EN BANC

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO,Petitioner,

- versus -

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS,

Respondents.X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI,

Petitioners,

- versus -

THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR,

Respondent.X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, Petitioner-in-Intervention.

X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

G.R. No. 170338

G.R. No. 179275

Present: PUNO, C.J.,QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,CARPIO,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CORONA,*

CARPIO MORALES,AZCUNA,TINGA,CHICO-NAZARIO,

** On leave.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES,

Respondents-Intervenors.

VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, REYES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, andBRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 23, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped

conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-

ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They

captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy

that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in

the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as

the “Hello Garci” tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to

COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of

the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of

heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of

Congress.1[1]

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority

Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, “Tale of Two

1[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 168.

Tapes,” and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the

Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and

Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and

Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several

versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National

Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and

the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the

respondent House Committees seven alleged “original” tape recordings of the

supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate

by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings,

the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House.2[2]

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend

the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports

based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.3[3]

Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano

(Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with

Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4[4]

docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be

restrained from using these tape recordings of the “illegally obtained” wiretapped

conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further

implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off

2[2] Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), pp. 7-9.3[3] Id. at 9.4[4] Id. at 1-38.

the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist

from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.5[5]

Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the

“Garci tapes” abruptly stopped.

After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the

slumbering issue with a privilege speech, “The Lighthouse That Brought

Darkness.” In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public “the

whole unvarnished truth — the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s” of the

alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of

telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.

On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was

referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by

Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills6[6] seeking to regulate

the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed

Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7[7]

In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued

when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008[8] if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry

on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a

privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely

5[5] Id. at 36-38.6[6] Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 215-220.7[7] Id. at 169.8[8] An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communications and for Other Purposes.

bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the “Hello

Garci” tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role

of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or

other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9[9]

On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili,

retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for

Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or

Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10[10] docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar

the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the

main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3,

Article III of the Constitution.11[11]

As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its

public hearings on the “Hello Garci” tapes on September 7,12[12] 1713[13] and

October 1,14[14] 2007.

Intervening as respondents,15[15] Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno

Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda,

M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment16[16] on

the petition on September 25, 2007.

9[9] Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 169-170.10[10] Id. at 3-17.11[11] Id. at 7-13.12[12] Id. at 24.13[13] Id. at 44.14[14] Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, p. 6.15[15] Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 68-70.16[16] Id. at 71-90.

The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17[17]

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and

one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its

hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18[18]

On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338

and 179275.19[19]

It may be noted that while both petitions involve the “Hello Garci”

recordings, they have different objectives—the first is poised at preventing the

playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee

reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry

on the wiretapped conversation.

The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the

second, G.R. No. 179275.

- I -

17[17] Id. at 62. The Court identified the following issues for discussion in the October 2, 2007 Oral Argument:1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring this suit.2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate Committees governing the conduct of

inquiries in aid of legislation have been published, in accordance with Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Corollarily:(a) Whether these Rules must be published by every Congress.(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the constitutional requirement.

3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called “Garci tapes,” violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic Act No. 4200. (Id. at 66.)

18[18] Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention filed on October 26, 2007.19[19] Resolution dated November 20, 2007.

Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the

issue on the parties’ standing, argued at length in their pleadings.

In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20[20] we explained that “‘[l]egal standing’ or

locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party

has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental

act x x x,” thus,

generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21[21]

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has “alleged such a personal

stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness

which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends

for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”22[22]

However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the

Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v.

Macapagal-Arroyo23[23] articulates that a “liberal policy has been observed,

allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to

prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and

rulings.”24[24] The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25[25] even permitted a non-

member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the 20[20] 465 Phil. 385, 402 (2004).21[21] Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, id. 22[22] Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736, 755.23[23] G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.24[24] David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, id. at 218.25[25] G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 441.

outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the

National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed

the current policy that “this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield

procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal

questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Court’s duty

under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of

government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the

laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.”26[26]

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the

petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the “Hello Garci” tapes.

Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the respondent committees

as one of the voices in the recordings.27[27] Obviously, therefore, petitioner

Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees’ actions and

charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the

petition for prohibition.

In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing

by alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP.

They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use the “Hello Garci” tapes will

further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public

funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are

worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the

blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative

inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.28[28]

26[26] Id.27[27] Reply in G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.28[28] Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 4.

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering

that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only

of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure

Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation

which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing

the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the

questioned hearings.29[29]

Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the

execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to

due process,30[30] they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the

controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.

Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of

Representatives,31[31] we find sufficient petitioners Ranada’s and Agcaoili’s and

intervenor Sagge’s allegation that the continuous conduct by the Senate of the

questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of public

funds.32[32] It should be noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice

Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the

House of Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein

for, as in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own rights—as

taxpayers, members of Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and

29[29] Petition-in-Intervention, p. 3.30[30] David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 23, at 223.31[31] 460 Phil. 830 (2003).32[32] Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, id. at 897.

members of the bar and of the legal profession—which were also supposedly

violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33[33]

Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the

petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the

attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as

precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to

the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the

guidance of all.34[34]

Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it

has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court

recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor

Sagge.

- II -

The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and

academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the

exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and

resolution of actual cases and controversies.35[35] By actual cases, we mean existing

conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or

anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory

33[33] Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra note 31, at 895.34[34] Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 139.35[35] Dumlao v. COMELEC, 184 Phil. 369, 377 (1980). This case explains the standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the power of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.

opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions

because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal

questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.36[36] Neither will the

Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be

granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.37[37] It is

unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot

question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the

nature of things, cannot be enforced.38[38]

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as

aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House

Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the same in their

committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records

of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were already

played in the House and heard by its members.39[39] There is also the widely

publicized fact that the committee reports on the “Hello Garci” inquiry were

completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees. 40

[40] Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be

dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive

remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide

a remedy for an act already accomplished.41[41]

36[36] La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860, 889-890 (2004).37[37] Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 and 139565, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 13, 46.38[38] Lanuza, Jr. v. Yuchengco, G.R. No. 157033, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 130, 138.39[39] Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), p. 9.40[40] See news article “Separate findings, no closure” by Michael Lim Umbac published in The Philippine Daily Inquirer on March 29, 2006; News item “5 House committees in ‘Garci’ probe file report on Monday” published in The Manila Bulletin on March 25, 2006.41[41] Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994, 229 SCRA 117, 135-136; Agustin v. De la Fuente, 84 Phil. 515, 517 (1949).

- III -

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate

cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative

inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the

constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that

“[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees

may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published

rules of procedure.” The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy

the basic requirements of due process.42[42] Publication is indeed imperative, for it

will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the

transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a

constructive one.43[43] What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the

Civil Code, which provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following

the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper

of general circulation in the Philippines.”44[44]

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on

oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of

Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995

and in 2006.45[45] With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however,

of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort 42[42] Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 679.43[43] Tañada v. Tuvera, 220 Phil. 422, 432-433 (1985).44[44] As amended on June 18, 1987 by Executive Order No. 200 entitled “Providing for the Publication of Laws Either in the Official Gazette or in a Newspaper of General Circulation in the Philippines as a Requirement for their Effectivity”.45[45] Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 179; Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, pp. 9-10.

was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their

session.

Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri

v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46[46]

we said:

Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the “duly published rules of procedure.” We quote the OSG’s explanation:

The phrase “duly published rules of procedure” requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion,

reinforces this ruling with the following rationalization:

The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to “constitute a quorum to do business.” Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of

46[46] G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 135-136.

Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47[47]

The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48[48] (On

the Motion for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:

On the nature of the Senate as a “continuing body,” this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:

RULE XLIVUNFINISHED BUSINESS

SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same status.

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure) states:

47[47] Id. at 297-298.48[48] Dated September 4, 2008.

RULE LIAMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES

SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.

The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for its approval.

RULE LIIDATE OF TAKING EFFECT

SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed.

Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.

However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state “(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.” The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.

The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.

If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated

publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and,

despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and

accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.49[49]

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules

cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of

Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more,

that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in

accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any

distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision.

The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom,

practice or tradition followed by the Senate.

Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is

illuminating:

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules “shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation,” precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.

49[49] TSN, Oral Arguments, March 4, 2008, (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 413-414.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,

otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim

of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792

considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional

equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the

law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of

electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the

internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could

not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative

inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of

legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the

publication of the rules, because it can do so only “in accordance with its duly

published rules of procedure.”

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of

Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues

of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the

recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited

by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the

legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the

respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear

contravention of the Constitution.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the

other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the

petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued

enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its

committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the

“Hello Garci” tapes.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAssociate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZAssociate Justice

(On Leave)RENATO C. CORONA

Associate JusticeCONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNAAssociate Justice

DANTE O. TINGAAssociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYESAssociate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTROAssociate Justice

ARTURO D. BRIONAssociate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

DIAMOND v. DIEHR, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) 450 U.S. 175

DIAMOND, COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS v. DIEHR ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT

APPEALS.

No. 79-1112.

Argued October 14, 1980. Decided March 3, 1981.

Respondents filed a patent application claiming invention for a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products. While it was possible, by using well-known time, temperature, and cure relationships, to calculate by means of an established mathematical equation when to open the molding press and remove the cured product, according to respondents the industry had not been able to measure precisely the temperature inside the press, thus making it difficult to make the necessary computations to determine the proper cure time. Respondents characterized their contribution to the art to reside in the process of constantly measuring the temperature inside the mold and feeding the temperature measurements into a computer that repeatedly recalculates the cure time by use of the mathematical equation and then signals a device to open the press at the proper time. The patent examiner rejected respondents' claims on the ground that they were drawn to nonstatutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101, which provides for the issuance of patents to "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof . . . ." The Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals agreed, but the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed.

Held:

Respondents' claims recited subject matter that was eligible for patent protection under 101. Pp. 181-193.

(a) For purposes of 101, a "process" is "an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. . . . The machinery pointed out as suitable to perform the process may or may not be new or patentable." Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 . Industrial processes such as respondents' claims for transforming raw, uncured synthetic rubber into a different state or thing are the types which have historically been eligible to receive patent-law protection. Pp. 181-184. (b) While a mathematical formula, like a law of nature, cannot be the subject of a patent, cf. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 ; Parker v. [450 U.S. 175, 176]   Flook, 437 U.S. 584 , respondents do not seek to patent a mathematical formula, but instead seek protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Although their process employs a well-known mathematical equation, they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation, except in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process. A claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer. Respondents' claims must be considered as a whole, it being inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. The questions of whether a particular invention meets the "novelty" requirements of 35 U.S.C. 102 or the

"nonobviousness" requirements of 103 do not affect the determination of whether the invention falls into a category of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection under 101. Pp. 185-191. (c) When a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies the formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e. g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies 101's requirements. Pp. 191-193.

