randall collins theory

7/30/2019 Randall Collins Theory

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What Collins's The Sociology of Philosophies Says about Sociological TheoryAuthor(s): Douglas GoodmanSource: Sociological Theory, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Mar., 2001), pp. 92-101Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/223294 .

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What Collins's The Sociology of PhilosophiesSays about Sociological Theory*

DOUGLAS GOODMAN

Wellesley College

In Collins's latest book, we see an attemptto apply his sociological theories to thehistory of philosophy.WhileCollins'smacrosociology of knowledgeprovides importantinsights into the role of conflict in an intellectual field, his microsociology is moreproblematic.Inparticular, Collins'smicrotheory ignores thefundamental importanceof social interpretations.This leads him to use a vague and unproductivenotion ofemotions.Nevertheless,we can usefully apply Collins'sfindings to sociological theoryitself.As inphilosophy, we see the same competitiveappropriationand elaborationofaccumulatedintellectualcapital and the same struggleover the limited resourcesnec-essary to intellectual production, especially over what Collins calls the intellectualattentionspace.

Randall Collins has always been interested in what he calls a "non-obvious" sociology(1982). A nonobvious sociology is one that reveals the hidden processes behind what istaken for granted and that demonstrates why the obvious questions are not necessarily themost central ones. His first publication (Ben-David and Collins 1966) revealed the socialconstruction of the field of psychology. Instead of looking at the seminal ideas that led tothe founding of a scientific psychology, he looked at the less obvious contribution of thecreation of new roles. His influential book Conflict Sociology (1975) exposed the under-lying interactions that construct the taken-for-granted nature of social stratification. Insteadof starting with social structures, his conflict approach examined the micro interactionsthat create the appearance of enduring structures. In his latest book, The Sociology ofPhilosophies (1998), he is at it again. Here he argues that philosophical ideas are not theproducts of individual geniuses; instead they emerge from the interaction rituals of groupsand the conflicts that structure the intellectual field.

Sociologies of other disciplines tend to strike readers, especially those in the targeted field,as attempts to expand the jurisdiction of sociology and to fulfill Comte's dream of makingsociology the ultimate explanatory foundation for all intellectual pursuits. Although we seesome of this in Collins, his primary goal in this latest work is not to sociologically explainaway philosophical truths. Instead Collins intends to use the history of philosophy to test hisideas about the relationship between concrete human interactions and social structures-that is, the relation between what have come to be called the micro and the macro. Conse-quently, this article will be less concerned with what sociological theory can say aboutphilosophy than what the analysis of philosophy can say about sociological theory. In thisrespect, TheSociology of Philosophies is both important and, I will argue, ultimately flawed.Even the flaws, however, say something significant about sociological theory.This article begins with an outline of Collins's micro- and macrosociological theories.These will be familiar to any who have read Collins's previous work, but what we see inThe Sociology of Philosophies is a credible application of the theories to the field of

*I thankRichardHarveyBrown for his help and generosity.Addresscorrespondence o: Douglas Goodman,Wellesley College, 2 HazelmereRoad,Roslindale,MA 02131; e-mail: [email protected] Theory19:1 March2001? AmericanSociological Association. 1307 New YorkAvenueNW,Washington,DC 20005-4701

