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I. Background

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program has primary responsibility to continually assess the status of offsite emergency preparedness (EP). Through this effort, the FEMA REP Program makes a reasonable assurance determination that, should a radiological emergency occur, the offsite response organizations’ (OROs’) emergency plans can be implemented to adequately protect the public health and safety through actions taken offsite. Such determination is provided to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). This Standard Operating Guide (SOG) should be implemented consistent with the agreements in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (Appendix F) between FEMA and the NRC “Regarding Radiological Response, Planning and Preparedness” dated December 7, 2015. In this regard, if a disaster causes damage or changes to the offsite emergency response infrastructure in the vicinity of NRC-licensed nuclear power plant (NPP) to the extent that the damage raises serious questions about the continued adequacy of offsite EP, the identifying agency (FEMA REP Program/NRC) will inform the other promptly. All agency decisions made pursuant to this SOG involving the FEMA REP Program and NRC, will be coordinated at the Headquarters (HQ) level. For the purpose of this document, and appendices, the term “FEMA Region” refers to the regional component of the FEMA REP Program. Additionally, all references to the FEMA Regional Administrator, Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chair, FEMA REP Branch Chief, and the FEMA Technological Hazards Division (THD) Director include the individual holding the position, or their designee (to include the FEMA REP Program Section Chief for the FEMA REP Branch Chief).

II. Purpose

These guidelines and procedures for the FEMA REP Program are for the conduct and document of a FEMA-led Preliminary Capabilities Assessment (PCA) and Disaster Initiated Review (DIR). FEMA Regional Leadership may elect to use this SOG as guidance to evaluate proposed State compensatory measures for unusual situations, such as State or local government-driven budget shutdowns. For these instances, the FEMA Region will negotiate the terms of review with the affected State.

III. Scope

This SOG should be used when a natural or man-made disaster causes damage or changes to the emergency response infrastructure around an NRC-licensed NPP to the extent that the damage raises serious questions about the continued adequacy of offsite EP. Moreover, these guidelines apply when a NPP is shut down and is beginning the process of a planned reactor

Assessment of Offsite Emergency Preparedness Infrastructure and Capabilities Following an Incident in the Vicinity of a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licensed-Nuclear Power Plant

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program STANDARD OPERATING GUIDE

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start-up. If the NPP is operating and there is a compromise of “reasonable assurance,” the FEMA Region and FEMA REP Program will coordinate with OROs and the NRC to determine necessary actions to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety. This SOG should be used during an extended plant shutdown (outage lasting longer than 6 months1), or a shutdown caused by electric grid blackout. The DIR would determine whether offsite emergency response capabilities are adequate to protect the public health and safety. These procedures are consistent with those of the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 1601. This SOG is applicable to the offsite infrastructure within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and all references to an EPZ herein is strictly referring to the 10-mile EPZ. Evaluation and assessment of infrastructure outside of this 10-mile zone (such as schools or water facilities) may be deemed necessary by representatives from OROs/FEMA Region. The RAC Chair and the DIR Team may tailor and modify operations outlined in this SOG based on the extent of damage and the urgency for plant startup. The FEMA REP Program and FEMA Region, in consultation with the OROs and the NRC, will determine necessary actions to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety. If reasonable assurance is in question while the NPP is operational, the FEMA REP Program will follow procedures outlined in 44 CFR § 350.13.

IV. Objectives

• Identify applicable criteria, as part of a PCA, to determine whether a DIR is warranted to assess the capability of offsite emergency response infrastructure. Provide a PCA report template (Appendix E).

• Identify FEMA Regional personnel roles and responsibilities related to completion of objectives (Section VI).

• Identify FEMA REP Program staff roles and responsibilities associated with providing a reasonable assurance finding to the NRC following satisfactory completion of a PCA or DIR (Section VI).

• Establish communication links and assign roles for information sharing and coordination among the FEMA Region, OROs, and the NRC, in completion of a PCA or DIR (Section VI).

• Provide pre-scripted report templates (Section VI.A) to communicate initial PCA and DIR findings from the FEMA REP Program to the NRC.

• Provide a flow chart to display the path that determines the need for a DIR and the communication flow of the response structure (Appendix A).

• Provide a DIR report template (Appendix E) to communicate DIR findings from the FEMA Region to the FEMA REP Program for use in providing a reasonable assurance finding.

• Provide guidance to FEMA Regions for other unusual events such as State or local government-driven budget shutdowns. (Appendix V).

1 NRC Inspection Manual, Manual Chapter (MC) 1601, Communication and Coordination Protocol for Determining the Status of Offsite Emergency Preparedness. (August 27, 2013)

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V. PCA/DIR Determination

While the following guidance has been designed specifically for natural or man-made disasters resulting in plant shut downs, this guidance can be used to address situations such as State or local budget-driven shutdowns.

A. PCA:

When a natural or man-made disaster has occurred at, or near, a NPP and has none or minimal effect on the plant, but damage or changes to the offsite emergency response infrastructure may be substantial or are in question, FEMA may elect to perform a PCA or DIR to assess the impact. The decision between a PCA and a DIR would be dependent on the operating status of the NPP. Should FEMA’s review indicate that offsite emergency response infrastructure and capabilities do not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a radiological incident, and the NPP continues to operate, then such a finding would be handled by the NRC under 10 CFR § 50.54(s)(2) and (3). A PCA should be used to obtain a prompt assessment (snapshot) of offsite EP immediately following an incident to assist in the FEMA Region/FEMA REP Program’s joint determination on the need and timing for a DIR. The DIR’s purpose, as addressed in the FEMA/NRC MOU, is to formally determine the offsite emergency response infrastructure and capabilities to effectively implement approved emergency plans. Communications and coordination between the FEMA REP Program and the NRC during the PCA process should be maintained primarily at the regional level between the RAC Chair and NRC Regional State Liaison Officer (RSLO). The respective Regions will be responsible for updating the respective FEMA REP Program staff on the status of the incident during the PCA. The PCA should include these questions: • Has a State or local emergency been declared?

• Are offsite emergency response facilities functional and with power?

• Are the OROs available?

• Are facilities for people with disabilities and access/functional needs operable?

• Are Alert and Notification Systems (ANS) operable?

• Are communication systems operable?

• Are evacuation routes clear?

• Are support facilities available?

• Have compensatory measures been put in place by the ORO or NRC Licensee?

• What is the initial assessment of the infrastructure for the licensee facility and OROs?

• Are the OROs capable of implementing the protective actions?

If the answer to any of the above questions reflects an inability to effectively coordinate response operations, the appropriate compensatory measures should be developed and implemented. As part of this process, consideration should be given as to whether backup means are available. These compensatory measures may be the responsibility of the OROs or

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the NRC Licensee. Compensatory measures required from the NRC Licensee should be coordinated through the NRC.