602 F.2d 982, affirmed.

REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, WHITE, and POWELL, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 193.

Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Litvack, Harriet S. Shapiro, Robert B. Nicholson, Frederic Freilicher, Joseph F. Nakamura, and Thomas E. Lynch.

Robert E. Wichersham argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Robert F. Hess, Jay M. Cantor, and Thomas M. Freiburger. *  

[ Footnote * ] Edward S. Irons, Mary Helen Sears, and Robert P. Beshar filed a brief for National Semiconductor Corp. as amicus curiae urging reversal.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Donald R. Dunner, Kenneth E. Kuffner, and Travis Gordon White for the American Patent [450 U.S. 175, 177]   Law Association, Inc.; by Morton C. Jacobs for Applied Data Research, Inc.; by William L. Mathis and Harold D. Messner for Chevron Research Co.; and by Reed C. Lawlor and James W. Geriak for the Los Angeles Patent Law Association. [450 U.S. 175, 177]  

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to determine whether a process for curing synthetic rubber which includes in several of its steps the use of a mathematical formula and a programmed digital computer is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101.

I

The patent application at issue was filed by the respondents on August 6, 1975. The claimed invention is a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products. The process uses a mold for precisely shaping the uncured material under heat and pressure and then curing the synthetic rubber in the mold so that the product will retain its shape and be functionally operative after the molding is completed. 1

Respondents claim that their process ensures the production of molded articles which are properly cured. Achieving the perfect cure depends upon several factors including the thickness of the article to be molded, the temperature of the molding process, and the amount of time that the article is allowed to remain in the press. It is possible using well-known time, temperature, and cure relationships to calculate by means of the Arrhenius equation 2 when to open the press [450 U.S. 175, 178]   and remove the cured product. Nonetheless, according to the respondents, the industry has not been able to obtain uniformly accurate cures because the temperature of the molding press could not be precisely measured, thus making it difficult to do the necessary computations to determine

cure time. 3 Because the temperature inside the press has heretofore been viewed as an uncontrollable variable, the conventional industry practice has been to calculate the cure time as the shortest time in which all parts of the product will definitely be cured, assuming a reasonable amount of mold-opening time during loading and unloading. But the shortcoming of this practice is that operating with an uncontrollable variable inevitably led in some instances to overestimating the mold-opening time and overcuring the rubber, and in other instances to underestimating that time and undercuring the product. 4  

Respondents characterize their contribution to the art to reside in the process of constantly measuring the actual temperature inside the mold. These temperature measurements are then automatically fed into a computer which repeatedly recalculates the cure time by use of the Arrhenius equation. [450 U.S. 175, 179]   When the recalculated time equals the actual time that has elapsed since the press was closed, the computer signals a device to open the press. According to the respondents, the continuous measuring of the temperature inside the mold cavity, the feeding of this information to a digital computer which constantly recalculates the cure time, and the signaling by the computer to open the press, are all new in the art.

The patent examiner rejected the respondents' claims on the sole ground that they were drawn to nonstatutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101. 5 He determined that those [450 U.S. 175, 180]   steps in respondents' claims that are carried out by a computer under control of a stored program constituted nonstatutory subject matter under this Court's decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). The remaining steps - installing rubber in the press and the subsequent closing of the [450 U.S. 175, 181]   press - were "conventional and necessary to the process and cannot be the basis of patentability." The examiner concluded that respondents' claims defined and sought protection of a computer program for operating a rubber-molding press.

The Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals agreed with the examiner, but the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed. In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 892 (1979). The court noted that a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory because a computer is involved. The respondents' claims were not directed to a mathematical algorithm or an improved method of calculation but rather recited an improved process for molding rubber articles by solving a practical problem which had arisen in the molding of rubber products.

The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks sought certiorari arguing that the decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was inconsistent with prior decisions of this Court. Because of the importance of the question presented, we granted the writ. 445 U.S. 926 (1980).

II

Last Term in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), this Court discussed the historical purposes of the patent laws and in particular 35 U.S.C. 101. As in Chakrabarty, we must here construe 35 U.S.C. 101 which provides:

"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 6   [450 U.S. 175, 182]  

In cases of statutory construction, we begin with the language of the statute. Unless otherwise defined, "words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning," Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979), and, in dealing with the

patent laws, we have more than once cautioned that "courts `should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed.'" Diamond v. Chakrabarty, supra, at 308, quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933).

The Patent Act of 1793 defined statutory subject matter as "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereof]." Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1, 1 Stat. 318. Not until the patent laws were recodified in 1952 did Congress replace the word "art" with the word "process." It is that latter word which we confront today, and in order to determine its meaning we may not be unmindful of the Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act which inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by man." S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952).

Although the term "process" was not added to 35 U.S.C. 101 until 1952, a process has historically enjoyed patent protection because it was considered a form of "art" as that term was used in the 1793 Act. 7 In defining the nature of a patentable process, the Court stated:

"That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the [450 U.S. 175, 183]   particular form of the instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed. . . . A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is an art. The machinery pointed out as suitable to perform the process may or may not be new or patentable; whilst the process itself may be altogether new, and produce an entirely new result. The process requires [450 U.S. 175, 184]   that certain things should be done with certain substances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used in doing this may be of secondary consequence." Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787 -788 (1877).

Analysis of the eligibility of a claim of patent protection for a "process" did not change with the addition of that term to 101. Recently, in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), we repeated the above definition recited in Cochrane v. Deener, adding: "Transformation and reduction of an article `to a different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines." 409 U.S., at 70 .

Analyzing respondents' claims according to the above statements from our cases, we think that a physical and chemical process for molding precision synthetic rubber products falls within the 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. That respondents' claims involve the transformation of an article, in this case raw, uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing cannot be disputed. The respondents' claims describe in detail a step-by-step method for accomplishing such, beginning with the loading of a mold with raw, uncured rubber and ending with the eventual opening of the press at the conclusion of the cure. Industrial processes such as this are the types which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws. 8   [450 U.S. 175, 185]  

III

Our conclusion regarding respondents' claims is not altered by the fact that in several steps of the process a mathematical equation and a programmed digital computer are used. This Court has undoubtedly recognized limits to 101 and every discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms. Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978);

Gottschalk v. Benson, supra, at 67; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). "An idea of itself is not patentable," Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498, 507 (1874). "A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right." Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853). Only last Term, we explained:

"[A] new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2.; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are `manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.'" Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S., at 309 , quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., supra, at 130.

Our recent holdings in Gottschalk v. Benson, supra, and Parker v. Flook, supra, both of which are computer-related, stand for no more than these long-established principles. In Benson, we held unpatentable claims for an algorithm used to convert binary code decimal numbers to equivalent pure binary numbers. The sole practical application of the algorithm was in connection with the programming of a [450 U.S. 175, 186]   general purpose digital computer. We defined "algorithm" as a "procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem," and we concluded that such an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is like a law of nature, which cannot be the subject of a patent. 9  

Parker v. Flook, supra, presented a similar situation. The claims were drawn to a method for computing an "alarm limit." An "alarm limit" is simply a number and the Court concluded that the application sought to protect a formula for computing this number. Using this formula, the updated alarm limit could be calculated if several other variables were known. The application, however, did not purport to explain how these other variables were to be determined, 10 nor [450 U.S. 175, 187]   did it purport "to contain any disclosure relating to the chemical processes at work, the monitoring of process variables, or the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting an alarm system. All that it provides is a formula for computing an updated alarm limit." 437 U.S., at 586 .

In contrast, the respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Their process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation. Rather, they seek only to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process. These include installing rubber in a press, closing the mold, constantly determining the temperature of the mold, constantly recalculating the appropriate cure time through the use of the formula and a digital computer, and automatically opening the press at the proper time. Obviously, one does not need a "computer" to cure natural or synthetic rubber, but if the computer use incorporated in the process patent significantly lessens the possibility of "overcuring" or "undercuring," the process as a whole does not thereby become unpatentable subject matter.

Our earlier opinions lend support to our present conclusion that a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital computer. In Gottschalk v. Benson we noted: "It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not so hold." 409 U.S., at 71 . Similarly, in Parker v. Flook we stated that "a process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm." 437 U.S., at 590 . It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection. See, e. g., Funk Bros. Seed [450 U.S. 175, 188]   Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923);

Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1877); O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62 (1854); and Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156 (1853). As Justice Stone explained four decades ago:

"While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be." Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). 11  

We think this statement in Mackay takes us a long way toward the correct answer in this case. Arrhenius' equation is not patentable in isolation, but when a process for curing rubber is devised which incorporates in it a more efficient solution of the equation, that process is at the very least not barred at the threshold by 101.

In determining the eligibility of respondents' claimed process for patent protection under 101, their claims must be considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim because a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in common use before the combination was made. The "novelty" of any element or steps in a process, or even of the [450 U.S. 175, 189]   process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. 12  

It has been urged that novelty is an appropriate consideration under 101. Presumably, this argument results from the language in 101 referring to any "new and useful" process, machine, etc. Section 101, however, is a general statement of the type of subject matter that is eligible for patent protection "subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." Specific conditions for patentability follow and 102 covers in detail the conditions relating to novelty. 13   [450 U.S. 175, 190]   The question therefore of whether a particular invention is novel is "wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter." In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (CCPA 1979) (emphasis deleted). See also Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898 (CA6 1978). The legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act is in accord with this reasoning. The Senate Report stated:

"Section 101 sets forth the subject matter that can be patented, `subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.' The conditions under which a patent may be obtained follow, and Section 102 covers the conditions relating to novelty." S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952) (emphasis supplied).

It is later stated in the same Report: "Section 102, in general, may be said to describe the statutory novelty required for patentability, and includes, [450 U.S. 175, 191]   in effect, an amplification and definition of `new' in section 101." Id., at 6.

Finally, it is stated in the "Revision Notes": "The corresponding section of [the] existing statute is split into two sections, section 101 relating to the subject matter for which patents may be obtained, and section 102 defining statutory novelty and stating other conditions for patentability." Id., at 17.

