prospects for st. petersburg 060713 - university of toronto

Kirton/Shocked into Success 1

Shocked into Success: Prospects for the St. Petersburg Summit

John Kirton

Revised version of a paper prepared for the 2006 G8 Pre-Summit Conference on “G8 Performance, St. Petersburg Possibilities,” co-sponsored by the Moscow State Institute on International Relations (MGIMO) and the G8 Research Group, University of Toronto, MGIMO, Moscow, June 29, 2006. I am grateful for the assistance of Laura Sunderland, Senior Researcher, G8 Research Group. Preliminary draft of July 13, 2006. John Kirton is director of the G8 Research Group at the University of Toronto and a member of the International Advisory Council of Civil G, and is advising the Russian government on preparing the St. Petersburg Summit. Introduction On July 15-17, 2006 in St. Petersburg, Russia will host its first ever regular G8 summit, in the 32nd installment of an annual encounter started by the leaders of France, the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan and Italy in 1975. At first glance, the political prospects for the summit meeting, like the meteorological ones for the surrounding location, are not promising. In the present climate, it seems likely to be a gloomy rather than sunny gathering, afflicted at least by several dark clouds in a grey sky or even by cold rains pouring down to overwhelm any co-operative warmth. The chilly tone was set right from the start of the Russian presidency on January 1 with Russia’s cut off of gas to Ukraine and Ukraine’s subsequent reduction of supplies to Europe. There followed a host of complaints, led by the United States, its prominent politicians and ultimately its vice-president, claiming that Russia was not behaving as a co-operative partner or even as a democratic polity that deserved to be a member of the G8 club. Two months before the summit, Russia recognized it had a global public relations problem, and began to mount what counteroffensive it could. But the effort seemed too little, too late, to overcome the frigid tone already set. Russia’s first summit seemed destined for disappointment or even disaster, in a sharp contrast to the striking success delivered by the British at Gleneagles the year before.

But such appearances are deceiving. For three weeks before it opens, the St. Petersburg summit is on track to produce a substantial success. The summit will deliver important new principles and a wide range of promises on the pressing global problems of international energy security, infectious disease, and education, the three topics that the Russians presciently chose as the summit’s priority themes. It will also meaningfully move forward much of a long and comprehensive built-in agenda where the global community badly needs a political push and a path from its G8 guides. Here progress will come on finance, trade, development, the environment, terrorism, weapons proliferation, and the wars not going well, let alone away, in Afghanistan and Iraq. It will also be forced to cope with the many breaking crises of regional security, starting with the multifaceted challenges of a nuclearizing and energy-rich Iran, a Hamas-led Palestine, a murderous Sudan and a missile-brandishing North Korea. And uniquely in the history of summitry, it will make a discernable difference to the dual and interconnected challenge of using the G8 summit to democratize the summit’s host state and society and using the host country to democratize the G8 itself.

Such success will not be produced primarily by the farsighted, strategically calculating, internationally experienced, politically secure G8 leaders assembling at St. Petersburg. For with the important exception of host President Vladimir Putin, the summit leaders are for the first time in the 20th century either unusually new to G8 summitry or politically insecure and sporting a short shelf life at home. Unlike Gleneagles, they will not be pushed into high performance by


their own personal prowess. Rather they will be pulled into a productive performance by the profound, proliferating pressures from a precarious world.

The St. Petersburg Summiteers face familiar shocks that reveal their vulnerability in the fields of energy, terrorism and health — largely the themes the Russians have focused the summit on and by which it will be judged. In response the G8 brings equalizing capabilities among its members, with the least capable members overall — host Russia and its neighbor Canada — standing as the only full strength energy superpowers in the G8 club and world at large. All know that they cannot rely on the multilateral organizations of the UN system for solutions. For despite some progress at the September 2005 World Summit in New York, the UN still contains no World Energy Organization, no World Counterterrorist Organization, an International Atomic Energy Agency inadequate to the challenges of Iran, Iraq and North Korea, a World Health Organization overwhelmed by HIV/AIDS, avian flu, and much else, and a UNESCO to which a still suspicious America has only recently returned. In the face of their common vulnerability to the many clear and present global dangers and without multilateral organizations that work the St. Petersburg G8 leaders know they can count only on themselves. They also know they need to combine all their capabilities to cope, and must mobilize their common commitment to open democracy, individual liberty and social advance to produce a credible collective response, in their two days alone together as leaders in St. Petersburg itself. 1. Summits Past A. The Past Energy Fuelled Success The first propeller of St. Petersburg’s prospective success is the choice of a substantive focus — international energy security — where the G7/8 has performed very well in the past. Today’s annual G8 summit emerged to an important degree as a response to the oil shock of 1973, caused by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargo on oil exports to the United States and the Netherlands amidst the October Middle East war. Since the first summit meeting at Rambouillet, France, in November 1975, energy has almost always been on the Summit agenda. The addition to the club of oil-, gas- and uranium-rich Canada in 1976 and the European Union in 1977 strengthened the group’s ability to respond to the supply shortages and the high, volatile prices in world oil markets in the 1970s.

The most successful summits have come as a result of the G8’s global energy governance, first as part of the large package deal for macroeconomic management forged at Bonn in 1978, then in response to the Iranian-generated second oil shock at Tokyo in 1979, and most recently in the agreement on climate change at Gleneagles in 2005. But energy has also served as the subject of the great failure at Versailles in 1982. Then the G7 fell into a bitter public dispute between European leaders who wanted a Soviet gas pipeline to bring Russia’s safe, clean, reliable, surplus supplies to their energy short countries, and America’s Ronald Reagan who warned that the pipeline would make Europeans vulnerable to a gas cut-off by a Soviet rival determined to win the Cold War. B. Russian-Reinforced Summit Success That same Soviet Union and now Russia has contributed to the G8’s global governance, especially in the field of energy, since the very start. The Soviet Union was a core member of the G7-centred London Nuclear Suppliers Group formed in 1975 to control the proliferation of nuclear materials after India’s explosion of a nuclear device for allegedly peaceful purposes in May 1974. Mikhail Gorbachev’s historic move in 1989 to become part of the western world helped the G7 cope well with the third oil shock created by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait


in August 1990 and the latter’s liberation by the invading American-led coalition in January 1991.

As a reforming Soviet Union and then democratizing Russia increasingly became part of the summit, the G7’s energy performance strengthened. Boris Yeltsin’s newly democratic Russia successfully hosted the G8 Nuclear Safety Summit in Moscow in 1996. This helped Russia’s democrats produce and win the country’s first popular election, and respond on the tenth anniversary to the Chernobyl nuclear explosion of 1986. Russia as host of the first meeting of G8 energy ministers in 1998 pioneered the participation of private sector leaders, through the contribution made by the Business Consultative Council at the time.

Russia subsequently participated actively in further meetings of G8 energy ministers in 2002, and, along with environment ministers, in November 2005. Starting with the 1992 Nuclear Safety Working Group, it has contributed to the more than a dozen energy-related official level working groups established by the G8 since that time.

In the closely related area of environmental security Russia has also made a critical contribution. Russia’s agreement at the G8’s Genoa 2001 summit to join Japan and Canada in ratifying the 1997 Kyoto Protocol ensured that the protocol would come into formal legal force as the foundation for the world’s 21st-century climate change control regime. Russia has been a full partner in the processes, created by the G8 at the Gleneagles Summit in July 2005 involving the G8’s new “plus five” partners of India, China, Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa, as well as the U.S. C. The Gleneagles Inheritance St. Petersburg also benefits from the strong momentum from last year’s Gleneagles Summit, which was by many measures the most successful summit in the then 31-year history of the event. As Appendix A indicates, Gleneagles earned a grade of A- from Nicholas Bayne, one of only three A level grades ever awarded and the first since the energy fuelled success of 1978 (Bayne 2005) . Gleneagles also produced the second highest number of commitments and mobilized the most money of any summit.

In the eleven months after the summit ended, these commitments have been complied with to a high degree. As Appendix B shows, the preliminary final compliance report from the G8 Research Group shows that member compliance with the 21 priority commitments made at Gleneagles has averaged +65% percent, measured on a scale ranging from -100% to +100%. The Gleneagles compliance score is thus 10 percentages points higher than that of the Sea Island summit in 2004, the highest since Okinawa in 2000 and the second highest of any summit from 1996 on (when the G8 Research Group’s assessments began).

Compliance with the Gleneagles commitments has strengthened after Russia assumed the chair at the start of 2006. Compliance has advanced 18 percentage points since that time. The compliance of each member and with each of the 21 commitments assessed lies in the positive range. Coming in with complete compliance are the six issues of terrorism, debt relief for Africa, renewable energy, Middle East reform, transnational crime and tsunami relief. Russia has moved from negative overall compliance at the end of 2005 to compliance in the positive range, after it assumed the responsibility of host in 2006.

However the Gleneagles inheritance has a more impact on St. Petersburg in other ways. One is the important factor of continuity and iteration in the G8’s agenda and action from year to year (Bayne 1999). Here St. Petersburg offers only a partial connection. The theme of climate change featured at Gleneagles fits partially with the renewable energy and nuclear energy components of Russia’s central international energy security theme. And Gleneagles concern with African development flows into St. Petersburg’s concern with energy poverty, education for all, and the fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and avian flu in the developing world. But energy


supply and demand dominate climate change concerns in St. Petersburg’s energy theme. And Africa as a region is no longer the focus for the first time in five years.

A second, somewhat poisoned chalice is the very success of Gleneagles in producing a very high standard against which the St. Petersburg performance will inevitably be assessed. Nowhere was this higher than the multi-billion person global audience Gleneagles got for its Make Poverty History and Live 8 campaign and concerts. St. Petersburg has little of such mass mobilization in the lead-up. None of its priority themes are likely to arouse the same degree of shared idealism, in the host country or globally, that African development did. St. Petersburg success in domestic political management in particular could suffer as a result.

