reposs #18: making philosophy of science relevant for science

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RePoSS: Research Publications on Science Studies RePoSS #18: Making philosophy of science relevant for science students Henrik Kragh Sørensen January 2012 Centre for Science Studies, University of Aarhus, Denmark Research group: History and philosophy of science

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Page 1: RePoSS #18: Making philosophy of science relevant for science

RePoSS: Research Publications on Science Studies

RePoSS #18:

Making philosophy of sciencerelevant for science students

Henrik Kragh Sørensen

January 2012

Centre for Science Studies, University of Aarhus, DenmarkResearch group: History and philosophy of science

Page 2: RePoSS #18: Making philosophy of science relevant for science

Please cite this work as:

Henrik Kragh Sørensen (Jan. 2012). Making philosophy of sci-ence relevant for science students. RePoSS: Research Publica-tions on Science Studies 18. Aarhus: Centre for Science Studies,University of Aarhus. url: http://www.css.au.dk/reposs.

Copyright c© Henrik Kragh Sørensen, 2012

Page 3: RePoSS #18: Making philosophy of science relevant for science

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Making philosophy of science relevant for science students

Henrik Kragh Sørensen, Centre for Science Studies, Department of Physics and

Astronomy, University of Aarhus, Denmark .1

Introduction Since 2004, it has been mandated by law that all Danish undergraduate university programmes

have to include a compulsory course on the philosophy of science for that particular program.

At the Faculty of Science and Technology, Aarhus University, the responsibility for designing

and running such courses were given to the Centre for Science Studies, where a series of

courses were developed aiming at the various bachelor educations of the Faculty. Since 2005,

the Centre has been running a dozen different courses ranging from mathematics, computer

science, physics, chemistry over medical chemistry, biology, molecular biology to sports

science, geology, molecular medicine, nano science, and engineering.

We have adopted a teaching philosophy of using historical and contemporary case studies to

anchor broader philosophical discussions in the particular subject discipline under

consideration. Thus, the courses are tailored to the interests of the students of the particular

programme whilst aiming for broader and important philosophical themes as well as addressing

the specific mandated requirements to integrate philosophy, some introductory ethics, and

some institutional history. These are multiple and diverse purposes which cannot be met

except by compromise.

In this short presentation, we discuss our ambitions for using case studies to discuss

philosophical issues and the relation between the specific philosophical discussions in the

disciplines and the broader themes of philosophy of science. We give examples of the cases

chosen to discuss various issues of scientific knowledge, the role of experiments, the relations

between mathematics and science, and the issues of responsibility and trust in scientific results.

Finally, we address the issue of how and why science students can be interested in and benefit

from mandatory courses in the philosophy of their subject.

1 This paper was presented at the ESHS workshop “How science works – and how to teach it”, Aarhus, June 23-25,

2011. It is the result of joint discussions among and contributions from members of staff at the Centre for Science Studies. It is an extension of a previous publication in Danish (Andersen et al., 2009).

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Implementing philosophy of science for science students at Aarhus

University When the Faculty of Science and Technology, Aarhus University delegated the responsibility for

teaching the compulsory undergraduate courses in philosophy of science to the Centre for

Science Studies, the Centre decided to design individual courses for each of the undergraduate

programmes and currently offers a dozen different 5-ECTS courses.2 The courses aim at making

the students able to 1) describe the characteristics of their subject and its relations to other

scientific disciplines, 2) relate their own professional training in a broader context, 3) discuss

philosophical and ethical aspects of their subject, and 4) critically reflect on the content of their

subject and its functions in society.

The courses are taught by a combination of lectures by members of the faculty and tutorials

taught by teaching assistants. Typically, we lecture for 3 hours weekly for the 7 weeks that

make up our quarters with an equal load of tutorials. The lectures provide theoretical

background and perspectives on topics such as delineation of science, scientific methods,

progress of science, institutional history, and ethics. In the tutorials, students present

predefined cases for discussion; these presentations are based on a selection of primary and

secondary texts in a compendium. The courses are evaluated through a 2-day take-home exam

on a specified set of questions and are graded. Didactically motivated by the written

examination, the students have to prepare a summary of their presentation in writing and will

receive feedback from the teaching assistants during the course regarding content and

argumentative style.

