REGULATORY *ORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYAM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8602070010 DOC.DATE: 86/02/04 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET 4 FACIL:50-361 San Onofre Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Southern Californ 05000361

50-362 San Onofre Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Southern Californ 05000362 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MEDFORD,M.O. Southern California Edison Co. RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION KNIGHTONG.W. PWR Project Directorate 7

SUBJECT: Forwards formal response prepared.in conjunction w/860116 telcon re proposed rev to Tech Spec 3/4.9.6, "Refueling Machine," to include operation of refueling machine auxiliary hoist.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: AO01D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL _ SIZE: TITLE: OR Submittal: General Distribution

NOTES:ELD Chandler Icy. 05000361 OL:02/16/82 ELD Chandler Icy. 05000362 OL:11/15/82

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL

PWR-B ADTS 1 0 PWR-B PD7 PD 01 5 5 PWR-B EB 1 1 PWR-B PEICSB 1 1 PWR-B FOB 1 1 ROOD,H 1 1 PWR-B PEICSB 1 1 PWR-B RSB 1 1

INTERNAL: ACRS 09 6 6 ADM/LFMB 1 0 ELD/HDS2 1 0 NRR/DHFT/TSCB 1 1 NRR/lS.RODgRAB 1 1 NRR/ORAS 1 0

04 1 1 RGNS 1 1

EXTERNAL: 24X 1 1 EG&G BRUSKE,S 1 1 LPDR 03 1 1 NRC PDR 02 1 1 NSIC 05 1 1

NOTES: 1 1

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 31 ENCL 27

Southern California Edison Company P. 0. BOX 800

2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE

ROSEMEAD, CALIFORNIA 91770 M.O.MEDFORD TELEPHONE

MANAGER, NUCLEAR LICENSING (818) 302-1749

February 4, 1986

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. George W. Knighton, Director

PWR Project Directorate No. 7 Division of PWR Licensing - B

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Subject: Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3

Enclosed for your information is a formal response prepared in conjunction with a telephone discussion on January 16, 1986 pertaining to the proposed Technical Specification Change, NPF-10/15-209 (PCN 209). The proposed change revises Technical Specification 3/4.9.6, "Refueling Machine", to include the operation of the refueling machine auxiliary hoist.

It is believed that the subject response will answer those outstanding issues discussed with your staff reviewers during this referenced telecon. Refueling operations for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 are currently scheduled to commence in March and September of 1986, respectively. The Southern California Edison Company again requests a timely review of the proposed change. Your expeditious approval of the proposed change for installation and operation of the refueling machine auxiliary hoist prior to either March or September of 1986 will greatly facilitate fuel shuffling and Control Element Assembly movements during the refueling outage.

If you have any questions regarding the enclosed information, please let me know.

Very truly yours,

--- 8 6020 5000361 ' PDR ADC~ PDR. P _

Enclosures

cc: Harry Rood, NRC Project Manager F. R. Huey, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3

O

RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTIONS ON PCN-209

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3

QUESTION 1:

Provide a diagram showing the refueling machine auxiliary hoist as the integral part of the refueling machine.

RESPONSE:

Three physical drawings illustrating different views of the refueling machine auxiliary hoist (RMAH) are attached herewith for your use. A brief description of the RMAH is also given in the following:

MANUFACTURER: Craneveyor Inc. (Eaton Corp.)

TYPE: Underhung Bridge-Monorail, Wire-rope Hoist.

HOIST: Electrically powered, 5-speed solid state controlled drawworks; speeds: 5-variable up to 18 FPM.

TROLLEY: Electrically powered, 2-speed solid state/electromechanically controlled; speeds: 30/10-FPM.

INTERLOCKS: Bi-directional; Refueling Machine/Auxiliary Hoist to prevent simultaneous operation of the Refueling Machine and the RMAH.

LOAD-LIMITER: Dual-redundant load-limiting devices; one electromechanical; one electronic.

VERTICAL LIFT: 66 feet.

CAB: None.

BRAKES: Dual system, electric/mechanical.

CONTROLS: Pendant with pushbuttons/indicating lights.

-2

QUESTION 2:

Provide a brief description of how the refueling machine auxiliary hoist (RMAH) will be operated in conjunction with the refueling machine for movement of Control Element Assemblies (CEAs).

