public security, criminal policy brazil the and changes and

www.crimejusticejournal.comIJCJ&SD20176(1):146‐163 ISSN2202–8005

©TheAuthor(s)2017

PublicSecurity,CriminalPolicyandSentencinginBrazilduringtheLulaandDilmaGovernments,2003‐2014:ChangesandContinuities

RodrigoGhiringhellideAzevedo,AnaClaudiaCifali1PontificiaUniversidadeCatolicadoRioGrandedoSul,BrazilTranslation:CharlottetenHave2

Abstract

Sincemid‐1980scrimeratesinBrazilstartedtoincreasewiththetransitionfrommilitarydictatorshiptodemocracy,aperiodmarkedbytheriseofpovertyandhyperinflation.Givenlevelsofpolice corruptionandprotectionof criminalgangs, trust in the criminal justicesystem was low, leading to a heightened dependence on private security, gatedcommunitiesandthepoliticisationoflawandorderpolitics.Animpressivepunitiveturnbeganatinthe1990s.Thispaperanalysedpenalpoliciesundersuccessiveleft‐wingLulaandDilmagovernmentsfrom2003to2014.Duringthisperiodtheriseof‘postneoliberal’and ‘postneoconservative’ politics, led by the Workers Party, developed governmentalstrategiesandinitiativesthatformulatedandlegitimizedrichandcomplexexpressionsoftraditionally left‐wing politics. Despite the simultaneous implementation of distributivepolicies,theincreaseofhumandevelopmentlevelsthroughoutthecountry,thereductionof social inequalitiesand theredirectionof theofficialdiscourseofFederalGovernmentsecuritypoliciestowardscrimeprevention,incarcerationratescontinuedtoincrease.Thisarticle examines why efforts to build an effective public security policy committed toupholdingcivilrightsandimprovingthecontrolofpoliceandpoliceactivitieshavefailed.Keywords

Incarcerationrates;Brazil;lawandorderpolitics;punitivepopulism.Pleasecitethisarticleas:deAzevedoRD andCifali AC (2017)Public security, criminal policy and sentencing inBrazilduring the Lula and Dilma governments, 2003‐2014: Changes and continuities. ten Have C(trans.). International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 6(1): 146‐163. DOI:10.5204/ijcjsd.v6i1.392.

Thisworkis licensedunderaCreativeCommonsAttribution4.0Licence.Asanopenaccessjournal,articlesarefreetouse,withproperattribution,ineducationalandothernon‐commercialsettings.ISSN:2202‐8005

RodrigoGhiringhellideAzevedo,AnaClaudiaCifali: PublicSecurity,CriminalPolicyandSentencinginBrazil,2003‐2014

IJCJ&SD147

Onlineversionviawww.crimejusticejournal.com ©20176(1)

Theresponsetocrimeinthepostneoliberalcontext

Since thebeginningof the1990s,violence, insecurityandcriminalityhavebeenkey issues inlarge‐andmedium‐sizedurbancentresinSouthAmerica.InthecaseofBrazil,homiciderateshaveincreasedsincethestartofthe1980stoanaverageof50,000deathsperyearand,inthefirstyearsof thenewmillennium, toapproximately25homicidesper100,000 inhabitants. InsomeStatecapitalsratesevengrewto90homicidesper100,000inhabitants.Afteradecreasebetween2003and2007,thehomicidecurveagainbegantoclimbinBrazil,reachingatotalof56,337deathsbyhomicidein2012,witharateof29deathsper100,000inhabitants(Waiselfisz2014).Thevastmajorityofvictimscomesfromalowerclassbackground;hasreceivedlowlevelschooling;isyoung,maleandblack;andoftenlivesintheoutskirtsofalargeurbancenter.Crimeratesstartedtoincreasewiththetransitionfrommilitarydictatorshiptodemocracyinthemid‐1980s, which period was marked by the rise of poverty and hyperinflation. The return ofdemocracybroughtwithitanunprecedentedintensificationofcrime.ThefollowingFigure1representsthehomicideratesinBrazilfrom1980to2012.Agrowthtrendcanbeidentifiedfrom11homicidesper100,000in1980to29homicidesper100,000inhabitantsby2012.3Adownwardtrendandstabilisationcanbeperceivedfrom2003onward,whensomeimportantStates likeSãoPauloandRiode Janeiroexperiencedasignificantdropinhomiciderates. This did not have a wider impact by virtue of the southern and north‐eastern Statesexperiencingincreasingratesinthesameperiod.However,fromthattimeonward,aclearshiftinthehomicidecurvecanbenoted.Thishasbeenattributedbyresearcherstochangesinpoliciesandsocialdynamics,oneofwhichwastheimplementationoftheStatuteofDisarmament,whichestablishedaneffectivearmscontrolpolicyandabanonthecarryingofweaponsbythecivilianpopulation,aswellastheconsolidationofthecriminalgroup‘delPrimerComandodelaCapital’(PCC)inSãoPaulo.PCCemergedinprisonsandhadamonopolyontheillegaldrugtrade.Thepolicythuscontributedtothereductionofhomicidescausedbydisputesoverterritory.4Theyear2012wasmarkedbyanewrecordinhomicides,reachingthehighestlevelsincethestartofthemeasurementofstatistics.

Figure1:HomicideratesinBrazil(per100,000inhabitants)1980‐2012Source:Waiselfisz(2014)

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12

12 13 13 14 15 15 15 17 17 20 22 21 19 20 21 24 25 25 26 26 27 28 29 29 27 26 26 25 26 27 27 27 29

