In Tuong Vu and Wasana Wongsurawat, eds. Dynamics of the Cold War in Asia: Ideology,

Identity, and Culture (New York: Palgrave, 2009)

Chapter 3

“To Be Patriotic is to Build Socialism”: Communist Ideology in Vietnam’s Civil War

Tuong Vu, University of Oregon

Introduction

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was the instigator and victor in the

Vietnamese civil war (1959-1975). It was led by a communist party (the Vietnamese Workers’

Party or VWP) that had displayed a particularly sharp binary worldview since at least the 1940s.1

To communist leaders, the world was divided into two opposing camps. The socialist camp was

imagined as a paradise in which peace, happiness and good will ruled. In contrast, the capitalist

or imperialist camp symbolized everything that was bad, including war, sufferings and

exploitation. The interests of the two camps were fundamentally opposed and war of mutual

destruction between them was inevitable. Yet because history was viewed as following a linear

progressive path and the socialist camp represented progress, this camp was expected to triumph

in such a war.

This binary worldview of Vietnamese communists was remarkably consistent throughout

the 1940s. As reality did not conform to what was imagined, it was modified but never

abandoned. Regardless of what happened, communist leaders enthusiastically identified

themselves with the revolutionary camp. In darkest moments when no support from this camp

was forthcoming, they did not cease associating themselves mentally with the Soviet Union,

63

imagining about it and displaying their admiration for it. Their loyalty explains why, when the

Cold War arrived in Asia in the late 1940s, DRV leaders volunteered to fight it on the front line

for the socialist camp, disregarding the looming threat of American intervention. Their earnest

appeals and Mao’s personal pleading helped persuade an uninterested Soviet Union to recognize

the DRV in early 1950, extending the battle line of the Cold War into Indochina.

The question is: What happened to this ideological loyalty during the subsequent civil

war between North and South Vietnam? The war was framed from the communist side as “the

resistance against America to save the country” [khang chien chong My cuu nuoc], making it

sound as if it were simply a war for national liberation and unification between the independent-

minded Vietnamese and American invaders. The standard version in the literature depicts a

fierce Vietnamese desire for national unification and independence that ran opposed to American

determination to stop communism from expanding into Southeast Asia.2 Vietnamese communists

are viewed as being driven by deep patriotic sentiments as descendants of a people who had

repeatedly fought off foreign invasions in history. Alliance with the Soviet camp was only for

political expediency. Even when VWP leaders’ strong adherence to communism is

acknowledged, it is often argued that they placed national liberation and unification higher than

ideological goals.3 Alternatively, when ideology is discussed, this is often done in the context of

factional conflict.4 Ideological conflicts in this line of analysis merely reflected power struggle.

Based on newly available documents and other primary sources, this chapter comes to the

opposite conclusion that Vietnamese communists never wavered in their ideological loyalty

during the period when key decisions about the civil war was made (1953-1960). They accepted

Soviet and Chinese advice to sign the Geneva Agreements but continued to perpetuate their

propaganda war against the US. Under various pennames, Ho Chi Minh published sharp

64

commentaries in Vietnamese newspapers, viciously attacking American policy and its capitalist

culture and society. Although North Vietnamese leaders expected elections to be held in 1956,

they pressed on with rural class struggle and their goal to build a “people’s democracy.” They

did not shy away from defending communism when the Saigon regime attacked the doctrine. As

previously, they never abandoned their binary worldview despite serious disputes within the

Soviet bloc in the late 1950s. The VWP was not of one mind in how to cope with discord within

the bloc, but its leadership worked hard to preserve bloc unity. As it launched an armed struggle

in South Vietnam, the Party did not downplay socialism but in fact boldly promoted it with the

new formulation “to be patriotic is to build socialism.” Party leaders sometimes spoke openly

that they wanted to build socialism in South Vietnam once the North won the civil war. The

1 Tuong Vu, ‘“From Cheering to Volunteering’: Vietnamese Communists and the Arrival of the

Cold War,” in Connecting Histories: The Cold War and Decolonization in Asia (1945-1962), ed.

Christopher Goscha and Christian Ostermann (Stanford University Press, 2009).

2 George Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York: Alfred

Knopf, 1986); Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York: HarperPerennial,

1990); Mark Bradley, Imagining Vietnam & America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam

1919-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); George Herring, America’s

Longest War, 4th edition (New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 2002).

3 W. R. Smyser, Independent Vietnamese: Vietnamese Communism between Russia and China,

1956-1969 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1980).

4 Martin Grossheim, “Revisionism in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam: New Evidence from

the East German Archives,” Cold War History 5, no. 4 (November 2005): 451-77; Sophie

Quinn-Judge, “The Ideological Debate in the DRV and the Significance of the Anti-Party Affair,

1967-68,” Cold War History 5, no. 4 (November 2005): 479-500.

65

evidence suggests that a modernizing socialist ideology rather than a mere desire for national

unification was driving the Vietnamese civil war from the north.

“Class struggle under the appearance of a nationalist struggle”

Existing literature rarely discusses the DRV’s negotiations at Geneva in tandem with its

domestic policy. Most accounts also begin in 1954 when the negotiations started.5 In this section,

I start in 1953 when the ground was laid for the decision to negotiate in 1954. A brief

examination of the decision to launch the land reform campaign made at the same time also

illuminates the mindset of DRV leaders in this obscure period.

Stalin published his short book titled Economic Problems of Socialism in 1952 at about

the same time with the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. The year also marked the

third year of the Korean War in which a stalemate was reached between Allies’ and communist

forces. In China, the Chinese communist government had just completed its land reform

campaign in 1951 and was poised to take the rural revolution to the next step, i.e.

collectivization.6

These events revived the optimism of the DRV government after an unsuccessful military

campaign in 1951. In his speech to open the Fourth Plenum of the VWP’s Central Committee in

January 1953, Ho Chi Minh recounted these developments with pride and joy. After

summarizing the contents of Stalin’s book, Ho said that the book taught Vietnamese communists

“how to assess the future of the world correctly;” now they could be “assured of the ultimate

victory waiting them.”7 Ho then turned to China and enthusiastically presented an array of

statistics about the success of socialist building there. For example, the land reform in China was

5 Pierre Asselin, “Choosing Peace: Hanoi and the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam, 1954-1955,”

Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 95-126.

6 Yang Dali, Calamity and Reform in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

66

said to have redistributed 700 million acres of land to farmers, raising production by 40 percent

in 1952. The percentage of poor farmers fell from 70 percent to around 10 to 20 percent.

Between 60 and 80 percent Chinese farmers were already organized either in mutual aid teams or

in collectives. Forty-nine million children of farmers were now enrolled in schools. If real, these

statistics were impressive.

