Resistance is Futile? Institutional and Geographic Factors in

China’s Great Famine

Elizabeth Gooch∗

November 21, 2017

Keywords: China, Famine, Terrain Ruggedness, Economic Development

Abstract

I present evidence that China’s state capacity was an important determinant of famine mortality

during China’s Great Famine (1959-61). I hypothesize that variation arising from the interaction of

terrain ruggedness and provincial-level political ideology identifies the propensity for local leaders’ will-

ingness to shirk implementation of the 1958 national development plan, the Great Leap Forward. I find

that communities under the jurisdiction of a Party Secretary aligned politically with Mao Zedong were

differentially shielded from famine conditions by rough terrain. I also find that additional benefit from

ruggedness applies to these communities’ subsequent economic development and is attributable to the

limiting effect rugged terrain had on provincial authorities’ ability to administer their territory including

demanding compliance of local leaders during the period.

∗Gooch: Economic Research Service, USDA, 1400 Independence Ave. SW, Washington, DC, elizabeth.gooch@ers.usda.gov.

1

There is mounting circumstantial evidence that Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward Development Plan

(GLF) which began in 1958, spurred the famine conditions in 1959, 60, and 61. This catastrophe, commonly

known as China’s Great Famine, killed 32 million people across China (Cao, 2005). Among the evidence,

the timing is incriminating. The GLF was implemented in the spring of 1958, and that following winter

hundreds of thousands of people began to experience famine conditions. More damning, the GLF policies had

the potential to interrupt rural people’s food entitlement. The probable conclusion from the circumstances

is strong, and there is little doubt of the causal relationship. Since a preponderance of evidence already

exists for the case against the GLF, what fruit could further investigation bear? This research addresses

questions that need further scrutiny: who is to blame? And to what extent? To answer these questions,

direct evidence is necessary. I construct a source of exogenous variation in intensity with which GLF policies

were implemented at the local level that provides proof without inference or presumption of the fact that

the central government bears a large portion of responsibility for the famine.

The official and unwavering stance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), henceforth referred to as

the “Party”, is that the famine conditions stemmed from a combination of poor weather and the random

atrocities committed by local cadres1 After the Great Famine, in the early 1960s, the Party authorities

penalized local leaders governing places with extreme excess death rates during the famine years. Scholars

across research fields have deduced patterns in the distribution of the famine conditions. Disparities in

famine mortality are apparent between provinces. This provincial-level variation has been determined to

arise from the political ideology of the provincial First Party Secretary during the GLF period.2 The job of

the Secretary is to guide provincial authorities in following the national political agenda. In 1958, his beliefs

could be described as a continuum from conservative to radical. In the late 1950s, a radical ideologue was

known to be loyal to the CCP Chairman Mao Zedong and willing to implement the GLF rigidly.

Three Secretaries are regularly named as extreme radicals, commonly referred to as zealots. They are

Zeng Xisheng of Anhui province, Wu Zhipu of Henan province, and Li Jingquan of Sichuan province.3 I have

identified a collection of qualitative evidence supporting the uniqueness of these three men’s alignment with

1Party is a conventional way to reference the Chinese central government. Cadre is used to refer to indoctrinated leadersactive in promoting the interests of a revolutionary party.

2The province is the first-level administration division in China.3Evidence for this proposition is presented in section 3.

2

Mao. Also, I exploit quantitative variation to capture the ideology of the First Party Secretary: (1) special

promotion pattern of the Secretary before 1959, (2) provincial-level communal dining hall participation rates,

and (3) provincial-level agricultural output inflation rates.

Below the province-level, the rigidity or cruelty with which the GLF policies were enforced is debatable,

and evidence of random assignment is growing. For example, Bramall (2011) accessed the relationship

between famine-related deaths in Sichuan province and grain output, rainfall, and temperature and concluded

that variation in mortality is random. Meng et al. (2015) also confirms that no distinctive pattern in the

distribution of caloric shortages is apparent within provinces and struggles to find a strong association

between grain procurement rate and food shortage as well as communal dining participation rates and food

shortages.

Meng et al. (2015), however, concludes that there are local-level characteristics that have unusual rela-

tionships with the distribution of famine conditions (1959-61). Specifically, the authors find that agricultural

suitability is positively correlated with famine mortality. In light of this evidence, Meng et al. (2015) pro-

poses communities were targeted for grain procurement by the Party, contributing to the famine severity.

The research of Cao (2014) and Liu et al. (2014) provides additional evidence that the aim of the state

brought about famine conditions. In a case-study conducted in Wuwei county, Anhui province, the famine

severity was compared between communes along a small navigable waterway and landlocked communes. The

communes in their analysis were very close together geographically, but the ones with direct access to the

waterway had more grain removed through procurement policies and realized more extreme food shortages.

People’s Communes played a major role in the Great Famine and the Party’s capacity to administer

the GLF. Before the early 1950s, the rural population in Wuwei county, for example, were part of small

villages. During the 1950s, these communities were divided up into agricultural production cooperatives.

Then, between August and October 1958, these cooperatives aggregated in much larger communes known

as the People’s Communes. The communes during the GLF period were the largest ever in China, some

reaching 10,000 households (Harvard University, 1962). For centuries, rural Chinese had been closely tied

to the land that they farmed and, in times of famine, would emigrate to escape the circumstances, if only

temporarily (Westad, 2003). However, in the mid-1950s, the Party implemented the Hukou Internal Passport

3

system which confined rural Chinese to live and work only in their hometown. Under the GLF, mobility was

further restricted. Members of the People’s Communes, which comprised the entire rural population, were

fully restricted from disenrolling or even physically leaving their assigned commune.

My methodology follows an empirical framework established by Nunn and Puga (2012), who accessed

another detrimental “policy” executed by a far-away state: the African Slave Trades. I expand upon the

theoretical basis for the relationship and construct a formal model relating the interaction between the reach

and ideology of the Party to establish local leaders’ propensity to shirk GLF implementation duties. I capture

the reach of the state using terrain ruggedness and the ideology of the Party using variation in a provincial

First Party Secretary allegiance to Mao Zedong. Terrain ruggedness has been shown to limit state capacity

by making cooperation more costly and facilitate conditions for insurgency (Jimenez-Ayora and Ulubasoglu,

2015, Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Wang, 1995). A Secretary’s loyalty to Mao has been demonstrated to increase

the rigorousness which GLF policies were implemented at the provincial level (Kung and Chen, 2011, Yang

et al., 2014). For the baseline analysis, I define provincial radicalism qualitatively. Radical provinces are

Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan. However, I conduct a series of sensitivity and robustness tests to bolster the

results. The unit of observation in the analysis is an old sub-national unit called a fu, which I refer to as

a district. This study is conducted to include province-level fixed effects because party secretaries made

decisions for their constituents.

The results confirm my hypothesis that, as under radical provincial leadership, the intensity with which

the GLF was implemented declined as terrain ruggedness increased. I find that famine mortality in rugged

districts is relatively less than in their provincial counterparts with low topological hurdles. The protection

from famine conditions afforded by rough terrain is most evident in Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan but exists

in the other five provinces administered by First Party Secretaries who went through a special promotion

process under the discretion of Mao in 1956. I conducted a variety of robustness tests for which the results are

maintained, but the analysis at the boundary between provinces under radical and moderate/conservative

leadership is the most compelling. At the border, it is likely that the only difference between districts is the

discrete change in Secretary ideology. I find that even with this subset of districts the estimated relationships

supporting the overall conclusions of the paper persist.

4

The principal contribution of the research to the literature is the creation of direct evidence that the

Party’s administration of the GLF caused the Great Famine. In Gooch (2017), I identified the causal impact

of the Great Famine on GDP per capita in 2010. An additional component of the research presented here tests

whether or not the Great Famine acted as a causal mechanism through which the GLF affected subsequent

development. I find that the estimated impact of the GLF on income in 2010 is completely absorbed by

famine severity as a mediator variable. The GLF affects contemporary income disparities through the famine

it caused.

1 Important Events in China’s Political History, 1949 to 1961

Already I have begun to use political terms like radical, conservative, cadre, and Party. This terminology

is commonplace when discussing and analyzing 20th century China. The 1950s, when a majority of the events

occurred which determined attitudes, decisions, and outcomes covered by this analysis, were extraordinarily

politically charged and centered on Mao Zedong. Westad (2003) provides an illuminating perspective on the

political scene:

[The Party] used a charismatic style of leadership in which the cult of Mao’s personality, the ideal

of complete adherence to his instructions, and the belief in the myths and visions he developed

gradually became the center of the [P]arty’s existence.

In this section, I outline the chronology of events from 1949 to 1958 leading up to the Great Leap Foward

(1958-61). I pay particular attention to the creation of circumstances that enabled the manifestation of the

most devastating famine conditions on record. This historical background primarily draws from Harvard

University (1962) in which the authors collated and analyzed 42 official documents published and speeches

given between 1952 and 1958. At the time of publication in 1962, the authors did not know the extent and

scale of famine conditions between 1959 and 61.4

4The first American demographic assessment of the famine causalities was in 1982 (Aird, 1982). Information on the magnitudeof the famine became available with the publication of the single year age distributions from the country’s first highly reliablepopulation census in 1982 (Smil, 1999).

5

1.1 Creation of the Political Environment in the 1950s

In 1949, the CCP under the control of Chairman Mao Zedong won the Chinese Civil War (1946-50) and

took military control of China. To begin remaking China as a socialist state, the CCP implemented land

reform, which redistributed land ownership and created a large new class of small landholders in the early

1950s, often referred to as peasants.

In the summer of 1955, the Party’s First Five-year Development Plan (1953-57) was ready.5 This plan

called for the formation of “agricultural producers’ cooperatives”. These cooperative again redistributed

land ownership but this time away from private property to ownership by the state. At this time, CCP

leadership recognized that advancement towards collectivization would be tough and genuinely proclaimed

the principles of “gradualness” and “volunteerism” regarding the transitions. Already, rapid collectivization

had been attempted in the spring of 1953, fall of 1954, and again in the spring of 1955 but the bursts of

acceleration had met obstacles and were abandoned.

Chinese leadership was also keenly aware of the tragic experiences in the 1930s Soviet Union when rapid

collectivization led to famine conditions and high mortality. Nevertheless, Mao called for another uptick

in the pace of collectivization in the summer of 1955. By mid-1950s growth in China’s industrial sector

was outpacing increased agricultural productivity; therefore, an increase in the economy of scale through

collectivization was one way that agricultural output could improve. The Party also considered cooperative

farming a more manageable system as compared to private plots allowing for easier labor organization, grain

taxes collection and food ration administration. In a statement given in 1955, Mao personally acknowledged

that progress on the formation of these new cooperatives would have to be checked two to three times a

year. In the winter of 1954, 700,000 new rural cadres were recruited to facilitate the transition.

The unanticipated and forced surge in collectivization between the summer of 1955 and spring of 1957

is now known as the Small Leap Forward but at that time was referred to as a “leap forward”. Mao’s

sudden call for a speed up in the transition to a socialist state in July 1955 conflicted with the principles

of “gradualness” and “volunteerism” guiding China’s institutional evolution up to that point. During the

Small Leap Forward, the opposition was apparent, but official documents published in the winter of 1955-56

5Though two and half years late.

6

such as “Decisions on Agricultural Cooperation” which said that “Rightest tendencies in the Party should

be censured and overcome...” countered the antagonism. Mao reiterated this message at the same time in

the preface to his essays Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside.

By late summer 1956, it became apparent that the methods of transformation of China’s agricultural

sector were not working well. Localized famine conditions were reported in Guangxi province, and peasants

began to hoard grain. The Party authorities in the area allowed a limited free market to open up which

quickly turned into an uncontrolled black market. In the fall of 1956, the peasants’ burden was identified as

the newly enlarged cooperative system. Peasants reacted by withdrawing from the collectives which in turn

led to the dissolution of some collectives. Between fall of 1956 and summer 1957, 570,000 people move from

rural areas to cities.

September 1956 was a time in which moderates within with CCP were especially influential of the

Party agenda. The setbacks and reversals that followed the Small Leap Forward vindicated the criticism

voiced during 1956 Hundred Flowers campaign to engage intellectuals in the revolution. The slogan, “let a

hundred flowers blossom, a hundred schools of thought contend,” aimed at giving academics a greater sense

of participation. By the fall of 1956, the CCP struggled to deal with the faction of “rightest” who opposed

the Small Leap Forward and “dogmatists” who disagreed with the Hundred Flowers campaign.