B. DIR:

The decision to conduct a DIR will be a joint decision between the FEMA THD Director, FEMA Regional Administrator, RAC Chair, and FEMA REP Program Branch Chief. The implementation of conference calls with all involved parties are encouraged and are specifically important for no-notice incidents. When evaluating whether or not the impacting incident warrants the implementation of this Guide, consider whether alternative means (i.e. alternative routes should a roadway or bridge be inaccessible) can adequately compensate for the offsite functions that have been impacted. Guidance on implementing a DIR Team and conducting a DIR are outlined in Section VI with further direction found in the subsequent appendices.

C. NRC Engagement:

During an extended plant shutdown, or a shutdown due to an electric grid blackout, the NRC may request the FEMA REP Program provide a reasonable assurance finding in support of a planned reactor start-up. This finding may conclude that the applicable OROs emergency plans can and will be implemented to protect public health and safety in a radiological incident at the specific NRC Licensee emerging from the shutdown. If the NRC finds that the state of EP does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a radiological emergency (including findings based on requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, section IV.D.3) and if the deficiencies (including those based on requirements of Appendix E, section IV.D.3) are not corrected within four months of that finding, the Commission will determine whether the reactor shall be shut down until such deficiencies are remedied or whether other enforcement action is appropriate.2 The NRC will make a determination on the suitability of ORO’s emergency plans based on a review of FEMA's findings and determinations. This paragraph in no way limits the authority of the Commission to act under other regulations at any time they deem appropriate.

VI. Responsibilities

A. FEMA THD Director (or Designee):

• In consultation with the FEMA Regional Administrator, RAC Chair, and the FEMA REP Branch Chief, make a final determination on the need for a DIR.

• Review DIR Findings Report and assess recommendation of reasonable assurance.

2 10 CFR 50.54 § (s)(2) & (3),

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• Communicate, in writing, the decision on whether or not to conduct a DIR to the NRC Director, Division of Preparedness and Response in the Office of Nuclear Security and Response (NSIR/DPR), using the examples provided below for initial statement:

NOTE: If an urgent need exists to communicate results promptly to the NRC in support of

NPP restart, then communications may be made orally through the NRC Operations Center at 301-816-5100 (recorded line) and request to speak with the NRC NSIR/DPR Director.

• The following are examples of final determination language that FEMA can provide to the

NRC:

• Example #1: PCA Finding – Continued Reasonable Assurance

“On [DATE], based on the Preliminary Capabilities Assessment (PCA) performed, our review of available information gathered in discussions with the OROs, FEMA has concluded that offsite radiological emergency preparedness (EP) remains adequate to provide “Reasonable Assurance” and that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public in a radiological emergency at the [NUCLEAR POWER PLANT]. At this time, FEMA is not initiating actions to conduct a Disaster Initiated Review (DIR) of offsite EP issues within the [NUCLEAR POWER PLANT] 10-mile emergency planning zone.”

• Example #2: PCA Finding – DIR is Warranted

“On [DATE], based on the Preliminary Capabilities Assessment (PCA) performed, our review of available information gathered in discussions with the OROs, FEMA has concluded that impediments may exist to offsite radiological emergency preparedness (EP) within the [NUCLEAR POWER PLANT] EPZ. This requires further evaluation to verify appropriate measures can continue to be taken to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. FEMA is initiating a Disaster Initiated Review (DIR) of offsite EP issues within the [NUCLEAR POWER PLANT] EPZ.”

• Communicate the decision to conduct a DIR to the Assistant Administrator, FEMA National Preparedness Directorate (NPD), Office of Response and Recovery (ORR) and the FEMA National Watch Center (NWC).

• Once the DIR is completed, review the DIR Findings Report submitted by the FEMA Region and, if required, request additional input from the RAC Chair. An interim written report of FEMA’s DIR Findings Report, including a reasonable assurance finding, should be prepared and submitted to the NRC Director, NSIR/DPR, using a pre-approved template. This initial statement will then be supplemented by a formal letter. Example provided below for the initial statement:

• Example #3: DIR Finding – Continued Reasonable Assurance

“On [DATE], a comprehensive investigation and collection of field data was performed by a joint FEMA/NRC Disaster Initiated Review (DIR) Team, in accordance with the FEMA Post Disaster Assessment of Offsite Capabilities checklist. Based on our review of all information gathered, FEMA has concluded that offsite radiological emergency preparedness remains adequate to provide “Reasonable Assurance” and that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the [NUCLEAR POWER PLANT].”

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D. FEMA Regional Administrator (or Designee):

• Participate in conference calls regarding the decision to conduct a DIR.

• Review the RAC Chair’s recommendation for conducting a DIR. Provide a recommendation to the FEMA REP Branch Chief for conduct of a DIR.

• Review the DIR results and/or Findings Report the RAC Chair submitted.

• Upon completion of review, submit assessment results to the FEMA REP Program Branch Chief and FEMA THD Director with the Regional recommendation for providing a reasonable assurance finding.

E. RAC Chair (or Designee):

• Participate in conference calls regarding the decision to conduct a DIR.

• Notify the FEMA REP Branch Chief of an impacting incident.

• Provide a recommendation to the FEMA Regional Administrator for conduct of a DIR.

• During and/or following an incident, the respective FEMA Regional staff should be in close communication with the respective OROs, NRC RSLO, and Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) regarding the condition of the offsite emergency response infrastructure, the reactor plant status, and Licensee activities.

• If information provided reveals that there is not sufficient damage to the EPZ offsite emergency response infrastructure to raise doubts on the adequacy of offsite EP, the RAC Chair should notify the FEMA REP Program Branch Chief of the assessment.

• The RAC Chair has the option to make recommendations regarding the adequacy of offsite EP if the assessment does not agree with the information provided by the OROs.

REMINDER: Conference calls between all involved parties are encouraged. These conference

calls are specifically important for “no-notice” incidents. Based on information acquired from any of these sources on damage sustained or security issues, the FEMA REP Program Branch Chief, in consultation with the RAC Chair, will make a determination on the need for a DIR.

• When incident related damage or changes to the offsite emergency response infrastructure

is considered to be substantial or in question, the RAC Chair, following consultation with the FEMA REP Program Branch Chief, will:

1. Discuss the initiation of a PCA and review the results of the PCA.

2. Prepare and transmit a PCA Report to the FEMA Regional Administrator then forward the results to the FEMA THD Director (via the FEMA REP Program Branch Chief). A template for the PCA Report is included as Appendix E.

3. If warranted based on the results of the PCA, conduct a DIR.

4. Establish a schedule for conducting the DIR. The schedule should be established in consultation with OROs, the NRC, and the affected NRC Licensee.

