reckless imprudence.pdf

8/9/2019 reckless imprudence.pdf

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G.R. No. 187899 October 23, 2013

ROBERT DA JOSE and FRANCISCO OCAMPO y ANGELES, Petitioners, vs.

CELERINA R. ANGELES, EDWARD ANGELO R. ANGELES and CELINE ANGELI R.

ANGELES, Respondents.

Notes/Doctrine:

The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actualdamages which must be duly proven by competent proof and the best

obtainable evidence thereof. Thus, as a rule, documentary evidence should be

presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity.

While it is true that the respondents submitted cash vouchers to prove the

deceaseds income, the officers and/or employees who prepared, checked or

approved the same were not presented on the witness stand. As such, the Court

ruled that said cash vouchers though admitted in evidence, whether objected

to or not, have no probative value for being hearsay.

Facts: On December 1, 2001, at about 9:00 p.m., a vehicular collision took placeinvolving a car registered under the name of, and at that time driven by the late

Eduardo Tuazon Angeles Eduardo), and another car registered under the name

of petitioner Robert Da Jose (Robert) and at that time driven by petitioner

Francisco Ocampo y Angeles (Francisco). Eduardo died on the same day due

to Hemorrhagic Shock as a result of Blunt Traumatic Injury.

A criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and

Damage to Property was filed on December 3, 2001 against Francisco before

the MTC. In a Decision dated December 22, 2008, the MTC declared Francisco

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

During the pendency of the criminal case, respondents counsel sent

petitioners a demand-letterfor the payment (within 5 days from receipt of theletter) of the amount ofP5,000,000 representing damages and attorneys fees.

Failing to reach any settlement, respondents subsequently filed a Complaintfor

Damages based on tort against Robert and Francisco before the RTC.

Celerina testified on the various damages and attorneys fees prayed for

in their complaint. She and Eduardo begot two children: Edward who was born

on August 20, 1985 and Celine who was born on June 22, 1987.Celerina testified

that she loved Eduardo so much that when he died, it was as if she also died.

She also testified that their two children, who were very close to their father,

were shocked by the tragedy that befell him. Celerina claimed, among others,

that prior to his death, Eduardo at age 51, was physically fit and even playedgolf 2 to 3times a week. A businessman during his lifetime, Celerina attested that

Eduardo was earning a yearly gross income of over P1,000,000.She also testified

that at the time of his death, Eduardo was the President of Jhamec Construction

Corp., a family enterprise, from which he derived an annual salary of more or

less P300,000; Vice-President of Classic Personnel, Inc. from which he received a

regular annual allowance ofP250,000 to P300,000; and part owner of Glennis

Laundry Haus per Joint Affidavit dated December 28, 1999 executed by


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Eduardo and his partner, one Glennis S. Gonzales. Celerina also claimed that

the expenses for the medical attendance extended to Eduardo by the F.M.

Cruz Orthopedic and General Hospital amounted to P4,830 per the

corresponding Statement of Account. She pegged the expenses incurred

during the 4-day wake and subsequent burial of Eduardo at P150,000. In her

assessment, Eduardos unrealized income due to his untimely demise isaboutP98,000 a month and that the extensively damaged Mitsubishi Lancer was

valued at more or less P700,000.Lastly, Celerina averred that for the services of

counsel, she paid P100,000 as acceptance fee and P3,000 per court hearing.

On April 12, 2004, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision holding that "it

was recklessness or lack of due care on the part of defendant Ocampo while

operating the Nissan Patrol [that] was the proximate cause of the vehicular

collision which directly resulted in the death of Eduardo T. Angeles very soon

thereafter." Thus, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence on record and the laws/jurisprudenceapplicable thereto, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Robert

Da Jose and Francisco Ocampo y Angeles to solidarily pay plaintiffs Celerina

Rivera-Angeles, Edward Angelo R. Angeles and Celine Angeli R. Angeles the

following amounts:

1) P50,000.00 for the fact of death of the late Eduardo T. Angeles;

2) P500,000.00 as moral damages;

3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4) P4,830.00 for the hospitalization and P50,000.00 for the burial expenses

of the aforenamed deceased; and

5) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.

