Realising Joint Rescue Coordinating Centre (JRCC): A Policy for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) from the Sea (Addition to MKN Directive No. 20) and Realising a Maritime Security Complex

Captain Martin A. Sebastian RMN (R) & Mohd Ikmal Hisyam Abu

Centre for Maritime Security & Diplomacy – CMSD

Version: Final

Date: 19 January 2017

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Table of Contents 1.0 Problem Statement 4 2.0 Area of the Study 4 3.0 Objectives of the Study 5 4.0 Outcomes of the Study 5 5.0 Methodology 5 6.0 Limitation 5 7.0 Introduction 6 7.1 Joint Rescue Coordinating Centre 6 7.2 Disaster Relief from the Sea 9 7.3 National Maritime Security Complex 14 8.0 Simulation Development Phase 16 9.0 Maritime Law Enforcement “Specialist Training” Workshop 19 10.0 Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea Simulation 21 11.0 Simulation Observation 28 12.0 Conclusion 29

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Table of Figures 1 IAMSAR Manual Vol I, II & III 6 2 ASEAN Search & Rescue Region 7 3 ASEAN Flight Information Region 8 4 SAR’s Area to be Harmonised 9 5 Disaster Relief Access Point 11 6 Disaster Relief from the Sea Concept of Operation 12 7 National Maritime Security Complex Element 15 8 Simulation development Phase 16 9 MMEA’s Vessel in Simulation Training 19 10 Evolution of MLE’s Training 2014 – 2016 20 11 Simulation Debrief Room 21 12 Participants from Vietnam during Simulation Phase 22 13 Tactical View during Post Simulation Debrief Phase 24

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Realising Joint Rescue Coordinating Centre (JRCC): A Policy for

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)

from the Sea (Addition to MKN Directive No. 20) and

Realising a Maritime Security Complex

Captain Martin A. Sebastian RMN (R) & Mohd Ikmal Hisyam bin Abu

Centre for Maritime Security and Diplomacy

Maritime Institute of Malaysia

CMSD policy recommendations take a long time to be understood even after

stakeholder buy-in. Experience has shown that though stakeholders agree

during discussions, implementation is another story. Simulations allow for step

by step scenario with added friction to allow them to see for themselves the

opportunities of the recommendations. CMSD has taken a further step to the

existing policy recommendation to the government namely the Establishment

of a Joint Rescue Coordinating Centre (JRCC), Disaster Relief from the Sea

Concept and Realising Maritime Security Complex into the simulation phase to

assist relevant stakeholders in appreciating the benefits of these efforts.

1.0 Problem Statement

Introducing a new concept of operation and joint operation centre is

much more difficult to achieve due to the multidiscipline skill sets required and

different perspectives of each stakeholder on similar security issues. This study

will examine the effectiveness of the simulation approach in realising the

objectives of the JRCC.

2.0 Area of the Study

The area of study covers the simulation-based approach towards

capacity building of Maritime Law Enforcement, Search & Rescue and Disaster

Relief from the Sea.

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3.0 The Objectives of this Study are as follows:

To develop simulation for Maritime Law Enforcement, Search &

Rescue (SAR) scenario and Disaster Relief from the Sea.

To identify the effectiveness of the simulation approach on

decision making processes for multidiscipline operations.

To introduce the new concept of exercises in inter-agency

capacity building processes.

4.0 The outcomes from this Study will be:

• Input paper for National Security Council.

• Identify local industrial which is capable of providing simulator

training for the agencies.

• Analysis of simulation based exercises towards operational

effectiveness.

5.0 Methodology

There were several methods used to achieve the objectives of this study.

Literature reviews were used to gain knowledge of the subject matter. In

addition, field visits were conducted to related agencies to gain firsthand

knowledge. Further, brainstorming sessions were conducted among

stakeholders followed by simulation scenario development and finally

simulation training itself.

6.0 Limitations

The information for this study is limited to open sources, discussionswith

relevant agencies and data received on restricted basis. It is also facilitated by

the simulation facilities in Contraves Advanced Devices, British Aerospace

Engineering, and Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia.