RESPONSE:

The RMAH and the refueling machine have an interlock which prevents concurrent operation such that no collisions or interactions are possible. The RMAH will be used during refueling to move CEAs (without fuel bundles), to perform and verify coupling/uncoupling of CEA extension shafts, and for lifting and manipulating refueling tools. The functions of the refueling machine are unchanged by the addition of the RMAH.

The operation of the RMAH will be governed by S023-I-3.42, "Refueling Machine Preoperation, Operation and Layup," which is the refueling machine operating procedure. The operation of the 5-finger control element assembly (CEA) handling tool in conjunction with fuel handling equipment is detailed in S023-X-7.1, "CEA Shuffle". In addition, accountability during a CEA Shuffle is part of the associated fuel shuffle procedure, S023-X-7.0, "Nuclear Fuel Movement, Units 2 and 3".

-3

QUESTION 3:

Discuss the purpose of installing the refueling machine auxiliary hoist and the advantage of its use in lieu of the CEA change mechanism.

RESPONSE:

The RMAH allows CEAs to be shuffled over the core which is advantageous because movement of fuel assemblies is minimized thereby reducing potential damage during handling and considerable time is saved by avoiding extra assembly moves to and from the CEA change mechanism. In addition, the RMAH can be used as a general purpose crane for handling small loads (i.e., cameras, lights, storage containers, refueling, tools, etc.) in lieu of the polar crane. Thus, installation of the RMAH will enhance flexibility of refueling operations and provide considerable savings in the critical path time by freeing the polar crane.

-4

QUESTION 4:

Does SCE plan to phase out the use of the CEA change mechanism or to maintain its use in conjunction with the refueling machine auxiliary hoist?

RESPONSE:

The RMAH and the CEA change mechanism are two separate devices. The CEA change mechanism provides flexibility to remove a CEA from a discharged assembly that must go to the upender in transition to the spent fuel pool for storage. The CEA change mechanism also serves.as a backup for the RMAH.

-5

QUESTION 5:

Provide a brief description of protection mechanisms which ensure safe operation of the refueling machine auxiliary hoist.

RESPONSE:

Safe operation of the RMAH can be ensured in view of the following design criteria, interlock features, and administrative control:

A. Auxiliary Hoist Braking System

The RMAH is equipped with both mechanical and electric brakes; either of which alone is capable of restraining 150% of the rated load (or 300%, of the maximum service load) in accordance with CMAA Publication No. 70 and HMI-#100. Both the mechanical and electric brakes are fully engaged automatically on loss of electric power, thus preventing "load creep".

B. Auxiliary Hoist Safety Factors

The RMAH is designed such that no more than 20% of the ultimate strength of the materials used will be the maximum rated load capacity (5:1 ultimate strength). In addition, load limiting devices are used to limit the maximum stresses to no gr'eater than 10% of the capacity of all load bearing components based on their ultimate material strength; therefore a 10 to 1 hoist failure safety factor will result.

C. Load Limiting Devices

In order to provide the operator with visual feedback of the magnitude of the load being lifted, a modular load cell is installed between the CEA grapple device and the RMAH.traveling hook. In addition, the RMAH will be equipped with two (2) built-in excessive load protection devices. These two devices will have independent set points for their operation, and will overlap in their excessive load sensing range. Both devices will disable upward hoist travel only; all other hoist functions will remain operative. One device (DILLON) will monitor loading for all 5 hoist speeds, and will cease lifting movement when loads greater than 1000 pounds + 20% are sensed. The other device (LOAD SENTINAL) will monitor loads at the slowest hoist speed only; having an adjustable set point at which lifting movement can be stopped. This device may be calibrated to an accuracy of + 1%. It is intended that this device be adjusted for a set point somewhat above the "600 pounds" of the equipment to be handled (but under no circumstances it is to be set greater than 1000 pounds) in order to yield the most sensitive excessive load protection. Since this device is functional only at the slowest hoist speed, selection of any other hoist speed bypasses the effects of this device; hence, an adjustable delay circuit is provided which holds the RMAH in the slowest speed before allowing selection of a higher speed. This delay is intended to provide sufficient time for a potential overload condition to be sensed and corrective action to be taken before equipment damage can occur.