Upon appeal before the CA, the CA affirmed with modification the RTCs

findings and ruling and instead awarded the following amounts of damages, to

wit:

1. The P500,000.00 award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00;

2. The award of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages is further reduced to

P25,000.00; and

3. P2,316,000.00 is awarded for lost earnings of the deceased Eduardo T.

Angeles.

Contention of the Accused: That the award of P2,316,000.00 for lost earnings isnot supported by competent evidence and that the CA erred in admitting the

Glennis Laundry Haus cash vouchers as evidence to prove loss of earnings as

the said vouchers are purely hearsay evidence, hence, inadmissible and of no

probative value.

Ruling: The petition is meritorious.


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Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the heirs of the victim are entitled to

indemnity for loss of earning capacity. Compensation of this nature is awarded

not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money. The

indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual

damages which must be duly proven by competent proof and the best

obtainable evidence thereof. Thus, as a rule, documentary evidence should bepresented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By

way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded

despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-

employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in

which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceaseds line

of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is

employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under

current labor laws.

Based on the foregoing and in line with respondents claim that Eduardo

during his lifetime earned more or less an annual income of P1,000,000, the casefalls under the purview of the general rule rather than the exceptions.

Now, while it is true that respondents submitted cash vouchers to prove

Eduardos income, it is lamentable as duly observed by the RTC that the officers

and/or employees who prepared, checked or approved the same were not

presented on the witness stand.

We thus agree with the RTCs ruling that said cash vouchers though

admitted in evidence, whether objected to or not, have no probative value for

being hearsay.51

Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and

credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be

produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: (1)absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence; and (3)

absence of oath.52Basic under the rules of evidence is that a witness can only

testify on facts within his or her personal knowledge. This personal knowledge is a

substantive prerequisite in accepting testimonial evidence establishing the truth

of a disputed fact. Corollarily, a document offered as proof of its contents has to

be authenticated in the manner provided in the rules, that is, by the person with

personal knowledge of the facts stated in the document.53

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The award for the loss of earning

capacity in the amount of P2,316,000 granted by the Court of Appeals in its

Decision dated August 29, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 83309 in favor of respondentsis hereby SET ASIDE. All the other monetary awards are hereby AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION in that interest at the rate of 6 per annum on the amounts

awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time of finality of this Decision

until full payment thereof. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 172778 November 26, 2012

SABINIANO DUMAYAG,Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.

Notes/Doctrine:

In this petition for the reversal of a judgment of conviction of the complex crime

of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and reckless imprudence

resulting in physical injuries against a bus driver, the Court ruled that the totalityof the evidence shows that the proximate cause of the collision was the reckless

negligence of the tricycle driver, who hastily overtook another vehicle while

approaching a blind curve, in violation of traffic laws. In spite of the acquittal,

the Court however held the accused was still civilly liable for his contributory

negligence.

Facts: A passenger bus of Petrus Bus Liner (passenger bus), driven by petitioner,

collided with a tricycle driven by Elsie Genayas (Genayas), resulting in the death

of four (4) persons and causing physical injuries to five (5) others, who were all

passengers of the tricycle. At the time of the mishap, the tricycle was overtakinga Mitsubishi pick-up when it collided with the passenger bus coming from the

opposite direction.

Petitioner was charged before the MTC with reckless imprudence resulting

in multiple homicide for the deaths of three of the tricycle passengers; and with

reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries sustained by five of the

tricycle passengers and damage to property.

The MTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide. On appeal, the RTC affirmed

with modification the decision of the MTC. The CA affirmed in toto the decision

of the RTC.