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7.0 Introduction

7.1 Joint Rescue Coordinating Centre (JRCC)

The IAMSAR Manual calls for a comprehensive approach to the

Global SAR Plan. Since ASEAN has already embarked on Harmonising

SAR as taken upon by APSAR TF and ICAO/IMO JWG, it will be

necessary for Malaysia to study the benefits of one single Rescue

Coordination Centre or Joint RCC (JRCC).1 This will entail managing

scarce resources, address duplication of efforts, and ensure a single

repository of information or point of reference in Malaysia.

To assist every state in achieving the required standard of the

SAR plan, IAMSAR has underlined several compulsory requirement and

self-assessment to be fulfilled.2 Malaysia’s achievement is as follows:

General System Concept 64.7%, System Component 47.6%, Training

21.1%, Communication 65.5%, System Management 80%, and

1 https://www.imrfmro.org/categoriesmro/c4/4-3-the-sar-mission-coordinator 2ICAO – IMO (2013). IAMSAR Vol I. IMO Publication. Appendix H – National Self-Assessment on Search and Rescue. pg H-1.

Figure 1: IAMSAR Manual Vol I, II & III Source: IMO Website

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Improving Services 60%. Total score for Malaysia is 57.8% which is an

indicator of our readiness level in handling a SAR scenario.

There are two different structure of SAR organisation practice

around the globe namely Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) and

Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (ARCC) together with

Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC). Malaysia has been

practicing the SAR operations via two centres i.e., ARCC managed by

DCA and MRCC by MMEA. The existence of these two different centres

has made us look at ASAR and MSAR as different scenarios even if it

occurs in the same area and require the same assets for both SAR

operations.

Interoperability challenges look more disruptive in the ARCC and

MRRC models compared to the JRCC model which carries each

element under the same command structure. By having the JRCC, it is

an advantage for the SAR expert within the centre to share expertise

either in aeronautical or maritime aspects. It also helps feed the

commander in the centre with valid information in each incident thus

improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the coordination centre.

Figure 2: ASEAN Search & Rescue Region (SRR) Source: Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency

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Through the establishment of JRCC there will be a single

authority responsible for meeting the International Civil Aviation

Organisation (ICAO) and International Maritime Organisation (IMO)

requirements in SAR. Currently there is still a requirement for two

representatives from different agencies (DCA and MMEA) for each

meeting to meet the ICAO and IMO requirements, for example meeting

for ICAO/IMO Joint Working Group.

The establishment of JRCC can also give a boost in SAR

operations by having a national SAR point of contact. This improvement

will reduce complexity for the alerting post and enhance the

effectiveness of SAR Person of Contact (SPOC). Bilateral cooperation

in SAR can be achieved in a simpler manner by the establishment of a

JRCC which is aligned with regional JRCC’s such as BASARNAS of

Indonesia and AMSA of Australia.

Figure 3: ASEAN Flight Information Region (FIR) Source: Google Images

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Further, the current arrangement of MRCC and ARCC is no

longer suitable for today’s environment and it is better to establish JRCC

to handle all kind of SAR scenarios which are fundamental aspects on

safety especially for related industries.

7.2 Disaster Relief from the Sea

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) is about

bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to

emergencies. It is a time-sensitive activity where timely response is the

essence to bring relief to affected victims in times of disasters. To

achieve this, coordination and mobility become the key pillars. The

National Security Council’s Arahan MKN No. 20: Dasar dan Mekanisme

Proposed Area to be

Harmonised

SAR Organisation

Area of Responsibility

in ASAR & MSAR

Coordination Processes

Technological Enablers

Training & Exercises

Information Sharing

Figure 4: SAR’s Area to be Harmonised Source: CMSD 2015 Research Project – Harmonisation of Maritime & Aeronautical SAR

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Pengurusan Bencana Negara was promulgated on 11 May 1997

following the Highland Towers incident. However, it is a land-centric

directive which does not cater for mitigation on HADR but on responses.