In contrast to the great progress made by “the democratic camp” [phe dan chu], Ho

described the US which led the imperialist camp [phe de quoc] as being “on its last leg” when it

used biological weapons in Korea.8 This act led to “great outbursts” of world opinion against the

US. Because the US had to concentrate all its forces to prepare for war, the American economy

was in shambles and Americans became more impoverished. Ho called for continued vigilance

against imperialists: “We have to keep in mind that colonizing backward countries and

exploiting their people are one of the basic characteristics of monopoly capital. French and

American imperialists crave for our rich reserves of raw materials such as rice, rubber, coal and

tin. They also want to conquer and use our country as a military base to invade China.” Ho’s

perceptions of Vietnam’s chief enemy were derived largely from Lenin’s theory of monopoly

capital with the logic going backwards: Imperialism originated from the need of monopoly

capital for markets and raw materials; America was an imperialist; America must desire Vietnam

because Vietnam could be made into a market for American goods and a supplier of raw

materials for American companies. Strategically, the goal of the US was assumed to be invasion,

7 “Ve tinh hinh truoc mat va nhiem vu cai cach ruong dat” [On the situation and our task of land

reform], January 25, 1953. Dang Cong San Viet Nam (Vietnamese Communist Party), Van Kien

Dang Toan Tap v. 14 (Collection of Party Documents, hereafter VKDTT): 18.

8 Ibid., 14-9.

67

not containment, of China. An offensive imperialist goal clearly fitted better with Ho’s two-camp

worldview than a defensive one.

VWP Secretary General Truong Chinh who gave the main report at the same Plenum

quoted Stalin at length about the “vast chasm” [mot troi mot vuc] between the basic principles of

modern capitalism and those of socialism. Whereas the former was characterized by

“exploitation,” “impoverishment,” “enslavement,” “profiteering” and “war-making”, the latter

was said to be based on “the effort to satisfy to the greatest extent the material and spiritual needs

of the whole society by continuously improving production based on advanced technology.”9

Stalin offered just another exegesis of the two-camp doctrine that Chinh espoused.

But Truong Chinh was most impressed with Stalin’s “invention” [phat minh] of the

dialectic logic of the predicted economic crisis in the capitalist camp. According to Stalin, the

imperialist countries’ economic blockade against the Soviet Union and other “people’s

democracies” led to the latter forming a market among themselves in which they “collaborated

closely and equally and helped each other sincerely.”10 The unified world market that had existed

up to then was broken into two opposing economic blocs. The development of the socialist camp

had been so rapid that soon socialist countries would not need goods thus far supplied by the

capitalist camp. This, Stalin predicted, would shrink the markets in capitalist countries and throw

their economies into deep crises. These crises in turn would further weaken world capitalism;

capitalist countries would have to cling to their colonies at any cost; the conflict among

imperialists would deepen; and war would break out among them.11 Because of this coming war

within the imperialist camp, war might not occur between the two camps for the time being. As

9 “Bao cao cua Tong Bi Thu Truong Chinh” [Report by Secretary General Truong Chinh],

VKDTT 14: 32.

68

Truong Chinh paraphrased Stalin, the Second World War had shown the imperialists that

attacking the Soviet Union was a risky business. While fighting among imperialists would only

affect their relative status within the capitalist camp, war with the Soviet Union would endanger

capitalism itself.

While being vigilant against “imperialists’ plots,” Truong Chinh cited three reasons for

Vietnamese communists to support the Soviet policy of protecting peace. First, protecting peace

for the time being was necessary for the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies to develop

their forces while imperialist forces declined. Second, one should not encourage wars among

imperialists because these wars by themselves would not destroy imperialism. Imperialism

would be destroyed only when the people in imperialist countries overthrew their rulers, or when

socialist armies liberated them (as the Soviet Union did in World War II). Finally, the people in

imperialist countries wouldn’t need imperialist wars to make revolution. Many revolutions in

history had occurred in the absence of such wars. While believing Stalin that peace was possible,

Truong Chinh also quoted the Soviet leader’s point that peace was only temporary and war was

inevitable in the long run because imperialism still existed.

The significance of this Plenum cannot be exaggerated. First, the analysis of world

situation formed a critical background to the most important decision made at the Plenum, which

was to launch a Chinese-style land reform in 1953. The VWP had been vigorously debating this

policy for many years and the achievements of the socialist camp, especially in China and Korea,

clearly inspired them to take this long awaited radical step. The new situation, Truong Chinh

10 Ibid., 32-4.

11 For discussion of Stalin’s ideas in this book, see John Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold

War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

69

argued, made irrelevant the experience of the Chinese Communist Party during 1937-1945 when

this party pursued rent reduction but not land redistribution:

We do not want to apply [that] Chinese experience mechanically. At that time, the

Chinese Communist Party was collaborating with Chiang Kai-shek to fight the Japanese.

Chiang was the representative of feudal landowning and comprador capitalist classes. He

did not want land redistribution and he had a government and an army. Now we are not

collaborating with such a powerful partner. So we can make a [bolder] step forward.

Also, at that time China was under siege by feudal and imperialist forces. Today our

country has formed one single bloc with [lien mot khoi] the socialist and democratic

camp and is connected to a big people’s democracy which is China.12

Truong Chinh’s reasoning led him to a concise theoretical formulation that effectively

solved a longstanding debate among Vietnamese communists. As he said, “Nationalist

democratic revolutions are [essentially] peasant revolutions. Wars of national liberation are

essentially peasant wars… Leading peasants to fight feudalism and imperialism is class struggle

and nationalist struggle at the same time. It is class struggle within a nationalist struggle and

under the appearance of a nationalist struggle.”13 The debate up to then had pitted radicals like

Truong Chinh against those who feared that land reform would break up the national coalition in

the struggle for independence.14 Given the favorable international and domestic conditions,

Chinh had now succeeded in persuading his comrades to go along. Land reform from then on

was viewed as complementing, not contradicting, nationalist goals. Land redistribution assumed

12 Ibid., 52-3.

13 Ibid., 53-4.

14 Tuong Vu, Accommodation vs. Confrontation: State Formation and the Origins of Asia’s

Developmental States (Book manuscript, 2008): chapter 5.

70

an importance equal to national liberation. As we will see later, Le Duan and others would make

a similar move in the late 1950s to infuse class struggle objectives into the fight for South

Vietnam.

Second, with the help of Stalin’s book, the Plenum also accepted the theoretical

justifications for another key decision to be made later in the year, which was to negotiate with

the French at Geneva. Several factors have been put forward to explain the DRV’s acceptance of

the Geneva Agreements, including the priority given to reconstructing the North, the belief in the

legality and practicality of the accords, war fatigue, and the pressure from the Soviet Union and

China.15 While all these factors played some role, Party documents published in 1953 reviewed

here suggested that ideology was also a factor. In particular, their loyalty to the socialist cause

and desire to coordinate policy with the Soviet camp led Vietnamese communists at the time to

accept uncritically Stalin’s policy of preserving peace. There was no doubt raised at the Plenum

about Stalin’s policy. VWP leaders even made an effort to justify the policy in doctrinal terms

even though at points they were simply paraphrasing Stalin. While there was internal dissent

about Geneva, top VWP leaders felt proud that they were acting on behalf of the camp in the

interests of not just their revolution but also world peace.16

The undeclared propaganda war: “civilized” Soviets vs. “stinking” Americans

Ever since officially joining the socialist camp in 1950, the propaganda machine of the

DRV had been busy spreading the two-camp view among Vietnamese people. Propaganda took

15 Nguyen Vu Tung, “Coping with the United States: Hanoi’s search for an effective strategy,” in

The Vietnam War, ed. Peter Lowe (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1998): 39.