5. Establish the DIR Team responsible for conducting the DIR within 24 hours of the decision to conduct a DIR. Establishment of the DIR Team should include (to the maximum extent practicable):

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a. The RAC Chair (or designee) and Site Specialist;

b. A representative from the NRC Regional Office (coordinated through respective NRC RSLO);

c. Representatives from the affected OROs emergency management programs and radiation control programs; and

d. Representatives from the emergency-planning staff of the affected NRC Licensee.

• Oversee and coordinate the completion of the DIR, maintaining the established schedule. The DIR Team should use the Post Disaster Assessment of Off-Site Capabilities (Appendix D) ensuring that essential emergency response elements are included in the review. One assessment should be completed for each impacted jurisdiction. The RAC Chair designee from the DIR Team will provide routine progress updates to the RAC Chair or FEMA REP Program Branch Chief.

• Prepare and transmit a DIR Findings Report to the FEMA Regional Administrator. A template for the DIR Report is included as Appendix E.

F. FEMA REP Program Branch Chief (or Designee):

• Participate in conference calls regarding the decision to conduct a DIR.

• Review the FEMA Regional Administrator’s recommendation for conducting a DIR. Provide a recommendation to the FEMA THD Director for conduct of a DIR.

• Communicate the recommendation for conducting a DIR to the FEMA THD Director.

• Orally communicate the status of offsite EP with the designated NRC Headquarters Branch Chief, to include, at a minimum:

FEMA’s decision to conduct a PCA to obtain an initial review of offsite emergency response infrastructure and EP capabilities surrounding the NPP site based on a natural or man-made disaster, in determining whether a DIR is warranted;

Periodic status of PCA and DIR activities, expected schedule for completing reviews, and any potential issues identified.

• Review the DIR Findings Report the RAC Chair submitted and forward to the FEMA THD Director with a recommendation to support a reasonable assurance finding, or request additional input from the RAC Chair prior to submittal to the FEMA THD Director.

VII. General DIR Team Guidance

DIR kits should be prepared in advance with information on each NRC Licensee within the FEMA Region. These kits are developed by the RAC Chair and should include (but are not limited to): 1. Copies of this SOG with additional copies of the Post Disaster Assessment of Off-Site

Capabilities checklist. Use one checklist for each impacted jurisdiction. (Appendix D);

2. Copies of ORO emergency response plans for the site;

3. Copies of the ANS Design Report for the site. (Useful in determining the disaster’s impact on the alert system);

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4. Copies of public/emergency information materials distributed. (Useful in reviewing evacuation routes, and public information related items);

5. Copies of the Evacuation Time Estimates. (Useful in determining impact of the disaster on evacuation);

6. Contact phone listings for OROs (to include emergency contact information). If satellite phone numbers are available, these numbers should be included as well;

7. Contact phone listings for the NRC Regional Office (to include emergency contact information);

8. Contact phone listings for FEMA REP Program Leadership. This should include contact information (and emergency information) for the FEMA REP Program Branch Chief, the FEMA THD Director, and the FEMA Office of Chief Counsel;

9. Cell phone and satellite phone (if available);

10. Government Emergency Telephone System (GETS) Cards;

11. Laptop and printer;

12. Digital camera (if available); and

13. Global Positioning System (GPS) Navigation System.

Accommodations in the disaster area may not be available. The DIR Team should be prepared to obtain nontraditional lodging when necessary (sleeping bags, etc., may be necessary). NOTE: DIR Team members should be aware and understanding of State/local priorities and

needs following a disaster. Other operations/activities may take precedent over activities related to conducting a PCA or DIR.

If a capability or location has been impacted, determine whether there is an alternative approach that can be implemented. Assist and be actively engaged in developing acceptable solutions. If delays or problems are encountered, notify the RAC Chair as soon as possible. Upon completion of a DIR assessment, the RAC Chair designee prepares the draft DIR Findings Report for the FEMA REP Program. Prior to distributing the Report to Team members, submit the Draft DIR Findings Report to the RAC Chair, the FEMA REP Branch Chief, and the FEMA THD Director for comment and concurrence (be prepared to submit additional information if requested by collecting all documents, e-mails, notes, field notes, and any document created throughout the DIR). The FEMA Region should keep the DIR and all documentation for official records. Information and logistics for entering an area where a disaster has hit should be coordinated through the RRCC. Lastly, information collected in the PCA and DIR should be shared with the RRCC to ensure transparency and efficiency in future FEMA response efforts. NOTE: For guidance on how to prepare and format the report, refer to the Preliminary

Capabilities Assessment (Appendix C) and DIR Review Checklists (Appendix D) and the Report Guidelines Memo (Appendix E).

VIII. References

A. 44 CFR Parts 350 – 354.

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B. 10 CFR Part 50.

C. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Washington D.C., November 1980.

D. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Addenda, Washington D.C., March 2002.

E. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, Supplement 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants – Criteria for Utility Offsite Planning and Preparedness, Final Report, Washington D.C., September 1988.

F. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. Supplement 4: Criteria for National Preparedness Initiative Integration, Exercise Enhancement, and Backup Alert and Notification Systems, October 2011.

G. REP Program Manual. (January 2016).

H. NRC Inspection Manual, Manual Chapter (MC) 1601, Communication and Coordination Protocol for Determining the Status of Offsite Emergency Preparedness. (August 27, 2013).

IX. Appendices

A. FEMA REP Incident Review Process Diagram

B. Disaster Initiated Review Decision Process Checklist

C. Preliminary Capabilities Assessment Checklist

D. Disaster Initiated Review Checklists

E. Report Guidelines Memorandum/Letter

F. FEMA/NRC Memorandum of Understanding (December 7, 2015)

X. Responsible Office:

National Preparedness Directorate (Technological Hazards Division).

Jonathan Hoyes (Electronic Signature: Original On File, May 25, 2017)

____________________________________________________________ Jonathan Hoyes

Director Technological Hazards Division

Federal Emergency Management Agency

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APPENDIX A: FEMA REP Incident Review Process Diagram

The diagram below outlines the communication direction and actions that the FEMA REP Program initiates during a DIR.

REP

Reg

iona

l Offi

ce

REP

Reg

iona

l St

aff

REP

Reg

iona

l Sta

ff

(Site

Spe

cial

ist)

NRC

Reg

iona

l Sta

te

Liai

son

Offi

cer (

RSL

O)

REP

Reg

iona

l St

aff

REP

Reg

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Rad

iolo

gica

l Em

erge

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Prep

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(REP

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DHS

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Tech

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If the offsite response infrastructure and capabilities status is “Unknown”, a PCA should be conducted to determine the effects on response.