per100,000inhabitants


IJCJ&SD148


Thisobjectivecomponentisaccompaniedbya ‘subjective’component,or ‘senseofinsecurity’,whichcanbeunderstoodasachangeinexpectationsandfeelingsoftheinhabitantsoflarge‐andmedium‐sizedcitiesinrelationtothepossibilityofbecomingacrimevictim.Thisunease,inturn,is expressedby innumerableself‐protectionandavoidance tactics,whichhavea considerableimpactonbehaviourineverydaylifeandconstitutesanewcomponentoftheinsecuritycrisis.Theseobjectiveandsubjectivecomponentsoftheinsecuritycrisishavebecomerecurringthemesinnewsandmediadebates,tothepointthattheyhavenowbecomeoneofthefundamentalformsof sense‐making by themedia. Additionally, it is viewed as a sign of State failure by Brazil’ssurroundingcountries,duetothefactthatsecuritypoliciesandcriminaljusticearetraditionallyarrangedbyState‐levelgovernance(police,judiciaryandthepenitentiarysystem).Asaresult,evenbeyondthegrowthofinsecurity,therehasbeenagrowing‘politicization’oftheissue,whichincreasinglymeansthatthe‘political’armsofStatestructuresareseenaspartoftheproblem,orastheonethat,togetherwithexperts(forexample,lawyersandcriminologists),mustmakekeydecisionsthatactinthearea,whilemovingtheadministrativeparttoasecondaryposition.Althoughmanyarguethatsomethinghastobedoneaboutcrime,thetrustinthecriminaljusticesystemremainsverylow.Itisviewedasslow,ineffectiveandbiasedinfavourofthewealthyandpowerful.5Braziliansthereforerarely involvethejusticesystemindealingwiththeirconflictsbut,instead,relyontheirexistinginterpersonalnetworkstoresolveissues.Oneconsequenceisthat themiddle‐andupper‐classes isolate themselvesbymoving intoclosedcompoundswithelectricgates,wallsandprivatesecurity.This is reflectedby the fact that theprivatesecurityindustryemploysmorepeoplethanthepublicsecuritysysteminBrazil.Inseveralregionsofthecountryitisnotunusualtohireaprofessionalhitmaninordertoeliminatepoliticalopponentsorsuspectedassailants.Additionally,inrecentyearsurban‘militias’emergedinthefavelasofRiodeJaneiro.Thesemilitiasarecontrolledbythepoliceandchargeresidentsmoneyinexchangeforprotectionofthecommunityfromdrugtraffickersandotherassaults.Effortstobuildapublicsecuritypolicycommittedtoguaranteecivilrightsandimprovementofthecontrolofpoliceandpoliceactivitieshavefailedsincethe1980s.Thisoccurredbecausetheywereblockedbytherulingpunitivepopulismatthetimeandtheinabilityofthegovernmenttoconfrontoftencorruptandviolentresistancebycorporatepolicestructures.Duringthemilitarydictatorship, political murders were secret acts by the government that were never publiclyadmitted. Under popularly elected governments, homicides committed by the police duringviolentandunprofessionalraidsintheurbanperiphery–onesthatoftenremainedunpunished–gainedpopularsupport.Thiswaswiththeapparentaimofcontrollingcrimewithinasituationwheretherewasnotrustinthejusticesystem.Inpractice,however,theyservedasacurrencyagreementbetweenthepoliceandtraffickinggroups,characterizingwhatMisse(2008)termed‘politicalgoods’.Duetothegrowingperceptionofapublicsecuritycrisis,theFederalGovernmentwasforcedinthemid‐1990stoassumeastrongerleadershiproleinthedevelopmentandinductionofsecuritypoliciesintheStates.ItdidsobycreatingtheNationalSecretariatofPublicSafety(in1996)andtheNationalPublicSecurityFund(in2001),andbypublishingsuccessivenationalplansonpublicsafety. These policieswere initiated during the first governing period of the Brazilian SocialDemocracy Party (PSDB) thatwas led by FernandoHenrique Cardoso,who governedwith acoalitionofcenter‐rightparties.ThepoliciesweredeepenedbythegovernmentsofLuisInacioLuladaSilvaofthePartidodosTrabalhadores(WorkersParty),theheadofacenter‐leftcoalition.It is possible to link the growing leadership of the Federal Government with the rise of‘postneoliberal’and ‘postneoconservative’politicswhich, ledbytheWorkersParty,developedgovernmental strategies and initiatives that formulated and legitimized rich and complexexpressionsoftraditionallyleft‐wingpolitics.


IJCJ&SD149


Despitethecomplexityofapoliticalsystemthatismadeupoutof30partiesandthatdependsontheconstructionofcoalitions ina ratherheterogeneousparliamentthatoften isbasedontheexchangeofpoliticalfavoursandpatronage,thefactremainsthat,sincethestabilizationofthecurrency due to the ‘Real Plan’ (Plano Real) in 1995, there was a steady growth of socialexpendituresbytheFederalGovernment.Between1995and2010thefederalsocialexpendituremorethandoubled,from234millionRealesin1995to638millionin2010,anincreaseof172per cent over 16 years. In relation to the country’s Gross Domestic Product, state socialexpenditureincreasedfrom11.24percentin1995to15.54percentin2010(Castro2012).DuringFernandoHenriqueCardoso’sfirstterm(1995‐1998),theGiniindexofincomeinequality(where0 correspondswithperfect equality and1withperfect inequality) remainedvirtuallyunchanged,andthenfellslightlyfromearlyoninhissecondterm(1998‐2002)toreach0.594in2002(Figure2).AconsiderabledecreasecanbenotedduringthegovernmentalperiodruledbyLula(2003‐2010)reaching0.533bytheendofhissecondterm.ThisdecreasecontinuedduringthegovernmentofPresidentDilmaRousseff,whosucceededLulain2011,reachingthelowestoutcomemeasuredinthelastdecadesin2012whentheindexdroppedto0.526.

Figure2:Movement in income inequality inBrazil(Gini indexofaveragehousehold incomepercapita),1995‐2012

Source:PNADThereturnofeconomicgrowthtothecountryin2004hadbeneficialeffectsonthelabourmarket,suchastheincreaseinemploymentandtheriseofwages.Thereductionofunemploymentandthe increase of GDP could be verified by a heightened demand in unskilled labour and theincreased income of those occupying the base layer of the so‐called social pyramid. This isreflected inadecreaseof5.7percent in theGini index from2002to2007,withanobservedaccelerationinequalityin2004(IPEA2008).However,thistrenddoesnotsignificantlyalterthehistoricalpictureofsocialinequality,whichremainsthemainchallengetobefacedbycurrentandfuturegovernmentsanddependsontheunlikelycontinuingstabilityoftheeconomicgrowthratesexperiencedinrecentyears.

0.602 0.599 0.6 0.6 0.5980.592

0.5930.5940.587

0.581

0.5690.566

0.56

0.5520.543

0.5330.527

0.526

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012


IJCJ&SD150


Criminalpolicyandlegalreforms

To analyse themovements of criminal policy and its impact on incarceration rates in Brazilinvolvesaddressingthecomplexityofcrimecontrol.Thegovernmentalorgansthatactwithinthisfield are linked to the Federal Executive power (Ministry of Justice, Federal Police), theExecutive’sstatepowers(civilandmilitarypolice,prisonadministration),theFederalJudiciary(SupremeCourt,HighCourtandFederalCourt),Stateexecutivepowers(StateAdministrationsofJustice),andtheFederalLegislature(NationalCongress–ChamberofDeputiesandSenate).TheNationalCongresshasthesolepowertolegislateincriminalmattersinBrazil.TheCongress,however,doesnothavetheautonomytodefinecriminalizedbehaviourbeyondwhathasbeenestablishedbyfederallaw;norisitabletocreateproceduralrules.Itisimportanttonotethatone of the characteristics thatmarks theBrazilianpost‐dictatorial political system, especiallyaftertheendoftheCollordeMellogovernment in1992, istheconsolidationofapresidentialsystembasedonthedevelopmentofcoalitions.Thesecoalitionsaremadeupofpartiesthatexistin the broad political landscape and need to create partnerships that reflect the majority inparliament. In this sense, the governmental system adopted is ‘presidentialism’, in whichgovernmentsresorttocoalitionsinordertogarnersupportfortheirinitiatives(Limongi2006).Infact,this isthemodusoperandiofmostcontemporarydemocracies.Inthissystemminoritygovernmentsfaceseriousgovernanceissues,whilegovernmentswithmajoritycoalitionsareabletomitigatesuchdifficulties.InBrazil,thecoalitionsinthissenseactasabasicoperatingbudgetoffunctioningpresidentialism,inwhichthegovernmentismoresuccessfuladoptinglegislationwhenitcanconsistentlycountonthesupportofabroadcoalitionofparties.Therefore,membersofthepartiesthatarepartofthecoalitionsupportingthepresidentgenerallyfollowthevoteofthegovernment’sleader(Limongi2006).BasedonempiricalstudiesLimongi(2006)showedthattheLulagovernment,inhisfirstterm,receivedanaveragesupportof89.1percentof164votes fromthedeputiesof itssupportingparties,thusensuringthemaintenanceofgovernance(Limongi2006).Inaddition,itappearsthatthelossesarenottheresultofindisciplineoftheparliamentarybaseofsupport,butratheritsinternaldivision.Inotherwords,lossesoccurredinsituationsinwhichatleastonepartydidnotfollowthedirectionofthegovernmentleader(Limongi2006).ItthusbecomesevidentthatwhetherproposalsoftheExecutivePowerbecomesuccessfulisnotthe result of case‐by‐case negotiations. Rather, it is the ability of the government to controllegislativeproduction,which in turn isbasedon the interactionbetween theExecutiveof theparty inpower toproduceanagendawhilstmaintainingmajoritysupport(Limongi2006). Inotherwords,becausetheprocessoflegislativedecisionfavourstheExecutivePower,objectionsof the Congress become more predictable. In order to structure and preserve support, it isimportanttofocusonplenarydebatesthatwillmostlikelybeacceptedandavoidthosethatmightpresentarisktothecoalition(Limongi2006).Generalresearchintermsoflegalreformsintheareaofcriminaljusticehaspointedtowardstheexistenceofahypertrophyor inflation incriminalrules,which invadeareasofsocial life thatpreviously were not covered by criminal sanctions. It is a criminal remedy used by politicaldecision‐makers in response to almost all types of conflicts and social problems. The penalresponse is the symbolic response by the state to the growing demands of security andpunishmentbysociety,whichareexpressedbythemedia.However,theresponseoccurswithoutmeasuring its instrumental effectiveness as a means of reducing crime, or forecasting thepotentialdirect impacton theprisonsystem,orassessinganyotherpossibleside‐effects thatmightresultfromtheuseofforce.Asforthecoordinationofpublicsecuritylegislationinthecountry,thelandscapeinBrazilwasmarkedbyarigiddivisionofpowers,inwhichStatesweregrantedgreatautonomyindesigning