16 “Thong tri cua Ban Bi Thu ve loi tuyen bo cua Ho Chu tich voi nha bao Thuy Dien” [Party

Secretariat’s Circulation on Chairman Ho’s talk with Swedish journalist], December 27, 1953.

VKDTT 14: 555.

71

many forms: publications of pamphlets17 and newspaper articles, organization of “Friendship

Month” [Thang huu nghi],18 and visits for government officials and intellectuals to China, North

Korea and the Soviet Union. On their return, travelers gave speaking tours around the country to

talk about their positive experiences.19

In this propaganda war to inculcate loyalty to socialism and incite hatred against America

and American imperialism, Ho Chi Minh played an active role as a satirist and commentator.

From 1951 to 1956, he authored nearly 100 short articles under a few pen names (Tran Luc, T.L.,

C.B., D.X., and Chien Si) published on the VWP’s newspapers Nhan Dan [The People] and Cuu

Quoc [National Salvation]. Most articles were about 500-word long and were published during

1953-1955, or about one every other week. They were written in simple style for the ordinary

readers but the language was sharp, concise and idiomatic. The topics ranged from the story of

an ordinary farmer in the Soviet Union to the evolution of the Soviet Communist Party over the

years. In these articles Ho often cited sources from foreign newspapers, presenting himself as a

well-read and objective observer who wanted to educate his people about those foreign lands

through hard facts (statistics) and interesting vignettes. The stories about the Soviet Union

17 See, for example, Ty Tuyen Truyen Van Nghe Yen Bai [Yen Bai Art Propaganda Department],

Chuc Tho Mao Chu Tich Sau Muoi Tuoi [Celebrate Chairman Mao’s 60th birthday] (Yen Bai,

1953).

18 See Dang Xa Hoi Viet Nam [Socialist Party], Thang Huu Nghi Viet-Trung-Xo voi nguoi tri

thuc Vietnam [Vietnamese-Chinese-Soviet Friendship Month with Vietnamese intellectuals]

(Viet Bac, 1954).

19 For example, see Hoang Quoc Viet, Chung toi da thay gi o nuoc Trung hoa vi dai [What we

have seen in Great China] (Hoi Huu Nghi Viet-Trung Lien Khu 5, 1953).

72

conveyed the happy life, advanced technology, economic success and progressive society there.

In a typical piece, the author wrote the following about a 147-year-old farmer named Aivazov:

“Communist Youth” is the name of a collective farm in Azerbaijan (the Soviet Union).

This farm was organized by Mr. Aivazov decades ago, when he was more than 120 years

old. He named the farm “Communist Youth” because he considered himself a young

man. Indeed, although he is now 147, he is still healthy and likes to do such things as

keeping sheep, raising chicken, planting, carpenter and blacksmith work…20

Although Vietnamese leaders fully supported Stalin’s policy of preserving peace as

mentioned above, they never underestimated the American threat. They concluded the Geneva

Agreements on the advice of their Soviet and Chinese comrades, but they were in many ways

preparing for war. During the Geneva talks, they intensified their propaganda to counter the

tendencies of “fearing and admiring America” among Vietnamese. About two-thirds of the

articles (67) written by Ho were about the US (the rest were about the Soviet Union). Most of the

pieces about the US were in satirical form, in which the author adopted a mocking tone to

criticize American society from its decadent culture to racist practices, from its crime-infested

society to its oppressive government. The author wanted to make Vietnamese not to admire, trust

or fear the US because it was morally, socially and politically corrupt. A typical piece discussed

the hypocrisy of American policy as follows:

America brings money and medicine to help people in other countries. At the same time,

how do Americans live? On July 5, the American president said, there are 32 million

Americans without doctors. Last year more than 1 million Americans died of intestinal

20 C.B., “147 tuoi ma van thanh nien” [Still a young man despite being 147 years old], Nhan Dan,

October 17, 1965. Reprinted in C.B. (Ho Chi Minh), Lien Xo Vi Dai [The Great Soviet Union]

(Hanoi: Nhan Dan, 1956): 26-7.

73

diseases. More than 600,000 Americans had mental disorder (insanity), more than 25

million had this or that disease. The great majority of Americans have no money to see

doctors or to buy medicine… So you see, the American people live such miserable lives

but American reactionaries are throwing money to help French colonizers, [Vietnamese]

puppets, Chiang Kai-shek, [and] Rhee Syngman to help spread American “civilization”

to the Asian people! How crazy. Even crazier are those who admire America, trust

America, fear America.21

Ho’s biting criticism was not limited to American policy or American government, but

was as often directed against American leaders as against American (capitalist) culture and

society. He viewed the struggle not only in political terms but also in cultural realms. As he

translated for readers materials from American newspapers in mid-August 1954,

‘Phoenix has 25,000 residents. Casinos, cocaine shops and brothels open freely.

Gangsters can be hired to kill people: the cost to kill a person is 12,000 francs [sic].22 A

merchant wanted to organize a self-defense group; his house was bombed to the ground

the next day. A local paper reported this case; the paper was raided and two

correspondents were critically beaten. A judge wanted to investigate the case; his house

was also bombed. Another judge declared he would wage war on crimes; he was

21 D.X., “Mo cha khong khoc, khoc mo moi” [They care about strangers but not their own people;

literally, they cried not at their father’s grave but at a pile of dirt], Cuu Quoc, October 12, 1951.

Reprinted in C.B. et al. (Ho Chi Minh), Noi Chuyen My… [Talking about America] (Hanoi:

Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1972): 31. (This is a collection of articles written by Ho Chi Minh under

various pennames such as C.B. and D.X.).

74

assassinated a few days later. Criminal gangs control the city. The government and the

police are their puppets…Phoenix is a small city; what about big ones? New York…’23

Ho then asked his readers: “Is [America] a civilized country? Or is it a disgusting and stinking

place [hoi tanh ron nguoi]? Ho’s technique was to pick an isolated story and present it as typical

of America:

Capitalist magazine Newsweek (January 30, 1956) reported, “Frist (?), 22, was executed

in Oklahoma for killing a policeman. When Frist was 18 months old, his uncle was

executed for murder. A year later, his mother (who had left his father for another man)

shot to death her new husband. She was absolved from this case because she was

“defending” herself from her husband who threatened to kill her. Later she killed her

third husband and spent 5 years in jail for this crime. Frist’s brother is serving 10 years

for theft. His uncle received a life sentence for repeated crimes. Frist’s girlfriend is

serving time in Virginia for stealing a car. Frist’s father is in a Texas prison because of

theft…What a model family of America!24

It is impossible to know for sure whether these articles represented Ho’s true worldview

or whether he was merely producing propaganda. It is likely that Ho believed in what he wrote

for three reasons. First, his view of American society of the 1950s was consistent with that in the

1920s when he was a young man, and it fitted with his broader two-camp worldview shared by

his comrades at the same time.25 Second, he was not writing these columns to make a career or a

22 Apparently Ho read the news story in the French media.

23 C.B. (Ho Chi Minh), “My ma: Phong khong thuan, tuc khong my,” [America: Coarse and ugly

customs], Nhan Dan, September 1, 1954.