During the spring of 1957, seven meetings sponsored by the CCP took place. In these meetings, criticisms

that called for an end to the political monopoly of the CCP were put forth by Democratic political parties. At

the same time, professors and students at Beijing University talked of revolt. In the summer of 1957, the CCP

now had to deal with open political opposition and general criticism. The counter-offensive began in June

1957 of which the primary tactic was to discredit the intellectual class. Simultaneously, Mao prematurely

instituted a rectification campaign likely in response to the results of the Hundred Flowers campaign coupled

with the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 in which the people revolted against the Soviet-imposed policies of the

Hungarian government. Rectification referred to re-education following the CCP line of thought, neither too

far to the right or the left. The CCP did not want to lose its monopoly of power.

In the fall of 1957, the CCP leadership focused on rectifying cadres already in the field and recruits.

During 1957, the failings of advancement of agricultural productivity and maintenance of the collectives

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were apparent. A fundamental administration problem existed on the ground. Cadres in the agricultural

cooperative system need to make the peasants work harder for the benefit of others and turn over the harvest

to the state. It seemed obvious that cadres from the local area would have the greatest influence on the

peasants but local cadres also presented a danger to the Party’s goal. It was likely that a local cadre would

be quicker to sympathize with the hardships faced by the farmers and shirk his duties to hold the Party line.

Propaganda dispensed by the Party at that time disguised the tension between localism (sympathy with the

peasants) and collectivism (loyalty to the Party) with the concept of “class struggle” in the countryside.

In preparation for the next “leap forward” extensive re-education and purges of cadres with localist and

rightest tendencies took place. The CCP’s counter-attack on open discourse at the tail end of the Hundred

Flowers campaign made it difficult for anyone to criticize radical policy in any way without incurring the

charge of rightism.

The slogans accompanying the announcement of another “leap forward” were similar to those that spurred

the 1956 acceleration, however, in the fall of 1957, Mao personally escalated the rhetoric. He set a goal

for China’s industrial development to surpass Britain within 15 years. In Lui Shaoqi’s May 1958 speech

launching the Great Leap Foward, he reiterates Mao’s “militant call” and warns against allowing misgivings

to interrupt progress. Harvard University (1962) characterizes this challenge Liu gives to conservatives in

the Party on matters of agricultural policy within the new goals as particularly strange.

Those conservatives referred to by Liu were already being targeted. In the spring of 1958, provincial

party secretaries conduct rectification campaigns were carried out by their respective governments and six-

teen provinces outed the conservative opposition in the People’s Daily. Specific purges of the Party (often

including the Party secretary) were mentioned.

For example, Pan Fusheng was deposed as Party Secretary of Henan for his strong element of “localism”

and opposition to CCP policies since 1955. But what happened to Pan was not typical. The secretaries

in other provinces reported that conservative-minded cadres, those who wanted to advance gradually and

doubted the possibility of a leap forward, had been overcome. Cadres in Gansu province accepted Liu’s

challenge from his 1958 speech. They responded in writing that they would “reckon accounts with leaders

after the fall..” which referred to the censuring, or economic crisis, they expected following this leap. Even

8

by the March of 1958, it was clear that opposition continued within the Party regarding the Great Leap

Forward and would re-emerge if the policies began to create problems.

Harvard University (1962) records reflections on the surge and censure associated with the Small Leap

Forward. In May 1958, Liu Shaoqi characterized China’s socialist development path as U-shaped. The

upward surge in 1955-56, the slump in 56-57, and another surge in 1958. A local cadre in Fujian province

was confused by the Party’s support for another “leap forward” in 1958. He said, “We were very vigorous

in the first half of 1956 and were censured in the second half of the year. This year we’re asked to be even

more vigorous. Is there a bigger censure waiting?”

1.2 The Great Leap Forward Development Plan, 1958 to 1962

The Great Leap Foward established people’s communes which were composed of the former agricul-

tural cooperatives. In the fall of 1958, the communes corresponded to townships or even county-units.

Each commune conducted it’s administrative, governmental, economic, and industrial functions. Commune

administrators mobilized labor for public works in agriculture, provided financing for the industry, and coor-

dinated agricultural with industrial production. Other elements of collectivization were being tried around

the country. The larger communes enabled administrators to more quickly mobilize labor for the construc-

tion of irrigation and water conservation works. The abolishment of family life was also a principal feature

of the commune system, and the CCP leader and propaganda were clear about this objective. Without

traditional family life, women would be free from household work and could contribute to the agricultural

and industrial production potential in their commune.

Harvard University (1962) claims that in the late summer of 1958 there was unlikely any popular demand

for this form of reorganization. Sherman (1959) adds that even though the enlarged collectivization was

known in advance by the provincial administrators, the final steps were rushed through to give the peasants no

time to react against it. However, the analysts of Harvard University (1962) favor an alternative explanation.

In a repetition of events in 1955, Mao suddenly decided the time was ripe for communizing.

Coinciding with enlarging communes, the CCP was also recruiting new members for the “People’s Militia”

to protect the Offshore Islands. Harvard University (1962) cannot conclude what real intention for the ramp-

9

up in military force was in reality. But sources do report that once the Offshore Island crisis died down

the primary use of the army was for agricultural “shock operation”. However, it is possible that controlling

revolts in the countryside may have been the main goal of the enlarged defensive force all along.

In December 1958, the CCP crafted a resolution to direct the Great Leap Forward. The decision frankly

addressed some issues that had arisen during the fall 1958 collectivization and clarified the path forward. (1)

The CCP insisted that cadre treat the peasants gently and let the Militia carry out stricter enforcement. (2)

Confusion about the private property was rampant. Some people thought that everything even wristwatches,

small animals, and other personal items were the assets of the state. The Wuhan resolution made it clear

that people could keep these types of things. (4) The resolution also postponed collectivization in urban

areas until the spring of 1960. (5) Wages payments were to remain, free-supply is not to be adopted at this

point. (6) In commune industrial ventures, cadres were warned not to forfeit quality for self-reliance. For

example, in a papermaking factory, workers wanted to use local straw for the process instead of waiting for

wood pulp to be delivered from outside the commune. (7) The transition to Communism is a slow process;

China is starting with the first stage, the transition from agricultural producers’ collectives to communes.

In August 1959, a virulent anti-campaign began. The political tensions at the time are extreme. Harvard

University (1962) explains the sentiments in this excerpt from their 1965 analysis:

It is, of course, hard to tell whether such polemics [public charges against rightists] should be

taken at their face value. They may be merely or partly intended to warn critics within the Party

[CCP comrades] that technical criticism will be willfully misinterpreted as high political treason.

This is perhaps the implication of a speech by Lu Ting-yi on October 31, 1959, in which he

says that the political line of demarcation is “to obey Chairman Mao or not.”...The sober if not

certain conclusion is that from the fall of 1958 until at least the end of 1959, rightest opposition

within the CCP had been a considerable force, with growing grievances against the leadership.

An acute motivation to quickly crush conservative opposition in the late summer of 1959 was because

on October 1, the CCP regime celebrated their 10th anniversary. In preparation, inflated production figures

remained and a second year of the “leap forward” was prepared. However, the conservative made progress

by adjusted output estimates for 1959 down a little.

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Localism was rampant throughout China and obstructed the Party’s policy of collectivism. In minority

areas, cultural and religious issues exacerbated the Party’s troubles. For example, in Gansu province, even

after the ousting of the Vice-Governor, it was reported that one-tenth of Party cadres doubted the success

of the Great Leap Forward.

Harvard University (1962) summarizes the means by which China could achieve the progress mandated

in the Great Leap Forward as follows:

The Government is committed to a mixture of bold targets for heavy industry; thrift and ingenu-

ity in developing light industry, and agriculture simultaneously; maximum work in the farm fields;

“planned consumption” (i.e., the minimum necessary rations of food, clothes, and other neces-

sities); and continual propaganda...The Party must take command everywhere...“Sky-rocketing

enthusiasm” must everywhere be displayed.

The 1962 analysis eerily foretells the magnitude of the event for which the rightists with the Party would

finally be vindicated.

It cannot be expected that rightist opposition can force any great changes of policy on the Central

Committee, until experience and experiment have proved the rightist point of view correct.

Unbeknownst to the outside world, including the foreign dignitaries who came to China to celebrate the

CCP’s 10th anniversary, famine conditions had begun in many parts of China in the winter of 1958-59.

1.3 The Great Famine, 1958 to 1961

In the late winter of 1958, rural communities across China began to experience food shortages. Official

recognition of the disaster by the CCP as the Three Years of Natural Disasters for which there was an excess

of 15 million deaths. In this research, I use excess death rates in 1959, 60, and 61 from Cao (2005) who

estimates 32.5 million unnatural deaths. Meng et al. (2015) emphasizes that mortality above the normal

rate in these three years was almost entirely due to acute starvation and not associate disease commonly

accompanying famine conditions at other times (Thaxton, 2008).

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By the summer of 1959, the CCP shifted is priorities from industry to agriculture. In April 1959, Zhou

Enlai addressed the National People’s Congress and insisted that the 80 percent of the workforce needed to

be devoted to agricultural output. Harvard University (1962) considers the Central Committee of the CCP

to be fully supportive of right-wing political ideology regarding the Great Leap Forward policies by the spring

of 1959. The conservatives taunted by Liu Shaoqi’s challenge in May of 1958 were, a year later, surrounded

by agreeable colleagues. However, October 1959 marked the tenth anniversary of the CCP regime’s control

of China. To bolster the Party, leaders did not back off their promises for production and participation set

a year earlier. The persistence of GLF implementation and conditions through the winter of 1960-61 is not

clear. However, in the spring of 1961, a year before the set end of the Great Leap Forward, the policies

were aborted, and aid was distributed to disaster areas. The aftermath of the famine is poorly recorded.

There is evidence that some regions completely abandoned collectives whereas others continued to uphold

the socialist institutions. Also, evidence that famine conditions persisted in the mid-1960s exists in some

areas.

In recent years, more personal accounts of the famine have been published. Yang et al. (2014) began his

account of the famine with his own story. The young author, at school in the nearby city, hears that his father

is dying in their countryside home. He returns home to find his father in a state of severe malnourishment.

His father died a few days later, and the author believes that his family tragedy is an isolated event, only

to learn, years later, that many people around the country had died during that same period. Additionally,

academic researchers and journalists have traveled through rural China, capturing the personal accounts of

villagers (Thaxton, 2008).

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Variation in Great Leap Forward (1958-61) Implementation at the District

Level

The GLF was a national policy, and there is no reason to think that implementation was not intended

to be uniform. Additionally, the assumption that Mao wanted GLF implemented intensely to produce to

12

transform the local community structure can be drawn from the historical narratives. I model the GLF

implementation decision of the district leader given information about the GLF implementation decision of

the provincial authorities to capture variation in GLF intensity at the district level.

The following notation will be used:

b = benefit to the district leader of shirking the GLF; b is positive.

p(h) = punishment given to the district leader by the provincial government for shirking the

GLF; p is positive for h ≥ 0.

h = harm caused to the state if shirking the GLF is committed; h is positive.

d(c) = probability of detection; d is negative for c ≥ 0.

c = fixed enforcement costs; c is positive.

The formal model follows Polinsky and Shavell (1992) who model an individual’s willingness to commit

a crime and the enforcement process. For this analysis, I redefine the “crime” a district leader shirking his

duty to the Party of implementing the GLF at the level requested by his provincial First Party Secretary.6 In

other words, the district leader is choosing some level of “localism” below the level dictated by his superiors

concerning the intensity with which he implements the GLF. The Party authorities punished district leaders

who shirked their responsibility in implementing GLF policies, but detection was costly. A district leader

will avoid implementing GLF policies to some degree if his benefit is greater than or equal to the expected

punishment.

b ≥ p(h)d(c) (1)

where b is the benefit to the district leader of shirking the GLF. The advantage to a leader from not

implementing all or parts of the GLF is both unobservable and broadly defined. The GLF stipulated a

change to community institutions with the establishment of large communes. Shirking this transition from

6The socialist ideals upheld in 1950s China advocated for gender equality but it likely that a vast majority of districtauthorities were male. For ease of discussion, I use the pronoun he when referring to these high-level leaders.