IJCJ&SD151


andimplementingtheirownpoliciesandinitiatives.AccordingtoSáeSilva(2012),theFederalGovernmentactionwassummedupbythemobilizationoftheFederalPolice(responsiblefortheinvestigationofcrimeswithinthejurisdictionoftheFederalCourt)andtheFederalTransitPolice.ThesecondnotablecharacteristicwasthecentralityofextensiveactionoftheStatePolice,backed–or,rather,ignored–bytheFederalGovernment.The political landscape starts to change with the start of the Fernando Henrique Cardosogovernment (1995‐2002). The National Secretariat of Public Security (SENASP) was createdundertheMinistryofJusticeandlaunchedthefirstNationalPlanofPublicSecurityin2000.Inaddition theNationalPublic SecurityFund (FNSP)was formed,whichallowedgreaterpowerinductionandensuredsystematicinitiativesintheFederalGovernmentsector.TheNationalPublicSecurityPlansduringtheLula‐(2003‐2010)andDilmaGovernments(2011‐2014)6

Afterthreepreviousattempts(in1989,1994and1998),LuizInacioLuladaSilvawaselectedPresidentoftheRepublicin2002.Withacareerbuiltontheunionstruggleinthe1970s,whichculminatedinthefoundingoftheWorkersPartyintheearly1980s,Lulabecamepresidentinacoalitionthatunitedthepartiesoftheso‐calleddemocraticandpopularbloc.Thecoalitionwasmainly comprisedof theBrazilianSocialistPartyand theCommunistPartyofBrazil andwaslocatedtotheleftofthenationalpoliticalspectrum.Thesepartiesprioritisedtheformationofacoalitionthataimedtoimplementpoliciestocombatpovertyandtoreducethehugesocialandregional inequalities. In addition it increased social spending, implemented state‐organisedincome distribution, and directed international policy towards greater autonomy whileprioritisingstrongerrelationshipswithLatinAmericancountriesandotherso‐calledemergingcountries. These elements influenced the government to be considered left‐wing. ThischaracteristicwasnotsubstantiallyaltereddespitethebroadeningofpartnershipsintermsoftheCongress,whichresultedinfurtherambiguitiesanddifficultytoimplementmoreprofoundreforms.Notcoincidentally,publicsafetywasoneoftheprioritiesidentifiedintheelectoralprocess,withafocusonagreaterrolefortheFederalGovernmentinreducingviolence.LulahadgonethroughtheexperienceofgoverningsomeimportantStatesbeforehisvictoryinthepresidentialelections,andhadfaceddifficultiesinmanagingthepoliceapparatus,particularlyinRioGrandedoSul.Thiswasduetoleft‐wingprogrammaticweaknessesontheissueofsecurityandtotheboycottofthepolice forces by important sectors that were committed to the defence of human rights andhistoricalalliesofsocialmovements.LulathereforeproposedaNationalPlanofPublicSecurityduringhiselectoralcandidacy,inwhichthefollowingwasspecificallyexpressed:

TheBrazilianpeoplearedominatedbyageneralfeelingofinsecurityand,forthatreason, our government will seek to establish a Public Security System on anationallevel.Socialexclusion,withunemploymentasitsmainexpression,affectsmillionsofmenandwomenandresults indailydespair formanypeople, ifnotcrime. The statistics show that firearms as the causamortis of youth. And theimpunity withwhich organized crime acts, threatens to compromise the ofteninfiltrated functioning of democratic institutions. The same impunity can beobservedinthehundredsofcrimescommittedagainstruralworkers,unionists,lawyersandreligiouspeoplewhofightfortheAgrarianReform.(WorkersParty2002)

Itbecameclearthatthecommitmenttoarmscontrolpolicywasinherentlyrelatedtothefight against the impunity of crimes committed by criminal organizations who wereopposedtosocialmovementsandhumanrights.Theplanalsorecognizedthat:


IJCJ&SD152


Thelackofhumanandmaterialpreparationofthepoliceapparatusandtheslowjudicialsystemencourageviolenceandaggravatecrime,whichinturnreproducesitselfandbroadensduetotheabsurdprisonsystem.Theimpunityofthepowerfulandbrutalmiseryofmuchofthepopulation,whichisinstarkcontrastwiththecontinued appeal of consumerism, causes a crisis of moral values that fuelsviolence.Boththerichandpoorarefrightenedandlockedintheirneighborhoodsandhomes.FormsofsociabilityforBraziliansbecomesincreasinglyrestricted.Thepoor are stigmatized as criminals and civil coexistence is threatened. Theorganizations responsible for national defense are put to the test by theincreasinglymoreinsolentactsbyorganizedcrime.(WorkersParty2002)