See also H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6, 7, and 17 (1952).

In this case, it may later be determined that the respondents' process is not deserving of patent protection because it fails to satisfy the statutory conditions of novelty under 102 or nonobviousness under 103. A rejection on either of these grounds does not affect the determination that respondents' claims recited subject matter which was eligible for patent protection under 101.

IV

We have before us today only the question of whether respondents' claims fall within the 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. We view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula. We recognize, of course, that when a claim recites a mathematical formula (or scientific principle or phenomenon of nature), an inquiry must be made into whether the claim is seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract. A mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). Similarly, insignificant postsolution activity will not transform [450 U.S. 175, 192]   an unpatentable principle into a patentable process. Ibid. 14 To hold otherwise would allow a competent draftsman to evade the recognized limitations on the type of subject matter eligible for patent protection. On the other hand, when a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e. g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of 101. Because we do not view respondents' claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather to be drawn to an industrial process [450 U.S. 175, 193]   for the molding of rubber products, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 15  

It is so ordered.

EN BANC

[A.M. No. CA-05-18-P.  April 12, 2005]

ZALDY NUEZ, complainant, vs. ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the actuations of a few erring court personnel peddling influence to party-litigants, creating the impression that decisions can be bought and sold, ultimately resulting in the disillusionment of the public. This Court has never wavered in its vigilance in eradicating the so-called “bad eggs” in the judiciary.  And whenever warranted by the gravity of the offense, the supreme penalty of dismissal in an administrative case is meted to erring personnel.[1]

The above pronouncement of this Court in the case of Mendoza vs. Tiongson[2] is applicable to the case at bar.

This is an administrative case for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct[3] against Elvira Cruz-Apao (Respondent), Executive Assistant II of the Acting Division Clerk of Court of the Fifteenth (15th) Division, Court of Appeals (CA). The complaint arose out of respondent’s solicitation of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez

(Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of the latter’s pending case in the CA,[4] more particularly, CA-G.R. SP No. 73460 entitled “PAGCOR vs. Zaldy Nuez.”[5] Complainant initially lodged a complaint with the Action Center of the Television program Imbestigador of GMA Network,[6] the crew of which had accompanied him to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission–Special Projects Group (PAOCC-SPG) in Malacañang where he filed a complaint for extortion[7] against respondent. This led to the conduct of an entrapment operation by elements of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) on 28 September 2004 at the Jollibee Restaurant, 2nd

Floor, Times Plaza Bldg., corner Taft and United Nations Avenue, Manila, [8] the place where the supposed hand-over of the money was going to take place.

Respondent’s apprehension by agents of the PAOCTF in the course of the entrapment operation prompted then CA Presiding Justice (PJ) Cancio C. Garcia (now Supreme Court Justice) to issue Office Order No. 297-04-CG [9] (Order) which created an ad-hoc investigating committee (Committee).[10] The Committee was specifically tasked among others to conduct a thorough and exhaustive investigation of respondent’s case and to recommend the proper administrative sanctions against her as the evidence may warrant.[11]

In accordance with the mandate of the Order, the Committee conducted an investigation of the case and issued a Resolution[12] dated 18 October 2004 where it concluded that a prima facie case of Dishonesty and Serious Misconduct against respondent existed. The Committee thus recommended respondent’s preventive suspension for ninety (90) days pending formal investigation of the charges against her.[13] On 28 January 2005, the Committee submitted a Report[14] to the new CA Presiding Justice Romeo A. Brawner with its recommendation that respondent be dismissed from service.

Based on the hearings conducted and the evidence received by the Committee, the antecedent facts are as follows:

Complainant’s case referred to above had been pending with the CA for more than two years.[15] Complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the Civil Service Commission (CSC).  The CSC ordered complainant’s reinstatement but a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order was issued by the CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not reinstated to his former job pending adjudication of the case.[16] Desiring an expeditious decision of his case, complainant sought the assistance of respondent sometime in July 2004 after learning of the latter’s employment with the CA from her sister, Magdalena David. During their first telephone conversation[17] and thereafter through a series of messages they exchanged via SMS, [18]

complainant informed respondent of the particulars of his pending case.  Allegedly, complainant thought that respondent would be able to advise him on how to achieve an early resolution of his case.

However, a week after their first telephone conversation, respondent allegedly told complainant that a favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the person who was to draft the decision was in return asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).[19]

Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind of money since he had been jobless for a long time, to which respondent replied, “Eh, ganoon talaga ang lakaran dito, eh. Kung wala kang pera, pasensiya na.” [20] Complainant then tried to ask for a reduction of the amount but respondent held firm asserting that the price had been set, not by her but by the person who was going to make the decision. [21]  Respondent even admonished complainant with the words “Wala tayo sa palengke iho!”[22] when the latter bargained for a lower amount.[23]

Complainant then asked for time to determine whether or not to pay the money in exchange for the decision. Instead, in August of 2004, he sought the assistance of Imbestigador.[24] The crew of the TV program accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion. [25] Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still asking for the money [26] and to set up a meeting with her.[27]  Upon learning that respondent’s offer of a favorable decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.

On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first time in person at the 2nd Floor of Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg.,[28] the place where the entrapment operation was later conducted.  Patricia Siringan (Siringan), a researcher of Imbestigador, accompanied complainant and posed as his sister-in-law. [29] During the meeting, complainant clarified from respondent that if he gave the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), he would get a favorable decision. This was confirmed by the latter together with the assurance that it would take about a month for the decision to come out.[30] Respondent also explained that the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) guaranteed a favorable decision only in the CA but did not extend to the Supreme Court should the case be appealed later.[31]

When respondent was asked where the money will go, she claimed that it will go to a male researcher whose name she refused to divulge. The researcher was allegedly a lawyer in the CA Fifth (5th) Division where complainant case was pending.[32]   She also claimed that she will not get any part of the money unless the researcher decides to give her some.[33]

Complainant tried once again to bargain for a lower amount during the meeting but respondent asserted that the amount was fixed.  She even explained that this was their second transaction and the reason why the amount was closed at One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was because on a previous occasion, only Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) was paid by the client despite the fact that the amount had been pegged at One Million Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,300,000.00).[34] Complainant then proposed that he pay a down payment of Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) while the balance of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) will be paid once the decision had been released.[35] However, respondent refused to entertain the offer, she and the researcher having learned their lesson from their previous experience for as then, the client no longer paid the balance of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) after the decision had come out.[36]

Complainant brought along copies of the documents pertinent to his case during the first meeting.  After reading through them, respondent allegedly uttered, “Ah, panalo

ka.”[37] The parties set the next meeting date at lunchtime on 28 September 2004 and it was understood that the money would be handed over by complainant to respondent then.[38]

On the pre-arranged meeting date, five (5) PAOCTF agents, namely: Capt. Reynaldo Maclang (Maclang) as team leader, SPO1 Renato Banay (Banay), PO1 Bernard Villena (Villena), PO1 Danny Feliciano, and PO2 Edgar delos Reyes [39] arrived at around 11:30 in the morning at Jollibee. [40] Nuez and Siringan arrived at past noon and seated themselves at the table beside the one occupied by the two (2) agents, Banay and Villena. Complainant had with him an unsealed long brown envelope containing ten (10) bundles of marked money and paper money which was to be given to respondent.[41] The envelope did not actually contain the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) demanded by respondent, but instead contained paper money in denominations of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) and One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), as well as newspaper cut-outs.[42] There were also ten (10) authentic One Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills which had been previously dusted with ultra-violet powder by the PAOCTF.[43] The three other PAOCTF agents were seated a few tables away [44]

and there were also three (3) crew members from Imbestigador at another table operating a mini DV camera that was secretly recording the whole transaction.[45]

Respondent arrived at around 1:00 p.m.[46] She appeared very nervous and suspicious during the meeting.[47] Ironically, she repeatedly said that complainant might entrap her, precisely like those that were shown on Imbestigador.[48] She thus refused to receive the money then and there. What she proposed was for complainant and Siringan to travel with her in a taxi and drop her off at the CA where she would receive the money.[49]

More irony ensued.  Respondent actually said that she felt there were policemen around and she was afraid that once she took hold of the envelope complainant proffered, she would suddenly be arrested and handcuffed.[50] At one point, she even said, “Ayan o, tapos na silang kumain, bakit hindi pa sila umaalis?,”[51] referring to Banay and Villena at the next table. To allay respondent’s suspicion, the two agents stood up after a few minutes and went near the staircase where they could still see what was going on.[52]

Complainant, respondent and Siringan negotiated for almost one hour. [53]  Complainant and Siringan bargained for a lower price but respondent refused to accede.  When respondent finally touched the unsealed envelope to look at the money inside, the PAOCTF agents converged on her and invited her to the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters at United Nations Avenue for questioning. [54] Respondent became hysterical as a commotion ensued inside the restaurant.[55]

On the way to the WPD on board the PAOCTF vehicle, Banay asked respondent why she went to the restaurant. The latter replied that she went there to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).[56]

Respondent was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the WPD where she was tested and found positive for ultra-violet powder that was previously dusted on the money.[57]  She was later detained at the WPD Headquarters.

At seven o’clock in the evening of 28 September 2004, respondent called Atty. Lilia Mercedes Encarnacion Gepty (Atty. Gepty), her immediate superior in the CA at the latter’s house.[58] She tearfully confessed to Atty. Gepty that “she asked for money for a case and was entrapped by police officers and the media.” [59] Enraged at the news, Atty. Gepty asked why she had done such a thing to which respondent replied, “Wala lang ma’am, sinubukan ko lang baka makalusot.”[60] Respondent claimed that she was ashamed of what she did and repented the same.  She also asked for Atty. Gepty’s forgiveness and help. The latter instead reminded respondent of the instances when she and her co-employees at the CA were exhorted during office meetings never to commit such offenses.[61]

Atty. Gepty rendered a verbal report[62] of her conversation with their division’s chairman, Justice Martin S. Villarama.  She reduced the report into writing and submitted the same to then PJ Cancio Garcia on 29 September 2004. [63] She also later testified as to the contents of her report to the Committee.

During the hearing of this case, respondent maintained that what happened was a case of instigation and not an entrapment. She asserted that the offer of money in exchange for a favorable decision came not from her but from complainant. To support her contention, she presented witnesses who testified that it was complainant who allegedly offered money to anyone who could help him with his pending case. She likewise claimed that she never touched the money on 28 September 2004, rather it was Capt. Maclang who forcibly held her hands and pressed it to the envelope containing the money. She thus asked that the administrative case against her be dismissed.