24 C.B., “Mot ‘gia dinh guong mau’ cua My” [A model family of America], Nhan Dan, February

16, 1956.

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living. He had a full-time job as President of the DRV and of his party and he was at the top of

his career. In other words, he was writing out of mere enthusiasm and his awareness of the need

to educate his people about the dark side of America. Third, what Ho wrote was not fabricated

but contained only half truths. We may think of his articles as mere propaganda but he would

probably disagree. He may have dismissed as imperialist lies anything positive about US society

in Western media. The extremely negative images of the US, which conformed to Marxist-

Leninist teaching, may have been accepted as the whole truth.

While his true belief is hard to ascertain, there is no question Ho was a talented satirist

who liked to play with words and to make short verses. In Vietnamese, “America” is called

“My” (from Chinese “Mei guo”). “My” also means “beauty.” Ho pointed this out, warning

Vietnamese that the name of the country suggested beauty and goodness but its actions were just

the opposite.26 Another example is Ho’s transliteration of General Douglas McArthur’s name

into Vietnamese as Mat-Acte (“Cruel Face” in Vietnamese).27 As a cultural entrepreneur, Ho was

subtly and skillfully revising the popular image of the US in Vietnam. Due to the lack of

information we can only speculate about the impact of his writings. The intensity of the contents

and the frequency of their appearance suggested possible impact on their readers. At least the

25 See “English ‘colonization’” (1923), “Lynching, a little known aspect of American

civilization” (1924) and “The Ku-Klux-Klan” (1924), reprinted in Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works,

v. 1 (1922-1926) (Hanoi: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960).

26 D.X., “My la xau” [America means ugliness], Cuu Quoc, November 3, 1951. Reprinted in C.B.

et al, Noi Chuyen My: 30.

27 C.B., “Dao duc cua My”[American morality], Nhan Dan, June 14, 1951. Reprinted in C.B. et

al., Noi Chuyen My: 97.

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articles made the idea of fighting the most powerful but also most corrupt superpower not that

daunting and even justified.

Defending communism and building an “essentially people’s democracy” at home

Vietnamese leaders fully agreed with Stalin’s call to preserve peace. They followed

Soviet and Chinese “socialist brother-countries” in signing the Geneva Agreements in July 1954

despite some dissent within their ranks. But, as we have seen, they watched closely every US’

move. Even before signing the Agreements, they had noted American efforts to create a new

Southeast Asian military alliance and warned that,

Since the beginning of the resistance, our forces have become stronger and the enemy’s

weaker… Yet we should not look down on our enemies. Our victory [at Dien Bien Phu]

has wakened American imperialists. They are adjusting their plots and plans to prolong

the war, internationalize it, wreck the Agreements, kick the French out to take over

Indochina, turn Indochinese people into their slaves, and create more tension in the

world.28

The DRV’s strategy at the time was to exploit the conflict between the US and France in

the imperialist camp. By late 1954, after a series of US success in consolidating the anti-

communist bloc, they already sensed that this strategy would fail.29 This new development

created a besieged mentality. At the 8th Central Committee Plenum in March 1955, party leaders

reviewed the balance of forces between two camps and were concerned that Vietnam was the

weaker outpost of the socialist camp compared to the other three (East Germany, North Korea

28 Ho Chi Minh, “Bao cao tai Hoi nghi lan thu sau” [Report at the Sixth Central Committee

Plenum], July 15, 1954. VKDTT 15: 165.

77

and China).30 They were worried about possible US attacks on the Soviet Union, China and other

Southeast Asian countries.31 They predicted that the US and the Saigon government were likely

to delay or refuse to carry out elections as proposed in the Geneva Agreements.32

On this occasion, Ho Chi Minh and Truong Chinh appeared to differ in their assessment

of the world situation. First, Ho viewed the US and the Soviet Union as more or less equal in

force capabilities, but the latter was ultimately stronger because it represented a just cause.33

Speaking after Ho, Chinh noted that the Soviet Union was helping some “people’s democracies”

to build nuclear-fueled electricity plants. Compared to the US which was still trying to test

nuclear weapons, he argued that the Soviet Union was clearly superior in nuclear technology and

science.34 Second, Chinh chided the Party propaganda department for praising India and Burma

too much, “causing the people to be confused about the political stand and goals of those

[capitalist] countries.”35 In contrast, Ho counted India and Indonesia as forces for peace,

suggesting that those countries could be allies of the socialist camp.36 These differences

confirmed the well-known fact that Truong Chinh was among the most radical of the VWP.

29 This refers to the Manila conference (September 3, 1954), the Paris Agreement (October 23,

1954) and the US-Taiwan Relations Act (December 2, 1954).

30 “Ket luan cuoc thao luan o Hoi nghi Trung uong lan thu bay” [Conclusions to the discussion at

the 7th Plenum], March 3-12, 1955. VKDTT 16: 177.

31 “Tinh hinh hien tai va nhiem vu truoc mat” [Current situation and upcoming tasks], Truong

Chinh’s report at the 7th plenum (March 3-12, 1955). VKDTT 16: 97, 128.

32 Ibid. 184.

78

These differences aside, all VWP leaders largely ignored the bustling diplomacy by governments

of the emerging non-aligned bloc. The Asian conference to be held in India and the Asia-Africa

Conference to be held later in Bandung, Indonesia were mentioned only once in one sentence.37

These activities clearly did not fit Vietnamese leaders’ two-camp worldview.

In response to the rising intensity of the Cold War, Vietnamese communists still

considered the need to preserve peace as being more urgent than Vietnam’s unification even

though they paid greater attention to the latter now.38 Diplomatically, the VWP wanted to further

consolidate Vietnam’s “solidarity” with the Soviet Union, China and other people’s democracies.

Ideologically, the Party wanted to educate the masses more about proletarian internationalism.39

This call for mass indoctrination indicates a consistent pattern of behavior that will be seen again

and again. This pattern was that, whenever life became more difficult, the Party would resort to

ever more rigorous indoctrination of the masses.40 The reason was that Party leaders never

33 “Loi khai mac cua Ho chu tich” [Chairman Ho’s opening remarks], March 3, 1954. VKDTT

16: 92.

34 “Tinh hinh hien tai va nhiem vu truoc mat,” VKDTT 16: 100.

35 Ibid., 166.

36 “Loi be mac cua Ho chu tich” [Closing speech of Chairman Ho], March 12, 1955. VKDTT 16:

222.

37 “Tinh hinh hien tai va nhiem vu truoc mat,” VKDTT 16: 100. Chinh mentioned these events in

his speech; Ho did not.

79

blamed their doctrine for what went wrong. Marx and Lenin were always right but cadres

(including the top leaders themselves) did not understand these masters correctly, which was

why more ideological study and training were required.

