Sustaining the FightResilient Maritime Logistics for a New Era

Timothy A. Walton

Ryan Boone

Harrison Schramm

SUSTAINING THE FIGHT: Resilient Maritime Logistics

for a New Era

with Richard V. Spencer, Secretary of the U.S. Navy

Sustaining the Fight

Resilient Maritime Logistics for a New Era

Timothy A. Walton

Ryan Boone

Harrison Schramm

Key Findings

• Current and programmed defense maritime logistics force is inadequate to support U.S.

strategy, particularly against China or Russia.

• The United States needs new logistics concepts and capabilities to allow the National Fleet

to fight in a more effective, distributed, and sustained manner, while supporting Joint

Force power projection.

• A new, operationally resilient fleet would be numerically larger, more differentiated, and

only moderately more expensive than the programmed force.

2

A resilient maritime logistics force is essential and achievable.

Anchorage Era

< 1917

Ships reliant on fixed shore facilities, and on coaling stations in particular. Expeditionary logistics, to the extent it existed, relied on seized or secure anchorages for unstable ship-to-ship transfers.

Expeditionary Era

1917-1957

Experimentation leads to the birth of reliable underway replenishment during WW I. Post-war progress stalled, with only minor Interwar improvement. U.S. Navy rapidly innovates during WW II and enters the Cold War with mature expeditionary logistics concepts and forces.

Fast Logistics Era

1957-1991

Cold War operational and technological demands lead to next-generation improvements in fleet support, including Fast Combat Support Ships (AOEs), STREAM and FAST transfer systems, VERTREP, and nuclear propulsion.

Agile Logistics Era?

?

Growing awareness of renewed great power competition may drive shift to a National Fleet approach for a resilient logistics architecture. Diversification of fleet support assets grants Navy options for agile and scalable support in contested areas.

Forward Presence Era

1992-2018

Peace dividend and perceived lack of threat to forward U.S. support facilities leads to dramatic downsizing of logistics fleet, especially expeditionary logistics forces, and cancellation of new logistics capabilities. Cost efficiency, not resiliency, becomes the prime metric.

Eras of Navy Fleet Support Logistics

3

Naval logistics and Strategic Sealift operate

efficiently in peacetime

4

Logistics for Naval Forces

Challenges to Current Strategic and

Operational Approach to Logistics

5

China focused on counter-logistics

Western Military District

Central Military District

Southern Military District

Northern Military District

500 km

OTH-R Receivers

OTH-R Receivers

S-300PMU1 (150 km)

Eastern Military District

OTH-R Receiver

SSK (18 days, 1730 km)

SS-N-27A (350km)

DDG (3 days, 1200 km)

SS-N-22 (240 km)

SS-N-27A (500 km)

SSN (75 days, 3250 km)

YJ-82 (33km)

H-6K (1800 km)

CJ-10 (2,200 km)

S-400 (400 km)

S-300PMU (90 km)

S-300PMU2/ HQ-9 (200 km)

DF-11A/ CSS-7 Mod 1(350 km)

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Long-range sensors and weapons protect Chinese forces conducting “gray zone” warfare and threaten logistics at different levels of escalation.

Russia can threaten logistics both near and far

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New Assumptions and Operational Concepts

and Implications for Logistics

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Assumptions and Concepts

• New threat-driven assumptions

– From secure, proximate resupply facilities to distant and/or contested basing

– From assumed rear theater sanctuary to global conflict

– From gradual force buildup to forward deterrence and rapid response

– From short-duration to potentially protracted conflicts

– From low attrition to high attrition planning

• New Navy and Other Service operational concepts levy considerable logistics demands.

Changes in the threat environment and emerging Joint Force concepts have changed the demand for maritime logistics forces.

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Proposed Maritime Logistics Architecture

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Elements of Proposed

Maritime Logistics Architecture

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• At-Sea Fleet Logistics

– Fuel

– Dry Cargo and Munitions

– Towing and Salvage

– Expeditionary Maintenance and Repair

– SAR (to include CSAR) and Medical Support Afloat

• Strategic Sealift

– Fuel

– Dry Cargo and Munitions

• Other Areas

– Hardening the Force

– Incorporating Logistics in Navy System Design

– Improving Logistics Coordination

Proposed Maritime Logistics Employment

iv 18

Get original map image and move legend; consider renaming Deter and Manuv

T-AOT, T-AKER, and T-AKM resupply forward logistics forces and combatants at intermediate points; CMV-22B (and possibly other aircraft) provide distributed aviation logistics support