-6

D. Interlock Calibration

Defeat or bypass of either of these load limiting devices cannot occur with normal hoist operation. Periodic "load tests" using calibrated weight sets will be performed prior to each scheduled refueling outage and set point adjustments performed as required in order to maintain calibration of the RMAH load limiting devices.

E. Administrative Control

The RMAH is in use only when the reactor is shut-down and will not be operated near any safe-shutdown equipment or systems. Operation of the RMAH will be governed by S023-I-3.42, "Refueling Machine Preoperation, Operation and Layup," which is the refueling machine operating procedure.

-7

QUESTION 6:

What are the administrative control procedures to prevent an inadvertent removal of all CEAs in the core at the same time by the refueling machine auxiliary hoist?

RESPONSE:

There Isn't any normal method to systematically remove only CEAs and store them outside the core. Therefore, from a logistics standpoint this is not a credible scenario. Further, criticality limits established for Fuel Handling Accidents in the SONGS 2/3 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Section 4.3, Table 4.3-1 were determined assuming all CEAs out of the core. Thus removal of all CEAs remains bounded by existing analysis. Technical Specification 3/4.9.1 provides boron concentration limits in the reactor cavity pool and all CEA shuffles are preplanned per engineering procedure S023-X-7.0, "Nuclear Fuel Movement,.Units 2 and 3".

In conclusion, inadvertent removal of all CEAs in the core at the same time is not credible, is restricted by the applicable administrative control procedure, and is bounded by existing technical specifications and FSAR accident analysis. As a result, there is no unreviewed safety question associated with the installation and operation of the RMAH.

-8

QUESTION 7:

Has the current Final Safety Analysis Report for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 been updated to reflect the installation and operation of the refueling machine auxiliary hoist?

RESPONSE:

The current Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 has been updated to reflect the installation and operation of the RMAH. However, the Southern California Edison Company (SCE) has just completed its internal review of the proposed revision to FSAR Sections 9.1.4.1.2, 9.1.4.2.1, 9.1.4.2.1.1, 9.1.4.2.2.1, 9.1.4.2.2.6, and 9.1.4.2.2.8 as well as Tables 9.1-4 and 3.2-1 in accordance with the proposed Technical Specification change and identified additional changes. These changes will be included in the 1987 FSAR revision. A copy of these changes is attached herewith for your reference in support of reviewing the proposed change.

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- San Onofre 2&3 FSAR Updated

GEAND HANDLING

9.1.4 FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM a

9.1.4.1 Design Bases

9.1.4.1.1 System

The fuel handling system is designed for handling and storage of fuel assemblies and control element assemblies (CEAs) and for the required assembly, disassembly, and storage of reactor internals and the reactor vessel closure head. As appropriate, the fuel handling equipment includes interlocks, travel limiting features, and other protective devices to minimize the possibility of mishandling or equipment malfunction that could result in inadvertent damage to a fuel assembly and potential fission product release.

The refueling water provides the coolant medium during spent fuel transfer. The spent fuel pool is provided with a spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system, which is discussed in detail in subsection 9.1.3.

All spent fuel transfer and storage operations are designed to be conducted underwater to ensure adequate shielding during refueling and to permit visual control of the operation at all times.

The refueling water level is monitored by a refueling water level indication instrumentation loop as described in paragraph 9.1.4.2.2.12.

The general arrangement of the fuel handling system is shown in figure 9.1-3.

9.1.4.1.2 Fuel and CEA Handling Equipment

The principal design criteria for the refueling machine, fuel transfer equipment, spent fuel handling machine, and CEA change mechanism are:

A. For non-seismic operating conditions, the bridges, trolleys, hoist units, hoisting cable, grapples, and hooks conform to the requirements of Crane Manufacturing Association of America Specification No. 70. All other components meet the requirements of the Manual of Steel Construction, American Institute of Steel Construction.

B. For seismic design, the combined dead loads, live loads, and seismic loads do not cause any portion of the equipment to disengage from its mountings or fail in a manner that would result in its falling into the refueling canal or spent fuel pool. The dead weight, live, and design basis earthquake (DBE) seismic loadings are combined in calculating material stress.