Additionally, it does not cater for responses from the sea. The new

National Disaster Management Agency (NADMA) acts as a coordinating

agency; however policies on HADR from the sea nor the effective use of

the civil-military cooperation architectures are not apparent. Therefore,

there is a dual need for policies for HADR from the sea and the use of

civil-military architecture for HADR operations. The lessons learnt from

previous HADR operations in the region suggest a need for the use of

the sea and to explore further the benefits of civil-military cooperation in

HADR.

HADR operations have attracted the attention of the global

community in recent years. Building capabilities, interoperability, and a

conceptual framework for participation in these operations has gained

traction among national, regional, and international policymakers.

Malaysia, being a divided land mass of the Peninsula and

Sabah/Sarawak, with coasts at every state may need to factor the sea

as a conduit for HADR.

Figure 5: Disaster Relief Access Point Source: CMSD 2015 Research Project – Disaster Relief from the Sea

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Though disasters cost a fortune to responds to, it is vital that the

response reaches the affected population early, feeds and provides

shelter, tends to the injured, clears the dead, and destroys carcasses

that may give rise to disease outbreaks. In addition, there is a need to

clear the affected area from debris for relief agencies to conduct logistics

movement. This entails providing fuel support services and mobility

support in addition to shelter for relief agencies working round the clock.

They too need to be fed and protected from disease. Coordination

mechanisms between logistics providers, movers, storage and

distribution are vital to ensure the right elements reach the right people

at the right time and at the right location. Force protection of storage

areas will be required especially food and medicine. In understanding

the whole gamut of HADR, it is vital to first understand that both the

supported and supporting require adequate logistics. To provide relief,

relief agencies themselves must be appropriately trained for the

calibrated response. In doing so, they must be well aware of the

restrictions, constraints and the hazards. This is where prior knowledge

is essential, learning from the lessons of past incidents. Humanitarian

organisations should appreciate that the key factors to responding

quickly to meet disaster survivors' expectations are: local permanent

relief logistics facilities, transportation, preparedness of human

resources, and co-ordination among different parties. Without that,

essential supplies and relief will take much longer to reach those who

need it at the time they need it most.

The government formed the National Disaster

Management Agency or NADMA to coordinate the work of various

agencies during a disaster. NADMA was set up not to take over the

functions of agencies like the armed forces, police, Civil Defence

Department, Fire and Rescue, Rela and Social Welfare Department, but

to manage and coordinate efforts.

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Phase 1 – Initiation

• Initiate by host country/regional secretariat

• Information gathering/ground recce

Phase 2 – Planning3

• Identify entry point and assembly point

• Type of assistance required by Host Country

• Selection of asset for deployment

3If this is going to be coordinated by AHA Centre, the ASEAN ERAT must consist of assessment teams and planners, instead of just the former. Planners should be mainly from the host country.

Figure 6: Disaster Relief from the Sea - Concept of Operation Source: CMSD 2015 Research Project – Disaster Relief from the Sea

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Phase 3 – Deployment

• Deploy all asset to assembly point within the planned time

frame

• Assets can be deployed from multiple axis of approaches

towards assembly point

• All assets are required to report to AmphCdr at the

assembly point

Phase 4 – Relief Operations

• Land Cdr will establish land relief area

• AmphCdr coordinate the aids movement based on the

instruction from Land Cdr

Phase 5 – Handover

• Landed aids will be distributed accordingly

• Land Cdr assume OPCOM for relief operation (including

sea element)

Phase 6 – Exit

• AmphCdr will detach each unit which complete offloading

processes

• Critical asset (Capital Ship) will remain in vicinity of Land

Relief Area to render any assistance required

7.3 National Maritime Security Complex

When addressing maritime security, the first thing to look at is the

cost of these crimes to the nation and then the region. Perhaps, in the

absence of an impact assessment, certain facts can be taken at face

value. Smuggling for example involves loss of tax revenue, income

otherwise gained from fines, unregulated migration, raising crime rates

adding to cost to threat response and risk index for businesses,

smuggling of illegal substances and loss of valuable human capital,

smuggling of wildlife, some with pandemic disease, raising cost for

medical response. Where marine resources are concerned, the loss of

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edible and ornamental fish due to poaching, destructive fishing and cost

in purchasing these resources elsewhere; loss of priceless underwater

national treasures. Loss of lives and property due to armed robbery and

piracy.