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COLLINS'SSOCIOLOGYOF PHILOSOPHIESAND SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY 93philosophy.Whether he details of the work areultimately convincing is beyond the scopeof this article, but no readercan be unimpressedby the geographicbreadthandhistoricaldepth of Collins's attempt.Following the overview of the theory is a discussion both ofwhatI findunconvincingin the microtheoryand also of whatI feel areCollins's importantnew contributionsto the sociology of knowledge. Finally, I will suggest what Collins'ssociology of knowledge might say aboutsociological theory itself.MICROAND MACRO IN COLLINS'STHEORYCollins's view of the micro-macrorelation is inspired by the empiricalachievementsofsuchmicrosociologicalapproaches sethnomethodology ndconversational nalysis.Thesemicrosociologies do not wholly reject macrosociological concepts, but they attempttoimproveon theirexplanationsby reconstitutingmacroconcepts nradicallyempiricalmicro-foundations.Suchmacrosociologicalphenomenaas institutionsandorganizationsareseensimply as analytical abstractions that summarizethe patternof related microbehaviors.The structure'sapparent ontinuity s due to the patterned epetitionof the microbehaviorsover time. Whetherstructureschange or persistdependsentirely upon whether the under-lying microbehaviorschange or persist (Collins 1981:989).Collins often describes structuresas simple aggregates of microevents and has sug-gested a ratherdubioussamplingstrategythatwould ignoreall traditionalmacrosociolog-ical variables(Collins 1981:988). This has left him open to the criticismthat he is unableto deal with macrostructures uch as those "social wholes, whose parts are related hori-zontally and/or vertically in specific ways" (Mouzelis 1995:21). However, a closer read-ing reveals thatCollins is sensitive to macrorelationsbuthe (1981:989) believes thattheycan be reducedto three "pure"macrovariables: 1) the dispersionof individuals in phys-ical space; (2) the durationandrepetition n timeof social processes;and(3) the numbersof individualsinvolved.Besides these pure macrovariables,more traditionalmacroconcepts-such as states,institutions,organizations,and cultures-are also useful. These macroconceptsallow theanalyst to more precisely formulate the temporaland spatialrelations among microphe-nomena,andthey providea framework orchoosing the most interestingmicrophenomenato analyze.Although the macroconceptsareuseful andperhapseven necessaryto sociol-ogy, Collins (1990a) arguesthatthey must be translatablebackinto the empiricallyacces-sible interactionsthat such macroconceptsmerely summarize. This is the approachthatCollins follows in his sociological studyof philosophy.Macroconceptssuch as schools ofphilosophy,culturalcapital,opportunitystructures,andthe like, areused but always withthe understanding hatthey should be translatablento actualinteractionsbetweenpeople.Collins's microsociology does not focus on the individual subject;rather, or Collins,the micro is the empiricallyobservableinteractionsbetween individuals.Therefore,Col-lins's analyticalfocus in The Sociology of Philosophies is not the individualphilosopherbut the small social circles thatmet regularlyand that, if successful, became the core ofinfluential philosophical schools. The celebratedindividualphilosopheris nothing but a"totemicemblem"for thatsocial groupandits spatialandtemporalnetwork.Forexample,the imposing figure of Hegel only stands in for the Jena-Weimarcreative circle, whichwas made up of at least 30 individuals.Even intellectual creativity is not a function of the individual but of the group as itbuilds networks of interactionsthat spreadout in both time and space. The successfulgroupdraws in new recruits,chargesthem with creativeenergy,andguides them into themost importantnew debates.Prolific philosophersareproductsof these circles of creativ-ity and of chains of significant teachersand students.



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SOCIOLOGICALTHEORYINTERACTIONRITUALSAND EMOTIONSAccording to Collins, the main function of these groups is not cognitive but emotional.Emotions have a physiological basis, but they also serve a social function.They producemoralsolidarity.Theemotions associatedwith ritualizedgroup nteractions onstitutemicro-mechanisms that explain the patternsof actions that make up social structures.Collinscalls these encounters nteractionrituals (IRs). They generatethe central eaturesof socialorganization-authority, property,and groupmembership-by creatingand reproducingbinding culturalsymbols and associatedemotionalenergies.In order o clarifythe roleof emotionsin moralsolidarity,Collins distinguishesbetweenthree differenttypes of emotions. Firstare the transientemotions, such as anger, oy, fear,and so on, that can become the focus of IRs. Second, there is emotionalenergy,the moti-vational arousalthat fuels the creativityand drive of individualswho participate n IRs.Finally, there is the emotion of moral solidarity that is producedby the IR and that isusually attachedto groupsymbols. Collins often does not differentiatebetween these lasttwo since they arethe subjectiveand social sides of the same experience,the IR.IRs buildon a shared ransientemotionand focus the attentionof a groupon a commonobject or action. Individualswho participate n IRs are filled with emotionalenergy.Thisis the attractionof IRs-they chargeindividualsup "like an electricbattery,giving themacorrespondingdegreeof enthusiasm owardrituallycreatedsymbolic goals when they areout of the presence of the group"(Collins 1998:23). ThroughIRs, participantsbegin tofeel a moralobligationto one another,andthis obligation becomes symbolized by what-ever they focus on duringthe IR. These symbols connect the emotions of solidarity tosocial structures.The term interactionritual comes from Goffman(1967), but the use to which Collinsputs it is mainly inspired by Durkheim([1912] 1965). The religious ritualsthatDurkheimdescribedare "archetypesof interactionswhich bind membersinto a moral community,andwhich createsymbols thatact as lenses throughwhich membersview theirworld,andas codes by which they communicate" Collins 1998:21). Goffman'scontributionwas topresentthe rituals as both local andubiquitous.Collins makes two furtheradditions:first,thatIRs areessentially emotionaland, second, thatthey generateconflict since the resul-tant solidaritiesareproducedvariouslyand discontinuouslythroughoutsociety.Philosophersparticipate n such IRs as lectures,conferences,discussions, and debates.These gatherthe intellectual community,focus members'attentionon a common objectand transientemotion, produceemotions of solidarity,chargethe participantswith emo-tional energy,andgive rise to philosophical schools. Since IRs producesolidarityonly inlocal groups-rather thanin all of society oreven an entirediscipline-they also give riseto the conflict of competing schools.Accordingto Collins, whatis significantaboutthese IRs is not the manifestsubjectbutthe fact that it serves as a focus for attentionandemotionalinvolvement.Traditionally,heIRs of philosophershave attempted o produce ruth.Whatever ts intrinsicvalue, this truthalso functions as Durkheim's([1912] 1965) sacredobjects, that is, as collective symbolsthatappear o transcend ndividuals,constrainbehavior,and demandrespect.The partic-ulartruthrepresents he solidarityof the groupandenergizes those who participate n itsproduction.The storeof collective symbolscanbe understoodas a type of culturalcapital.The mostimportantculturalcapitalfor the philosopher s that which facilitatesthe creationof novelsymbols that become candidatesfor new collective truths.This requiresa knowledge ofprevious collective symbols and the relationshipsthroughwhich they were createdanddistributed.Such collective symbols also facilitate subsequentIRs since they energize a

