preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: what role for turkey?

8/9/2019 Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Role for Turkey?

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Preventing the Proliferation of

WeaPons of Mass Destruction:

What role for turkey?

Sinan lgen

p a p e r s e r i e s


2/20

2010 ransatlantic Academy. All rights reserved.

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About the Transatlantic Academy

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Preventng the Prolferaton ofWeapons of Mass Destructon:

What Role for Turkey?

Transatlantc Academy Paper Seres

June 2010

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Preventng the Prolferaton of Weapons of Mass Destructon: What Role for Turkey? 3

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Introduction11


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Transatlantc Academy4

Turkey takes a

firm stance

against

proliferation of

WMDs and their

means of delivery,

and favors global

disarmament.

Ankaras policy is

to support all

efforts in the field

of arms control,

nonproliferation,

and disarmament.

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Implementing nonproliferation commitments:

the role of export controls

Ex WMD w

Turkish Nonproliferation Policies:

An Overview2
http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.htmlhttp://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.htmlhttp://www.ctbto.org/treaty/treatytext.tt.htmlhttp://www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc/eng/cwc_frameset.htmlhttp://www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc/eng/cwc_frameset.htmlhttp://www.opbw.org/convention/documents/btwctext.pdfhttp://www.opbw.org/convention/documents/btwctext.pdfhttp://www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc/eng/cwc_frameset.htmlhttp://www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc/eng/cwc_frameset.htmlhttp://www.ctbto.org/treaty/treatytext.tt.htmlhttp://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.htmlhttp://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html


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As a country

intent on

developing

an ambitious

program of civilian

nuclear power,

Turkeys primary

concern at the

international level

is to safeguard

its rights for the

development of

a domestic and

civilian nuclear

capacity.

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Understanding Turkeys priorities in the

nuclear field

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Turkeys Nuclear Strategy

3


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What went wrong?

Unlike prevailing models in the rest of the world,

the Turkish government wanted to transfer all

the risks and costs of building and operating

a nuclear power plant to the private investor.

In addition, and despite repeated attempts by

interested bidders, no government guarantee was

offered for the construction of the plant, meaning

that a change in the government could potentially

put the whole project at risk. Finally, the electricity

purchase commitment was limited to 15 years,

whereas the technological life of a nuclear power

plant is around 60-70 years. As a result, the

unit electricity price offered by the single bidder

turned out to be around 20 cents/kWh compared

to the prevailing market price of 12 cents/kWh.

Direct negotiations with the consortium partners

and intergovernmental talks at the highest level

between Prime Minister Recep Erdogan and

then-Russian premier Vladimir Putin led to the

lowering of the price to 15 cents/kWh. Eventually

the administrative court canceled the tender on

a technicality and saved the government from

having to make a difficult decision. Following the

cancelation of the tender, the Turkish governmentdecided to adopt a different model for building

the countrys first nuclear power plant, and

decided to engage in intergovernmental

negotiations with Russia on the modalities of the

construction and operation of this nuclear facility.

In addition, negotiations with South Korea were

also initiated for the construction of the second

nuclear facility near Mersin on the Mediterranean

coast. The Minister of Energy Taner Yildiz

reiterated the governments willingness to talk to

other potential nuclear power operators.

Governance and regulatory questions

The transition to nuclear power is also undermined

by the lack of an appropriate regulatory framework

and, in particular, the absence of an independent

regulatory authority for nuclear safety and security.

At present, the Turkish Atomic Energy Institution(TAEK) is operating as a regulatory body while at

the same time is responsible for the operation

of the countrys single atomic research facility in

Kucukcekmece, near Istanbul. The regulatory and

operational role of TAEK should be separated,

and a new and independent nuclear regulatory

agency should be setup. The independence of

this institution from the government is all the

more important given that the state-held electricity

company will be part of the nuclear electricity

generating consortium. The new agency should

be in a position to dictate its rules to all future

players including the state-held ones. A draft lawfor the establishment of this new agency is under

discussion at the governmental level. Following the

adoption of this nuclear framework law, secondary

legislation regarding safety and security in the

nuclear field are to be adopted in line with the

relevant IAEA guidelines.


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Turkey wants

to protect its

sovereign right

for uranium

enrichment for

civilian purposes.

The protection

of this right

is deemed to

be crucial for

preventing any

future supply

bottlenecks.

Uranium enrichment from a Turkish perspective

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10/20


Turkish authoritie

believe that the

country is unjust

treated as a

potential nuclear

proliferator. Many

analysts do not

view Turkeys

embedding in

the Western

alliance as an

insurmountable

obstacle for the

country to develo

nuclear weapons

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Turkey as a potential proliferator?

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11/20


Turkey wants the

NPT conference to

retain a balanced

approach

between the NPTs

three pillars of

disarmament,

nonproliferation,

and civilian use

of nuclear energy.

As such, the NPT

review conference

should not be

used just to try

to strengthen

nonproliferation

rules, but it should

also address

the concerns

of countries

interested in

switching to

nuclear power.

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Dissatisfaction with the NPT and the 2010 NPT

Review Conference

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13/20


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14/20


Iran is not viewed

as a direct threa

by the Turkish

establishment or

in Turkish public

opinion. That

being said, Irans

nuclear ambition

are viewed

with concern in

Ankara. Turkish

officials are quite

clear that they

do not want to

see an Iran with

nuclear weapons

capability.

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Turkey and the Iranian

Nuclear Crisis4


15/20


Ankara remains

against the

imposition of new

sanctions on Iran.

These differences

may now lead

Turkey to abstain

from voting for,

or even voting

against, such a UN

Security Council

Resolution. But

Turkish leaders,

and in particular

Prime Minister

Erdogan, have

in fact not

been adept at

explaining the

rationale for

Turkeys opposition

to a new set

of sanctions

against Iran.

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16/20


Unlike the U.S.

or EU security

strategy where

proliferation

of WMDs are

identified as

among the chief

security risks,

nonproliferation

concerns have

not acquired any

similar visibility

in Turkish foreign

and security

policy. Turkish

foreign policy did

not feel the need

to conceptualize

and prioritize

the nuclear

proliferation

challenge as an

item of Turkish

foreign policy.

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5Conceptualizing Nonproliferation

Strategies and Turkish Foreign and

Security Policy


17/20


The lack of an

agreed conceptual

framework

regarding the

proliferation of

nuclear weapons

led Turkish leaders

to assess the

rising crisis from

a more pragmatist

and populist

perspective. The

Iranian nuclear

issue has been

framed by the

body politic firstly

as an issue

of neighborly

relations, and

secondly as an

issue of regional

stability. These are

several barriers

impeding the

emergence of a

constituency, in

particular among

foreign and

security policy

experts, that could

have helped to

frame the Iran

debate from the

nonproliferation

angle.

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18/20


The Turkish Criminal Code No: 5237 w b T G N Ab Sb 6, 4 w Ob , 4 I bb T - w A 6, 7, 73, 74 w

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Article 172 D R A , wbj , w / , b T b ,

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Appendix: Turkeys Nonproliferation

Legislation6


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A b Law on Control of thePrivate Industrial Enterprises Producing War

Weapons, Equipment, Vehicles, Ammunitionand Explosives (Law No: 5201) A b P J 4, 4, Lw N: 636, w w M N D (MND) b x w T MND w, , x

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preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: what role for turkey?

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