C. Grapples and mechanical latches that carry fuel assemblies or CEAs are mechanically interlocked against inadvertent opening.

9.1-20

TO BE 0 PAGE 1 OF d

(FSAR Page 9.1 - 20)

9.1.4.1.2 Fuel and CEA Handling Equipment

The principal design criteria for the refueling machine, refueling machine auxiliary hoist, fuel transfer equipment, spent fuel handling machine, and CEA change mechanism are:

(FSAR Page 9.1 - 23 Second Paragraph)

Major components of the system are the refueling machine, refueling machine auxiliary hoist, the CEA change mechanism, the fuel transfer equipment, the spent fuel handling machine, the new fuel handling crane/monorail hoist, and the cask handl ing crane. The refuel ing machine moves fuel assembl ies into and out of the core and between the core and the transfer equipment. CEAs are moved from one fuel assembly to another either by utilizing the CEA change mechanism or the refueling machine auxil iary hoist. The Fuel Transfer equipment moves fuel bundles between the fuel transfer building and the fuel handling buil ding through the transfer tube. The spent fuel handling machine moves fuel between the transfer equipment, the fuel storage racks in the spent fuel pool , and the spent fuel shipping cask.

(FSAR Page 9.1 - 24, Table 9.1 - 4)

I 33. New Fuel Handling Tool (Fig 9.1-23) 1l per unit I (a) I 34. CEA Handling Tool I 1 per unit I (a) I 35. Spent Fuel Handl ing Tool (Unit 1) I 1 per unit I (a)

36. Refuel ing Machine Auxil iary Hoist I 1 per unit I (b) I (Units 2 and 3) I I I 37. 5 Finger CEA Handling Tool I 3 per unit I (a) (b) .I II

I _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _I I__ _ ___I i a. Not stored in containment during reactor operation.

b. Stored in containment during reactor operation.

San Onofre 2&3 FSAR Updated

FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING

Table79.1-4 ONLY ONLY MAJOR TOOLS AND SERVICING EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR REFUELING FUNCTIONS

Storage Quantity Location

1. R.V Stud Tensioners 3 (a) 2. R V. Study Tensioners Pump Unit 1 (a) 3. R.V. Stud Storage Stand 1 per unit (b) 4. Lifting Tools for R.V. Studs and Nuts 3 (a) S. R.V. Guide Studs 2 per unit (b) 6. Source HandLing Tool 1 (a) 7. Head Lift Rig Spreader (Fig 9.1-11). 1 per unit (b) 8. Stud Tensioning Hoists 3 (a) 9. Stud Hole Plugs 54 per unit (b)

10. Surveillance Handling Tool 1 (a) 11. Reactor Coolant Pump Stud Tensioner 2 (a) 12. Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Cartridge Lift 1 (a)

Rig 13. UGS Lift Rig (Fig 9.1-12) 1 per unit (b) 14. CSB Lift Rig (Fig 9.1-13) 1 (a) 15. Internals Lift Tie Rod Assembly 1 (a) 16.' Hydraulic Power Package (Fig. 9.1-14) 2 per unit (a) & (b) 17. Pool Seal (Fig 9.1-15) 1 per unit (b) 18. CEA Transfer Basket 4 per unit (a) 19. CEA Handling Tool (Four Finger) 1 per unit (a) 20. Refueling Machine (Fig 9.1-16) 1 per unit (b) 21. Transfer Carriage 1 per unit (b) 22. Upending Machine 2 per unit (a) & (b) 23. CEA Change Mechanism (Fig 9.1-17) 1 per unit (b) 24. Underwater TV System (Fig 9.1-18) 1 per unit (a) 25. Dry Sipping Console (Fig 9.1-19 & 9.1-20) 1 per unit (b) 26. R.V. Stud Support 54 per unit (b) 27. Containment Polar Crane 1 per unit (b) 28. Cask Handling Crane 1 per unit (a) 29. Transfer System Cable Receiving Tool 1 per unit (a) 30. Spent Fuel Handling Machine (Fig 9.1-21) 1 per unit (a) 31. New Fuel Elevator (Fig 9.1-22) 1 per unit (a) 32. Spent Fuel Handling Tool (Units 2 & 3) 1 per unit (a)