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traditional life was circumvented cost in emotional, social and financial terms. Additionally, evading specific

policies like the procurement of the harvest to urban rations or export was advantageous.

The punishment given for shirking, p(h), is a function of h, the harm caused to the state if shirking is

committed. Harm to state refers to the Party leaders at the provincial level not meet their GLF goals.7

District leaders incurred punishments such as criticism and self-criticism session which incorporated public

humiliation and sometimes physical violence. A leader who was accused of shirking was often removed from

office. The probability of detection, d(c) is a function of fixed enforcement costs, c.

However, equation (1) is simple and does not capture intricate details of the situation of interest. I

propose two extensions that will end up driving my empirical investigation. First, historical studies have

documented that the harm to the state, h, and the benefit to the district leader, b, may not be uniform

across Chinese provinces but vary with the first party secretary’s political ideology; instead, provincial GLF

goals set by the secretary are relative to the secretary’s allegiance to Mao Zedong’s GLF agenda. I model

this variation for province j as mj ∈ [0, 1], where mj = 0 when the provincial agenda of the secretary is not

aligned with Mao’s national plan and mj = 1 the secretary’s and national agenda are one in the same.

Second, the development literature has established that ruggedness of terrain limits state capacity through

increasing the costs of cooperation. Ruggedness hinders infrastructure development and restricts interac-

tions among constituencies. Jimenez-Ayora and Ulubasoglu (2015) finds that terrain ruggedness presents

challenges to the provision of public goods. Nunn and Puga (2012) determines that topographic irregularities

limited the scope of slave traders in Africa (1400-1900). And in a case study, Osborne (2013) reports that

Southeast Asia groups living near one another but separated by highly rough surfaces rarely exchange or

cooperate due to the insurmountable transportation costs they face. I include the topographic irregularities

in a local area, ri, as a determinant of fixed enforcement cost, c(ri).

Notation is updated as the following:

7These Higher-Up authorities were also punished for not commanding their constituents, but that is out of the scope of thispaper.

14

b(mj) = benefit to the district leader of shirking the GLF; b is positive for m ≥ 0.

mj = index for provincial-level political ideology; m ∈ [0, 1].

p(hj) = punishment given to the district leader by the provincial government for shirking the

GLF; p is positive for h ≥ 0.

h(mj) = harm caused to the state if shirking the GLF is committed; h are positive for m ≥ 0.

d(ci) = probability of detection; d is negative for c ≥ 0.

c(ri) = fixed enforcement costs; c is positive for r ≥ 0.

ri = measure of terrain ruggedness; r ∈ [0, 1].

Conceptually, the inclusion of provincial ideology and local terrain ruggedness alters incentives to shirk.

First, when m → 1 the benefit of shirking increases because the district leaders opt of a relatively large

transition and the harm to the provincial goals when shirking is committed is relatively large. Therefore,

both b and h and functions of m; and both b and h are positive for m ≥ 0. It follows that fines p are also a

function of m and f is positive for m ≥ 0. Secondly, the measure, ri ∈ [0, 1] where ri = 0 denotes smooth

terrain and ri = 1 is very bumpy and inaccessible. Detection in district i is also a function of district’s

topographic irregularities, d(ri) and d is positive for r ≥ 0. Therefore, the linear form of the three variables

from equation 1 b(mj), p(mj) and d(ri) can be rewritten as:

b(mj) = κ1 − αmj , (2)

p(mj) = κ2 + γmj , (3)

d(ri) = κ3 − δri, (4)

Plugging equations (2), (4) and (3) back into the model (1) and solving for zero determining the relative

15

levels of ri and mj for which a district leader would choose to shirk the GLF.

κ4 − κ5mj + κ2δri + γδmjri ≥ 0 (5)

where κ4 ≡ κ1 − κ2κ3 and κ5 ≡ α + κ3γ. Equation (5) summarizes the incentives for district leaders’

willingness to shirk the GLF.

2.2 Together the Reach of the State and Ideology of the Provincial First Party

Secretary Influence Famine Mortality (1959-61)

The traditional literature regarding the Great Famine surmises three factors determined that the scale

and distribution of mortality: (1) reduced grain production between 1958 and 1961, (2) unequal distribu-

tion of grain supplies through excessive state grain procurement and output overreporting, and (3) “over-

consumption” of the available food supply in the communal canteens and increased demand caused by the

mobilization of the population to work or irrigation expansion and steel production (Bramall, 2011). Fol-

lowing from above, a district leader’s shirking decision, si, influenced the degree to which these factors

determined food acquisition his district a(s); a is positive for s ≥ 0. Let’s also add terrain ruggedness into

the function of food acquisition such that a(s, r); a is negative for r ≥ 0.

Sen (1986) created the “Entitlement Approach” to explain how the determinants of food acquisition,

a(s, t) determine famine conditions f ; f is negative for a ≥ 0. The approach does not conflate supply, which

can fluctuate with natural forces, with command over food. A person has an entitlement set which is made

up of an original bundle of ownership, the endowment and the ability to acquire additional bundles. The

person experience famine through the loss of the original endowment, like land or labor power, and the loss

the ability to acquire, like lower wages or higher prices.

The linear form of three relationships a(s, r) can be f(a) written as

a(s, r) = κ6 + τsi − πri (6)

16

f(a) = κ7 − λai (7)

Famine conditions for a district i are a function of the district leader’s shirking choice such that the

combination of (6), (7) and (5) leads to the motivating equation of this research.

f(m, t) = κ8 + κ5λmj + κ9ri − λγδmjri (8)

where κ8 ≡ κ7 − λ(κ4 + κ6) and κ9 ≡ λ(π − κ2δ). Equation (8) summarizes the relationships between

ruggedness, the ideology of the provincial First Party Secretary, and the famine conditions. It illustrates

the core hypothesis of this paper: that for provinces with First Secretaries aligned with Mao Zedong at the

onset of the GLF, there is an additional negative effect of ruggedness on famine conditions (I capture this

variation with the average excess mortality rate during the Great Famine) that works through the district

leaders increased probability of shirking the Great Leap Foward in rugged districts, −λγδ.

3 Data

My basic unit of analysis is a historical sub-provincial administrative unit known as a fu. I align my other

variables with this unit of observation. The fu is based on the zhou regions from early history and was a stable

administrative unit for a millennium. The fu unit was chosen by Cao (2005) to bring together demographic

information across the 1953, 1964, 1982 censuses for 17 provinces to create excess death rate data between

1959 and 1961. Fu were only recently abandoned by the CCP (circa 1950). The 1820 boundaries of fu are

published by Harvard’s CHGIS department (CHGIS, 2010, Twitchett and Fairbanks, 1979). For ease of

discussion, I will refer to the fu as a district for the rest of the paper.

3.1 Capturing Variation in the Ideology of the Provincial First Party Secretary

at the Start of the Great Leap Forward

The famine accounting literature has established two primary methods for accessing the political ideology

of the First Party Secretary (1) evidence of atypical or special promotions of the Secretary in the few

17

years prior to the GLF and (2) observation of GLF policies between 1958 and 1961: communal dining hall

participation rates, inflated agricultural production output, and excessive grain procurement rates Meng

et al. (2015). Evidence that the pattern of promotion for leaders played a role in their expectation of the

national agenda has been confirmed by Kung and Chen (2011) and Yang et al. (2014). Moreover, Yang et al.

(2014) finds specific evidence that those leaders who gained their positions through a special promotion were

relatively more politically loyal to Mao Zedong.

My data on atypical or special promotions between 1956 and 1962 comes from Yang et al. (2014). I

simplify my analysis by creating two indicators: I1956 = 1 if the secretary received special promotion during

the “small leap forward” in 1956 and 0 otherwise and I1959 = 1 if the Secretary received special promotion

by 1959 and 0 otherwise. By construct, provinces for which I1956 = 1, I1959 = 1 as well.

Additionally, I create an indicator for three First Party Secretaries, in particular, Li Jingquan of Sichuan

province, Wu Zhipu of Henan province, and Zeng Xisheng of Anhui. I single out these three secretaries

because there is a body of qualitative evidence that these three individuals demonstrated allegiance to Mao’s

agenda before 1959 in unique and extreme ways and likely implemented the GLF policies most rigorously.

In table 1, I collate evidence from analyses of political history in the late 1950s to identify first party

secretaries that fully supported the GLF. Numerous sources identify the secretaries of Anhui, Henan, and

Sichuan as ardent supports of the GLF. Accounts of actions taken by Zeng (Anhui), Wu (Henan), and Li

(Sichuan) bolster the uniqueness of these leaders propensity to rigorously GLF policies. I construct a binary

indicator variable equal to one, ILWZ = 1, if the district lies within Anhui (headed by Zeng), Henan (headed

by Wu), or Sichuan province (headed by Li) and zero otherwise; for Anhui, Sichuan, and Henan provinces,

ILWZ = I1956 = I1959 = 1. A few sources also classify the secretaries of Gansu, Guizhou, Yunnan, and

Shandong as particularly rigorous GLF implementors but evidence of extremism in the political perspective

of these leaders is lacking. Instead, it likely the intensity of GLF implementation is likely conflated with the

famine outcome for these other provinces.

Finally, I construct a categorical variable such that the base level consists of provinces for which the First

Party Secretary was promoted ordinarily, I1959 = 0, with three other levels (1) I1959 = 1 and I1956 = 0, (2)

I1956 = 1 and ILWZ = 0, and (3) ILWZ = 1. The provinces in each category are mapped in figure 1.

18

I use the communal dining hall participation rate at the province level published by Chang and Wen (1997)

and the agricultural output inflation rate by local officials in 1958 published at the provincial reported by

Fan et al. (2016). The dining hall participation rate captures the shift from private households to commune

living for a province, a central intention of the GLF. The output inflation rate in 1958 shows the extent

to which local cadres were willing to exaggerate production to meet Party ideals. This inflation, though

publically denounced by Mao, aligns with the political eagerness rewarded at the time.

3.2 Capturing Variation in District-Level Topological Irregularities

To capture the accessibility of a community, we employ a relief intensity index constructed by Dijkshoorn

et al. (2008) based on 90-meter digital elevation data (90m DEM) of the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission

(SRTM) (CGIAR-CSI, 2004). I calculate the median terrain relief intensity (TRI), ri, for each sub-provincial

district and use the natural log of it for ease of interpretation. TRI is defined as the median differences

within one km2 circle around the pixel in consideration and measures small-scale terrain irregularities such

as caverns, caves, and cliffs. These topographic hurdles isolated communities from regional administrators

because transportation over irregular terrain is slower and more costly.8

3.3 Capturing Variation in in District-Level Famine Conditions

Excess mortality between 1959 and 1961 was primarily due to starvation (Meng et al., 2015). Therefore,

famine mortality and famine conditions are highly correlated. I use excess death rate (EDR) data created by

Cao (2005) to measure variation in famine mortality. EDR is the ratio of average unexpected deaths (1959-

61) relative to the population in 1958. The aggregation of excess death according to Cao (2005) assessed

the total number of famine-related causalities at 32.5 million. This estimation of the total death toll is far

above the official estimate but below the highest estimate at 45 million (Dikotter, 2010).

3.4 Descriptive Statistics

The summary statistics are presented in table 2. A majority of my empirical results and conclusion

rely on the differential effect between the group of provinces administered by the most radical First Party

8I explore other measures of terrain irregularities as a sensitivity check in table 12.

19

Secretaries (Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan) all other provinces. I assess the difference in mean TRI between

these groups using a two-tailed t-test and find that the null hypothesis that the means are similar and cannot

be rejected (p-value = 0.17). I also test the difference between the group of provinces with a Secretary who

had gone through a special promotion process in 1956 and all other provinces and for provinces with a

Secretary who had gone through a special promotion process by 1959 and all other provinces. I again find

that the magnitude of the test statistic does not warrant rejection of the null hypothesis (p-values equal 0.17

and 0.7, respectively.)