A third mixed blessing from Gleneagles is the way the Russians, determined to host an up-to-standard summit, inherited the particular style that Britain had used as host. Hosting the G8 for a second time, and knowing for a long time what issues he wanted his summit to focus on, British prime minister Tony Blair used the prerogatives of host to the full, driving with great determination to his desired result with relatively little deference to what his partners thought. The Russians, as the least powerful summit member, with less experience in the club than the British founders, and hosting for the first time, face the danger of overestimating from their recent first hand look at the British, how far their prerogatives as host can carry them, and assuming that Blair’s way was the only route to summit success. At the same time, having lived with their partners through the frustrations of the single-minded British presidency, they were willing to mount a more inclusive process of mutual listening and learning themselves. 2. The St. Petersburg Plan A. The Substantial Surrounding Handicaps In preparing to host its first ever regular summit, Russia and its president Vladimir Putin face an unusually high set of handicaps, unlike any it has seen since it first joined the club as a permanent member in 1998. As a first time host, Russia has no built-in experience based on past successes and failures on how to do it right, especially in the extensive reaches of the Russian bureaucracy that lie behind the talented, long-engaged first responders on the front line from the sherpa team. More broadly, unlike the previous new members of Canada in 1976 and the European Union in 1977, as well as the original six of 1975, Russia has no inherited culture of co-operation with its G8 partners bred by many years of working together in the cognate clubs and nests of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Word Trade Organization (WTO), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (for all but Japan). It is also relatively new to global public relations and to the particular skill of mobilizing its potential soft power to make its case and ease its path in the G8 and around the world (Nye 2006).

Russia’s G8 suffers further from a unique challenge no other host has ever faced. Russia’s partners are calling upon the St. Petersburg Summit to deepen democracy in the host country as well as democratize the G8 in ways that build on the globally inclusive innovations of Gleneagles and compensate for the black hole that swallowed any civil society participation and presence at Sea Island the year before. In both cases they are implicitly asking Russia to adjust to the norms of the existing G7, rather than engage in a process of learning, sharing and balanced mutual accommodation that treats Russia’s distinctive practices as equally legitimate and valuable and whose adoption by its partners can strengthen all. While its St. Petersburg hosting has certified that Russia is now a full and equal member of the summit, if not in all cases of the underlying G8 system, it is still a host that has to prove itself in the eyes of most other members of the club.

Moreover, Russia has compounded its challenge by creating problems of its own, if often more from misunderstanding how its G8 partners work than from any malevolence or mistrust on


its part. Having chosen international energy security as its leading St. Petersburg Summit subject, Russia began its year as host amidst a frigid winter by cutting its gas exports to an underpaying Ukraine, which then in turn reduced the gas supplies it sent on to Europe down the line. Overwhelmingly the world found it easy to resurrect convenient Cold War frames and Ronald Reagan’s dire warning from the failed 1982 summit that a Soviet gas pipeline to a democratic Europe would put the latter at the political mercy of a bullying Russia at the other end. Almost everyone rushed to accuse Russia of punishing a struggling democratic Ukraine, rather than applauding Russia for following the basic market principle that customers should pay for their products or be cut off, or the environmentalist core principle of full cost pricing for non renewable natural resources. The WTO’s Pascal Lamy was a lonely voice reminding the world it had long been asking Russia to stop subsidizing its gas sales abroad and at home.

Further incidents made the atmosphere more difficult. The Russians passed and signed into law a new bill regulating NGOs, a bill that some U.S. NGOs and some members of the U.S. Congress condemned as a suppression of democratic rights. The Russians accused the British government of spying within Russia with dramatically televised “evidence” of transponders hidden in a rock in a park Subsequent accusations arose that Russia had tipped off Saddam Hussein’s Iraqis about the American-led coalition’s imminent invasion in the spring of 2003. Moves to create state-controlled monopolies, sometimes through non-transparent methods, in the energy and other sectors raised doubts about whether Russia was renouncing the market economy it had recently embraced. And Russia long stood apart from all its other G8 partners on high-profile issues such as aiding a Palestinian Hamas-led government committed to Israel’s destruction, and a non-democratic Iran’s drive to secure the capacity to produce its own nuclear bombs. As the U.S. mid-term Congressional elections in the autumn drew closer, along with the race for the presidential nominations of both parties there, such moves fed a rising crescendo of critical voices from U.S. NGOs and political figures, culminating in Vice-President Dick Cheney’s stern warning to Russia at a speech in Vilnius, Lithuania, in late spring. In turn, in his National Day address, President Putin himself drew attention to the behaviour of what he colourfully called “Comrade Wolf,” a phrase many in the West concluded was clearly a code word for the United States. Amidst the familiar rhetoric and the Cold War frame convenient for those of a certain generation in all G8 countries, less attention and approval were given to Russia’s accommodating moves. The biggest was President Putin’s costly re-routing of a proposed pipeline to protect the purity of Lake Baikal as the largest freshwater body of water in the world. B. Russia’s St Petersburg Strategy Beneath this conflict-ridden surface, however, Russia quietly pursued its carefully set, well-chosen strategy for making St. Petersburg a success. Russia’s strategy for St. Petersburg started when it first learned at the 2002 summit that it would host in 2006. At the personal initiative of President Putin and Russia’s prime minister, Russia immediately selected international energy security as the centerpiece subject, despite the world’s abundant supplies and low prices then. Russia sought to bring its surplus supplies as an energy superpower to the aid of an America assaulted by terrorism on September 11th, 2001, and one whose president had even earlier looked to the G8 to provide energy security for a vulnerable United States.

Putin’s choice and ensuing strategy flowed from the importance of Russia as a global energy supplier and growing consumer, together with the importance of energy to Russia’s economic growth and influence abroad. It also came from Russia’s distinctive approach to energy security, one that sought to blend and balance both the security of supply offered by OPEC and the security of demand offered by the OECD.

President Putin publicly signalled his choice of energy security as the primary theme for St. Petersburg at the conclusion of the Gleneagles Summit. He thus took advantage of the foundation


offered by Gleneagles’ concentration on, and success in, climate change control and its components of energy efficiency, renewable energy and low-carbon, climate-friendly nuclear power as part of the mix.

Russia then developed a comprehensive approach that included security of supply and security of demand, all sources of energy, a broad range of instruments and the energy poverty that most generated energy insecurity in the developing south. Moreover Russia sought to have the G8 act in strategic, proactive fashion by defining principles and starting programs that would last for a generation, and be commensurate with the need for long-term multi-billion dollar investment in upstream and downstream projects. The G8 would thus go beyond its past practice of reacting to the crisis of the moment, often generated by a sudden shortage of overseas oil supplies badly needed by ever more members of an energy short G7.

President Putin himself also chose the second priority theme of infectious disease. Here as on energy Putin himself specified privately and in his public speeches some of the component topics to be addressed. The third priority of education, however, came more from the initiative of the Russian sherpa, Igor Shuvalov, as did the task of identifying some of the components in all three priority themes and across the broader “built-in” agenda as well. 3. The St. Petersburg Preparations To help transform their strategy into a collective achievement the Russian hosts began immediately after Gleneagles to put their preferred format for the physical summit and their preferred substance for the policy summit in place. A. Shaping the Summit Format The first issue to be faced in regard to the summit format concerned outside participation. Here the Russians decided in November to invite as participants to St. Petersburg the executive heads of the international organizations most relevant to the priority themes (see Appendix C). In doing so the Russian hosts were driven by their functional focus on their three priorities, their experience with the UN-based multilateral organizations, their desire to decrease the number of people at the summit table, and a wish not to offend anyone by leaving them out. All non-G8 members countries would thus be represented indirectly, through the multilateral organizations they were members of. Thus invitations went out to the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Science and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the WTO, the International Energy Agency (IEA), the International Energy Forum, the African Union, the leader of Malaysia as host of the Islamic Conference Organization and the chairman-in-office of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan. He had been elected, democratically in the Russian view, at home within the past year.

A similar desire for constricted participation in part drove the initial choice not to invite any specific country leaders, even in regional categories such as Africa, as the hosts had from 2001 to 2005 and the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) as the U.S. had in 2004 (see Appendix D). At an early stage the Russians had given serious attention to inviting their poorer regional neighbours from the Commonwealth of Independent States. But their G8 partners made it known that they would not welcome so many non-democratic leaders at the summit. And the Russians themselves concluded that their inclusion would cost money and create conflict, as the poor participants would ask Russia and its G8 partners for funding, and fight among themselves over who should get the greatest share.

This initial choice to exclude country categories was soon subject to persistent pressures to expand. The British and others suggested that the leaders of China and India should be invited. In


response, the Russians made it very clear that no leaders of other countries would be invited. In response to questions about “how can we discuss this or that issue without them” the Russians replied that they could be invited to the ministerials dealing with the priority themes and make their influence felt there. Especially with nine leaders of international institutions already invited, there was a fear that adding country categories would mean that there would be too many leaders and delegations at the summit to make it a productive, informal affair.

As the spring unfolded, the Italians and other pressed strongly to have the Africans invited back. In the end, the Russians adjusted to the strong preferences of their partners, to their own functional logic, and to the principle of continuity, and invited the leaders of the Gleneagles plus-five group to return. These were the great energy consumers and carbon producers of the future, that had been gathered to good effect on climate change in 2005 (see Appendix D).