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COLLINS'SSOCIOLOGYOF PHILOSOPHIESAND SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY 95group of individuals who value the same symbols. IRs may reaffirmprevious truths,orthey often create new ones, but, whetherreverential or iconoclastic, IRs create a chainconnecting previousIRs to future ones.

Because of their cumulative effect, Collins (1987) suggests that we should look atinteractionritual chains. Throughtheir history of ritual participation,people acquire apersonalrepertoireof culturalcapital loaded with significance for the group. They alsoacquirea store of emotionalenergythatprovides,amongotherthings, a motivation to puttheir culturalcapital to use. Collins (1998:24) contends that the meshing of these inter-action ritualchains"constituteseverythingthat s social structuren all its myriadshapes."This meshingcan be analyzedas a network of interactionchains"crisscrossingeach otherin space as they flow along in time" (Collins 1981:998).The conceptof IRs is only presented n the abstractby Collins, and in TheSociology ofPhilosophies, he never offers a single concrete case taken from memoirs or diaries of alecture,conference, discussion,ordebate whereparticipantsdescribe the sort of emotionalcontent and results that Collins's theory assumes. Nevertheless, Collins does provide uswith manyexamples of interactionritualchains in philosophy,and it is at this meso leveland the macro level of the intellectual field that we begin to see the fruits of Collins'sapproach.CONFLICTAND THE LAWOF SMALL NUMBERSCollins's sociology combines a micro theoryof emotional solidaritywith a macro theorybased on conflict. Collins believes that the same processes thatproduce solidarityon themicro level produce conflict on the macro. The culturalcapital, emotional energy, andgroup solidaritiesproduced n IRs allow individuals to dominate hierarchiesand encour-age groupsto engage in concerted conflict. IRs are both a site where domination s prac-ticed and a supplierof the majorweapons used in social conflict.In philosophy,IRs provide for the competitive appropriation nd elaborationof accu-mulated intellectualcapital. Divergentphilosophical schools emerge out of different setsof IRs andcompetefor the limited resourcesnecessaryto intellectualproduction.Accord-ing to Collins, the structureof the intellectual world allows only a limited number ofpositions to receive much attention at any one time. Once a small number of niches areoccupied, it is extremely difficult for a new philosophical school to get the necessarymaterialresources, culturalcapital, and intellectual attention,especially since there arefirst-moveradvantages(Collins 1998:532). Collins's study suggests thatonly three to sixactive philosophical schools are able to reproducethemselves for more than one or twogenerations.He calls this the "law of small numbers."Although the actual values for the law of small numbers are determinedthroughhis-torical research,the necessity of having an upperand a lower limit can be derived fromCollins'sconflicttheory.Theupper imit is a functionof competition or material esources,culturalcapital, intellectualattention,and the need to attracta criticalmass of followers.The lower limit is due to the intimate link between conflict and intellectual creativity.According to Collins, creativity emerges from conflict and so will not occur without atleast two positions, andwherever there aretwo positions, a third s always availablesince"aplague on both houses is always a viable intellectualstrategy" Collins 1998:81).The law of small numbersproducesa structural ivalry n the intellectual field. Creativ-ity appears n twos or threes as intellectualmovementsrestructure he attentionspace bydeveloping opposing positions.The attentionspace divides along whatCollins calls "deeptroubles," hatis, those incorrigibleproblemsthatshapethe oppositional space that rivalscan occupy. Conflict under the law of small numbersencourages creativity along exploit-



