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Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics National University of Singapore The 25 th Annual IAEE International Conference Omni Interlocken Resort, Denver September 18 – 21, 2005

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Page 1: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market

Youngho ChangDepartment of Economics

National University of Singapore

The 25th Annual IAEE International ConferenceOmni Interlocken Resort, Denver

September 18 – 21, 2005

Page 2: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

2

An Overview

• Competition gaming model studies on pricing behavior and market power are prolific– Bertrand-type model– Cournot-type model– Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) model

• But empirical studies are relatively rare

• Calculate Competitive Benchmark Price (CBP) and Price-Cost Margin Index (PCMI) and analyze pricing behavior and market power in a recently deregulated electricity market in a small open economy

Page 3: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

3

Competition Gaming Models

• Bertrand-type model– Any firm is able to capture the entire market by pricing

below others and expanding their respective output• However, there are significant constraints in capacity

expansion• Increasing marginal costs of producing electricity

• Cournot-type model– A firm has a perfectly flexible real-time control– Instantaneous changes in generation are possible

• In general, generators are not in total control of their real-time output

• Potential ramping costs prohibit instantaneous changes

Page 4: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

4

Supply Function Equilibrium Model

• Profit-maximizing equilibrium in the electricity market is attained under the condition of uncertain demand faced by competitors– Strategic biddings in a competitive spot market– Linear supply function

• Gives output levels for a range of prices

• Also with a linear marginal cost function– Interaction between contract markets and spot markets– Short-run incentive to exercise market power is removed

Page 5: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

5

New Electricity Market in Singapore (NEMS)

• Vertically integrated-government-owned monopoly– Public Utility Board (PUB) was responsible for electricity supply

• Singapore Electricity Pool (SEP): A day-ahead market – From 1998 to June 2001

• There was a sole purchaser of electricity (Power Supply Ltd)– From July 2001 to December 2002

• Contestable consumers were introduced (whose power requirement is greater than 2MW)

• NEMS started on January 01, 2003– A mandatory pool, but a spot market for electricity and reserves

operated by the Energy Market Company (EMC)

Page 6: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

6

Characteristics of the NEMS

• Wholesale and retail market– Since July 2001, about 250 big consumers became contestable– June 2003, about 5,000 consumers– December 2003, another about 5,000 consumers – 75% of total electricity demand are contestable– Domestic (22%); Non-Domestic (78%)

• A mandatory 100% price cap during 2003

• Vesting contracts from January 2004– A contractual obligation to produce a specified quantity of

electricity (65% of total electricity demand)– Non-contestable customers are fully covered

Page 7: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

7

NEMS Industry Structure

RetailCompanies

GenerationCompanies

Bilateral Contracts

ReserveCapacity

SpinningReserveMarket

ElectricitySpot

Market

InterruptibleLoads

Electricity Electricity

Customers

Market Operator

Market Support Services: Billing, Settlements &Meter Reading

System Operator

Page 8: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

8

NEMS Market Structure

: SP Group $(UoS) : Use of System Charge $(kWh) : Energy Payment $(*) : Regulated Tariffs

$(MSS) : Market Support Service Charge $(C) : Commercially agreed terms

MarketOperator

Market SupportServiceProvider

Retailers

Non Contestable

> 120,000 kWh/paAccess to

Spot Mkt Prices

Competitively Supplied

Retail Customers

Wholesale Customers

GEN

ERA

TOR

S

PowerSeraya

PowerSenoko

TuasPower

Others

Physical FlowFinancial Flow

CO

NSU

MER

S

$(*)

$(kWh)

$(C)

$(UoS)

$(kWh, UoS,MSS)

$(kWh)

$(UoS, M

SS)

$(kWh,

UoS,MS

S)

$(kWh)

T&D NetworkT&D NetworkPOWERGRIDPOWERGRID

OR

Page 9: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

9

Competitive Benchmark Price (CBP)

• Definition– The short-run marginal cost of supplying electricity

from the last unit that clears the market in each half-hour

• The calculated CBP considers – Daily available capacity by plant type – Daily plant outage level by plant type – Short-run marginal cost of each individual plant-type

owned by the different generation companies

• This possibly reflects an intentional plant outage, considered an exercise of market power

Page 10: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

10

Competitive Benchmark Price (CBP): Calculation

Quantity (MW)

Price ($/MWh)

Company A Company B Company C

60

0

Market Clearing Point

Total Demand

Clearing Price = $60/MWh•

Page 11: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

11

Observed USEP and CBP: September 2003

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

1 52 103 154 205 256 307 358 409 460 511 562 613 664 715 766 817 868 919 970 1021 1072 1123 1174 1225 1276 1327 1378 1429

Page 12: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

12

Observed Average USEP and CBP (2003)

Month Average USEP Average CBP 1 Average CBP 2Jan-03 80.85 67.81 67.93Feb-03 91.92 67.64 70.20Mar-03 101.53 68.47 71.01Apr-03 90.47 68.64 69.98May-03 96.85 68.27 69.36Jun-03 86.16 68.51 70.20Jul-03 96.97 68.04 69.00Aug-03 89.37 68.81 72.06Sep-03 85.30 68.22 70.66Oct-03 90.94 68.25 71.07Nov-03 103.96 68.64 72.17Dec-03 93.73 68.24 70.51

AVG 92.34 68.29 70.35

Page 13: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

13

Average USEP and CBP in 2003Average USEP and CBP in 2003

0.00

20.00

40.00

60.00

80.00

100.00

120.00

Jan-03 Feb-03 Mar-03 Apr-03 May-03 Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 Dec-03

Month

S$/M

Wh Average USEP

Average CBP 1Average CBP 2

Page 14: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

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Observed Average USEP and CBP (2004)