With the subject field of the undergraduate student as its starting point, the teaching aims at

broadening and qualifying philosophical and ethical discussions in epistemological, social and

ethical contexts. This is achieved through the use of selected cases from the subject discipline

that are used as starting points for reflections and discussions. Thus, the courses are noticeably

not taught as history of philosophy of science but rather as philosophical reflection brought

about through selected historical and contemporary cases showcasing the lively, complex and

relevant philosophical problems involved in doing science.

Amongst the cases currently used in bringing about such discussions, we present in the

following three cases highlighting a selection of themes: 1) Using examples from the history of

science we emphasize how problems do not have “natural” domains: Different scientific

disciplines can address “the same” issue applying different epistemological approaches until a

discipline claims authority over the solution of the problem. And even when this happens,

answers are fallible and temporary. 2) Using contemporary cases, we confront the professional

2 The Centre is also involved in other teaching efforts in philosophy of science, including at the graduate level.

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ethics involved in possessing scientific expert knowledge. This applies particularly to whistle

blowing in situations when certain concerns can outweigh the direct loyalty-relations of

employment. 3) Using ethical dilemmas we challenge our students’ concepts and innate beliefs

about concepts such as ‘nature’ and ‘life’ in order to stimulate their ethical reflections and

interest them in tools for ethical decision making.

Case #1: Age of the Earth One important point to stress in a philosophy of science course aimed at science students is

that scientific claims have limited scope, and different types of claims have different scopes.

Many relevant scientific problems and questions cannot adequately be analysed and solved

within the boundaries of one separate academic discipline. Yet, the disciplinary borders are

often thought (by students and practitioners) to be natural and obvious. Thus, it can be a very

provocative and eye-opening experience for the students to face the historical fact that

contemporary borders of a specific discipline have resulted from intricate historical processes.

Disciplinary borders have emerged as products of intense negotiation, conflicts and boundary

work.

This complex of problems and processes can be illustrated by discussing which branches of

knowledge can deal with the question of the age of the Earth. During the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries, this question belonged firmly in the science of Biblical chronology where

scholars typically dated Genesis at approximately 4000 BC, some with considerable precision.

During the nineteenth century, however, the question was transformed into a scientific one.

When Lord Kelvin used advanced mathematical theories to argue that the age of the Earth was

on the scale of 20-30 million years, this estimate gained a lot of support due to his status as a

very accomplished physicist, although it squared poorly with predominant geological theories.

In the beginning of the twentieth century, geologists developed new methods to determine the

age of the Earth and they reached an estimate of the order of 100 million years. The

development of further theories based on radioactive isotopes meant that in the 1930s an even

higher estimate was reached (roughly 2.5 billion years); and as relatively late as 1956, a value

was obtained using meteorite research which put the age of the Earth at approximately 4.5

billion years. This value is still considered to be the most precise estimate.

This historical case can be utilised to make a variety of philosophical points about science.

Three of these claims are of such general nature that they form part of all the courses in

philosophy of science, although they are not everywhere introduced in the same way. First, it

illustrates that it is never beyond discussion and debate which branch of knowledge holds the

greatest authority in answering a specific question. The boundaries between scientific

disciplines and other subject areas have continuously developed and continue to do so. Second,

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the case illustrates the problems of scientific ‘tunnel vision’: The insight that was eventually to

prove decisive in bringing us to our current state of knowledge about a particular problem

often comes from researchers who possess knowledge about other, bordering areas. Third, the

case illustrates that scientific claims are (always) fallible; not false, but potentially false and that

science as the pursuit of knowledge has the inbuilt requirement that all knowledge be

correctible. As with almost all of the cases which we present, they can serve additional

philosophical discussions and points; for instance the Kelvin-case can also be used to argue

about the mistakes and bottlenecks in science by critically examining claims such as: “Had

scientists better appreciated one of Kelvin’s contemporary critics, the theory of continental

drift might have been accepted decades earlier” as claimed in (England et al. 2007).

Case #2: Whistle-blowing and expertise Modern science is never confined to research in ivory towers at universities, and it is an

important point of our courses to argue and illustrate that values and discussions of values

enter into scientific practice. For some sciences, the majority of the students will be looking

forward to careers in the private sector, whereas other fields produce higher proportions of

teachers and researchers. However, regardless of their future mode of employment, it is

essential that the candidates reflect upon the various consequences of producing and

possessing scientific insights.