(Fig 9.1-23) 33. New Fuel Handling Tool (Fig 9.1-23) 1 per unit (a) 34. CEA Handling Tool 1 per unit (a) 35. Spent Fuel Handling Tool (Unit 1) 1 per unit (a) 36. Refueling Machine Auxiliary Hoist 1 per unit (b)

(Units 2&3)

a. Not stored in containment during reactor operation b. Stored in containment during reactor operation

9.1-24 Revision 28 2441t

TO BE

PAGE 1 OF

(FSAR Page 9.1 - 20)

9.1.4.1.2 Fuel and CEA Handling Equipment

The principal design criteria for the refueling machine, refueling machine auxiliary hoist, fuel transfer equipment, spent fuel handling machine, and CEA change mechanism are:

(FSAR Page 9.1 - 23 Second Paragraph)

Major components of the system are the refueling machine, refueling machine auxiliary hoist, the CEA change mechanism, the fuel transfer equipment, the spent fuel handling machine, the new fuel handling crane/monorail hoist, and the cask handl ing crane. The refuel ing machine moves fuel assemblies into and out of the core and between the core and the transfer equipment. CEAs are moved from one fuel assembly to another either by utilizing the CEA change mechanism or the refuel ing machine auxiliary hoist. The Fuel Transfer equipment moves fuel bundles between the fuel transfer building and the fuel handling building through the transfer tube. The spent fuel handling machine moves fuel between the transfer equipment, the fuel storage racks in the spent fuel pool , and the spent fuel shipping cask.

(FSAR Page 9.1 - 24, Table 9.1 - 4)

I 33. New Fuel Handling Tool (Fig 9.1-23) 1l per unit I (a) I I 34. CEA Handling Tool I1 per unit I (a) I I 35. Spent Fuel Handl ing Tool (Unit 1) 1 per unit I (a) I I 36. Refueling Machine Auxiliary Hoist I 1 per unit I (b) I

(Units 2 and 3) I | I 37. 5 Finger CEA Handling Tool I 3 per unit I (a) (b)l I I I I I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I __ _ I __ I

a. Not stored in containment during reactor operation.

b. Stored in containment during reactor operation.

San Onofre 2&3 FSAR Updated

ONLY. FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING Redundant switches are provided to minimize the possibility of this interlock becoming inoperative, and slow bridge and trolley speeds are mandatory for movement of the refueling machine in areas other than its normal level route which might contain obstructions. Travel limits also restrict running the mast into the pool wall.

I. Refueling Machine Hoist Speed Interlock-

Provides restriction on maximum hoisting speed.

During insertion and withdrawal, the change in hoist speed can be monitored by observation of the hoist vertical position indicator. A change in the sound of the hoist accompanies the change in hoist speed.

9.1.4.2.1.2 Transfer System. The following identifies and describes the functions of the interlocks contained in the transfer system:

A. Transfer System Winch Interlock-

. Terminates winching of the fuel carriage through the transfer tube if the load increases above the overload setpoint.

The winching load is visually displayed so that the operator can manually terminate the transfer operation if an overload occurs and the interlock fails. An overload is indicated by a light on the control panel and by an audible alarm.

B. Transfer System Winch Interlock-

Prevents the winch from attempting to pull the fuel carriage through the transfer tube with an upender in a vertical position. If this interlock malfunctions and a transfer signal is initiated, winching is terminated when the load increases above the overload setpoint.

C. Transfer System Upender Interlock-

Denies rotation of the upender while the refueling machine is at the upender station.

Failure of this interlock while the refueling machine is at the upending station allows an upending signal by the transfer equipment operator at the station only to initiate rotation of the fuel carrier by the upender. In the event that this signal is erroneously initiated while the fuel assembly is being lowered from or raised into the refueling machine, a bending load is applied to the fuel bundle.

9.1-26

San Onofre 2&3 FSAR Upda ted

U p d a e F U E L S T O R A G E A N D H A N D L IN G

B. New Fuel Elevator Hoist Interlock-

Prevents raising of the elevator with a fuel assembly in the elevator box. This interlock is a backup for the administrative control, which precludes the placement of a spent fuel assembly in the new fuel elevator.