In regard to the summit’s core membership, matters were much less problematic. The Russians swiftly issued new letters of invitation to newly elected leaders in partner countries and speedily mounted the appropriate new information about them on their well-designed and -operated presidency G8 website. There was some problem in regard to Finland. The Russians had chosen to move their summit from its initially envisaged dates in June to mid July, in order to accommodate the attention grabbing World Cup in nearby G8 partner Germany and in deference to other demands from their partners. This decision was not due to any desire to have Finland rather than Austria, both of which Russia had long had a special relationship with, attending St. Petersburg to represent the European Union through their successive six-month presidency of its European Council. But the Russians first invited the Finnish President rather than the Prime Minister, even though the latter chaired the European Union Council that the Finns were there to represent and also held more power at home on the summit’s priority themes due to a recent constitutional change.

In regard to the important logistical matters, a series of sensible decisions was made. In accordance with past practice, no G8 countries would be allowed to have bilaterals with the plus-five participants. The G8 leaders would meet with them on the last day of the summit, once the G8 had had considerable time alone. To minimize the chance of unplanned distractions, the outreach partners would come and go on the same day.

The summit would all be held in a single, quasi-retreat like and easily secured location in the suburbs of St. Petersburg — the Konstantin Palace. The media would work next door, in a facility to which they would be transported by sea. This would avoid the disruptions caused in 2005 by demonstrators blocking the roads to Gleneagles, thus preventing journalists from getting to work to freely and transparently tell the world what was going on. B. Shaping the Summit Substance To shape the summit substance, the Russians creatively combined continuity and innovation. There were several innovations, some of which aroused initial doubts but which proved to be productive in the end.

i. The 2005 Concept Papers The Russians began with “concept papers” sent first to the G8 sherpas and then to the invited international organizations in November 2005. Inverting the British approach for Gleneagles, which had begun with discussions on the priorities of Africa and climate change and were followed by papers, the Russians started with papers. With them they sought to invent something new, set their own way, and push their initiatives. The papers were formulated on the basis of existing documents from within the UN, rather than the G8. This approach would appeal to the invited St. Petersburg participants at that stage and to the broader multilateral community, and perhaps arouse the ability and willingness of the UN system to help implement the St. Petersburg


Summit’s results (Kirton 2006d, 2006e). This UN foundation was evident in the approach taken in the energy, health and education papers alike.

ii. The Experts Council Russia then hosted a meeting of international experts in December, under the auspices of the Experts Council they had formed. At this meeting largely governmental experts from all the G8 countries gathered in Moscow with the Russian Experts’ Council. There they made small alternations to the concept papers, which were then presented to the sherpas. The Expert Council’s leaders participated in the first sherpa meeting in January 2006, presenting their papers on the first day.

iii. Civil G8 Another Russian innovation was the creation of a new Civil G8. It was led by Ella Pamfilova, who headed Putin’s Human Rights Council and added this new responsibility as civil society “sherpa” for the G8. The Civil G8 brought together Russian and international NGOs starting in February. They met with the sherpas in March and May, and prospectively with Putin himself during the Civil G8 gathering in Moscow on July 3-4. As its activities unfolded and expanded, Civil G8 did much to democratize the G8 process and produce new highs on some key dimensions of civil society engagement in the G8. One clear contribution came in process, by connecting the major NGOs of the G7 with their Russian counterparts, to form across a broad array of subjects networks that were likely to endure beyond Russia’s year as host. Of great immediate value was the external support provided by the international NGOs to their Russian counterparts, and the realization by the internationals of how well developed this part of Russian civil society had become. Another contribution came in substance, as the environmental NGO’s that dominated the Civil G8 leadership and process did much to inject badly needed environmental sensitivity into the energy agenda and framing of the G8 governors. President Putin’s decision in the spring to re-route the proposed pipeline to protect Lake Baikal signalled a surprising and much different approach to the energy-environment relationship than that of the Russian concept paper on energy circulated a few months before. The fact that the Russians considered holding their final sherpa meeting in the fall on the shore of Lake Baikal suggested that this environmental injection might have permanent effects.

Beyond the innovative Civil G8, the Russians undertook outreach activities largely inspired by the British in 2005. In mid spring the Russian sherpa and his team toured all G8 capitals for meetings with their governmental colleagues but with civil society stakeholders as well. The Russians also planned to mount two rock concerts, reminiscent of the Hyde Park Live 8 ones, in Moscow and St. Petersburg, shortly before and during the summit itself.

iv. The Lead-Up Ministerials The sequence of G8-centred ministerial meetings leading up to the summit also combined continuity and innovation, in what proved, despite some initial skepticism, to be productive ways (see Appendix E).

The first innovation was to mount G8 ministerial meetings on each of the three priority themes: for energy on March 15-16, health on April 28, and education on June 1-2. These were only the fourth ministerial meeting on energy, the second on education and the first ever on health in G8 history.

In addition the Russians, not yet full members of the G7 finance ministers club, held an usually rich, “fast start” sequence of G8 Finance ministers meetings, held in Moscow on February 10-11, and in St. Petersburg on June 10-11. They also participated in the meeting of G7 finance


ministers and central bank governors in Washington DC on April 21. Further summit preparatory meetings were held in Moscow by G8 ministers of justice and home affairs on June 15-16 and G8 foreign ministers on June 29. Putin was unusually active in joining some of these ministerial forums.

As the meetings of the ministers dedicated to the summit’s three priorities unfolded, it became clear that the texts they produced would not be used as the basis for the leaders’ communiqués. The responsibility for drafting the latter would remain exclusively with the sherpas. But from the start the sherpas, led by the Americans, were open to the prospect that the ministerials might produce useful material that the sherpas and their leaders could adopt as their own.

As the very dense schedule of ministerial meetings unfolded, another clear contribution arose. At the first, February 10-11 G8 finance ministers meeting, the concluding communiqué boldly declared that “Market mechanisms are vital to the effective functioning of the global energy system.” This principle, perhaps easy for liberalizing finance ministers to endorse, was reaffirmed by the energy ministers in their mid March communiqué. In their words, “meeting energy security challenges will require reliance on market-oriented approaches aimed at increasing energy supply and stemming growth in demand, while encouraging market-based pricing, competition, energy efficiency, and conservation.” For a communiqué drafted by the Russian host, this was a major advance in principle and in Russia adjusting to the preferences of its G8 partners, from the equivalent passages in the concept paper the Russians had circulated just before their year as host began. A genuine learning process was taking place.

A further contribution came from the Finance Ministers meeting held in St. Petersburg on June 9-10. This 2006 installment of the traditional immediate pre-summit finance ministers meeting made an unusually direct contribution to the leaders priority issues, by issuing a separate statement on energy and one on infectious disease.

iv. The Sherpa Sequence These innovations proved valuable only on the basis of the progress made in the sequence of sherpa meetings that unfolded largely in the conventional way. These meetings took place on January 19-20 in Moscow, March 9-10 in Moscow, May 18-19 in Moscow and Kazan, with another scheduled before the summit’s start (see Appendix E). These were supported by the foreign affairs sous-sherpa (FASS) meetings that followed and later accompanied each sherpa gathering.

v. The Leader’s Lead-Up Summitry Another important process in the lead up to the summit was the direct bilateral communication among G8 leaders, taking place by phone or face to face. Unlike Tony Blair in 2005, Vladimir Putin as host did not take a pre-summit tour in person or by videoconference to discover directly what was on his partners’ minds. But there was an intense sequence of bilateral visits that displayed several promising patterns (See Appendix F).

First, the newly elected leaders were well socialized into G8 summitry by meetings with their veteran partners: Germany’s Angela Merkel with Tony Blair in December and George Bush in January (as well as newcomer Romano Prodi in June); Prodi with Jacques Chirac, Merkel and Putin in a mid June tour; and Stephen Harper with Bush in March and July and Junichiro Koizumi in late June. Second, there was also considerable contact between the G8 veterans. This bilateral summitry crossed the regional divide between Europe and the Pacific, and, less clearly beyond Merkel, the ideological left-right divide. Third, there was also considerable contact between G8 leaders and their plus 5 outreach partners, with India and China in the lead. This made it more likely that less time would be taken at the summit for introductory “meeting and


greeting”, and that fewer misunderstandings would arise. The one outstanding question, however, was whether Putin could pull together the private preference of all his partners, especially in the North Pacific triangle of Bush, Koizumi and Harper, none of whom he had not met since his year as G8 host began.

3. St. Petersburg’s Prospects Based on these preparations, the St. Petersburg Summit will make useful advances across a wide array of subjects. During the two days of their time together at the summit, from the evening of Saturday, July 15, to the afternoon of Monday, July 17, the leaders will have six scheduled sessions (including two with their plus-five partners) and will release at least eleven documents (see Appendix G). In the priority area of health, the emphasis will be on concrete decisions in response to avian flu, HIV/AIDS and other infectious disease (Kirton 2006b). There could also well be valuable new directions set on critical issues — such as the need to keep borders open in the face of fast-moving, fear-inducing disease. In the priority theme of education, progress will come more from the discussion of the issues, and perhaps an affirmation of the ways human capital and innovation are critical for social advance and economic growth in today’s globalized knowledge economy and world (Kirton 2006C)

Yet St. Petersburg will and should ultimately be judged by its achievements in the field of energy, broadly defined. This subject will take centre stage as the first of the three priority subjects, as the most clear and present danger in the outside world, and as the area where the G7/8 has had the longest experience and greatest success (Kirton 2006a). Energy will pervade much of the leaders’ discussions and statements, through energy’s strong links with global economic growth, inflation and imbalances, trade, development and debt, terrorism, weapons proliferation and regional security in Iran, Iraq, the Broader Middle East and North Africa and beyond. On the core subject of international energy St. Petersburg promises to be a substantial success, due to its contribution, in a statement of principles and an accompanying action plan, on seven key points.

A. St. Petersburg’s Prospective Substantial Energy Security Success The first is transparency, openness and predictability. As its leadoff achievement, the summit will proclaim the principles of greater transparently, predictability, reliability and stability of energy markets. This will be turned into action through measures to ensure more transparency in statistics and regulation, such as extending the Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI) to include natural gas and oil and gas reserves.