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SOCIOLOGICALTHEORYable lines of oppositionin two differentways: First,the creativityinvolved in creatingorincreasing he distinctivenessof aphilosophicalposition;andsecond,thecreativity nvolvedin synthesis. The first type of creativity tends to occur in strong intellectual movementsand the second type in weak movements.This approach, or example, allows Collins to challenge the stereotypicalview of slowchange andconservatismin the religious philosophies of India. He demonstrates, nstead,often radical philosophical views presentedin the name of traditionalreinterpretations.Forexample, as the Buddhist materialbase weakened in the seventhandeighthcenturies,Hinduphilosophies begin to producefertile rivalries structuredby deep troubles aroundrealism and monotheism. There was a double revolution-first the Mimamsarevolution,which in the name of a conservative defense of ritualscreateda realistatheismfocusing onmantric ounds.Outof theMimamasan etwork ame the Advaitarevolution,whoseespousalof transcendentalmonismandworldillusion opposedthe Mimamsaphilosophyandstruc-turedthe intellectual divisions for the next generation. By establishingmonastic andedu-cationalinstitutions,the Advaita movementprovidedthe materialbase for these new linesof opposition to colonize the available intellectualattentionspace. On the otherside, wesee the syncretismof weak movements in the non-Advaitaschools, both Hindu andBud-dhist. All of this, however,has been covered over by the movements' own presentationoftheirhistory as a developmentof traditions.When the attentionspace in a given field is alreadyfull, there is always the possibilityof a segmental restructuring.New fields canemergewith theirseparatematerialresources,cultural capital, and attentionspace. This possibility depends, at the minimum,upon amaterialbase that can provide positions for this new field.

Philosophy,andindeed all intellectualfields, requiresa materialbase, althoughwe cannever understand he field simply as a superstructuraleflection of thatmaterialbase. Inthe modern world, the materialbase of philosophy is found in the universities that arepracticallythe only place of employmentforphilosophers.Before thatphilosophershad torely on patronage. Certainly the different material bases affected the content of thephilosophies-attacks uponthe rich were muchless common under hepatronage ystem-but the more importantandpervasiveeffect is how the materialbase affects the structureof rivalries.Changesin the materialbase can cause internalrealignments hatencourage creativity.Some changes in the material base may differentiallyaffect the established factions. Forexample, the migrationof most naturalphilosophersto the greenerfields of the naturalsciences left thephilosophicalattentionspace opento more varieties of metaphysics.Otherchanges have moregeneraleffects on the field, such as allowing for unrestrained egmen-tal restructuring,which makes it easier to create a new field with autonomous materialresourcesthan it is to create a rival position in the extantfield.All changes in the materialbase aremediatedthroughthe law of small numbers.Thisexplains why political and economic changes rarely determineintellectual ideas, whichhave more to do with exploitable lines of opposition. First,changes occur in the materialbase that supportsthe philosophical field; second, philosophical positions either split oramalgamate n orderto fill the space available to them underthe law of small numbers.