This Court is not persuaded by respondent’s version. Based on the evidence on record, what happened was a clear case of entrapment, and not instigation as respondent would like to claim.

In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of ensnaring and capturing the law-breakers in the execution of their criminal plan.  On the other hand, in instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense, and he himself becomes a co-principal.[64]

In this case, complainant and the law enforcers resorted to entrapment precisely because respondent demanded the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision of the latter’s pending case.  Complainant’s narration of the incidents which led to the entrapment operation are more in accord with the circumstances that actually transpired and are more credible than respondent’s version.

Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the former’s pending case with the CA.  The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence[65] which provides:

“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.”

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, “Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . .” In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import.  Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers.[66] Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant.[67] It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.[68] We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.

Complainant’s testimony as to the discussion between him and respondent on the latter’s demand for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was corroborated by the testimony of a disinterested witness, Siringan, the reporter of Imbestigador who was present when the parties met in person.  Siringan was privy to the parties’ actual conversation since she accompanied complainant on both meetings held on 24 and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee.

Respondent’s evidence was comprised by the testimony of her daughter and sister as well as an acquaintance who merely testified on how respondent and complainant first met.  Respondent’s own testimony consisted of bare denials and self-serving claims that she did not remember either the statements she herself made or the contents of the messages she sent.  Respondent had a very selective memory made apparent when clarificatory questions were propounded by the Committee.

When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainant’s cellphone and which reflected her cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were not incriminating but claimed she did not remember those that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant.  Thus, during the 17 November 2004 hearing, where respondent was questioned by Justice Salazar-Fernando, the following transpired:

Q:     After reading those text messages, do you remember having made those text messages?

(Respondent)

A:      Only some of these, your honors.

Justice Salazar-Fernando: Which one?

A:      Sabi ko po magpunta na lang sila sa office. Yung nasa bandang unahan po, your Honors.

Q:      What else?

A:      Tapos yung sabi ko pong pagpunta niya magdala siya ng I.D. or isama niya sa kanya si Len David.

Q:      Okay, You remember having texted Zaldy Nuez on September 23, 2004 at 1309 which was around 1:09 in the afternoon and you said “di me pwede punta na lang kayo dito sa office Thursday 4:45 p.m. Room 107 Centennial Building.

A:      Yes, your Honors.

Q:       And on September 23, 2004 at 1731 which was around 5:31 in the afternoon you again texted Zaldy Nuez and you said “Sige bukas nang tanghali sa Times Plaza, Taft Avenue, corner U.N. Avenue. Magdala ka ng I.D. para makilala kita o isama mo si Len David.

A:      Opo, your Honors.

Q:      How about on September 23 at 5:05 in the afternoon when you said “Di pwede kelan mo gusto fixed price na iyon.”

A:      I don’t remember that, your Honors.

Q:      Again on September 23 at 5:14 p.m. you said “Alam mo di ko iyon price and nagbigay noon yung gagawa. Wala ako doon.” You don’t also remember this?

A:      Yes, your Honors.

Q:      September 27 at 1:42 p.m. “Oo naman ayusin nyo yung hindi halatang pera”. You also don’t remember that?

A:      Yes Your Honors.

Q:      September 27 at 1:30 in the afternoon, “Di na pwede sabi sa akin.  Pinakaiusapan ko na nga ulit iyon.”  You don’t remember that?

A:      No, your Honors.[69]

Respondent would like this Court to believe that she never had any intention of committing a crime, that the offer of a million pesos for a favorable decision came from complainant and that it was complainant and the law enforcers who instigated the whole incident.

Respondent thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell the latter to stop calling and texting her, not to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged.

This claim of respondent is preposterous to say the least. Had the offer of a million pesos really come from complainant and had she really intended to stop the latter from corrupting her, she could have simply refused to answer the latter’s messages and calls.  This she did not do.  She answered those calls and messages though she later claimed she did not remember having sent the same messages to complainant.  She could also have reported the matter to the CA Presiding Justice, an action which respondent admitted during the hearing was the proper thing to do under the circumstances.[70] But this course of action she did not resort to either, allegedly because she never expected things to end this way.[71]

While claiming that she was not interested in complainant’s offer of a million pesos, she met with him not only once but twice, ostensibly, to tell the latter to stop pestering her.  If respondent felt that telling complainant to stop pestering her would be more effective if she did it in person, the same would have been accomplished with a single meeting.  There was no reason for her to meet with complainant again on 28 September 2004 unless there was really an understanding between them that the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) will be handed over to her then.  Respondent even claimed that she became afraid of complainant when she learned that the latter had been dismissed by PAGCOR for using illegal drugs.[72] This notwithstanding, she still met with him on 28 September 2004.

Anent complainant’s narration of respondent’s refusal to reduce the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000.000.00) based on the lesson learned from a previous transaction, while admitting that she actually said the same, respondent wants this Court to believe that she said it merely to have something to talk about. [73] If indeed, respondent had no intention of committing any wrongdoing, it escapes the Court why she had to make up stories merely to test if complainant could make good on his alleged boast that he could come up with a million pesos.  It is not in accord with ordinary human experience for an honest government employee to make up stories that would make party-litigants believe that court decisions may be bought and sold.  Time and again this Court has declared, thus:

“Everyone in the judiciary bears a heavy burden of responsibility for the proper discharge of his duty and it behooves everyone to steer clear of any situations in which the slightest suspicion might be cast on his conduct. Any misbehavior on his part, whether true or only perceived, is likely to reflect adversely on the administration of justice.”[74]

Respondent having worked for the government for twenty four (24) years, nineteen (19) of which have been in the CA,[75] should have known very well that court employees are held to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity.  Their conduct should at all times be above suspicion.  As held by this Court in a number of cases, “The conduct or behavior of all officials of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the Presiding Judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.”[76] Their conduct must, at all times be characterized by among others, strict propriety and decorum in order to earn and maintain the respect of the public for the judiciary.[77]

Respondent’s actuations from the time she started communicating with complainant in July 2004 until the entrapment operation on 28 September 2004 show a lack of the moral fiber demanded from court employees. Respondent’s avowals of innocence notwithstanding, the evidence clearly show that she solicited the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision.  The testimony of Atty. Gepty, the recipient of respondent’s confession immediately after the entrapment operation, unmistakably supports the finding that respondent did voluntarily engage herself in the activity she is being accused of.

Respondent’s solicitation of money from complainant in exchange for a favorable decision violates Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which took effect

on 1 June 2004 pursuant to A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC. Sections 1 and 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel expressly provide:

“SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not use their official position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges or exemption for themselves or for others.”

“SECTION 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.” (Underscoring supplied)

It is noteworthy that the penultimate paragraph of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel specifically provides:

INCORPORATION OF OTHER RULES

“SECTION 1. All provisions of the law, Civil Service rules, and issuances of the Supreme Court governing the conduct of public officers and employees applicable to the judiciary are deemed incorporated into this Code.”

By soliciting the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant, respondent committed an act of impropriety which immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the judiciary and the people’s confidence in it.

In the recent case of Aspiras vs. Abalos,[78] complainant charged respondent, an employee of the Records Section, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Supreme Court for allegedly deceiving him into giving her money in the total amount of Fifty Two Thousand Pesos (P52,000.00) in exchange for his acquittal in a murder case on appeal before the Supreme Court.  It turned out that respondent’s representation was false because complainant was subsequently convicted of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the Supreme Court.[79]

The Supreme Court en banc found Esmeralda Abalos guilty of serious misconduct and ordered her dismissal from the service. This Court aptly held thus:

“In Mirano vs. Saavedra,[80] this Court emphatically declared that a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. The administration of justice is a sacred task, and by the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle that public office is a public trust, solemnly enshrined in the Constitution.”[81]

Likewise, in the grave misconduct case against Datu Alykhan T. Amilbangsa of the Shari’a Circuit Court, Bengo, Tawi-Tawi,[82] this Court stated:

“No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than the judicial office. Those connected with the dispensation of justice bear a heavy burden of responsibility. Court employees in particular, must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court . . . . The High Court has consistently held that persons involved in the administration of justice ought to live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service. He should refrain from financial dealings which would interfere with the efficient performance of his duties. [83] The conduct required of court personnel must always be beyond reproach.”[84]

The following pronouncement of this Court in the case of Yrastorza, Sr. vs. Latiza, Court Aide, RTC Branch 14 Cebu City [85] is also worth remembering:

“Court employees bear the burden of observing exacting standards of ethics and morality. This is the price one pays for the honor of working in the judiciary. Those who are part of the machinery dispensing justice from the lowliest clerk to the presiding judge must conduct themselves with utmost decorum and propriety to maintain the public’s faith and respect for the judiciary. Improper behavior exhibits not only a paucity of professionalism at the workplace but also a great disrespect to the court itself. Such demeanor is a failure of circumspection demanded of every public official and employee.”[86]

In view of the facts narrated above and taking into account the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Committee in their Report[87] recommended that respondent be dismissed from government service for GRAVE MISCONDUCT and violation of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.[88]

Finding the Committee’s recommendation to be supported by more than substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the recommendation is well taken.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Elvira Cruz-Apao is found GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and violation of SECTIONS 1 and 2 of the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT PERSONNEL and is accordingly DISMISSED from government service, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.  Her retirement and all benefits except accrued leave credits are hereby FORFEITED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Garcia, J., No part.

EN BANC

ANNA JANE D. LIHAYLIHAY, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1659Clerk III, Regional Trial Court,Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboangadel Norte,

Complainant,

- versus -

JUDGE ALEJANDRO T. CANDA,Municipal Circuit Trial Court,Liloy-Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, Respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

JUDGE ALEJANDRO T. CANDA, A.M. No. P-06-2254Municipal Circuit Trial Court,Liloy-Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, Complainant,

- versus -

ANNA JANE D. LIHAYLIHAY, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court,Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboangadel Norte, Respondent.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

ANNA JANE D. LIHAYLIHAY, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1730Clerk III, Regional Trial Court,Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboangadel Norte, Present: Complainant,

PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, - versus - CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, and

BERSAMIN, JJ. JUDGE ALEJANDRO T. CANDA, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,Liloy-Tampilisan, Zamboanga Promulgated: del Norte, Respondent. June 18, 2009x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court are two complaints for grave misconduct filed by Anna

Jane D. Lihaylihay (Lihaylihay), Clerk III, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28,

Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, against Judge Alejandro T. Canda (Judge Canda),

Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Liloy-Tampilisan, Judicial Region IX,

Zamboanga del Norte.