Their success is in being organised. Maneuver and tempo come

from coordinated activity, invincible when the measures to counter it is

not organised enough. Crime Syndicates spend vast sums of money

analysing maritime security regimes in all countries, identifying and then

exploiting vulnerabilities, including the corruption of officials in

constabularies, customs agencies, ports, governments and industries.

Perpetrators caught, escape from the long arm of the law due to the

technical faults in the indictment process. The net effect is billions in lost

revenues that could have been spent on good governance, and on

strengthening our national instruments of power, from defence, to

transportation infrastructure, to education and healthcare.

Therefore, there is a need to invest, to add value to the effort in

addressing these threats systematically. The investment could be less

than the net cost when capacity building is done coherently. Still, the

common trait in all coastal states is that multiple forces, ministries and

agencies all have a strong interest in maritime surveillance, whether it’s

the immigration department for illegal migrants, the national police for

counter-narcotics, the fisheries department for illegal fishing, the coast

guard for search and rescue, or the navy for sovereign presence and

when necessary for combat. When these groups are stove-piped, acting

separately, guarding their data jealously, and competing against one

another for resources and influence, then they collectively do their

countries a disservice, and it becomes much easier for adversaries to

identify and exploit the vulnerabilities that exist at the inter-agency

seams.

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When dealing with Transnational Organised Crime (TOC), one

has to be organised to counter them. Then again the question was as to

whether a neither single agency nor country can be organised to do just

that. Being Transnational and Orgnaised, these crimes can only be

deterred and suppressed through a collaborative, cooperative and

coordinated approach. Security complexes around the region may

complement the WoN approach where they can be organised into a

regional system. The focus of this approach is to break the logistics chain

of crime. Bridging the land-sea nexus through an organised network

against TOC. The idea is to deter and suppress crimes by targeting the

logistics of the crime on land so as they would not be able to fuel and

feed from the crimes at sea. To do this, nations should focus on the

economic cost of not getting organised and the value of being otherwise.

Nations must agree that neither single agency nor country can break this

NATIONAL JOINT

INTERAGENCY BUREAU

Government Agencies

Industry

Non National structures

National Bank

Multimedia Commisison

NGO Against Graft

Media

Commmunity Policing

Figure 7: National Maritime Security Complex Element Source: CMSD 2014 Research Project – Maritime Security Complex

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logistics chain unless they do it collectively and among themselves

regionally, working together.

8.0 Simulation Development Phase

8.1 Simulation Concept Development

The first phase of simulation development is concept

development covering the need for having the right idea and objectives

of the simulation training. During this phase, MIMA’s team with the

stakeholders will discuss the broad concept of the simulation scenario

and what is the mission objectives for each simulation run. The concept

will cover the synopsis of the simulation scenario and what is expected

action to be taken by the agencies or players.

8.2 Stakeholder Endorsement

After the concept is finalized, it will be presented to stakeholders

and potential players to be endorsed. This endorsement will be based

on their current Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and the policy of

Simulation Concept

Development

Stakeholders' Endorsement

Main Event List

Development

Trial RunTabletop Exercise

Simulation Execution

Post-simulation Analysis

Debrief Session

Figure 8: Simulation Development Phase

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each agencies towards the proposed scenario. The endorsement also

covered the chosen training facility and other logistic matters.

8.3 Main Event List Development

Scenario plays are guided by main event list or also known as a

storyboard. This list will underline the whole storyline of each simulation

run such as asset movement, weather conditions and escalation levels.

The drafting processes of the main event list shall be carried out by both

parties which is MIMA’s team and the simulation facility provider to

ensure the storyline can be played by the simulator. The list will be

divided into several phase to meet the training objectives and to facilitate

the gradual difficulties level for participants.

8.4 Trial Run

Once the Main Event List is completed, the training organizer will

undertake the trial run or mock-up run to ensure the storyline is playable

within the given timeframe. Detailed observation will be conducted

especially on asset’s distance and movement to facilitate the timeline

given. During this phase all parties will identify room for improvement

before the real simulation run takes place.