4 Empirical Strategy and Results

4.1 Evidence that the Party Authorities Influenced the Distribution and Inten-

sity of GLF Policies Famine Severity

Guided by equation (8), I estimate the following relationship between ruggedness, provincial ideology,

and famine mortality:

fi = β0 + β1mj + β2ri + β3mj × ri + ei (9)

for each fu, i, in province, j. The outcome variable, fi, is the natural log of average excess death rate (1959-

61). I capture variation in the ideology of first party secretary, mj using a few different measures described

in section 3.9 In the baseline estimation, I use the binary indicators for special promotions in 1956 (I1956 = 1

if yes, 0 if no) or by 1959 (I1959 = 1 if yes, 0 if no), the indicator for whether or not the province was run

by Li Jingquan, Wu Zhipu, or Zeng Xisheng (ILWZ = 1 if yes, 0 if no), or the categorical variable. The

categorical variable is coded in the following way: the base level is if first party secretary was promoted in an

ordinary way during the years leading up to the GLF and the three categories are (1) promoted by 1959, (2)

promoted in 1956, and (3) provinces administered by Li, Wu, or Zeng (Sichuan, Henan, and Anhui.) Relief

intensity, ri, captures accessibility and Ωj introduces province-level fixed effects. ei is a classical error term.

I now examine if relief intensity limited famine conditions between 1959 and 61. In column 1 of Table

9As discussed in section 3, m was chosen to represent alignment with Mao Zedong.

20

3, we re-estimate equation (8). I find that the coefficients on TRI interacted with each type of political

radicalism proxy, I1959, I1956, or ILWZ , in columns 1, 2, and 3, respectively, are negative and statistically

significant. This positive differential effect provides evidence that topological irregularities limited famine

conditions between 1959 and 61 for provinces under more zealous leadership.

In column 4, I create an interaction term between the continuous variable, TRI, and categorical indicator

of different types of special promotions and the identification of Li, Wu, and Zeng specifically.10 The provinces

that comprise the base level with which each group is compared was led during the GLF period by a First

Party Secretary who was promoted in an ordinary way. The results show that the differential benefit is most

apparent for Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan province but also extends to the other provinces whose Secretaries

received a special promotion during the Small Leap Forward.

4.2 Evidence that the Great Famine is the Causal Mechanism through which

the GLF Policies Effected Subsequent Economic Development

The estimates in table 3 provide evidence that the GLF directly affected famine mortality. Next, I will

examine whether or not the Great Famine is a causal mechanism through which the GLF has impacted

income today. In Gooch (2017), I already established a causal relationship between famine mortality (1959-

61) and GDP per capita in 2010 using an instrumental variable approach.11 Extending the theoretical

and empirical framework, following Nunn and Puga (2012), I formalize the legacy of the GLF on economic

development through the following series of equations:

qi = κ10 − ρfi (10)

where i indexes districts; qi is a measure of the efficiency or quality of the organization of society; ri is relief

intensity; and κ10, and ρ are constants (ρ > 0).

Institutional quality has a close positive relationship with income. Additionally, topological irregularities

play a role in economic development, making cultivation, building, and trade more costly. These relationships

10Li, Wu and Zeng were part of the group of Secretaries promoted in 1956.11The data for GDP per capita in 2010 comes from NBS (2010) at the county level. There are many counties in each district.

I calculate the population-weighted GDP for each district. GDP at the county level was first reported in 1997 for a subset ofcounties. The full set of country was published for the first time in 2000.

21

can be written as

yi = κ11 − θri + ψqi (11)

Substituting equation (8) from section 2 into equation (10) and then into (11) yields

yi = κ12 − κ13ri − ψρκ5λmj + ψρλγδmj × ri (12)

where κ12 ≡ ψ(κ10 − ρκ8) − κ11 and κ13 ≡ θ + ψρκ9. Equation 12 summarizes the relationships between

income, ruggedness, and the famine mortality (1959-61). It illustrates a secondary core hypothesis of this

research: that for provinces with a first party secretary that aligned with Mao Zedong, there is an additional

positive historical effect of ruggedness on income that works through the Great Famine, ψρλγδ.

Guided by equation (12), I estimate the following relationship between ruggedness and income:

yi = β4 + β5mj + β6ri + β7mj × ri + ui (13)

I now estimate the general effect of TRI on income per person in China and its differential effect for

provinces with radical First Party Secretaries. The baseline estimates of equation (13) are given column 5 of

Table 4, the specification when mj ≡ ILWZ . By regressing income per person on TRI while allowing for a

differential effect in radical provinces, I find that the coefficient for relief intensity is negative and statistically

significant: β6 < 0 in equation (13), which indicates a negative effect of TRI for most of China. This adverse

effect is consistent with ruggedness negatively affecting income by increasing the costs of trade, construction,

and agriculture.

The coefficient estimate for interaction term, TRI × ILWZ , positive and statistically significant: β6 > 0

in equation (13). This differential effect means that TRI has an additional positive effect on income that

may arise from the detrimental effect on the death due to the GLF in districts with more gentle topographic

features.

Recall that using equation (8), I modelled the intensity of famine conditions as determined by food

acquitions potential relative to mj and ri. Since excess death rate, fi, more accurately captures variation

22

in famine conditions, if I add include fi in equation (13), f(m, t), then the terms mj × ri and fi in my

estimating regression will be collinear in theory. Empirically, the pairwise correlation between the TRI and

EDR is 0.82 when ILWZ = 1 and 0.27 when ILWZ = 0.

In column 6 of table 4, I re-estimate equation (13) with fi and fi × ILWZ included as covariates.

The coefficient on for interaction term, TRI × ILWZ is now insignificant and close to zero. Thus, fi

predicted f(m, t) with a substantial degree of accuracy. Multicollinearity in a model does not reduce the

reliability of the model but did affect the calculation of the predictor TRI × ILWZ . Specifically, creating

an insignificant regression coefficient for the affected variable. The disappearance of a statistically and

economically significant differential effect of TRI provided in province administered by Li, Wu, and Zeng

means that the GLF determined a substantial portion of famine severity in Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan

provinces where 18.67 million people died or 60 percent of the Great Famine. According to the estimates in

columns 7 and 8, the collinearity between famine conditions predicted by ruggedness and zealotry for Anhui,

Henan, and Sichuan provinces is unique as compared with other Party Secretaries promoted in 1956 or by

1959.

4.3 Evaluating the Economic Significance of the Baseline Empirical Results

Using a counterfactual calculation, we find that the economic magnitude of the direct impact of TRI on

famine and indirect historical impact of TRI on income for Sichuan, Henan, and Anhui provinces under the

leadership of Li, Wu, or Zeng, working through the Great Leap Famine, are substantial.

Using estimates from column 3 of table 3, I calculate the change in the excess death rate for a coun-

terfactual district with mean level TRI and mean level excess death rate. Within the group of provinces

administered by Li Jingquan, Wu Zhipu, and Zeng Xisheng (ILWZ = 1), the counterfactual district’s excess

death rate would be f ′i = 4.65 as opposed to the actual mean excess death rate of fi = 8.17. For Anhui,

Henan, and Sichuan provinces, a one standard deviation increase in TRI translates to a 1.19 standard devia-

tion decrease in the excess death rate. If I conduct a similar analysis for a counterfactual district in another

province under more politically moderate leadership (1959-61) the counterfactual excess death rate would

be greater than the actual excess death rate: f ′i = 2.65 > fi = 2.32. In the other provinces, a one standard

23

deviation increase in TRI translates to a 0.11 standard deviation increase in the excess death rate.

Using estimates from column 5 of table 4, I calculate the change in the excess death rate for a counter-

factual district with mean level TRI and mean level EDR. Within the group of provinces administered by

Li Jingquan, Wu Zhipu, and Zeng Xisheng (ILi, Wu, Zeng=1), the counterfactual district’s GDP per capita

in 2010 would be y′i = 17124.93 as opposed to the actual GDP per capita in 2010 of yi = 16323.16. For

Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan provinces, a one standard deviation increase in TRI translates to a 0.13 standard

deviation increase in income in 2010. If I conduct a similar analysis for a counterfactual district in another

province under more politically moderate leadership (1959-61) the hypothetical district’s GDP per capita in

2010 would be y′i = 15198.47 as opposed to the actual GDP per capita in 2010 of yi = 18964.81. For these

other provinces, a one standard deviation increase in TRI translates to a 0.75 standard deviation decrease

in income in 2010.

When the famine mortality (1959-61), however, is taken into account in the specification, column 6 of

table 4 then the impact of a one standard deviation increase in TRI translates to a 0.7 decrease in income in

2010 for provinces with more politically moderate leadership during the GLF period and a 0.28 decrease in

income for Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan. Now, a one standard deviation increase in TRI produces lower GDP

per capita in 2010 that is not significantly different from the other provinces. Therefore, the differential

benefit from TRI is due to its limiting effect on famine mortality during the Great Famine.

4.4 Pinpointing the Extent of Topological Protection from Enforcement

I re-estimate equations (9) and (13) with and without taking into account famine mortality (1959-61)

using a categorical measure of promotion status and a binned version of TRI data and present the results

in table 5. I divide districts in into three categories based on their TRI percentile grouping. Districts with

smooth terrain fall in percentile ∈ [0, 33), districts with the moderately rugged terrain are in percentile

∈ [33, 66), and district in rough terrain have TRI in percentile ∈ [66, 100). The benefit of combining two

categorical measures of the topological irregularities, ri and provincial ideology, mj is that I can locate the

specific districts for which TRI limited famine and if this barricade to anthropogenic famine has had a lasting

effect on economic development.

24

In column 1, the differential benefit of topological irregularities on famine mortality (1959-61) is most

pronounced for districts with the roughest terrain in the provinces administered by Li, Wu, and Zeng, Li,

Wu, & Zeng, specifically × High relief, as well as for the other provinces with First Party Secretaries who

received a special promotion during the Small Leap Forward in 1956, Special Promotion in 1956 × High

relief. Additionally, in Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan, even districts in moderately rugged terrain realized a

differential positive effect on their famine mortality, Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically × Medium relief.

The differential benefit of rugged terrain on income in 2010 with and without accounting for the mortality

consequences associated with the GLF period are presented in columns 2 and 3, respectively. The estimates

are economically but not statistically significant. A simple assessment of the benefit for the most rugged

terrain on income in Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan provinces, Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically × High relief,

reveals that the differential effect cancels out the common effect and in the moderately rugged districts, ×

High relief, the differential effect combined with the common effect equals an overall benefit of topological

irregularities on economic development. However, once famine mortality (1959-61) is taken into account, the

benefits vanish.

The legacy of the GLF is less discernable to non-existent in Special Promotion in 1956 and Special

Promotion by 1959 province groups relative to the base. The positive coefficient on Special Promotion in

1956 × Medium relief in column 2 is large and significant, and this magnitude does not go away once

the EDR is taken into account. This anomaly may be due to the small number of districts on which this

regression was estimated. Interestingly, the coefficient on Special Promotion in 1956 × High relief in column

1 is both economically and statistically significant whereas the coefficient in column 2 is small in magnitude.

In Special Promotion by 1959, the legacy of the GLF is more or less the same as in province with Party

Secretaries that were promoted through the ordinary process.

4.5 Capturing the Ideology of the First Party Secretary with Specific Provincial

Level GLF Policy Variation

As discussed in section 3 the promotion process of the First Party Secretary is not the only means by

which to capture the political ideology of the Secretary, there is information at the provincial level about

25

specific GLF policies. In this analysis I interaction the provincial communal dining hall rate at the end of

1959 with TRI and the provincial agricultural output inflation rate by local leaders in 1958 with TRI to

capture the intensity of district-level GLF implementation. In these specifications, mj , from equations (9)

and (13), is a continuous variable that uniform within province.

As expected the provincial communal dining hall and agricultural output inflation rates are both corre-

lated with famine mortality. In columns 1 and 2 of table 6, I estimate equation (9) and find that the general

effect of these policies in positive when the outcome in the natural log of the excess death rate (1959-61).

The differential effects, CDR × TRI in column 1 and OI × TRI in column 2 are both positive. This

means that when the GLF policies were more rigorously implemented at the provincial level, the districts in

more rough terrain experienced an additional positive benefit from their inaccessible topology.

In columns 4 and 6, I present the estimates from equation (13) and find that each provincial-level GLF

policy has a negative relationship with income in 2010. The differential effect of each policy interacted with

TRI is positive, but only OI × TRI in column 6 is statistically significant. The specification relating TRI,

GLF policies, and EDR to income in 2010 is presented in columns 5 and 7. In these specifications, the

differential benefit of the interaction term is close to zero.

These results, using specific GLF policies, resemble those in the baseline analysis. Measures that capture

variation in the ideology of the First Party Secretary at the start and during the GLF period contribute to

the greater probability to shirk GLF policy implementation at the district level provinces administered by a

more radical ideologue as theorized in section 2.