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APPENDIX B: DIR DECISION PROCESS CHECKLIST

I. Organization Assignment Of Actions

The following chart outlines the key steps in the process for conducting a DIR and the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR).

OPR

Key Steps in Conducting a DIR

FEM

A RE

P Pr

ogra

m

REP

Regi

on

1. Impacting incident. X X 2. Establish a conference call between the FEMA THD Director, FEMA Regional Administrator(s), FEMA REP Program Branch Chief, RAC Chair, and respective NRC RSLO, to make a determination on the need for a DIR. This may involve the determination to perform a PCA to obtain a prompt assessment of offsite EP capabilities immediately following the incident to assist in FEMA’s determination on the need and timing for a DIR. (ESTABLISHED BY THE FEMA REP PROGRAM)

X X

3. Communicate the recommendation to FEMA THD Director. X X 4. Facilitate communication with NRC regarding DIR process. X X 5. Determination if a DIR is needed. X 6. Establish a DIR Team within 24 hours of decision to conduct a DIR. X 7. If a DIR is not warranted, further evaluation and determination on the adequacy of compensatory measures will be made. X

8. Conduct a DIR. X 9. Review the DIR Findings Report. X X 10. Provide FEMA THD Director with a recommendation to support a reasonable assurance determination. X X

11. Reasonable assurance determination is issued. X

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II. Delegation Of Tasks

The following chart outlines the associated tasks to the key steps in conducting a DIR and the responsible position (or designee).

Responsible Position

Delegation of Tasks

RAC

Chai

r

FEM

A Re

gion

al

Adm

inis

trat

or

FEM

A RE

P Br

anch

Chi

ef

FEM

A TH

D

Dir

ecto

r

1.1. Notify FEMA REP Branch Chief of impacting incident. X

2.1. Assist in determining the need for a DIR. X X X X 2.2. Coordinate communication with the respective NRC RSLO for determining the need for a DIR via conference call.

X

3.1. Communicate recommendation for conducting a DIR to the FEMA Regional Administrator. X

3.2. Communicate recommendation for conducting a DIR to the FEMA REP Branch Chief. X

3.3. Communicate recommendation for conducting a DIR to the FEMA THD Director. X

4.1. Facilitate the communication between the FEMA REP Program and the NRC, via the designated NRC Branch Chief, regarding the decision making process for a DIR determination.

X

4.2. Facilitate the communication with the respective NRC RSLO, regarding the decision making process for a DIR determination.

X

5.1. Make a final determination on the need for a DIR. X

5.2. Communicate DIR decision to the Assistant Administrator, FEMA National Preparedness Directorate (NPD).

X

5.3. Communicate DIR decision to NRC Director, NSIR/DPR. X

5.4. Communicate DIR decision to National Watch Center (NWC). X

6.1. Establish a schedule for conducting the DIR. The schedule should be established in consultation with OROs, the NRC, and the affected NRC Licensee.

X

6.2. Establish the team responsible for conducting the DIR within 24 hours of the decision to conduct a DIR in accordance with the SOG.

X

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7.1. Coordinate further evaluation of offsite EP capabilities, including compensatory and alternative measures.

X

8.1. Coordinate implementation of DIR Team and conduct of review. X

8.2. Ensure routine progress updates are provided by the DIR Team. X

8.3. Communicate with regional staff and ensure close communication with the ORO(s) officials regarding the condition of the EP infrastructure within the EPZ and reactor plant status. Provide updates to the respective NRC Regional State Liaison Officer.

X

8.4. Prepare and transmit a DIR Findings Report (Appendix E) and recommendation of determination of reasonable assurance to the FEMA Regional Administrator for review.

X

9.1. Review and transmit DIR Findings Report and recommendation of reasonable assurance to the FEMA REP Branch Chief for review; request additional input from RAC Chair if needed.

X

9.2. Review DIR Findings Report and recommendation of reasonable assurance; request additional input from RAC Chair if needed.

X

10.1. Transmit DIR Findings Report and recommendation of reasonable assurance to the FEMA THD Director for review.

X

11.1. Review the DIR Findings Report and reasonable assurance determination; request additional input from the RAC Chair as needed.

X

11.2. Provide an initial reasonable assurance determination and the DIR Findings Report using a pre-approved template to the NRC Director, NSIR/DPR.

X

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APPENDIX C: Preliminary Capabilities Assessment Checklist

The following checklist is for use in conducting a PCA. A fillable PDF version of the following checklist is available from the FEMA Region upon request.

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APPENDIX D: Post Disaster Assessment of Off-Site Capabilities Checklists

The following checklists are to be used when conducting a DIR. Fillable PDF versions of the following checklists are available from the FEMA Region upon request.

I. Emergency Response Facility

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II. Communicaitons

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III. Emergency Response Organizations (A)

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Emergency Response Organizations (B) (Continuation)

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IV. Public Alert and Notifications (A)

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Public Alert and Notifications (B) (Continuation)

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V. Access/Functional Needs and Transportation Resources

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VI. Evacuation Routes (A)

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Evacuation Routes (B)

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VII. Accident Assessment Resources

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VIII. Support Services

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IX. Population Shifts

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APPENDIX E: Report Guidelines Memorandum/Letter

The following templates are provided for use in developing a PCA or DIR Report Memorandum.

I. PCA Report Guidelines Memorandum

PCA

Date

MEMORANDUM FOR: ___________________, Director Technological Hazards Division National Preparedness Directorate U.S. Department of Homeland Security-FEMA ATTENTION: ___________________, Chief Radiological Emergency Preparedness Branch Technological Hazards Division National Preparedness Directorate U.S. Department of Homeland Security-FEMA FROM: Regional Technological Hazards Branch Chief/RAC Chair [include name, title

and location] SUBJECT: Preliminary Capabilities Assessment – [NUCLEAR POWER PLANT] Background: List event/date/time and affected nuclear power plant. Provide a description of the event; effects on the plant (onsite and offsite) and a shutdown timeline; list impacted areas within Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) (parish/county). Include the dates of the review and a brief statement of the FEMA Region, State, Tribal and local government agencies, NRC Licensee and other Federal Agency representatives involved in conducting the assessment. On [DATE], based on the Preliminary Capabilities Assessment (PCA) performed, our review of available information gathered in discussions with State, tribal, and local government agencies, Region [___] has concluded that offsite radiological emergency preparedness remains adequate to provide a reasonable assurance determination and that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the [NUCLEAR POWER PLANT]. At this time, Region [___] is not recommending actions to conduct a Disaster Initiated Review of offsite emergency preparedness issues within the [NUCLEAR POWER PLANT] 10-mile emergency planning zone.