Contention of the Petitioner-Driver: That the proximate cause of the accident

was the negligent, reckless and imprudent act of the tricycle driver, who

suddenly overtook another vehicle while approaching a blind curve. That the

tricycle was overloaded with eight passengers, in addition to the driver; that the

driver of the tricycle was operating along the national highway, a route

specifically prohibited under the franchise; and that the tricycle driver also

violated Section 41 (a) and (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136, as amended,

otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code of the Philippines

when he tried to overtake another vehicle while approaching a blind curve of

the highway. Therefore, due to serious violations committed by the tricycledriver, the resulting deaths and injuries arising from the vehicular accident should

be his sole responsibility.

Ruling: The Court finds merit in the petition.

Reckless imprudence, as defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily,

but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage

results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person


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performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his

employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and

other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. In order to establish a

motorists liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that

there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries

or damages complained of. Thus, to constitute the offense of reckless driving,the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a

motor vehicle, and a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is

required.

After going over the records of this case, the Court is unable to sustain the

findings of fact and conclusion reached by the courts below. The totality of the

evidence shows that the proximate cause of the collision was the reckless

negligence of the tricycle driver, who hastily overtook another vehicle while

approaching a blind curve, in violation of traffic laws.

The evidence indubitably shows that before the collision, the passenger

bus was cruising along its rightful lane when the tricycle coming from theopposite direction suddenly swerved and encroached on its lane. The accident

would not have happened had Genayas, the tricycle driver, stayed on his lane

and did not recklessly try to overtake another vehicle while approaching a blind

curve. Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all motorists to drive

and operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway. When overtaking

another, it should be made only if the highway is clearly visible and is free from

oncoming vehicle. Overtaking while approaching a curve in the highway,

where the drivers view is obstructed, is not allowed. Corollarily, drivers of

automobiles, when overtaking another vehicle, are charged with a high degree

of care and diligence to avoid collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to it

that vehicles coming from the opposite direction are not taken unaware by hispresence on the side of the road upon which they have the right to pass.

Furthermore, it was undisputed that the tricycle was overloaded, with a

total of eight (8) passengers (excluding the driver), which is a clear violation of

traffic rules and regulation. It was likewise admitted by the owner of the tricycle,

Beethoven Bernabe (Bernabe), that his driver violated the conditions specified

in the tricycle franchise which prohibited all tricycles to travel along the national

highway. In fact, he admitted that Genayas was only the alternate driver of his

son and that he did not interview him anymore when he applied as a company

driver because he was a neighbor and a nephew of his wife. For said reason,

the award of damages to Bernabe by the courts below has no justifiable basis.The immediate and proximate cause being the reckless and imprudent act of

the tricycle driver, petitioner should be acquitted.

Nevertheless, he is civilly liable. The rule is that an "acquittal of the

accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it

the extinction of the civil l iability based on quasi delict."

Under the proven circumstances, there was contributory negligence on

the part of petitioner. It is to be noted that there were two blind curves along


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the national highway. Having travelled along it for the past 20 years, he was

aware of the blind curves and should have taken precaution in operating the

passenger bus as it approached them. In the situation at hand, he did not

exercise the necessary precaution. After negotiating the first curve, he claimed

to have stepped on the accelerator pedal because his lane was clear.

According to SPO2 Patalinghug, he found skid marks produced by thepassenger bus. It could only mean that petitioner had slammed on the brake

brought about by the sudden emergence of the tricycle in front of him.

Notwithstanding, it was still short of reckless or criminal negligence as he was

driving along his rightful lane.

In this case, a reduction of 50% of the actual damages is deemed

equitable considering that the negligence of the tricycle driver was the

proximate cause of the accident and that of petitioner was merely contributory.

Moreover, under the circumstances, petitioner cannot be made liable for moral

and exemplary damages for lack of basis. The award of attorney's fees is not

warranted either.


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G.R. No. 187246 July 20, 2011

EDWIN TABAO y PEREZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Notes/Doctrine:

The Court explained that inconsistency between the affidavit and testimony

during trial does not impair the credibility of a witness. Likewise, the Court

reiterated that the right of a person using public streets and highways for travelin relation to other motorists is mutual, coordinate and reciprocal. He is bound to

anticipate the presence of other persons whose rights on the street or highway

are equal to his own. Although he is not an insurer against injury to persons or

property, it is nevertheless his duty to operate his motor vehicle with due and

reasonable care and caution under the circumstances for the safety of others

as well as for his own.