The second is investment. Here the leaders will affirm principles to guide the G8 and the world for decades, with the need for long-term investment in first place. They will define security of supply as guaranteeing stability and an uninterrupted mode of supply. They may also stress the need for increased private investment in all links of the energy chain in order to enhance security of supply and even welcome foreign investment in distribution, consumer markets and both upstream and downstream segments.

The third is energy efficiency and saving. The communiqué will contain long-term principles on energy efficiency and energy saving. It will strongly support energy efficiency, as a unit saved is equivalent to a unit produced and thus makes more energy available for suppliers (starting with Russia) to sell. Everyone thus gains from more effective domestic use of energy. Conservation will be included too, in the way that President Putin has already endorsed.

The fourth is diversification of sources, including renewables and nuclear energy. The leaders will endorse the full set of alternatives and renewables, including bio-energy and nuclear energy. They will promote innovative forms of research into renewables in the context of developing countries, and thus link to the outreach participants and the energy poverty file.


The fifth is the physical security of the energy infrastructure. Here the focus will be on security against terrorism, natural disaster and system failure. This will be heralded as an important innovation, as world leaders for the first time mandate their experts to draft specific proposals to improve the physical safety of key components of the world’s energy system.

The sixth is energy poverty. Here G8 leaders will rely on the World Bank for initiatives and implementing action to reduce energy poverty, especially in developing countries. They will encourage innovative forms of research into renewables for developing countries.

The seventh is clean energy and climate change. The summit will logically build on the Gleneagles agreements and deal with aspects of clean energy and measures to counteract the negative consequences of climate change. It will make the clean energy–climate change link by emphasizing new technology, including renewable energy. It will reaffirm the “three Rs” (reduce, recycle, reuse) introduced to the summit in 2004. A. St. Petersburg’s Possible Strong Energy Security Success Beyond these promising prospects lies the possibility that St. Petersburg could become a strong success — if the leaders can go beyond their existing consensus to forge a grand bargain based on bold breakthroughs, in the way that the summit has performed at its best in the past (Putnam and Bayne 1987). Such a St. Petersburg grand bargain would be based on the G7 accepting Russia’s imperative of security of demand in return for the Russia delivering the G7’s great need for security of supply. The bargain would be cemented through a new regime for asset swapping. Such a regime would allow Russian firms to invest in downstream businesses within G7 countries to help Russia guarantee the revenues it needs from its non-renewable raw energy assetsat all stages of the value chain. In return, it would govern and guarantee G7 countries’ ability to invest more freely in upstream projects in Russia, to bring in the capital, technology and management needed to discover and develop the new supplies that Russia, its G7 partners and the world badly need. Two weeks before the summit, the dynamic that could deliver such a grand bargain, through a security of supply for security of demand and an upstream for downstream trade — is already off to a promising start.

i. Market-Based Security of Demand To forge this grand bargain, the first challenge is to accept the role of the market as a contributor to security of demand. The Russians had initially portrayed private sector energy markets as a risk to energy security, by creating the uncertainty, price fluctuations and volatility that inhibit the large, long-term investments required to provide adequate supply. They also described the current state of the world energy market in a worrisome tone. In contrast, their G7 partners, led by the British, Americans and Canadians, emphasized how government intervention could harm rather than help the energy market, and how the world needed the G8 to send a strong message of confidence about the state of the energy market now. By May however, all had agreed that the summit would emphasize market-based mechanisms as a defining principle. There were even signs they would agree to endorse long term contracts as a way to enhance security of demand, especially if such contracts were freely entered into by private sector firms rather than guided or guaranteed by governments. Yet the G7 remains reluctant to use the word “security” and the concept of “security of demand,” for fear that it is a Russian code word for government guarantees. The Russians counter that security is a two-way street that should take both producers’ and consumers’ interest into account. Similarly, the Russians still seek to have long-term contracts endorsed. The term “security” remains the greatest obstacle to an agreement on energy overall.


ii. Nuclear Energy A second difficult issue is nuclear energy. Here the biggest divisions lie among the G7 themselves. Driven by domestic policy, political and public opinion imperatives, the Germans, supported to some degree by the British and Italians, initially insisted that there be no reference at all to nuclear energy in the leaders’ communiqués. The nuclear-reliant Russians, Japanese, French and Canadians argued that if the summit was to be credible, nuclear energy had to be included as a source, and a climate friendly one.

The leaders will include nuclear energy in the passages on the diversification of energy sources. They will affirm the need for nuclear safety in their communiqué of the 2006 summit — being held on the 20th anniversary of Chernobyl and the tenth anniversary of the Moscow Nuclear Safety Summit. They will emphasize the need for investment in safe technology for the existing nuclear power plants. They might also call for better understanding of the part nuclear energy will play in the supply mix over the next decade. This could lead to an acceptance of the necessary role for governments in supporting both the technology and its commercialization over the longer term, and actions to deal with the issues of “security of cost” for new nuclear plants, “security of price” consumers pay for their power, and the safe disposal of the nuclear waste the plants produce. iii. Liquified Natural Gas Partnership A third difficult issue is Russia’s proposed partnership on liquefied natural gas (LNG). It is aimed at helping bring Russian supplies to North American and global markets, and thus diversifying demand for Russia and supply for its G7 partners at the same time. The G8 has now moved well beyond the initial reaction of some G7 partners that such a scheme seemed like a new OPEC-like cartel for LNG that was no longer allowed. The summit could well endorse market-based, long-term contracts as a critical part of encouraging the badly needed, more diversified, intercontinental system of LNG transportation and supply. But whether it will add more practical measures of support remains to be seen.

iv. Other Issues There are several other divisive issues, important to different G8 members, that could be cast into the cauldron from which a great package deal could be forged. President Putin could accept the principles of the European Energy Charter and pledge to abide by the more precise requirements of a mutually updated Transit Protocol. In return the G7 partners could support three Russian proposals. The first is a new fund for technology transfer. Here concerns about intellectual property rights, private sector interests and creating new institutions would need to be addressed. A second is new global energy institutions, such as a new G8–plus-five renewable energy group, an international renewable energy agency and a 21st-century consumer-producer dialogue. Here the G7 would need to set aside its aversion to creating new institutions and its vivid memories of the unhappy 1970s and the ultimate failure of global negotiations after the preparatory achievements of the G7 Summit at Montebello in 1981. A third is Russian membership in the International Energy Agency. Here the U.S. would have to agree to allow the Russians in, with or without Russian membership in the World Trade Organization where the U.S. remains the lone obstacle in the G8 to letting the Russians join.


4. The Compelling Causes of Substantial St. Petersburg Performance The prospects for the St. Petersburg summiteers producing a substantial, and potentially strong, success are promising. To be sure, in the view of highly focused veteran summit watchers they may at first glance seem less powerful than those for Gleneagles at a similar stage last year. Gleneagles was pushed to high performance from within the G8, and pulled even further from outside by high energy prices and the shock of the terrorist attack on the London subway on the summit’s first full day. St. Petersburg in contrast lacks some of the critical “inside the summit” advantages that Gleneagles enjoyed last year. These include a leader who is hosting a summit for the second time, who concentrates on themes well designed to inspire the idealism of many, and who again creatively connects the G8 with civil society on a much larger scale than ever before. However the global demands pulling St. Petersburg toward high performance are greater than they were last year. St. Petersburg will thus be a summit shocked into success from outside pressures, more than one pushed into high performance from within. A. Strong Shared Shock-Activated Vulnerability The first outside pull into high performance is the set of several interconnected shocks that are making all G8 leaders acutely aware of their countries’ vulnerability and thus their need to co-operate ambitiously and urgently with their G8 partners in response. These are in some measure shared shocks and vulnerabilities. But for those that directly affect only a few G8 members, they hit most heavily the most generally powerful G8 members (the U.S, Japan and Germany) while bypassing the least powerful who thus have surplus capability available to devote to their partners’ aid. Unlike Gleneagles’ priorities of African development and climate change, which were chronic and compounding problems but largely devoid of sudden shocks, the St. Petersburg priorities have such material or socially constructed shocks in abundance. They are ones that connect directly with the particular shocks that have reliably produced high summit performance in the past.

i. Energy The first shock-activated vulnerability is the classic cause of high-performance - energy (Kirton 2006a). It comes from unprecedented high, sustained nominal world oil prices that have their largest and most pervasive impact on oil-import-dependant America, Japan and Germany. As Appendix H shows, the St. Petersburg summit year started on January 1 with world oil prices at US$63.11, up substantially from the start of earlier years. They soon soared to a new nominal high of US$75.35 a barrel on April 21, and remained at around US$70.00 a barrel through to the end of June and jumped up to US$73.93 on July 3. On July 5, they spiked to a new historic intraday nominal high of US$75.40 a barrel, and closed at US$75.20 a barrel.