The fuel handling and CEA machines do not fall within the definition of an overhead or gantry crane as described in OSHA subpart N, Materials Handling and Storage, or 29CFR1910, Section 1910.179. However, considerable importance has been attached to meeting the standard as well as operator, equipment, and facility safety. More than 95% of the fuel handling machine does conform to the OSHA regulations. In each case, additional features to protect the safety of the operator and facility have been installed and are a part of appropriate operational procedures.

9.1.4.2.2 Components

9.1.4.2.2.1 Refueling Machine. The refueling machine is shown in figure 9.1-16. The refueling machine is a traveling bridge and trolley located above the refueling pool and rides on rails set in the concrete on each side of the refueling pool. Motors on the bridge and trolley positioh the machine over each fuel assembly location within the reactor core or the fuel transfer carrier. The hoist assembly and grappling device are raised and lowered by a cable attached to the hoist winch. After the fuel assembly has been raised into the refueling machine, the refueling machine transports the fuel assembly to its designated location.

Controls for the refueling machine are mounted on a console located on the refueling machine trolley. Coordinate location of the bridge and trolley is indicated at the console by digital readout devices driven by encoders coupled to the guide rails through rack and pinion gears.

During withdrawal or insertion of a fuel assembly, the load on the hoist cable is monitored at the console to ensure that movement is not being restricted. Limits are such that damage to the assembly is prevented.

Locking between the grapple and the fuel assembly is provided by the engagement of the grapple actuator arm in axial channels running the length of the fuel hoist assembly. Therefore, it is not possible.to uncouple, even with inadvertent initiation of an uncoupling signal to the actuator assembly. The drives for both the bridge and the trolley provide close control for accurate positioning, and brakes are provided to maintain the position once achieved. In addition, interlocks are installed so that movement of the refueling machine is not possible when the hoist is withdrawing or inserting an assembly. After operation of the hoist, a console-mounted interlock button must be actuated to allow movement of the bridge or trolley.

9.1-29

TO BE

PAGE 2 OF 4

(FSAR Page 9.1 - 26)

I. Refueling Machine Hoist Speed Interlock -

Provides restriction on maximum hoisting speed.

During insertion and withdrawal , the change in hoist speed can be monitored by observation of the hoist vertical position indicator. A change in the sound of the hoist accompanies the change in hoist speed.

J. Refueling Machine Auxiliary Hoist Interlock

1. Prevents concurrent operation of the refuel ing machine and the refueling machine auxiliary hoist.

2. Includes redundant devices to limit maximum service load to 1000 pounds.

(FSAR Page 9.1 - 29)

9.1 .4.2.2 Components

9.1 .4.2.2.1 Refuel ing Machine. The refuel ing machine is shown in igure 9.1-16 (auxil iary hoist structure not shown). The

refuel ing machine is a refueling pool and rides on rails set in the concrete on each side of the refueling pool. Motors on the bridge and trolley position the machine over each fuel assembly location within the reactor core or the fuel transfer carrier. The hoist assembly and grappling device are raised and lowered by a cable attached to the hoist winch. After the fuel assembly has been raised into the refueling machine, the refueling machine transfers the fuel bundle to its designated location. The auxil iary hoist is supported on the refueling machine bridge and is used for handling refuel ing equipment and CEAs in the refuel ing pool.

(Last Paragraph)

Locking between the grapple and the fuel assembly is provided by the engagement of the grapple actuator.arm in axial channels running the length of the fuel hoist assembly. Therefore, it is not possible to uncouple, even with inadvertent initiation of an uncoupling signal to the actuator assembly. The drives for both the bridge and the trolley provide close control for accurate positioning, and brakes are provided to maintain the position once achieved. In addition, interlocks are installed so that movement of the refueling machine is not possible when the hoist is withdrawing or inserting an assembly or when the auxiliary hoist is being operated. After operation of the hoist or the auxiliary hoist, a console mounted interlock button must be actuated to allow movement of the bridge or trolley.

San Onofre 2&3 FSAR Updated ONLY FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING

hoisting, and vice versa. The equipment, including all moving parts, may be lifted off its rail for maintenance or repair.