LIMITATIONSOF COLLINS'SMICROTHEORYDespite the insights providedby Collins's conflict theory and the law of small numbers,there are considerable problems with his micro theory of interactionrituals. First, histheory lacks the prime advantagethat Collins sees in a micro approach, ts openness toempiricaltesting. Increases in emotional energy are no more observable than any of the

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COLLINS'SSOCIOLOGYOF PHILOSOPHIESAND SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY 97macrostructures hatCollins labels as nonempiricalabstractions. n an earlierarticle Col-lins (1990b:50) admits as much. "My argument, hatEE [emotionalenergy] builds up ordeclines over a series of interactionritualsdepending upon the ups and downs of one'sexperiences of power and status,is inferential.There is little direct evidence for it."Thereis, of course, the possibility of testimonialevidence for subjectivestates such asemotions, butCollins avoids these in his researches nto philosophy.A numberof philos-ophershave writtenabouttheiremotions;manyhave keptdiaries;butCollins uses no suchtestimonies to show, for example, the greateremotional energy and creativity that somephilosophersexperiencedafter the type of group experiences that Collins would call aninteractionritual.Instead,his indirectevidence is his theory'sabilityto offercausalexpla-nationsfor the professionalsuccesses and careertrajectoriesof differentphilosophers.Forthis, he couples his theoryof IRs to a rationalchoice model.Collins (1993) offers emotionalenergyand emotions of solidarityas theprimary"goods"upon which rational choice explanationscan be made. People predictablymove towardexperiences that provide more of these emotions. Unfortunately,we do not see in hissociology of philosophies any explanationsthat could not be made upon more obviousgrounds.Forexample, we would expect the disciples of productivephilosophersto them-selves be productive just on the basis of the transmission of such cultural capital aspersonal knowledge of the unwrittenhistory of philosophy and a feel for the emergingissues, as well as easier access to what is publicly available. In addition,we would ex-pect the brightest students to be attractedto the more productiveand creative philoso-phers. It is hard to see what Collins's theory of interactionrituals and emotional energyadds to this.

What wouldreally supportCollins's argumentareexamplesof minorphilosopherswithmediocreculturalcapitalattractingaveragestudentswho were nevertheless able to mentorinfluentialphilosophers simply by increasingthe number and intensity of IRs. Unfortu-nately,thereis no attemptto separatethe more obvious influence of culturalcapitalfromthe effects of IRs on emotionalenergy.It is possible thatCollins is not able to performsuch a test because of the vague way inwhich he defines emotions and IRs. For Collins, emotions are the residualcategory forwhat is not rational.His (1981:994) argument or the necessity of an emotional dimensionto social order is simply that social order cannot be completely explained by rationaldecisions. He therefore umps togetherall tacitknowledge, bodily skills, andintuitions,aswell as Foucault'sdisciplines (1979), Bourdieu's habitus (1977), and Schutz's lifeworld(1967). His notion of an IR is equally encompassing,includingthe most "rudimentary ctof speaking" Collins 1998:47).Andjust as anyinteractioncan be called a ritual,any topicof conversationcan be considereda sacredobject.Withthis he stretchesDurkheim's nsightbeyond believability.Collins's use of emotions is partof his attemptto establish a scientific sociology thatcan minimize the role of interpretivemeaning. Emotions are describedas separatefromtheir interpretation,which is merely a secondaryeffect with no behavioralconsequences(Collins 1981:1008). We see this throughoutCollins's career,from his (1975:111) decla-rationthat we must challenge the "sentimentalnotion that social behavior is inherentlymeaningful,"to his (1986) selective appropriationsof Weber without any discussion ofVerstehen,o the avoidance,mentionedabove, of using testimonies as evidence to supporthis sociology of philosophies.Collins gives us no idea of what an emotion separate rom its interpretationwould be.He suggests thatthere is a quantityof energy that is analyticallydistinct from any inter-pretation,but even if we found a way to reduce qualitativelydifferentemotions to theirquantitativeexchange values, this is not enoughto establishthe autonomyof the emotion