Giving this growing chronic problem greater force has been a succession of old and new shocks hitting an already highly energy sensitized G8, especially in its American and continental European parts. As noted below these started with the new ecological shock of Hurricane Katrina that struck America on September 1, 2005, followed by the old socially constructed but now physically realized energy shock of Russia’s targeted cut-off of gas to Ukraine and the subsequent unintended reduction of supply for Europe on January 1, 2006. Then came the new ecological shocks of unusually cold weather across Russia and Europe that strained supplies in the following months. These shocks were all the more potent in driving summit performance because they connected directly with St. Petersburg’s first and defining priority of international energy security.


ii. Terrorism The second shock is the other classic proven performance inducer — terrorism. Although G8 countries have escaped the major deadly terrorist strikes on their soil of previous years (as Appendix I shows), an already highly sensitized G8 has been constantly reminded of the continuing clear and present danger by several events. The first is the all too vivid memory of the July 7th, 2005 attack on the London subway and transit system during last year’s G8 summit. This memory is most acute in Russia as the country hosting this year and one whose subways had already been struck. This worry has been reinforced by the discovery, amidst the killing of the Chechen rebel leader in June, of a plot to mount a terrorist strike at or during the St. Petersburg Summit. As the summit approaches, other G8 countries have uncovered terrorist plots of their own at home. These include Canada in Toronto in early June and the U.S. in Miami on June 22nd.

iii. War The third shock comes from the chronic old vulnerability of casualties from combat, now made more surprising as the mounting body count contradicts earlier expectations that the wars would be won long ago (see Appendix J). These shocks are tied to both energy and terrorist shocks in Iraq, where American and British forces are most directly hit. Two weeks before the summit started, the number of uniformed Americans killed in Iraq passed the 2,000 mark. In Afghanistan more than 40 foreign soldiers have been killed since the start of the year, about half of them American (including four on June 2nd) and including British, Canadians and French as well. With the Italians and Japanese still in Iraq (if coming out), and the Germans and the Dutch in Afghanistan, Russia had remained the only G8 member without the regular reality or constant worry of their citizens coming home in body bags. But in the weeks before the summit started, terrorists perhaps affiliated with the Chechnyan rebels killed four Russian diplomats in Iraq, while more Russian troops died in Chechnya itself.

iv. Health The fourth shock comes in the newer field and in the new form of health, in particular infectious disease (Kirton 2006b). In its familiar form of HIV/AIDS it comes as a chronic challenge, even though the UNAIDS report released just before the summit showed some progress in the fight against the disease in its traditional African epicenter. But a potential shock looms as a result of an emerging pandemic in Russia, China and India and the Eurasian countries and routes in between. The UNAIDS report indicated that India had now overtaken South Africa as the country with the most cases in the world. Another new shock in a new form arises from avian flu, which has broken out of its Asian home and is rapidly spreading throughout Europe and Russia itself. In the month before the summit, a case of serious human-to-human transmission in Indonesia was confirmed. These health shocks are also all the more potent in driving summit performance because they connect directly with the summit’s second priority of infectious disease.

v. The Environment The fifth shock comes in the older field and newer form of the environment. Here the tanker spills of old (and for Evian in 2003) have been replaced by far more violent ecological assaults. The memory of hurricanes Rita and Katrina that recently struck America in September 2005 have not receded. Nor have America’s energy production and population in New Orleans recovered from the hit. The physical deprivations remained, even as the new hurricane season started in early June 2006 and reports predicted another unusually severe onslaught. At the same time, a deadly


earthquake in Indonesia reminded all of the Pakistani earthquake and the Asian tsunami of the recent past. These shocks directly connected with that component of the G8’s health agenda focused on improving the response to natural disasters.

v. Finance The sixth shock comes in the old field but newer form of finance. The common move by G8 central banks to remove liquidity from the global economy started to breed exchange rate crises in small countries such as Iceland and New Zealand and then emerging economies such as Turkey. And the plummeting stocks markets in May and June in emerging and G8 economies alike awakened anxious memories of the October 1987 stock market crash. B. Equalizing Capability i. Overall Capability Even as the major energy, terrorist, war and environmental shocks have afflicted America most, equalizing capabilities within the G8 put America’s partners in a better (and in some cases such as energy a necessary) position to help out. The most dramatic shifts took place in exchange rates. Here the currency of America declined and ththoseat of the G8 partners rose, with that of the second least capable member, Canada, enjoying a particularly strong rise.

The distribution of real growth in the G8 economies began to equalize as well. While the U.S. remained the G7 growth leader for the first quarter of 2006, projections by the IMF and OECD suggested the U.S. would drop and Canada would take the lead in the following year.

Behind these broad numbers lay a United States whose underlying weaknesses were pronounced. To the still cancerous problems of international imbalances, large federal deficits and debt, and a low savings rate were added rising interest rates and inflation, a weakening housing market and consumers thus less able to keep using their homes as collateral for more debt.

In sharp contrast, number two Japan was starting to grow again. While its chronic problems of deficit, debt, and a rapidly aging society remained, it had clearly escaped the spectre of deflation that had afflicted it for the last several years.

European countries were also doing better. Once again they were led by Russia, as strong world prices for its oil, gas and other minerals fuelled G8-leading growth. Equally vibrant were the other “BRICSaM” emerging economies of Brazil, India, China, South Africa, whose leaders would participate in the summit on its final day. The combined power of this G8–plus-five combination was more than enough to make a major difference in the world, especially in regard to St. Petersburg’s specialized priority themes.

ii. Specialized Capability Even more pronounced is the equalization among G8 members and their outreach partners of the specialized capabilities most relevant to the summit’s first priority theme. Within the G8 the otherwise least powerful partners of Russia and Canada are the G8’s and the world’s leading full strength energy superpowers in the core combination of oil, gas and uranium surpluses and reserves. Germany is a leader in wind and solar. The outreach partner of Brazil stands first in ethanol (with a finally converted and politically committed U.S. coming on strong in second place, with the subsidies, government-guaranteed security of demand and protectionist trade policies to match). Mexico along with Canada brings the oil and gas power that America needs from its safe, secure, reliable, NAFTA-connected and committed North American neighbours.


And China and India, along with the U.S. are the great Kyoto unconstrained energy demand powers of the present and future.

This configuration of overall and specialized capabilities does much to explain Russia’s insistence on security of demand, and suggest why its rational G8 partners should accept it in the end. Russia’s current prosperity, important for the G8’s combined power, is fuelled by its energy exports. Many Russians and others fear that a plunge in world energy prices, similar to that of the early 1980s collapse that bankrupted oil-rich Mexico and many other emerging economies of that era, will swiftly wipe out all the progress that Russia has made since its default in 1998. That 1980s collapse had been engineered by the G8. It ultimately helped bring the cold war victory by making Russia unable to economically sustain the arms race with the U.S., as Putin himself vividly remembered and noted in his 2006 National Day address. Yet it come only after a very dangerous five years across the east-west divide and did much to destroy development for a decade in the south. This time, a collapse of world energy demand and prices would create devastation for the very powers and G8 plus five partners America and its allies most need, as well as do much harm in the war against terrorism in the Middle East (starting in Iraq) and around the world. Moreover, while loose comparisons to Germany’s Weimar Republic, wiped away by a severe depression in the 1930s, are deeply flawed (Kopstein 2006), the spectre of how a deep recession in Russia could destroy its democratic development remain a reality for G8 leaders devoted to this defining principle in their G8 club. Unlike in the Cold War 1980s, ensuring security of demand is now a collective G8 and global good. C. Multilateral Organizational Failure The third broad force pulling the St. Petersburg G8 toward success is the poor performance, clear failure and even absence of the multilateral organizations of old. In the summit’s signature priority there was a clear change from Gleneagles, as energy, unlike development and climate change, had no organization at all devoted to it within the UN–Bretton Woods system. Even the plurilateral Atlanticist offering, the International Energy Agency born in 1974, excluded the G8’s first-ranked energy power and G8 host of Russia from membership. As the case of Iran demonstrated, the International Atomic Energy Agency was inadequate to the challenges in energy, weapons proliferation, regional security in the Middle East, and terrorism in the eyes of some. For some time in these later cases the G8 had come to rely upon the G8-dominated Six Parties. And in the other two summit priority areas of health and education, no-one argued that the WHO or UNESCO were doing sufficiently well that they could be counted on and left alone to do the job.

A much broader failure came from the core organizations of the 1944-45 order — the UN as a whole and the Bretton Woods twins. The United Nations, recently discredited by the oil-for-food scandal that involved the family of its secretary general Kofi Annan, faced a larger challenge. For its World Summit held in New York in September 2005 had largely failed to reform the body to govern the 21st-century world. While important progress had been made in accepting the new principle of an international responsibility to protect human security, there was no prospect of a change in the Charter that would give it the legal force required to compete with the UN’s prevailing constitutional principle, enshrined in Article 2 (7), prohibiting international interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Nor was there any prospect of change in the UN’s Charter encoded conviction that Japan and German would in perpetuity be considered enemy alien aggressor states, unworthy of permanent membership, let alone a veto, on the Security Council. The UN had its last chance in a long time at the summit level to reform itself, and equip itself to meet its already much in doubt Millennium Development Goals. Relative to the magnitude of the failure and the challenge, it clearly failed to reform itself, just as the G8 had largely failed to reform it in 1995.


In the case of the Bretton Woods twins, failure in reform flowed largely from the continuing refusal of the Europeans to give up any of the power and privileges they had granted themselves in 1944 in the management control of these bodies. This made it more difficult to mobilize the money and alter the mission to meet the needs of a much-changed fast-moving globalized 21st-century world. It has also brought the frustrated Asians to the verge of open revolt, looking to the G20 meeting later in 2006 for a final chance at a solution and failing that, a potential withdrawal to create a new Asian Monetary Fund. Amidst these many absences and inadequacies from the inherited multilateral system, there was still no strong evidence, even in the economic institutions controlled by G7 members, that they had, would or could help the G8 members comply with or implement the commitments the G8 summits made (Kirton 2006d). D. Common Democratic Principles The fourth, less potent, propeller of success comes from within the G8, in the way its chosen agenda, membership and participants at St. Petersburg meet the club’s core mission of globally promoting open democracy, individual liberty and social advance. In the energy area, there is hard-fought progress toward having the G8 affirm the principle that market mechanisms are vital, that openness and transparency are vital, and that free, open, legally guaranteed markets for energy transit and foreign direct investment (FDI) are important values to share and affirm. In the areas of health and education, the connections are less direct. In health the challenge is to constrain open markets so governments can guarantee public goods. In education, prospective moves to more open comparable standards and the mobility of students and professionals flow in the desired direction, but have not progressed very far.

