
11.2%
6.3%
3.1%
4.4%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
2000 2003 2006 2009
The KGZ health reform is successful,
but more efforts will be required
Total OOP payments share of total household expenditure, 2003-2009
% who needed but did not seek care due to distance or
affordability, 2000-2009
Source: World Bank, KIHS, WHO; Note: OOP=Out-of-pocket; DALY=Disability-adjusted life year
The financial protection and access improved significantly…
…but the financing system is not targeted well to diseases or the poor
Burden of disease by cause group, 2012
16,641
5,767
15,300
13,554
3,421
4,611
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000
LMIC
KGZ
DALY per 100,000 population
Group I: Communicable, maternal, perinatal and nutritional conditions
Group II: Noncommunicable diseases
Group III: Injuries
50 47 48
45
39
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Poorest 20% Q2 Q3 Q4 Richest 20%
% c
ov
era
ge
of
po
pu
lati
on
Current policy (covers 47.6% of population)
Coverage of co-payment exemptions policies, 2010
26
The KGZ reforms can be lessons learned to
countries with overcapacity but limited fiscal space
• Successes are in part due to the comprehensive approach, not a single instruments or “magic” bullet
• Complex reforms require careful sequencing of various reform steps
• Paying attention to institutional aspects was important in order to ensure sustainable benefits
• Phased implementation and careful sequencing were an effective implementation approach and helped
build capacity and stakeholder support as well as learning by doing
• Strong government coordination and collaboration with the development partners facilitated
harmonized support for reform design and implementation
• Well-developed health information system that facilitated effective research-to-policy channels and
central budget planning
Problem
definition
and
Options
development
Political
decision
Piloting
and
Learning
from
evidence
Evaluation
and
Redesign
Scaling
Embedding
in legal,
regulatory
framework
Positive policy cycle in Kyrgyz Republic
Health information system
Source: Author’s analysis, World Bank, the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine
Outline
27
Background
Comparative Review of Health Financing in CW Asia
Country Studies
Recommendations
Conclusions
28
Protection through
pre-paid mechanism
is limited
Predominant play of
private sectors w/o curb
on high cost expansion
Capacity of risk
distribution is weak and
less effective
Inequity to access
appropriate health service
Increased poverty gap due to
catastrophic health expenditure
Poor and inequitable
health outcome
Constrained economic
growth
Core Problem
Effects
Causes
Scarcity of
public
health
facilities
Poor quality of
services and
distrust for public
health providers
No
established
referral
patterns
No regulation
of payment
for private
sector
No effective control
of multi-channel
payment system
Highly frequent
pooling system
(institutional /
provincial level)
No VHI
mechanism
No earmarked tax
for health
Public services
are de facto
paid
Extremely low public funding
Weak integrated
health sector policy
and planning
VHI-unfriendly
environment
(lack of regular capacity
and affordability) Low
revenue
collection
Various investment
level on health
across provinces
No government
purchasing
power
Lack of incentives to
improve efficiency in
service delivery
No statutory
explicit BP
scheme
No monitoring and
evaluation
High inefficiency
of public resource
management
Comprehensive and sector-wide approach is
necessary for PAK’s health reforms
Financial hardship for the poor/vulnerable
In Punjab
29
Protection through
pre-paid mechanism
is limited
Predominant play of
private sectors w/o curb
on high cost expansion
Capacity of risk
distribution is weak and
less effective
Inequity to access
appropriate health service
Increased poverty gap due to
catastrophic health expenditure
Poor and inequitable
health outcome
Constrained economic
growth
Core Problem
Effects
Causes
Scarcity of
public
health
facilities
Poor quality of
services and
distrust for public
health providers
No
established
referral
patterns
No regulation
of payment
for private
sector
No effective control
of multi-channel
payment system
Highly frequent
pooling system
(institutional /
provincial level)
No VHI
mechanism
No earmarked tax
for health
Public services
are de facto
paid
Extremely low public funding
Weak integrated
health sector policy
and planning
VHI-unfriendly
environment
(lack of regular capacity
and affordability) Low
revenue
collection
Various investment
level on health
across provinces
No government
purchasing
power
Lack of incentives to
improve efficiency in
service delivery
No statutory
explicit BP
scheme
No monitoring and
evaluation
High inefficiency
of public resource
management
Comprehensive and sector-wide approach is
necessary for PAK’s health reforms
Financial hardship for the poor/vulnerable
Financing
institutional design
ICT, hospitals,
health workers
Federal-
provincial
coordination
30
Flagship programs can be identified through
integration of operational focus in PAK
Health
financing
Health
infrastructure
Health
governance
ADB’s
operational
focus
Project loan / result-based financing for national health insurance
Sequencing of various reform steps, beyond health financing
Federal
Provincial
… and long-term pipeline development in line with country partnership strategy “
”
Possible solutions may include…
• Increase provincial funding for health
• Strengthen government purchasing power
• Establish appropriate referral process
• Introduce the research-to-policy channel
• Improve geographical accessibility eg.