By late 1955, it became clear to VWP leaders that things were not right. Ngo Dinh Diem

declared that he would not honor the Geneva Agreements because his government did not sign

them, and because free elections as stipulated in the Agreements would not be possible in North

Vietnam under the communist dictatorship. Ngo also organized a poll to oust Emperor Bao Dai

and to make himself President of a new Republic of Vietnam. He named communism as one of

the three enemies of his regime, together with feudalism and colonialism.41 In the wake of Ngo’s

attack on communism, party leaders decided that not to defend the doctrine was a serious right-

leaning mistake.42 They launched a propaganda campaign designed to show Vietnamese more

clearly the superiority of the socialist camp over its imperialist enemy. Party members were

mobilized to fight against the “enemy camp’s slanders and lies about our regime and the regimes

38 Ibid., 178. See also Hoang Quoc Viet, “Dau tranh de thong nhat nuoc nha tren co so doc lap va

dan chu, bang phuong phap hoa binh” [Struggle to unify the country based on independence and

(socialist) democracy by peaceful means], Hoc Tap (December 1955): 41-3.

39 “Tinh hinh hien tai va nhiem vu truoc mat,” VKDTT 16: 159.

40 To be sure, there were times when indoctrination campaigns were used to intimidate dissidents

within the Party. See Grossheim, “Revisionism in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.”

80

in our socialist brother-countries.”43 The goal was to make “the people, especially the working

people, to enthusiastically support communism and actively defend communists.”

This unfavorable international situation generated internal debate among VWP leaders

about the ongoing violent land reform campaign.44 Some argued that the rural class struggle in

the North could alienate the upper classes in South Vietnam, making it more difficult to unify the

country. Hoang Quoc Viet, a Politburo member in charge of united front work, asserted that any

successful united front must be based on the alliance of workers and peasants and must meet

their “basic demands.” This essentially meant class struggle should go on. In his report at the 8th

Central Committee Plenum in August 1955, Truong Chinh pushed for sustaining the land reform

but nevertheless argued that calling for rapid socialist industrialization in the current

environment was a “left-leaning mistake.”45 He mentioned the word “socialism” only twice in his

59-page report.

The Plenum resolution reflected some uncertainty but the radical view adopted since

1953 still held sway. On the one hand, the Party decided that the North was to take “gradual but

firm steps toward socialism,” and that the political regime in the North must essentially be a

“people’s democracy.” On the other hand, the regime in appearance was allowed to retain

certain characteristics of “old-style democracy,” and it would be acceptable if the speed to

41 “Bai phong, da thuc, diet cong” (Oppose feudalism, fight colonialism and destroy

communism).

42 “Thong tri cua Ban Bi Thu so 48-TT/TW” [Party Secretariat’s Circulation], July 21, 1955.

VKDTT 16: 459.

43 Ibid., 460-1.

44 Hoang Quoc Viet, “Dau tranh de thong nhat nuoc nha”: 40.

45 “Bao cao cua dong chi Truong Chinh” [Comrade Truong Chinh’s report]. VKDTT 16: 524.

81

socialism in North Vietnam would be slower than that in other people’s democracies.46 This

confusing formulation essentially meant that class struggle would continue but must be

conducted in a way that would not appear harsh from outside. There were thus different views

among Party leadership about the speed of the socialist revolution but not about socialism itself.

No Party leaders expressed any reservations about the need to publicly and proudly defending

communism.

“No other way out but revolution”

Khrushchev’s denunciations of Stalin and his policy of peaceful coexistence in early

1956 shook the VWP. Given the VWP’s worship of Stalin and the failure of the Geneva

Agreements, Khrushchev’s policy touched on sensitive nerves in Hanoi. In response, Vietnamese

leaders accepted Khrushchev’s overall argument but denied its full utility in their case. First, they

argued that VWP had been practicing collective leadership and personality cult was not a big

problem in their party.47 VWP Politburo pledged to strengthen collective leadership, but also

warned about committing right-leaning mistakes such as “extreme democracy” [dan chu cuc

doan] and the wholesale refutation of the role of individual leaders in revolution.48 It was stressed

that Ho Chi Minh’s role must still be elevated.

Second, VWP Politburo took exceptions to Khrushchev’s new calls for peaceful

coexistence on two grounds. Clearly with South Vietnam in mind, VWP leaders asserted that,

although it was possible to prevent war, imperialism by its economic nature was war-oriented.49

46 “Nghi quyet Hoi nghi Trung uong lan thu 8” [Resolution of the 8th Central Committee

Plenum], August 1955. VKDTT 16: 577.

47 “Bao cao cua Bo Chinh Tri” [Politburo’s Report at the 9th Central Committee Plenum], April

19-24, 1956. VKDTT 17: 158-62.

48 Ibid., 165-6.

82

Until the day when imperialism was totally destroyed, the threat of war remained and “people of

the world” [nhan dan the gioi] must always be on guard. Also, while it was possible for some

countries to advance to socialism by peaceful means as Khrushchev argued, in cases where the

capitalist class still controlled the coercive apparatus and were determined to suppress revolution

with force, the proletarian class must be prepared to take up arms if they were to win. Although

the VWP pledged to continue its peaceful unification policy toward the South, they publicly

distanced themselves from Khrushchev’s stand.

VWP leaders formulated a clearer assessment of their Southern policy by the end of 1956

as they convened the 10th Central Committee Plenum. They noted that the international

environment had become more favorable to the socialist camp.50 The Soviet Union was at the

forefront of the world movement to curb the arms race. Soviet-Yugoslavian talks improved unity

in the socialist camp while US-led military alliances in Europe, Asia and the Middle East

encountered internal friction. Domestically, the VWP finally concluded that the land reform and

“organizational rectification” campaigns in the North had committed serious errors. This

conclusion would lead to the resignation of Secretary General Truong Chinh at the end of the

Plenum.

In South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem had categorically rejected the Geneva Agreements.

July, the month that national elections were supposed to take place to unify the country, passed

without such events. This confronted VWP leaders with the problem of how to explain this

failure to their followers. In this sense Le Duan’s 42-page analysis from the South came as a

49 “Nghi quyet cua Hoi nghi Ban chap hanh Trung Uong lan thu chin mo rong” [Resolution of the

expanded 9th Central Committee Plenum]. VKDTT 17: 169.

50 “De cuong bao cao cua Bo Chinh tri tai Hoi nghi Trung uong lan thu 10” [Draft report of the

Politburo at the 10th Plenum], August 25-October 5, 1956. VKDTT 17: 418-9.

83

timely blessing (although conventional scholarship views this only as a criticism of central

leadership). In this document, Duan as the third-ranking party leader in charge of the Party office

in the South called for a new policy of revolutionary struggle to defeat the Ngo Dinh Diem

regime.51 Duan presented the harshest and most doctrinal analysis of the Saigon regime to date,

calling it “a neo-colonialist regime under the control of an aggressive imperialist—the US,” and

“a cruel and clever fascist dictatorship.”52 He eloquently asserted that revolution was the only

way out in the South, pushing central policy toward, if not a more radical, then a sharply clarified

position.53

Either out of respect for the general policy of the socialist camp or out of strategic

analysis of military balance in the South, Le Duan accepted that the revolution could proceed for

the time being as a “political struggle” but not yet an “armed struggle.” At the same time, he

stressed that political struggle should be based on mass forces in opposition to the Saigon

government, not on mere legal or constitutional demands. Here Duan implicitly dismissed as

misguided the central policy to demand the implementation of Geneva Agreements. To Duan,

the goal of the struggle from then on must be “revolutionary,” i.e. to eventually overthrow the

Saigon government and to implement communism.54 Duan offered a lengthy analysis of the

history of the Vietnamese revolution to conclude that the revolution must give equal priority to

51 Le Duan, “Duong loi cach mang mien Nam” [Our revolutionary line in the South], August

1956. VKDTT 17: 783-825.

52 Ibid., 787-8.

53 At the 10th Plenum which met without Duan who was still in the South, the Politburo claimed

that the idea of revolution in the South was not new to them although they admitted to failure in

clarifying the idea, in researching the Southern situation and in pursuing a corresponding policy.