Grain procurement is another policy that contributed to the famine. Yang et al. (2014) compiled yearly

grain procurement amounts at the provincial level from years 1955 to 1962. Using this data spanning from

the “Small Leap” to the GLF, I construct four measures of relative procurement intensity. First, the Ratio

Decline (1955-56) measures the intensity of censure following the “Small Leap”. A priori, the censure decision

in 1956 captures the willingness of a provincial leader to put into practice “rightest” ideology by moderating

procurement. As recorded in the historical narrative in section 1, leaders’ actions during the “Small Leap

Forward” determined whether or not they were purged and replaced with more radical politicians or targeted

for self-criticism to radicalize them for the GLF.

26

When Ratio Decline (1955-56) is used as a proxy for provincial radicalism, the correlation reported in

column 1 of table 7 shows a strong positive relationship. This means that these provinces with a greater

censure in 1956 had relatively greater famine in 1959 to 61. Additionally, the interaction between the Ratio

Decline (1955-56) and TRI is negative and statistically significant. Therefore, it was in these provinces that

shirking was either more prevalent or most impactful. The coefficients using the Ratio Decline (1955-56)

produce similar results to the other measures of zealous during the GLF in tables 3 and 6. In columns 2

through 4, the coefficients do not follow the hypotheses of this research. The use of procurement choices

during the GLF may present an identification problem. It may be the case that procurement rates during

the GLF are a mechanism through which the term β3mj × ri affects fi from equation (9) and not a good

measure of mj itself because ri may influence procurement rates.

5 Robustness and Sensitivity Tests

5.1 Analyzing the Border between Radical and Conservative Provinces

To test the validity of my estimation, I conduct boundary test to try to balance unobservable character-

istics that may be influencing the results. Restricting the analysis districts that lie near the border between

provinces groups delineated by the ideology of their First Party Secretaries will further address possible

omitted variable bias because only the discrete difference in Secretary ideology should differ between the

districts whereas other characteristics will be similar.

I conduct the boundary analysis using equations (9) and (13) on three samples of districts along the

boundary. First, I examine the boundary between province group ILWZ and all other provinces and present

the estimates in table 8. The differential benefit of rough terrain in Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan province

remain economically and statistically significant according to the estimates in column 1. In columns 2 and

3, the effect of TRI on income is negative. The differential benefit of TRI on income in column 2 for Anhui,

Henan, and Sichuan is economically significant but imprecise. In column 3, the differential benefit vanishes.

This boundary analysis resembles the baseline analysis except for a loss of precision and provides a sharpened

look at the protection topological irregularities provided communities under the jurisdiction of Li, Wu, and

27

Zeng.

The second and third anlyses examine the differential effect along the boundary between province group

I1956 and I1959 as compared with other provinces. Their respective estimate are presented in table 9 and

10, respectively. The pattern of estimates from equations (9) and (13) with and without famine mortality

(1959-61) taken into account are similar to those in table 8 and the baseline estimates. In column 2 of table

9, the additional benefit of TRI in radical provinces is statistically significant.

5.2 Including Additional Covariates

The People’s Communes established in 1958 consisted of a township and sometimes, whole counties

(Harvard University, 1962). If this is the case, then a more populated town gave rise to a larger com-

mune. Furthermore, if in provinces with politically moderate First Party Secretaries town were converted to

communes whereas, in provinces with politically radical Secretaries, whole counties were the basic building

block of communes, then this covariate could affect the analysis. Likewise, Meng et al. (2015) proposes

that a districts potential agricultural yield may have motivated Party authorities such that more produc-

tive communities were subjected to greater procurement rate and in turn experience more severe famine

conditions.

In this section, I include two district-level characteristics that could have directed GLF policy application.

Greater population density in 1958, constructed by Cao (2005), may positively influence the size of communes

and better agricultural suitability may have led Party authorities to procurement a larger percentage of a

district’s food supply. In table 11 is re-estimate equation (9) and (13) with and without taking famine

mortality (1959-61) into account. The most conservative estimates for the differential benefit of TRI on the

EDR are presented in column 5 and on GDP per capita in 2010 in columns 10 and 11.

In column 5, the positive coefficient of ILWZ × TRI is economically and statistically significant. The

inclusion of the control variables and their interaction with ILWZ do not alter the results, those topological

irregularities limited famine conditions between 1959 and 1961 in Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan provinces.

Additionally, while the interaction between ILWZ and population density and agricultural suitability are

large in magnitude, they are not statistically significant. In column 10, the interaction term ILWZ × TRI

28

remains positive and significant even when population and agricultural suitability are taken into account.

And in column 11, the differential benefit vanishes as it does in the baseline results. The legacy of the GLF

at work on economic development through the Great Famine is maintained when possible confounders are

taken into account.

5.3 Using Alternative Measures of Terrain Ruggedness

The measure of topological irregularities I chose for the baseline analysis is the median terrain relief

intensity. As discussed in section 3, I use relief intensity created by Dijkshoorn et al. (2008) because of the

attention to data peculiarities in China given by the researchers. I use the median measure so that extremes

do not play a large role in the relief variation. In this section, I introduce three additional ways to measure

topological irregularities: (1) mean relief intensity (Dijkshoorn et al., 2008), (2) median terrain ruggedness

(Nunn and Puga, 2012), and (3) mean terrain ruggedness (Nunn and Puga, 2012). I transform the measured

with the natural log and interaction each measure with the indicator for provinces administered by Li, Wu,

and Zeng.

In table 12 is present the estimates of 9 and 13 with and without taking famine mortality (1959-61) into

account. I find that the differential benefit of the intensity of topological irregularities on famine mortality is

maintained across all types of terrain measures. Furthermore, I find the differential benefit of rough terrain

on income in 2010 is maintained when these alternative measures of terrain are used and the excess death rate

(1959-61) in not taken into account. When the demographic consequences of the GLF period are accounted

for, like the baseline estimates, the additional benefit of rough terrain disappears.

5.4 Removing Outliers: Extreme Topological Irregularities and Extreme Famine

Mortality

In this section, I address the possibility that my baseline results are being influenced by a few outlying

districts regarding relief intensity and famine severity. I re-estimate the core equations (9) and (13) with

and without taking famine mortality (1959-61) into account while removing 16 districts with the greatest

relief intensity and present the results in table 13. Across all specification for which the outcome variable

29

is the natural log of the excess death rate (1959-61) in columns 1 to 4, the differential benefit of TRI in

provinces administered by Li, Wu, and Zeng persists. In the odd-numbered columns, 5-11, the differential

benefit on income in 2010 and the disappearance of the additional positive effect of TRI on income when

famine mortality is taken into account also persist. The core relationship when districts with the greatest

relief intensity are removed closely resemble the baseline results and provide evidence that outliers of this

type of not influencing the conclusions.

In table 14 I echo the analysis above but remove outliers in famine mortality (1959-61). In the first

specification, I remove the two districts with the greatest EDR (1959-61), then top four, six, and eight. In

columns 1 through 4, I present the results for these four specifications when the outcome is the natural

log of the excess death rate (1959-61) and, in columns 5 through 12, I present the results for these four

specifications when the outcome is income in 2010. Specification presented in columns 5, 7, 9, and 11 do not

take into account famine mortality (1959-61) whereas those in columns 6, 8, 10, and 12 do. I find that all

estimates closely resemble the baseline results further confirming the principal conclusions of this analysis.

6 Parsing Out Famine Caused by the State’s Enforcement Capac-

ity

Anhui and Sichuan provinces realized the highest EDR during the GFL period, and I want to check that

this is not driving my results. The theory presented in 2 supports this proposal since the differential benefit

afforded by TRI arises from district leaders’ willingness to shirk GFL policies based on how much the act of

shirking harms the provincial Party’s goals. To check this assertion, I construct a binary variable, IHigh EDR,

equal to one for provinces that had EDR > 4 and equal to zero otherwise. I substitute IHigh EDR in for mj ,

my measure of provincial-level political radicalism. In table 15, I present the estimates from equation (9) in

column 1 and equation (13) in columns 2 and 3. I find that no different benefit was experienced in rugged

districts in provinces with high provincial-level EDR and there is no indirect benefit from TRI on income

today. This means that, in some provinces with high EDR, Guizhou (EDR=10.23), Hunan (EDR=6.81),

Gansu (EDR=6.45), and Guangxi (EDR=4.63), specifically, there is not sufficient evidence that the aim of

30

the Party systemically drove famine conditions.

To further explore the reach of the state during the GLF, I re-estimate equations (9) and (13) using the

categorical indicator for a special promotion, but in these specifications, I change the base level of Ordinary

promotion to Li, Wu, and Zeng. This restructuring allows me to test the significant difference between the

region for which TRI afforded protection for shirkers (AH, HN, and SC) and the other type of province

groups. In column 1 of table 16, I find that the positive differential effect of TRI for provinces under the

jurisdiction of a Secretary who received a special promotion in 1956 is not significantly different than in the

jurisdictions of Li, Wu, and Zeng. My inability to reject a difference between the additional benefit of TRI

on the EDR means that famine conditions in Hebei, Shandong, Guangdong, and Yunnan were also systemic

and related to the reach of the Party. The death toll in these seven provinces, where ILWZ = 1 and I1956 = 1

totals 17.038 million or 54 percent of the Great Famine.

In column 2 of table 16 the perplexing positive differential impact of TRI on GDP in 2010 for provinces

under the jurisdiction of a Secretary who received a special promotion in 1956 is not significantly different

than in the jurisdictions of Li, Wu, and Zeng. This similarity is not shared by the provinces with Secretaries

promoted by 1959. However, interpretation of the estimates in column 3 is confusing. The differential effect

of TRI is insignificant across promotion types when the indirect benefit is absorbed with the covariate, EDR.

The differential benefit of famine mortality EDR × Ordinary promotion and EDR × Special promotion in

1956 in column 3 is interesting. As compared with Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan for which EDR is negatively

related to economic development, the loss of life during the GLF has been much less detrimental in these

other provinces. This difference may arise from the lower overall level of famine mortality. The average EDR

in provinces with a Secretary who received a special promotion in 1956 was 2.6 and those with a Secretary

who went through the ordinary promotion process was 3.03, whereas the average EDR in the jurisdiction of

Li, Wu, and Zeng was 12.54 and in provinces with a Secretary who received a special promotion by 1959 was

5.02. Perhaps, a lower loss of life created a greater capital to worker ratio while not harming overall human

capital (see Gooch (2017) for theoretical background on this relationship between famine and economic

growth).

Another interesting difference between the jurisdiction of Li, Wu, and Zeng and provinces with a Secretary

31

who received a special promotion in 1956 is the relationship between the indicator for Special promotion in

1956 and GDP in 2010. In column 2, the province group effect is not statistically different than that of the

base level, Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan, but once the EDR is included as a covariate, the province group

indicator become negative and significant.

So what is happening differently in Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan compared to other provinces with a Special

promotion in 1956 ? The estimates for each type of group satisfy the hypothesis that topological irregularities

shielded shirkers which in turn lower famine mortality in rugged districts. Both groups present a positive

differential effect of topological irregularities on long-term economic growth. But only in Anhui, Henan,

and Sichuan is this positive differential effect explained through famine mortality (1959-61). Provinces with

Special promotion in 1956 have a lower economic trajectory in general. Therefore, it could be the case that

the legacy of protection against state capacity afforded by TRI in provinces with Special promotion in 1956

extended beyond food acquisition and famine.

7 Conclusion

I have examined the role state capacity in shaping the extent and scale of the Great Chinese Famine

(1959-61). I develop a formal model for a local leader’s willingness to evade his duty of implementing the

policies of the National Development Plan, the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) based on the interaction

between policy-related goals of provincial government authorities and the cost of the enforcement process to

the regional government. I capture variation in the aims of the government using the year of promotion of

the provincial First Party Secretary. I also single out the Secretaries of Anhui, Sichuan, and Henan based

on evidence of these leaders uniquely rigorous adoption of Great Leap Forward policies. To identify a causal

relationship between the Great Leap Forward and subsequent famine mortality, I exploit the interaction

between political ideology at the province-level and topological irregularities at the local level.