Month Average USEP Average CBP 1 Average CBP 2Jan-04 64.24 67.67 68.26Feb-04 70.91 69.04 70.46Mar-04 73.56 69.31 71.96Apr-04 74.99 68.30 69.06May-04 80.52 68.52 69.49Jun-04 95.86 68.53 70.19Jul-04 80.69 68.24 68.96Aug-04 84.34 68.27 70.40Sep-04 83.78 68.51 71.50Oct-04 91.25 68.55 71.52AVG 80.01 68.49 70.18

Page 15: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

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Average USEP and CBP in 2004Average USEP and CBP in 2004

0.00

20.00

40.00

60.00

80.00

100.00

120.00

Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04

Month

S$/M

Wh Average USEP

Average CBP 1Average CBP 2

Page 16: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

16

Price-Cost Margin Index (PCMI)

• Definition– Modified Lerner Index where CBP is used instead of

MC [(P-MC)/MC]

• This is used as a proxy for gauging market power by examining how much the actual price observed deviates from the calculated CBP

• The large the deviation, the higher the probability that the observed price is due to market power in the market

Page 17: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

17

Price-Cost Margin Index (PCMI) in 2003

Month Average USEP Average CBP 1 Average CBP 2 Average PCMI 1 Average PCMI 2Jan-03 80.85 67.81 67.93 19.04 18.86Feb-03 91.92 67.64 70.20 35.63 30.08Mar-03 101.53 68.47 71.01 48.03 42.37Apr-03 90.47 68.64 69.98 31.49 29.01May-03 96.85 68.27 69.36 41.73 39.68Jun-03 86.16 68.51 70.20 25.71 22.69Jul-03 96.97 68.04 69.00 42.29 40.36Aug-03 89.37 68.81 72.06 29.70 23.92Sep-03 85.30 68.22 70.66 24.89 20.39Oct-03 90.94 68.25 71.07 33.02 26.88Nov-03 103.96 68.64 72.17 50.66 43.15Dec-03 93.73 68.24 70.51 37.22 33.06

AVG 92.34 68.29 70.35 34.95 30.87

Page 18: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

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Price-Cost Margin Index (PCMI) in 2004Monthly PCMI in 2003

0.00

20.00

40.00

60.00

80.00

100.00

120.00

Jan-03 Feb-03 Mar-03 Apr-03 May-03 Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 Dec-03

Month

Average USEPAverage PCMI 1Average PCMI 2

Page 19: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

19

Price-Cost Margin Index (PCMI) in 2004

Month Average USEP Average CBP 1 Average CBP 2 Average PCMI 1 Average PCMI 2Jan-04 64.24 67.67 68.26 -5.13 -5.95Feb-04 70.91 69.04 70.46 2.77 0.80Mar-04 73.56 69.31 71.96 6.20 2.39Apr-04 74.99 68.30 69.06 9.78 8.69May-04 80.52 68.52 69.49 17.47 15.87Jun-04 95.86 68.53 70.19 39.92 37.08Jul-04 80.69 68.24 68.96 18.21 17.05Aug-04 84.34 68.27 70.40 23.50 19.79Sep-04 83.78 68.51 71.50 22.32 17.38Oct-04 91.25 68.55 71.52 33.12 27.61AVG 80.01 68.49 70.18 16.81 14.07

Page 20: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

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Price-Cost Margin Index (PCMI) in 2004Monthly PCMI in 2004

-20.00

0.00

20.00

40.00

60.00

80.00

100.00

120.00

Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04

Month

Average USEPAverage PCMI 1Average PCMI 2

Page 21: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

21

Oil Price-Adjusted PCMI (2004)

Month Average USEP Adjusted CBP 1 Adjusted CBP 2 Average PCMI 1 Average PCMI 2

Jan-04 64.24 67.67 68.26 -5.13 -5.95

Feb-04 70.91 68.89 69.49 2.94 2.05

Mar-04 73.56 70.13 70.74 4.89 3.99

Apr-04 74.99 71.39 72.01 5.04 4.13

May-04 80.52 72.68 73.31 10.79 9.83

Jun-04 95.86 73.98 74.63 29.57 28.45

Jul-04 80.69 75.32 75.97 7.14 6.21

Aug-04 84.34 76.67 77.34 10.00 9.05

Sep-04 83.78 78.05 78.73 7.35 6.42

Oct-04 91.25 79.46 80.15 14.84 13.85

Page 22: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

22

PCMI and Oil Price-Adjusted PCMI (2004)PCMI and Oil-price-adjusted PCMI in 2004

-20.00

0.00

20.00

40.00

60.00

80.00

100.00

120.00

Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04

Month

Average USEPAverage PCMI 1Average PCMI 2Adjusted PCMI 1Adjusted PCMI 2

Page 23: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

23

Concluding Remarks

• Competitive Benchmark Price (CBP) and Price-Cost Margin Index (PCMI) are used to analyze pricing behavior and maker power in a recently deregulated electricity market of a small open economy

• USEP (Uniform Singapore Electricity Price) is lower in 2004 than 2003. But CBP is slightly higher in 2004 than 2003

• During 2003, PCMI is larger than 20% except January and itshows that market power seemed to exist in 2003

• During 2004, PCMI is larger than 10% except the first 4 months even under vesting contracts

• However, oil-price-adjusted PCMI is lower than 10% except June and October 2004 and supports non-existence of market power in general and effectiveness of vesting contracts in controlling market power vis-à-vis prices

Page 24: Pricing behavior market power USAEE25 · 2005-09-18 · Pricing Behavior, Market Power and Vesting Contracts in a Deregulated Electricity Market Youngho Chang Department of Economics

THANK YOU!

ANY COMMENTS, ENQUIRY OR RECOMMENDATIONS,

EMAIL: [email protected]