9.1.4.2.2.6 Fuel Handling Tools. Two fuel handling tools, as shown.on figure 9.r-23 are used to move Units 2-and 13 fuel assemblies in ,the spent fuel pool area. A short tool is provided .for dry transfer of new-. fuel and long tools are provided for underwater handling of both.spent-and.:new Unit 2 and 3 fuel in the spent fuel pool. A third tool is used for handling Unit 1 spent fuel in the spent fuel and cask pool. The tools are operated manually.

9.1.4.2.2.7 Reactor Vessel Head Lifting Rig. The reactor vessel head lifting rig is shown in figure 9.1-11.

This lifting rig, used in conjunction with the polar crane, is composed of a removable three-part lifting frame and a three-part column assembly, attached to the reactor vessel closure head. The column assembly supports the three hoists for handling the hydraulic tensioners, the studs, washers, and nuts, and links the lifting frame with the reactor vessel.head.

9.1.4.2.2.8 Reactor Internals Handling Equipment. Separate lifting rigs are used to remove either the upper.guide structure or the core support. barrel'from the reactor vessel.

The core support barrel lifting rig, shown in figure 9.1-13, is provided to withdraw the core support barrel from the vessel for inspection purposes. The upper clevis assembly is a tripod-shaped structure connecting the lifting rig to the containment crane lifting hook. The lifting rig includes a spreader beam providing three attachment points that are threaded to the core support barrel flange. This is accomplished manually from the refueling machine bridge. Correct positioning of the lifting rig is assured by attached guide bushings that mate to the reactor vessel guide pins.

The upper guide structure lifting rig is shown in figure 9.1-12. The lifting rig consists of a delta spreader beam that supports three columns providing attachment points to the upper guide structure. Attachment to the upper guide structure is accomplished manually from the working platform. The integrol incore instrumentation hoist connects to an adaptor that is manually attached to the incore instrumentation support plate. The incore instrumentation is then lifted by the crne hook. The upper clevis assembly which is common to this and the core support barrel lifting rig, is installed prior to lifting of the structure by the crane hook. Correct positioning is assured by attached bushings that mate to the reactor vessel guide pins.

9.1-32

IZ,~d~dZ~~i ISan Onofre 2&3 FSAR

Updated

U p d a e F U E L S T O R A G E A N D H A N D L I N G The refueling pool is filled with water stored on two cross-connected 245,000-gallon tanks (TO05 and T006 shown in figure 9.1-10). The maximum storage requirements on these tanks results during refueling and is approximately 450,000 gallons.

The upper guide structure lift rig (figure 9.1-12) is installed and the work platform lowered to a convenient height for disconnecting the CEDM drive shaft extensions from their CEAs using the grapple operating tool described previously. The extension shafts remain in place for subsequent removal with the upper guide structure. The platform is then raised to its normal position and the incore instrumentation is withdrawn into the upper guide structure and locked in place.

Provision is made in the refueling pool for the temporary storage of the upper guide structure. After this is removed from the vessel, the refueling machine hoist mechanism is positioned to the desired location over the core. Alignment of the hoist to the top of the fuel assembly is accomplished through the use of a digital readout system and is monitored by closed circuit television. After the fuel hoist is lowered, minor adjustments can be made to properly position the hoist if misalignment is indicated on the monitor. The operator then energizes the actuator assembly which rotates the grapple at the bottom of the hoist and locks the fuel assembly to the hoist. The hoist motor is started and the fuel assembly is withdrawn into the fuel hoist box assembly so that the fuel is protected during transportation to the fuel upender. The grapple is designed to preclude inadvertent disengagement as the fuel assembly is lifted vertically from the core. When the fuel has been withdrawn from the grapple zone, positive locking between the grapple and the fuel. assembly is established so that uncoupling is prevented even in the event of inadvertent initiation of an uncoupling signal to the assembly. After removal from the core, the spent fuel assembly is moved underwater to the transfer area of the pool. The spent fuel assembly is lowered into the transfer carriage in the refueling pool. If the fuel assembly contains a control element assembly, the CEA change mechanism transfers the control element assembly to a new fuel assembly.

The new fuel assembly is removed from the carriage and is moved to the reactor as the upending machine lowers the spent fuel assembly to the horizontal position after which a cable drive transports the carriage on tracks through the transfer tube into the spent. fuel pool.

