radionavigation integrity and security
TRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Radionavigation Integrity
and SecurityDr. Todd E. Humphreys
CSR Seminar, April 6, 2010
![Page 2: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Radionavigation
GPS GNSSRadionavigation
Systems
![Page 3: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
GPS: The Achilles’ Heels
Weak GPS Signals
Like a 30-Watt lightbulb held 4000 km away
GPS does not penetrate well indoors
GPS is easy target for jamming
GPS is vulnerable to natural interference (e.g.,
solar radio bursts and ionospheric scintillation)
Unauthenticated Civil GPS Signals
Civil GPS broadcast “in the clear”
Makes civil GPS vulnerable to spoofing
![Page 4: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
GPS: Dependency Begets Vulnerability
Banking and Finance
Communications
Energy
Transportation
From Dane Egli, IDA
Banking and Finance
Communications
Energy
Transportation
From Dane Egli, IDA
Banking and Finance
Communications
Energy
Transportation
From Dane Egli, IDA
![Page 5: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
Civil GPS Jamming Event
![Page 6: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Civil GPS Spoofing
![Page 7: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Civil GPS Spoofing (cont’d)
![Page 8: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
Ionospheric Scintillation
Receiver noise and scintillation-induced
phase errorsCycle slips
(phase unlock)
Total loss of carrier lock (frequency unlock)
![Page 9: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
Research Agenda
GPS Jamming
Locate jamming sources by combining data from a network of receivers
Develop augmentation-based defenses
GNSS Spoofing
Characterize spoofing signatures
Develop receiver-autonomous defenses
Develop augmentation-based defenses
Natural GNSS Interference
Improve tracking loop robustness to scintillation
Network-Centric Navigation
Establish theory for time stability transfer
Opportunistic and collaborative navigation
![Page 10: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
Research Agenda
GPS Jamming
Locate jamming sources by combining data from a network of receivers
Develop augmentation-based defenses
GNSS Spoofing
Characterize spoofing signatures
Develop receiver-autonomous defenses
Develop augmentation-based defenses
Natural GNSS Interference
Improve tracking loop robustness to scintillation
Network-Centric Navigation
Establish theory for time stability transfer
Opportunistic and collaborative navigation
![Page 11: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
INTERLOC:
Network-based Interference Location
![Page 12: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
INTERLOC Functional Diagram
![Page 13: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Research Agenda
GPS Jamming
Locate jamming sources by combining data from a network of receivers
Develop augmentation-based defenses
GNSS Spoofing
Characterize spoofing signatures
Develop receiver-autonomous defenses
Develop augmentation-based defenses
Natural GNSS Interference
Improve tracking loop robustness to scintillation
Network-Centric Navigation
Establish theory for time stability transfer
Opportunistic and collaborative navigation
![Page 14: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
GRID Software-Defined Radio
Flexible software-defined radio platform enables:
GPS Assimilator
Spoofing characterization
GPS-based scientific research
Collaborative navigation research
![Page 15: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
The GPS Assimilator
The GPS Assimilator modernizes and makes existing GPS equipment
resistant to jamming and spoofing without requiring hardware or
software changes to the equipment
![Page 16: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
Research Agenda
GPS Jamming
Locate jamming sources by combining data from a network of receivers
Develop augmentation-based defenses
GNSS Spoofing
Characterize spoofing signatures
Develop receiver-autonomous defenses
Develop augmentation-based defenses
Natural GNSS Interference
Improve tracking loop robustness to scintillation
Network-Centric Navigation
Establish theory for time stability transfer
Opportunistic and collaborative navigation
![Page 17: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
Scintillation-hardened Tracking Loops
• Straightforward approach: navigation
data bit prediction
• Incorporate the observed second-order
dynamics into a Kalman filter whose
state includes the complex components
of z(t)
• Combine this with a Bayesian
multiple-model filter that spawns a
new tracking loop whenever a data bit
is uncertain. Prune loops at parity
check.
