pritchett 1997 jep

8/10/2019 Pritchett 1997 JEP

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American Economic Association

Divergence, Big TimeAuthor(s): Lant PritchettSource: The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Summer, 1997), pp. 3-17Published by: American Economic AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138181 .Accessed: 24/07/2013 14:38

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Journal of Economic Perspectives-Volume 1, Number 3-Summer 1997-Pages 3-17

Divergence, Big Time

Lant Pritchett

ivergence n relative productivity evels and living standards s the domi-nant feature of modern economic history. In the last century, incomes in

the less developed (or euphemistically, the developing ) countrieshave fallen far behind those in the developed countries, both proportionatelyand absolutely. I estimate that from 1870 to 1990 the ratio of per capita incomesbetween the richest and the poorest countries increased by roughly a factor of fiveand that the difference in income between the richest country and all others hasincreased by an order of magnitude.' This divergence is the result of the very dif-ferent patterns in the long-run economic performance of two sets of countries.

One set of countries-call them the developed or the advanced capi-talist (Maddison, 1995) or the high income OECD (World Bank, 1995) -iseasily, if awkwardly, identified as European countries and their offshoots plusJapan. Since 1870, the long-run growth rates of these countries have been rapid(by previous historical standards), their growth rates have been remarkably sim-ilar, and the poorer members of the group grew sufficiently faster to produceconsiderable convergence in absolute income levels. The other set of countries,called the developing or less developed or nonindustrialized, can beeasily, if still awkwardly, defined only as the other set of countries, as theyhave nothing else in common. The growth rates of this set of countries havebeen, on average, slower than the richer countries, producing divergence in

' To put it another way, the standard deviation of (natural log) GDP per capita across all countries hasincreased between 60 percent and 100 percent since 1870, in spite of the convergence amongst therichest.

* Lant Pritchett s Senior Economist, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

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Lant Pritchett 5

Table 1

Average Per Annum Growth Rates of GDP Per Capita in the Presently High-Income Industrialized Countries, 1870-1989

Per annum growth atesLevel n 1870

Country (1985 P$) 1870-1960 1960-80 1980-94

Average 1757 1.54 3.19 1.51Std dev. of growth rates .33 1.1 .51

Australia 3192 .90 2.43 1.22

Great Britain 2740 1.08 2.02 1.31New Zealand 2615 1.24 1.39 1.28Belgium 2216 1.05 3.70 1.52Netherlands 2216 1.25 2.90 1.29USA 2063 1.70 2.48 1.52Switzerland 1823 1.94 2.07 .84Denmark 1618 1.66 2.77 1.99Germany 1606 1.66 3.03 1.56Austria 1574 1.40 3.81 1.58France 1560 1.56 3.53 1.31Sweden 1397 1.85 2.74 .81Canada 1360 1.85 3.32 .86

Italy 1231 1.54 4.16 1.62Norway 1094 1.81 3.78 2.08Finland 929 1.91 3.77 1.09Japan 622 1.86 6.28 2.87

Source:Maddison, 1995.Notes: Data is adjusted from 1990 to 1985 P$ by the U.S. GDP deflator, by a method described later inthis article. Per annum growth rates are calculated using endpoints.

1960; conversely, the richest five countries in 1870 recorded the five slowest growthrates from 1870 to 1960.3 As is well known, this convergence has not happened ata uniform rate. There is as much convergence in the 34 years between 1960 and1994 as in the 90 years from 1870 to 1960. Even within this earlier period, thereare periods of stronger convergence pre-1914 and weaker convergence from 1914to 1950.

Second, even though the poorer countries grew faster than the richer countriesdid, the narrow range of the growth rates over the 1870-1960 period is striking. TheUnited States, the richest country in 1960, had grown at 1.7 percent per annumsince 1870, while the overall average was 1.54. Only one country, Australia, greweither a half a percentage point higher or lower than the average, and the standarddeviation of the growth rates was only .33. Evans (1994) formally tests the hypothesis

'The typical measure of income dispersion, the standard deviation of (natural log) incomes, fell from.41 in 1870 to .27 in 1960 to only .11 in 1994.