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II. DIR Report Guidelines Memorandum

DIR

Date

MEMORANDUM FOR: ___________________, Director Technological Hazards Division National Preparedness Directorate U.S. Department of Homeland Security-FEMA ATTENTION: ___________________, Chief Radiological Emergency Preparedness Branch Technological Hazards Division National Preparedness Directorate U.S. Department of Homeland Security-FEMA FROM: Regional Technological Hazards Branch Chief/RAC Chair [include name, title and

location] SUBJECT: Disaster Initiated Review – [NUCLEAR POWER PLANT] Background: List event/date/time and affected nuclear power plant. Provide a description of the event; effects on the plant (onsite and offsite) and a shutdown timeline; list impacted areas within Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) (parish/county). Include the dates of the review and a brief statement of the FEMA Region, State, Tribal and local government agencies, NRC Licensee and other Federal Agency representatives involved in conducting the assessment. Assessment: For all areas: Include information on areas requiring follow-up actions and provide information on any compensatory measures that are in effect.

1. Emergency Response Facilities

Summarize findings for off-site facilities using the Post Disaster Assessment of Off-Site Capabilities as a guide.

2. Communications

Summarize findings for communications using the Post Disaster Assessment of Off-Site Capabilities as a guide. 3. Emergency Response Organizations Summarize findings for emergency response organizations using the Post Disaster Assessment of Off-Site Capabilities as a guide.

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4. Public Alert and Notification

Summarize findings for public alert and notification using the Post Disaster Assessment of Off-Site Capabilities as a guide. 5. Special Needs and Transportation Resources Summarize findings for special needs and transportation resources using the Post Disaster Assessment of Off-Site Capabilities as a guide. 6. Evacuation Routes

Summarize findings for evacuation routes using the Post Disaster Assessment of Off-Site Capabilities as a guide. 7. Accident Assessment

Summarize findings for accident assessment using the Post Disaster Assessment of Off-Site Capabilities as a guide. 8. Support Services

Summarize findings for support services using the Post Disaster Assessment of Off-Site Capabilities as a guide. 9. Population Shifts

If there has been a population shift due to the incident, include detailed information on the population shift. 10. Supporting Documentation

Supporting documentation may be gathered in the course of the review. While it is necessary to maintain this documentation on file, it is not required to be submitted with the report. A statement should be made to the effect that “All supporting documentation gathered by the Review Team will be on file at the [___] Region.”

Conclusions: Summarize the findings of the Review Team. Make a specific recommendation with regard to providing a reasonable assurance determination to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

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III. Continued Reasonable Assurance Letter Template

Continued Reasonable Assurance

Date

Director Division of Preparedness and Response Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop T4D22A Washington, D.C. 20555 Dear [___]: This letter is to inform you that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has completed its Disaster Initiated Review (DIR) of the [STATE(S)] and local offsite response organizations continued capability to adequately respond to an incident at the [NUCLEAR POWER PLANT] following [IMPACTING INCIDENT] that affected 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone communities’ communication capabilities, Emergency Operations Center functionality, and possibly blocked evacuation routes. On [DATE], a comprehensive investigation and collection of field data was performed by the joint FEMA/Nuclear Regulatory Commission DIR Team, in accordance with FEMA's Post Disaster Assessment of Offsite Capabilities procedure. Based on the review of all of this information, FEMA concludes that offsite radiological emergency preparedness is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the [NUCLEAR POWER PLANT]. At this time, FEMA is not aware of any unresolved offsite emergency preparedness issues around [NUCLEAR POWER PLANT], and therefore, we have no objections to plant startup and full-power operations. Please contact me at [THD DIRECTOR PHONE NUMBER], if you have any questions or require any further assistance on this matter.

Sincerely,

Director Technological Hazards Division

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APPENDIX F: FEMA/NRC Memorandum of Understanding (December 7, 2015)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY/FEDERAL EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT AGENCY AND NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGARDING RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE, PLANNING, AND PREPAREDNESS

I. PARTIES. The parties to this Agreement are the Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). A. DHS/FEMA 1. PRIMARY MISSION. The primary mission of DHS/FEMA is to reduce the loss of life and

property and protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation.

2. SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES. In support of the primary mission of DHS/FEMA, the Technological Hazards Division (THD):

a. Ensures that state, local, and tribal governments can adequately protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the utilization facilities, as defined by Public Law 96-295, in the event of an incident at a utilization facilities;

b. Informs and educates the public about radiological emergency preparedness; and

c. Supports and provides guidance to state, local, and tribal governments’ emergency planning and preparedness activities that take place “offsite”, or beyond the boundaries of the owner-controlled area around a utilization facility.

B. NRC 1. PRIMARY MISSION. The primary mission of the NRC is to license and regulate the

Nation's civilian use of radioactive materials to protect public health and safety, promote the common defense and security, and protect the environment. NRC’s regulatory mission covers three main areas:

a. Reactors – Commercial reactors for generating electric power and research and test reactors used for research, testing, and training.

b. Materials – Uses of nuclear materials in medical, industrial, and academic settings and facilities that produce nuclear fuel.

c. Waste – Transportation, storage, and disposal of nuclear materials and waste, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities from service.

2. SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES. In support of the primary mission of the NRC, the Division of Preparedness and Response (DPR):

a. Performs emergency preparedness licensing casework for Operating Reactors, Fuel Cycle, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI), and New Reactors;

b. Conducts analysis and evaluations of emergency preparedness decommissioning requests;

c. Initiates emergency preparedness rulemaking upon the Commission’s direction; and

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d. Oversees the agency exercise program, responder qualifications, and readiness of the NRC Operations Center.

II. AUTHORITY. This Agreement is authorized under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; NRC Authorization Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-295), § 109; Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93-288, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 5131(a) and (b); 6 U.S.C. § 744; Executive Order 12127, as amended; Executive Order 12148, as amended; Executive Order 12657, as amended; Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8): National Preparedness.

III. PURPOSE. The purpose of this Agreement is to establish a framework of cooperation between

the FEMA and NRC in radiological emergency response planning and preparedness matters so that their mutual efforts will be directed toward more effective plans and related preparedness measures at and in the vicinity of utilization facilities, as defined in Public Law 96-295.

FEMA coordinates all Federal planning for offsite impact of radiological emergencies and takes the lead for assessing offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness, makes findings and determinations as to the adequacy and capability of implementing offsite plans, and communicates those findings and determinations to the NRC. The NRC reviews FEMA’s findings and determinations in conjunction with the NRC onsite findings for the purpose of making determinations on the overall state of emergency preparedness. These overall findings and determinations are used by the NRC to make radiological health and safety decisions in the issuance of licenses and the continued operation of licensed utilization facility to include taking enforcement actions such as notices of violations, civil penalties, orders, or shutdown of operating reactors. This delineation of responsibilities avoids duplicative efforts by the NRC in preparedness matters.