In Anhui, Sichuan, and Henan, specifically, the Great Famine killed over 13 million people. These are the

province where the reach of the state had the largest effect on famine condition. I find that while in most

of China, a one standard deviation increase in TRI translated to a little over a 1/10 of standard deviation

increase in the EDR whereas in AHS the same increase in TRI translated to a 1.1 SD decrease in the EDR.

32

Moreover, for seven provinces with First Party Secretaries promoted through an atypical process during the

Small Leap Forward (1955-56), I find that rugged topology afforded protection to communities from GLF

policies resulting in lower famine mortality. These results imply that the goals of the provincial “Party”

authorities generated over 50 percent of the Great Famine’s extent. The historic indirect benefit of TRI

in AHS means that a district in AHS with GDP per capita in 2010 of 16,322 RMB/person would have

17,125 RMB/person if it were located in a topography more rugged by one standard deviation. However, the

indirect historical benefit from the protection afforded by protection for state reach is present in AHS and

fully explained by reduced famine conditions. In Hebei, Shandong, Guangdong, and Yunnan the protection

extends beyond famine mortality.

33

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883.

37

Tables and Figures

Reference Anhui

Fuji

anG

ansu

Guiz

hou

Guan

gdon

gG

uan

gxi

Hen

anH

ebei

Hunan

Hub

eiJi

angs

uJi

angx

iShan

don

gShan

xi

Sic

huan

Yunnan

Zhej

iang

Bramall (2011) X X XChang and Wen (1998) X X X X X XChen (2011) XGoodman (1980) XLi (1994) XRzanna (2010) XWalker (1998) XYang (1996) X XYang and Su (1998) X X X X X

Table 1: Evidence of Extremely Radical Political Ideology of First Party Secretaries’ Li Jingquan, Wu Zhipu,and Zeng Xisheng

Figure 1: Provinces with Special Promotion of First Party Secretary

38

Tab

le2:

Su

mm

ary

Sta

tist

ics

Sta

tist

icN

Mea

nS

t.D

ev.

Min

Max

Nat

ura

lL

ogof

Med

ian

Ter

rain

Rel

ief

Inte

nsi

ty223

139.0

0114.0

06.0

0496.0

0N

atu

ral

Log

ofM

ean

Exce

ssD

eath

Rate

(1959-6

1)

223

1.1

01.2

0−

2.3

03.4

0N

atu

ral

Log

ofG

DP

per

cap

ita

2010

223

0.6

00.6

5−

0.9

12.8

0F

irst

Sec

reta

ryis

Li

(SC

),W

u(H

N)

or

Zen

g(A

H),ILW

Z=

1223

0.2

20.4

10

1S

pec

ial

Pro

mot

ion

ofF

irst

Sec

reta

ryin

1956,I1956

=1

223

0.5

00.5

00

1S

pec

ial

Pro

mot

ion

ofF

irst

Sec

reta

ryby

1959,I1959

=1

223

0.7

20.4

50

1C

omm

un

alD

inin

gH

alls

Par

tici

pati

on

Rate

by

the

En

dof

1959

223

77.0

021.0

00.0

098.0

0O

utp

ut

Infl

atio

nR

ate

by

Loca

lO

ffici

als

in1958

223

139.0

066.0

00.0

0308.0

0

39

Table 3: The Differential Effect of Terrain Relief on Famine Mortality (1959-61)

ln(Excess of Death Rate (1959-61))

(1) (2) (3) (4)

ln(Terrain Relief Intensity), TRI 0.284 0.308∗∗∗ 0.108 0.284(0.185) (0.109) (0.0843) (0.178)

Binary indicator for province classification:I1959, Special Promotion of First Secretary by 1959 4.747∗∗∗

(0.940)I1956, Special Promotion of First Secretary in 1956 5.454∗∗∗

(0.671)ILWZ , First Secretary is Li (SC), Wu (HN) or Zeng (AH) 4.940∗∗∗

(0.659)TRI × Binary indicator province classification:

I1959 -0.408∗∗

(0.200)I1956 -0.608∗∗∗

(0.139)ILWZ -0.519∗∗∗

(0.146)Categorical indicator of province classification:

Special Promotion by 1959 1.687(1.103)

Special Promotion in 1956 3.954∗∗∗

(1.119)Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically 5.725∗∗∗

(0.960)TRI × Categorical indicator of province classification:

Special Promotion by 1959 0.0386(0.226)

Special Promotion in 1956 -0.450∗∗

(0.220)Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically -0.695∗∗∗

(0.213)

Obs. 223 223 223 223Province FE X X X XAdj. R2 0.523 0.555 0.542 0.555

Notes: Coefficients are reported with classical standard errors in brackets. The three binary indicators are I1959 = 1 if theFirst Party Secretary in 1959 had received a special promotion and zero otherwise; I1956 = 1 if the First Party Secretary in1956 had received a special promotion and zero otherwise; ILWZ = 1 if the First Party Secretary is Li Jingquan, Wu Zhipu, orZeng Xisheng and zero otherwise. The base level of the categorical variable for provinical-level political ideology based on thebinary indicators. The base level is I1959 = 0 and the other two categories are (1) I1959 = 1 and I1956 = 0, (2) I1956 = 1 andILWZ = 0, and (3) ILWZ = 1, where ILWZ = 1 ∈ I1956 = 1 ∈ I1959 = 1.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

40

Table 4: The Differential Effect of Terrain Relief on GDP per capita in 2010 and Examination of FamineMortality (1959-61) as a Causal Mechanism

ln(GDP per capita in 2010)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

ln(Terrain Relief Intensity), TRI -0.176∗ -0.145 -0.265∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗ -0.176∗ -0.145(0.106) (0.104) (0.0632) (0.0643) (0.0487) (0.0472) (0.103) (0.102)

ln(Excess Death Rate (1959-61)), EDR -0.109 -0.134∗∗ -0.111∗∗ -0.109(0.0673) (0.0580) (0.0436) (0.0661)

Binary indicator of province classification:I1959 -1.483∗∗∗ -0.749

(0.540) (0.552)I1956 -2.192∗∗∗ -1.457∗∗∗

(0.389) (0.439)ILWZ -1.863∗∗∗ -0.629

(0.381) (0.500)TRI × Binary Indicator for:

I1959 0.0890 0.0352(0.115) (0.112)

I1956 0.269∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗

(0.0807) (0.0825)ILWZ 0.203∗∗ 0.0718

(0.0843) (0.0890)EDR × Binary Indicator for:

I1959 -0.0760(0.0823)

I1956 -0.000224(0.0795)

ILWZ -0.179∗

(0.0980)Categorical indicator of province classification:

Special Promotion by 1959 -0.383 -0.222(0.640) (0.633)

Special Promotion in 1956 -1.955∗∗∗ -1.683∗∗

(0.649) (0.657)Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically -1.900∗∗∗ -0.583

(0.557) (0.646)TRI × Categorical Indicator for:

Special Promotion by 1959 -0.142 -0.105(0.131) (0.134)

Special Promotion in 1956 0.142 0.106(0.127) (0.125)

Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically 0.211∗ 0.0612(0.124) (0.127)

EDR × Categorical Indicator for:Special Promotion by 1959 -0.102

(0.135)Special Promotion in 1956 0.0775

(0.0959)Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically -0.181∗

(0.109)

Obs. 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223Province FE X X X X X X X XAdj. R2 0.447 0.487 0.474 0.497 0.461 0.499 0.473 0.505

Notes: Coefficients are reported with classical standard errors in brackets. The three binary indicators are I1959 = 1 if theFirst Party Secretary in 1959 had received a special promotion and zero otherwise; I1956 = 1 if the First Party Secretary in1956 had received a special promotion and zero otherwise; ILWZ = 1 if the First Party Secretary is Li Jingquan, Wu Zhipu, orZeng Xisheng and zero otherwise. The base level of the categorical variable for provinical-level political ideology based on thebinary indicators. The base level is I1959 = 0 and the other two categories are (1) I1959 = 1 and I1956 = 0, (2) I1956 = 1 andILWZ = 0, and (3) ILWZ = 1, where ILWZ = 1 ∈ I1956 = 1 ∈ I1959 = 1.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

41

Table 5: The Differential Effect of a Categorical Measure of Terrain Relief on Famine Mortality and GDPper capita in 2010 and the Examination of Famine Mortality (1959-61) as a Causal Mechanism

ln(Excess Death Rate) ln(GDP per capita in 2010)

(1) (2) (3)

ln(Excess Death Rate (1959-61)), EDR -0.108(0.0674)

Categorical indicator of TRI percentile:ln(Mean Terrain Relief Intensity), Medium 0.688∗ -0.105 -0.0301

(0.385) (0.220) (0.217)ln(Mean Terrain Relief Intensity), High 1.346∗∗∗ -0.376 -0.230

(0.485) (0.278) (0.283)Categorical indicator of province classification:

Special promotion by 1959 2.223∗∗∗ -1.026∗∗∗ -0.642∗

(0.629) (0.360) (0.373)Special promotion in 1956 2.734∗∗∗ -1.270∗∗∗ -1.057∗∗∗

(0.595) (0.341) (0.353)Li, Wu, Zeng, specifically 3.997∗∗∗ -1.186∗∗∗ -0.287

(0.470) (0.269) (0.355)Special promotion by 1959 × TRI category:

Medium relief -0.545 0.0644 0.0281(0.592) (0.339) (0.330)

High relief -0.632 -0.0867 -0.0425(0.658) (0.377) (0.383)

Special promotion in 1956 × TRI category:Medium relief -0.740 0.480 0.403

(0.515) (0.295) (0.288)High relief -1.683∗∗ 0.0538 -0.109

(0.648) (0.371) (0.369)Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically × TRI category:

Medium relief -1.456∗∗∗ 0.326 0.0345(0.488) (0.280) (0.281)

High relief -2.451∗∗∗ 0.396 -0.0617(0.599) (0.343) (0.355)

EDR × Province classification:Special promotion by 1959 -0.158

(0.135)Special promotion in 1956 0.0590

(0.0957)Li, Wu, & Zeng, specifically -0.174

(0.108)

Obs. 223 223 223Province FE X X XAdj. R2 0.554 0.485 0.522

Notes: Coefficients are reported with classical standard errors in brackets. The three binary indicators are I1959 = 1 if theFirst Party Secretary in 1959 had received a special promotion and zero otherwise; I1956 = 1 if the First Party Secretary in1956 had received a special promotion and zero otherwise; ILWZ = 1 if the First Party Secretary is Li Jingquan, Wu Zhipu, orZeng Xisheng and zero otherwise. The base level of the categorical variable for provinical-level political ideology based on thebinary indicators. The base level is I1959 = 0 and the other two categories are (1) I1959 = 1 and I1956 = 0, (2) I1956 = 1 andILWZ = 0, and (3) ILWZ = 1, where ILWZ = 1 ∈ I1956 = 1 ∈ I1959 = 1. The categorical variable for terrain relief intensity(TRI) is defined as follows: districts for which the TRI ∈ percentiles (0, 33) comprise the base level, Low relief. The two otherTRI categories are Medium relief ∈ [33, 66) and High relief∈ [66, 100).∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

42

Tab

le6:

Th

eD

iffer

enti

alE

ffec

tof

Ter

rain

Rel

ief

on

Fam

ine

Mort

ali

tyan

dG

DP

per

cap

ita

in2010

an

dth

eE

xam

inati

on

of

Fam

ine

Mort

ali

ty(1

959-6

1)

asa

Cau

sal

Mec

han

ism

wh

enP

rovin

cial

-lev

elP

oli

tica

lId

eolo

gy

isC

ap

ture

dth

rou

gh

Sp

ecifi

cG

LF

Poli

cies

ln(E

xce

ssD

eath

Rate

)ln

(GD

Pp

erca

pit

ain

2010

)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

ln(T

erra

inR

elie

fIn

tensi

ty),

TR

I0.

760∗∗

0.58

3∗∗∗

-0.3

40∗

-0.2

25-0

.294∗∗

-0.2

02∗

(0.3

19)

(0.2

09)

(0.1

84)

(0.1

81)

(0.1

21)

(0.1

20)

ln(E

xce

ssD

eath

Rat

e(1

959-

61))

,E

DR

-0.2

05-0

.133

(0.1

41)

(0.0

901)

Com

mu

nal

Din

ing

(%in

1959

),C

DR

0.36

7∗∗∗

-0.1

32∗∗∗

-0.0

778∗∗∗

(0.0

433)

(0.0

249

)(0

.029

1)C

DR×

conti

nu

ous

vari

able

:T

RI

-0.0

106∗∗∗

0.0

0310

0.00

151

(0.0

0401)

(0.0

023

1)(0

.002

28)

ED

R0.