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6 Journal of Economic Perspectives

that growth rates among 13 European and offshoot countries (not Japan) were

equal, and he is unable to reject it at standard levels of statistical significance.Third, while the long run hides substantial variations, at least since 1870 there

has been no obvious acceleration of overall growth rates over time. As CharlesJones(1995) has pointed out, there is remarkable stability in the growth rates in theUnited States. For instance, if I predict per capita income in the United States in1994 based only on a simple time trend regression of (natural log) GDP per capitaestimated with data from 1870 to 1929, this prediction made for 65 years ahead isoff by only 10 percent.4 Although this predictive accuracy is not true for everycountry, it is true that the average growth rate of these 17 countries in the most

recent period between 1980 and 1994 is almost exactly the same as that of the 1870-1960 period. However, this long-run stability does mask modest swings in the growthrates over time, as growth was considerably more rapid in the period between 1950to 1980, especially outside the United States, than either in earlier periods or since1980.

These three facts are true of the sample of countries that Maddison defines asthe advanced capitalist countries. However, the discussion of convergence andlong-run growth has always been plagued by the fact that the sample of countriesfor which historical economic data exists (and has been assembled into convenientand comparable format) is severely nonrepresentative. Among a sample of now

advanced capitalist countries something like convergence (or at least nondiver-gence) is almost tautological, a point made early on by De Long (1988). Definingthe set of countries as those that are the richest now almost guarantees the findingof historical convergence, as either countries are rich now and were rich historically,in which case they all have had roughly the same growth rate (like nearly all ofEurope) or countries are rich now and were poor historically (likejapan) and hencegrew faster and show convergence. However, examples of divergence, like countriesthat grew much more slowly and went from relative riches to poverty (like Argen-tina) or countries that were poor and grew so slowly as to become relatively poorer(like India), are not included in the samples of now developed countries thattend to find convergence.

Calculating a Lower Bound For Per Capita GDP

This selectivity problem raises a difficult issue in trying to estimate the possiblemagnitude of convergence or divergence of the incomes since 1870. There is no

'Jones (1995) uses this basic fact of the constancy of growth to good effect in creating a compellingargument that the steadiness of U.S. growth implies that endogenous growth models that make growtha function of nonstationary variables, such as the level of R&D spending or the level of education of thelabor force, are likely incorrect as they imply an accelerating growth rate (unless several variablesworkingin opposite directions just happen to offset each other). These issues are also discussed in his paper inthis issue.



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speculative estimates for western European countries going back much further in

time; for example, he estimates that per capita GDPs in the Netherlands and theUnited Kingdom in 1700 were P$1515 and P$992, respectively, and ventures toguess that the average per capita GNP in western Europe was P$400 in 1400. Kuz-nets's (1971) guess of the trough of the average per capita GDP of European coun-tries in 900 is around P$400.' On this score, P$250 is a pretty safe bet.

A complementary set of calculations to justify a lower bound are based onsubsistence income. While subsistence as a concept is out of favor, and right-

fully so for many purposes, it is sufficiently robust for the task at hand. There arethree related calculations: poverty lines, average caloric intakes and the cost ofsubsistence. Ravallion, Datt and van de Walle (1991) argue that the lowest defen-sible poverty line based on achieving minimally adequate consumption expendi-tures is P$252 per person per year. If we assume that personal consumption expen-ditures are 75 percent of GDP (the average for countries with GDP per capita lessthan P$400) and that mean income is 1.3 times the median, then even to achievemedian income at the lowest possible poverty line requires a per capita income of$437.6

As an alternative way of considering subsistence GDP per capita, begin withthe finding that estimated average intake per person per day consistent with work-ing productively is between 2,000 to 2,400 calories.7 Now, consider two calculations.The first is that, based on a cross-sectional regression using data on incomes fromthe Penn World Tables and average caloric intake data from the FAO, the predictedcaloric consumption at P$250 is around 1,600.8 The five lowest levels of

5More specifically, Kuznets estimated that the level was about $160, if measured in 1985 U.S. dollars.However, remember from the earlier discussion that a conversion at market exchange rates-which iswhat Kuznets was using-is far less than an estimate based on purchasing power parity exchange rates.If we use a multiple of 2.5, which is a conservative estimate of the difference between the two, Kuznets'sestimate in purchasing power equivalent terms would be equal to a per capita GDP of $400 in 1985 U.S.dollars, converted at the purchasing power equivalent rate.