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SOCIOLOGICALTHEORYfrom its interpretation.Far from being an inconsequentialsecondaryeffect, doesn't theinterpretation rive the emotionalenergy?How else can we explainthe diverseeffects thatan IR has on the various participants?In fact, philosophy conferences provide a fittingexample of an IR from which some would derive high emotional energy while othersmight find boredom anddepression.If emotionsareinextricablyboundup with interpretations,henonly very loose rationalchoice explanationscan be based upon them. The high emotionalenergyderived from anIR could be transformed nto the low energy associated with depressionby a posteventreinterpretation f the meaningof the IR. We could not simply trace a philosopher'spaththrougha series of objectively defined IRs withouttryingto understand he meaningthatthe IR held for the particularphilosopher n thatparticularsocial context. The categoryofemotions would retain an importantrole in explaining social action, but it would not befundamental.Moreimportant han the quantityof emotionalenergywould be the way thatan IR and its symbols stabilize the meaningof that emotionalenergy.COROLLARIESFROM THE LAWOF SMALLNUMBERS AND THEIRAPPLICATIONTO SOCIOLOGICALTHEORYDespite these problemswith his microsociology,Collins's conflict perspectiveand his lawof smallnumbers ead to a numberof importantnsightsforthe sociology of an intellectualfield, including sociological theory.Collins, showing admirablerestraint, ollows only afew of those insights into his own terrain of sociological theory. Nevertheless, there isnothing to keep those of us who have never been overly burdenedby restraint rom thisendeavor.Before we can proceedwith that,however,we need to look at the emergenceofwhat Collins (1994) calls "high-consensus, rapid-discoveryscience," because Collins'smacroanalysesof science and philosophy are distinct and it is not quite clear into whichrealmsociological theorywould fit.Accordingto Collins, high-consensus,rapid-discoveryscience has escaped the law ofsmall numbers o which philosophyis in thrall.This occurredbecausecompetitionfor theattentionspace in scientific fields has moved from conflict over basic concepts to conflictover a fast-moving researchfront. Scientific fields achieve a greaterconsensus on basicconcepts because of an ability to build networks not only of people but also of researchtechnologies. Consensus is achievedthroughthe authorityof "physical practices,embod-ied in materialequipment"(Collins 1998:538). The progressivechain of technical inno-vations makesdiscoveriesrepeatableandtransportable, ndthis,alongwiththeequipment'smaterialpresence, fosters a consensus thatmere ideas can never achieve. Because of thisconsensus on old issues, competitionfor the attentionspace is focused on new discoveriesusing the latest equipment.Hence we have a convincing explanationfor the two mostnoticeablecharacteristicsof Westernscience, a rapidlymovingresearch ront eaving in itswake a high consensus about demonstrated acts and fruitful theories.Sociology clearly is not now a high-consensus, rapid-discovery science. Collins(1998:876) sees sociology in a kind of "limbo"between philosophy and science in thatitencompasses empirical investigation but still lacks the consensus and hence the rapiddiscovery of a field that has escaped the law of small numbers.He nevertheless believesthat sociology has the potential to be a rapid-discoveryscience, and, in line with hisanalysis, he places his hope in the technicizing of sociology. But Collins is unable toexplain why the naturalsciences developed researchtechnologies able to produce highconsensus and sociology did not except as a historical accident.Even if this were a satis-factory explanation,it appearsto be contraryto the historicalrecord.Sociology, in fact,has developed researchtechnologies, buthigh consensus has not developed aroundthem.

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COLLINS'S SOCIOLOGYOF PHILOSOPHIESAND SOCIOLOGICALTHEORY 99Most notably, sociology has developed mathematical echniquesthat, in another con-text, Collins (1998:538-42) himself convincingly arguesare a type of research technol-ogy. However,whendiscussing sociology,he contends hatstatistics sjust themanipulationof data ratherthan a method of producing new data. But this seems a rather straineddistinction. Doesn't the formula for a standarddeviationproducea new datum,or areweto assume that the standarddeviation is already lying around n the Platonicspace of thedata set? In addition,how would Collins explain why statistics used in biological infor-matics is able to producea high-consensus, rapid-discoveryscience but in sociology it isnot?Again, the problemin Collins's analysis can be traced to the missing categoryof inter-pretation.It would seem that the interpretivenature of social facts makes it difficult tostabilizea consensus with a research echnology in the sameway as in the natural ciences.Collins neverengages thepowerfularguments e.g., Habermas1988) thata science whosebasic data areirreducibly nterpretivecannot be technicized.