IV. SUPERSEDES. This Agreement supersedes (1) the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

between FEMA and NRC dated September 7, 1993 (58 FR 47997, September 14, 1993), and published as Appendix A to 44 CFR part 353; (2) the MOU between FEMA and NRC relating to cooperation and responsibilities in response to an actual or potential radiological emergency entered into on October 22, 1980 (45 FR 82715, December 15, 1980); and (3) the MOU between FEMA and NRC relating to Executive Order 12657 concluded on December 1, 1991.

V. RESPONSIBILITIES. A. DHS/FEMA Responsibilities 1. To take the Federal lead role in offsite emergency planning and preparedness activities and to

review and assess offsite emergency plans and preparedness for adequacy. 2. To make findings and determinations as to whether offsite emergency plans are adequate and

can be implemented (e.g., adequacy and maintenance of procedures, training, resources, staffing levels and qualifications, and equipment). Notwithstanding the regulations which are set forth in 44 CFR Part 350 for requesting and reaching FEMA approval of state, local, and tribal plans, findings, and determinations on the current status of emergency planning and preparedness around particular sites, referred to as findings, will be provided by FEMA for use as needed in the NRC licensing process. Such findings will be provided by FEMA on mutually agreed to schedules or upon specific NRC request. The request and findings will constitute written communications between the co-chairs of the FEMA/NRC Steering Committee. Any finding provided under this arrangement will constitute an extension of FEMA's review and approval of offsite radiological emergency plans and preparedness set forth in 44 CFR Part 350. Findings will be based on the review of currently available plans

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and joint exercise results related to a specific utilization facility, as defined by Public Law 96-295.

a. Exercise evaluations will identify one of the following conditions: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the plans are adequate and can be implemented as demonstrated in the exercise; (2) there are inadequacies that must be corrected; or (3) a finding of reasonable assurance cannot be determined and FEMA will provide a schedule of actions leading to a decision.

b. A Level 1 finding is defined as an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a utilization facility. Because of the potential impact of Level 1 findings on emergency preparedness, they should be corrected within 120 days through appropriate remedial actions, including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions.

When there are Level 1 findings of the types noted above, and there is potential for remedial actions, FEMA Headquarters will promptly (1-2 days) discuss these with NRC Headquarters. Within 10 days of the exercise, official notification of the identified Level 1 finding will be made by FEMA to the State, NRC Headquarters, and the FEMA Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) with an information copy to the licensee. NRC will formally notify the licensee of the Level 1 finding and monitor the licensee's efforts to work with State and local authorities to correct the identified inadequacy. Approximately 60 days after official notification of the Level 1 finding, the NRC, in consultation with FEMA, will assess the progress being made towards resolution.

3. If FEMA determines under 44 CFR § 350.13 that offsite emergency plans or preparedness are not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public, FEMA shall withdraw approval.

4. To lead the development of radiological preparedness focused information and education programs.

5. To review applications under 10 CFR Part 52 for an early site permit, FEMA will receive pertinent information provided by the applicant, and forwarded by NRC, and determine whether there is any significant impediment to the development of offsite emergency plans. As appropriate, depending upon the nature of information provided by the applicant, the NRC may also request that FEMA determine whether major features of offsite emergency plans submitted by the applicant are acceptable, or whether offsite emergency plans submitted by the applicant are adequate, as discussed below.

a. A finding based only on the review of currently available offsite plans will include an assessment as to whether these plans are adequate when measured against the planning standards (44 CFR 350.5) and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, and, pending a demonstration through an exercise, whether there is reasonable assurance that the plans can be implemented. The finding will indicate one of the following conditions: (1) plans are adequate and there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented with only limited or no corrections needed; (2) plans are adequate, but before a determination can be made as to whether they can be implemented, corrections must be made to the plans or supporting measures must be demonstrated (e.g., adequacy and maintenance of procedures, training, resources, staffing levels and qualifications, and equipment); or (3) plans are inadequate and

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cannot be implemented until they are revised to correct inadequacies noted in the Federal review.

b. If, in FEMA's view, the plans that are available are not completed or are not ready for review, FEMA will provide NRC with a status report delineating milestones for preparation of the plan by the offsite authorities as well as FEMA's actions to assist in development and review of the plans.

c. A finding on preparedness will be based on review of currently available plans and joint exercise results and will include an assessment as to (1) whether offsite emergency plans are adequate as measured against the planning standards (44 CFR 350.5) and criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, and (2) whether an exercise(s) demonstrates that there is reasonable assurance that the plans can be implemented.

6. To assume responsibility, as a supplement to state, local, tribal, and utility efforts, for radiological emergency preparedness training of state, local, and tribal officials.

7. To develop and issue an updated series of interagency assignments which delineate respective agency capabilities and responsibilities for coordination and direction for radiological emergency planning and preparedness activities for radiological incidents at fixed nuclear facilities and transportation incidents involving radioactive materials. [Current assignments are in 44 CFR Part 351, March 11, 1982. (47 FR 10758)]

8. To inform the NRC if a disaster significantly damages the area around a licensed operating utilization facility and FEMA seriously questions the continued adequacy of offsite emergency preparedness. FEMA will also take the following actions:

a. Perform a Preliminary Capabilities Assessment (PCA) to obtain an assessment of offsite emergency preparedness capabilities immediately following an event and assist FEMA in making a determination on the need and timing for a full disaster-initiated review (DIR) of offsite radiological emergency preparedness. Communication and coordination between FEMA and NRC during the PCA phase should be maintained primarily at the Regional level between the appropriate FEMA RAC Chair and NRC Regional State Liaison Officer (RSLO). The respective Regions will be responsible during the PCA phase for updating respective HQ staff on status.

b. If determined that a DIR of offsite radiological emergency preparedness capabilities of the affected offsite jurisdiction(s) is necessary, the NRC will be informed in writing, as soon as practicable, including a schedule for conduct of the review. FEMA will also give the NRC (1) interim written reports of its findings, as appropriate, and (2) a final written report on the results of its review. A DIR is not intended to be a comprehensive review of offsite plans and preparedness.

9. To support NRC licensing reviews related to utilization facilities, with regard to the assessment of the adequacy of offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness. This will include submittal of an evaluation suitable for inclusion in NRC safety evaluation reports. Routine support will include providing assessments, findings, and determinations (interim and final) on offsite plans and preparedness related to reactor license reviews. To support its findings and determinations, FEMA will make expert witnesses available before the Commission, the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, NRC hearing boards and administrative law judges, and any court actions, including any related proceedings.