building hospitals, training heath workers
• Establish the official co-payment and/or the
user-fee process
…but should be carefully considered
with federal programs and/or directions
31
Reducing inefficiency and re-utilizing its
savings can address the core problem in UZB
Informal payment is
prevalent
Protection through
pre-paid mechanism
is limited
Primary care is under-
utilized
Capacity of risk
distribution is weak and
less effective
Inequity to access
appropriate health service
Increased poverty gap due to
catastrophic health expenditure
Poor and inequitable
health outcome
Constrained economic
growth
No monitoring
and evaluation
(data scarcity)
Lack of
medical
supplies
“Shallow”
BP scheme
Frequent
pooling system
(vlioyat level)
Low salary
of health
workers
Lack of quality
in primary care
No VHI
mechanism
No established
referral
procedure
Inefficient
resource
management
Inefficient
government
revenue
Various investment
level on health
across oblast
No government
purchasing
power
Rigid input-based
financing in hospital
(line-item budgeting)
Core Problem
Effects
Causes
VHI-unfriendly
environment
(lack of regular
capacity and demand)
Insufficient public funding
Financial hardship for the poor/vulnerable
32
PPP can create efficiency incentives for
the private sector by linking payment to
specific performance criteria in UZB and KGZ
Initiator
(defines services
and area)
Selector
(who chooses
provider)
Manager Production
Infrastructure
Source of
Financing
Government service Government Government Government Government Government
Management
contracts Government Government Private sector Government Government
Service delivery
contract
(clinical/non-clinical)
Government Government Private sector Private sector Government
• Greater focus on the achievement of measurable results if contracts define
objectively verifiable outputs and outcomes
• Using the private sector’s greater flexibility, efficiency, and generally
better staff morale to improve services and expand access to needed
services
• Use competition to increase effectiveness and efficiency
• Allow governments to focus more on other roles that they are uniquely
placed to undertake, such as planning, standard setting, financing, regulation
and the various public health functions
Contracting can strengthen the public model… …under UZB and KGZ’s situations
Government has more
stewardship
Empirical evidence to work
well on a larger scale
Tra
dit
ion
al
mo
del
New
PP
P
mo
del
Source: Author’s analysis based on Loevinsohn B, et al.
33
PPP can be introduced not only in service
delivery, but also in medical supply
Sta
ge
2
Sta
ge
1
Janssen GPH
Agreement with PATH, IPM
• Implement clinical trials targeted to the vulnerable
(women)
• Ensure access the treatment through affordable
pricing strategy
NGO/academia
• $30 million of drug
supply
• Treatment protocols
• Trainings for disease
management programs
Agreement with USAID
• Implement the national part clinical targeted to
the vulnerable (women)
• Engage with the global TB community to solicit
support
Collaborate with IDA (International Development Association)
• A procurement agent for the Stop TB
Partnership’s Global Drug Facility (GDF)
• Facilitate access to quality-assured medicines
Bi/multilateral Agencies
• Royalty free license
• R&D expertise HIV
MDR-TB
Target diseases on the company’s pipeline
as well as national disease priority
Building capacity and gains
in regard to clinical outcome,
accessibility to modern technology,
and/or information system
“
”
Building capacity (learning-by-doing) is a main objective
of our work. And partnership with development agencies is
central to all that we do.
Director, Janssen GPH
Source: Interview and news articles from Janssen Global Public Health; Note: IPM=International Partnership for Microbicides; MDR-TB=multi-drug resistant tuberculosis
34
Health Infrastructure
Contribution of ADB on health financing will
support inclusiveness and reduce vulnerabilities,
through UHC achievement
By 2020, ADB will have expanded health operation
to 3-5% of its annual process
CWRD should be processing $XXXX XXXX
health interventions each year
ADB’s Strategy 2020 Mid-term Review
CWRD target: $XX XXXX
processing in 2015
No health intervention
in the pipeline
Health Financing Health Governance
Universal Health Coverage in Asia and Pacific
Inclusive Economic Growth Fighting poverty, improving lives
Central and West Asia
35
Acknowledgement
for the “hottest” EVER summer ;-)
Michiel Van der Auwera (CWPF)
Eduardo Banzon (SDCC)
Betty Wilkinson (CWPF)
Direct supervision of work
Munir Abro (PRM)
Mamatkalil Razaev (KYRM)
Nargiza Talipova (CWUW)
Support and review in the country context
Susann Roth (SDCC)
Andaleeb Alam (YP)
Gerard Anderson (Professor, JHU)
Sachiko Ozawa (Assistant Scientist, JHU)
Hwayoung Lee (Postdoctoral Fellow, SNU)
Hyobum Jang (Fellowship, WHO WPRO)
Hoon Sang Lee (Senior Health Advisor, KOICA)
Enrique Esteban (Director, Janssen GPH)
Advisory / Interview
Willdon Oller (BPMSD)
CWPF IS/NS
ADBK Staffs
…and 2015 ADB Intern Fellows!