Therefore, theNationalPublic SecurityPlan encouraged,on theonehand, socialpolicies thatallowedforthereductionofinequalityandcontributedtosocialappeasementand,ontheotherhand,improvedtheperformanceofpublicsecurityorgans,inparticularthatoftheFederalPolicebutalsooftheStatePolice.ThepolicieswouldbecarriedoutwiththeuseofnewtechnologiesandthecreationofadatabasethatwouldallowforthecoordinationofStateforcesineffortstofightorganizedcrime,withaspecialfocusondrugtraffickingandarmssmuggling.Thenationalpublicsecuritypolicywasassessedtolackplanningandmanagementcapacitydueto fragmenting actions by several States in the area. The proposedmodel therefore involvedincreasingStates’understandingoftheactualandcurrentstatusofviolenceandcrime,inordertopromotepreventive,strategicandtargetedactions,whichwouldpermanentlybemonitoredbyactorsofpublicsecurityandinthecriminaljusticesystem.Theactualimplementationoftheproposal,however,wasonlypartiallycarriedout.Moreover,theorganizationalreformsofpolicestructureswascompletelyremovedfromtheagendawiththefalloftheNationalSecretaryofPublicSecurityinthesecondyearofLula'sterm.Thiswasduetopressurefromgroupsthatwerehighlyinvolvedinpublicsecurityorganizations,particularlytheFederalPolice,andthatwantedtomaintaintheircentralroleinpolicycoordinationinthearea.ThewithdrawalofsupportbytheMinistryofJustice,ledbylawyerMarcioTomazBastosfromSanPaulo,andtheconcomitantfallofLuizEduardoSoareswhowasinchargeofpublicsafety,meant that the development of knowledge, the structuring of research networks and thesystematicproductionofdatawerebroughttoahalt.However,thiswastakenintoaccountonlyto a limited extentwhen informing strategicmanagement. The first agreements between theFederalGovernmentandtheStatestoimplementpreventionprogramsandtrainingforpublicsafetyprofessionalswereseenasverificationoftheprogressofpreventionpolicy.Eventhoughthe plan was still situated in the police schools, they received an important contribution toestablishtheNationalNetworkforAdvancedStudiesinPublicSafety(RENAESP).Thisfacilitatedmorepermanentcontactbetweenpolice,Brazilianuniversitiesandothersafetyoperatorinordertoenableconsolidationbetween,orcreationof,severalresearchgroupsinthearea.During the electoral process which led up to Lula’s second term, the development of theGovernment Security Plan was coordinated by sociologist José Vicente Tavares dos Santos.TavaresdosSantoswasaprofessorandresearcherattheFederalUniversityofRioGrandedoSulwithaproventrackrecordinthefieldofpublicsafetyandthesociologyofviolence.TheproposalfinallyconfrontedmajorproblemssuchasthequestionofobsolescenceoftheStatePolice;thefailureofthepenitentialmodel;thefragmentationofthepublicsecuritysystem;thelowsuccessrateofStateagencyinterventionsandserviceprovision;thedevelopinginstrumentalizationofpoliceintelligence;thelackoflocalpublicpowertodealwiththetopic;andthelackofinteractionand involvement in thediscussion, evaluationanddevelopmentofpublicpolicies in thearea.(TavaresdosSantos2006).


IJCJ&SD153


Theproposalwasarticulatedaroundtheconceptofpublicandcitizenrysafety,withinitiativesaimed to strengthen State security and criminal justice institutions and, especially, dismantleorganized crime in Brazilian territory. It was also aimed at stimulating new patterns ofcoexistencebetweenpeople;atstrengtheningandimprovingparticipationindemocratization;andatpromotinghumanrights;whileatthesametimedevelopingpreventionpoliciestocountercrimeand(physicalandsymbolic)violence,inordertoensurepeaceasafundamentalvalueinBrazilian society. In order to do this, three basic policy guidelines were presented: first,democratizationandparticipationofbothsocietyandthestateinthemanagementofsafetyinanarticulatedmanner; second, the integrationof public security institutions; and third, definingpublicsecuritypoliciesinscientificinformationandresearchsystems.The proposal was developed in 2007 following the broader trend of introducing Stateperformanceintotheareaofpublicsafety,whichhadbegunwiththeestablishmentoftheSENASPandwassoonfollowedbyaproposedSinglePublicSecuritySystem(SUS).ItwasdevelopedbytheMinistryofJustice,whichwasledatthetimebyTarsoGenro,alawyerandpoliticalfigureintheWorkersPartywhohadbeentwiceelectedasthemayorofthecityofPortoAlegre inRioGrande do Sul. Genro launched the National Program for Public Security with Citizenship(PRONASCI)withtheuseofthepreviouslydevelopedplans,atthesametimebearinginmindthecomplexityofthephenomenonofviolence,andwithgreateremphasisonthesocio‐culturalrootsand underlying dynamics of violence and criminality. The program proved to have anunderstandingoftheinherentembeddednessofsecurityissueswithinothersocial,culturalandenvironmentalfactorssuchaseducation,health,cultureandinfrastructureservices.The PRONASCIwas based on twomajor principles: structuralmeasures and local programs.Among the first structural projects developed by PRONASCI were the improvement ofprofessional public security and criminal justice system; the restructuring of the penitentialsystem; and the combatting of police corruption and organized crime and the communities’involvementinit.ThelocalprogramsthatareworthmentioningareTerritoryofPeace,WomenforPeace,thePROTEJOandtheCommunityJusticeprograms.Inreturnaccesstojusticeandtherecovery of public spaces were guaranteed through the revitalization and redevelopmentmeasures.Despiteadvancesinthedesignoftheplanandlinkingtheproposalsandprogramstoresourcesfortheirimplementation,theresultswerequitefragmentedanddispersed.Thereviewsshowedthattherewereissueswiththelimitedroomtoquestiontheproposedsolutions,thepureandsimple accession of the States involved, the lack of adequate mechanisms to monitor theimplemented policies, and the abandoning of the planned structural reforms of public safetyorganizations.7In 2011, Rousseff won the second round of presidential elections over Jose Serra, a PSDBcandidatewithconservativeviewsonadministrativemanagementwhoalsospokeoutinfavourofmoralissuessuchasthecriminalizationofabortionandcriminalhardening.DilmaRousseffsubsequentlytookofficewith373partnereddeputies(against111fortheopposition)and62senators(against18fortheopposition).Howevertherewasnounityinpoliticalprogramswhichmadeitdifficulttocarryouttheplannedreforms.The area of public safety did not receivemuch attention during the election period and theNationalPublicSecurityPlanwasnotevenformulatedandreleaseduntilRousseff’ssecondyearinoffice.Whenitdidappear,itturnedouttobemuchmorediscreetthanpreviousproposalsandhad been transformed from an integrated whole to a number of points to be implementedaccordingtotheconveniencesofthepartneringStategovernments.EventhoughDilmaRousseff’selectioncampaignhadsupportedproposalsonpublicsecurityissuesthatcloselyresembledthoseoftheLulagovernment,thefactwasthat,onceelected,theplanswereredirectedtofocusonotherpriorities.


IJCJ&SD154


As president of the Republic Dilma Rousseff argued for amore reluctant role of the FederalGovernmentinpublicsafetybasedonArticle144oftheFederalConstitution,whichattributedtheresponsibilityofPublicSafetytoStategovernmentswiththeuseofcivilandmilitarypolice.The PRONASCI was discontinued, due to thewithdrawal of Federal Government support formunicipalitiestoimplementcrimeprevention.Asitsreplacementthegovernmentpresentedthe‘ASaferBrazilPlan’,whichwasneverimplemented,evenasapilotstudyintheStateofAlagoaswherehomicideratesreached92per100,000inhabitantsin2010.Additionally,resourceswereredirectedtowardsafocusonbordercontrolpolicies,byestablishingpartnershipsbetweenthearmedforcesandStatePoliceandFederalPolice.Atthesametimepolicieswereprioritisedthatassured the security conditions in the 12 State capitals during the 2014 FIFAWorld Cup bydevelopingcommandandcontrolcentrescoordinatedandoccupiedbythearmedforcesandtheFederalandStatePolice.Incarcerationratesandpenitentialpolicy

Despite the simultaneous implementation of distributive policies, the increase of humandevelopment levels throughout the country, the reduction of social inequalities and theredirection of the official discourse of Federal Government security policies towards crimeprevention,itisnoteworthytomentionthatincarcerationratescontinuedtoincreasethroughouttheanalysedperiod.Whereastheaveragemonthlyincarcerationin1990was61prisonersper100,000,by2014thismonthlyaverage(toJuly)hadincreasedto300prisonersper100,000inhabitants.AsshowninFigure3thisgrowthtrendwasvirtuallyuninterruptedovertheentireperiod.