“De cuong bao cao cua Bo Chinh tri tai Hoi nghi Trung uong lan thu 10,” VKDTT 17: 423.

84

both class struggle and national struggle to ensure its success.55 We have seen that this was

exactly what Truong Chinh had argued since 1953.

As before, the 10th Plenum did not blame land reform mistakes on the doctrine. Instead,

the leaders humbly blamed themselves for failing to apply Marxist-Leninist theories correctly.56

At the same time, Party leaders were concerned about many new, post-land reform problems in

the countryside, including “right-leaning” errors and the revival of capitalism among upper-

middle peasants.57 In response to the new situation, Party leaders called for more rigorous study

of the doctrine (for the leaders) and for more systematic indoctrination (for the rank and file).58

The Party and the people must study harder so that they could combine patriotism and

proletarian internationalism harmoniously in their belief system. The idea that Vietnam could be

a neutral country between the two camps must be denounced. People must believe in the socialist

camp led by the Soviet Union and China, and must work hard to strengthen Vietnam’s solidarity

with the socialist brother-countries, friendship with neighboring nations, and support for the

peace and democratic movement.59 Party leaders vowed that, “regardless of circumstances,”

North Vietnam must be strengthened to make “gradual steps toward socialism.”

54 “Duong loi cach mang mien Nam,” VKDTT 17: 805-6. The implementation of communism

was referred to indirectly as Le Duan vowed that victory would eventually come for the causes

of unification, independence and communism.

55 Ibid., 806-22.

56 “De cuong bao cao cua Bo Chinh tri tai Hoi nghi Trung uong lan thu 10,” VKDTT 17: 449.

57 Ibid., 480-2.

58 Ibid., 486-98.

59 Ibid., 496.

85

Existing analyses discuss socialist construction in the North and unification of the

country as conflicting goals in the thinking of VWP leaders. If this had indeed been the case, it

was no longer true by 1956 in the minds of these men. Both regions were assigned tasks that

together would take Vietnam on the path to socialism. This formulation created ideological

consistency but it also required clarifying that the upcoming war in the South was not just a war

for national liberation but also as a step on the long road to socialism. Le Duan’s analysis of the

Southern situation in clear doctrinal terms as a neo-colony under imperialist rule was a crucial

step to prepare for new conceptualizations of the war to be developed over the next two years.

Defending the “universal truths” of Marxism-Leninism abroad

Internal conflict within the socialist bloc during 1957-1960 tested Vietnamese

communists’ commitment to their two-camp doctrine. Khrushchev’s active pursuit of peaceful

coexistence was a wedge in Sino-Soviet relations. But China and the Soviet Union had numerous

other disputes, including Soviet invasion of Hungary, Soviet aid to China, Soviet normalization

with Yugoslavia, China’s border war with India, and the Albanian challenge to the Soviet Union.

How did VWP leaders think about the new developments? At the 13th Plenum of the

VWP in December 1957, First Secretary-designated Le Duan lambasted “modern revisionism”

although he did not mention Tito and Khrushchev. Duan charged that this doctrine promoted

national communism, criticized Stalin, denied the “universal truths” [chan ly pho bien] offered

by Marxism-Leninism, slighted the value of Soviet revolutionary experience, questioned the

necessity of proletarian dictatorship, failed to see the enemy’s plots, doubted the motives of

Soviet aid, rejected Soviet leadership, and advocated incorrect views about peaceful

coexistence.60

86

The two-camp worldview of Vietnamese leaders assumed two unified camps with

fundamentally opposed class interests seeking to destroy each other. The existence of two camps

was believed to be an “objective truth and the result of a historical process.”61 The nature of the

two camps was fundamentally different like paradise versus hell. The socialist camp came into

being with the birth of the Soviet Union in 1917 and expanded with the emergence of many

“people’s democracies” after World War II. The formation of many “nationalist countries” such

as India and Indonesia after World War II did not change the two-camp reality because these

countries were essentially capitalist. Within the socialist camp, the national interests in each

“brother-country” were identical to those of the entire camp because they all were based on the

interests of workers and the working people. There should not be conflict within the socialist

camp. Soviet leadership of the camp was also the result of a historical process: the Soviet Union

was the first socialist country whose experience was relevant to all others; Soviet military forces

were most powerful and provided the security for the whole bloc; and the Soviet Union had

proven to be a great leader since its birth.

But why did conflict break out among socialist countries? Vietnamese leaders chose to

blame “imperialist forces” and remnants of the capitalist class in the new people’s democracies

for stirring up the troubles.62 They imagined a dialectic process as follows. As the socialist camp

60 Le Duan, “Thong nhat tu tuong, doan ket toan Dang day manh hoan thanh nhiem vu cong tac

truoc mat” [Unite our thoughts and all Party’s actions to fulfill our upcoming responsibilities],

report at the 13th Plenum, December 1957. VKDTT 18: 762-3. Also, Le Duan, “Nhung nhiem vu

lich su cua phong trao Cong san quoc te” [The historical responsibilities of the international

communist movement], Hoc Tap (December 1957).

61 Minh Nghia, “Tang cuong doan ket va hop tac trong phe Xa hoi chu nghia” [Increase solidarity

and collaboration in the socialist camp], Hoc Tap (March 1957): 26-32.

87

grew, comprador capitalists and imperialist powers became increasingly desperate and sought

every means to destroy socialist regimes and to reinstate their rule. These enemy forces

organized uprisings and tried to divide the socialist camp. They exploited ancient national

sentiments generated in past conflicts caused by exploiting classes. They slandered the “generous

and sincere assistance of the Soviet Union and distort Soviet relationships with the people’s

democracies.”63

The DRV’s diplomatic maneuvers in response to the Sino-Soviet disputes have been well

covered in other accounts.64 Here I wish to focus on the ideological dimension only. From this

perspective, several questions emerge about the VWP’s behavior in this difficult period. First,

why were they so obsessed with the unity of the camp and willing to act as mediator despite the

risks of being entangled in the disputes between their bigger brothers?65 In the Soviet-Albanian

dispute, why did they defend Albany that could not offer them aid, and defied the Soviet Union

that could? Smyser66 speculates that the VWP’s obsession with the unity of the camp stemmed

62 Le Duan, “Nhung nhiem vu lich su cua phong trao Cong san quoc te”: 19.

63 Minh Nghia, “Tang cuong doan ket va hop tac trong phe Xa hoi chu nghia”: 32.

88

from their traditional mentality, which considered the ideal socio-political order to be a

harmonious organized community. But we have seen how zealous many top Vietnamese

communist leaders were about class struggle; their alleged preference for harmony simply

contradicts the evidence here. Ideological loyalty to world socialism offers a much better

explanation. Unity would give the greatest strength to the bloc and to world revolutionary

movement in order to defeat the ever clever and cruel imperialists.