8.5 Tabletop Exercise

Prior to the real simulation game, participants must undergo a

tabletop exercise which is similar to the scenario given in the simulation

phase. They will be provided the scenario synopsis and a ‘brown

envelope’ to simulate the situation and all assets movement will be

carried out at the discussion table. By using this method, all participants

will have the ample time justify their response or action towards the

scenario and assist them before they play the scenario in the actual

simulator.

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8.6 Simulation Execution

After the tabletop exercise, all participants will be stationed in

designated cubicles to play as platform (ship, boat or aircraft) and

command centre (headquarters, rescue coordinating centre, or disaster

command centre). This is similar to the tabletop exercise but this phase

will judge the timely response and decision-making processes of each

participant.

8.7 Post-Simulation Analysis

On completion of each simulation run, instructors and simulation

controller will conduct and ad-hoc analysis for each run to identify the

mistake and also the impact of each action taken by the participants.

This analysis will be presented by the simulation controller during the

debrief session.

8.8 Debriefing Session

The final phase of each simulation run will be a debriefing session

where all participants from different cubicles and instructor will gathere

to discuss the simulation run. Participants will be briefed on their action

and its impact and determine room for improvement for the next

simulation run.

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9.0 Maritime Law Enforcement “Specialist Training” Workshop

The Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea

series has been conducted annually by Indonesia since 1991. The Track 1.5

Workshop brings together China, Taiwan and ASEAN participants to discuss

and enhance functional cooperation projects to build trust and confidence

among participating members.

During the 25th Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South

China Sea, in Jakarta, Malaysia reported on the 2nd Maritime Law Enforcement

(MLE) “In-Service Training” Workshop conducted in April 2015.4 The Workshop

was a success with participants from ASEAN and Taiwan. Malaysia was given

the mandate to conduct the subsequent workshop in 2016 themed “Specialist

Training”.

The objectives of the third MLE Workshop are:

a. Use the workshop process to build working relationships on

training matters.

4 https://www.mmea.gov.my/index.php/en/mengenai-kami/carta-organisasi/56-arkib-aktiviti-2015/1119-workshop-on-managing-potential-conflicts-in-the-south-china-sea-maritime-law-enforcement-workshop-in-service-training

Figure 9: MMEA’s offshore Patrol Vessel in Simulation Training Source: Contraves Advanced Devices

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b. Enhancing cooperation through capacity building in maritime

security training among regional partners.

c. Identify and share Best Practices on law enforcement and

maritime Search & Rescue (MSAR).

d. Improve the understanding of standard operating procedures on

law enforcement and MSAR by capitalizing the realism on the

simulator facility.

e. Increase networking among participating agencies to better

interact on a personal basis.

Throughout the simulation programme, it was observed that:

a. Diversified skillsets posed by participants bring in more value to

the training programme.

b. Active interaction between participants leads towards better

networking which benefits them after the training.

c. Different procedures practiced by each country bring in

challenges in the multinational combined maritime operation.

d. Simulation-based exercises provide more room for participants to

achieve their best decision making processes.

Figure 9: Evolution of MLE’s Training 2014 - 2016

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10.0 Code for Unplanned Encounter at Sea (CUES) Simulation

The Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) and Centre for Humanitarian

Dialogue (HD) convened a group of navy and coast guard officers from claimant

states in the South China Sea region on 21-23 March 2016 for a training course

covering the internationally-agreed, coordinated, communication method

known as the 'Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea' or CUES. This was the

first time that working level officers from the naval and coast guard services of

Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines had joined together to train and conduct

simulation exercises in the standard operating protocol for handling encounters

at sea. China was represented by an observer from the China Institute of

International Studies (CIIS) and indicated that it may be willing to consider fuller

participation in future training.