FEMA will appear in NRC licensing proceedings as part of the presentation of the NRC staff. In accordance with the NRC’s regulations and the discretion of the NRC licensing board,

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FEMA counsel will normally present FEMA witnesses and be permitted to cross-examine the witnesses of parties, other than the NRC witnesses, on matters involving FEMA findings and determinations, policies, or operations; however, FEMA will not be asked to testify on status reports. Specific assignment of professional responsibilities between NRC and FEMA counsel will be primarily the responsibility of the attorneys assigned to a particular case. In situations where questions of professional responsibility cannot be resolved by the attorneys assigned, resolution of any differences will be made by the Chief Counsel of FEMA and the General Counsel of the NRC or their designees. NRC will request the presiding officer to place FEMA on the service list for all litigation in which it is expected to participate.

10. To notify the NRC upon receiving a licensee’s request for Federal facilities and resources when a decline or fail situation exists (44 CFR 352.4). FEMA will consult with affected Federal agencies to determine the need for and commitment of Federal facilities and resources, consistent with Executive Order 12657, as amended. During this consultation process, FEMA will cooperate with affected agencies, including the NRC, to review the needs of the licensee, the Federal resources available, the conditions under which any assistance would be provided, and the options for obtaining reimbursement.

11. To coordinate the discontinuation of FEMA REP Program Services when the NRC determines, through an approved exemption from 10 CFR 50.47 and appendix E to Part 50 requirements or through other regulatory processes, that FEMA REP Program Services affecting offsite radiological emergency planning and preparedness are no longer required at a particular utilization facility. FEMA requires notification of the effective date from NRC to close out REP Program services. FEMA will make necessary notifications to state, local, and tribal entities.

B. NRC Responsibilities 1. To assess licensee emergency plans for adequacy. This review will include organizations

with which licensees have written agreements to provide onsite support services under emergency conditions.

2. To verify that licensee emergency plans are adequately implemented (e.g., adequacy and maintenance of procedures, training, resources, staffing levels and qualifications, and equipment).

3. To review FEMA’s findings and determinations as to whether offsite plans are adequate and can be implemented.

4. To make radiological health and safety decisions with regard to the overall state of emergency preparedness (i.e., integration of emergency preparedness onsite as determined by the NRC and offsite determined by FEMA and reviewed by NRC) such as the issuance of operating licenses and the regulation of the operation of licensed utilization facilities, as defined by Public Law 96-295, to include taking enforcement actions, such as issuing notices of violations, civil penalties, and orders, including the shutdowns of operating reactors.

5. To identify those utilization facilities, as defined in Public Law 96-295, and transmit a request for review to FEMA as the emergency plans are completed.

6. To review FEMA’s findings and determinations upon receiving notification of FEMA’s withdrawal of reasonable assurance, and formally document the NRC's position. When, as described, in 10 CFR §§ 50.54(s)(2)(ii) and 50.54(s)(3), the NRC finds the state of emergency preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective

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measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, the NRC will notify the affected licensee accordingly and start the "120-day clock."3

7. To assist FEMA by reviewing for accuracy educational materials concerning radiation, and its hazards and information regarding appropriate actions to be taken by the general public in the event of an incident involving radioactive materials associated with utilization facilities as defined in Public Law 96-295.

8. To inform FEMA of any information it received from licensees, its inspectors, or others, that raises serious questions about continued adequacy of offsite emergency preparedness.

9. To consider information provided by FEMA Headquarters and pertinent findings from FEMA's PCA and/or DIR in making decisions regarding the restart or continued operation of an affected operating nuclear power reactor. The NRC will notify FEMA Headquarters, in writing, of the schedule for restart of an affected reactor and keep FEMA Headquarters informed of any changes in that schedule.

10. To provide only advice to the licensee on assistance and resources, when a decline or fail situation (as defined in EO 12657, as amended) exists.

11. To coordinate the discontinuation of FEMA REP Program Services, NRC will make the following notifications to FEMA, as the information becomes available, regarding:

a. Which utilization facility will be undergoing decommissioning/closure;

b. The decommissioning schedule to include the proposed dates for when FEMA REP Program Services are no longer needed; and

c. The NRC-approved effective date that FEMA REP Program services are no longer needed.

C. Both DHS/FEMA and NRC will: 1. Conduct joint exercises. These joint exercises will include cooperation and coordination

between the agencies for the following:

a. Determining exercise requirements for licensees, and state, local, and tribal governments. To the extent practicable, both agencies will observe and evaluate exercises through implementation of the National Preparedness System, regulations, and programmatic guidance.

b. Assuring that both onsite and offsite considerations are adequately addressed and integrated in a manner that provides a technically sound exercise upon which an assessment of preparedness capabilities can be based.

2. Provide opportunity for the other agency to review and comment on guidance, including interpretations of agreed-upon joint guidance, and relevant research and development programs prior to adoption as formal agency guidance and/or implementation.

3. Participate in the FEMA/NRC Steering Committee on Emergency Preparedness. The Steering Committee will continue to be the focal point for coordination of emergency planning and preparedness and will consist of an equal number of members to represent each agency with one vote per agency. When the Steering Committee cannot agree on the resolution of an issue, the issue will be referred to FEMA and NRC management. The Steering Committee will establish the day-to-day procedures for assuring that the

3 Per 10 CFR § 50.54(s) (2) (ii), the Commission will determine whether the reactor shall be shut down or other enforcement action is appropriate if such conditions are not corrected within four months. The NRC is not limited by this provision of the rule, for, as stated in 10 CFR § 50.54(s)(3), "Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as limiting the authority of the Commission to take action under any other regulation or authority of the Commission or at any time other than that specified in this paragraph".

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arrangements of this MOU are carried out. Any follow-up reports or documentation of actions will be coordinated through the Steering Committee. Details of this arrangement are articulated in the FEMA/NRC Steering Committee Charter.

4. Will maintain close communication between their respective Offices of Public Affairs/External Affairs, as much as practical, to maintain situational awareness of the external communication efforts of the other. Upon request, and when possible, FEMA will supply additional public affairs staff to augment the NRC’s crisis communication response.

5. Adhere to the preparedness, response, and recovery roles and responsibilities set forth in the National Preparedness System (NPS), National Planning Frameworks, and the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex (NRIA) to the National Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs).

VI. POINTS OF CONTACT.

A. DHS/FEMA

Timothy Greten, Acting Director Technological Hazards Division National Preparedness Directorate Federal Emergency Management Agency timothy.greten@fema.dhs.gov 202.657.2300 (office) 1800 South Bell Street Arlington, VA 22202

B. NRC Robert Lewis, Director Division of Preparedness and Response Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response Nuclear Regulatory Commission robert.lewis@nrc.gov 301 287-3779 (office) 11545 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

VII. OTHER PROVISIONS.

A. Nothing in this Agreement is intended to conflict with current law or regulations or the

directives of DHS/FEMA or NRC. If a term of this Agreement is inconsistent with any such authority, and/or thereby deemed invalid, the remaining terms of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

B. Nothing in this Agreement is intended to restrict the authority of either party to act as provided by statute or regulation.