The Facts

On 25 February 2005, Sheriff IV Camilo Bandivas (Sheriff Bandivas) of the

RTC retired from the service. Lihaylihay alleged that Judge Canda asked Process

Server Emmanuel Tenefrancia (Tenefrancia) of the RTC to apply for the position

vacated by Sheriff Bandivas. To the dismay of Judge Canda, a certain Jesus V.

Alimpolo (Alimpolo) applied for the vacated position. Judge Canda strongly

opposed Alimpolo’s application.

Judge Canda was of the impression that Lihaylihay was assisting Alimpolo

in his application for the position of Sheriff IV. On 5 January 2006, Judge Canda

sent a text message to Lihaylihay stating, “Maayo tingali modistansya ka anang

mga tawhana kay basin masabit ka, pakiusap lang ni.” Taking the text message as

a threat, Lihaylihay reported it to the police and requested that a blotter entry be

made. On 6 January 2006, Judge Canda sent another text message stating, “For

maliciously causing it to appear as threatening in the police blotter of what is

otherwise a very harmless text message of appeal I consider the same as

declaration of war, don’t worry you will have your owned [sic] fair share of

trouble in due time.”

In a letter50[1] dated 9 January 2006 and addressed to Executive Judge Oscar

D. Tomarong (Judge Tomarong) of the RTC, Judge Canda accused Lihaylihay of

(1) actively supporting Alimpolo; (2) using the facilities of the RTC in preparing

Alimpolo’s medical certificate; (3) being at the beck and call of Alimpolo; (4)

blatantly disregarding the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel; (5)

fraudulently scheming against the court; (6) performing highly

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contemptuous acts; (7) being unworthy of her position as Clerk III; (8) failing to

distance herself from Alimpolo; (9) failing to stay neutral; (10) having a distorted

sense of values that deserves disciplinary action; (11) being arrogant, insolent and

cocky; and (12) disrespecting him. He added that:

And speaking of Ms. Lihaylihay, it is the observation of the Court employees and the public that her personality does not speak well of her employment with the judiciary which is characterized by the inappropriateness of her attire. She exudes herself like a GRO or going to a party when reporting to work, not to mention her very undignified appearance as a chain smoker which is akin to a WHORE and who does not hesitate to smoke inside the office in the very eyes of her office mates and the public. But what is very disgusting in spite of her being very new to her position is her being an UPSTART who doesn’t care to get involve [sic] in matters that earns the ire and contempt of the court users and her co-workers. She is that repulsive “PAKIALAMERA” type very few would want to associate with. (Emphasis supplied)

In another letter51[2] dated 11 January 2006 and addressed to Judge

Tomarong, Judge Canda charged Lihaylihay with violation of reasonable office

rules and regulations. He stated that:

On my behalf and in behalf of all the Court employees especially within the administrative area of your court, I would like to make manifest this FORMAL PROTEST against Ms. Ana [sic] Jane D. Lihaylihay, Docket Clerk III of your Court for her actuations which is [sic] highly offensive and demeaning not only to your Court but the entire judiciary as well, to wit:

1) The unmitigated inappropriateness of her attire when reporting to work which to us is very offensive to the taste of decency because she exudes herself like a GRO (Guest Relations Officer). She is supposed to be wearing uniform or decent attire instead of very tight fitting jeans and blouses with very low hemline [sic] that almost exposes [sic] her breast or cocktail dresses as if she is [sic] going to a party or attending high profile gatherings of elite [sic].

2) her [sic] very undignified and repulsive appearance as a chain smoker with heavily made up face which reminds us of her to be like a WHORE, and who [sic] does not hesitate to smoke inside the

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office in the very eyes of her office mates and the public, an act which is in gross violation of existing rules and regulations against smoking in public places and government offices. (Emphasis supplied)

In his 1st Indorsement52[3] dated 12 January 2006, Judge Tomarong directed

Lihaylihay to comment on Judge Canda’s 9 and 11 January 2006 letters. On 13

January 2006, before Lihaylihay could comment on the letters, Judge Canda gave a

copy of the 11 January 2006 letter to the desk editor of the Mindanao Observer and

asked that it be published in the newspaper. In his affidavit53[4] dated 27 February

2006, Dennis C. Baguio stated that (1) he was a reporter and photographer of the

Mindanao Observer; (2) he saw Judge Canda talking with the desk editor of the

Mindanao Observer; (3) he saw Judge Canda giving a copy of the letter to the desk

editor; and (4) he heard Judge Canda asking the desk editor to publish the letter.

The 11 January 2006 letter was published in the 15 January 2006 issue of the

Mindanao Observer. The front page headline read, “Huwes miprotesta batok sa

seksi nga docket clerk.” The text of the letter was printed in the newspaper with

the omission of words which were deemed unprintable.

In her comment54[5] dated 20 January 2006, Lihaylihay stated that (1) she did

not participate in Alimpolo’s application for the position of Sheriff IV; (2) Judge

Canda ridiculed, humiliated, and besmirched her reputation by publishing in the

newspaper the 11 January 2006 letter describing her as a GRO and a whore; (3)

Judge Canda’s text messages threatened her; and (4) she followed the office dress

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53

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code. Lihaylihay alleged that Judge Canda wanted Tenefrancia to apply for the

position of Sheriff IV so that Tenefrancia’s position as process server would

become vacant — Judge Canda’s son, Alejandro Canda, was qualified for the

position of process server. Lihaylihay also alleged that, before the present case

started, Judge Canda sent her several indecent text messages stating, “You’re sexy

today,” “I missed your gorgeous face,” and “I missed your golden voice when you

sing.” Lihaylihay also alleged that she was shocked and disgusted when Judge

Canda invited her to go out of town with him.

Alan D. Marapao (Marapao), publisher and editor of Tingog Peninsula,

contacted Lihaylihay. He asked her if he could interview her, have a copy of her

20 January 2006 comment, and take her picture. Lihaylihay agreed. Without

asking for Lihaylihay’s permission, Marapao published the 20 January 2006

comment in the 22 January 2006 issue of the Tingog Peninsula. Irked, Judge

Canda filed a criminal case for libel against Lihaylihay.

Lihaylihay filed a complaint55[6] dated 20 January 2006 with the Office of the

Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Canda of (1) bullying her; (2)

ridiculing, humiliating, and besmirching her reputation by publishing in the

newspaper the 11 January 2006 letter describing her as a GRO and a whore; (3)

sending her threatening text messages; and (4) sending her indecent text messages.

The case was docketed as MTJ-06-1659.

Judge Canda filed a complaint56[7] dated 25 January 2006 with the OCA

charging Lihaylihay with conduct unbecoming a court employee for publishing in

55

56

the newspaper her 20 January 2006 comment. The case was docketed as A.M. No.

P-06-2254.

In its 1st Indorsement57[8] dated 15 February 2006, the OCA directed

Lihaylihay to comment on Judge Canda’s 25 January 2006 complaint. In her

comment58[9] dated 22 March 2006, Lihaylihay stated that (1) the publishing of her

20 January 2006 comment in the newspaper unlikely affected Judge Tomarong’s

impartiality and objectivity; (2) Judge Canda published his 11 January 2006 letter

in the newspaper; (3) Tingog Peninsula published her comment without asking for

her permission; and (4) Judge Canda was arrogant.

Lihaylihay filed another complaint59[10] dated 4 May 2006 with the OCA

containing the same allegations as her 20 January 2006 complaint with the

additional allegation that Judge Canda had several documents sworn to before

MCTC Clerk of Court Rosalio M. Manigsaca without paying the required legal

fees. The case was docketed as MTJ-09-1730.

In its 1st Indorsement60[11] dated 20 July 2006, the OCA directed Judge Canda

to comment on the 4 May 2006 complaint. In his comment61[12] dated 16 August

2006, Judge Canda denied the allegation that he failed to pay the required legal

fees.

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58

59

60

61

In its Report62[13] dated 24 August 2006, the OCA found that Lihaylihay and

Judge Canda failed to preserve the good image of the judiciary. The OCA stated

that:

This Office is disappointed, nay, ashamed of the actuations of the complainant and respondent in this case. Their disgraceful behavior adversely affects the good image of the judiciary. Their actuations degraded the image of the courts before the eyes of the public.

In the instant case, respondent, although not directly responsible for the publication of her comment should have exercised prudence in dealing with the media considering the interest generated by the publication of the complaint against her by Judge Canda. She should have known that the media would take advantage of the opportunity to sensationalize the case considering the personalities involved.

Complainant Judge Canda, on the other hand, should not have caused the publication of his complaint against the respondent. As a judge, complainant should have known that administrative proceedings before the Court are confidential in nature in order to protect the respondent therein who may later turn out to be innocent of the charges. The public airing of his complaint unnecessarily exposed the Court to the eyes of the public. No justifiable or unselfish purpose would be served by such media exposure of the complaint already filed in Court and therefore covered by the mantle of confidentiality, except to sensationalize the same and to defile the reputation of the respondent.

The OCA recommended that Lihaylihay be admonished and that her 22

March 2006 comment be treated as a complaint for gross misconduct against Judge

Canda.

In a Resolution63[14] dated 9 October 2006, the Court admonished Lihaylihay

for her irresponsible behavior and consolidated A.M. No. P-06-2254 with A.M. No.

MTJ-06-1659. In the same Resolution, the Court treated Lihaylihay’s 22 March

2006 comment as a complaint for gross misconduct against Judge Canda, re-

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docketed the 22 March 2006 comment as a regular administrative matter, and

directed Judge Canda to comment.

In his comment64[15] dated 5 December 2006, Judge Canda stated that his

description of Lihaylihay as a GRO and a whore was not a “malicious imputation”

but a “formal accusation,” and that the publication of his 11 January 2006 letter in

the newspaper was a “journalistic endeavour.”

In a Resolution65[16] dated 12 January 2009, the Court (1) docketed the 4 May

2006 complaint as a regular administrative matter; (2) consolidated A.M. No. MTJ-

09-1730 with A.M. No. P-06-2254 and A.M. No. MTJ-06-1659; and (3) directed

Judge Canda to comment on the allegation that he sent threatening and indecent

text messages.