Figure 10: Simulation Debrief Room Source: Contraves Advanced Devices

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During a series of previous meetings convened by HD, held in Singapore

(May 2015), Kuala Lumpur (September 2015), and Beijing (December 2015)—

including expert participants from China, Malaysia, Vietnam and the

Philippines—CUES5 was identified as a useful platform and a priority maritime

confidence-building measure (MCBM) from which to base a set of processes

for responsible behaviour and clear communications at sea. The overall aim is

to improve inter-operability and co-operation between the claimant states. The

resultant training event was designed based on the findings of these three

earlier experts’ meetings.

The CUES training6 course was hosted by HD and MIMA at a simulation

facility in Cyberjaya, Malaysia, with a combination of navy and coast guard

delegates, as well as observers, from the four countries. The morning session

comprised of two components; the first examined the definition, history and

value of CBMs in general and looked at INCSEA case studies as previous

5http://asean.org/storage/2016/09/Joint-Statement-on-the-Application-of-CUES-in-the-SCS-Final.pdf 6 http://www.mima.gov.my/v2/?m=posts&c=shw_details&id=576

Figure 11: Participants from Vietnam during Simulation Phase Source: MIMA Website

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successes. During this talk the formation of the CUES and the general aims of

the training were also explained. The second session divided the delegation

into smaller groups with two separate instructors to discuss the CUES

document and interpretations of the communications format in greater detail,

and engage in voice procedure exercises. Following the morning sessions,

participants were split into four smaller operational groups, according to

country, to simulate unplanned encounters on the high seas.

The scenarios that were executed are as follows:

Scenario One – Warship meets Warship on the high seas

Scenario Two – Warship meets Coast Guard on the high

seas

Scenario Three – Coast Guard meets another Coast

Guard in pursuit of a third partyvessel at the operational

border area.

The simulations were followed by facilitator-led, operational debriefings.

The event overall was closed with a post-course debrief and distribution of a

feedback form.

Figure 12: Tactical View during Post-Simulation Debrief Phase Source: Contraves Advanced Devices

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The following key observations were made by the training facilitators,

over the course of the training and three simulations:

a. Operational communication procedures vary appreciably

between the regional navies and coast guards; further work can be

done to deepen implementation of CUES communication

procedures.

In pre-simulation discussions about voice procedures, it was noted that

some participants used ATP standard voice procedures as a matter of

course (Malaysians have theirs scripted in a document called procedural

communications) whereas other participants chose to prioritise the use

of plain voice. The Philippines Coast Guard confirmed that their voice

procedure training is currently based on ATP publications but without a

script. It was acknowledged and appreciated by the delegates that the

interpretation of plain voice over VHF communications is much

dependent upon both the choice of words used and the tone of voice,

which will inevitably vary by nationality and can potentially lead to

intentions and challenges being misconstrued. This highlights the real

potential for CUES-scripting for challenge and reply.

b. Lack of knowledge of other countries’ standard operating

procedures can cause misunderstanding and misperception.

In a pre-simulation discussion about ‘standard manoeuvres in close

proximity’, the participants were asked to appreciate that what are

perceived as ‘standard manoeuvres’ for one nation may be seen as

aggressive manoeuvres by another having a different style of approach.

The participants were asked to consider differences in perception as

opposed to black and white thinking when confronted by these situations

in order to reduce the potential for escalation.

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c. Translating CUES into other languages will help deepen its

implementation.

It was observed that the level of English language fluency (which is the

international language of the sea) varied significantly amongst

participants. The Vietnamese and Filipino Coast Guard delegates

requested future assistance with CUES translation to provide an internal

working document.

d. Lack of knowledge of international law can lead to

misunderstanding and misperception.

It was clear to the facilitators that there was a general lack of

understanding among the training participants on the full range of

operations and restrictions that are allowable using International Law in

EEZs and interritorial waters, and in the proximity of these boundaries.

It is felt that this fundamental lack of understanding will only serve to

exacerbate the situation in the region where tensions are already high.

Remedying this information gap would be integral to the future of

successful interactions.

e. Multilateral interagency cooperation is more challenging

between the Coast Guards than between the Navies.