High poverty rates, meaning that many people live below these poverty lines, are not inconsistent withthinking of these poverty lines as not far above our lower bound, because many individuals can be inpoverty, but not very far below the line. For instance, in South Asia in 1990, where 33 percent of thepopulation was living in extreme absolute poverty, only about 10 percent of the population would beliving at less than $172 (my estimates from extrapolations of cumulative distributions reported in Chen,Datt and Ravallion, 1993).7The two figures are based on different assumptions about the weight of adult men and women, themean temperature and the demographic structure. The low figure is about as low as one can go becauseit is based on a very young population, 39 percent under 15 (the young need fewer calories), a physicallysmall population (men's average weight of only 110 pounds and women of 88), and a temperature of250 C (FAO, 1957). The baseline figure, although based on demographic structure, usually works out tobe closer to 2,400 (FA0, 1974).8 The regression is a simple log-log of caloric intake and income in 1960 (the log-log is for simplicityeven though this might not be the best predictor of the level). The regression is

ln(average caloric intake) = 6.37 + .183*ln(GDP per capita),(59.3) (12.56).



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Lant Pritchett 9

caloric availability ever recorded in the FAO data for various countries-1,610 calories/person during a famine in Somalia in 1975; 1,550 calories/personduring a famine in Ethiopia in 1985; 1,443 calories/person in Chad in 1984; 1,586calories/person in China in 1961 during the famines and disruption associated withthe Cultural Revolution; and 1,584 calories/person in Mozambique in 1987-revealthat nearly all of the episodes of average daily caloric consumption below 1,600 areassociated with nasty episodes of natural and/or man-made catastrophe. A seconduse of caloric requirements is to calculate the subsistence income as the cost ofmeeting caloric requirements. Bairoch (1993) reports the results of the physiolog-ical minimum food intake at $291 (at market exchange rates) in 1985 prices. These

calculations based on subsistence intake of food again suggest J$250 is a safe lowerbound.

That life expectancy is lower and infant mortality higher in poorer countriesis well documented, and this relation can also help establish a lower bound onincome (Pritchett and Summers, 1996). According to demographers, an under-fiveinfant mortality rate of less than 600 per 1000 is necessary for a stable population(Hill, 1995). Using a regression based on Maddison's (1991) historical per capitaincome estimates and infant mortality data from historical sources for 22 countries,I predict that infant mortality in 1870 for a country with income of J$250 would

have been 765 per 10O.9 Although the rate of natural increase of population backin 1870 is subject to great uncertainty, it is typically estimated to be between .25and 1 percent annually in that period, which is again inconsistent with income levelsas low as J$250.1o

Divergence, Big Time

If you accept: a) the current estimates of relative incomes across nations;

b) the estimates of the historical growth rates of the now-rich nations; and c) thateven in the poorest economies incomes were not below J$250 at any point-thenyou cannot escape the conclusion that the last 150 years have seen divergence, bigtime. The logic is straightforward and is well illustrated by Figure 1. If there hadbeen no divergence, then we could extrapolate backward from present income ofthe poorer countries to past income assuming they grew at least as fast as the United

'The regression is estimated with country fixed effects:

ln(IMR) = -.59 ln(GDP per capita) _ .013*Trend _ .002*Trend*(l if >1960)(23.7) (32.4) (14.23)

N = 1994 and t-statistics are in parenthesis. The prediction used the average country constant of 9.91.'Livi-Basci (1992) reports estimates of population growth in Africa between 1850 and 1900 to be

.87 percent, and .93 percent between 1900 and 1950, while growth for Asia is estimated to be .27 1850to 1900, and .61 1900 to 1950. Clark (1977) estimates the population growth rates between 1850 and1900 to be .43 percent in Africa and India and lower, .33 percent, in China.



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Figure 1

Simulation of Divergence of Per Capita GDP, 1870-1985(showing only selected ountries)

1870 1960 1990

Richest / poorest 8.7 38.5 45.2std. dev.: 0.64 0.88 1.06

o | l j~~~~~~~~~~~~~~P$18054USA USA

- - -Ethiopia

pritchett 1997 jep

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