Life in ADB
36
Thank You!
…Questions?
https://www.linkedin.com/in/yeonheeyang
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper/presentation are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), or its Board of Governors, or the
governments they represent. ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibil ity for any consequence of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent
with ADB official terms.
37
Appendix
38
Public financing: Tax-based vs. Payroll tax
• Beveridge model
• Also known as National Health
Services
• Named after William Beveridge who
designed Britain’s National Health
Service in 1942
• Health services almost entirely financed by tax
revenues
• Government collects funds (tax) and also
(generally) is the provides (or contracts them)
health services
• Pooling takes place at Ministry of Health (federal)
level
• Example of single-payer system; one entity (eg.
a government-run organization) collects all health
care funds and pays out all health care costs.
• Bismarck model
• Also known as Social Security
based healthcare systems
• First established by Bismarck in
Germany in late 1800’s
• Compulsory earmarked payroll contributions;
employer-based health insurance because
covers formal sector health workers in many
countries
• Clear link between these contributions and a set
of defined rights for the insured population
• Financing and provision are separated in many
countries
Source: Author’s compilation, based on JHSPH class “Health Financing in LMIC” by Prof. Ozawa
Mo
de
l
Ma
in c
ha
rac
teri
sti
cs
39
Purchasing Mechanisms: Pros/Cons
Payment
mechanism Characteristics Advantages Disadvantages
Fee-for-
service
• Determined prospectively, paid
retrospectively
• Payment based on quantity of
services provided
• Incentive to provide services
• Cost escalation
• Incentives for Supplier-induced demand
• Unpredictable expenses for fund holder
Capitation
• Determined prospectively, paid
prospectively
• Payment based on patient head
count
• Incentive to operate efficiently
• Predictable expenses for fund
holder
• Good if you have a healthy
population
• Eliminates supplier-induced
demand
• Moderate administrative costs
• Disincentive to provide care
• Avoid sick & costly patients (cream-
skimming)
• Possible cost shifting (referral to another
provider)
• Financial risk may put provider in debt
Case-based
(include DRG)
• Determined prospectively, paid
retrospectively
• Payment based on patients’
case/condition
• Incentive to operate efficiently
• High administrative costs (DRG
classification)
• Less suitable for out-patient care (difficult
to define case)
• Incentive to select low risks within case
categories
• Unpredictable expenses for fund holder
Global budget
• Determined prospectively, paid
prospectively
• Payment based on the
organization’s budget
• Low administrative costs
• Predictable expenses for fund
holder
• Permit reallocation of resources
• No direct incentives to be efficient
• Disincentive to provide care
Line-item
budget
• Determined prospectively, paid
prospectively
• Payment based on each line in
the organization’s budget
• Allow central control
• Desirable when local management
is weak
• Predictable expenses for fund
holder
• Incentive to maintain status quo
• No direct incentives to be efficient
• Disincentive to provide care
• Resources are fixed & cannot be
reallocated
Source: Author’s compilation, based on JHSPH class “Health Financing in LMIC” by Prof. Ozawa; Note: DRG=Diagnostic-related groups
40
PPP in Health: Wide Range of Options
Design &
construction
Non-clinical
services Primary care
Specialized
clinical
services
Hospital
management
Clinical
support
services
• Detailed
designs
• Building
construction
• Medical
equipment
• Capital
financing
• IT
equipment &
services
• Maintenance
• Food
• Laundry
• Cleaning
• Security
• Lab analysis
• Diagnostic
tests
• Medical
equipment
maintenance
• Ambulance
services
• Primary care
• Public health
• Vaccinations
• Maternal &
child health
• Dialysis
• Radio-therapy
• Day surgery
• Other
specialist
services
• Management
of entire
hospital or
network of
hospitals
and/or clinics
Source: IFC