A broader challenge arises in regard to membership. For Russia faces the question, unique in G8 hosting history, of whether it is a real democracy worthy of summit membership and hosting, and whether the summit it designed and delivered will deepen democracy within the host itself. On the later challenge, the Russian G8 has made great progress. On the former, the demand that it demonstrate its democratic convictions produced a distraction for the host and partners, and less trust within the preparatory process (notably over concepts such as security of demand in the energy discussions). But as Russia’s acceptance of the importance of the market for energy security shows, it could inspire the Russians to make an exceptional effort to move to forge agreements on a democratic foundation with the rest of the G8. For Russia has never renounced and has repeatedly and recently reaffirmed its historic strategic decision to become an open democratic polity.

This is not the case with China, which along with India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, have been invited to participate in this summit on its final day. But among this plus-five, democratic polities dominate and China is the only country outside. The strength of the common principle of democracy in the G8 has already been demonstrated. The reluctance of G8 partners to welcome the many non-democratic leaders in the CIS helped induce the Russians to give up their early thought that they would invite this set of neighbours as their preferred country outreach group. E. Poor Political Control The fifth cause of performance — political control and capital at home on the part of G8 leaders — is largely low, and thus an important inhibitor of success this year. In sharp contrast to the previous five and even 31 years of G8 summits, there is less leadership continuity, more divided coalition or precarious government, less legislative control, looming lame duck-hood and much domestic unpopularity (See Appendix L).

Leadership experience and continuity is substantially less that that brought by the leaders of the same “summer camp club” who almost all came back a virtually unprecedented five years in a


row to the summits from 2001 to 2005. St. Petersburg, in contrast, features an almost even split of veterans (Chirac, Blair, Putin, Bush and Koizumi) and newcomers (Merkel, Prodi and Harper). Together they bring a combined total of 36 years of summit experience, or an average of 4.5 among the eight (compared to a total of 44 and average of 5.5 at Gleneagles in 2005). It thus matters that Putin as host is a very experienced veteran, as are the leaders of first-ranked America, second-ranked Japan and last year’s host, the UK.

Again apart from Putin, the presence or prospect of divided, coalition or minority government affectsall. Bush is in danger of losing control of the Senate and even the House of Representatives in the mid-term elections in the autumn. Merkel has a grand coalition government confined by a detailed 400 page political constitution, which directly inhibited the German sherpa from agreeing for a long time to say anything at all in the communiqué about nuclear power, and then anything beyond its safety dimensions. Prodi has a precarious legislative majority and coalition government. Harper has a minority government. Blair has a reduced majority and has recently lost votes in the House.

In addition, many of the veteran leaders are lame ducks with a short shelf life. Koizumi is due to leave in September. Blair has promised this mandate will be his last and is facing a rebellion in his own party from the impatient supporters of his finance minister, Gordon Brown. Also due to leave are Putin in 2008, Bush in January 2009 and Chirac in 2007.

Moreover the polling data show that, again with the exception of Putin and at times Harper, all leaders are unpopular (Bush, Chirac, Blair) or unlikely to win a majority in an election held now. In May President Putin retained an approval rating of 70%. In Canada, Stephen Harper reached a party support level of 43%, up five points from mid-March, the highest level for the Conservative Party in almost 20 years and enough to provide him a majority government were an election to be held now. However in Britain, Blair had plummeted to the lowest level of his long prime ministership. And in the United States, Bush had done likewise for his presidency, dropping to levels as low as 29% by one poll. From a domestic standpoint, only the summit’s two smallest members but energy surplus superpowers are in a position to take a G8 and global lead.

Success as St. Petersburg will thus depend heavily on host Putin. He stands out from the rest with his high experience, party and legislative control, and domestic popularity, and will be at the summit in Germany next year. With his great reservoir of domestic political capital and control, it is he who has the most room to adjust to his partners, to make his first G8 summit a success. F. Constricted Participation The sixth proven cause of summit success is constricted participation. This is the key component of the ability of the leaders to come together as leaders to exert the political will, flexibility and balanced mutual adjustment required to generate innovative moves forward and comprehensive ambitious large package deals in which all are left better off. Here St. Petersburg suffers from several disadvantages. There are an unusually large number of outreach participants — eight international institutional and five country heads — for a total of 13. Many of the outreach partners do not intuitively know and value what the experience of being democratically and popularly elected is like. And the most functionally promising and effective candidates may not have been selected. For absent bodies such as UNICEF have much to offer on education and infectious disease, as does the Arctic Council, where Russia is a member and chair, on energy and climate change.

Still there are several offsetting advantages. In the recent past, summits such as Gleneagles and Evian, with 17 outreach partners each, have been successful. The organizations and “plus five” partners invited follow a familiar formula and bring their past experience to bear. And Putin has experience elsewhere in plurilateral summit institutions of varying sizes, notably the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum and the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO).


The St. Petersburg Summit is also is following a format familiar to the host and his powerful experienced partners, and one that has produced success in the past several years. The summit takes place in a compact, somewhat secluded site where travel times and distractions will be at a minimum and the chance for the G8 leaders to meet spontaneously maximized. The outreach partners will be met on the last day once the G8 have had considerable time to be alone together. And no bilateral meetings between the G8 leaders and the outreach partners will be allowed.

The large question that remains is whether the host and his colleagues will be in the mood to mutually adjust to produce ambitious collective solutions when they sit down together to talk face to face. Whatever the answer to this question arising from the G8 leaders own personal and political calculations, it is very likely that the many acute pressures and proximate shocks from the outside world and the reminders they bring to the leaders of their countries shared vulnerability will force them to come together as G8 colleagues and collective global governors to a substantial degree. References Bayne, Nicholas (2005). Staying Together: The G8 Summit Confronts the Twenty-First Century

(Aldershot: Ashgate). Bayne, Nicholas (1999). “Continuity and Leadership in an Age of Globalization.” In Michael

Hodges, John Kirton and Joseph Daniels, eds., The G8’s Role in the New Millennium (Aldershot: Ashgate).

Kirton, John (2006a), “The G8 and Global Energy Governance: Past Performance, St. Petersburg’s Opportunities,” Paper presented at a conference on “The World Dimension of Russia’s Energy Security,” sponsored by the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Moscow, April 21, 2006.

Kirton, John (2006b), “The G8 and Global Health Governance: The Case for a Eurasian AIDS Extension,” Paper presented at the International Parliamentary Conference in Conjunction with Russia’s G8 Presidency, on “HIV/AIDS in Eurasia and the Role of the G8,” sponsored by the Transatlantic Partners Against AIDS, at the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Moscow, June 8, 2006.

Kirton, John (2006c), “The G8 and Global Education Governance,” Paper presented at a conference on “On the Road to St. Petersburg,” sponsored by The State University — Higher School of Economics, The Experts Council for the Steering Committee for the G8 Presidency of the Russian Federation in 2006, and the University of Toronto G8 Research Group, at the Center for Strategic Research, Moscow, April 3, 2006.

Kirton, John (2006d), “Implementing G8 Economic Commitments: How International Institutions Help,” Paper presented at the 2006 G8 Pre-Summit Seminar “On the Road to St. Petersburg: The Role of International Organizations in Implementing G8 Commitments,” co-sponsored by the State University – Hig vgher School of Economics (SU-HSE) and the G8 Research Group, University of Toronto, Moscow, June 30, 2006.

Kirton, John (2006e) “Explaining Compliance with G8 Finance Commitments: Agency, Institutionalization and Structure,” Paper presented at a conference on “Perspectives on Monetary, Financial, and Economic Integration” at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington, April 7-8, 2006.

Kirton, John and Laura Sunderland (2006), “Russia’s 2006 G8: Combining Continuity and Innovation for Summit Success,” Italianieuropei: Bimestrale del riformismo italiano, N. 2 (March/April).

Kopstein, Jeffrey. “What Is Russia?” CERES News, Spring 2006. Nye, Joseph (2006), Russia and the G8,” Italianieuropei: Bimestrale del riformismo italiano, N. 2

(March/April).


Putnam, Robert and Nicholas Bayne, eds. (1987), Hanging Together: Co-operation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summit. 2nd ed. (London: Sage Publications).


Appendix A: G8 Summit Performance, 1975-2005

Domestic Political management Deliberative Dir-

ectional Deci-sional

Deli-very

Dev’t of global gov.