But whatever our differences on the potentialof sociology, Collins and I both agree thatsociological theory today is structuredby the same types of conflicts that he diagnoses inthe history of philosophy. Consequently, hree corollaries from the law of small numbersalso apply to sociological theory.First,since structural onflict drivescreativity,we wouldexpect thata single orthodoxyfor more than a couple of generations would stifle creativity (Collins 1998:380), and,indeed, the historicalrecord in sociology seems to bear this out. Certainly,we see this incomparingthe theoreticallysterile enforced Marxism of the formerSoviet Union to theproductivenessof Marxismin the West, where it has been underconstantchallenge. Andwe should note that the creativity of American sociology has been markedby almostconstant theoreticalconflict. We areso used to this conflict that it is easy to forgetthattheone case of theoreticaldominancethatAmericansociology has known-Talcott Parsons'sstructural-functionalism-lasted less than 20 years,coming to dominance afterWorldWarII andbeing subjectedto witheringattackby the early 1960s.Second, since positions are drivenby conflict and need to differentiate hemselves fromthe competition, we would expect to see a great deal of innovation in even the mostintellectuallyconservativemovements(Collins 1998:381).As in philosophy,we also see arevolutionarycreativity in the returnto "traditional" ociology. We need only think ofAlexander's innovations under cover of a returnto Parsons or Habermas'snovel "refor-mulation"of the Frankfurtschool against the postmoderncritique. In fact, it is hard tothink of an innovativesociological theorythat has not involved, at least to some degree, areturnto classical sources. This would include Collins's returnto Weber(Collins 1986)and Durkheim(Collins 1988).Third,we wouldexpect the exportingandimportingof ideas,either from otherculturesor other fields, to have an effect upon creativity and the availability of niches in theattentionspace (Collins 1998:446-50). The importationof ideas from a single source,especially a simple translationwithout elaboration,takes up a segment of the attentionspace that could have been used by novel movements. However, importingideas frommultiplesources andelaborating hemto fit within the structural ivalriesof the receivingfield encouragescreativity. Similarly, exportingideas opens up new areasin the attentionspace of the receiving culture andnew sources of conflict.In the matterof importingandexportingideas, it seems to me thatsociological theoryhas done much worse than philosophy. Exchange theory has importedfrom behavioralpsychology in a creative way, Luhmann rom general systems theoryandrationalchoicefrom economics, but, for the most part, sociological theory has been rather nsular,pre-



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SOCIOLOGICALTHEORYferring to mine its own classics. In exporting, it has done even more poorly. Fields thathave recently expressedan interestin theorizing society, such as movementsin literatureandin art,have practically gnoredthe sociological work thathasbeen done in those areas.

Collins's own work demonstrates both of these deficits. One of the most influentialsocial theories outside of sociology has been postmoderntheory.The receptionin main-streamsociological theoryhas tended to be defensive (Ritzerand Goodmanforthcoming).Collins (1992), for example, wrote a blisteringattackon postmodernism hatneverquotesor even cites a postmodernistand thatpresentsonly the broadest caricatureof the post-modernposition. One could not imagine such a cavalier dismissal of a theoretical move-mentbeing printed f the movement hadoriginatedwithin sociology. Conversely,Collins'swork has been received outside of sociology with a deafening silence. Forexample, it hasbeen almost two years since the publicationof The Sociology of Philosophies, and it hasyet to receive a review in any of the mainstreamphilosophy journals.1Despite these similarities withphilosophy,therearesome reservationsaboutthewhole-sale applicationof the law of small numbersto sociology. We should remember hat this"law"is, in fact, a historicalobservationand that its upperlimits in particularcannot bederived directly from the theory. In this, there may be an importantdifference betweenphilosophy and currentsociology. In most of the philosophical movements that Collinsstudied, the focus was upon the productionof a single truth,and the idea of a pluralityoftruths was a marginalposition. The situation is not the same in sociology, which hasmoved towardvaluing and even encouraging pluralism.It is quite likely thatsuch a fieldcanfunctionwith a higherupper imit fordividing its attentionspace,and, indeed,it wouldbe difficult to point to only six major sociological schools.

CONCLUSIONThe Sociology of Philosophies is an importantbut flawed book. That the flawed and theimportantshould divide so easily along the micro-macro ine is disturbingfor one whobelieves in the necessity of linking micro and macro theories. It could be that there issomethingin our insulardisciplinaritythat makes it so difficult to achieve this synthesis.Whether it is emotions from psychology, rational choice from economics, or the frag-mented self from postmodernism, sociological theorists are too inclined to ignore thecomplexity outside our discipline andto borrowoverly simplistic versions of microtheo-ries from otherfields.Whateverthe micro theory,I don't believe we will be able to simplify away the cat-egory of interpretation.Despite their scientific messiness, interpretationsare an irreduc-ible partof sociology. Really, though,this is not the point aboutwhich an argumentneedsto be made.All sociologists, includingCollins, alreadyengage in interpretations.Collins'sanalysis of philosophy, for example, is full of interpretations.The argumentthat appar-ently must be made is that interpretationsarejust as fundamental or the social actor asthey arefor the sociological theorist.In otherwords,the micro-macro ink must include alink between the macrointerpretationsf the sociologist and the everyday microinterpre-tations of actors. This would have been a richer and more satisfying book had Collinsincluded an empiricalexaminationof the interpretiveexperiences of philosophers.Collins himself has quite recently provided a counterexampleto the anti-interpretiveapproachused in The Sociology of Philosophies. His (2000) article, "SituationalStratifi-cation: A Micro-MacroTheoryof Inequality,"dropsthe focus on anobjectivedefinitionof