For some subjects, the ethical implications are evidently important – students in the life

sciences need to be able to reflect upon how values enter into their scientific practice and

theories when these deal with our fundamental understanding of self, humanity, life, nature,

etc. However, all scientific disciplines have ethical questions to ponder, including the

technological implications of basic research. Finally, there are important professional ethical

obligations and norms that codify and shape the disciplines and their practitioners.

When the US president Ronald Reagan launched the ambitious Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI,

the so-called Star Wars Project) in 1983, prominent computer scientists and physicists became

involved in the consultation phase (for more on this case, see Slayton 2003). The vast project

comprised enormous costs for technologically advanced research and development. Amongst

the physicists on the advisory board, a widespread consensus about the relevant fundamental

physical assumptions was quickly acquired, but that was not the case among the computer

scientists. The production of software was (and is) not an exact science and there were only

very few and small examples of complex systems developed that were sufficiently reliable for

such a critical task as the SDI. When tested in realistic environments, most computer systems of

that complexity would exhibit some margin of error; and even a small mistake in e.g. the

decision system would have catastrophic consequences. The SDI would feature the most

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complex computer system developed to date, and this combination of limited past successes,

critical nature of the system, and the sheer size of it made American computer scientist David

Parnas, who served on the advisory board, blow the whistle and object. Although a series of

concerns – personal as well as professional in promoting and developing computer science as

an academic discipline – spoke in favour of entering into the project, Parnas objected to the

limited scientific background in the field of computer science and withdrew from the board.

Thus, Parnas acted not only in accordance with his own conscience but also based on his

understanding of the ethical norms of the academic community. However, his publicised

objections also threatened to question the success and integrity of academic computer science

as a discipline in the American realm.

This case is useful for discussing the professional and personal ethical commitments involved in

doing science in either the public or the private sector. Computer science is, today, codified by a

series of ethical norms put forward by the American Association for Computing Machinery

(ACM), which have been adopted by many other communities, including the Danish one. The

guidelines provide a meaningful way of investigating the stakeholders in issues of loyalty,

professional standards, and legal matters. Aiding students to understand and be able to apply

such discussions to relevant situations is an important component of the courses. Inside the

academic disciplines, such professional ethics are complemented by regulations and norms

concerning responsible academic conduct which serve as similar starting points for discussing

‘good research practice’. The ambition is therefore to provide the students with basic ethical

understanding and fundamental positions in order to be able to apply professional ethics to

relevant future conflicts in professional life.

Case #3: Should the dodo remain extinct? In the philosophy courses on the life sciences, an important theme revolves around applied

genetics as it pertains to animals. The potential cloning of racehorses or beloved pets raises

issues of both emotional, ethical and scientific importance, whilst the cloning of animals of

endangered or even extinct species present even further concerns about our understanding of

‘nature’ and the place of humans therein.

Several questions arise in connection with these different scenarios. First, there are the

scientific issues: What is at all possible? How are we to access the possibilities in relation to

both micro and macro levels of scientific issues? Which are the effects if we use extensive

cloning on a small population? And do these effects vary by species? What are the effects on

the habitats of reinstating formerly extinct species such as the Mammuthus sungari (the

Songhua River mammoth) in Siberia and Northern China or the Raphus cucullatus (the Dodo) on

the islands of the Indian Ocean?

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Second, answers to such scientific questions are interwoven with our understanding of nature

and our conception of it. We frequently employ our concept of nature in arguing about ethical

problems. For instance, we might argue for or against the appropriateness of resurrecting

extinct species. But even if we argue the unnaturalness of reinstating for instance a

Tyrannosaurus rex, this does not exclude that scientists would, could, and should make the

attempt either the sake of knowledge or for some other purpose such as personal gain or

human vanity. But how are we to evaluate such purposes against each other? How – and by

which criteria – can a line be drawn?