Once received in the spent fuel pool, another upending machine returns the transfer carrier to the vertical position. The spent fuel handling machine transfers a new fuel assembly to the transfer carriage and then removes the spent fuel assembly from the transfer carriage and transports it to the spent fuel rack. The new fuel assembly is carried through the transfer tube to the refueling pool where the refueling machine picks it up and places it in its proper position in the core. The refueling machine is also used to shuffle fuel within the core in accordance with the fuel management scheme.

9.1-39

TO BE

PAGE 3 OF 4

(FSAR Page 9.1 - 32)

9.1 .4.2.2.6 Fuel and CEA Handling Tools. Two fuel handling tools, as shown on figure 9.1-23 are used to move Units 2 and 3 fuel assembl ies

- in the spent fuel pool area. A short tool is provided for dry transfer of new fuel and long tools are provided for underwater handling of both spent and new Unit 2 and 3 fuel in the spent fuel pool. A third tool is used for handling Unit 1 spent fuel in the spent fuel and cask pool . The tools are operated manually. New CEA's are handled by short CEA handling tools and irradiated CEAs are handled underwater by long CEA handling tools.

(FSAR Page 9.1 - 39, 3rd Paragraph)

Provision is made in the refueling pool for the temporary storage of the upper guide structure. After this is removed from the vessel , the refueling machine hoistmechanism is positioned to the desired location over the core. Al i gnment of the hoist to the top of the fuel assembly is accompl ished through the use of a digital readout system and is monitored by closed circuit television. After the fuel hoist is lowered, minor adjustments can be made to properly position the hoist if misalignment is indicated on the monitor. The operator then energizes the actuator assembly which rotates the grapple at the bottom of the hoist and locks the fuel assembly to the hoist. The hoist motor is started and the fuel assembly is withdrawn into the fuel hoist box assembly so that the fuel is protected during transportation to the fuel upender. The grapple is designed to preclude inadvertent disengagement as the fuel assembly is the grapple zone, positive locking between the grapple and the fuel assembly is establ ished so that uncoupling is prevented even in the event of inadvertent initiation of an uncoupl ing signal to the assembly. After removal from the core, the spent fuel assembly is moved underwater to the transfer area of the pool . If the fuel assembly contains a CEA, the refueling machine auxiliary hoist or the CEA change mechanism transfers the CEA to a new fuel assembly.

INFORMA 6J Table 3.2-1

EQUIPMENT CLASSIFICATION (Sheet 22) ONL Principal Design

FSAR Quality and Construction Seismic Quality Location Section Principal Component Group Code or Standard Category Class (Building)

9.1.3 Other (cont)

Heat exchangers C III-3/TEMA R I II F

Ion-exchangers D VIII II III F

Filters and strainers D VIII II III F

Skimmers D (j) III .IV F 0

Supports Cl)

0.M 9.1.4 Fuel Handling System

Refueling machine NA CHAA/AISC II III C

Spent fuel handling machine NA CMAA/AISC II(g) III F

Control element assembly NA AISC II(g) III C change mechanism 0

Fuel transfer equipment set NA CHAA/AISC II III F/C

Fuel transfer tube and B III-2/III-MC. I II F/C Eno flexible bellows assembly at containment penetration

Fuel transfer valves D III-3 I II F

Cn~

TO BE

PAGE 4 OF 4

(FSAR Table 3.2-1 Sheet 22 Page 3.2-26)

9.1.4

Fuel Handling System I I I I I I e I I I I I

I Refueling machine I NA I CMAA/AISC I II(9) I C I I I I I I I I Refuel ing machine I NA I CMAA/AISC I II 9) ii II I C I lAuxiliary Hoist I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Spent fuel handling machinel NA I CMAA/AISC II (g) III I F I

II I I I I I . I Control element assenbly I NA I CMAA/AISC II (g) I III I F t I change mechanism I I 1 I I I I I I 'I I I I I Fuel transfer equipment setj NA I CMAA/AISC IT IIIII I F/C I I I I I I I I I Fuel transfer tube and I B I III-2/III-MC I I I II I F/C I I flexible bellows assembly I I I I I I I at containment penetration I I I I I I I I I I I I I . I Fuel transfer valves I D I III-3(P) i1(g) I II I F/C I I 1 7I I I I I I I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I _ _ I. I I1 _ _ I _ _ _ I

01 57T