0006

37

(0.0

0179

)O

utp

ut

Infl

atio

n(1

0,00

0to

ns

in19

58),

OI

0.07

70∗∗∗

-0.0

270∗∗∗

-0.0

151∗∗

(0.0

0919

)(0

.005

33)

(0.0

0601)

OI×

conti

nu

ous

vari

able

:T

RI

-0.0

043

6∗∗∗

0.00

130∗

0.0

00604

(0.0

0133

)(0

.000

769)

(0.0

00773)

ED

R-0

.000149

(0.0

00579)

Ob

s.223

223

223

223

223

223

Pro

vin

ceF

EX

XX

XX

XA

dj.

R2

0.52

90.5

380.

450

0.48

60.4

530.4

87

Note

s:C

oeffi

cien

tsare

rep

ort

edw

ith

class

ical

stan

dard

erro

rsin

bra

cket

s.∗p<

0.1

0,∗∗

p<

0.0

5,∗∗

∗p<

0.0

1

43

Tab

le7:

Th

eD

iffer

enti

alE

ffec

tof

Ter

rain

Rel

ief

on

Fam

ine

Mort

ali

tyan

dG

DP

per

cap

ita

in2010

an

dth

eE

xam

inati

on

of

Fam

ine

Mort

ali

ty(1

959-6

1)

asa

Cau

sal

Mec

han

ism

wh

enP

rovin

cial

-lev

elP

oli

tica

lId

eolo

gy

isC

ap

ture

dth

rou

gh

Gra

inP

rocu

rem

ent

Rate

s ln(E

xce

ssD

eath

Rate

)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

ln(T

erra

inR

elie

fIn

tensi

ty),

TR

I0.

0918

-0.0

543

-0.1

85

-0.2

11

(0.1

05)

(0.1

23)

(0.1

16)

(0.1

34)

Net

Gra

inP

rocu

rem

ent

Rat

ioD

ecline

Follow

ing

Sm

all

Lea

pF

orw

ard

(1955-

56)

0.4

29∗∗∗

(0.0

680)

Rat

ioD

ecline

(195

5-5

6)×TRI

-0.0

282∗∗

(0.0

141)

Net

Gra

inP

rocu

rem

ent

Rati

oU

pti

ckfo

rG

LF

(1956

-59)

0.4

87∗∗∗

(0.0

697)

Rati

oU

pti

ck(1

956-5

9)×TRI

-0.0

00736

(0.0

0702)

Diff

eren

cein

Net

Gra

inP

rocu

rem

ent

Rati

o:G

LF

&Sm

all

Lea

pF

orw

ard

(195

9&

55

-0.9

68∗∗∗

(0.1

20)

Rat

ioD

iffer

ence

(195

9&

55)×TRI

0.0

138

(0.0

105)

Net

Gra

inP

rocu

rem

ent

Rati

oD

ecline

Follow

ing

GL

F(1

959-

62)

1.6

86∗∗∗

(0.2

41)

Rat

ioD

ecline

(195

9-62

)×TRI

0.0

133

(0.0

104)

Obs.

222

222

222

222

Pro

vin

ceF

EX

XX

XA

dj.

R2

0.523

0.5

13

0.518

0.5

17

Note

s:C

oeffi

cien

tsare

rep

ort

edw

ith

class

ical

stan

dard

erro

rsin

bra

cket

s.∗p<

0.1

0,∗∗

p<

0.0

5,∗∗

∗p<

0.0

1

44

Table 8: Analysis at the Boundary of Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan Provinces: The Differential Effect ofTerrain Relief on Famine Mortality and GDP per capita in 2010 and the Examination of Famine Mortality(1959-61) as a Causal Mechanism

ln(Excess Death Rate) ln(GDP per capita in 2010)

(1) (2) (3)

ln(Terrain Relief Intensity), TRI 0.0606 -0.0874 -0.0802(0.129) (0.0793) (0.0758)

ILWZ × TRI -0.490∗∗∗ 0.154 0.0334(0.167) (0.103) (0.105)

ln(Excess Death Rate (1959-61)), EDR -0.119(0.0789)

ILWZ × EDR -0.146(0.114)

ILWZ 4.822∗∗∗ -1.550∗∗∗ -0.409(0.753) (0.464) (0.553)

Obs. 122 122 122Province FE X X XAdj. R2 0.661 0.519 0.563

Notes: The sample of districts used in this analysis reside either on the boundary or one district away from the boundarybetween provinces for which LWZ = 1 (Anhui, Henan, and Sichuan) and provinces for which LWZ = 0. Coefficients arereported with classical standard errors in brackets.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Table 9: Analysis at the Boundary of Provinces for Which the First Party Secretary Received a SpecialPromotion in 1956: The Differential Effect of Terrain Relief on Famine Mortality and GDP per capita in2010 and the Examination of Famine Mortality (1959-61) as a Causal Mechanism

ln(Excess Death Rate) ln(GDP per capita in 2010)

(1) (2) (3)

ln(Terrain Relief Intensity), TRI 0.190 -0.140∗ -0.110(0.125) (0.0736) (0.0694)

I1956 × TRI -0.632∗∗∗ 0.177∗ 0.0196(0.169) (0.0990) (0.0976)

ln(Excess Death Rate (1959-61)), EDR -0.156∗∗

(0.0653)I1956 × EDR -0.133

(0.0950)I1956 5.438∗∗∗ -1.680∗∗∗ -0.312

(0.763) (0.448) (0.506)

Obs. 150 150 150Province FE X X XAdj. R2 0.572 0.496 0.566

Notes: The sample of districts used in this analysis reside either on the boundary or one district away from the boundarybetween provinces for which 1956 = 1 and provinces for which 1956 = 0. Coefficients are reported with classical standard errorsin brackets.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

45

Table 10: Analysis at the Boundary of Provinces for Which the First Party Secretary Received a SpecialPromotion by 1959: The Differential Effect of Terrain Relief on Famine Mortality and GDP per capita in2010 and the Examination of Famine Mortality (1959-61) as a Causal Mechanism

ln(Excess Death Rate) ln(GDP per capita in 2010)

(1) (2) (3)

ln(Terrain Relief Intensity), TRI 0.173 -0.178∗ -0.160(0.185) (0.107) (0.101)

I1959 × TRI -0.407∗ 0.193 0.110(0.214) (0.124) (0.118)

ln(Excess Death Rate (1959-61)), EDR -0.103(0.0728)

I1959 × EDR -0.174∗

(0.0994)I1959 4.654∗∗∗ -1.775∗∗∗ -0.735

(0.971) (0.563) (0.579)

Obs. 138 138 138Province FE X X XAdj. R2 0.601 0.537 0.594

Notes: The sample of districts used in this analysis reside either on the boundary or one district away from the boundarybetween provinces for which 1959 = 1 and provinces for which 1959 = 0. Coefficients are reported with classical standard errorsin brackets.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

46

Tab

le11

:T

he

Diff

eren

tial

Eff

ect

ofT

erra

inR

elie

fon

Fam

ine

Mort

ali

tyan

dG

DP

per

cap

ita

in2010

an

dth

eE

xam

inati

on

of

Fam

ine

Mort

ali

ty(1

959-

61)

asa

Cau

sal

Mec

han

ism

wit

hth

eIn

clu

sion

of

Ad

dit

ion

al

Cov

ari

ate

s

ln(E

xce

ssD

eath

Rat

e)ln

(GD

Pp

erca

pit

ain

2010

)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

ILW

Z2.

211∗∗∗

4.9

40∗∗∗

5.5

13∗∗∗

4.8

47∗∗∗

5.92

6∗∗∗

-1.1

16∗∗∗

-1.8

63∗∗∗

-2.1

36∗∗∗

-1.6

68∗∗∗

-2.0

99∗∗∗

-0.6

93(0

.565)

(0.6

59)

(0.9

50)

(0.6

84)

(1.0

66)

(0.2

90)

(0.3

81)

(0.5

40)

(0.3

91)

(0.5

87)

(0.6

77)

ln(E

xce

ssD

eath

Rat

e(1

959-

61))

,E

DR

-0.0

739∗

(0.0

421)

ILW

Z×

ED

R-0

.224∗∗

(0.0

941

)ln

(Ter

rain

Rel

ief

Inte

nsi

ty),

TR

I0.

237∗∗∗

0.1

080.0

925

0.0

941

0.0

565

-0.2

66∗∗∗

-0.1

68∗∗∗

-0.1

50∗∗∗

-0.1

48∗∗∗

-0.1

03∗∗

-0.0

992∗∗

(0.0

627)

(0.0

843)

(0.0

849

)(0

.085

5)

(0.0

869

)(0

.029

9)(0

.048

7)

(0.0

483)

(0.0

488)

(0.0

478

)(0

.0463

)IL

WZ×

TR

I-0

.218∗

-0.5

19∗∗∗

-0.4

94∗∗∗

-0.5

36∗∗∗

-0.4

60∗∗∗

0.20

3∗∗∗

0.2

03∗∗

0.2

28∗∗

0.194∗∗

0.18

1∗

0.0

560

(0.1

29)

(0.1

46)

(0.1

69)

(0.1

54)

(0.1

69)

(0.0

657

)(0

.084

3)(0

.095

9)

(0.0

881

)(0

.092

9)(0

.096

1)

ln(A

verg

age

Agr

icult

ura

lSuit

abilit

y),

Ag.

Suit

.0.1

70

0.328∗

-0.2

38∗∗

-0.4

25∗∗∗

-0.4

01∗∗∗

(0.1

66)

(0.1

82)

(0.0

948)

(0.0

999)

(0.0

977)

ILW

Z×

Ag.

Suit

.-0

.386

-0.6

65

0.31

30.4

02∗

0.27

7(0

.374

)(0

.437)

(0.2

14)

(0.2

40)

(0.2

35)

ln(P

opula

tion

Den

sity

(195

8)),

Pop

.D

ens.

-0.1

25

-0.1

97∗∗

0.1

40∗∗∗

0.23

4∗∗∗

0.2

19∗∗∗

(0.0

868

)(0

.095

2)(0

.0494

)(0

.052

4)

(0.0

513)

ILW

Z×

Pop

.D

ens

0.14

60.

317

-0.0

510

-0.1

38-0

.087

4(0

.199)

(0.2

33)

(0.1

13)

(0.1

28)

(0.1

25)

Obs.

223

223

223

223

223

296

223

223

223

223

223

Pro

vin

ceF

EN

oX

XX

XN

oX

XX

XX

Adj.

R2

0.2

19

0.54

20.

542

0.54

00.

546

0.22

40.

461

0.4

78

0.4

72

0.5

17

0.54

8

Note

s:C

oeffi

cien

tsare

rep

ort

edw

ith

class

ical

stan

dard

erro

rsin

bra

cket

s.∗p<

0.1

0,∗∗

p<

0.0

5,∗∗

∗p<

0.0

1

47

Tab

le12

:T

he

Diff

eren

tial

Eff

ect

ofA

lter

nat

ive

Mea

sure

sof

Top

olo

gic

al

Irre

gu

lari

ties

on

Fam

ine

Mort

ali

tyan

dG

DP

per

cap

ita

in2010

an

dth

eE

xam

inat

ion

ofF

amin

eM

orta

lity

(195

9-61

)as

aC

au

sal

Mec

han

ism

ln(E

xce

ssD

eath

Rate

)ln

(GD

Pp

erca

pit

ain

201

0)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

ILi,

Wu

&Zeng

4.94

5∗∗∗

5.2

33∗∗∗

7.278∗∗∗

2.8

69∗∗∗

-1.8

59∗∗∗

-0.6

22-2

.003∗∗∗

-0.9

05-2

.554∗∗∗

-0.5

04-0

.978∗∗∗

-0.3

29

(0.6

60)

(0.8

48)

(1.5

16)

(0.3

70)

(0.3

82)

(0.5

00)

(0.4

94)

(0.6

08)

(0.8

74)

(0.9

85)

(0.2

16)

(0.2

86)

ln(E

xce

ssD

eath

Rat

e(1

959-

61))

,E

DR

-0.1

13∗∗

-0.1

24∗∗∗

-0.1

21∗∗∗

-0.1

27∗∗∗

(0.0

437

)(0

.0445

)(0

.0433

)(0

.044

4)

ILW

Z×

ED

R-0

.177∗

-0.1

06-0

.193∗∗

-0.1

27(0

.0981

)(0

.098

3)

(0.0

961)

(0.0

973)

ln(T

erra

inR

elie

fIn

tensi

ty),

TR

I0.