T-AO, T-AOL, and T-AKE support Deterrence Force groups forward

Highly contested ports, either unavailable or available for limited resupply

Ports in useAfloat Resupply Locations (T-AOT, T-AKRE, T-AKM)

Logistics assets support deterrence operations against opportunistic Russian aggression

Contact Force Operating Area

Blunt Force Operating Area

T-AO/E and T-AKE support Maneuver Force groups

T-AKE, T-AKR, and T-AKM reload in rear-area ports or more distant CONSOL locations

Shore-based resupply

T-ATS tow damaged ships to safer intermediate points for repairs with AS/D and FLO/FLO; CMV-22B, amphibious aircraft, and other assets rescue personnel; T-AHL stabilize and transport wounded personnel to intermediate evacuation points

Strategic Sealift transports forces and supplies to theater

Strategic Sealift transports forces and supplies to theater

T-AOs refuel transiting surge forces

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Fuel

13

Meeting Fleet Refueling Requirements

Current AO/E fleet

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Go Small: T-AOLs (OSVs)

Go Big: CONSOL Tankers (T-AOTs)

Go Fast: Oilers (T-AO 205s)

Go Different: Dracones, Pipefish, and Barges 14

Cargo and Munitions

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Munitions Rearmament

• Increase and harden munitions stocks and infrastructure

• Field new weapons technologies and concepts

• Develop new ways to distribute munitions

– T-AKER ships

– Reload at anchor

– VLS Rearming at Sea (RAS) on a Missile Reload Ship (T-AKM)

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Joint Force Maritime Logistics:

Strategic Sealift

17

Institute financial incentives to grow

U.S. tanker fleet

18

Increase U.S. preference cargo• Increase purchase of DLA Energy fuel from U.S. refineries• Mandate energy export requirement

A National Fleet approach to securing access to U.S. Government and U.S. commercial tankers could rapidly and economically meet requirements.

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Alternate Approach to Securing DoD Sealift Tanker Support in Conflict

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Current Approach to Securing DoD Sealift Tanker Support in Conflict

DoD Sealift Requirement (86) DoD Sealift Requirement (86)

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6079

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MSC Prepositioned Tankers MSC Government-Owned and Long-Term Chartered Tankers

U.S. Merchant Marine MSP and VTA Tankers (Non-MSC)

U.S. Merchant Marine Tankers Previously in Domestic Trade

Foreign Tankers

Meeting Strategic Sealift

Dry Cargo and Munitions Requirements

MSC, MARAD, and U.S.-flag commercial shipping all essential to meeting sealift requirements—and all face challenges. 19

Meeting Strategic Sealift

Requirements: Government Shipping

• SLEP of Select Government Ships

– Necessary to buy time for other components of plan

• Acquire Ships

– Foreign-constructed ships to meet RO/RO Surge and Sustainment (from open market or from U.S.-flag)

– U.S-constructed to meet specialty sealift, other sealift RO/RO, and novel auxiliaries

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Fiscal Year

Sealift Procurement

FY2019 Plan - Used Sealift

FY2019 Plan - New-Build U.S. Sealift

Proposed - Used Sealift

Proposed - New-Build U.S. Sealift

Proposed steady acquisition approach provides stability, reduces cost, and avoids “boom and bust” cycles. 20

Meeting Strategic Sealift

Requirements: Merchant Marine

• Improve financial incentives

• Tax and policy reforms

• Merchant Marine labor reforms

Strengthen U.S.-flag commercial merchant marine; pursue options to expand MSP and offset acquisition of foreign-built sealift ships with CO/CO surge shipping.

21

1. Cargo Revenue- Commercial- USG Preference

2. Jones Act Cabotage Protections

3. Maritime Security Program Operating Stipends

4. Tax, Legislative, and Policy Support

underutilized

Recommendations and

Implementation

22

Proposed Logistics Fleet

Additional SCN, Sealift, MSC charter, and MSP costs of $47.8 billion over 30 years 23

Key Findings

• Current and programmed defense maritime logistics force is inadequate to support U.S.

strategy, particularly against China or Russia.

• The United States needs new logistics concepts and capabilities to allow the National Fleet

to fight in a more effective, distributed, and sustained manner, while supporting Joint Force

power projection.

• A new, operationally resilient fleet would be numerically larger, more differentiated, and

only moderately more expensive than the programmed force.

A resilient maritime logistics force is essential and achievable.

24

Discussion

25