C. Any information shared under this Agreement will comply with the Privacy Act, and to the extent required and allowable, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and any other applicable statute, Executive Order, or regulation.

D. This Agreement is between DHS/FEMA and NRC and does not confer or create any right, benefit, or trust responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity, by any third person or party (public or private) against the United States, its agencies its officers, or any person; or against NRC, their officers or employees or any other person.

E. The parties will use or display each other’s name, emblem, or trademarks only in the case of particular projects and only with the prior written consent of the other party. The DHS seal is

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protected by 18 U.S.C. §§ 506, 701, and 1017, among other laws, and use of the seal is controlled by the DHS Office of Public Affairs through DHS Management Directive No. 0030 (MD 0030).

F. This Agreement, upon execution, contains the entire agreement of the parties and no prior written or oral agreement, express or implied, shall be admissible to contradict the provisions of this Agreement.

G. This Agreement is not a fiscal or funds obligation document. Any funds, services or equipment provided to accomplish the goals anticipated under this agreement are done so without expectation of reimbursement or the payment of fees related to the provision of such services, equipment or personnel unless otherwise agreed. Any specific work or activity that involves the transfer of funds, services, or property among the parties will require execution of a separate agreement, and will be contingent upon the availability of appropriated funds. Such activities must be independently authorized by appropriate statutory or other authority. This Agreement does not provide such authority.

VIII. EFFECTIVE DATE. The terms of this agreement will become effective upon the signature of

both parties. IX. MODIFICATION. This agreement may be modified upon the mutual, written consent of the

parties.

X. TERMINATION. The terms of this agreement, as modified with the consent of both parties, will remain in effect until terminated by both or either parties. The agreement may be extended by mutual written agreement of the parties. Either party upon 60 days written notice to the other party may terminate this agreement.

[81 FR 15755, March 24, 2016]

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APPENDIX G: Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANS Alert and Notification Systems CFR Code of Federal Regulations DHS Department of Homeland Security DIR Disaster Initiated Review DPR Division of Preparedness and Response DRP Division of Reactor Projects DRS Division of Reactor Safety EP Emergency Preparedness EPZ Emergency Planning Zone FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FIOPs Federal Interagency Operational Plans FOIA Freedom of Information Act GETS Government Emergency Telephone System GPS Global Positioning System HERO Headquarters Emergency Response Officer HOO Headquarters Operations Officer HQ Headquarters IMC Inspection Manual Chapter ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations MC Manual Chapter MOU Memorandum of Understanding NOED Notice of Enforcement Discretion NPD National Preparedness Directorate NPP Nuclear Power Plant NPS National Preparedness System NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRCC National Response Coordination Center NRIA Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex NRR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NSIR Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response NWC National Watch Center (FEMA) OGC Office of the General Counsel OPR Office of Primary Responsibility ORLOB Operating Reactor Licensing and Outreach Branch ORO Offsite Response Organization PCA Preliminary Capabilities Assessment PPD Presidential Policy Directive RAC Radiological Assistance Committee REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness RRCC Regional Response Coordination Center RSLO Regional State Liaison Officer SOG Standard Operating Guidelines THD Technological Hazards Division

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APPENDIX H: Definitions

Adequate: As used in reviews of radiological emergency response plans/procedures, adequate means that the plan/ procedure contents are consistent and in full compliance with the requirements delineated in the Planning Standards and associated NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 Evaluation Criteria or alternative approaches approved by FEMA

Coordinate: To bring into common action so as not to unnecessarily duplicate or omit important actions (does not involve direction of one agency by another).

Emergency Planning Zone: A geographic area surrounding a commercial nuclear power plant for which emergency planning is needed to ensure that prompt and effective actions can be taken by offsite response organizations to protect the public health and safety in the event of a radiological accident. The plume pathway EPZ is approximately 10 miles in radius, while the ingestion pathway EPZ has a radius of approximately 50 miles.

Facility: Any building, center, room(s), or mobile unit(s) designed and equipped to support emergency operations.

Incident: An occurrence, natural or man-made, that requires a response to protect life or property. Incidents can include major disasters, emergencies, terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, civil unrest, wildland and urban fires, floods, hazardous materials spills, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms, tsunamis, war-related disasters, public health and medical emergencies, and other occurrences requiring an emergency response.

Licensee: The utility or organization that has applied for or has received from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1) a license to construct or operate a commercial nuclear power plant, (2) a possession-only license for a commercial nuclear power plant, with the exception of licensees that have received an NRC-approved exemption to 10 CFR § 50.54(q)

requirements, (3) an early site permit for a commercial nuclear power plant, (4) a combined construction permit and operating license for a commercial nuclear power plant, or (5) any other NRC license that is now or may become subject to requirements for offsite radiological emergency planning and preparedness activities.

Offsite: Beyond the boundaries of the owner-controlled area around a commercial nuclear power plant.

Offsite Response Organization: Any State, local, and Tribal government; supporting private industry and voluntary organizations; and Licensee offsite response organizations (that are formed when State, local, and Tribal governments fail to participate in the REP Program) that are responsible for carrying out emergency functions during a radiological emergency

Operational: Status of a facility (e.g., emergency operations center, emergency operations facility, media center, assistance center, emergency worker center, laboratory, etc.) when all key decision makers, as identified in plans/ procedures, are at their duty stations and capable of performing all emergency functions assigned to that facility.

Plans/Procedures: An organization’s documented concept of operations and implementing procedures for managing its internal response to emergencies and coordinating its external response with other organizations. The term plans/procedures as used in this manual includes radiological emergency preparedness/response plans, associated implementing procedures such as Standard Operating Guides, and other supporting and referenced materials, all of which are subject to review. The generic term plans/ procedures is used specifically for flexibility. Procedures may be either incorporated in the main plans or into separate procedural documents at the discretion of the offsite response organization.

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Preliminary Capability Assessment: The purpose of a PCA is to obtain a prompt assessment (snap shot) of offsite EP capabilities immediately following electric grid blackouts, malevolent act, government shutdown, pandemic, or natural disaster (e.g., hurricane, tornado, flood, and earthquake) in the vicinity of commercial Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs), to assist in FEMA’s determination on the need and timing for a DIR.

Radiological emergency: A type of radiological incident that poses an actual or potential hazard to public health or safety or loss of property.

Reasonable Assurance: A determination that State, local, Tribal, and utility offsite plans and preparedness are adequate to protect public health and safety in the emergency planning areas of commercial nuclear power plants.

REP Branch Chief: FEMA Headquarters individual responsible for implementation of the national Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program.