Figure3:Growthof incarceration rates inBrazil,12monthaverage (per100,000 inhabitants),1990‐2014

Source:DEPEN(2015)

61.475.2 81.9

82.893.6

104.0116.2

137.1135.9136.8

172.2184.8

159.7

206.7

225.8239.4

249.8260.2266.6

279.6288.4

299.8

per 100,000 inhabitants


IJCJ&SD155


Theprisonpopulationfrom1990to2014inabsolutenumbersasmeasuredinthemonthofJunegrewbyaround575percent(from90per100,000inhabitantsto607per100,000inhabitants)(Figure4),whilepopulationgrowthoverthesameperiodwasonlyslightlygreaterthan30percent.

Figure4:GrowthofincarcerationinBrazil,inabsolutenumbers(per100,000inhabitants),June1990‐June2014

Source:DEPEN(2015)By 2005, after a period of relative stability from the start of millennium when the prisonpopulationwasaround230,000prisoners, incarceration rates started togrowsignificantly inabsolute numbers. This increase of approximately 8 per cent per annum remained relativelyconsistent, reaching a total of 574,000 prisoners in June 2013. By July 2014 the rates hadincreasedto300inmatesper100,000inhabitants.TheseratesvariedgreatlybyState.AmongtheStateswithabovenationalaverageincarcerationrateswere:Acrewith521inmatesper100,000inhabitants;MatoGrossodoSulwith519;SãoPaulowith503;Rondôniawith495;andtheFederalDistrictwith476inmatesper100,000 inhabitants(Figure5).Conversely, theStateofPiauirankedamongtheStateswithbelownationalincarcerationrateswith95prisonersper100.000inhabitants.InadditionMaranhãoandBahiahadcomparativelylowaveragerateswith,respectively,99and113prisonersper100,000inhabitants.OfthetotalnumberofprisonersinBrazilinJune2013,56.2percentwasservingtheirsentences.Prisonerswithaninterimstatus,someevenwithoutaconviction,represented43.8percentofthetotal,whichwasanincreaseof2percentcomparedtoDecember2012.Theconstantgrowthinthenumberofprovisionalprisonersoverthelastdecadeprovestheineffectivenessofthenewlawrelatingtoprecautionarymeasuresincriminalproceedings(2011,art.12.403).Thelawwasdevisedtogivethejudiciaryaseriesofnewpossibilitiestoensuretheadvancementoftheprocesswithouttheneedtoimprisontheaccused.Oneofthesemeasureswaselectronicmonitoringoftheaccused,amethodthatisstilllittleusedeitherduetoresistanceofthejudgesorduetothelackofavailableStatestructures.

90.0114.3126.2129.2

148.8170.6

194.1232.8233.9239.3

308.3336.4

361.4401.2

422.4429.4

473.6496.3

514.6549.8

581.7607.0

per100,000inhabitants


IJCJ&SD156


Figure5:IncarcerationratesinBrazil(per100,000inhabitants),byState,June2013Source:DEPEN(2015)CrimeagainstpropertyisthenumberonetypeofcrimethatgeneratesimprisonmentinBrazil,representing49.1percentofallconvictionsin2012.Crimesincludedinthiscategoryaresimpleandaggravatedtheft,simpleandaggravatedrobbery,larceny,extortion,extortionbykidnapping,wrongfulappropriation,embezzlement,andintentionalandunintentionalreceivingandhandlingofstolengoods.Thenextlargestgroupofprisonerswerethoseconvictedofdrugrelatedcrime,whichrepresented25.3percentofallcrimesin2012.Thisnumberhasbeengrowingsincetheimplementation of Law 11.343/2006, which increased the minimum sentencing for drugtrafficking‐relatedoffenses.Beyondthe increasedsentencing, the lawhadanunexpectedsideeffectwhichwas the option to charge under drug trafficking situations thatwere previouslytypifiedaspersonaldruguse.BecauseBrazilhasnoclearlydefinedcriteria for theamountofdrugs that represents personal use, it is the profile of the accused that gets weighted. Thisreinforcestheselectivenatureofthesystemandcontributestotheovercrowdingoftheprisonsystem.Thethirdhighestrankedtypeofcrimeiscrimesagainstaperson,accountingfor11.9percent of all sentenced prisoners in 2012. Crimes against a person include manslaughter,(premeditated) murder, kidnapping and false imprisonment. The so‐called crimes againstcustoms,whichincluderape,violentattemptedassault,corruptionofminors,andinternationalanddomestichumantrafficking,accountedfor3.9percentofthetotal.Finally,itisnoteworthytocommentontheseeminglyhighpercentageofprisoners(5.6percent)convictedofcrimesundertheStatuteofDisarmament,suchasillegalpossessionofweapons.

521519

503495

476424

373351

339334

287281277269264

252238

228226222

208201

187161159

1139995

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

AcreMatoGrossodoSul

SãoPauloRondônia

DistritoFederalEspíritoSantoMatoGrossoPernambuco

RoraimaAmapáBrasil

SantaCatarinaMinasGerais

RioGrandedoSulParaná

AmazonasParaíbaCeará

RiodeJaneiroSergipe

TocantinsGoiás

RioGrandedoNortePará

AlagoasBahai

MaranhãoPiaui


IJCJ&SD157


Figure6:NumberprisonersbytypeofcrimeinBrazil(forcrimeswithhighincarcerationrates),2005‐2012

Source:DEPEN(2015)AccordingtothedatabyDEPEN,theincreasingdecisiontooptforimprisonmentinBrazil(ascanbe observed in Figure 6) is linked to twomain discourses: the steady increase in preventiveincarcerationandtheincreasingcriminalizationofthedrugmarket.Thesediscourseshavenotbeenaccompaniedbyimprovedprisonconditions,whichinturncontributetoprisonviolence,the spreadofdiseasesand thegrowthof criminalorganizations. In2011, thedeficitbetweennumberofavailableplacesandactualnumbersincarceratedstoodat175,841places.By2012thisnumberhadrisento211,741,anincreaseof20%intheshortperiodofoneyear,toanationalaverageof1.7prisonersperplaceavailableintheprisonsystem.InsomeStatesthesituationwasevenmoreacuteandtheproportionsofinmatesperbedreachedover2,asinBahia(2.2),RioGrandedoNorte (2.3),Amapá (2.4),Pernambuco (2.5),Amazonas (2.6) andAlagoaswith therecord of 3.7 prisoners per place.Withno guarantees of places in theprison systemand thegrowingnumberofprisonerseachyear,itseemsclearthatprisonsinBrazilendupassumingacriminogenicrole.Theprisonsystembecomesavehiclebywhichcrimebecomesworththeriskand in which the State’s own performance is delegitimized. The responsibility for thisphenomenoncanbesharedbytheFederalGovernmentandStategovernments,whichhavethedutytoguaranteeplacesinprisons,andbytheCongress,thatisunabletoadvancecriminallawreformsanddefineamorerationalandjudiciarycriminalpolicy.Further,delaysandselectiveactionsendupworseningthehighprovisionalimprisonmentrates.WhereareBrazil’spenalpoliciesheading?