In his comment66[17] dated 23 February 2009, Judge Canda (1) denied that he

sent Lihaylihay indecent text messages; (2) described his 5 January 2006 text

message as “brotherly;” and (3) stated that his 6 January 2006 text message was

not intimidating — it only reflected the natural reaction of an angry person.

The OCA’s Report and Recommendations

In its Report67[18] dated 7 October 2008, the OCA found Judge Canda liable 64

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66

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for using inappropriate language. The OCA recommended that (1) Judge

Canda be found guilty of gross misconduct; (2) Judge Canda be fined P21,000; (3)

the 4 May 2006 complaint be docketed as a regular administrative matter; (4) A.M.

No. MTJ-09-1730 be consolidated with A.M. No. P-06-2254 and A.M. No. MTJ-

06-1659; and (5) Judge Canda be directed to comment on the allegation that he

sent Lihaylihay indecent text messages. The OCA stated that:

Judge Canda’s contention that he had nothing to do with the publication of his complaint as it was the Mindanao Observer which decided to pursue the story runs on shallow grounds.

x x x x

Judge Canda already did the right thing when he brought to the attention of the Executive Judge the matter of Ms. Lihaylihay’s alleged administrative transgressions. However, he stepped out of bounds when he allowed the Mindanao Observer to publish a copy of his complaint. The newspaper would not have had the audacity to publish the complaint if Judge Canda did not consent to it. Suffice it to say, Judge Canda should have known better.

Judge Canda stands accused of Gross Misconduct. He did not only refer to Ms. Lihaylihay as a “whore” in the complaint he filed before the Executive Judge; he also caused the publication of the document in a newspaper. If the Court can penalize a judge for uttering a foul term, it can definitely provide for a heavier penalty in the instant case where respondent judge even contributed to the publication of his utterance.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds Judge Canda liable for gross misconduct.

Judge Canda harassed and publicly humiliated Lihaylihay: (1) he asked her

to stay away from Alimpolo; (2) when she reported the matter to the police, he

took it as a “declaration of war” and warned her that she will have her “fair share

of trouble in due time”; (3) indeed, three days after sending the threatening text

message, he filed a complaint with Judge Tomarong accusing her of several things,

asking that she be disciplined and removed from the service, and describing her as

a “GRO,” “undignified,” a “whore,” “disgusting,” “repulsive,” and

“pakialamera”; (4) two days after filing the first complaint, he filed another

complaint accusing her of violating office rules and describing her as “offensive,”

“demeaning,” “inappropriate,” a “GRO,” “undignified,” “repulsive,” and a

“whore”; (5) still unsatisfied, he had his second complaint published in the

newspaper; and (6) when she published her comment in the newspaper, he filed a

criminal case for libel against her.

Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine

Judiciary states that “Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above

reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable

observer.” Section 2, Canon 2 of the Code states that “The behavior and

conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the

judiciary.” Section 2, Canon 4 of the Code states that “As a subject of constant

public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed

as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In

particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the

dignity of the judicial office.” Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code states that

“Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression x x x, but

in exercising such [right], they shall always conduct themselves in such a

manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office.” Section 6, Canon 6 of

the Code states that “Judges shall x x x be x x x dignified and courteous.” Judge

Canda violated these provisions.

Judges are required to be temperate in their language at all times. They must

refrain from inflammatory or vile language. They should be dignified in demeanor

and refined in speech, exhibit that temperament of utmost sobriety and self-

restraint, and be considerate, courteous, and civil to all persons.68[19] In Juan de la

Cruz v. Carretas,69[20] the Court held that:

A judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. He should be x x x dignified in demeanor, refined in speech and virtuous in character. x x x [H]e must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. x x x

[A] judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. x x x

[A] judge should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. He descends to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant when he utters harsh words [or] snide remarks x x x. As a result, he degrades the judicial office and erodes public confidence in the judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)

In Re: Anonymous Complaint dated February 18, 2005 of a “Court

Personnel” against Judge Francisco C. Gedorio, Jr., RTC, Branch 12, Ormoc

City,70[21] the Court held that:

[A] judge x x x ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting a gentleman and a high officer of the court.

x x x x

The Court has repeatedly reminded members of the bench to conduct themselves irreproachably, not only while in the discharge of official duties but also in their personal behavior every day. x x x

It bears stressing that as a dispenser of justice, respondent should

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exercise judicial temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and insulting language. He must maintain composure and equanimity.

The judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions. This is a price that judges have to pay for accepting and occupying their exalted positions in the administration of justice. Irresponsible or improper conduct on their part erodes public confidence in the judiciary. Thus, it is their duty to avoid any impression of impropriety in order to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)

Judge Canda’s acts of (1) threatening Lihaylihay with her “fair share of

trouble in due time”; (2) filing administrative complaints and a criminal case to

harass her; (3) describing her as a “GRO,” “undignified,” a “whore,” “disgusting,”

“repulsive,” “pakialamera,” “offensive,” “demeaning,” and “inappropriate”; and

(4) publishing such foul remarks in the newspaper are very unbecoming a judge.

The image of the judiciary is reflected in the conduct of its officials and Judge

Canda subjected the judiciary to embarrassment.

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross misconduct

constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious offense. It is

punishable by (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits, and

disqualification from reinstatement to any public office; (2) suspension from office

without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not exceeding six

months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.71[22]

The Court notes that this is Judge Canda’s second offense. In Barbarona v.

Judge Canda,72[23] the Court fined him for violation of Circular No. 1-90 and

warned him that the repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

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Considering the gravity of Judge Canda’s offense and the fact that this is his

second offense, the Court fines him P40,000.

The charges that Judge Canda sent Lihaylihay indecent text messages and

that he failed to pay the required legal fees are unsubstantiated, thus, they must be

dismissed. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of

proving, by substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, the allegations in the complaint.

The Court cannot rely on mere conjectures or suppositions.73[24]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Alejandro T. Canda, Municipal

Circuit Trial Court, Liloy-Tampilisan, Judicial Region IX, Zamboanga del Norte,

GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT CONSTITUTING VIOLATIONS OF

THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. Accordingly, the Court FINES him

P40,000 and STERNLY WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar acts

shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

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THIRD DIVISION

EVA LUCIA Z. GEROY, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2092

Complainant, (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2685-RTJ

Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

HON. DAN R. CALDERON, NACHURA, and

Presiding Judge, Branch 26 of the REYES, JJ.

Regional Trial Court of Medina,

Misamis Oriental, Promulgated:

Respondent. December 8, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

“A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are externalized. He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.”74[1]

Before the Court is a letter-complaint dated June 13, 2007 filed by Eva Lucia Z.

Geroy (complainant) charging Judge Dan R. Calderon (respondent) of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC), Branch 26, Medina, Misamis Oriental, with gross immorality for having an

extra-marital affair with her.

Complainant alleges: She was introduced by her cousin Cesar Badilas (Badilas) to

respondent in a Rotary Club dinner on November 30, 2002. Thereafter, respondent

always communicated with her, visited her at her house and showered her with food and

gifts, making her believe that he was single or separated as he acted like a bachelor

towards her. They spent most of their time in his house in Upper Balulang, Cagayan de

Oro City where complainant would sleep over during weekdays and spend entire

weekends with respondent. They would dine in public places, watch movies, go to malls,

groceries and hear mass together. Respondent lent her money and she ran errands for

him such as making reservations for his trips and purchasing items for his house, encode 74

decisions, pay bills and encash checks for him. Respondent paid her tuition in a caregiver

course and gave her a cell phone for an e-load business.75[2]

There were times, however, when complainant felt she was being abused by

respondent, such as when he wanted to take a picture of them naked after they had

sexual contact, when he asked her to buy abortive pills because his son impregnated his

girlfriend, and when he (respondent) forced her to utter vulgar words during their

intercourse. In August 2005, complainant went to Xavier University where respondent

was a professor, and respondent uttered hurtful words towards her. On December 24,

2005, complainant received a call from respondent and his wife degrading and

threatening her. She also received a text message from respondent on December 29,

2005 saying that she had made herself a “despicable disease.” Respondent's wife and

daughter also called complainant, confronting and threatening her. On March 21, 2007,

complainant saw respondent in a restaurant with a woman and when she approached

respondent, he cursed and looked angrily at her and asked the guard to drive her out.

Respondent then went to his car and locked the doors. Complainant knocked at the

window near the driver's seat but respondent arrogantly looked at her and maneuvered

his car, nearly hitting her, as he sped past her.76[3]

Complainant avers that she was expecting that if her relationship with respondent

would end, there should be a friendly talk and a peaceful closure between them, but

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none took place.77[4] She further claims that respondent is in another relationship and she

is filing the present case, not just to put an end to the immoral conduct of respondent,

but to prevent other women from being victimized by him.78[5]

Attached to the complaint are transcripts of respondent's text messages to her

from December 2002 to 2005, pictures of her taken inside respondent's house, pictures

of complainant's diary, cellphones, gifts allegedly given to her by respondent, receipts

showing the name of respondent, and a photocopy of a check showing that respondent

lent her money.79[6]

Respondent, in his Comment dated July 24, 2007, denies that he had any illicit

relationship with complainant; and claims that her allegations are completely

manufactured to suit her elaborate plan to extort money from him. He claims that he is

the original complainant in the public prosecutor's office; thus, the present case is in the

nature of a counter-charge. While respondent admits that he met complainant at a

Rotary dinner sometime in late 2002 through Bardilas, a fellow Rotarian, he didn't realize

that when she tagged along with respondent and Bardilas that night, a malicious plan had

been set into motion. Respondent further claims that complainant had no regular job

and expressed dire financial need; that out of charity, respondent hired her to encode

simple case facts and test questions in her house using respondent's laptop; that it was

arranged that he would stop by her house to hand her materials for typing, and later pick

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up the same from her residence; that she later offered to run other errands for him in

exchange for a reasonable fee.80[7]

Respondent further relates: later, complainant started visiting his house

unannounced during weekdays saying she was in a nearby subdivision. Thinking it was

innocent, respondent allowed her inside the house and told her to help herself to snacks,

and then she would leave shortly. In the total of four or five unannounced visits of

complainant, respondent noticed a shift in her conversation, relating to him lurid sex

experiences with her previous boyfriends. She also insinuated that it was now accepted

in society for married men to have paramours, upon which respondent bluntly told her,

personally and in several text messages, that he had no such inclination. In her last

unwelcome visit, complainant gave respondent letters professing her uncontrollable love

for him. Unknown to respondent and his helpers, complainant had sneaked into his

house and the upper bedrooms, where she took pictures alleging that sexual activity had

taken place therein. Respondent started ignoring respondent in 2005, but she did not

stop sending him text messages asking for a meeting. She also sent text messages to his

wife, children, relatives and friends and even went to his wife's dental clinic in St. Luke's,