Second, VWP leaders are known to be very concerned about preserving their

independence from foreign countries but they supported Soviet military intervention into

Hungary in 1956.67 Echoing the Kadar government’s line,68 Le Duan criticized those who did not

see imperialist plots and who believed in the theory that the uprising in Hungary was caused by

64 Smyser, Independent Vietnamese; Ilya Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War

(Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1996); Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina

Conflict, 1954-1963 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2003); Zhai Qiang, China &

the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Ang

Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists’ Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict,

1956-1962 (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1997); Ang Cheng Guan, “The Vietnam War, 1962-64:

The Vietnamese Communist Perspective,” Journal of Contemporary History 35, no. 4 (October

2000): 601-18.

65 Smyser, Independent Vietnamese: 44.

66 Smyser, Independent Vietnamese: 12.

67 Ibid.

68 Mark Pittaway, “The Education of Dissent: The Reception of the Voice of Free Hungary,

1951-1956,” in Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History, ed. Rana Mitter and

Patrick Major (London: Frank Cass, 2004).

89

resentment toward socialism and by its leaders’ mistakes: “Even if we didn’t make any mistakes,

they would keep plotting against us,” for that was imperialist nature. The Hungarian leadership

may have committed some mistakes, but this would at most have caused some disorder but not

an uprising. While Le Duan was not paranoid,69 he could not have failed to see that the principle

of national independence was at stake here. Ironically, the VWP welcomed Soviet invasion of

Hungary, first, for the camp’s unity, and second, because they considered the Hungarian

communist party had committed heresy and thus forfeited their right to independence.70

Ideological loyalty was again the dominant factor in this decision.

Third, why did VWP leaders defend Stalin who was dead and challenge Khrushchev who

was the incumbent leader and who could offer them aid for their struggle in the South?71 Because

Ho’s personal relationship with Stalin was poor, there could only be two other possible reasons.

First, Vietnamese leaders could be afraid of the ramifications of Khruschev’s criticisms of Stalin

for the unity of their own party. We still know little about internal politics of the VWP Politburo,

but they appeared to cope with the issue of personality cult very well in their 9th Plenum in

March 1956. The report to the Plenum was written by the entire Politburo, indicating broad

unanimity. The Politburo even saw Khrushchev’s report as giving an opportunity for them to

correct their mistakes, if any.72 Second, as VWP leaders claimed, it was due to their belief that

69 For US clandestine political warfare in Eastern Europe, including the impact of the Radio Free

Europe on the Hungarian event, see Kenneth Osgood, “Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional

Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 4, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 85-107.

70 Smyser, Independent Vietnamese,123.

71 Le Duan, “Thong nhat tu tuong, doan ket toan Dang day manh hoan thanh nhiem vu cong tac

truoc mat.” VKDTT 18: 769-71.

72 Smyser, Independent Vietnamese: 11.

90

“Stalin was a loyal follower of great Marxism and Leninism; his entire revolutionary career was

great; his achievements were fundamental while his mistakes were marginal; his written work

will remain in the treasures of Marxism-Leninism.”73 We do not have to trust VWP leaders’

claim; yet this is a clear case where their actions contradicted their practical interests and could

be explained only by ideological loyalty.

“To be patriotic is to build socialism”

We have seen that Vietnamese communists found innovative discursive formulations to

justify class struggle even at the height of the nationalist struggle. They translated Marxist-

Leninist arguments into concise Vietnamese formulations such as “class struggle within a

nationalist struggle.” As they launched an armed struggle in the south, they did not relax but in

fact intensified their socialist goals. By 1958 they no longer talked simply about “strengthening

the North” but planned for “socialist industrialization.” In this section, I trace the process in

which new definitions of “patriotism” were invented to justify the radicalization of the struggle

in both North and South.

Prior to 1957, VWP leaders talked of “patriotism” [chu nghia yeu nuoc] and proletarian

internationalism [tinh than quoc te vo san] as two separate things.74 Patriotism was defined as

loving the fatherland. Proletarian internationalism meant support for the socialist camp and for

the international working class movement. VWP leaders frequently stressed the need to educate

their cadres and the masses about these two isms. By 1957, as they debated the approaches to

economic development in the North and national unification, a new formulation that tied these

two concepts together gradually emerged.

73 Ibid., 669-70.

74 An example is To Huu’s report on thought work [cong tac tu tuong] at the 10th Plenum in

August 1956. VKDTT 17, 495-7.

91

In an article on the Party theoretical journal Hoc Tap, Hoang Xuan Nhi, a professor of the

Party school, attempted to elaborate on the standard Marxist-Leninist proposition that “the

national problem” was reducible to class struggle.75 He argued that patriotism was a historical

phenomenon that had different class contents in each different historical period. In feudal times,

patriotism was understood as loyalty to the king. In the struggle against feudal classes, capitalists

claimed to represent nations but their nationalism was ultimately made to serve their class

interests, not those of the working people. Nhi claimed that among all classes, workers loved

their country the most. Through their [manual] labor, generations of workers produced material

goods and created cultures, languages, writing systems and other national traditions. While they

loved their country, their patriotic senses were spontaneous and easily manipulated. As Nhi

argued, only when led by a vanguard party armed with Marxism-Leninism could they develop

“genuine patriotism” [chu nghia yeu nuoc chan chinh]. Genuine patriotism combined passionate

love for one’s country with one’s clear political consciousness [nhan thuc chinh tri] about the

goals of class struggle. Because the VWP represented the interests of the working class in North

Vietnam, patriotism also meant support for the Party and its rule in all aspects of society. While

Nhi’s theoretical discussion was so blatantly directed to serve the Party’s need to mobilize

popular support for its socialist agenda, he showed an early effort of Party theorists to find new

ideological expressions for the old concept of patriotism.

Throughout 1957, all Party members were required to study Marxism-Leninism.76 This

was the first systematic organization of mass study sessions, which aimed to strengthen

75 Hoang Xuan Nhi, “Boi duong chu nghia yeu nuoc, tang cuong chu nghia quoc te vo san trong

nhan dan ta [Inculcating patriotism and strengthening proletarian internationalism in our people],

Hoc Tap (January 1957): 34-45.

92

members’ theoretical understanding, loyalty to the causes of the proletariat, and belief in the

Party and the socialist camp. In the previous year, a series of international and domestic events

seriously eroded popular support for the VWP.77 As Party theorists sought to quell heretical ideas

within their ranks, they had to clarify their concepts and sharpened their arguments. According to

a report of the campaign, among the topics studied was the approach to unification.78 A major

target of criticism was the notion that Vietnam could be unified faster had it taken the neutral

path like many Asian and African countries. This notion obviously contradicted the two-camp

worldview and was thus criticized as “completely mistaken.” First, it was argued that

revolutionary victory could only result from a long and difficult class struggle but would never

be granted by imperialists. Second, “independence and unification were not abstract and empty

concepts but embodied class contents. Independence and unification meant the liberation of the

working people, and for this reason, could only be brought by the Party of the proletariat.” Third,

the neutral countries were formed thanks to the growth of the socialist camp and the mass

movements in those countries, but not due to a random process. Again, here was another

clarification of what patriotism should mean in the new era—“the era when socialism was

winning on the global scale.”