ThecurrentBrazilianpublic securitysystem,whichwasdevelopedat thestartof theFederalConstitution in 1988, established individual and collective security as a legal commitment.However,sincethenBrazilhasnotbeenabletoconfrontitsmajorstructuralissuesinthepublicsecurityandcriminaljusticesystem.Thedividedcircleofpoliceactivitymodel,withtheStates’

0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000

Drugtrafficking

Robbery

Aggravatedrobbery

Homicide

Aggravatedhomicide

Theft

Aggravatedtheft

Receivingstolengoods

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012


IJCJ&SD158


military and civilian police dividing extensive policing and criminal investigation activities,strengthensmilitarismandbureaucracy.BothconceptsarecharacteristicsofthetwoStatepoliceforcesandhaveremainedunchanged.Asaresult,violenceandcorruptionremaintrademarksoftheBrazilianpolice.Theexternalmechanismsofcontroltomanagepoliceactivityareineffectivein altering this picture. Additionally, criminal investigation is a highly inefficient andbureaucratisedprocesswithalowsuccessrateforseriouscases–suchasmurder–asaresult.Additionally,thejudiciaryisslowandinefficientinguaranteeingdueprocessforvulnerablesocialgroups who often are the targets of police selectivity, which, despite the steady increase inincarcerationrates,resultsinageneralsenseofimpunityinBraziliansociety.Prisonsthereforeare overcrowded, dominated by criminal organizations, and largely occupied by provisionalprisonersandyoungdrugdealers.An enormous increase can be noted the incarceration rates over the last decade, which hasbroughttheresultsclosetothehistoricallyhighmarkof600,000prisoners,comparedtoaprisonpopulationofaround150,000inmatesinthelate1990s.Thegeneraldatafortheprisonsystemshowthatespeciallypreventivedetention–thatis,peoplewhoareinprisonwithoutasentence– has increased and now accounts for 40 per cent of all prisoners in the country. Increasedincarceration rates, resulting from a punitive demand supported by the parliament (primarytargeting) through theperformance of public security and criminal justiceorgans (secondarytargeting), did not have the expected effect of decreased crime. This canbe explainedby theselectivenatureofthecriminaljusticesystemwhichonlyattacksthelowerlevelsofthecriminalchainandimprisonsindividualsthatareeasypreyforthecriminalorganizationsthatruletheillegalmarketinandoutsideofprisons,duetotheirsocialvulnerability(OliveiraandAzevedo2012).Despite a growth in recent years of the number of cases against white‐collar criminals, theincreasehasnotproducedasignificantchangeintheprofileoftheprisonpopulation.Thisprofileisstillcharacterizedbyindividualswithlowincomesandlimitededucationandwho,inthevastmajority of cases, are imprisoned for crimes against property (theft) or for drug trafficking.Because they are within the penitentiary system, they will most likely become permanentlyingrainedinthenetworkofillegalities.Itisimportanttoanalysethediversityandambiguityofcurrentgovernmentalpolicy.AccordingtoMatthews(2013:14):‘therearemixedmessagesandcompetingimperativesemanatingfromofficialsources’.Itisthereforepossible,atonepoint,tobetalkingaboutalternativemeasuresand‘de‐incarceration’ and, at another, aboutmore severemeasures to prevent impunity. Officialcriminologythusbecomesincreasinglydualistic,polarizedandambivalent,afactthatdoesnothelpthecomprehensivenessofsomeaspectsofthecurrentsituationofnewlyemergingpublicpolicies that are distinct in their fundamental guidelines. Therefore, ‘it is not the exclusivepunishingthatisthedefiningcharacteristicofthisperiod,butrathertheambivalence’(Garland1999:75).DuringthefirstelectionofLuizInacioLuladaSilvain2002,hisgovernment’sprogramprioritisedpublicsafetyandadvocatedagreaterrolefortheFederalGovernmenttoreduceviolence.Lula'scandidacy represented a commitment to arms control policy, by focusing on combatting theimpunity of crimes committed by criminal organizations, and against social movements andhumanrights.Thesecommitmentsontheonehandencouragedsocialpoliciesthatwouldallowfor the reduction of inequalities and contribute to social pacification and, on the other hand,wouldimprovetheperformanceofpublicsecurityorgans,especiallytheFederalPolicebutalsothe State Police. These aimswould be carried outwith the use of new technologies and thecreationofadatabasethatwouldallowforthecoordinationofeffortstofightorganizedcrime,with a special focus on drug trafficking and arms smuggling. Based on thediagnosis that thenational public security policy lacked planning and management capacity – this due to thefragmentationofactionsbytheStatesinthefield–theproposedmodelinvolvedincreasingthe


IJCJ&SD159


knowledgeon the realityofviolenceandcrime.Theaimwas to fuelpreventive, targetedandstrategic actions that were to be constantly monitored by actors in the public security andcriminaljusticesystem,aswellasnecessaryreformsofthepoliceforces.Theimplementationoftheproposal,however,occurredonlyinpartandtheissueofstructuralreforms of police organizationswas quickly removed from the agenda. However, therewereimportantadvancesinknowledgemanagementwiththedevelopmentofresearchnetworksandamore systematicproductionof data,which culminated in the establishment of theNationalSystem of Information for Public Security, Prisons, and Drugs (SINESP) during the Dilmagovernment. But thatwas hardly taken into accountwhen informing the originally proposedstrategicmanagement.Advances inpreventionpolicieswereassumedonthebasisofthefirstagreements between the Federal Government and municipalities to implement preventionprogramsandtrainingforpublicsafetyprofessionals.EventhoughthepolicieswerestillcentredinpoliceschoolstheyreceivedanimportantcontributionbytheestablishmentoftheNationalNetworkforAdvancedStudiesinPublicSafety(RENAESP),whichfacilitatedamorepermanenttiebetweenthepoliceandotherpublicsafetyoperatorsandBrazilianuniversities.Inhissecondterm,andnowwithTarsoGenroleadingtheMinistryofJustice,LulaimplementtheNationalProgramofSecurityandCitizenship.ItwasthefirstprogramthatpresentedaclearlinkbetweenthebudgetandspecificState‐andmunicipality‐implementedprogramsthataddressedviolence,suchastrainingcommunityleaders,youthandwitnessprotection,communityjusticeprograms focused on conflict mediation, and the expansion of mechanisms that addresseddomesticviolenceagainstwomen.Inadditiontheprogramsoughttoqualifyandvalorisepublicsafety officials through training courses, scholarships, equipment investments and therestructuringofthepoliceforce.AsaresultofthisattempttoimplementanewparadigmforthereductionofviolenceinBrazil,thegovernmentmobilizedcivilsocietytocarryoutaNationalPublicSecurityConferencein2009,seekingtosourceandbuildsocialsupportthatwasnecessarytoimplementthepolicy.AttheendofLula'ssecondterm, theproposalstillhadn’tbeenconsolidatedandmuchhadtohappentostructure a National Public Security System. But the innovative left‐wing approach left animportantmarkinthearea,layingthefoundationfromwhichthesucceedinggovernmentcouldwork,andeventhedifficultfightagainsthomiciderateshadapartiallysuccessfuloutcomewithstabilizingandreducinglevelsintheearly2000s.In the following election,whenDilmaRousseffwas launched as governmental candidate, thepublicsafetyissuewasrelegatedtosecondplaceintheprogramandintheelectoraldebate.Thisoccurredlargelybyvirtueoftherelativesuccessachievedinthepreviousperiodwhenthegrowthinhomiciderateshadstalled,especiallyintheSouthEast.TheNationalPlanofPublicSecurity,which wasn’t developed and released until Rousseff’s second year in office, wasmuchmorediscreetthanthepreviousdisclosure.Ratherthananimplementedapproach,theplanpresentedaseriesofpointsthatwouldbeimplementedaccordingtotheconvenienceofthegovernmentsofthepartneredStates.Bytheendofherfirsttermandwiththeadventofanewelectoraldispute,theDilmagovernmentlacked favourable indicators in the area of security. This was influenced by the regrowth ofhomicideratesandthegovernmentfollowedthemomentumtocreatearesurgenceofthelawandorderdiscourse, lowering theageof criminal responsibility, and increasingpenaltiesandothermeasureslinkedtopunitivepopulism.Withthesecurityguaranteeduringthe2014FIFAWorld Cup as her only success, the candidacy of Dilma returned to the proposed idea ofinstitutionalized integratedcommandandcontrol centers, inorder to integrategovernmentalandStateaction,aswellastheintegrationofcivilian,militaryandFederalpoliceefforts.