Facts:At around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, the petitioner was driving his

Toyota Corolla car along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street towards

Nagtahan when it suddenly ramped on an island divider, bumping RochelleLanete who was crossing the street. As a result of the impact, Rochelle was

thrown into the middle of the road on her back. Thereafter, Leonardo Mendez

speeding blue Toyota Corona car with plate number PES-764 ran over

Rochelles body. Bystanders armed with stones and wooden clubs

followed Mendez car until it stopped near the Nagtahan Flyover. Francisco

Cielo, a newspaper delivery boy, pleaded with the bystanders not to hurt

Mendez. Cielo went inside Mendez car, sat beside him, got his drivers license,

and ordered him to move the car backwards. Mendez followed his order, but his

car hit the center island twice while backing up. Cielo went out of the car and

approached the sprawled body of Rochelle; he and the petitioner brought

Rochelles body inside Mendez car. The three of them (the petitioner, Cielo andMendez) brought Rochelle to the UST Hospital, where she died on February 6,

1993 due to septicemia secondary to traumatic injuries.

Thereafter, the petitioner and Mendez was charged with reckless

imprudence resulting to homicide. The trial court ruled that it was very clear

that both accused are responsible for the death of Rochelle Lanete, and

convicted the two (2) accused of the crime charged. It found that the

petitioners car first hit the victim, causing her to be thrown into the road on her

back, and that Mendez car ran over her as she was lying down. It held that the

two failed to observe the necessary precaution and due care in operating their

respective vehicles, to wit: the petitioner was not attentive to his driving suchthat he failed to see the island divider and bumped Rochelle; Mendez was

driving his car too fast at nighttime such that he was unable to avoid running

over her as her body lay prone on the street. Upon appeal before the CA, the

CA affirmed its decision with the modification that the petitioner be sentenced

to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor,

as minimum, to four years, nine months and 10 days of prision correccional, as

maximum.


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Contention of the Accused-Petitioner:That the findings of facts are highly

speculative, manifestly mistaken and unsupported by the evidence, and that

the CA erred in upholding his conviction on the basis of the incredible and

unreliable testimony of Victor Soriano.

Ruling:After due consideration, we resolve to DENY the motion.

Reckless imprudence, generally defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily,

but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage

results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person

performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his

employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and

other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Imprudence connotes

a deficiency of action. It implies a failure in precaution or a failure to take the

necessary precaution once the danger or peril becomes foreseen. Thus, in order

for conviction to be decreed for reckless imprudence, the material damagesuffered by the victim, the failure in precaution on the part of the accused, and

the direct link between material damage and failure in precaution must be

established beyond reasonable doubt. We are morally convinced that all three

were established in this case in accordance with the required level of evidence

in criminal cases.

The petitioner was positively identified by an eyewitness

An eyewitness account established that the petitioners vehicle actually hit

Rochelle Lanete. Eyewitness identification is vital evidence, and, in most cases,

decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. One of the prosecution

witnesses, Victor Soriano, unfortunately for the petitioners cause, saw the

incident in its entirety; Victor thus provided direct evidence as eyewitness to thevery act of the commission of the crime. [24] In his September 1, 1994 testimony,

Victor positively identified the petitioner as the person who drove the car that

ramped on an island divider along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street,

and hit Rochelle.

Contention of the Accused-Petitioner:That Victor is not a credible witness due to

inconsistencies between his affidavit and court testimony: Victor declared in his

affidavit that the petitioners car first hit Rochelle before it ramped on an island

divider; while he testified in court that the petitioners vehicle ramped on the

island divider before hitting the victim.

Ruling: We find these arguments unmeritorious.

Discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness affidavit and

testimony in open court do not impair credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte

and are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack or absence of searching

inquiries by the investigating officer. At any rate, Victor was able to sufficiently

explain the discrepancies between his affidavit and court statements. Victor


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trajectory of Governor Forbes Street and to end up jumping on top of the traffic

island intended to channel vehicular traffic going to the Nagtahan Flyover.

A motorist is expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a

reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered, to

enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put

the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway. It has notescaped our notice that the intersection of Governor Forbes Street and G.

Tuazon Street is adjacent to the vicinity of the incident. A driver approaching an

intersection is generally under duty, among others, to keep and maintain his

vehicle under control so he can, if needed, stop at the shortest possible notice.

Ordinary or reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle at an

intersection would naturally require more precaution than is necessary when

driving elsewhere in a street or highway.

The fact that the petitioner was driving near the Governor Forbes Street

and G. Tuazon Street intersection gives rise to the expectation that he would

drive at a speed that anticipatedor would have anticipatedthat otherpersons are on the road, whether as pedestrians or as motorists. In this case, the

petitioner was driving his car at an inappropriate speed for a vehicle crossing an

intersection. Otherwise, he should have been able to put his vehicle to a

complete stop or, at the very least, at a speed that would have prevented his

car from climbing entirely on top of the island divider. That the petitioners entire

vehicle landed on top of the traffic islandbody, chassis, four wheels and all

sufficiently indicates his speed at that time. The force that propels an entire car

off the street and on top of a traffic island could only have been inordinate

speed, or at least speed beyond that of a motorist coming from or going to an

intersection. In short, the ramping of his vehicle demonstrably indicates to us

that the petitioner failed to observe the duty to maintain a reasonable speed.We therefore believe Victors testimony that the petitioner was speeding when

he bumped the victim.

We are likewise not persuaded by the petitioners claim that darkness and

the traffic islands alleged newness justify his failure to notice the island. The

petitioners admission that he did not notice the traffic island is in itself an

indication of his failure to observe the vigilance demanded by the

circumstances. Ultimately, it shows the criminal recklessness for which he has

been convicted. The record shows that pedestrians were present in the vicinity

at the time of the incident. The CA even pointed out that the vicinity is near

residential areas, while we pointed out its proximity to an intersection. Thedarkness and these circumstances should have caused the petitioner to be

more alert and more vigilant, to say nothing of slowing his car down. Newly

constructed or not, the island divider should have received the petitioners due

attention. His bare allegation that the island lacked markers or reflectorized

marks is likewise not persuasive. As the trial court correctly observed, many other

vehicles passed the same road that night but only the petitioner failed to notice

the island divider. We thus find the trial court to be correct when it held that the


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petitioner failed to exercise precaution in operating his vehicle on the night of

the incident.

All told, we see no reason to overturn the lower courts findings of fact

and conclusions of law finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

the crime charged.


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G.R. No. 170071 March 9, 2011

HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, MICAELA B.

OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA, Petitioners, vs. G & S TRANSPORT

CORPORATION, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 170125G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K.

OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA,

Respondents.

Notes/Doctrine:

The Court once again held that acquittal in the criminal case does not affect

the prosecution of an independent civil action arising from a contract of

carriage. Additionally, the Court clarified on the matter of the award of lost

earnings, stating that certification from the employer (the USAID in this case)

cannot be considered as self-serving and therefore may properly be made as

sufficient basis for the deceaseds loss of earning capacity.

Facts: Jose Marcial K. Ochoa (Jose Marcial) died on the night of March 10, 1995

while on board an Avis taxicab owned and operated by G & S Transport

Corporation (G & S), a common carrier.

At about 11:00 p.m., the taxicab was cruising along Epifanio delos Santos

Avenue [EDSA], in front of Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City at high speed. While

going up the Boni Serrano (Santolan) fly-over, it overtook another cab driven by

Pablo Clave and tried to pass another vehicle, a ten-wheeler cargo truck.