It was Pham Van Dong, the Premier and a Politburo member, who produced a succinct

formulation that would acquire the status of a new doctrine of patriotism. The formulation was

“to be patriotic is to build socialism.”79 Dong came to this formulation after a lengthy but

eloquent recount of the world revolutionary movement from its success in Russia in 1917 to its

current status in Vietnam in 1958.80 He boldly stated that “our era is the era when patriotism

meets socialism.” He imagined Russia’s October Revolution to be “the result of two great

struggles: one by Russian workers and peasants led by the Bolshevik party, and the other by the

93

nations under Czarist rule.” The encounter of patriotism and socialism was a key factor

determining the success of that revolution. As he described passionately,

The Soviet Union, the product of the October Revolution, is the first model image of a

state comprising many nations who live together in an equal and friendly relationship and

who together build socialism. [In this society] all nations enjoy the conditions required to

develop their capacity to build their happy lives while contributing to the prosperity of

the entire Soviet Union. “The prison of all nations” has been replaced by “the Fatherland

of 100 brother-nations.”81

After reviewing the history of the Vietnamese revolution, he made a similar claim that it

was also “the history of the marvelous, inevitable and productive encounter between patriotism

and socialism.” It was the meeting of patriotic forces with the leadership of a working class’s

Party. But to Dong this meeting only reached its “highest level” in North Vietnam since 1954. In

76 High-ranking cadres studied “Marxist-Leninist theories” whereas lower ranking cadres studied

basic concepts in historical materialism. See Nguyen Hoi, “Ket qua cua dot hoc tap duy vat lich

su vua qua” [Results of the study sessions in historical materialism]. Hoc Tap (March 1958): 53-

62.

77 These events included mistakes in the land reform, rural unrest, the surge of intellectual

dissent, Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin, and Hungarian and Polish revolts.

78 Ibid., 59.

79 A later variant of this formulation is, “to love your country means to love socialism” [yeu nuoc

la yeu chu nghia xa hoi].

80 Pham Van Dong, “Chu nghia yeu nuoc va chu nghia xa hoi” [Patriotism and Socialism], Hoc

Tap (August 1958): 6-17.

81 Ibid., 9.

94

this current context, Dong asserted that the encounter was the agreement between patriotism and

socialism over the goal of the revolution: “to be patriotic is to build socialism; to build socialism

is to be patriotic.”82 In South Vietnam, the “people’s struggle …must be accompanied by their

enthusiastic and determined support for the socialist North… The patriotic movement in the

South and the construction of socialism in the North [joined to form] an image of that encounter

between patriotism and socialism in the revolutionary process.” This encounter, Dong concluded,

would “lead to unification and to the favorable development of socialism in all of Vietnam. In

our contemporary world, this path was inevitable; nothing could prevent it from taking place”

(italics added).

The significance of this formulation is that for the first time Vietnamese communists

raised “socialism” in the public discourse to the level of “patriotism.”83 “Patriotism” was a much

older and more popular concept than “socialism.” No Vietnamese had ever questioned patriotism

but socialism had always been controversial.84 As communist leaders contemplated the

revolutionary paths in the North and the South, they found a formulation that placed the two

apparently separate paths in each region in one single phrase that expressed the dialectic

relationship between them: to struggle in the South meant to build socialism in the North and

vice versa. The war in the South was no longer viewed as being limited to unification; it was tied

to socialist construction in the North and in all of Vietnam eventually. To win the war the Party

must aggressively and publicly promote socialism rather than restrain or hide it under a

nationalist appearance as in 1953. The new formulation paved the way for the subsequent

82 Ibid., 14.

83 In their internal discourse, Vietnamese communists talked far more about socialism than about

patriotism.

84 Vu, Accommodation vs. Confrontation: chapter 8.

95

revision of the Party Constitution in which the class base of the Party was changed from “the

working class and the working people” to “the working class” only. This change was followed

by a newly inserted phrase pledging “to organize the teaching of Marxist-Leninist principles to

Party members and to the people in a broad and systematic way…”85 The new formulation of

patriotism and socialism would later be included in the new national Constitution approved in

1960.86

Conclusion

This paper examines how Vietnamese communists’ ideological beliefs evolved during

1953-1960 as they struggled with international and domestic challenges. I hope to show that they

never wavered in their communist ideology. While they accepted Stalin’s call to preserve peace,

they rejected Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence with the imperialist camp. An

examination of their propaganda indicated that war continued in this sphere, and a war of words

with the “stinking” Americans for the hearts and minds of Vietnamese began long before the US

made serious commitments to the Saigon regime. They never allowed their enemies to freely

attack communism as a doctrine. They never blamed Marxist-Leninist theory for problems that

occurred during policy implementation. The consistent pattern of their responses was to blame

themselves and to organize ever more rigorous and systematic study and indoctrination of

Marxism-Leninism.

85 Le Duc Tho, “Viec sua doi Dieu le Dang,” [Revising the Party Constitution], Hoc Tap (May

1960): 23.

86 The Party leadership discussed and decided to proclaim in the new national Constitution that

the North would take the path of socialism. See “De cuong bao cao ve Hien phap sua doi” [Draft

report about the revised Constitution]. VKDTT 21: 834-7.

96

When the Soviet bloc split, Vietnamese communists worked hard to preserve its unity

despite the risks of being entangled in one side of the dispute. Their international behavior often

did not correspond to their narrow interests in “liberating” South Vietnam; rather, it was

motivated by larger ideological principles that continued to underlie their two-camp worldview.

They defended communist orthodoxy when it was criticized in its very homeland, for no obvious

practical benefits. They defended a dead communist dictator when he was abandoned by his very

successors, at the risk of antagonizing the incumbents. They sided with a small power against the

leader of the bloc in the interests of bloc unity. At the same time, they supported a superpower’s

invasion of its small ally when this ally committed heresy. Their ideological loyalty paid off

handsomely as far as their strategic goals were concerned: if the Soviet Union and China in 1954

discouraged them from continuing to fight imperialists, by late 1964 they were competing to

supply North Vietnam with men and weapons!

The VWP leadership was not a monolithic group being of one mind on all ideological

matters. Their worldview and strategic understanding of the environment were not fixed and

continued to be debated and clarified during the period examined here. Yet they generally

achieved consensus; at the crucial points of 1953 and 1957,87 the radicals among them won the

internal debates, which suggested that the majority of VWP leaders leaned to the far left when it

came to doctrinal questions. During this period, class struggle was never downplayed vis-à-vis

nationalist goals although occasional efforts were made to create a moderate appearance to

outsiders. Party leaders tirelessly sought doctrinal justifications for every policy move and

worked hard to construct innovative ideological formulations when confronted with political

challenges. Socialism was promoted, not delayed or denied, after 1956, precisely at the time

87 These points were also the low points in terms of their military situation, although I do not

suggest a necessary correlation.

97

when a new struggle for national unification was decided. By 1959, the Party was no longer

reticent about its ultimate goal of building socialism in the whole country, even though they did

not expect victory in the South in the near future. In the theoretical formulations that these men

finally achieved, patriotism was made to serve socialism, not vice versa.

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