Year

Bayne Grade % mem

Ave # refer-ences

# of Days

# of State-ments

# of Words

# of Commit-ments

Comp-liance Score

# of Bodies Created Min/Off

1975 A– 3 1 1,129 5 14 +57.1 0/1 1976 D 2 1 1,624 0 7 +08.9 0/0 1977 B– 2 6 2,669 0 29 +08.4 0/1 1978 A 2 2 2,999 0 35 +36.3 0/0 1979 B+ 2 2 2,102 0 34 +82.3 0/2 1980 C+ 2 5 3,996 3 55 +07.6 0/1 1981 C 2 3 3,165 0 40 +26.6 1/0 1982 C 3 2 1,796 0 23 +84.0 0/3 1983 B 3 2 2,156 7 38 –10.9 0/0 1984 C– 3 5 3,261 0 31 +48.8 1/0 1985 E 3 2 3,127 1 24 +01.0 0/2 1986 B+ 3 4 3,582 1 39 +58.3 1/1 1987 D 3 6 5,064 0 53 +93.3 0/2 1988 C– 3 2 4,872 0 27 –47.8 0/0 1989 B+ 3 11 7,125 1 61 +07.8 0/1 1990 D 3 3 7,601 10 78 –14.0 0/3 1991 B– 3 3 8,099 8 53 00.0 0/0 1992 D 3 4 7,528 5 41 +64.0 1/1 1993 C+ 3 2 3,398 2 29 +75.0 0/2 1994 C 3 2 4,123 5 53 +100.0 1/0 1995 B+ 3 3 7,250 0 78 +100.0 2/2 1996 B 40% 1 3 5 15,289 6 128 +36.2 0/3 1997 C– 40% 1 3 4 12,994 6 145 +12.8 1/3 1998 B+ 25% 1 3 4 6,092 5 73 +31.8 0/0 1999 B+ 80% 1.7 3 4 10,019 4 46 +38.2 1/5 2000 B 40% 6.5 3 5 13,596 6 105 +81.4 0/4 2001 B 33% 1.5 3 7 6,214 3 58 +49.5 1/2 2002 B+ 17% 1 2 18 11,959 10 187 +35.0 1/8 2003 C 40% 2.5 3 14 16,889 17 206 +65.8 0/5 2004 C+ 33% 1 3 16 38,517 11 245+ +54.0 0/15 2005 A- 40% 1 3 16 22,286 29 212 +65.0 0/5 Average B- 38.8% 1.8 2.9 5.5 8,017 4.8 75 +41.9 0.37/2.4 Cycle 1 B– 2.1 2.9 2,526 1.1 29 +32.5 0.14/0.71 Cycle 2 C– 3 3.3 3,408 1.3 34 +32.4 0.29/1.14 Cycle 3 C+ 3 4 6,446 4.4 56 +47.5 0.58/1.29 Cycle 4 B 29.3% 2 2.9 6.7 10,880 5.7 106 +40.7 0.58/3.57 Cycle 5 B- 37.7% 1.5 3 15.3 25,897 19 221 +61.6 0.00/8.33

Notes: Bayne Grade: the 2005 grade of A- is a preliminary grade; Domestic Political Management: % Mem is the percentage of G8 countries that made a policy speech referring to the G8 that year. Ave # refs = the average number of references for those who did mention the G8 that year; Location: Ldg = Lodge on outskirts of capital city; Res = remote resort; Cap = inside capital city; Prv = provincial (not capital) city; Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis. Compliance scores from 1996 to 2005 measure compliance with G8 Research Group’s selected commitments. The 2005 compliance score is a preliminary grade; U.S.-hosted summits are in italics.


Appendix B: Gleneagles 2005 Compliance

CDA FRA GER ITA JAP RUS UK US EU Issue Average

Peacekeeping +1 +1 +1 0 +1 -1 +1 +1 +1 0.67 Good Governance 0 +1 +1 0 -1 0 +1 +1 +1 0.44 Health: HIV/AIDS 0 0 0 -1 +1 +1 0 +1 +1 0.33 Health: Polio Eradication +1 -1 +1 -1 -1 -1 +1 +1 +1 0.11

ODA +1 +1 +1 -1 -1 -1 +1 0 +1 0.22 Debt Relief: Africa +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 1.00 Promoting Growth: Africa +1 0 +1 0 +1 -1 +1 +1 +1 0.56

Education: Africa 0 +1 +1 0 +1 +1 +1 +1 0 0.67 Trade: Africa +1 -1 +1 -1 +1 -1 +1 +1 +1 0.33 Trade: Export Subsidies +1 -1 +1 -1 0 0 +1 0 0 0.11

Trade: LDCs 0 0 0 0 +1 -1 +1 +1 +1 0.33 Middle East Reform +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 1.00

Debt Relief: Iraq 0 +1 +1 +1 +1 0 +1 +1 n/a 0.75 Sudan +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 0 +1 +1 +1 0.89 Terrorism +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 1.00 Non-proliferation +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 0 +1 +1 +1 0.89 Transnational Crime +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 1.00

Renewable Energy +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 1.00 Climate Change +1 +1 +1 0 +1 0 +1 +1 +1 0.78 Tsunami +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 1.00 Surface Transportation +1 +1 +1 +1 0 -1 +1 +1 +1 0.67

Individual Country Scores +0.76 +0.57 +0.90 +0.24 +0.62 +0.05 +0.95 +0.90 +0.90

Country Average +0.65 Issue Average +0.65 Interim Compliance Average

+0.47


Appendix C: International Organizations at the G8 Summit

1989 Paris Non-Aligned Movement: Presidents Abdou Diouf, Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, Carlos Andres Perez and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 1993 Tokyo Non-Aligned Movement: President Soeharto of the Republic of Indonesia, Chairman 1996 Lyon United Nations: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General International Monetary Fund: Michel Camdessus, Managing Director World Bank: James Wolfensohn, President World Trade Organization: Renato Ruggiero, Director-General 2001 Genoa United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General World Bank: James Wolfensohn, President World Trade Organization: Renato Ruggiero, Director-General World Health Organization: Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director-General

2002 Kananaskis United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General 2003 Evian United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General World Bank: James Wolfensohn, President International Monetary Fund: Horst Köhler, Managing Director World Trade Organization: Supachai Panitchpakdi, Director-General 2005 Gleneagles Commission of the African Union: Alpha Oumar Konare, Chair International Energy Agency: Claude Mandil, Executive Director International Monetary Fund: Rodrigo de Rato y Figaredo, Managing Director United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General World Bank: Paul Wolfowitz, President World Trade Organization: Supachai Panitchpakdi, Director-General 2006 St. Petersburg Commission of the African Union: Alpha Oumar Konare, Chair CIS: Nursultan Nazarbayev, Chairman-in-office International Energy Agency: Claude Mandil, Executive Director International Atomic Energy Agency: Mohammed ElBaradei, Director-General UNESCO: Koichiro Matsuura, Director-General World Health Organization: Dr. Anders Nordström, Acting Director-General World Trade Organization: Pascal Lamy United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General


Appendix D: Outside Leaders at the G8 Summit

2000 Okinawa Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria 2001 Genoa Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria 2002 Kananaskis Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria 2003 Evian Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa H.M. King Mohammed VI, King of Morocco, Chair of the Group of 77 Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal Vicente Fox Quesada, President of the United Mexican States Pascal Couchepin, President of the Swiss Confederation Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Dr Mahathir Bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of the Republic of India 2004 Sea Island Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of Algeria Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, King of Bahrain Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer, President of Iraq Abdallah II, King of Jordan Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Prime Minister of Turkey Ali Abdallah Salih, President of Yemen John Agyekum Kafuor, President of Ghana Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria Abdoulaye Wade, President of Senegal Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki, President of South Africa Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda


2005 Gleneagles Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil Hu Jintau, President of the People's Republic of China Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia John Agyekum Kufour, President of the Republic of Ghana Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of the Republic of India Vicente Fox Quesadal, President of the United Mexican States Olusegun Obasanjo GCB, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki GCB GCMB, President of the Republic of South Africa Benjamin William Mpkapa, President of the United Republic of Tanzania 2006 St. Petersburg Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil Hu Jintau, President of the People's Republic of China Vicente Fox Quesadal, President of the United Mexican States Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki GCB GCMB, President of the Republic of South Africa Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of the Republic of India


Appendix E: Preparatory Process

List of Ministerial, Sherpa and FASS Meetings G8 Summit Preparatory Schedule, 2006 Sherpa Meetings January 19-20 Sherpa 1 February 16-17 FASS February 21 Political Directors March 9-10 Sherpa 2 March 27-28 FASS April 12 Political Directors May 4-5 FASS May 18-19 Sherpa 3 June 7 Political Directors June 20-21 FASS June 22-23 Sherpa 4 July 5 Sherpa 5 Ministerial Meetings January 26-27 G8 Finance deputies February 10-11 Finance March 15-16 Energy April 21 G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors April 28 Health (not the G8SI) June 1-2 Education June 9-10 Finance June 15-16 Justice and Home Affairs June 29 Foreign Affairs October 9-10 Labour and Employment


Appendix F: Bilateral Summit Contact since Gleneagles Summit (July 6-8, 2005)

050718: Singh visits Bush in Washington (India, outreach) 050908: Blair visits Singh in Udaipur (India, outreach) 050912: Singh visits Chirac in Paris (India, outreach) 051116: Bush visits Koizumi in Kyoto 051118: Bush meets Putin in Busan, South Korea (margins of APEC meeting) 051120: Bush visits Hu in Beijing (China, outreach) 051121: Putin visits Koizumi in Japan 051124: Merkel visits Blair in London 051127: Blair visits Strasbourg for EU debate 060113: Merkel visits Bush in Washington 060228: Berlusconi visits Bush in Washington 060303: Bush visits Singh in New Delhi (India, outreach) 060309: Lula visits Blair in London (Brazil, outreach) 060330-31: Harper meets Bush and Fox in Cancun (Mexico, outreach) 060420: Hu visits Bush in Washington (China, outreach) 060424: President of the EC visits Koizumi in Tokyo for Japan-EU summit 060525: Chirac visits Lula in Brasília (Brazil, outreach) 060525-26: Blair visits Bush in Washington 060513: Prodi visits Chirac in Paris 060609: Blair visits Chirac in Paris 060614: Prodi visits Merkel in Germany 060620: Prodi visits Putin in Moscow 060621: Bush visits Vienna for US-EU summit 060623: Merkel visits Wen Jiabao (Prime Minister) in Beijing (China, outreach) 060628: Koizumi visits Harper in Ottawa 060629: Koizumi visits Bush in Washington 060706: Harper visits Bush in Washington 060713-14: Bush visits Merkel in Stralsund, Germany 060713-14: Harper visits Blair in Britain * The 2006 outreach countries are Brazil, India, China, Mexico, South Africa and Kazakhstan (chair of CIS)


Appendix G: The St. Petersburg Summit Schedule

Saturday, July 15 Sherpa 5 meeting to finalize documents (probably in the morning); also political

directors and foreign affairs sous sherpa meetings 14h00-18h00 Leaders’ arrivals (afternoon) Bilateral meetings begin (Putin-Bush, etc.) 19h15 Informal dinner with spouses Sunday, July 16 Bilateral meetings 10h00 Session on three main themes of energy, health and education 11h30 J8-G8 leaders meeting (for 15-30 minutes) Session – World economy, trade, intellectual property rights with documents on trade,

combating corruption, intellectual piracy 12h00 Working lunch: Discussion on Africa 16h00 Session on world Security, with documents on counterterrorism, non-

proliferation, Global Partnership against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