IJCJ&SD160


IfDilma’sproposalhas themeritof recognizing theneed for theeffectiveparticipationof theFederalGovernmentinthemanagementofsecurity,onemustrecognizethatlittlechangesinthisregard. Accordingly, the implementation of effective control mechanisms of policing, policereformsand thenecessary competence improvementsofmunicipalities in this areaareoftenbeingomittedfromproposals.Infact,thepolicereformproposalmightevencounteractandendup reinforcing a logic that does not question the issue of police militarization but ratherestablishes a new model of police structures. Neither is the need to incorporate popularparticipation in security management promoted, an idea that developed in the Cabinets ofIntegrated Management which disseminated from PRONASCI. Finally, and perhaps mostimportantly, nothing is said about the necessary construction of alternative pathways to thehardeningofcriminallaw,inordertorevisedrugpolicyandimplementeffectivemechanismstomanageeverydayconflictsinlargeandmediumurbancenters.Conversely,thegovernmentsthatwereledbytheWorkersPartyleftasignificantmarkonattemptstoaddressthepunitivecultureandreductionofviolencewiththeapprovaloftheDisarmamentStatutein2003.Thisfacthasledthemtobethesubject,eventoday,ofattacksfromfreearmstradeadvocatesinthecountry,whoareoftenlinkedtothearmsindustryandthepunitivediscourse.Atthesametime,theWorkersParty governments contributed to the passing of tougher laws to combat corruption andencouragedcrimepreventionpoliciesbytheStatesandmunicipalities.Additionally, the Dilma government passed an important legal reformwhich allowed for theexpansionofprecautionaryalternativesincriminalproceedingsinanattempttoreducetheuseofremandimprisonment,aswellaslegislationandcriminalizationoftheuseoftorturebyStateagents.Intheareaofpenalreform,duringtheLulagovernment,themeasurethatwasdefinitelyofanopposingdirectionwasundoubtedlythenewdruglawin2006.Theparliamentarydebatethatledtotheadoptionofthenewlawshowednoclearperspectiveontheroleofthecriminalizationof the drug market in the ‘hyper‐incarceration’ nor an ability to develop a proposal thatobjectively distinguished between users and dealers. In other words, it showed the limitedcapacityofleft‐wingBrazilianpoliticstodealwiththisissueandperhapsthereforefellintoatrap.Inreturnforthedecriminalizationofpersonaldruguse–which,ithastobenoted,didnotleadto incarceration before the adoption of the new law – a reformwas adopted that hardenedmeasuresagainstsmalldrugdealerbyincreasingtheminimumsentencing.However,thereformlackedanyobjectivecriteriatodefineoffenses,leavingthefateofsmalldrugdealersuptothepolice and judges,which led to increasingly overcrowdedBrazilian prisons, especially in SãoPaulo.Tounderstandtheparadoxbetweentheattemptstocontainpunitivepowerbutatthesametimereducetheall‐timehighincarcerationratesthatplayedoutatafederallevelduringtheLulaandDilmagovernments,onemustconsidertheweightoftheSãoPauloStateintheseresults,amongstotherfactors.Throughoutthe12yearsthattheFederalGovernmenthadapoliticalorientationthatwasinspiredbyatraditionofLatinAmericanleft‐wingpolitics,thegovernmentofSãoPaulowas under the control of the conservative PSDB party. This is a political party that, bothdiscursivelyand intheirmanagementpractices,adoptedpoliciesrelatedtothe lawandordermovements,whicharguedinfavourofharshimprisonment,especiallyfordrug‐relatedcrimes.ThisresultedinthediscrepancyofincarcerationdataofSãoPaulocomparedtootherStatesandreflectstheorientationoftheExecutivePowerwhichisresponsibleforthecoordinationofthecivilandmilitarypolice.Thecurrentpracticesofpoliceforceshavecrossedthelinefromalegalitythatisconsideredold‐fashionedandinquisitorialifnotauthoritarian,toatypeof‘practicalillegality’,alogicjustifiedtoimprove efficiency. If criminal investigations become an obstacle, alternative practices arecreatedtoincreaseefficiency,inordertodealwithwhatotherwisewouldbeanoverwhelmingdemandforpolice.However,this‘efficientillegality’diminishestheguaranteesoftherightsofthe