Because of the narrow space between the left side railing of the fly-over and

the ten-wheeler truck, the Avis cab was unable to pass and because of its

speed, its driver (Padilla) was unable to control it. To avoid colliding with thetruck, Padilla turned the wheel to the left causing his taxicab to ram the railing

throwing itself off the fly-over and fell on the middle surface of EDSA below. The

forceful drop of the vehicle on the floor of the road broke and split it into two

parts. Both driver Padilla and passenger Jose Marcial K. Ochoa were injured and

rushed to the hospital. At the East Avenue Medical Center, Ochoa was not as

lucky as Padilla who was alive. He was declared dead on arrival from the

accident. The death certificate issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of

Quezon City cited the cause of his death as vehicular accident.

The heirs, through counsel, sent G & S a letter demanding that the latter

indemnify them for Jose Marcials death, his loss of earning capacity, andfuneral expenses in the total amount of P15,000,000.00. As G & S failed to heed

the same, the heirs filed a Complaintfor Damages before the RTC.

The RTC found the taxicab driver negligent and found the evidence

adduced by G & S to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a

family in the selection and supervision of its employees as insufficient. Hence, the

trial court declared G & S civilly l iable to the heirs. However, for lack of receipts

or any proof of funeral expenses and other actual damages, the trial court


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denied the heirs claim for actual damages. Italso denied them moral and

exemplary damages for lack of legal basis. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the

RTC decision with the following MODIFICATION: appellant is ordered to pay

appellees the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the deceased

Jose Marcial K. Ochoa, P200,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary

damages, P100,000.00 for attorneys fees and the costs of litigation. The trialcourts award of P6,537,244.96 for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased

is DELETED for lack of basis.

G.R. No. 170125

Contention of the Common Carrier: G & S reiterates its arguments that the

proximate cause of the accident is a fortuitous event and/or the negligence of

the driver of the delivery van which bumped the right portion of its taxicab and,

that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and

supervision of its employees.

Position of the Heirs: That fortuitous event was not the proximate cause of the

mishap. They point out that as correctly found by the trial court, Padilla was

running at an extremely high speed. This was why the impact was so strong

when the taxicab rammed the fly-over railings and was split into two when it hit

the ground. Also, G & S remains to be civilly liable to the heirs for its breach of

contract of carriage and from its negligence in the selection and supervision of

its employees.

Ruling: We cannot proceed to resolve said issues and disturb the findings and

conclusions of the CA with respect thereto.

There is a contract of carriage between G & S and Jose Marcial

What is clear from the records is that there existed a contract of carriage

between G & S, as the owner and operator of the Avis taxicab, and Jose

Marcial, as the passenger of said vehicle. As a common carrier, G & S "is bound

to carry [Jose Marcial] safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,

using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the

circumstances." However, Jose Marcial was not able to reach his destination

safely as he died during the course of the travel. "In a contract of carriage, it is

presumed that the common carrier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger

dies or is injured. In fact, there is even no need for the court to make an expressfinding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory

presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised

extraordinary diligence." Unfortunately, G & S miserably failed to overcome this

presumption. Both the trial court and the CA found that the accident which led

to Jose Marcials death was due to the reckless driving and gross negligence of

G & S driver, Padilla, thereby holding G & S liable to the heirs of Jose Marcial for

breach of contract of carriage.


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Contention of the Accused: That the CA erred when it overlooked the fact that

the MTC Decision convicting Padilla of reckless imprudence has already been

reversed on appeal by the RTC with Padilla having been accordingly acquitted

of the crime charged.

Ruling: Regardless of Padillas acquittal or conviction in said criminal case, the

same has no bearing in the resolution of the present case.

Article 31 of the Civil Code provides, viz: When the civil action is based on an

obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such

civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and

regardless of the result of the latter.

In this case, the action filed by the heirs is primarily for the recovery of

damages arising from breach of contract of carriage allegedly committed by G

& S. Clearly, it is an independent civil action arising from contract which isseparate and distinct from the criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting

in homicide filed by the heirs against Padilla by reason of the same incident.