19h30 Working dinner: Discussion on demography and social issues

Monday, July 17 10h00 Outreach session with the plus five leaders and heads of international

organizations: Discussion of the three priorities, with documents on - energy, health and infectious diseases 12h00 Working lunch with outreach leaders and international organization heads:

Discussion on the three priorities Release of document on G8 progress on Africa Chair’s statement

14h00 Concluding news conference by Putin


Appendix H: Global Energy Vulnerability

World Energy Prices of Light Sweet Crude Oil Date US$ 74-00-00 9.07 (annual average) 81-00-00 35.24 (annual average) 85-01-02 25.56 86-05-01 13.80 (Tokyo Summit, 4-6 May) 87-06-01 19.55 (Venice Summit, 8-10 June) 88-06-01 17.60 (Toronto Summit, 19-21 June) 89-06-01 19.83 (Paris Summit, 14-16 July) 90-06-01 17.51 (Houston Summit, 9-11 July) 91-06-03 21.16 (London Summit, 15-17 July) 92-06-01 22.07 (Munich Summit, 6-8 July) 93-06-01 20.20 (Tokyo Summit, 7-10 July) 94-06-01 18.29 (Naples Summit, 8-10 July) 95-06-01 18.89 (Halifax Summit, 15-17 June) 96-06-03 19.86 (Lyon Summit, 27-29 June) 97-06-02 21.15 (Denver Summit, 20-22 June) 98-01-02 17.41 98-05-01 16.25 (Birmingham Summit, 15-17 May) 99-01-04 12.42 99-06-01 16.31 (Cologne Summit, 18-20 June) 00-01-04 25.56 00-06-01 30.19 (Okinawa Summit, 21-23 July) 01-01-02 27.29 01-06-01 27.88 (Genoa Summit, 20-22 July) 02-01-02 21.13 02-06-03 25.10 (Kananaskis Summit, 26-27 June) 03-01-02 31.97 03-06-02 30.72 (Evian Summit, 1-3 June) 04-01-05 33.71 04-03-01 36.85 04-06-01 42.33 (Sea Island Summit, 8-10 June) 04-09-01 43.89 05-01-03 42.16 05-03-01 51.67 05-06-01 54.40 (Gleneagles Summit, 6-8 July) 05-09-01 69.50 06-01-02 63.11 06-02-01 66.61 06-03-01 62.01 06-04-21 75.35 (intraday high) 06-05-29 71.85 06-06-20 69.30 06-07-03 73.93 06-07-05 75.40 (intraday high) 06-07-05 75.20 06-07-07 75.85 (intraday high) 06-07-12 74.95 06-07-13 75.80 (7am) 06-07-15 (St. Petersburg Summit, 15-17 July)


Source: Energy Information Administration 2006, (accessed June 26, 2006), http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/rwtcd.htm Notes: Daily closing price for light sweet crude oil on the New York Mercantile Exchange, closing price in U.S. dollars. 2005 data: The West Texas Intermediate (WTI) spot prices are published on the United States Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration’s website. Brent Crude is a type of oil sourced from the North Sea and forms a benchmark for the price of other crude oils from Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. The oil price before the annual summit and date of summit is in bold.


Appendix I: Global Terrorism Vulnerability

Major Shocks from Terrorism to G8 Countries and Citizens Abroad Year Number of Attacks Number of Injuries Number of Deaths 1983 1 175 370 1985 1 329 1988 1 28 1992 1 2 1993 2 1,073 24 1994 1 1995 2 6,060 19 1996 1 200 19 1998 1 4,085 225 1999 1 300+ 2000 1 39 17 2001 2 3,019 2,997 2002 5 229 488 2003 2 100+ 62 2004 20 2,628+ 721+ 2005 22 836+ 152+ 2006 H1 13 41 8 Note: Deadly attacks from terrorists of global (or local) reach on territory of G8 members (including the European Union) or on G8 nationals (i.e., citizens of G8/EU countries) anywhere in the world. Deadly = death or injury. On July 11, 2006, Russia announced the death of Chechnyan leader Shamil Basayev. On July 12, 2006, eight explosions struck trains in Mumbai, India, killing approximately 200. H1 = first 6 months of 2006 (January-June) 2006 data from: MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database (accessed June 26, 2006), www.tkb.org/IncidentRegionModule.jsp


Appendix J: G8 Combat Casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan

Country Casualties in Iraq

(2003–) Casualties in Afghanistan

(2001–) U.S. 2,510 306 UK 113 8 Italy 31 5 Canada 17 (20060709) France 7 Germany 18 TOTAL 2,654 361

Note: The UK had 5000 troops in Afghanistan and had six killed in the month ending July 6, 2006. It announced the dispatch of an additional 900 troops on July 10, 2006. It also 7200 troops in Iraq, 8500 in Northern Ireland and 900 in the Balkans.


Appendix K: Confirmed Cases (Cumulative) of H5N1 Bird Flu

Country 1996-2003

2003-2004

2004-H1 2004-H2 2005-

H1 2005-

H2 Jan

2006 Feb

2006 Mar 2006

Apr 2006

May 2006

Total human cases: deaths

Other Asia Thailand Yi:0:0 Y:12:8 Yii:17:12iii Y:0:0 Y:22:14 22:14 Vietnam Y:23:16 Y:27:20 Y:33:20 Y:66:22 66:22 Cambodia Y:0:0 Y:0:0 Y:4:4 Y:1:1 Y:6:6 6:6 Lao PDR Y:0:0 Y:0:0 0 Malaysia Y:0:0 0 Mongolia Y:0:0 0 Other Europe Kazakhstan Y:0:0 0 Romania Y:0:0 0 Croatia Y:0:0 0 Turkey Y:0:0 Y:21:4 21:4 Azerbaijan Y:0:0 Y:7:5 Y:8:5 8:5 Bulgaria Y:0:0 0 Slovenia Y:0:0 0 G12 Hong Kong Y:18:6 0:20:7 20:7 China Y:0:0 Y:0:0 Y:0:0 Y:0:0 Y:7:3 Y:10:7 Y:14:8 Y:16:11 Y:18:12 18:12 S. Korea Y:0:0 0 Indonesia Y:0:0 Y:0:0 Y:16:11 Y:19:14 Y:27:20 Y:29:22 Y:32:24 Y:48:36 48:36 India Y:0:0 0 G8 Yiv:0:0 Yv 0 Japan Y:0:0 0 Russia Y:0:0 0 UK Yvi0:0 0 Canada Yvii:0:0 0 Italy Y:0:0 0 Germany Yviii:0:0 Yix 0 France Y:0:0 0 EU Brussels Yx:0:0 0 Greece Y:0:0 0 Austria Y:0:0 0 Sweden Y:0:0 0 Middle East Iraq N:1:1 Y:2:2 2:2 Iran Y:0:0 0 Egypt Y:0:0 Y:5:2 Y:12:4 Y:14:6 14:6 Afghanistan Y:0:0 0 Africa Nigeria Y:0:0 Y 0 Niger Y:0:0 0 Djibouti Y:1:0 0 TOTAL 225:114

Notes: Mortality rate from H5N1 cases in humans is approximately 46%, (1) Ratio used is birds infected : human cases : human deaths, (2) 2004-Q1 = January – June; 2004-Q1 = July – December, 2005-Q1 = January – June, (3) + means that the country announced an initial human infection, and then subsequently


announced “more” infections in humans, without a specific number., (4) Total human cases : deaths is all cases that have been confirmed by laboratory tests, and does not account for all “suspected” or “probable” human H5N1 infections., (5) Y = yes, a poultry outbreak has occurred., H1 = first 6 months of year (January-June), H2 = last 6 months of year (July-December). Source: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/Timeline_28_10a.pdf


Appendix L: Political Capital and Control

Year Average Leader First

Elected Re-

elections

Summit experience (and

hosting)

Legislative control

Party control

Approval rating Next election

1975 (6) 1976 (7) 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 (8) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 44 2006 36

2006 U.S. (Bush) 2000 1 (2004) 5 (1) 2 of 2 Yes 29% 2008 lame duck;

Midterms Nov 06

Japan (Koizumi) 2001 1 5 (0)

Germany (Merkel) 0 0 (0)

Britain (Blair) 1997 2 (2005) 9 (2)

France (Chirac) 1995 1 11 (2)

Italy (Prodi) 2006 0

Canada (Harper) 2006 0 0 (0)

Russia (Putin) 2000 1 (xx) 6 (0)


i First cases of large mammal (non-human) infection in leopards and tigers fed on chickens. ii Outbreak and death in 147 tigers in Thai zoo. iii First case of human-to-human transmission. iv H5N1 confirmed in Germany in both poultry and three domestic cats (Baltic island of Ruegen). v H5N1 confirmed in Germany in a second mammalian species, a stone marten, in the same area where the infected domestic cats were located (Baltic island of Ruegen). vi H5N1 confirmed in imported parrot, held in quarantine and died. vii Two outbreaks in birds in Canada (in Manitoba and B.C.), H5N1 virus confirmed, but not the same virulent strain as in Asia. (www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2005/11/20/avian-flu051120.html) viii H5N1 confirmed in Germany in both poultry and three domestic cats (Baltic island of Ruegen). ix H5N1 confirmed in Germany in a second mammalian species, a stone marten, in the same area where the infected domestic cats were located (Baltic island of Ruegen). x Two eagles imported (illegally) into Brussels from Thailand infected with H5N1.

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