Quezon City, telling her that she was his woman. She also tried to talk to his son by

waiting for him in his company's shuttle bus. She kept every receipt which would show

favors she received from him, taking advantage of his generous disposition. She

borrowed from him her tuition fee for a caregiver course, as well to buy cellphones for an

e-load business which loans respondent gave in good faith. When complainant realized

that all the good things she was getting from him were coming to an end and that he was

not falling for her blackmail, she started to become vicious and physically assaulted him, 80

such as when she waited for him in the parking lot of Xavier University and tried to enter

respondent's car. On March 21, 2007, complainant saw respondent in an eatery and

then tried to board his car. In her frustration, she broke the car's side mirror and threw

the same at the departing car. On April 24, 2007, while respondent was in his car along

Pabayo St., complainant suddenly appeared and again tried to enter the locked car; failing

to do so, she started hitting the car with her umbrella and blocked the car's way, forcing

respondent to get down the car and wrest the umbrella away. As the car left,

complainant grabbed the car's rear plate number, destroying its frame. It was at this time

that respondent decided to file a case against her for malicious mischief and slander by

deed. In her desperation to support her charge, complainant now concocts another

malicious, baseless charge that he is presently involved with another woman.

Respondent avers that he has gained the respect of the community as a nationally

awarded outstanding prosecutor for Region X in 1994 and a Centennial Judge awardee in

2001 and therefore he cannot compromise such reputation through alleged extra-marital

liaisons.81[8]

Attached to said Comment is a copy of the Resolution of the Asst. City Prosecutor

finding sufficient evidence to support respondent's charge of malicious mischief and

finding no sufficient basis to support respondent's charge of slander by deed and

complainant's counter-charge for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262 (Violence

Against Women and Their Children Act).82[9] He also attached affidavits of his gardener,

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caretaker, his wife's assistant, and that of Bardilas and his wife, corroborating his

allegations.83[10]

In the Resolution dated November 26, 2007, the Court, upon recommendation of

the OCA, redocketed the complaint as a regular administrative matter and referred the

same to the Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cagayan de Oro Station, for

investigation, report and recommendation after a raffle of the case among the Justices.84

[11]

Complainant filed a Rejoinder dated October 31, 2007 refuting respondent's

Comment85[12] and a Motion for Early Resolution dated December 26, 2007,86[13] which

the Court referred to the Investigating Justice.87[14]

The hearings before Investigating Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. were reset twice as

complainant could not find any counsel, since no lawyer in the city or the province

wanted to take her case. Thus, the summary hearing only commenced on June 3, 2008

and continued on June 12, 13, 20 and 23, 2008. Complainant and her witness, Ofelia

Labitad, a neighbor, were cross-examined by the counsel of respondent; while

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respondent and his witness, Bardilas, were cross-examined by complainant herself

without the assistance of any counsel.88[15] Thereafter, the parties submitted their

respective memoranda.89[16]

In the Report which the Court received on July 31, 2008, Investigating Justice

Rodrigo F. Lim found respondent guilty of immorality and recommended his suspension

for six months without salary and other benefits.90[17]

The Investigating Justice held: There were admissions on respondent's part which

revealed the existence of an illicit affair. Complainant was able to disclose that

respondent had skin tags between his thighs which respondent admitted. Complainant

would not have had knowledge of such intimate and concealed marks unless she was

able to see respondent naked. While respondent claimed that he may have divulged such

fact in one of their casual conversations, such disclosure goes against respondent's very

claim that what they had was only a platonic employer-employee relationship. The

pictures taken by complainant showing the rooms in the house and her familiarity with

the same proves that complainant had access to all the rooms in the house and would

also show that some of their sexual trysts took place in respondent's house. Respondent

also asked complainant to assist him in the solemnization of three marriages when he

could have utilized a staff from his office. From these, it could be inferred that

complainant's services were utilized so that they could be together in the evening after

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the reception. Respondent also asked complainant to encode his draft orders/decisions

when he has four stenographers. Respondent, in doing so, disregarded the fact that by

giving complainant such encoding jobs, he was compromising the integrity of the court

records. Despite the finding of immorality, however, the ultimate penalty of dismissal

from service, as prayed for by complainant, should not be imposed upon respondent, as

records revealed that complainant was equally guilty, if not more so, in the whole sordid

affair. Considering his length of service and the fact that this was the first time that

respondent was charged with immorality or any other administrative offense, the penalty

of six months suspension should suffice.91[18]

The Investigating Justice also found incredible complainant's claim that she was

misled by respondent into thinking that he was single or unmarried, since she admitted in

one of her affidavits that by his age and the way he carried himself, she knew that he was

really a married man and it was up to her discretion whether to reciprocate respondent's

affections knowing respondent's marital status.92[19]

The Court finds the report and recommendation of the Investigating Justice to be

well-taken.

The Court has not been sparing in its exhortation of judges that they should avoid

impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. No position is more

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demanding as regards the moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a

seat on the Bench; thus, their personal behavior, not only while in the performance of

official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach, for they are, as they

so aptly are perceived to be, the visible representation of law and of justice.93[20] A judge

traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price he has to pay for

occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture.94

[21]

The complainant, in administrative proceedings, has the burden of proving by

substantial evidence the allegations in her complaint,95[22] i.e., that amount of relevant

evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;96[23]

the Court finds that the complainant in this case was able to discharge such burden.

As correctly found by the Investigating Justice, the complainant was able to

support her charge of immorality against respondent and has shown that the latter had

not exhibited the ideals and principles expected of a magistrate. The disclosure by

complainant of very intimate facts about respondent and respondent's own seemingly

innocuous admissions clearly reveal the existence of an illicit affair. Complainant would

not have known personal information about respondent, such as the skin tags in between

his thighs, if they really did not have an intimate physical relationship.97[24]

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As respondent himself testified:

Q Is it not that you have skin tags on the inner thigh of your body, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, I told you about it and in fact it is not just in my thighs but also under my armpit and that was in the course of your asking about my physical features and my scars on my face, and may be that was also the time that I also told you the story about the scars on my face that I got during the fraternity rumble during my college days.98[25]

Respondent's own admissions are also inconsistent with his claim that his

relationship with complainant is purely platonic and professional. As gathered from the

transcripts:

Q Mr. Witness, do you recall that December 1, 2002 you have been calling up and then is it not that November 30 we've met, we were introduced, the following day you texted me and said in Annex A-1 it is there December 1, 2002 at 8:32:33 in the morning you were texting,

“Gud am, just saying thanks for the wonderful evening”?

A Yes, but I am not sure if that is accurate text message but I was being polite, it is in my nature.99[26]

x x x x

Q Do you remember then, Mr. Witness that after your family went back to Manila January 6 you were texting me again saying that was already 6 January 2003 you were texting, “knock, knock hello are you still there”?

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A This could be right because this was in reply to your earlier text message which I've read.100[27]

x x x x

Q In fact, Mr. Witness, you texted me in my Annex “I-c” it was there on December 8, 2002 at 1:24:9 early morning, do you remember because on December 7 I was with you, we were together we were in your house nobody was there and no son Ian Phillip was there, we savor our togetherness at that time, do you remember this text message, Mr. Witness which I quote, “I feel more 4 your comfort Tet, I felt u really nid d rest, I just can't resist it wen u're here u know.”

A I don't remember if this is the exact message that I sent you; but this would indicate that I gave you a lot of work, these were the first things that you were working for me but it is not that because you were in my house; that is a lie.101[28]

x x x x

Q Is it not also, Mr. Witness, you were always appreciating our togetherness and wonderful evening like what you said in your text message on 21 January 2003 2:43:44 in the morning you texted to me I quote, “Am in my room now thanks for a wonderful evening the songs and the towelets sleep tight”, it was already 2:43:44 in the morning, do you remember that?

A I remember this particularly and I checked a mistake, this was a Friday and we had our rotary meeting here in the rotary bar site, when I went home I read your text because I believe before I went to the rotary meeting I passed by your house and we talked and you gave me something, I think it was a CD or a recording that you gave me, I do not remember about the towelets but you gave me some CDs and then I went home from the rotary I read your text that was the only time I read your text and I answered, but I do not think it was this late also it

could have been that you received my text message late or you intentionally erroneously typed this wrong time, this late time.102[29] (Emphasis supplied).

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While respondent insists that his relationship with complainant is purely

professional, the text messages which admittedly came from him are not of the kind an

employer would ordinarily send an employee. Try as he might, respondent's own

admissions betray his claim of innocence.

Complainant's witness, her neighbor Ofelia Labitad, also testified that she believed

complainant and respondent had an intimate relationship because they were always

together, i.e., there were times that she saw respondent's car parked in front of the

house of the complainant or across the street.103[30]

To this, respondent tried to explain that it was arranged that coming from the Hall

of Justice in Cagayan de Oro City and subsequently from Medina, Misamis Oriental, he

would stop at the corner or near complainant's residence, which was on the way to his

residence, and would hand over to her from the car any encoding job that had to be done

for a reasonable fee.104[31]

Respondent also admitted that complainant assisted him in at least two weddings

which he solemnized.105[32]

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As correctly observed by the Investigating Justice, however, respondent as RTC

judge has several employees under him --- a branch clerk of court, four stenographers, a

legal researcher, a branch sheriff, personnel in charged of the civil and criminal records

plus a utility worker. He could have asked any of his stenographers to do the encoding for

him, especially the encoding of decisions, and any of his staff to assist him in the

solemnization of weddings. His resort to complainant's services could be nothing but just

a convenient excuse for them to be able to spend more time together. Also, as correctly

observed by the Investigating Justice, his utilization of complainant's services especially in

encoding cases also compromised the integrity of court records. A person who is not a

regular court employee should not be allowed to type decisions and to have access to

court records.106[33]

Complainant related in detail her relationship with respondent and respondent

could only offer general denials. Even then, he could not completely deny some

communications which transpired between him and complainant which betrayed his

claim of a purely platonic relationship.