Such questions – when posed and discussed with a view to the cultural and ethical debates –

illustrate to students the need to reflect on larger issues than pure ‘scientism’ and technological

optimism. These are issues that are – to a large extent – value-based and yet integral to the

programs in which the students are involved. Thus, the call for qualified deliberation of ethical

and historical aspects simultaneously fosters awareness of the contexts and implications of

science. And the way we attempt to do this critically involves addressing core issues from the

curricula of the relevant scientific disciplines.

Student outcome and responses Due to the unique Danish setup and the local implementation at the Faculty of Science and

Technology at Aarhus University, we engage with a complex matrix of challenges in interesting

and educating the students in philosophy of science. For instance, due to idiosyncrasies in the

way the studies are planned, third-year mathematics students entering our philosophy of

mathematics course are already imbued with a specific set of beliefs and norms about

mathematics. Those they have acquired through their textbooks and through more informal

communication among each other and with faculty and teaching assistants in mathematics.

Thus, we have both the benefit of a quite homogenous set of prior beliefs and the challenge of

critically examining and addressing those beliefs. More specifically, the mathematics textbooks

and teaching style have presented mathematics predominantly as a formal and rigorous science

which is only a limited part of the image of mathematics that our course aims to argue.

In all our courses, we have set ourselves the ambition of making better scientists of our

students through teaching them philosophy of science. Therefore, the course needs both to be

engaging and address professional skills of a diversified program. Some of these skills are

specific to philosophy of science such as knowledge about professional identity, including

professional behaviour and ethics, theories of practice of and progress in science, and the

societal role of science. However, the courses have also been designed to induce other more

generic skills such as reading a philosophical text, analysing philosophical arguments, as well as

oral and written presentations. Whereas the first skills are shared between lectures and

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tutorials, the more generic skills are mainly trained in the tutorials under the guidance of

teaching assistants. This has created a situation in which we rely greatly on our teaching

assistants, whom we therefore need to educate and train to these tasks which are – as we are

ourselves – interdisciplinary.

We have found that – with variations – the courses in philosophy of science have been well

received among our students and our colleagues in other departments. Undoubtedly, a large

part of this acceptance is due to the success of providing some recognisable set of skills to the

students. However, the image of the courses still varies, relying also on the performance of the

teaching assistants and their reflection of the cross-disciplinary work.

A comparison between the students’ evaluations and the teaching assistants’ experiences show

that when the students have completed their philosophy of science course, they roughly view

the course in three different ways:

1. Some found the course in general uninteresting and irrelevant for their further

education and professional life.

2. Some found the lectures on history and philosophy of their field interesting in general

but did not engage actively in discussions during the tutorials.

3. Some found the course interesting and relevant, engaging actively in the discussions.

The relative size of these groups varies from one year to another and from discipline to

another.

Furthermore, we have found from empirical studies that students can be divided into A, B and C

students (see figure), where students belonging to group A have a very narrow interest in their

own field. Students in group B have an interest in their own field, but believe that inputs from

other fields will help them avoid ‘tunnel-vision’ which is a concern to them. Students in group C

know that in their professional lives they will need qualifications not provided through their

science courses.

A possible hypothesis is that the students in groups 2 and 3 are mainly group B students. This

hypothesis is partly supported by observations made by the teacher assistants, for instance the

engineering students are aware that they will need communication skills, although they do not

see our course in philosophy of engineering as an opportunity to acquire such skills. Assuming

that the hypothesis is correct, in order to gain greater student interest and visibility, it would be

natural to focus more of our attention to the students in group C, making it clear to them that

we have something to offer them.

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In a nutshell, our teaching challenges can be summarised as: “Teaching philosophy to science

students is like having philosophy students do laboratory experiments”. It has thus become

clear to us that one of the biggest challenges, particularly for the teaching assistants, is that a

many of our student do not meet the standards we might expect. Thus, the vast majority of the

students have difficulties with at least some of the following related tasks:

Reading a philosophical or historical text, identifying the important passages, and

deciphering and critically examining the key arguments.

Preparing and delivering a clear and relevant presentation of a given text.

Using philosophical terms and arguments in an open discussion.

Formulate clear and concise arguments and put them in writing.

These difficulties mean that many students gain insufficiently from the texts we give them. This

in turn makes the quality of the student presentations, which form the basis for many of the

discussions in the tutorials, rather low. And this again lowers the level of the open discussions,

making it difficult to reach and support the learning objectives.