Hence, regardless of Padillas acquittal or conviction in said criminal case, same

has no bearing in the resolution of the present case. There was therefore no error

on the part of the CA when it resolved this case without regard to the fact that

Padilla has already been acquitted by the RTC in the criminal case. Moreover,

while the CA quoted some portions of the MTC Decision in said criminal case,

we however find that those quoted portions were only meant to belie G & S

claim that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the

driver of the delivery van which allegedly hit the Avis taxicab. Even without

those quoted portions, the appellate courts ultimate finding that it was Padillasnegligence which was the proximate cause of the mishap would still be the

same. This is because the CA has, in fact, already made this declaration in the

earlier part of its assailed Decision. The fact that the MTC Decision from which

the subject quoted portions were lifted has already been reversed by the RTC is

therefore immaterial.

Contention of the Heirs: That the CA erred in deleting the award of P6,537,244.96

for Jose Marcials loss of earning capacity

Ruling: The denial by the CA of the heirs claim for lost earnings is unwarrantedIn this case, the testimony of Jose Marcials wife that he was earning

around P450,000.00 a year was corroborated by a Certification issued by the

USAID. The USAID Certification is not self-serving and unreliable. A research on

USAID reveals that it is the "principal [United States] agency to extend assistance

to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in

democratic reforms." It is an "independent federal government agency that

receives over-all foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of the State [of the


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United States]." Given this background, it is highly improbable that such an

agency will issue a certification containing unreliable information regarding an

employees income. Besides, there exists a presumption that official duty has

been regularly performed. Absent any showing to the contrary, it is presumed

that Cruz, as Chief of Human Resources Division of USAID, has regularly

performed his duty relative to the issuance of said certification and therefore,the correctness of its contents can be relied upon. This presumption remains

especially so where the authenticity, due execution and correctness of said

certification have not been put in issue either before the trial court or the CA.

Verily, the USAID certification cannot be said to be self-serving because it

does not refer to an act or declaration made out of court by the heirs

themselves as parties to this case.

Clearly, the CA erred in deleting the award for lost income on the ground

that the USAID Certification supporting such claim is self-serving and unreliable.

On the contrary, we find said certification sufficient basis for the court to make a

fair and reasonable estimate of Jose Marcials loss of earning capacity just like inTamayo v. Seora52where we based the victims gross annual income on his

pay slip from the Philippine National Police. Hence, we uphold the trial courts

award for Jose Marcials loss of earning capacity.

While the trial court applied the formula generally used by the courts to

determine net earning capacity which is, to wit:

Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy*x (gross annual income - reasonable

living expenses),53*Life expectancy = 2/3 (80age of the deceased)

we, however, find incorrect the amount of P6,537, 244.96 arrived at. The award

should be P6,611,634.59 as borne out by the following computation:

Net earning capacity =

2 (80-36)

3

x 450,844.49-50%

=

88

3

x 225,422.25

= 29.33 x 225,422.25

= P6, 611,634.59

Contention of the Heirs: That the CA erred in reducing the award of moral

damages from P300,000.00 to P200,000.00.

Ruling: The award of moral damages should be modified

While we deemed it proper to modify the amount of moral damages

awarded by the trial court as discussed below, we nevertheless agree with the
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heirs that the CA should not have pegged said award in proportion to the

award of exemplary damages. Moral and exemplary damages are based on

different jural foundations. They are different in nature and require separate

determination. The amount of one cannot be made to depend on the other.

In Victory Liner Inc. v. Gammadwe awarded P100,000.00 by way of moral

damages to the husband and three children of the deceased, a 39-year oldSection Chief of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, to compensate said heirs for

the grief caused by her death. This is pursuant to the provisions of Articles 1764

and 2206(3) of the Civil Code.

Here, there is no question that the heirs are likewise entitled to moral

damages pursuant to the above provisions, considering the mental anguish

suffered by them by reason of Jose Marcials untimely death. Under this

circumstance, we thus find as sufficient and "somehow proportional to and in

approximation of the suffering inflicted" an award of moral damages in an

amount similar to that awarded in Victorywhich is P100,000.00.


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