PT5:PT5: Public Transport Public Transport

Security Planning - Security Planning - Organisation, Organisation,

Countermeasures & Countermeasures & Operations GuidanceOperations GuidanceCOUNTERACT FINAL CONFERENCECOUNTERACT FINAL CONFERENCE

Brussels 3Brussels 3rdrd March 2009 March 2009

Why guidance is needed Any PTO or IM can be targeted by terrorists PTOs/IMs cannot afford potential impact Standard of preparedness varies across MS PTOs/IMs must be prepared

Study objectives: Developing improved security organisation management, operational and incident response arrangements.

Approach: Identification, analysis and documentation of existing best practice applied by public transport systems within the EU and beyond.

Security Planning Guidance

Benefits: Identifies key basic counter terrorism needs Enables review of existing or provision of new arrangements Enables harmonised approach within EU member states

helping to achieve common European standards Emphasises links with external security agencies and

stakeholders – better understanding of the specific needs of PTO/IM organisations

Gives benchmarking for new Member States whose security plans may not be well developed and those who have so far not suffered from security problems

Study Structure

Part A:

Organisation arrangements

Part B:

Security operations

planning

Part C:

Security systemsdesign

considerations

Part D:Emergency

preparedness, crisis,

business continuity &

recovery planning

Guidance main focus

Part A: Security Organisation Arrangements, Planning and Preparedness

Legal requirements & expectations Communications Interfaces external organisations Security direction & advice Security organisation structures Policy & decision making processes Risk management (Relationship to PT4 – risk assessment) Monitoring, control & audit

Guidance main focus

Part B: Security Operations Planning High level security planning – development of operational concept Security procedures Site level security plans Security training

Part C: Security Systems & Design Considerations Architectural & engineering design strategies Security systems Protection of public & non public areas.

Guidance main focusPart D: Incident & crisis preparedness, recovery and business continuity Incident response plans and responsibilities Plan preparation Introduction of plans Organisation, command & control Crisis management Business continuity Maintenance of plans Training

Security Operations Planning

Risk assessmentRisk management plan and

Security master plan

Security operations planning

Emergency and crisis preparedness

Security operations In routine

Design safeguards1. Technological2. Trained personnel3. Civil engineering4. Procedural

Design strategies

Training programmes

Field level security plans

Standard and emergency operating procedures

Security organisation1. Legal aspects2. Management arrangements3. Decision making process

Business continuity and recovery

StakeholdersPublic transport operator /Infrastructure manager

Security Operations Planning

Risk assessmentRisk management plan and

Security master plan

Security operations planning

Emergency and crisis preparedness

Security operations In routine

Design safeguards1. Technological2. Trained personnel3. Civil engineering4. Procedural

Design strategies

Training programmes

Field level security plans

Standard operating procedures

Security organisation1. Legal aspects2. Management arrangements3. Decision making process

Business continuity and recovery

Public transport operator /Infrastructure manager

Part A:Security

organisation

Part B:Security

operations

Part C:Technologica

l solutions

Part D:Emergenc

y planning

Emergency operating procedures

Training programmes

PT4 Study

PT7:PT7: Potential Terrorist Potential Terrorist

Action Decision Action Decision Making Making

COUNTERACT FINAL CONFERENCECOUNTERACT FINAL CONFERENCEBrussels 3Brussels 3rdrd March 2009 March 2009

Why this study is needed

Most PTOs/IMs have no experience of the impact of terrorist incidents

Response procedures for threats and incidents commonly involves stopping services and evacuation

Impact must be minimised - safety and costs Response actions and decision making processes are complex –

often not solely PTO/IM responsibility Knowing direct and indirect costs helpful for security

investment but limited detail available

Aims of Study Review decision making processes involved Identify risks involved – disruption, shutdown, delayed restart Indication of costs involved Identify procedures and technical innovations giving confidence

to decision makers

Benefits For PTOs/IMs – best practice for incident response strategies For the EC – better understanding for further R&D and policy

development

Study Approach Information from PTOs, IMs and external agencies

How circumstances are handled

Who makes decisions

What affects decision making

Implication of decisions

Timeframe: End March 2009

Example: Metro /LRT operator

Railway undertaking

&Infrastructure manager

Municipal police and

Railway Police

Specific station - organisation,facilities analysis

Several stakeholders – PTOs, IM, rail police, etc

Decision making and implications 

Scenario based analysis, for example: Threats Suspicious items IED/VBIED and

multiple attacks Toxic material attack