While there exists a strong naval tradition to draw on in interactions

between navies even outside of the CUES, coast guards are generally

not trained to interact with other coast guards. During the third

simulation, each country team demonstrated significantly different VBSS

(visit, board, search, and seizure) procedures in accordance with their

own standard operating procedures while conducting Combined

Boarding Operations (boarding by boats and helicopter). It was evident

that procedural misunderstanding could also lead to misperception.

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Participants were asked to score (on a scale of 1 to 10) how valuable

each component of the training was. The components listed were: lectures,

voice procedure exercise, simulations, and debrief sessions. Participants were

also asked to reflect on the aspects of the course that were most and least

valuable.

a. Simulations were seen as the most valuable component to

training. The other components also received positive feedback with the

majority of scores within the8 to 10 range.

b. Participants confirmed that through the training they had

developed a better understanding of the CUES and some also

commented that interaction with participants from other countries, and

the improved understanding of the multilateral application of CUES

between claimants, was useful.

c. Participants suggested the course had given them an

understanding of the importance and challenges to communications

(especially between navies and coast guards, and between different

countries) and a belief that regional cooperation had real utility.

d. Participants agreed that there was merit in the onwards

application of the content of CUES, and in the importance of establishing

common procedures between coastguards and navies.

e. Participants were keen to undertake a further ‘extended version’

of the training which could potentially include more complicated

scenarios (dealing with interactions in disputed areas, situations where

friction may arise, situations involving fishermen, and situations within

EEZs) in order to fully test and practice application of the CUES.

Participants also expressed interest in a potential future focus on the

alternative (non-radio) forms of communications,

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As well as offering participants a broader understanding of the

complexities surrounding perception and more general differences in national

operating procedures, a baseline understanding of operational communications

between claimants in the region was achieved from which future training

packages and improved protocols can now be built. The training reiterated the

need for a common language to be agreed, practiced and fully understood

between the claimant states (which may be based on an amended version of

the CUES with consideration for removing superfluous annex data for adoption

by law enforcement agencies).

The training also identified gaps in the participants’ understanding of

territorial waters andEEZ border and zone operations which would be

fundamental to the preservation and policing of good order at sea.

11.0 Observation

a. Brings a range of participants to a near real-time scenario

In order to achieve training effectiveness, the training provider

should create the most likely scenario based on system capability and

external factors such as weather, machinery status and level of tension.

This approach helps the participants to reach this level without deploying

any real assets hence save the manpower, operational cost and risk of

operation.

b. Big Picture view for Stakeholders

By using the simulation approach, stakeholders are exposed to at

least three method of operational view: tabletop view, real-time view and

tactical view. These three different views are beneficial for each level of

exercise namely table top (pre-exercise), real-time (exercise) and

tactical (post exercise). The differences in this views will assist

stakeholder in doing its assessment on decision making processes

taken during the exercises.

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c. Opportunity to develop flow charts as Contingency Plans

Major advantage when using the simulation are simulation

players or participants may develop their own flow charts as a

Contingency Plans for each scenario. This is assisted by sufficient room

for making errors when doing the simulation exercise such ships

collision, casualties and alibi destruction. Further, participants can also

test their contingency plan on the spot during the given scenario.

d. Opportunity to identify practical steps towards effective

implementation of actions

Having the simulation as a training concept also helps

participants identify all practical steps to ensure action taken is effective

enough for the mission objective. This effort can be achieved without

jeopardizing the mission itself because every outcome of each taken

action can be repeated as many times as required.

e. Addresses unnecessary duplication and management of

scarce resources

During the maritime law enforcement, SAR, or HADR operations,

it is normal to see multiple agencies handling the situation. Most

agencies have their very own expertise but due to operational

requirements, they tend to undertake similar task and duties. Such

duplication of effort reduces agency effectiveness and is wasteful of

resources. Simulation exercises can address and resolved such issues.

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12.0 Conclusion

Having a simulation approach brings a new dimension on training

methods and also cooperative measures between agencies. Most input papers

by CMSD are a challenge for the government to adopt due to lack of awareness

and understanding on the subject. Simulation training facilitates the process of

new concept adoption by various agencies without deploying any real assets

and thus save much human and financial resources.