'Since this review was written,there hasbeen a review symposiumin Philosophyof the Social Sciences (30:2)and an insightfulreview essay in Journalof the Historyof the BehavioralSciences (36:2), but,despite theirfinework, these are usually not seen as mainstreamphilosophyjournals.

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COLLINS'S SOCIOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHIES AND SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 101emotions embedded in a rational choice analysis and does a sensitive reading of the rela-tion between everyday microinterpretations of hierarchy and the macrointerpretations ofsociologists. It is the mark of a great theorist that he produces his own critique.

REFERENCESBen-David, Joseph, and Randall Collins. 1966. "Social Factorsin the Originsof a New Science: The Case of

Psychology."AmericanSociological Review 31:451-67.Bourdieu,Pierre.1977. Outlineof a Theoryof Practice. Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress.Collins, Randall. 1975. Conflict Sociology: Towardan ExplanatoryScience. New York:Academic Press..1981. "On the Microfoundationsof Macrosociology."AmericanJournalof Sociology 86:984-1014.1982. Sociological Insight:An Introduction o Non-ObviousSociology. Oxford,England:Oxford Uni-versity Press..1986. WeberianSociological Theory.Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversityPress..1987. "InteractionRitualChains, Power,andProperty:The Micro-MacroConnectionas anEmpiricallyBasedTheoreticalProblem." n TheMicro-MacroLink193-206, editedby J.Alexander,B. Giesen,R. Munch,andN. Smelser. Los Angeles, CA: Universityof California Press.. 1988. "The DurkheimianTradition n ConflictSociology."InDurkheimianSociology: CulturalStudies107-28, edited by J. Alexander.Cambridge,England:Universityof CambridgePress.. 1990a."ConflictTheoryand the Advance of Macro-HistoricalSociology."In Frontiersof Social Theory:The New Syntheses68-87, editedby George Ritzer. New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress.. 1990b. "Stratification,EmotionalEnergy,and the Transient Emotions." In Research Agendas in the

Sociology of Emotions27-57, editedby T. Kemper.Albany,NY: SUNY.. 1992. "TheConfusionof the Modes of Sociology."In Postmodernismand Social Theory:The Debateover General Theory179-98, edited by S. SeidmanandD. Wagner.Cambridge,MA: Blackwell.. 1993. "EmotionalEnergyas the Common Denominatorof RationalAction."Rationalityand Society5:203-30.. 1994. "Whythe Social Sciences Won't Become High-Consensus,Rapid-DiscoveryScience."Sociolog-ical Forum9:155-77.

.1998. TheSociologyof Philosophies:A GlobalTheoryof IntellectualChange. Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress.2000. "SituationalStratification:A Micro-MacroTheoryof Inequality."Sociological Theory18:17-43.Durkheim,Emile. [1912] 1965. TheElementaryFormsof Religious Life. New York:Free Press.Foucault,Michel. 1979. Discipline and Punish: The Birthof the Prison. New York:Vintage.Goffman,Erving. 1967. InteractionRitual:Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior. GardenCity,NY: Anchor.Habermas,Jiirgen.1988. On the Logic of the Social Sciences. Cambridge,MA: MIT Press.Mouzelis,Nicos. 1995.Sociological Theory:WhatWentWrong?Diagnosis and Remedies.New York:Routledge.Ritzer,George,andDouglasGoodman.Forthcoming."PostmodernTheory." nHandbookof Sociological Theory,edited by J.Turner.New York:Plenum.Schutz,Alfred. 1967. ThePhenomenology of the Social World.Evanston,IL: NorthwesternUniversityPress.

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