As the Court has held, mere denial does not overturn the relative weight and

probative value of an affirmative assertion. Denial is an inherently weak defense. To be

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believed, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such

denial is purely self-serving and has no evidentiary value.107[34]

The bottom line is that respondent failed to adhere to the exacting standards of

morality and decency which every member of the judiciary is expected to observe.108[35]

Respondent is a married man, yet he engaged in a romantic relationship with

complainant. Granting arguendo that respondent's relationship with complainant never

went physical or intimate, still he cannot escape the charge of immorality, for his own

admissions show that his relationship with her was more than professional, more than

acquaintanceship, more than friendly.

As the Court held in Madredijo v. Layao, Jr.:109[36]

[I]mmorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.110[37]

Immorality under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-

SC dated September 11, 2001 on the discipline of Justices and Judges, is a serious charge

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which carries any of the following sanctions: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all

or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from

reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or

controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case

include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits

for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00

but not exceeding P40,000.00.111[38]

In recommending the penalty of suspension for six months without salary and

other benefits, instead of the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service, the

Investigating Justice gave weight to the fact that complainant was equally, if not more

guilty in the whole sordid affair.112[39] He also considered respondent's length of service

and the fact that this was the first time respondent had been charged with immorality,

and it did not appear from the records that he had been previously charged with any

offense or that there was any pending administrative case against him.113[40]

The Court agrees that complainant clearly consented to the illicit affair. The

Investigating Justice correctly observed that complainant was a clearly enamored and

highly obsessed woman, as proven by her propensity to be at the exact place and time

where respondent happened to be and her insistence on having a “formal closure”

between them. Records also revealed that complainant sought out respondent's wife,

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parents and children, meeting them personally or texting them, when respondent started

ignoring her. The Investigating Justice also correctly found incredible complainant's claim

that she was misled by respondent into thinking that he was an unmarried man, as

complainant could have easily verified respondent's status, he being a public figure, which

information was readily available to anyone. Complainant also admitted in one of her

affidavits that the very first time she met respondent, she knew by the way he carried

himself and his age that he was a married man; but because of his perseverance, her

heart was won.114[41]

As aptly observed by the Investigating Justice in his Report:

x x x the present case was merely borne out [of] the sentiments of a woman whose affections were unreciprocated, even spurned and not really out of a noble cause to purge the judiciary of magistrates undeserving of the robes they wear. Indeed, she is the epitome of the saying that: “Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned.”115[42]

However, the Court does not agree that complainant's guilt or intentions should

mitigate respondent's liability.

Whatever intentions complainant may have has no bearing on the instant case. As

the Court has explained, the purpose of an administrative proceeding is to protect the

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public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.

And complainants are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein.116[43]

The Court agrees, however, that this is respondent's first administrative infraction

since he took his office as judge on January 3, 1997.117[44] It should be considered as

mitigating his liability.118[45] In view thereof, the Court finds the recommended penalty of

suspension for six months without salary and other benefits, with a stern warning as

recommended by the OCA, to be sufficient in this case.

WHEREFORE, Presiding Judge Dan R. Calderon, Branch 26 of the Regional Trial

Court of Medina, Misamis Oriental is hereby found GUILTY of IMMORALITY for which he

is meted the penalty of SUSPENSION for six months without salary and other benefits,

with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be

dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

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Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate Justice

Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. P-04-1774. February 9, 2004]

GERALDINE P. DIZON, complainant, vs. HIYASMIN L. CAMPO, Court Stenographer, MCTC - Capas, TARLAC, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

This case stemmed from the Letter-Complaint119[1] dated March 5, 2002, filed by Geraldine P. Dizon against Hiyasmin L. Campo, Court Stenographer of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Capas, Tarlac, for Immorality.

Complainant alleged that respondent who is a single mother of a nine-year-old child was having an illicit relationship with her husband, Arnel T. Dizon. On March 3, 2001, according to the complainant, her husband admitted his relationship with the respondent who was then already one month pregnant. She met with respondent in order to beg the latter to leave her husband and respondent answered “I will” to the plea. However, respondent and complainant’s husband continued their illicit relationship still. On December 19, 2001, complainant received a text message from respondent that complainant’s husband loves her and was willing to leave his family for her.120[2]

On March 4, 2002, complainant went to the MCTC of Capas, Tarlac, where she confronted respondent about the illicit relationship inside the chamber of Judge Panfilo Valdez, Sr. Respondent allegedly not only admitted her relationship with complainant’s husband but also stated that she was pregnant. Pleading to respondent that she leave her husband, complainant offered financial support. Respondent refused the offer, stating that she is working and that all she needs is complainant’s husband.121[3]

Attached to the Letter-Complaint was the Affidavit of Amelita Tanglao Dizon, the sister of Arnel T. Dizon, wherein she stated that she knew of the affair between her brother with respondent as she often saw them together at the Municipal Hall where she is also working. Once during a heavy traffic, so she narrated, she approached and knocked on the car where Arnel and respondent were riding but the two ignored her.

Respondent filed a Comment122[4] dated March 15, 2002, denying the charges hurled against her. She alleged that complainant’s husband, a member of the Sangguniang

119 [1] Rollo.p. 1.

120 [2] lbid.

121 [3] Ibid.

122 [4] Id., at 10-12.

Bayan of Capas, Tarlac, became her acquaintance because of their common place of work. Hence, it was not infrequent that she and Arnel would be seen talking with each other in public within the compound of the Municipal Hall. It was only in the year 2001 that she found out that some employees attributed malice to her acquaintance with Arnel Dizon. Respondent denied having sent text messages to complainant. She also denied that she was pregnant and claimed she knew nothing about the alleged admission of Arnel on the matter. To prove the point she submitted a Medical Certificate dated May 5, 2002, attesting to the fact that she did not get pregnant within the preceding three months.123[5]

On August 7, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.124[6]

On August 15, 2002, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Additional Evidence125[7]

attaching thereto a Certification126[8] dated August 9, 2002, from the Civil Registrar confirming the marriage that took place on May 28, 2002, between Arnel T. Dizon and respondent.

On October 15, 2002, complainant filed another Motion to Admit Additional Evidence 127[9] dated October 4, 2002, attaching thereto the Application for Marriage License dated May 17, 2002, of respondent and Arnel.

On November 8, 2002, the OCA128[10] referred the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, for investigation, report and recommendation.

Respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration129[11] dated February 5, 2003, praying that she be allowed to resign effective as of June 2003. She claimed that several months after the filing of the administrative complaint, she decided to ask the indulgence of the OCA to allow her to resign even though, as she claimed, she was an effective and efficient court stenographer. The recommendation of the OCA allowing her resignation was simply noted pending the submission of the report of the investigating judge.

In his Report, Investigating Judge Arsenio P. Adriano, Executive Judge, RTC, Branch 63, Tarlac City, recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of three (3) months suspension without pay for immoral conduct. He based his recommendation on the following findings, thus:

“Respondent admitted that Arnel T. Dizon courted her. Even when the administrative case had already been filed, she was made to believe by Arnel T. Dizon

123 [5] Id., at 13.

124 [6] Id., at 16-18.

125 [7] Id., at 19.

126 [8] Id., at 20.

127 [9] Id., at 27.

128 [10] Id., at 24.

129 [11] Second Rollo, pp. 1-2.

that he was not lawfully married and has in fact, separated from complainant Geraldine Dizon.

Respondent further admitted that since she relied on Arnel Dizon’s allegations that he was not legally married, respondent signed an application for marriage license and in fact signed a marriage contract with Arnel Dizon.

Respondent is tall and pretty and it is not difficult to accept her explanation that Arnel Dizon courted her and was able to convince her that he (Arnel) was not legally married to complainant Geraldine Dizon. It was only later on that she came to her senses and realized that she could not be happy with Arnel Dizon as he has (sic) already two children. The respondent filed an annulment suit before the RTC at Mabalacat, Pampanga.

Respondent further alleged that she filed a letter to the Honorable Supreme Court begging that she be allowed instead to resign as court-stenographer. Even assuming that she be allowed to resign, this will not abate the progress of this administrative case.

But then, the respondent has shown remorse for what she had done. She had filed an annulment suit to annul her marriage with Arnel Dizon. There is really no evidence that when she [had or when] started her relationship with Arnel Dizon, [that] she was fully aware that Arnel Dizon was married (lawfully or illegally) with complainant Geraldine Dizon.

RECOMMENDATION:

It appearing that this is her first offense, and that the alleged relationship was not entirely her fault, it is most respectfully recommended that she be meted the penalty of three (3) months suspension without pay for immoral conduct instead of suspension of six months and one day under Memorandum Circular No. 30 of the Civil Service Commission, dated 20 July 1989.”

The OCA agreed with the penalty recommended by the investigating judge which is three (3) months’ suspension without pay, which is not even the minimum of six (6) months and one (1) day of suspension provided in Memorandum Circular No. 30 dated July 20, 1989.

The Court affirms the findings of immorality on the part of the respondent reached by the OCA and the investigating judge. However, the penalty they recommended is lower than what respondent deserves.

The facts on record warrant the imposition of the penalty of suspension prescribed by the Civil Service Law130[12] for the first offense for disgraceful and immoral conduct, the minimum of which is six (6) months and one (1) day while the maximum is one (1) year.

Instead of rectifying her errant ways after the wife of her paramour had pleaded with her, she continued the illicit relationship and even abhorrently aggravated the situation by marrying complainant’s husband. Interestingly, respondent married him after she stated in her Comment that her relationship with him was purely based on friendship. Respondent cannot feign ignorance of Arnel T. Dizon’s marital status for he was then a

130 [12] Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989 of the Civil Service Commission; Section 23(o) of Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.

member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Capas, Tarlac. Someone like respondent who works in the same Municipal Hall must have known of, or at least could have easily verified, the status of Arnel. Even assuming that she was unaware of Arnel’s married status when they first became acquainted with each other, she should have been put on guard when a woman claiming to be his wife pleaded to her to abort her illicit relationship for the sake of the couple’s two children.

By agreeing to marry a man during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to another person, respondent subjected both herself and her paramour to the risk of criminal prosecution. Also, while it appears that Arnel had courted respondent, the fact remains that she entertained the advances of a married man. Respondent’s subsequent filing of an action for the annulment of her marriage to Arnel does not extenuate her liability.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Hiyasmin L. Campo GUILTY of immorality and hereby imposes upon her the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay. Let a copy of this Decision be appended to respondent’s 201 file.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.