109

-0.1

67∗∗∗

-0.1

55∗∗∗

(0.0

844)

(0.0

488)

(0.0

472)

ILW

Z×

TR

I-0

.521∗∗∗

0.202∗∗

0.0

706

(0.1

46)

(0.0

843

)(0

.0891)

ln(M

ean

TR

I)0.0

743

-0.0

965

-0.0

873

(0.1

04)

(0.0

605

)(0

.058

8)IL

WZ×

TR

I(m

ean

)-0

.532∗∗∗

0.235∗∗

0.1

21

(0.1

80)

(0.1

05)

(0.1

09)

ln(M

edia

nT

erra

inR

ugg

edn

ess)

0.0

510

-0.1

49∗∗∗

-0.1

43∗∗∗

(0.0

807

)(0

.046

5)(0

.044

5)IL

WZ×

Ru

gged

nes

s(m

edia

n)

-0.3

99∗∗∗

0.1

34∗

0.018

5(0

.136)

(0.0

783)

(0.0

806

)ln

(Mea

nT

erra

inR

ugg

edn

ess)

0.008

36-0

.084

3-0

.0833

(0.0

967

)(0

.056

4)(0

.054

4)IL

WZ×

Ru

gged

nes

s-0

.396∗∗

0.158

0.0580

(0.1

64)

(0.0

955)

(0.0

981)

Ob

s.222

222

222

222

222

222

222

222

222

222

222

222

Pro

vin

ceF

EX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XA

dj.

R2

0.54

20.

535

0.536

0.5

31

0.4

58

0.497

0.440

0.4

73

0.4

54

0.501

0.4

35

0.4

73

Note

s:C

oeffi

cien

tsare

rep

ort

edw

ith

class

ical

stan

dard

erro

rsin

bra

cket

s.∗p<

0.1

0,∗∗

p<

0.0

5,∗∗

∗p<

0.0

1

48

Tab

le13

:T

he

Diff

eren

tial

Eff

ect

ofT

erra

inR

elie

fon

Fam

ine

Mort

ali

tyan

dG

DP

per

cap

ita

in2010

an

dth

eE

xam

inati

on

of

Fam

ine

Mort

ali

ty(1

959-

61)

asa

Cau

sal

Mec

han

ism

Aft

erR

emov

ing

Dis

tric

tsw

ith

Extr

eme

Ter

rain

Rel

ief

Inte

nsi

ty

ln(E

xce

ssD

eath

Rate

)ln

(GD

Pp

erca

pit

ain

2010

)

Om

itT

op

4O

mit

Top

8O

mit

Top

12

Om

itT

op

16O

mit

Top

4O

mit

Top

8O

mit

Top

12

Om

itT

op16

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

ILi,

Wu

&Zeng

4.76

5∗∗∗

4.7

97∗∗∗

4.8

54∗∗∗

4.7

52∗∗∗

-1.7

53∗∗∗

-0.5

42

-1.7

71∗∗∗

-0.5

23

-1.7

34∗∗∗

-0.3

97

-1.8

43∗∗∗

-0.5

15

(0.6

63)

(0.6

70)

(0.6

80)

(0.6

93)

(0.3

83)

(0.5

03)

(0.3

89)

(0.5

15)

(0.3

97)

(0.5

30)

(0.4

04)

(0.5

35)

ln(E

xce

ssD

eath

Rate

(1959

-61)

),E

DR

-0.1

09∗∗

-0.1

11∗∗

-0.1

07∗∗

-0.1

09∗∗

(0.0

435)

(0.0

440

)(0

.0445)

(0.0

452)

ILi,

Wu

&Zeng×

ED

R-0

.188∗

-0.1

91∗

-0.2

14∗∗

-0.2

12∗∗

(0.1

02)

(0.1

03)

(0.1

05)

(0.1

06)

ln(T

erra

inR

elie

fIn

ten

sity

),T

RI

0.1

00

0.0

934

0.0

887

0.0

660

-0.1

50∗∗∗

-0.1

40∗∗∗

-0.1

51∗∗∗

-0.1

41∗∗∗

-0.1

49∗∗∗

-0.1

39∗∗∗

-0.1

73∗∗∗

-0.1

66∗∗∗

(0.0

850)

(0.0

852)

(0.0

854

)(0

.0900)

(0.0

491)

(0.0

476)

(0.0

495)

(0.0

479)

(0.0

498)

(0.0

481

)(0

.052

5)

(0.0

506)

ILi,

Wu

&Zeng×

TR

I-0

.471∗∗∗

-0.4

82∗∗∗

-0.5

00∗∗∗

-0.4

78∗∗∗

0.1

76∗∗

0.0

556

0.1

81∗∗

0.0

537

0.1

71∗

0.0

296

0.196∗∗

0.0

564

(0.1

47)

(0.1

50)

(0.1

53)

(0.1

56)

(0.0

849)

(0.0

889)

(0.0

870)

(0.0

915)

(0.0

895)

(0.0

947)

(0.0

912)

(0.0

962

)

Ob

s.220

217

213

208

220

220

217

217

213

213

208

208

Pro

vin

ceF

EX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XA

dj.

R2

0.549

0.5

46

0.545

0.5

50

0.4

57

0.494

0.455

0.4

93

0.4

51

0.4

910.4

560.4

96

Note

s:C

oeffi

cien

tsare

rep

ort

edw

ith

class

ical

stan

dard

erro

rsin

bra

cket

s.∗p<

0.1

0,∗∗

p<

0.0

5,∗∗

∗p<

0.0

1

49

Tab

le14

:T

he

Diff

eren

tial

Eff

ect

ofT

erra

inR

elie

fon

Fam

ine

Mort

ali

tyan

dG

DP

per

cap

ita

in2010

an

dth

eE

xam

inati

on

of

Fam

ine

Mort

ali

ty(1

959-

61)

asa

Cau

sal

Mec

han

ism

Aft

erR

emov

ing

Dis

tric

tsw

ith

Extr

eme

Fam

ine

Mort

ali

ty

ln(E

xce

ssD

eath

Rat

e)ln

(GD

Pp

erca

pit

ain

2010)

Om

itT

op2

Om

itT

op4

Om

itT

op6

Om

itT

op8

Om

itT

op

2O

mit

Top

4O

mit

Top

6O

mit

Top

8

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

ILi,

Wu

&Zeng

4.94

5∗∗∗

4.90

4∗∗∗

4.76

2∗∗∗

4.69

6∗∗∗

-1.8

59∗∗∗

-0.6

22-1

.839∗∗∗

-0.6

24

-1.7

62∗∗∗

-0.5

65

-1.6

89∗∗∗

-0.4

80

(0.6

60)

(0.6

70)

(0.7

06)

(0.7

36)

(0.3

82)

(0.5

00)

(0.3

89)

(0.5

10)

(0.4

07)

(0.5

15)

(0.4

25)

(0.5

28)

ln(E

xce

ssD

eath

Rat

e(1

959-

61))

,E

DR

-0.1

13∗∗

-0.1

13∗∗

-0.1

13∗∗

-0.1

13∗∗

(0.0

437)

(0.0

439)

(0.0

437)

(0.0

438)

ILi,

Wu

&Zeng×

ED

R-0

.177∗

-0.1

74∗

-0.1

81∗

-0.1

90∗

(0.0

981

)(0

.101)

(0.1

01)

(0.1

02)

ln(T

erra

inR

elie

fIn

tensi

ty),

TR

I0.

109

0.1

090.

109

0.1

09-0

.167∗∗∗

-0.1

55∗∗∗

-0.1

67∗∗∗

-0.1

55∗∗∗

-0.1

67∗∗∗

-0.1

55∗∗∗

-0.1

67∗∗∗

-0.1

55∗∗∗

(0.0

844)

(0.0

844)

(0.0

847)

(0.0

849)

(0.0

488)

(0.0

472)

(0.0

489)

(0.0

475)

(0.0

488)

(0.0

473)

(0.0

490)

(0.0

474)

ILi,

Wu

&Zeng×

TR

I-0

.521∗∗∗

-0.5

21∗∗∗

-0.5

02∗∗∗

-0.4

95∗∗∗

0.20

2∗∗

0.07

060.

202∗∗

0.0

708

0.1

87∗∗

0.0

585

0.1

75∗

0.0

458

(0.1

46)

(0.1

47)

(0.1

50)

(0.1

54)

(0.0

843

)(0

.089

1)(0

.0851

)(0

.0903)

(0.0

867)

(0.0

910)

(0.0

888)

(0.0

927)

Obs.

222

220

218

216

222

222

220

220

218

218

216

216

Pro

vin

ceF

EX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XA

dj.

R2

0.54

20.

533

0.52

10.

510

0.45

80.4

970.

457

0.4

94

0.4

61

0.4

99

0.4

61

0.5

00

Note

s:C

oeffi

cien

tsare

rep

ort

edw

ith

class

ical

stan

dard

erro

rsin

bra

cket

s.∗p<

0.1

0,∗∗

p<

0.0

5,∗∗

∗p<

0.0

1

50

Table 15: The Differential Effect of Terrain Relief on Famine Mortality and GDP per capita in 2010 and theExamination of Famine Mortality (1959-61) as a Causal Mechanism when Provincial-level Political Ideologyis Captured High Excess Death Rates

ln(Excess Death Rate) ln(GDP per capita in 2010)

(1) (2) (3)

ln(Terrain Relief Intensity), TRI -0.0893 -0.0302 -0.0419(0.0892) (0.0501) (0.0482)

ln(Excess Death Rate (1959-61)), EDR -0.131∗∗∗

(0.0439)Indicator for Provinical EDR ≥ 4, IHigh EDR 2.732∗∗∗ -0.382 0.258

(0.675) (0.379) (0.409)IHigh EDR × TRI 0.0666 -0.188∗∗ -0.182∗∗

(0.147) (0.0826) (0.0794)IHigh EDR × EDR -0.113

(0.0867)

Obs. 222 222 222Province FE X X XAdj. R2 0.514 0.457 0.500

Notes: Coefficients are reported with classical standard errors in brackets.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

51

Table 16: Examining the Differential Effect of Terrain Relief When the Group of Most Radical Provinces isSet as the Base Level

ln(Excess Death Rate) ln(GDP per capita in 2010)

(1) (2) (3)

ln(Median Terrain Relief Intensity) in in AH, HN, & SC -0.411∗∗∗ 0.0353 -0.0840(0.117) (0.0680) (0.0750)

ln(Excess Death Rate) in in AH, HN, & SC -0.290∗∗∗

(0.0873)Categorical indicator of province classification:

Ordinary promotion -5.725∗∗∗ 1.900∗∗∗ 0.583(0.962) (0.557) (0.647)

Special promotion by 1959 -4.038∗∗∗ 1.516∗∗∗ 0.361(0.847) (0.491) (0.581)

Special promotion in 1956 -1.762∗∗ -0.0477 -1.082∗

(0.868) (0.503) (0.608)TRI × Province classification:

Ordinary promotion 0.695∗∗∗ -0.211∗ -0.0612(0.214) (0.124) (0.127)

Special promotion by 1959 0.734∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.167(0.181) (0.105) (0.114)

Special promotion in 1956 0.247 -0.0670 0.0464(0.174) (0.101) (0.105)

EDR × Province classification:Ordinary promotion 0.181∗

(0.109)Special promotion by 1959 0.0796

(0.146)Special promotion in 1956 0.254∗∗

(0.112)

Obs. 222 222 222Province FE X X XAdj. R2 0.555 0.471 0.504

Notes: Coefficients are reported with classical standard errors in brackets. The base level is ILWZ = 1 and the other threecategories are (1) Secretaries who were promoted the ordinary ways, I1959 = 0, (2) I1959 = 1 and I1956 = 0, and (3) I1956 = 1and ILWZ = 0, where ILWZ = 1 ∈ I1956 = 1 ∈ I1959 = 1. The natural log of terrain relief intensity (TRI) is a continuousvariable∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

52