GOAL: Ts > 240 seconds for
{S4 = 0.8, 0 = 0.8 sec., C/N0 = 43 dB-Hz}
(a factor of 10 longer than current best)
![Page 18: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
A New Approach to Carrier Modeling
![Page 19: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
A Multiple-Model Approach to Data
Bit Estimation
![Page 20: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Research Agenda
GPS Jamming
Locate jamming sources by combining data from a network of receivers
Develop augmentation-based defenses
GNSS Spoofing
Characterize spoofing signatures
Develop receiver-autonomous defenses
Develop augmentation-based defenses
Natural GNSS Interference
Improve tracking loop robustness to scintillation
Network-Centric Navigation
Establish theory for time stability transfer
Opportunistic and collaborative navigation
![Page 21: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
Time Stability Transfer
Leverage the frequency stability of an
“anchor” clock to extend the coherence time
of an inexpensive clock
Allow GPS RX to coherently integrate over
several seconds to draw signal from noise
anchor clock: OCXO (10-11) or atomic quality (10-13)
receiver clock: TCXO quality 10-9
Synthesized receiver clock:
quality better than 10-9
![Page 22: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
Opportunistic Navigation Opportunistic Frequency Stability Transfer: GPS RX clock “leans”
on more stable signals of opportunity (cell transmissions, HDTV, WWVB)
Opportunistic Ranging: Phase locks to one or more non-GPS transmission signals to maintain localization in GPS denied environments (indoors, jamming).
RX uses a priori knowledge of signal standards and base station locations
GPS
cell
WWVB
Iridium
freq.
stability
transfer and
ranging
time transfer
GPS denied
environment
![Page 23: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
Collaborative Navigation Create a network of GPS receivers capable of operating as
GPS, Iridium and spread-spectrum transceivers
Nodes relay GPS tracking data and range to each other
Collective navigation solution could achieve greater accuracy than individual solutions
“Anchor nodes” with OCXO-grade clocks provide time stability to less stable nodes
cell
OCXO
anchor node
GPSGPSIridium
![Page 24: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
Radionavigation Lab
Jahshan Bhatti Ph.D.-track, AE
INTERLOC, spoofing defenses
Muthukumar Pasupathy Ph.D.-track, AE
Ionospheric effects on SatNav
Kyle Wesson Ph.D.-track, ECE
Collaborative navigation and time stability transfer
Ken Pesyna Ph.D.-track, ECE
Time stability transfer, cell-phone-based opportunistic navigation
Zach Tschirhart Undergraduate, AE
Lab manager/technician
![Page 25: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
Backup Slides
![Page 26: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
User
LEOcrosslinks
Aiding signal from LEO high-powerspot beams over area of operations
400-km switchable beams
GPS Signals
Iridium-Augmented GPS Anti-jam aiding (couple receiver
with low-grade IMU)
High-precision time transfer
Navigational backup to GPS
Civilian Anti-spoofing
![Page 27: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
GPS Assimilator Prototype
All digital signal processing implemented in C++ on a high-end DSP
Marginal computational demands:
Tracking: ~1.2% of DSP per channel
Simulation: ~4% of DSP per channel
Full capability:
12 L1 C/A & 10 L2C tracking channels
8 L1 C/A simulation channels
1 Hz navigation solution
Acquisition in background
![Page 28: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
Civil GPS Spoofing (cont’d)
![Page 29: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
Outside CollaborationCornell GPS Group, Ithaca NY:
Faculty: Dr. Mark Psiaki & Dr. Paul Kintner
Engineer: Steve Powell
~6 Ph.D. students
Numerous M. Eng. students
Todd Humphreys,
Assistant Professor
UT Austin
Brent Ledvina, Bob Clauer,
Virginia Tech
Coherent Navigation
GPS-related Technology Development
Humphreys among 6 co-founders
![Page 30: Radionavigation Integrity and Security](https://reader030.vdocument.in/reader030/viewer/2022020704/61fb49742e268c58cd5c6166/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Who is Interested in our Work?
Scintillation-robust software GPS receivers ASTRA (Atmospheric and Space Technology Research
Associates LLC)
National Science Foundation
Spoofing characterization and defenses Joint Research Centre, European Commission
Office of the Secretary of Defense
GPS Wing of the Air Force
GPS Assimilator DARPA
Department of Homeland Security
Coherent Navigation