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The challenges constitute something like a Gordian knot as we both want to educate and

illuminate all our students to the themes of the courses and interest and attract the most

engaged, qualified and active students for further studies. Therefore, a greater focus on the

needs and interests of students in group C seem to be an attractive line of pursuit for creating

not only better scientists but also better philosophers of science.

References Andersen, H. et al. (2009). “Vedkommende videnskabsteori”. In: Aktuel Naturvidenskab 1, pp.

32–35.

England, P. C., P. Molnar, and F. M. Richter (2007). “Kelvin, Perry and the Age of the Earth”. In:

American Scientist 95.4, pp. 342–349.

Hvidt, K. (1991). “Filosofikum: Dansk dannelse mellem Madvig og Marx”. In:

Uddannelseshistorie 25, pp. 109–117.

Slayton, R. (2003). “Speaking as Scientists: Computer Professionals in the Star Wars Debate”. In:

History and Technology 19.4, pp. 335–364.

Stinner, A. and J. Teichmann (2003). “Lord Kelvin and the Age-of-the-Earth Debate: A

Dramatization”. In: Science & Education 12, pp. 213–228.

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RePoSS issues#1 (2008-7) Marco N. Pedersen: “Wasan: Die japanische Mathematik der Tokugawa

Ära (1600-1868)” (Masters thesis)

#2 (2004-8) Simon Olling Rebsdorf: “The Father, the Son, and the Stars: Bengt Ström-gren and the History of Danish Twentieth Century Astronomy” (PhD disser-tation)

#3 (2009-9) Henrik Kragh Sørensen: “For hele Norges skyld: Et causeri om Abel ogDarwin” (Talk)

#4 (2009-11) Helge Kragh: “Conservation and controversy: Ludvig Colding and the im-perishability of “forces”” (Talk)

#5 (2009-11) Helge Kragh: “Subatomic Determinism and Causal Models of RadioactiveDecay, 1903–1923” (Book chapter)

#6 (2009-12) Helge Kragh: “Nogle idéhistoriske dimensioner i de fysiske videnskaber”(Book chapter)

#7 (2010-4) Helge Kragh: “The Road to the Anthropic Principle” (Article)

#8 (2010-5) Kristian Peder Moesgaard: “MeanMotions in the Almagest out of Eclipses”(Article)

#9 (2010-7) Helge Kragh: “The Early Reception of Bohr’s Atomic Theory (1913-1915): APreliminary Investigation” (Article)

#10 (2010-10) Helge Kragh: “Before Bohr: Theories of atomic structure 1850-1913” (Arti-cle)

#11 (2010-10) Henrik Kragh Sørensen: “The Mathematics of Niels Henrik Abel: Continua-tion and New Approaches in Mathematics During the 1820s” (PhD disser-tation)

#12 (2009-2) Laura Søvsø Thomasen: “In Midstream: Literary Structures in Nineteenth-Century Scientific Writings” (Masters thesis)

#13 (2011-1) Kristian Danielsen and Laura Søvsø Thomasen (eds.): “Fra laboratoriet tildet store lærred” (Preprint)

#14 (2011-2) Helge Kragh: “Quantenspringerei: Schrödinger vs. Bohr” (Talk)

#15 (2011-7) Helge Kragh: “Conventions and the Order of Nature: Some Historical Per-spectives” (Talk)

#16 (2011-8) Kristian Peder Moesgaard: “Lunar Eclipse Astronomy” (Article)

#17 (2011-12) Helge Kragh: “The Periodic Table in a National Context: Denmark, 1880-1923” (Book chapter)

#18 (2012-1) Henrik Kragh Sørensen: “Making philosophy of science relevant for sci-ence students” (Talk)

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RePoSS (Research Publications on Science Studies) is a series of electronicpublications originating in research done at the Centre for Science Studies,

University of Aarhus.

The publications are available from the Centre homepage(www.css.au.dk/reposs).

ISSN 1903-413X

Centre for Science StudiesUniversity of Aarhus

Ny Munkegade 120, building 1520DK-8000 Aarhus C

DENMARKwww.css.au.dk

1

Faculty of ScienceDepartment of Science Studies