IJCJ&SD161


accused andhasnot shown to increase the investigatory capacity of thepolice.MichelMisse(2008) proposed the concept of criminal submission to address the phenomenon, which,althoughnotnew,isreinforcedbycontemporarysocialdynamics.To understand criminalization processes and the incarceration geography of Brazil, it isnecessarytolookbeyondtheimportanceoftheprovincialStategovernmentsandtheirinfluenceonpoliceactionandtaketheperformanceoftheothertwootherpunitivecontrolagenciesintoaccount:thePublicMinistryandtheJudiciary.InrelationtothePublicProsecutorsOffice,whichis in charge of criminal proceedings, investigations into the conceptions of criminal policyadvocatesandpublicprosecutors (AzevedoandVasconcellos2012;Azevedo2005) indicateagrowingidentificationwithzerotoleranceproposals forcrimeasawaytocombathighcrimerates.Thecurrentinalienablerights,guidedbytheideathattheprosecutioncannotviolatetheconstitutionalrightsoftheaccused,hasfewerandfewersupporterswithintheinstitution.Entrustedwithlawenforcementandtheprosecutionofspecificcases,judgesarecentralactorsinthecriminaljusticesystem.Magistratesthereforebecametheobjectsofstudywithrespecttothecontentandreasonsfortheirdecisions.Researchonprofessionalbehaviour,thementalityofjudgesandtheirsocialbackgroundexposedthefallacyofthemythofneutrality,whichledtotheopeningofinquiriesintotherealmotivationsofjudicialdecisions.Theoverallfindingspointtothe existence of a twofold of selective judicial activity. Firstly, there is a selectivity in lawenforcement,inwhichsocialgroupsthatareeconomicallyandculturallydisadvantagedaremorelikely to be sentenced as opposed to favouritism for the upper classes. Secondly, there isselectivity in the interpretation of the law, in which judges use their discretionary power tobenefittheirpoliticalandideologicaloptions.Foranumberofreasons–includingthevariouscorruptionscandalsthatoccurredoverthelast12yearsandthelackofaclearerdirectionaboutthedecarcerationprogramwhich,atthesametime,addressedthesocialdemandforthereductionofviolence–governmentsledbythePartidodos Trabalhadores (Workers Party) in Brazil were losing the ability to build an effectivehegemonyaroundpublicsecurityinrelationtotheaffirmationofrightsandtheadequateandRepublicanfunctioningofthegovernmentorgansresponsibleforthepolicepersecutions.Theyalsolosttheirpoliticaleffectonotherareasofgovernment,suchastheStatesandmunicipalities,inadditiontootherinstitutionaldimensions,suchasthelegislativeandjudicialpowers.Theseeffectsarecrucialinordertobeabletochangethedirectionofjudicialdecisionsandexpandalegalsystemthatisabletorestructurelawenforcementagenciesandimplementeffectivecontrolmechanisms.Thisishowwearriveatthestartofanewgovernment,stillwithaleftistperspective,butwithacontinuousanduninterruptedgrowthinincarcerationrates,higherlevelsofviolentcrime,andtheresurgenceofthelawandordermovement,whichthreatenthefewachievementsthathavebeenaccomplishedandthrowashadowofdoubtonpublicpolicyincriminalmattersinBrazilinthenearfuture.Correspondence:ProfessorRodrigoGhiringhellideAzevedo,Sociologist,PontificiaUniversidadeCatolicadoRioGrandedoSul,Brasil;researcherINCT‐INEAC(InstitutodeEstudosComparadosemAdministraçãoInstitucionaldeConflitos)andoftheBrazilianForumofPublicSafety,Brasil.Email:[email protected]


IJCJ&SD162


1Lawyer,specialistinPenalSciencesandwithaMaster’sdegreeinCriminalScience,PUCRS(PontificiaUniversidadeCatolicadoRioGrandedoSul,Brasil);receivedascholarshipfromCAPESfortheacademicCNJprogram.

2ThisarticlewasoriginallypublishedinSpanish(availableathttp://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/clacso/gt/20160404115404/Postneoliberalismo_penalidad.pdf)andwastranslatedforthisspecialissue.

3ForsystematicandstratifiedstudyoftheevolutionofhomicideratesinBrazil,see<http://www.mapadaviolencia.org.br/>./

4AboutthedebateinrelationtothecausesforthereductioninhomicidesinSãoPaulooverthelastdecade,seeFeltran(2012)andCerquiera(2014).

5Aboutthesocialperceptionofthejusticesystem,seetherecenttrimestralresearchesoftheFundaçãoGetúlioVargas,whichdevelopedtheICJ.–IndexoftheConfidenceintheJusticesystemisavailableon<http://direitosp.fgv.br/publicacoes/icj‐brasil>.

6PresidentDilmawasimpeachedandremovedfromofficein2016;thisaccount,however,isfortheperiodto2014.7ForanevaluationofPRONASCI,seeAzevedoetal.(2013).

References

Azevedo,RGhiringhellideandSantos,MCSantiago(2013)PolíticasdeSegurançaPúblicaeJuventude:ocasodoRioGrandedoSul.OPúblicoeoPrivado21:111‐126.

Azevedo,RGhiringhellideandVasconcellos,FBestetti(2012)Puniçãoedemocraciaembuscadenovaspossibilidadesparalidarcomodelitoeaexclusãosocial.InGauer,RMChittó(eds)Criminologiaesistemasjurídico‐penaiscontemporâneos:93‐119PortoAlegre:EDIPUCRS.

Azevedo,RGhiringhellide(2005)MinistérioPúblicoGaúcho:QuemsãoeoquepensamosPromotoreseProcuradoresdeJustiçasobreosdesafiosdaPolíticaCriminal.PortoAlegre:ProcuradoriaGeraldeJustiça.

CastroJAbrãode(2012)GastoSocialFederal:prioridademacroeconômicanoperíodo1995‐2010.IPEA.Availableatwww.ipea.gov.br/agencia/images/stories/PDFs/nota_tecnica/120904_notatecnicadisoc09.pdf(accessed10May2014).

Cerquiera,D(2014)CausaseConsequênciasdoCrimenoBrasil.Brasília:BNDES.DepartamentoPenitenciário(2015)LevantamentoNacionaldeInformaçõesPenitenciárias.

Availableatwww.justica.gov.br/noticias/mj‐diwww.justica.gov.br/noticias/mj‐divulgara‐novo‐relatorio‐do‐infopen‐nesta‐terca‐feira/relatorio‐depen‐versao‐web.pdfvulgara‐novo‐relatorio‐do‐infopen‐nesta‐terca‐feira/relatorio‐depen‐versao‐web.pdf(accessedJune2014).

FeltranGdeSantis(2012)Governoqueproduzcrime,crimequeproduzgoverno:odispositivodegestãodohomicídioemSãoPaulo(1992‐2011).RevistaBrasileiradeSegurançaPública6(2):232‐255.

GarlandD(1999)Ascontradiçõesda‘sociedadepunitiva’:ocasobritânico.Trans.AlmeidoNeto,BPradode.RevistadeSociologiaePolítica13:58‐80.

InstitutodePesquisaEconômicaAplicada(2008)Aquedadadesigualdadeentreaspessoasocupadas–AnálisedoBrasilMetropolitano.InformedaPresidêncianº6,junhode2008.Availableathttp://agencia.ipea.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1713&Itemid=1(accessedJanuari2014).

LimongiF(2006)AdemocracianoBrasil.Presidencialismo,coalizãopartidáriaeprocessodecisório.NovosEstudos76:17‐41.

MatthewsR(2013)Omitodapunitividade.ReinoUnido:LondonSouthbankUniversity.MisseM(2008)AcusadoseAcusadores:Estudossobreofensas,acusaçõeseincriminações.Riode

Janeiro:REVAN/FAPERJ.


IJCJ&SD163


OliveiraJandAzevedoRGhiringhellide(2012)OMonitoramentoEletrôniconaJustiçaCriminal:ocasobrasileiro.InRosaAMandPrudenteNM(eds)MonitoramentoEletrônicoemDebate:105‐128.RiodeJaneiro:LumenJuris.

PartidodosTrabalhadores(2002)PlanodeGoverno–Eleições2002.Availableatwww1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/especial/2002/eleicoes/candidatos‐lula‐programa‐01‐01.shtml,(accessed10July2014).

SáeSilvaF(2013)‘Nemisso,nemaquilo’:TrajetóriaeCaracterísticasdaPolíticaNacionaldeSegurançaPública(2002‐2012).RevistaBrasileiradeSegurançaPública6(2):412‐433.

TavaresJVdosSantos(2006)OProgramadeGovernodoCandidatoLulasobreSegurançaPública.Availableatwww.comunidadesegura.org.br/pt‐br/node/30709(accessed10May2014).

WaiselfiszJJ(2014)PréviadoMapadaViolência2014.OsjovensdoBrasil.Availableat:www.mapadaviolencia.org.br/pdf2014/Previa_mapaviolencia2014.pdf(accessed12May2014).

public security, criminal policy brazil the and changes and

Documents